Post-Election Violence in Kenya: Place-Based Explanations of Conflict

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Post-Election Violence in Kenya: Place-Based Explanations of Conflict

by

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The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.
Abstract

When and where do contentious politics become violent politics? How does election violence emerge from, and operate through, formal and informal social institutions? What are the impacts of this electoral violence for the people and places it affects? Focusing on the conflict that followed Kenya’s December 27th 2007 national election, I use a geographical conceptual framework and mixed quantitative-qualitative methods to understand a phenomenon that plagues many African societies. I find evidence that local level social circumstances - contextual effects - influence the observed rate of conflict. These settings are measured in terms of ethnic community relations, socioeconomic status, and the institutional legacy of post-independence settlement schemes, among other influences. Overall, I find that local demographic patterns, in terms of prior-incumbency in the national executive and ethnic community polarization (especially in a context of poverty) increase the risk of exposure to electoral violence. There is also evidence that a political economy of insecure land tenure influences the rate of conflict among Kenyan districts, but this relationship holds true mainly in the presence of other contemporary social circumstances. In trying to understand the cyclical nature of political violence, I find that experiences with individual-level election violence reduce several forms of inter-personal and institutional trust, and also affects other social attitudes. There is only mixed evidence that indirect exposure to political violence at a locality scale has additive effects upon individual attitudes. I conclude this research - as I also introduced it - by relating the Kenyan case to other African countries, and in reiterating the important role that localized and place-based social influences have upon electoral political violence.
Dedication

To my family.
I owe many thanks to my entire dissertation committee, first of all, for making helpful suggestions about how to improve my research as I completed this study. I hope that they will continue to make such suggestions as my career moves forward. Without implying a full endorsement of the material throughout this dissertation, I must also acknowledge helpful suggestions from John Agnew, Stathis Kalyvas, Catherine Boone, Alex Braithwaite, Ivan Ermakoff, Halvard Buhaug, Clionadh Raleigh, Brett Logan Carter, Daniel Blocq, Sheena Chesnut, James Sidaway, and several anonymous manuscript reviewers. I thank Adamson Lanyasunya and his family, Jane Mweru and her family, Paul Osago, Sophie Koech, Ken Koech, Wanyambura, Alice Odina-Odingo, and many others across Kenya who helped me during the course of my fieldwork. My thanks are also extended to many people I simply spoke with informally. I am thankful to those who provided me with valuable suggestions at many AAG, ISA, and other professional academic meetings. Additionally, I thank many attendees and participants at several university colloquia during recent years. In all cases, audiences had helpful comments and constructive criticism that forced me to improve my work. I also must thank Steve Graham, Marcia Singer, Karen Weingarten, Darla Shatto, and Rajshree Shretta for helping navigate various corridors of CU’s institutions. I thank Steve Graham for always waving goodbye as he left me in the Institute of Behavioral Science computer lab at 5pm close of business. Jeremy Johnson and Uday Reddy at the institute helped me many times navigating software, server, and other technical difficulties. I owe sincere thanks to Bethany Everett. Finally, I should thank two of my sidekicks (and troublemakers), Ivan and Sasha.
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Chapter 1

Framing Kenya’s Electoral Conflict

*It is a well-known axiom that all states have been created in violence. In the process of state formation in the contemporary world, violence between ethnic groups with or without the direct implication of the state authorities, is essential to that process as it has been defined... One of the most curious aspects of the process is the extent to which competing elites in these states proclaim a message of secularism while mobilizing ethnic groups around symbols of religion, language, and ethnicity. Riots between ethnic groups, sometimes deliberately fomented by politicians or by the state authorities themselves, are an ongoing part of the political process so generated.*

- Paul Brass, 1996, p. 41

1.1 Introduction

It is October 2011, and roughly four years have passed since post-election violence killed hundreds of Kenyans in and around Eldoret. Just outside of Eldoret town I am in a restaurant sharing dinner with Julius, a middle-aged man. A television that is propped in one corner of the room suddenly lights up with reporting from the Hague. Eight prominent Kenyan politicians are now appearing before the International Criminal Court (ICC) to answer charges that they committed crimes against humanity during the weeks that followed Kenya’s December 27th 2007 national election. Today it is Kenya’s first president’s son, Uhuru Kenyatta, appearing before the court (his charges were eventually confirmed). Also answering preliminary charges are the MP from North Eldoret constituency William Ruto and former minister of the interior George Saitoti. I am well aware that Julius witnessed the gruesome killings that each of the men is accused of inciting. Turning deliberately away from me, and looking over his shoulder at the screen, Julius utters calmly
and quietly, without looking back in my direction, “violence will continue. Those are the wrong
guys.” The tone Julius conveyed was both dismissive and disappointed, betraying his familiarity
with intimate details of such conflict. It becomes slightly clearer, upon further discussion, what
Julius means. The violence is part of the order of political affairs in Kenya, he suggests, indicating at
social processes that have a depth and scope beyond that of a single election, or of one small group
of political leaders (Author interview 1, 2011). Occurring with predictability, the violence itself had
become something of an institution, he seemed to imply. The events surrounding the election that
followed the one Julius described were quite different, but nevertheless revealed consistent themes
extending throughout Kenyan politics.

On March 4th, 2013 Kenyans voted, as in 2007, for national and local leaders. According
to official results, the Jubilee alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto won - by a slim
margin - the majority of Kenyans’ support. Raila Odinga, leading western regions of the country
that have been marginalized from political power since independence, disputed the election results.
A court ruling upheld the Jubilee victory on March 30th and Odinga reluctantly conceded his loss.
In dramatic contrast to earlier electoral contests, violence did not erupt alongside the claims of
voting irregularities. There are several possible reasons for the relatively peaceful character of the
2013 poll. The structure of alliances between political parties, popular hope about the effectiveness
of a new constitution, and substantial international oversight all may have acted against the risk
of violence. I address each of these possible explanations for peace in detail below. While the
most recent election was generally calm, political violence is still a crucially important issue in
Kenya. The 2007-2008 electoral conflict that I study followed a peaceful national poll in 2002, for
example, which suggests that the potential for violence in the future still exists. As will become
clear throughout the following chapters, immediate and long-term causes of violence interact. In
other words, contemporary party politics influence violence, but land tenure disputes dating to
national independence in 1963 also undoubtedly contribute to contentious politics and the risk
of conflict during an election season. It is unlikely that land disputes will be solved overnight.
Furthermore, in a set of unprecedented circumstances newly elected president Kenyatta will be
acting Kenyan president while simultaneously standing trial in the Hague for committing crimes against humanity. As a result of the ICC trial, Kenyan national political debate will surely revisit volatile political and ethnic issues in the coming years.

One of the participants in my research told me a story during a research follow-up meeting in Nairobi during June, 2013 that illustrates the very important role of ethnicity in contemporary Kenyan life. The middle aged Kalenjin woman had been living in Kibera (a predominantly Luo informal settlement in Nairobi) when I first spoke with her in 2009. She was still residing there with her family in 2011, when I met with her for a second time. In Kibera during the 2007-2008 post election violence, many Kikuyu were attacked by Luo youth (Kibera was the area of Raila Odinga’s constituency when he served as MP). Kalenjin were not targeted for violence during that time, because the Luo and Kalenjin communities were in an alliance under the Orange Democratic Movement party ticket. When I asked her most recently whether she was still living in Kibera, Shila explained to me that she had moved only weeks before in anticipation of the 2013 election. She explained that she had moved because “this time we [meaning Kalenjin] were aligned with the Kikuyu,” reminding me that “last time, we were with the Luo” (Author Interview 2, 2011). Her fear was that as a result of the shifting political landscape, where the Jubilee alliance brought together Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, her family would now become a target of violence initiated against Jubilee alliance supporters if they won the poll. In other words, Shila and her family had moved from Kibera to an area called Eastlands - much further from her daily work - simply as a function of the national level political alliances that formed before the March 2013 election. Ethnic community party politics, and the memory of recent violence has undoubtedly had a strong impact on her everyday life; presumably, this is true for many other Kenyans as well. Throughout this dissertation, I investigate in careful detail the individual themes - violence, politics, and local level demographic patterns - that are woven throughout Shila’s experience.

The character of fighting that surrounded Kenya’s 2007 poll closely resembled prior election violence in the country. It also shared certain traits with electoral conflict in other African countries, as I will illustrate below. The conflicts are similar in that they are loosely - to varying degrees -
planned and organized by political leadership, and are mixed with longstanding historical disputes over land and political representation. Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and other countries have been plagued by similarly deadly election violence in recent decades. As many observers will recognize, the organizational form of this type of conflict is, in many ways, a new normal for instability on the African continent. Coups still occur (Mali, 2012-2013), full-blown civil war does still exist (DRC, since the mid-1990s), and autocratic regimes still brutally repress millions (Republic of Congo, since 1997). However, militia, peri-state, and political gang conflict without clear organizational logic and leadership is more common than rebels, for example, confronting government tanks in the context of a civil war. Without question, such violence is also a detriment to the meaningful development of societies where political and economic institutions are evolving. While it is not possible in others (there is no functioning government in Somalia), in cases such as Kenya violent politics emerges alongside and within institutions, both new and old. To ignore the detailed geographies of institutional legacies in Kenya would be a serious mistake. On one hand, manipulation and abuse of institutions have contributed to violence in the past, as I will show. On the other hand, emerging institutions have the potential to either manage contentious politics effectively, or increase the risk of violence in the future.

In this dissertation, I address key questions related to persistent instability and insecurity in contemporary Africa using a political geographic lens. This framework includes attention paid, most specifically, to theoretical questions regarding social context, place, space, scale, territory, and power. I have intended the volume to read as a survey of the politics of place in a setting of political violence. I ask, specifically: when, where and how do contentious politics become violent politics? In addition, I strive to understand what the effects of electoral violence may be for a country and for victimized populations. To answer these and related questions I use a mixed quantitative-qualitative methodological approach to understand Kenya’s electoral conflict in late 2007 and early 2008. As have others, I bridge the literature on instability in African societies and the localized study of violent conflict. I understand power to mean the ability to influence individuals and populations in their decision making and everyday activities. Expressions of power
manifest through explicitly violent physical means, but they may also be less visible than overt warfare. In the empirical work that follows, I operationalize my understanding of power and conflict in a diverse set of definitions for electoral violence. With regard to scale, my approach is firmly localized, rather than solely at the national level, and is receptive to the importance of both formal and informal institutions at multiple scales. The process of violence emerging, receding, and recurring also necessarily concerns the production of space. Physical and social spaces are arenas for daily life, but their character is not naturally defined, and is instead constructed by members of a society. Influential groups and individuals deliberately alter their surroundings to further their specific agendas. An individual’s relative place within a conflict prone society can therefore change without shifting his or her absolute location. Given the prevalence of this phenomenon in the case of Kenyan election violence, I thread academic work on the production of space (usually implicitly) throughout my following analysis.

With the research design explained above, this dissertation therefore constitutes a unique view below the state scale, and inside the process of Kenyan election violence. Often too-readily framed only as “ethnic conflict”, election violence in Kenya is nevertheless truly characterized by ethnic community divisions. However, inter-group relationships are always expressed in social, political, and economic contexts, which I capture using multiple sources of quantitative data in addition to many weeks of fieldwork in Kenya. Existing conflict research tends to offer explanations of violence that are either dominated by behavioral considerations, on one hand, or are structurally determinist. For example, in the political science and international relations behavioralist approach conflict might be explained as taking place between rational ethnic actors within a security dilemma “game”. Many explanations of conflict as a function of poverty, in contrast, are rooted so firmly in that social reality that individuals are strictly constrained in their actions. As I will show, I have bridged the divide between these two veins of research. Secondly, much of the existing conflict studies research, with the exception of research on riots, tends to focus on full-blown civil war and rather strict rebel-government logics. I have departed from such definitions of conflict episodes. Thirdly, much of the literature on riots and less formal types of violent conflict tends to be specific to
regions outside of sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to these tendencies of the literature on political violence, I offer an analysis that focuses on an understudied region.

Since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1992, each Kenyan election cycle has been marred by varying degrees of politically motivated violence. Despite the regularity of such conflict, the severity and scope of the fighting that followed Kenya’s December 27th 2007 general election took many by surprise. Most observers believed that Kenya had passed its period of autocratic repression, during Moi’s presidency, and that with the peaceful 2002 election the country was moving forward (e.g. Klopp and Zuern 2007). Hailed only initially as a model for other African states to follow (*Economist*, December 19, 2007), because of the massive violence that followed, Kenya’s 2007 presidential contest took place mainly between incumbent Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU), and Raila Amolo Odinga, leading the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). Kibaki was elected in 2002 under the banner of the National Alliance and Rainbow Coalition (NARC), and his success ended the nearly four-decade long reign of the Kenya African National Union (KANU). NARC’s victory was initially welcomed as a sign of change by many Kenyans, but the party failed to follow through with many social policy reforms that it promised while campaigning. Harnessing discontent, Odinga’s ODM had enough support by the fall of 2007 to genuinely threaten President Kibaki’s control.

Tensions between the communities that supported Odinga and Kibaki are not new. Representing western Kenya’s Luo community during the independence movement, Raila Odinga’s father Jaramogi Odinga Odinga became Vice President with Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu from Central Province, after independence in 1963. Already a prominent leader within the Luo community, Odinga’s political career began in 1957 when he was elected to the legislative council for central Nyanza constituency in western Kenya. As Vice President, Odinga did not agree with Kenyatta on many policy matters and he resigned after only two years in office. Through many attempts to create nationally-viable political parties, a politically motivated arrest in 1969, and a coup attempt in 1982 Odinga Odinga was sidelined from influence in state policy formulation and implementation. At first, Kenyatta played a direct role in Odinga Odinga’s marginalization. After Kenyatta’s death
in 1978, however, barriers to Odinga Odinga’s participation lasted throughout Daniel Arap Moi’s presidency as well. The legacy of Odinga Odinga’s exclusion is still viewed as an historical injustice by many Luo, and this sentiment fed into the political rhetoric surrounded the 2007 contest between Kibaki, a Kikuyu, and Raila Odinga. Mwai Kibaki, like Kenyatta, was born in Central province. He began his political career in 1963 as MP for what is now Makadara constituency in Nairobi province. From 1965 onward Kibaki at various times held the positions of Minister of Finance, Minister of Commerce and Industry, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Vice-President, Minister of Home Affairs and National Heritage, and Minister of Health. In contrast to Odinga Odinga’s career trajectory, Kibaki clearly held many positions of influence in national affairs. In polls plagued by violence, Kibaki even challenged President Moi unsuccessfully in 1992 and 1997. Before leaving the party to found the Democratic Party (DP) in 1991, Kibaki was also vice president of KANU.

When the Electoral Commission of Kenya first announced the initial December 27th 2007 election results, only 159 of 210 constituencies had been counted. With 3.7 million votes Raila Odinga was ahead of Mwai Kibaki, who reportedly had received only 3.4 million. After the remaining 51 constituencies had been counted the following day, Kibaki was leading with 4.6 million to Odinga’s 4.4 million. Of the remaining ballots, in other words, Kibaki reportedly achieved over 60% support, and to the surprise of many his victory was publicly announced on December 31st. As soon as the announcement was made, violence erupted across the country. Gruesome attacks against the Kikuyu raged immediately, as is it was believed by other groups that this community had stolen the election from ODM supporters. A reprisal wave of attacks was then carried out by some Kikuyu against the Luo community and other ethnic groups who were believed to have supported ODM. The ethnic character of Kenya’s election violence, according to Wanwere (2008, 95), is a direct result of “negative ethnicity,” or the intentional manipulation of communities against one another by entrepreneurs of violence at the national level. Political leadership may have planned some attacks in advance, but local radio stations using vernacular languages also spread hateful messages that also fueled the outbursts (Ismail and Deane 2008). According to estimates by the
Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC 2008, 15) 1,300 people were killed and as many 600,000 displaced from their homes before former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan mediated a settlement between Odinga and Kibaki on February 22nd, 2008. Stipulations of the agreement included Odinga assuming the role of Prime Minister and supervising the National Assembly as well as cabinet positions, which are allocated according to the size of parties in Parliament. The agreement was viewed as a tenuous solution to the crisis by many academic observers and Kenyans alike.

Sadly, the death toll of approximately 1,300 represents only an immediate effect of the skirmishes. While burnt buildings and graves remain as visceral scars on the physical landscape, the less tangible effects of political violence on Kenyan attitudes and perceptions about society and politics are not as clear. The unknown long term individual and institutional effects of the violence are unclear even though the March 4th 2013 election was largely peaceful. As in other regional contexts, electoral conflict and other cases of inter-ethnic killing are about the production of public space. For example, according to Peter van der Veer (1996) violence surrounding India’s elections is specifically about “public space.” Defining who controls the public sphere, how, and by what rules is necessarily a geographical process. Delineating control among populations is also a process that occurs within specific historical, institutional, economic, and cultural contexts that vary dramatically in a geographic manner within countries (Boone 2003). Due to the varying experiences of people within localities and the fact that their shared claims to resources are contentious, defining who has control over the public sector is not only geographical, but too often conflictual and overtly violent.

1.2 Election violence and ethnic politics in sub-Saharan Africa

This kind of political and social fragility characterizes many African societies. Post-election violence engulfed Nigeria following the April 2007 election, for example, where several hundred were killed after a botched case of incumbent ballot rigging allowed the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) Umaru Yar’Adua into office. Certain characteristics of Nigerian election violence are basically
similar to the conflict that has affected Kenya, including the ethnicization of opposing political parties (Osaghe and Suberu 2005), and the organization of private state supported militias and political gangs to sew unrest. In Nigeria, one of the more prevalent political militias was the Bakassi Boys, who operated throughout Anambra State (Sisk 2012, 52). In December 2011, Côte d’Ivoire nearly descended into civil war when Laurent Gbagbo refused to accept that Alassane Ouattara had won the national poll. In rioting and street battles lasting for months, approximately 3,000 Ivorians of multiple ethnic groups were killed. Electoral violence in Côte d’Ivoire followed some patterns similar to those observed in Kenya, mainly in the fact that a north-south divide between candidate support bases existed in Côte d’Ivoire and that political rhetoric commonly referred to certain populations as being “outsiders” in some areas (Boone, forthcoming; Straus 2011). In Uganda, state repression was designed to intimidate the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) presidential candidate Kizza Besigye (opposing the longtime president Museveni) in 2011. Although the level of Ugandan violence was less severe in comparison to the Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire experience, it still represented a serious irregularity. In Zimbabwe, one of the most closed and autocratic societies on the continent, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai was physically beaten (along with innumerable supporters) in a brazen example of state electoral repression in March 2008. Incumbent (ZANU-PF) Mugabe supporting militia were known to have killed dozens and otherwise tortured or attacked thousands in the streets of Zimbabwe following the announcement of election results. Smaller states that do not have the conflict histories of countries such as Uganda or Côte d’Ivoire also experience significant electoral conflict. Togo, for instance, in April 2005 was a scene of approximately 500 deaths (Bekoe 2012, 123-124) in waves of clashes that erupted following the highly suspicious election of Faure Gassingbé - the former president’s son - to office. The main Togolese opposition party (UFC), called for street protests and demonstrations that were swiftly attacked by security forces and incumbent party (RPT) supporters. The frequency with which such violence grips countries across the continent speaks to the importance of studying election violence with careful attention.

Electoral conflict in sub-Saharan African societies is almost invariably linked with ethnic
politics. In explaining social tensions in these contexts, researchers have often focused on the colonial experience as influencing identity related social dynamics. Mamdani (1996) and many others have carried out this research, emphasizing the distortions of ethnic categories that colonial administrations introduced. The autocratic tendencies of these colonial administrations also has a strong legacy that plays an important role in my research. “Bulu Matari” (Young 1994), for example, the symbolic “crusher of rocks” is one common metaphor for autocratic regimes in Africa. In Kenya, to place both Mamdani and Young’s work in context, the Lancaster Constitution\(^1\) that was adopted upon independence was largely derived from the colonial political order. The patrimonial character of the state is both created by, and now itself engenders a link between ethnicity and government. Bates (2005, 48), for example, states that “the British chose elections as instruments for orchestrating their retreat from imperial rule: they conferred power upon those [the Kikuyu] who proved able to command an electoral majority.” Colonial authority structures map closely onto ethnic politics in Kenya still today, as “once the colonizers had established juridical facts in accord with their ethnographic fantasies, Africans subject to these jurisdictions had no choice but to behave as if the theories were true” (Bates 2005, 48). Ethnic-chauvinism is therefore dually an influence upon, and also a result of, conflict. As I have pointed out above, ethnocentric beliefs are often too-simply presented as the sole cause of African conflict in popular media accounts. This is a practice that I will elaborate upon and critique below. While ethnocentric clientelism and opportunistic institutional manipulation are very real, a careful assessment of their social role must acknowledge the ability of individuals to select from among myriad identities depending on the circumstances at a given period in time. Even beyond the realm of formal institutions, Shatzburg (2001) outlines the informal roots of patrimonial, authoritarian, and, usual, ethnically-chauvinistic leadership through the use of symbols and images in public discourse. Support for the status quo institutions becomes part of an organizing logic of the social body, but this is a not only a function of the physical practices and capabilities (e.g. policing strength) of the state.

\(^1\) Kenya’s first constitution was written throughout a series of three meetings in 1960, 1962, and 1963, and formally ended British Colonial rule in the country.
The guidelines for determining access to power for groups profoundly influences how they interact, and this often concerns perceived prior injustice among ethnic communities (Horowitz 1985). My following work is not meant to re-define the construction of ethnicity in its basic elements. I accept that identity politics were influenced by colonial policy (explained in detail below), and by new and more rapid interactions among groups under unprecedented conditions of post-independence urbanization in an evolving national political economy. For this research, my discussions of ethnicity instead concern when, how, and, most importantly, where identities matter for electoral conflict. In many everyday settings and in certain social interactions, a Kenyan’s ethnic lineage matters very little. In other cases, however, employment opportunities, the quality of schools and hospitals in one’s town, and even being named as a target of deadly violence hinge on one’s ethnic background. Where ethnocentric party politics dominate, as they do in many African countries (Van de Walle 2003), patronage politics and exclusion can combine to raise the risk of deadly violence in electoral contests (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995). Because ethnic community boundaries matter for everyday life and are also variable in their salience, my treatment of ethnicity throughout the following research should be understood as falling in line with Posner’s (2005, 7) consideration of “identity choice” and not of “identity construction.” Making an identity choice implies that several (or more) identities exist in the first place, and this conceptual framework for discussing inter-ethnic politics is therefore in agreement with the geographical notion of “nested identities” (Herb 1999). Posner (2005, 11), to reiterate the point above, argues that a careful consideration of identities:

turns on the assumption that the context in which a person finds herself does more than simply provide a perceptual frame that subconsciously shapes the persons’ way of thinking about who she is and how she relates to her environment. I suggest that it also affects the conscious choices she makes about which identity will serve her best. [I] thus view the link between a person’s environment and her identity not as the outcome of some passive psychological process (although sometimes it may be) but as the product of a deliberate decision designed to maximize payoffs. These payoffs need not be material.

A paradigm developed with the principles above is useful for capturing the influence of locality, and
spatial and temporal setting, while not removing agency from individuals. As I will show later in this introduction, my research design is therefore situated closely alongside scholarship surrounding the politics of place from a political sociology and human geography background.

Substantial violence has taken place in Kenya as a part of the transition process from a colonial entity, to autocratic regime, and, finally, to a multiparty state. As the experience of other countries has shown, these institutional growing pains can be costly. Straus and Taylor (2009), for instance, show that roughly 19% of elections in Africa have seen substantial levels of violence beyond instances of political harassment and arbitrary detentions. In outlining the high prevalence of violence surrounding elections in African transitioning democracies, they highlight Kenya as a case plagued by land and economic marginalization grievances in addition to party politics alone. Since their independence, Lindberg (2006) similarly identifies only about a quarter of African countries' elections as genuinely peaceful. Speaking not of civil war, but simply holding an election - a relatively commonplace event in institutionally developed democracies - this is an alarmingly high level of conflict.

By focusing specifically on election violence (instead of civil war, or insurgency) my work falls closely to Chabal and Daloz’s (1999, 13) now classic study of “the political instrumentalization of disorder.” Their approach is helpful for its accommodation of strategic thinking and calculated political decision making in a setting of seemingly chaotic social processes. In Chabal and Daloz’s research, they point toward a set of institutions that generate and then reproduce violence that serves the interests of influential actors in African countries. Informal institutions that feed into and coordinate campaigns of violence during each Kenyan electoral cycle are anything but haphazard. As evidence of this in Kenya, Branch (2011, 237) remarks: “politicians sponsored private armies and militias for self-protection and to attack rivals - the Baghdad Boys, for instance, provided security for Luo political leaders in Kisumu through the multiparty era. A number of Kikuyu MPs attempted to use Mungiki\(^2\) in a similar fashion.” The influence of such organizations cannot be

\(^2\) Mungiki translates into “multitude” in Kikuyu. The group emerged in the 1980s as a rural religious movement to further Kikuyu cultural beliefs and practices. As the movement urbanized after its initial founding it became increasingly involved in outright criminal and gang activity.
understated, with the violent Sri Lanka and Kuzacha Boys militias also operating on the coast during the 1980s, and the rival Chinkororo and Amachuma gangs terrorizing rural Kisii (Anderson 2002, 548). These four groups were used by influential politicians to intimidate their opponents, steal voter-ID cards, and even evict individuals from key electoral districts. Clearly, also, this phenomenon mirrors one of the key dynamics of Nigerian election violence noted above.

In an analysis of Kenya’s election violence surrounding the 2007 poll Mueller (2008, 186) - albeit implicitly - invokes a conceptual framework reflecting the type of systematic social stress and instability that was expressed by Chabal and Daloz (1999). She claims that three factors served as a platform for the violence that erupted:

A gradual decline in the state’s monopoly of legitimate force and a consequent generalized level of violence not always within its control; deliberately weak institutions, mostly overridden by a highly personalized and centralized presidency, that could not and did not exercise the autonomy of checks and balances normally associated with democracies; and political parties that were not programmatic, were driven by ethnic clientelism, and had a winner-take-all view of political power and its associated economic byproducts. The argument here is that: violence was diffused, could be ignited easily but not controlled, and was not; institutions outside the presidency normally associated with vetting a contested election were not viewed as being sufficiently neutral to do so and did not; and the nature of Kenyan party politics predisposed both leaders and followers to see politics as a do-or-die zero sum game, which is what this election became.

Throughout this dissertation I will provide a view within the institutional configurations outlined by this view from Mueller. Where checks on abuses of authority are scarce and corruption prevalent, officials in government gain immensely from forcibly displacing populations and causing conflict if it increases the odds that they will succeed in an electoral contest. From this point of departure, it makes sense to consider the “profit to be found in the weak institutionalization of political practices” (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 13). While it is not always state actors who directly engage in violence that furthers their cause, they are very often party to the activities. It is worth revisiting my interlocutor, Julius’, reaction to the ICC confirmation hearings, introduced above, where he pointed out that the wrong men were facing prosecutors in the Hague courtroom. Violence was certainly common political practice during the election violence of 2007 and 2008, but in the
loosely organized campaigns, it was agents of leadership who actually engaged in fighting, and not the leaders themselves. For example, William Ruto’s testimony to the ICC acknowledges holding meetings with Raila Odinga in early 2008 to discuss plans for how to organize popular “mass action” against PNU and PNU supporters; the two organized others to commit violence, but did not participate themselves. On the incumbent side of the confrontations, police were known to have stood by in certain campaigns of violence that were committed by armed thugs, doing little at all to prevent their actions (Njugo 2009). Brass (1996, 30), in relation to the role of the state in riotous internecine violence emphasizes that “the range of state action includes undoubted deliberate instigation, as in Nazi Germany; deliberate inaction or turning of a blind eye either for narrow political purposes or to avoid an undesired political reaction for suppression of a riot; conflicting actions or inaction by local, state, and national authorities; and the deliberate and cynical manipulation of riot situations once they have occurred for political advantage in party and electoral competition.” In Kenya the role of the state has varied over time, with the most severe repression of opposition directly by the state taking place in the Moi years throughout the 1990s. As I have just indicated, however, it is known that in certain settings during 2007 and 2008 the police either acted with undue force in suppressing protests or stood idly by as violent gangs attacked civilians.

In a very general sense, the background for this project is a democratic transition process, which classical research has shown can be politically risky and violent (Dahl 1971). Despite this, my work is not a political science treatise concerning the composition and origins of civil society and formal political institutions, or an exhaustive engagement with definitions of the state. These thematic dedications often neglect the degree to which African politics are informal, or that state politics are not “emancipated” from society (Chabal and Daloz 1999). Definitions and theoretical contributions to my understanding of the state and civil society are incorporated below, where appropriate, but my research is focused on informal conflict and the social conditions that enable such violence more particularly. Framed relative to existing literature, therefore, my work is much more similar to Scarritt et al. (2001), who study ethnopolitical rioting and rebellion within democ-
rationization, than it is similar to much classical work on formal state institutions and the details of electoral representation.

1.3 A spatial lens for research

In addition to my deviation from existing literature by studying conflict outside of strict civil war definitions, another key difference between my research and contemporary literature on electoral conflict (Wilkenson 2004; Boone 2011; Lindberg 2006, and others) is the emphasis that I place on the production of space and scale in the process of violence. Other researchers study conflict by focusing at the individual level, in the behavioral politics tradition, treating people somewhat atomistically (even if the unit of analysis is some administrative unit or city). In political science research, for example, people are often viewed as being influenced by institutional settings. In contrast, economic development research emphasizes household poverty, and anthropological studies weigh heavily the impact that custom and culture has upon individuals. Poverty and culture are clearly important for me, but in this research, I examine physical and social landscapes among Kenyan localities, and pay careful attention to social contexts in forming individual beliefs and behaviors. That local level social realities (contemporary, and historical) play a critically important role in determining the political character of an area, and the activities and behavior of individuals is a well founded principle in human geographical scholarship (Agnew 1987, 1996; Massey 1994; Pred 1983, 1984; Giddens 1979; Granata 1980; Johnston and Pattie 1988; Pattie and Johnston 2000; Thrift 1983; Flint 1998a). Tenets of this body of research into political behavior include paying careful attention to “the settings and scenes of everyday life: to place” (Agnew 1987, 5). Throughout my following work, I merge quantitative empirical research with fieldwork and a careful consideration of what constitutes normal Kenyan life in the circumstances of political instability and institutional fragility. Place does not matter because of innate characteristics of a location. In other words, physical geography does not have a deterministic role in driving individual behavior. Instead, the lens that I adopt places individuals in a setting relative to other individuals, rather than understanding them to be autonomous units free-floating through life and acting 100 %
individualistically. According to Agnew (1987, 19), “the outcome of social action is tied to specific occasions and to other participants in the situation. Behavior is therefore contingent upon others.” This is true despite the social changes associated with modernization or globalization, according to Massey (1987, 11) who argues that “most people still live their lives locally, their consciousness is formed in a distinct geographical place” (see also Tilly 1973).

I focus specifically on the role of “context” in my electoral violence research in order to capture the influences of place upon social conditions. A contextual research design has been defined as follows by Agnew (1987, 132).

In a contextual view human action is seen as threading out from the here and now of face-to-face social interaction into more extensive fields of mediated interaction managed by institutions and organizations. In this way social relations can be thought of as stretching over time and space yet linked to the concrete production of individual attitudes and behavior. A parallel can be drawn between this idea and so-called configurational explanation. This involves the claim that, rather than adding together the categorical traits of an abstracted individual, explanation is better served by establishing the configuration or juxtaposition of stimuli to behavior within a relevant space-time matrix. This perspective combines commitments to the theoretical primacy of ‘the human agent’ (who does the behaving) with the analytic primacy of ‘the social-geographical’ (the setting for behaving). In this way the human agent and the social context can be integrated into analysis without getting into the abstract swamp of ‘the micro-macro problem’ or unproductive debate about the relative merits of reduction and emergence.

The example of a contextual view that Agnew provides concerns voting in northern Italy. He (1987, 132) concludes from his spatial electoral analysis that, “it is not simply the compositional differences between different regions but the nature and understandings of politics in the region as experienced by different groups of actors that are at play in this case.” For Kenyan election violence, I show how compositional differences between Kenyan areas (for instance, in terms of ethnic polarization) influence trends in electoral violence. Secondly, I show that incentives to engage in violence may be associated with attitudes related to political and economic marginalization, or, in the terms Agnew uses above, the understanding of politics in each area. In order to accommodate the theory that places, locales, and regions are defined by linkages to other areas (Massey 1994) and by their non-absolute (relative) location, I consider “context” to be defined by group membership definitions
in addition to physical location. As I will make clear in later sections, this is especially important for the setting of ethnicized politics in Kenya. My achievement in this research is extending this contextualized political analysis into the realm of conflict studies and African politics.

Voting was the topic for research in geography and social science more broadly that championed the role of local contextual effects on the social landscape (e.g. Johnston and Pattie 2006). For example, Flint (1998, 1298) effectively illustrates how the interaction of state policy and electorale preferences influenced the observed overall level of support for the Nazi Party in Germany 1924-1932; “the NSDAP’s construction of a cross-class electorate was embedded within spatial structures,” he argues. My goal is to investigate the social forces that influence not only political attitudes and behaviors as they may relate to elections, but as they matter for political violence. One illustration of how place-based approaches may be applied to the study of conflict is found in the following (Agnew 1987, 60).

Of course, voting is not the only form of political activity. Why is it, for example, that political violence characterizes the political histories of some places but not others? Often this may have been the product of place-specific repression, or the absence of other alternatives such as electoral politics. However, it is clear that there can be settings in which political mobilization is more likely to produce violence or similar ‘dangerous’ activities than others. Fitzpatrick (1978), in a study of revolutionary violence and nationalism in Ireland, demonstrates that it was the interaction between poorer and rural conditions and the incidence of branches of specific nationalist organization, especially Sinn Féin, that explains the incidence of political violence in the period 1920-21. It seems that even the forms that political activity take are related to organizational capacity. And organizational capacity is place specific. Political activities are therefore place specific in origin also.

“Context” is not simply a single variable in my quantitative analysis; this view would suggest that I ignore the influences of locality simply by controlling them away (e.g. with a single binary “dummy” variable that equals “context”). That approach is common in some areas of quantitative social science, where predictive analysis uses technical fixes (e.g fixed effects, random-intercept, and many other models) for absorbing the unobserved variability in any relationship between two indicators of interest (e.g. poverty and election violence). Instead of simply plugging into my analysis a crude solution for variation in statistical associations, my goal is to measure the qualities
of “context” with regard to a key social indicator and estimate how that indicator influences any outcome of interest for the specific question. For example, let us say that the results from some analysis indicate that a single measurement of common spatial residential location strongly influences the observed rate of electoral violence. Instead of stopping with the analysis there - and this would be a confirmation that “context,” as a variable, matters - and speculating that ethnic community politics or poverty might play a role, I take a different approach. I strive to directly measure and test the influence of individual components of context. Following the example I have provided here, my goal is not to show that context matters, but to separate out the individual influences that poverty, or ethnic community politics, might have upon observed rates of violence. As I have already shown, I consider context to be spatially absolute, but also relative. The relative understanding of context is a community or group level phenomenon (ethnic kin, class, peers within education experience, etc.). This understanding of how context may be defined is somewhat similar to Miller’s (2007) argument that an individual’s location (within a country, county, city) may not be the best measurement of their real-life daily activities and the social forces that may direct their interaction with others.

Across Kenya, the emphasis of my research is on the space- (and place-) contingent character of post-election violence. Certain important political economy and institutional legacies of the colonial period, which I discuss in detail below, have undoubtedly shaped the distribution of conflict in a fashion that is similar to voting patterns and some behavioral outcomes that were investigated previously by other researchers. Because I follow research where individuals can act according to their abilities, needs, and interests in a possibilist (rather than determinist) lens for social science scholarship, I include analyses of the effects that electoral conflict has upon individuals in my sixth chapter. This is also important because election violence has harmful effects on societies beyond the immediate term. Bekoe (2012, 4), for example argues that violence represents a serious impediment to the consolidation of political institutions, and citizens’ opinions about the role of government in society. Bratton (2008) makes a similar claim about election violence causing victims to abstain from voting, withdraw from political life, and effectively relinquish their right to influence society
through formal avenues of expression. This body of research suggests that violence permeates local societies, influencing population opinions and ideas. Because conflict is said to have such powerful and important effects, I specifically test the role that Kenyan election violence has had upon political and other social attitudes.

Formal and informal institutions of violence are necessarily geographic phenomena. Where violence that results in eviction from homes takes place in certain areas of Kenya, clear messages between communities are sometimes literally written on buildings in the form of graffiti. Often the politics of individual places can be read by interpreting the condition of building structures, the attitudes of residents, and the condition of the infrastructure. More specifically, we may learn important information about campaigns of conflict by paying attention to these local level characteristics of places. As I show below, the claim-making processes is inherently territorial, and echoes spatial processes of conflict that have been identified by geographers in other settings around the world, including Cambodia (Tyner 2008), Colombia (Oslander 2007), Ireland (Kearns 2007), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dahlman and Toal 2006; Toal and Dahlman 2010), Mozambique (Lunstrom 2009), Iraq (Agnew et al. 2008), Palestine (Alatout 2009), and numerous other cases. Using fieldwork, spatial-statistical and quasi-experimental quantitative methods, and a wealth of geographical data, I address the causes of post-election violence in a contextualized analysis of Kenya’s social fabric in the wake of tragedy. Scale linkages are also an important geographical component of my explanation of the distribution of conflict within Kenya, as I will illustrate in Chapter Four.

1.4 Kenya’s comparative position

Where does the Kenyan case fit into the bigger picture? If Kenya is an outlier with regard to any key social condition, such as regime type or income level, then the chances that my research would apply to other cases are small. In Table 1.1, Kenya’s position relative to other countries on the continent is presented. Countries are sorted from low to high for population growth, percentage of agricultural land, regime score (POLITY), and GDP per capita for the year 2007 (when election violence broke out). It is apparent that Kenya (red) lies roughly in the middle of the distribution
for each indicator with the exception of democracy level.

That Kenya is comparatively democratic is not a surprise, and according to some comparative analyses of democratization and conflict we might actually expect more severe conflict in countries near, but not at, the democratic end of the spectrum (Lindberg 2006; Straus and Taylor 2009). Where autocratic institutions dominate a society, the political space for organizing political opposition to incumbents (or any other group) do not exist. Therefore, sectors of the population with grievances are not able to develop into a movement with critical mass. In contrast, relatively democratic societies allow for open organization of opposition movements. In such a setting, according to the conclusions of existing research about the inverted-U relationship between democracy and violence, the potential for conflict among groups rises. Kenya has fallen at the comparatively democratic end of the continent-wide POLITY spectrum since the country transitioned to a multiparty system for the 1992 election. Some academic observers (Klopp and Zuern 2007) believe that Kenya falls far enough on the democratic side of the distribution that it ought to have passed peak conflict risk. Klopp and Zuern (2007, 133) explain the results of an “opening” the political sphere: “As transitions often involved increasing waves of demonstrations incorporating large numbers of protesters, periods of greater public contestation would be expected to be marked by increases in public violence.”

In order to further situate Kenya in an African comparative perspective, I turn to Lindberg (2006), who presents a learning curve model of democratic institutional development; it is only by practicing democracy that a country develops the capacity to govern its territory effectively. Some African countries have been slowly improving, with regard to institutional transparency and the representation of previously excluded territorial groups. This is certainly not true for all countries on the continent, and observers have noted that some states are sliding backwards. Within a very broad temporal resolution, however, the political systems in many of these countries will be opening in the future, if slowly.

Beyond formal political institutions, other characteristics of a country are important considerations for comparative analysis. Were, as in the case of Liberia, population growth extremely
Table 1.1: Kenya (red) in continental comparison with regard to key social and political indicators that are associated with political violence in the conflict studies literature. Each country is ranked on its score for each indicator from low (top) to high (bottom).

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<th>Pop. growth</th>
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high, we might expect electoral conflict to be a function of intense pressure for access to land and competition over resources. Ranking 28 out of 50, however, Kenyan population growth leading into the 2007 poll was nearly average, continent-wide. Instead of Kenyan election conflict relating
to this key social explanation, I will show how local level political dynamics and national level institutions shape the likelihood of conflict across Kenya’s regions. With regard to the percentage of a country’s territory that is agricultural land, we might also expect a similar relationship between a low percentage of territory (e.g. as in Cameroon or Liberia) and conflict. However, as for population density, Kenya lies almost directly at the mean for this key social condition. Finally, especially poor countries might be at a higher risk of experiencing electoral conflict because the stakes are very high for winning the poll, and the costs of engaging in violence are relatively low. Kenya is, importantly, approximately mid-way through the distribution of wealth continent wide. This suggests that the findings of my work are not overwhelmingly driven by national poverty level, and therefore may be comparable with other cases in different regions of the continent.

In March 2013, Kenya held a nation-wide election for president, county governors, and many other important elected positions. Less than one month before the election, in a test of the country’s open institutions, Kenyan presidential candidates held a public and televised debate. The moderator asked genuinely difficult questions directly to each of the eight present candidates on topics ranging from reducing poverty rates, to the involvement of the international community in Kenya’s recovery from the 2007-2008 election violence - this issue is especially critical for newly elected president Kenyatta, who faces charges at the ICC currently. In the process of implementing the new county borders after the 2010 constitutional referendum passed, nominees to lead the Interim Boundaries and Electoral Commission (IBEC) were each individually interviewed in public, televised hearings during October 2011. That either a televised presidential debate or an open hearing for a position as important as IBEC chairman would take place in Angola, Zimbabwe, or Republic of Congo is inconceivable. However, years (even decades) from now it is a real possibility, as Lindberg’s (2006) research suggests. Studying the Kenyan conflict associated with heightened political awareness, hotly contested electoral positions, and uncertainty over sovereignty at local scales may contribute to our understanding of conflict emerging in countries that slowly transition toward democracy.

A note on the Kenyan fieldwork that informs my research is in order. It can be difficult to
ask people about politically motivated killing. Whether speaking with victims or perpetrators of violence, the atmosphere can be tense. The responses people gave me were, of course, highly contingent on the physical setting of an interview (in public versus in a private home), and the level of trust they extend toward me. Greiner (2013) also points toward the importance of trust in eliciting responses from research participants in Kenya when studying ethnicity and conflict. In certain instances during my fieldwork people named the individuals who were involved in attacks; when conflict takes place at a microcosmic social scale (home-by-home) it can be highly personalized.

The political climate in Kenya when I conducted 2011 portions of this fieldwork was particularly tense because of the preliminary ICC hearings that were simultaneously taking place in the Hague. On more than one occasion, group interview participants did not arrive for fear that I would be recording or filming the discussion (in fact a common practice for focus groups in academic social science research!). At one point, I was sent vaguely threatening SMS messages by an acquaintance I arranged to meet in Eldoret. This is certainly not to imply that everybody was reluctant to speak with me. I found that (as during an earlier research trip) dozens people in Nairobi, Eldoret, Kisumu, Kisii, Kitale, and Maralal welcomed me into their homes and helped me in many ways.

I have only directly quoted from interviews that are absolutely pertinent to the specific argument at hand, and where I either had a recording of the conversation or meticulously noted exact phrases from research participants. In total, 51 interviews during late August, September, and October of 2011 (and many more informal conversations) informed this research.

1.5 The dissertation outline

The dissertation is comprised of chapters that may be read individually, but it can also be read as a monograph. In this brief chapter, I have presented a summary of Kenya as a case study. I also have explained how this research is framed, carried out, and relates to existing research in African politics, conflict studies, and political geography. In Chapter Two, I expand in greater detail upon how conflict studies and human geography can be merged into a conflict geography framework for analysis. I also present major debates outlining the causes of conflict, with a focus
on political and economic marginalization and electoral institutions. Within this discussion, it is important to consider the differences between state-level explanations of conflict and the social forces that contribute to violence within regions of a country. Furthermore, it is important to understand the distinction between localized studies of civil war and localized studies of violence that is persistent and deadly, but less severe. Research on rioting in developing countries and also a substantial body of research addressing the causes of electoral conflict are helpful in understanding these distinctions.

In Chapter Three, I present an empirical overview of Kenya’s 2007-2008 electoral violence. I review these conflict events relative to non-election violence to identify whether spatial differences exist between the two types of conflict. I apply various methods of geospatial and simulation analysis to these Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data to identify patterns of conflict. Predictably, conflict is clustered in regions of historical instability (e.g. central Rift Valley), but some unexpected patterns in the data appear. Overall, spatial analysis of these data emphasizes the importance of adopting the fine-resolution spatial lens that I use in later chapters. Identifying clusters of conflict is helpful and necessary, but is also fundamentally descriptive. Finding violent “hot spots” of instability, in other words, is not a confirmation of why conflict appears in one area versus another.

To explain the causes and consequences of violence, I turn to confirmatory and predictive modeling in Chapters Four through Six. Chapter Four examines what I have called an incumbency incentive for participating in, or tacitly supporting, political violence. This is strongly related to the compound, or coupled, grievances explanation for the severity of violence that I will introduce in Chapter Two. The incumbency incentive principle builds heavily upon theory from Boone (forthcoming), with regard to “statist” land tenure regimes (vs. “customary”) in Africa, and on Petersen’s (2002) “resentment” mechanism for ethnic conflict. Research suggests that opposition to long-standing injustices, political and economic marginalization, and outright discrimination can contribute to political violence. I propose revising this to reflect types of violence, and the temporal definition of opposition. Based on group experience in the executive branch, prior-incumbency opposition violence and non-incumbency opposition violence differ in noteworthy ways. I use geo-
referenced hospital records and population-based surveys to characterize electoral conflict by the experiences of victims.

The fifth chapter uses quasi-experimental methods and survey data to test whether bimodal ethnic group polarization and prior settlement scheme status raised the risk of conflict following Kenya’s 2007 electoral poll. In this section, I use survey data to characterize populations across sub-national regions, and new previously not studied GIS data for the settlement status of districts. Furthermore, I identify poverty as a mechanism explaining the influence of polarization upon conflict, independent of the settlement scheme effect. One expectation of the Kenyan violence literature is that if districts are the site of previous government facilitated in-migration, then electoral violence is likely. In a modification of this claim, I find that ethnic community polarization has strong explanatory power as a mechanism for why settlement scheme status translates into electoral conflict.

In Chapter Six, I use survey data and several additional sources of violent event data to test individual- and local-level influences of conflict upon attitudes. According to the conflict studies literature, exposure to violence is said to have both negative, and, surprisingly, positive effects on civic engagement, certain political beliefs, and even altruistic behavior. These views are important for the development of institutions, and in determining how individuals conduct political life more generally. I test whether different scales of engagement with instability may influence survey respondent attitudes. There is mixed evidence in dozens of propensity score matching models that individual- and local-level exposure to violence reduces certain forms of trust (institutional vs. inter-personal), and results in other harmful individual level effects.

The seventh and final chapter identifies common themes from my entire study and revisits the broader political issues under investigation. I have already provided evidence that Kenya is similar to other African states in terms of wealth, population growth and other key social indicators. Because it is relatively similar, conclusions from research in Kenya are more likely to apply to other countries than if it were an extreme outlier. A key difference between Kenya and other African countries is that it is comparatively democratic. However, because many countries on the continent
are likely to move toward liberalization in the future, this study of Kenya’s political violence has substantial broader impact.
Chapter 2

The Geographical Analysis of Conflict, Applied to the Kenyan Case

*It is the local reality that determines the total picture, and not the reverse.*

- Granata, 1980, p. 512

2.1 Introduction: conflict and elections, in theory and in Kenya

In this chapter, I define election violence and clarify why electoral conflict is the focus of my study. Following this, I review the existing literature related to geographies of conflict and elections. Conflict geography scholarship has had a great influence on the conceptual framework that I have adopted for my dissertation research, and I hope that the ties between my work and Granata’s sentiment above will be clear from this point forward. In a second section, I provide an overview of research explaining the causes of conflict. Most, but not all, of this research concerns sub-Saharan African societies. When the original work is not specifically addressing African cases, I present it in relation to politics on the continent. Within the body of scholarship that explains conflict, I focus on marginalization and exclusion (economic and political) and, separately, on the role of the state in conducting elections. I present empirical evidence related each of these explanatory factors to establish the context of the rest of the study. Finally, I conclude by explaining the severity of this election violence as a function, in part, of “compound grievances” against the incumbent and the incumbent party support base. I turn now to a broad definition of election violence as a distinct form of conflict.
The Central Depository Unit (CDU) was formed in 2001 with the goal of overseeing elections in Kenya and preventing violence. The CDU (2003, 17) defines election violence as: “any act or series of acts that cause, or are likely to cause harm or threat of harm to an individual or group of people, or damage to property; if the act or series of acts are intended to or result in influencing election choices or outcomes. The harm caused can be either physical or psychological or both. Electoral violence can occur before, during or after an election” (CDU, 2003, 17). Straus and Taylor (2009), Lindburg (2006), Wilkenson (2006), and others use similar terms to define electoral violence. Straus and Taylor (2009, 8), for instance, define election conflict to be “physical violence and coercive intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or to an announced electoral result.” Of particular interest in this study is post-election violence, and there may be some important distinctions between the pre-and post-poll forms of conflict. Pre-election violence may influence a given election, for example, but actual post-election conflict cannot (although the threat of if may). Often, as was common during the 1992 and 1997 elections in Kenya, populations were purged from a region or threatened before a poll if they were viewed to be supporters of a given party. If they were not forced to leave altogether, they were at least threatened not to participate. Because of the differing purposes of violence, the tone of post-election conflict may be different than conflict taking place before the poll. Post-election violence is frequently presented as revenge activity, or an expression of discontent with an illegitimate result. In a basic typology, therefore, influential factors for pre- and post-election violence might be different and, if this is true, it could be inappropriate to apply theory from existing pre-election violence research to a post-election violence case. However, for Kenya in 2007 and 2008 it became abundantly clear that some motives from the pre-election violence spilled over into the post-poll period. By making the country largely ungovernable through the use of violence, for example, and by giving no indication of common ground for compromising, ODM opposition supporters in 2007 and 2008 effectively did influence the post-election political establishment, if not the actual vote tally. The terroristic activity of the militant opposition worked, in other words, because their candidate, Raila Odinga, ended up sharing power with Mwai Kibaki. Because the post-election violence did influence Kenya’s
political arrangement after the poll in this fashion - and the violence was designed explicitly to do so - I believe that it is appropriate to cautiously blend some pre-election violence explanations into a post-election violence study. Still, the 2007-2008 Kenyan post-election violence was less state-centric and premeditated than pre-election conflict in 1992 or 1997, and I elaborate upon such distinctions as I move forward with my analysis.

I rely on several types of data to capture exposure to election violence as it occurred across Kenya following the 2007 national poll. For most of these data, it is easy to be certain that incidents of conflict are in fact cases of election violence. This is because the sources are either defined as such explicitly (the hospital records I use), or because it is possible to set a date range for observations in the larger violence data set (my media-based conflict event data). However, I also use population based surveys to measure exposure to violence. Fortunately, the Afrobarometer Round Four (enumerated in October 2008) survey instrument clearly identifies the 2007 post-election violence. Respondents are told before being asked questions about conflict: “Now I would like to ask you some questions about the events that followed the December 2007 general elections. As you know, there were outbreaks of violence in various parts of the country...” (Afrobarometer, 2010, 41). Using this prompt clearly distinguishes violence that took place during other time periods from the electoral conflict that I study. In conducting interviews personally, I was also careful to define the subject of discussion as election violence.

There are several reasons that it is important for researchers to limit the range of experiences with violence that are under investigation in any study. Raiding activity among pastoralist communities in northern Kenya, as an example of one form of conflict, can be considered a noteworthy deviation from election violence. While such violence is linked to politics on the whole, Pokot-Turkana raids, among other perennial skirmishes, take place with a cyclical regularity that is only loosely tied to electoral politics (though increasingly so, according to Grenier 2013). Quasi-criminal banditry activity along the Somali border is also a form of conflict that is not appropriate to include in the present study. Exposure to the forms of hijacking and robbery violence that militia groups commit in that area could skew the conclusions that I make for electoral conflict. Finally, Islamist
militant activity is also not part of the scope of this work, though violence associated with their cause occurs periodically along the coast, and, increasingly, in Nairobi.

2.2 Geographical approaches to the study of violent politics

In this section, I present core elements of the geographical lens that I adopt in this study of election violence. This overview is more specific than the general presentation of a “contextual view” of social processes that I provided in the preceding chapter. The geographical framework that I lay out can be broken into three main areas. First, the spatial dependencies of conflict are of substantial interest because the geographically patterned distribution of events reveals important underlying social phenomena. Second, scales of analysis are important for conflict research, mainly in that localizing research allows researchers to avoid committing an ecological fallacy. Finally, a geographic approach to the study of conflict must uncover the nuances of territoriality and the roots of claims that populations make to certain geographic spaces. I present the last section with a clear application to Kenya, as territoriality is a highly place-specific phenomenon.

2.2.1 Conflict dependencies and underlying social processes

No social phenomena take place in a spatial vacuum. Following Waldo Tobler’s law - that “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things” (Tobler 1970) - political violence clusters at global inter-regional scales (Most and Starr 1980; O’Loughlin 1986; O’Loughlin and Anselin 1991; Ward and Gleditsch 2002; Gleditsch and Ward 2000) and at local levels (O’Loughlin, et al. 2012; Linke, Witmer, and O’Loughlin 2012; O’Loughlin, Holland, and Witmer 2011; O’Loughlin, Witmer, and Linke, 2010; O’Loughlin, et al. 2010; O’Loughlin and Witmer 2009; Zhukov 2012; Weidmann and Ward 2012; Braithwaite 2010; Beardsley 2011; Braithwaite and Johnson 2012; Schutte and Weidmann 2010). Across social science disciplines, there is a growing recognition of geographers’ conceptual and methodological contributions to the study of conflict clustering. Geographical dependencies are observed across space if conflict at observation \( n_i \) is related to conflict at nearby \( n_j \). The association may be caused by location only, whereby
values among data are literally a function of, or dependent upon, the values in nearby observations (the “auto-” portion of the term “autocorrelation”). Alternatively, the similarity in observations may be a result of the fact that neighboring observations are commonly influenced by an underlying process, or mechanism, that produced the relation among values. Flint (1998) presents a helpful overview of the distinction between spatial dependencies and spatial associations in a study of Nazi party support in Germany. For both cases, areas of homogeneity are observed among data, whereby like values cluster in certain regions of a study area. Spatial heterogeneity, on the other hand, is viewed among data where the un-related character of observations results in a random or normal distribution. At an international scale, conflict may cluster among states as a result of underlying country-level factors such as regime type or poverty (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Hegre, et al. 2001), or declining economic growth among countries in the region (Murdoch and Sandler 2004) and this would represent a spatial association for conflict driven by an underlying process. A direct dependency between conflict observations in the case of civil war would be observed where rebels crossed international borders, carrying conflict with them (Saleyhan 2009; Prunier 2009). The spatial dimension of any geographical clustering analysis may be defined for any geographical unit (exact location, states, sub-national administrative units, or otherwise), and by a range of connectivities, or weights matrices. Connections between observations can be defined by geographical distance (proximity or congruence among units of observation), or other characteristics that units of observation have in common (e.g. trade network engagement).

As I have indicated in the brief examples above, the causes of conflict spillover among observations may be both internal and external to the country or sub-national administrative unit under investigation. Gledisch (2007, 293), for instance, in investigating a closed-polity explanation of violence finds that “the risk of civil war is not determined just by a country’s internal or or domestic characteristics, but differs fundamentally depending on a country’s linkages to other states.” First, shared borders provide the opportunity for violence between neighboring states (O’Loughlin and Anselin 1992; Siverson and Starr 1990). The 1978-1979 war between Uganda and Tanzania involved territorial claims, and even after Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia fighting took place in
the late 1990s and early 2000s along disputed territory. Somalia and Ethiopia fought over the Ogaden region in 1978-1979, but animosities emerged again in late 2006 and Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia’s territory. Second, ethnic group distributions (Forsberg 2008; Gleditsch 2007) may facilitate the spread of conflict as well. This could be due to historical ties separating members of a cohesive group that is split across state lines from the majority group dominating each of those states. Third, conflict can spread from one territory to another directly along with the movement of militants across porous borders (Saleyhan 2009). Such a contagion effect may be found in the case of the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda and Southern Sudan, or for *Interhamwe* ex-genocidiers committing attacks in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (Prunier 2009). Relatedly, conflict may spread across territory specifically because a group uses territory across an international border as a training ground or base for attacks (Braithwaite 2010; O’Loughlin, Witmer, and Linke 2010). Comparatively benign, the transfer of non-militant populations may also simply place stress on the availability of resources in the arrival location (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Clustering of conflict can also exist in cases where neighboring states support either side within a given war (Gleditsch 2007). Libyan support for armed resistance in northern Chad is an example of such a phenomenon along with Charles Taylor’s support for the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, among many others.

In sub-national studies, diffusion and clustering of violence may be a result of several influential factors. For political violence in the setting of an insurgency, conflict clusters along roads because of their strategic and practical importance (Zhukov 2012). Schutte and Weidmann (2011) suggest that violence exhibits varying types of diffusion - “relocation” and “escalation” - based on whether the war is irregular, or not state-vs-rebel based. In escalation violence the original location representing the source of a diffusion signal remains violent, instead of transitioning to peace, which is more likely to take place with frontline (regular) warfare. Wilkinson (2006), in his electoral conflict research that I discuss in greater detail below, argues that violence clusters (implicitly, in his study) in Indian electoral constituencies where political party support is evenly matched. O’Loughlin and Witmer (2012) suggest that patterns of conflict diffusion are driven by
the ideological shift from nationalism to Islamism for the insurgents engaged in conflict in Russia’s North Caucasus. The authors of all of these studies point toward underlying forces that drive the spatial characteristics of conflict, identifying such influences is also my goal in this dissertation.

In my following analysis, I have not focused on the diffusion of conflict *per se*, which is the clear topic of some of the studies above. Nevertheless, an important foundation for my work lies in the geographical characteristics of electoral conflict. First, the geographic dependencies that are observed for the conflicts studied above highlight spatial and temporal patterns that I also identify for Kenyan electoral conflict. More importantly, as in the research above, I view the spatial clustering of conflict to be a signal emanating from, and in some way therefore representing, an underlying social process. The typical conflict research first identifies a pattern of conflict and then moves toward an explanation of that pattern; these are the steps that I follow in moving from Chapters Two and Three to Chapters Four through Six.

2.2.2 Scales of conflict analysis

A conceptual issue that has plagued attempts to explain violence within the academic community is the ecological fallacy. The ecological fallacy presents a problem of geographical scale that I view to be very important for my analysis. Ecological fallacies are made when inferences concerning social processes and mechanisms explaining conflict are drawn from one level of analysis (e.g. country) and applied to another (e.g. the individual). Often this occurs in the context of civil war studies, whereby “poverty” and “relative deprivation” models of conflict, to use two common examples, are explained in empirical analysis based on a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Does the fact that a country is poor necessarily explain whether poverty motivates one person to participate in killing? With analysis conducted at the country scale, the researcher simply cannot know. Although mechanisms are difficult to identify in research conducted at inter-state scales, as my question highlights, researchers propose many explanations for a poverty-conflict link. Collier and Hoeffler (2004), for instance, suggest that individuals in poorer countries are more willing than in wealthier countries to supplement their incomes by fighting. But the data Collier and Hoeffler use
to test their propositions about the association between poverty and war do not match the highly localized character of violence itself. It is a gross simplification, for example, to declare that conflict affects all places within a country at the same time and for the same reasons (a tacit assumption of the country-year analysis Collier and Hoeffler and other researchers use). Conceptually, therefore, there exists a clear mismatch between individual- and group-level theoretical models of violence and the coarse data that are often used to test their empirical evidence in the real world.

Beyond identifying the inter-dependence of conflict at the inter-state scale, a trend in the geographic study of conflict that I presented in the last section, a second geographic turn in the conflict research community has been toward localized analysis. While earlier work covering the geography of war and other forms of violence was carried out at the country level, it is more appropriate to discuss conflict on a town-by-town, or constituency-by-constituency basis. Recent examples of such a spatial focus include rayoni in the North Caucasus (O’Loughlin and Witmer 2011), districts in Iraq (Linke, Witmer, and O’Loughlin 2012), municipalities in Guatemala (Sullivan 2012), actual locations in the North Caucasus (Zhukov 2012) and Spain (Balcells 2011b), grid cells in Africa (Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013), districts in Afghanistan (Berman, et al. 2011) and even buffer zones (defined in km from a location) in Afghanistan (O’Loughlin, Witmer, and Linke 2010). Straus (2004), Kalyvas (2006), Varshney (2002), and Wilkinson (2006) pioneered the sub-country level of analysis for their work, and identify important trends in the distribution of conflict by doing so. For example, electoral conflict may exhibit clustering patterns predominantly in an area where constituents’ party loyalty is near parity, where a small deviation in the level of support could mean victory (Wilkinson 2006). Following the election violence scenario, that area is a context where violence is encouraged by political party leaders, who use campaign promises as incentives. Similarly, explaining the motivations for participating in civil war is more appropriately carried out at a scale where territorial control can be measured alongside the specific details of victimization and location (Kalyvas 2006). Further, a general environment of insecurity - varying across towns depending on their unique histories and position relative to ongoing warfare - was a greater predictor of participating in Rwanda’s genocide than any other factor according to localized
scrutiny of the conflict (Straus 2004). Straus’ claim rests on the individual desire to remain personally secure in the face of pressures to participate in violent behavior that is being perpetrated against others. With all of these studies as background for my research, one of the reasons that I rely on survey data to understand Kenyan post-election violence is that it captures social dynamics at the level of the individual.

2.2.3 Territoriality and claiming place in conflict

During 1992 and 1997 election skirmishes in Kenya, armed actors employed coerced relocation and eviction as a political tool. In addition to understanding the social contexts of such conflict, it is also important to consider the process of place-claiming that occurs within bouts of election violence. In contrast to the discussions above, the attention that I pay to territoriality is highly context specific and I review it within the Kenyan case. Figure 2.1 below shows provinces, by color, and districts, indexed by number, across Kenya. This figure is a helpful resource throughout the following chapters, where I refer to districts and regions frequently. The boundaries of administrative units in Kenya have changed frequently over the last decade or more. These changes have taken place largely because politicians want the opportunity to make politically-motivated appointments in the form of district commissioner postings. Figure 2.1 identifies those district boundaries that I use in the analysis throughout this research. These borders are closest to those provided in the Afrobarometer survey data I use, but also most closely reflect political realities before the 2007 poll.
As I have established above, ethnicity is a crucially important consideration for understanding the context of any social processes, including political violence. I present the spatial distribution of Kenyan ethnicities with large population sizes in Figure 2.2 below. In Chapter One, I introduced my understanding of the fluid nature of ethnicity and my view of its role in Kenyan conflict. While I maintain the position that the salience of ethnicity is context specific, many claims to territory and resources are bound to relatively static historical narratives of group lineage and
traditional homelands. For this reason it is important to understand the ethnic demography of Kenya. Additionally, the country’s ethnic composition is closely related to voting patterns, which are an important element of following sections of this chapter. These locationally-specific data are derived from *Ethnologue* information (Ethnologue 2010). Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Kalenjin, and Kamba populations are the largest in Kenya, overall, with roughly 17.15%, 13.82%, 12.8%, 10.47% and 10.00%, respectively, according to the 2009 census. Many of the pastoralist groups identified in the figure, including the Turkana, Samburu, Pokot and Masai, play an important role in the country’s politics. These groups often feel that they are marginalized from the provision of public goods by the state, and that they are discriminated against due to their non-agricultural livelihood strategy. In following analysis, I outline the many political disputes related to the distribution of populations within the country.
While the Kikuyu traditional area is central, this population now lives in all regions of the country, and are often forced to flee during times of election conflict. The geographic process of forced eviction in Kenya is as common among ethnic enclaves in urban settings as it is in rural regions (de Smedt 2009). While land tenure conflicts in Kenya heat up during elections, the foundational ingredients for violence exist year-round (see Boone 2011). This is especially so in the central and northern Rift Valley area, traditionally claimed by the Kalenjin and Masai. As the colonial era came to an end, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), chaired by
future president Daniel Arap Moi generally represented the interests of the large Kalenjin and Luhya groups within Kenya. The Kenya African National Union (KANU), a political party more national in support, was largely dominated by the Kikuyu. Overseeing resettlement following Jomo Kenyatta’s Million Acre scheme, which allowed any Kenyan to buy land anywhere in the country for the first time, the Rift Valley Regional Assembly (among the nine other provincial organizations) was dominated at a rate of two to one by KADU. With the balance of representation skewed in favor of the Kalenjin, who originally inhabited the central Rift Valley, “The politicians of the [Rift Valley Regional] Assembly became increasingly aggressive in pushing the land claims of their constituents against those of ‘outsiders,’ by which of course they meant the Kikuyu” (Bates 2006, 59). Popularizing the issue, KADU officials reportedly sometimes told the Kalenjin that once outsiders left, the land would belong to them. Similar rally cries were made during the 2007 election campaign, and Straus and Taylor (2009) have shown that when such local disputes related to the distribution of resources, especially land, are translated onto a country’s party politics, the risk of serious electoral conflict rises. The historical legacy of this phenomenon is well documented for Kenya. Before voter registration began during the summer of 1992, Bungoma district was engulfed in violence designed to intimidate opposition “outsiders” (Commonwealth Secretariat 1993, 20). In an effort to maintain KANU control of Rift Valley constituencies during the same year, politicians also organized campaigns to evict Kikuyu “foreigners” and “aliens” in from traditionally Kalenjin land (Daily Nation 1993). Wamwere (2008, 62) expresses the logic in spatial terms, describing an effort to create an ethno-territorial “Moi-KANU zone.”

When exclusive ethnic distributions and borders are naturalized in political discourse, the differences between groups are cemented in historical memory (Mamdani 2005, 272), and conflict repeatedly takes place along ethno-territorial lines. While many Kikuyu are now third and fourth generation residents of the central and north-central Rift Valley, they nevertheless face charges of historical injustice. Efforts to spread ethno-spatial ideals appeared in regional vernacular radio broadcasts and randomly-disseminated SMS messages following the 2007 election. One documented SMS message from immediately after the December election read: “we as Kalenjin Community
would like to inform the Kikuyu who live here at Solai to immediately leave the farms you occupy or else we warn you that we shall attack you forcefully anytime” (KHRC 2008, 36). While the Kikuyu are commonly targeted population during elections since the 1990s, and their collective experience serves as a vignette here, other groups were targets of territorial violence as well (Barkan and Ng’ethe 1998, 33). Many Luo moved into Nandi district following the colonial era and by buying portions of formerly white settler land they offended the Kalenjin, who viewed the land as originally theirs. In October 1991 Kalenjin attacked Luo at Meteitei Fram, pushing them from their homes in violence that eventually spread to nearby Kericho and Kisumu (Branch 2011, 198). Additionally, Kisii and Luo were evicted from areas of Narok district during Moi’s tenure (Branch 2011, 205). The fact that violence affects Kenyans across the ethnic spectrum is also true for the Afrobarometer Round Four data (2008), and I illustrate this below. Eviction-related election violence also takes place outside of the Rift Valley, as evidenced by the fact that approximately 75% of those populations who opposed incumbent KANU during the 1997 election were displaced from their homes in coastal areas in Mombasa and Kwale districts (Mazrui 1997).

By ejecting a particular group from a constituency, leaders of another group assume that their associates would be elected to the National Assembly and represent their interests while in office. Following the (arguably misguided) belief that leaders of an ethnic group necessarily act in the interest of all members of that group, it follows that individual supporters of X or Y party have an incentive to do the footwork for the leaders of those parties (Mutahi 2005). This is the principle that drives clientelistic and ethnic patronage relationships within African states (Clahpam 1998). At a house-by-house local scale, perpetrators of election violence were engaged in spatial behavior that was organized to influence some larger (national) territorial goal defined by political leadership. The contentious nature of Kenyan constituency re-districting in the 1990s and early 2000s, which served as a tool to maintain KANU power after the introduction of competitive polls in 1992, is another illustration of manipulating access to power through delimiting territorial boundaries (Kasara 2010a). While evicting political opponents cannot influence a current/contemporary poll, this practice can alter the next round of elections. The logic of expulsion therefore continues
even though the narrative of post-election violence is often dominated by discourses of revenge. The practice of forcibly expelling Kenyans from their homes during election periods represents, “an attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (Sack 1986, 19). As such, forced displacement constitutes a classical expression of territoriality.

Ethno-national territoriality may not involve outright elimination of a targeted population - as in genocide - but often includes their permanent spatial dislocation from a particular area (Wood 2001). A terribly effective tool toward this end is “domicide”, which Porteous and Smith (2001, 12) have defined as “the deliberate destruction of home by human agency in pursuit of specified goals, which causes suffering to the victims.” Domicide is not simply the destruction of a building; home is not only a tangible place, but connotes abstract and relative ideas of place. In this sense, domicile destroys community relationships, history, culture, and symbols associated with the victims. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (2005, 244) emphasize the fact that domicile occurs in order to realize a spatial principle or goal - that of an ethnically homogenous space. On Colombia’s Pacific coast, Oslender (2007) has shown that armed actors leave threatening traces such as graffiti to indicate their impending return and intention to commit violent acts. Similarly, during Mozambique’s civil war Renamo used campaigns of terrorizing destruction as a spatial governance tool designed to keep Frelimo-sympathizing villages unpopulated (Lunstrum 2010). The destruction of ethnic Georgian villages was also common during the 2008 Russian incursion into South Ossetia, a predominantly Russian ethnicity autonomous region of northern Georgia (Ó Tuathail 2008). O’Loughlin, Ó Tuathail, and Kolossov (2008) illustrate the ethnicized politics of expulsion in North Ossetia as well. Because of the diverse forms that territorial conflict may take, I have specifically incorporated the destruction of home and eviction to account for the influential role of this practice within broader bouts of violence.
2.3 Explanations of conflict

Here I provide an overview of literature explaining the causes of conflict. In the discussion of spatial dependencies, spatial scales, and territorialities applied to conflict research above, I try to emphasize how consideration for each sheds light on the conflict process by presenting innovative findings in several cases. Below is a more detailed overview, paired with application to Kenya, of two main causes of conflict found in the literature on violence in African states. Where much of the earlier literature on conflict is based on civil war as a unit of analysis, the logic of participating in or supporting opposition politics pertain more specifically to an overview of my research questions. Violent politics, after all, usually emerge out of an existing case of more benign contentious politics. In this section I am focusing on marginalization and exclusion explanations for conflict, and the electoral and institutional context of ballot irregularities and manipulation. These two explanations combine, I believe, to form a coupled or compounded grievance structure that I outline in greater detail in the conclusion to this chapter. Explained briefly, the fact that the election was viewed as “stolen” by a community that also committed an initial set of injustices during Kenya’s early independence caused opposition mechanisms to merge. This clout translated into the severity of the election killings following the 2007 poll.

2.3.1 Marginalization and exclusion as explanations of conflict

Ethnicity is key for understanding conflict in African states. Outside of Marakwet district in the Rift Valley during fieldwork I was in a Kalenjin home proudly displaying a photograph of former-president Daniel Arap Moi above the door (Author Interview 3, 2011). While it is common to find shops displaying the current Kenyan president’s portrait as an act of patriotism, why a person would commemorate the leadership of a past president in a private resident is perhaps more obvious: The answer of course is ethnic affiliation. As a matter of pride, this family did not remove Moi’s portrait and post Kibaki’s instead in 2002 because the Moi image as president represents achievement for that ethnic community. There is nothing wrong with such sentiments in a basic sense, but they
play an important role in narratives surrounding electoral violence and need to be investigated seriously. Out-dated models of conflict assume a nearly “natural” tendency for conflict between groups. These views can be roughly categorized within the so-called “ethnic-hatreds” frameworks for understanding violent conflict, which are found more often in media accounts than academic conflict studies research. Proponents of this position, generally speaking, may be divided between classical works in the area of ethnic relations, and those with a specific focus on African states. In the former group, the more “primordial” view can be found in the work of Smith (1983), and Connor (1994; 2004). Spanning back to the origins of nation analysis in Herder’s 18th century study of Germans, ethnocentric approaches have relied on the fact that nationalists regularly make claims to ethnic origins and cultural historical legacies. In their view, political developments associated with what we would broadly call “modernization”, have not - in contrast to the views of other outlined below - led to the demise of ethnicized politics and conflict. The end of the Cold War represented, on the surface, a vindication of the ethnocentric view of conflict in that ideological differences at the macrocosmic level gave way to ethnicized war in the Balkans (as accounted for in Hagen’s “ethnic hatred” account of Kosovo in 1999), and among African states (including Horowitz’s (1993) coverage of the war that followed in the wake of state collapse in Somalia).

In contrast to the view that ethnicity has an overwhelmingly immutable characteristic, other classical work has illustrated the manufacture of ethnicity by influential actors (be they state or non-state). Deutsch (1966) presents a comparatively modernist view to the interpretation of the role that ethnicity plays in social life, and political mobilization, arguing that there is cause to believe social cohesion, for example as a result of urbanization, plays an important role in the value placed in ethnic communities. Similarly, ethnicity is “invented” before it becomes salient as part of any social process for individuals according to Gellner (1983), and, as Kedourie (1993) had emphasized, nationalism is sociologically formulated. The importance of ethnicity to the political arena may be a result, also, of technological change, whereby uneven development between groups fosters perceived injustice and ethnic boundary maintenance. Communication technologies and the political-economy zeitgeist in an era contributes to the importance of ethnic ties, additionally,
according to Anderson (1981; 1983). The work of Deutsch, Gellner, Kedourie, Anderson, and others, all called into question overly simplistic and deterministic understandings of ethnicity in some areas of research on the topic. It is in this vein that academic scholarship on ethnic identity in Africa follows, as is evident in the work of Posner, Jacquin-Berdal, and Chabal and Daloz I have referred to in earlier sections. The interpretation of identities in African societies as relatively fluid, in contrast with the immutable interpretation, is due to the highly influential role that the colonial state played in manipulating ethnic categories and their role in political life.

There is no question that states played a role in the development of ethnicities globally, but sometimes, as in common European examples, the structures of governance emerged endogenously from a given population. In these cases, the state reflected the character of at least some sector of the population, although on the whole that portion of the population may have been un-characteristically wealthy, demographically majoritarian, or otherwise dissimilar from the wider population. Amadife and Warhola (1993, 538) note that even with regard to macroscopic African territorial divisions (of nation-states), at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, “topographic, demographic, and ethnographic considerations, to the extent that they mattered at all, reflected European, and not indigenous, interests.” The interests certainly were related to resource extraction, but the structure and institutional framework that European governments used in Africa were altogether unfamiliar and foreign. Paradoxically, of course, the Berlin conference was meant to prevent conflict among European powers, with little regard for the fact that it very likely increased conflict for future African generations.

In the ethnic-hatreds model, underlying conflict is somehow released, or triggered, but fundamental differences between communities, be they linguistic, cultural, or religious, cause disagreement and tension organically. A more nuanced claim about inter-group conflict might be that ethnicity is key for understanding conflict in African states because ethnicity is key for understanding marginalization and exclusion in African states. Introduced as a guiding lens in Chapter One, I adopt an approach for this research that emphasizes the social and political contexts surrounding ethnic conflict. Intra-group cohesion may be greatest when, to use the terms of Emerson (1967) in
his study of nationalism, when “the chips are down”, or where other entities for providing security and well-being have collapsed. In such a case it is not the difference between communities in and of itself that translates into conflict, but some extenuating circumstance. To follow the example of poverty, when social conditions are harsh, families are poor, and future security is uncertain - as in too many African states - in-group ties become something like an “insurance policy” for survival (Collier 2009). An in-group in this scenario matters not at all because of some historical cultural trait that defines difference from other ethnic communities. Instead, the most important quality of in-group ties might be common language, which reduces the difficulties of collective action, but also may be spoken sometimes to limit inclusion of members of other communities. More explicitly political, Posen (1993) translates this dynamic into the security dilemma paradigm. In that model of group dynamics, inter-active efforts for groups to control territory, access to policy implementation measures, and to actual physical safety play off of one another in cyclical fashion of escalating threats and counter-threats. Specifically, again, to the African context Jacquin-Berdal (2002) shows that political violence can be a very important component of ethnic group formation and maintenance in political narratives of public affairs. This understanding of how ethnicity plays a role in contemporary Africa, and in contemporary African conflicts, is far closer, conceptually, to the work of Giddens (1985) and Mann (1986) in that I understand the role of the state in forming ethnicities to be powerful.

Accepting that ethnicity is often a vector for exclusion and marginalization, it is worth revisiting classical literature on the issues of grievance, and opposition politics (and even rebellion). The argument translating marginalization into conflict is as follows. Where legal avenues of expression are not available for citizens, the potential for political expression to take violent forms increases. This explanation of conflict is based on an exclusion mechanism, whereby there exists institutionalized discrimination against the cultural, religious, or linguistic traits of a group. There is certainly evidence of this phenomenon in the Kenyan experience of 2007-2008. In some cases, identity politics and language policy are even linked explicitly to violent conflict in western Kenya (Jones 2011). At issue was the Kenyan national policy of using the local language of an area in Standards 1-3
(Early Childhood) alongside Kiswahili and English, with a switch to English and Kiswahili after Standard 4. Those who support a greater degree of regional autonomy, and this includes those who favor ethno-territorial ideals such as majimboism, support using local languages throughout schooling. For some cases in the literature on this topic religious freedom plays an important role in the marginalization and conflict narrative, as in disputes between Hindu Tamil populations and the majoritarian Buddhist Sinhalese population in Sri Lanka. Typical examples include the partition of India, with regard to religious differences, or in European conflict in the Balkans. Gurr (1970), for example, similarly identifies causes for joining secessionist rebellion, where management of political affairs of a territory is the key end goal. Among African states, Herbst (2001) focuses on the capacity of the state to manage remote areas, where rebel groups form, train, and recruit for their cause. This represents a kind of institutional or infrastructural marginalization, and typical examples include the unruly and disputed ethnic Somali region of Ethiopia, among others. The greatest instability may lie where each type of marginalization - that is religious or ethnic and in terms of state access - overlap. The doubled risk of the both conditions holding may translate into conflict, however, where populations cluster within those areas (Hegre and Raleigh 2009).

There is evidence that administrative units within a country that are poorer than other areas are more prone to secessionist conflict (Deiwiks, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2012). Economic considerations for explaining conflict are also inherently political, of course, but this might be considered an economic exclusion model, rather than cultural or religious. The link between poverty and politics is clear where access to the state is the only means to remedy distorted provision of public goods. According to Gurr (1970, 24), for example, “the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity.” Certain researchers propose that engaging in violence in circumstances of poverty is the result of rational calculation of cost and benefit. For individuals, the incentives to participate in conflict for a wage is viewed as outweighing the costs of being unemployed (Sambanis 2002; Collier and

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1 majimboism translates to mean, roughly, “regionalism” in Kiswahili. The term has been used in Kenya since independence to mean institutional federalism.
Hoeffler 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). An alternative to engaging in violence does exist, however. Some propose granting citizens a legitimate degree of autonomy for managing political affairs: federated governance systems is one option that Gurr (1970) recommends, and this theme of decentralized institutions is woven throughout my research.

But what political explanations exist for participating in violence that does not reach the level of civil war? By most considerations, Kenya did not descend into civil war following the December 2007 election. Conceptually, also, somewhat amorphous mob violence cannot always easily be fit into a “government vs. rebel” logic that we would find in a case of secessionist civil war. Political militia and peri-state criminal violence, along with “livelihood” conflicts over land and water, are more common forms of violence today than formal civil wars that characterized years before the end of the Cold War (Straus 2012). Even applying a civil war model to Kenya does not stand empirically. There has always been a self-determination vein in Kenyan political discourse, but this falls shy of independence efforts amounting to full secession. Federalism, or *majimboism*, has always been a central vector of tension in Kenyan politics. Positions on the issue of regional autonomy divide those who value a civic Kenyan identity with those who have ethnocentric ideals. *Majimboism* is not overtly cultural or religious, and proponents of the philosophy have stated openly that they simply want a greater degree of autonomy *within* Kenya. A single exception to this is the so-called “Shifta war”² for ethnic Somali independence in the late 1960s. The goal of the Shifta movement was to break away from Kenya and join independent Somalia.

Outside of civil war studies, direction toward understanding deadly election skirmishes across Kenya can be found in the literature surrounding riots, and especially ethnic riots. Without turning our backs completely on the country-scale studies of marginalization and conflict, it is worth highlighting that in certain instances the mechanism proposed for the link between politics and conflict can be applied to election violence. Elections represent a chance - however unlikely in the case of regimes with autocratic tendencies - for the under-privileged, marginalized, and sidelined groups to achieve change. Because the payoffs for electoral victory are high, opposition party political

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² The term *shifta* is used to mean “outlaw” or “bandit” and has a slightly derogatory connotation in Kenya.
activity rises and public debate often becomes heated.

Individual level expected payoffs link marginalization to electoral violence because the model hinges implicitly on marginalization and exclusion (real or perceived). How likely, for instance, is it that an opposition figure would win support if she campaigned on a platform claiming “we’re doing just fine and need nothing additional from the administration?” Thus, even elite party leader efforts to shape the discourse of violence (Brass 1997) are related to marginalization and exclusion. When cleavages for marginalization fall along ethnic lines, as they so often do in African societies, so does the contest for official positions. In such a scenario, politicians use inflammatory language and inter-group threats to increase their support base. This practices is known as “ethnic-outbidding” (Horowitz 1985), and while it is used to gain political party clout, the effect is to raise social distance between communities. This is a phenomenon Hoglund (2012, 421) also identifies for election violence, whereby norms of using violence, coupled with impunity for doing so, act as factors facilitating election conflict in unstable regimes. Where payoffs from violence are high, and inciting conflict unsanctioned, the practice is likely to continue. This echoes my framing of the informal institutional politics of Kenya being a case where disorder serves “as political instrument” (Chabal and Daloz 1999).

Following these approaches to understanding violence, the influences of local level “contextual” factors are evident. Specifically, the legacies of violence are substantial, and histories of exclusion in particular places become important if the analysis timeline is drawn far enough into the past. A place-based and geographic approach is therefore necessary for understanding the development of conflict in a broad temporal dimension, as I have argued in Chapter One. In the more proximate temporal context, we might expect the tension in election rhetoric to be associated with the polarized quality (near 50-50 proportion support between major groups) of administrative units. This circumstance has been shown to increase the likelihood of violence in India (Wilkenson 2004), but may interact also with a long-term history of exclusion. As for Wilkenson and others, local population proportions are important for my analysis in Chapter Four.

In terms of household level well-being, marginalization has a clear role for participating in
violence according to Scacco (2009), but it is not explicitly because individuals want to remedy
their low standard of living relative to others. Instead, using surveys in Nigeria Scacco finds that
exposure to violence and looting is due to the fact that poorer families cannot afford security
(e.g. gated communities) and are thus drawn in to rioting and political protest. Their position
in the fray is a results of absolute spatial proximity to unrest, and this finding contrasts directly
with elite manipulation models (similar conclusions are drawn by Straus (2004) and Fujii (2009)).
However, granting some power to the role of influential figures, we must understand their appeals
of marginalization are related to several more general areas of grievance. In other words, an
opportunistic party leader would capitalize on sentiments related to economic disparity as quickly
as a hot-button issue like discriminatory practices toward religious or cultural preferences.

How Kenyans perceive their position vis-a-vis other groups on the country stage is key for
explaining who supports violence where, and when. Peterson’s (2002) work provides an important
conceptual framework for my understanding of marginalization and exclusion as explanations of
conflict in Kenya. This is particularly true in Chapter Four, where the four emotions that spark mob
violence in his work are of crucial importance. Separate from fear, hatred and rage explanations
for conflict, the resentment model is built on “consciousness of group status” (Peterson 2002, 1)
and this is a preferred explanatory model for participating in electoral violence. Among Kenya’s
ethnic communities, I show evidence that one of the most important group status definitions may be
previously having controlled the executive office of the national government. The spatial component
of the argument is found in the fact that each motivation for violence “predicts a different pattern
in the timing and targets of action” (Peterson 2002, 2). In narratives of Kenyan ethnic conflict,
there is some evidence for the hatred model identified by Peterson. However, experience in the
government complicates this explanation and, as I argue, the resentment mechanism dominates.

One key type of marginalization that has taken place in Kenya is physical marginalization
from land. In academic research, the most frequently cited consideration for explaining election
violence in Kenya is competition for land (Kanyinga 2009, Rutten and Owuor 2009; Dercon and
Guttiérrez-Romero 2011; Boone 2011). This factor dominates the discussion of Kenyan violence,
but I make the case below that it operates alongside other explanations. Consider the marginalization of Kalenjin communities from areas of the central northern Rift Valley. First, the population was relocated forcibly by the colonial administration from the fertile high elevation lands. After development of the railroad linking Lake Victoria to the Mombasa the formal institutional implementation of land acquisition is marked by the Colonial Office approval in 1908 of the so-called “Elgin pledges”, whereby “as a matter of administrative convenience” non-Europeans were excluded from holding title to land (Sorrenson 1967, 55). For half a century this statute held. Estimates for the territory of white settlement appear in Figure 2.3 below. Data here are derived from Leys (1975, p. xvi) and illustrate a clear pattern. The area of this territory is closer to the settlement scheme area that includes scheduled areas (below) and totals 35,824.24 km².
Arguably, it was policies implemented immediately upon independence that had damning effects for the future, however. This second round of marginalization came in the form of native Kenyan re-settlements that filled a vacuum of colonialist departure. In media accounts of conflict, ethnicity and tribal narratives of violence dominate. From 1963 through 1967, 31,081 individual plots were allocated within 123 settlement schemes ranging in size from less than 10 to over 70 acres, but totaling 1,125,191 acres (Von Haugwitz 1972, 12 + 28). Figure 2.4 below illustrates the distribution of these settlement schemes. Figure 2.5 shows the settlement areas that include so-called “scheduled areas” that were not actually settled at the time of publication, but were formerly owned by white settlers. These data could be important in characterizing the distribution of settlement scheme areas after the 1967 cutoff of the original source material. Land technically was
available to any Kenyan but the settler applications were approved by District Commissioner offices and other state functionaries and required fees (for the land itself and the application fee) (Von Haugwitz 1972, 15-16). With employment experience in the colonial administration, the system was viewed as favoring the Kikuyu, under the implementation of the first, Kikuyu, president Jomo Kenyatta. In essence, this land was purchased after skipping several generations. In the mid-1800s populations were forced off the land and by the mid-1900s it was sold to another community. Tension has arisen, in other words, where land is viewed as having been stolen by white settlers and subsequently “given” to other (Kenyan) settlers on terms that are unfair to the original population. As shown above, during elections, politicians make promises that they say will remedy the situation via some schematic for redistribution and allocation according to new rules.

The policy of establishing and populating settlement schemes was not intended to be contentious and divisive, according to Harbeson’s (1973) overview of land reform following Kenyan independence. Depending on whether the post-independence administration is granted a benevolent benefit of the doubt, the policy was a nominal effort to avoid conflict, not to instill it. However, the policy did grant land to the former Kikuyu reserves’ residents where it was deemed necessary to do so by politicians.

The selection of land and the demarcation of individual plots have appeared to attempt to honor both the economic objectives of African nationalism in Kenya and the economic requirements and objectives of post-independence nation-building. The Kenya government, for example, has tried to divert ambitious African farmers from the White Highlands to high-quality underutilized lands within their own areas [emphasis added] that are suitable for profitable smallholder farming at less expense than the Highlands. At the same time, the Kenya government has met the objectives of African nationalism not only by creating the schemes but also by subdividing the formerly European farms into small-scale intensively farmed units for the benefit of landless persons from the former reserves.

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3 Boone, 2012, and Leys 1975 show that it no one group dominated the entire process: Luo also collectively purchased land in the central Rift Valley. Luhya have also been targeted repeatedly in and around Tranz-Nzoia for similar reasons.
Figure 2.4: Across Kenya, settlement schemes implemented 1964-1967, excluding Scheduled areas. Shapefile and figure, author. Original source, Von Haugwitz (1972).
Key to considering the land allocation issue is that manipulating the system has benefitted multiple ethnic communities at different stages in Kenya’s development. This fact directs us toward the institutional avenues of opportunistic manipulation that state officials use, which is of central importance to understanding land related violence (Boone 2012). Under the Kenyatta regime in the early 1960s, Kikuyu settlers were viewed as having gained privileged access to certain areas; under Moi, the Mau forest and other areas were parcelled out for political favor in a series of what became known as “land grabs” following eviction of the long established settlers (Throup and Hornsby, 2000). Branch (2011, 204-205) makes the case that Moi was an even more serious offender than Kenyatta because during the Kenyatta era at least, some semblance of bureaucratic framework for titling and maintaining records existed. Mueller (2008) makes a similar claim, but with a focus
on dwindling lands available for allocation, and on the harmful effects of falling commodity prices (coffee) for state revenue. This phenomenon is not limited to Kenya, of course, and Boone and Kriger (2010) outline how a similar process is taking place in Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire. For Moi, Boone and Kriger argue, land itself became “valuable currency” to buy support and favor. This behavior spread even into urban areas at the end of 1990, with thousands displaced by the destruction of informal settlements which were then sold privately (Branch 2011, 205). Because land is used by politicians, “disputes over access to land in Kenya are intertwined with disputes over how state power has been used to gain political advantage, lock in these advantages, and create winners and losers in the national political economy at large” (Boone 2012, 78). There is a re-scaling, in other words, from local land disputes to the national political arena.

While the issue emerges in general political debate, explaining violence as a result of underlying land issues does not explain violence everywhere in Kenya. Even where land issues broadly defined are translated into political violence in other locations - an “extension” of the phenomenon rather than an outlier or exception, according to Boone (2011, 1330-1331) - there is still a possible missing link between the contentious issue and actual violence. Table 2.1 illustrates an interesting phenomenon in this regard. Leading up to the 2007 national poll, respondents to a nationally representative survey were asked how often political representatives in their area “openly advocated” the use of violence. The distribution of responses across provinces shows that politicians made the most inflammatory and caustic remarks in Nairobi and Coast provinces. Were settlement schemes the key link with violence, we might expect encouragement for open conflict to cluster in the Rift Valley, which instead ranks third, with Central a close fourth.\footnote{From Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero (2011) replication data, respondents were asked “Over the last year, how supportive of violence, in terms of openly advocating violence, have been political representatives in your area?” I collapse “somewhat”, “much”, and “extremely” into a single category. No finer resolution than province is exists in the public file.} The trend in this table is not meant to address whether politicians foment violence effectively, or even to suggest that perpetrators of violence would or would not have chosen to follow the lead of influential figures. It is only to suggest that the rhetoric leaders use does not fall in line with an explanation relying solely on land issues.
That violence actually was worse in the Rift Valley may even underscore the fact that contentious politics there erupt with high predictability despite the national level dialogue. Nevertheless, Table 2.1 underscores broader patterns of instability and a crises of political leadership across Kenya.

Table 2.1: Cases of politicians promoting violence across provinces. Author calculations from Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2011) survey data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Respondents Reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Below I pair spatial representations of settlement schemes and colonial landholdings with districts in order to empirically assess the relationship between land tenure context and election violence. I use the district as a scale of analysis because this is the finest resolution reported in the Commission for the Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV). For a measure of violence, I present the number of deaths reported by hospitals in the weeks following the December 2007 election. I rely on this data again in later chapters. I also use GIS spatial representations (presented above) of settlement schemes that were implemented during the first years of independence. The area of settlement scheme territory according to the data I generated from historical texts is 5,631.85 km². Converted into acres, this is 1,391,662.17 acres, corresponding relatively well with the value 1,125,191 given in the original material (Von Haugwitz 1972, 12). Overlaying either the settlement program or colonial holdings shapefile with the district boundary representation, I calculate the area of each district that can be considered either part of a settlement scheme, or, at the very least, formerly-white owned. We may expect a roughly linear relationship between the area of a district that might be called tenuously-held by current residents, and post-election violence, if the land tenure issue alone were to blame.
There is some evidence for the expected relationship, but it is not complete or conclusive. In a watercolor regression plot, blue indicates wide margins of errors (in 1000 bootstrapped simulations) for a non-linear fit and low certainty in the relationship between the horizontal and vertical axis (see Figure 2.6, 2.7). Red areas indicate a strong association between settlement scheme area and conflict. The benefit of this simple and preliminary modeling strategy is that it is visually easy to interpret: where the relationship varies widely with many simulations the relationship is weak. I use this tool to test the relationship between the area of a district that can be classified as colonial-era settlement territory, and the number of injuries, and separately deaths, that were reported in the CIPEV. The expression of uncertainty in the simulations is helpful because of the small sample size (60) in this preliminary analysis. Results are only bivariate and present the most simple relationship we might expect. For the broad (large) settlement area estimate, Figures 2.6 and 2.7 both illustrate a generally positive, but weak, relationship, with the relationship evaporating with larger settlement scheme area values and greater injury and death counts. Pearson’s product-moment correlation for deaths is .488 ($p \leq .001$), and for injuries it is .371 ($p \leq .01$).
If I use a more conservative estimate of settlement schemes from the von Haugwitz text (only known schemes as of 1967, and not scheduled areas), the relationship is also not strong. A more acute association could emerge with actual settlement scheme data, but this is not supported. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show that the relationship between settlement area and conflict for settlement schemes from Figure 2.4 is not substantially different than those from Figure 2.5. In this case the data are not correlated at all for either deaths or injuries. Again, this result lies in contrast to our expectation, which would result in a near linear positive relationship, and, ideally more certainty (red) in the link.
Figure 2.8: CIPEV reported deaths, by district, as a function of district area (km$^2$) designated as settlement schemes according to Von Haugwitz (1972, 94) after excluding scheduled settlements.

Figure 2.9: CIPEV reported injuries, by district, as a function of district area (km$^2$) designated as settlement schemes according to Von Haugwitz (1972, 94) after excluding scheduled settlements.

Finally, I test the relationship above with a spatial representation of Leys’ (1975, p. xvi) white-owned colonial landholder map (Figure 2.3 above). A trend similar to that revealed above emerges in Figures 2.10 and 2.11, although the association between settlement area and conflict is stronger. The correlation between deaths, on one hand, and injuries, on the other with formerly-white land ownership is .398 ($p \leq .05$) and .282, with the later not-statistically significant. Because the sample size in this analysis is relatively small the results warrant careful interpretation. It is possible that the settlement-scheme-violence link is relatively weak because of the scale of analysis (district) used here. Specifically, conflict may be clustered within districts immediately at the site of a settlement land parcel. However, districts are an important unit of analysis for later analyses because data for that level are most readily available (often, in survey form).
Figure 2.10: CIPEV reported deaths, by district, as a function of district area ($km^2$) designated as white-owned prior to independence according to Leys (1975, xvi).

Figure 2.11: CIPEV reported injuries, by district, as a function of district area ($km^2$) designated as white-owned prior to independence according to Leys (1975, xvi).

Within patronage land regimes, there is something more to the story that lies in the relative positioning of groups vis-a-vis one another, and this is an argument I develop further in Chapters Four and Five. I propose later that social contexts (defined by historical typology of land settlement) explain conflict behavior outcomes - that is, violence - most effectively when they are understood alongside contemporary social settings. In later analyses, I add data for socio-economic status, ethno-centric preferences, and ethnic community polarization to my investigation of how settlement schemes may influence conflict.

### 2.3.2 Election geographies and Kenya

In the section above, I have outlined the politics of marginalization from land in Kenya. This common explanation for conflict plays some role in explaining inter-community tensions and violent politics, but the explanatory power is not especially strong in preliminary analysis. While land issues are often proposed as an explanatory factor for polling violence, the electoral system
itself - and the manipulation of it - is at least as important (Bekoe 2012). The land issue may give rise to conflict that is spatially-proximate; in this sense it is highly place-specific. However, the election itself is, by definition, national and therefore broader in influence. In this section, I provide a brief overview of electoral institutions in Kenya, and the geography of the 2007 election. I also present results from an empirical test for irregularities in the returns for the 2007 poll. These are valuable for my analysis in that they contextualize the broad political landscape of the country. Also, however, clear links have been made between the exposure of election irregularities and an increased risk of post-election violent uprisings (Daxecker 2012). Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2012, 737) find that the majority of their Kenyan survey respondents reported the proximate cause of election violence in their neighborhood to be “election irregularities and a weak Electoral Commission.” The response in that case situates the conflict at least partly in institutional terms, especially considering that only 10% of respondents attributed the violence to “tribal conflict” alone (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012, 737).

According to Busteed (1975, 3), “geography is particularly important [for electoral research] in that it can add an entirely new dimension to the study of elections,” and in this section I examine the geography of election fraud. In a seminal study of political geography, Cox (1973) identified two elements of human geography: de facto and de jure. Either one, or more frequently a combination of the two, describes the distribution and management of human populations. I examine in this section de jure factors as the electoral system, which are “the set of spatial patterns explicitly defined for administrative purposes” (Taylor and Johnston 1979, 22). However, on the whole this study represents a merger of both because I incorporate de facto elements of the political world as spatial patterns of “social areas”, to use Taylor and Johnston’s term (1979, 22), across Kenya.

Understanding Kenya’s majoritarian political system is important because according to existing research it may have contributed to the risk of violence. Specifically, the majoritarian system may foster post-election violence due to the fact that the election is a winner-take-all affair, with relatively limited allowance for expression granted to the runner-up (Branch and Cheeseman 2008, 21; Kanbur, Rajaram, and Varshney 2010). As the result of the poll being so crucial, it is possible
that post-election violence was perpetrated as a terroristic signaling activity to influence the country’s post-poll institutions. Unfortunately, terrorism often works (Kydd and Walter 2006). Odinga was drawn into the executive branch under Kenya’s post-conflict power-sharing agreement, after all. With this success, from the view of the extreme ODM supporters, terroristic post-election violence - perpetrated against unarmed actors on a large scale - may have been a great success. According to Kydd and Walter’s (2006) typology, for instance, Kenyan post-election skirmishes may be entwined in long term cycles of spoiler behavior, where groups are suspicious of each others’ motives. Those who orchestrate violence are signaling that moderates must not be trusted and that only the extreme position is viable.

The electoral system in Kenya has changed since post-election violence ravaged the country. In 2010 a new system was approved and is being implemented currently, beginning with a March 2013 national presidential election. A highly detailed description of the new constitutional arrangement is provided in the discussion of governmental devolution in Chapter Five. At the time of the 2007 election, the Kenyan electoral system for parliament is based on the British colonial model. Parliamentary representation is based on a first-past-the-post system using electoral constituencies. According to the Kenyan constitution at the time, “all constituencies shall contain as nearly equal numbers of inhabitants as is reasonably practicable” (Kenya 1991, 42.3). In parliamentary elections leading into the December 2007 poll, representation of the 210 elected positions is determined by winning the popular vote in a constituency. There are 12 Parliament members appointed by the president and two seats reserved ex officio. An act calling for a referendum decision allowing direct democracy was introduced in 2004, but it expired. In contrast to the selection of parliamentary representatives, the President was chosen by a nation-wide popular vote where he/she must win a simple majority. The president must also win at least 25 percent of the vote in five of the eight provinces. Provinces - the largest administrative units - include Central, Coast, Eastern, Nairobi, North Eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley, and Western Provinces. According to the constitution, presidential elections are also held according to a two-round system, where candidates must have a run-off if any of the criteria above are not met.
The design of electoral systems and the distribution of representation in national scale decision-making is never a conflict-free enterprise. The goal of democratic governance is to foster participation in decision making at a variety of scales (Taylor and Johnston 1979, 34), but the definitions of administrative unit scale and meanings of participation (whose vote counts, when, and where) are contentious. In this regard, electoral conflict may not be only a behavior immediately related to the election itself, as explained above. Instead, violence may be tied to boundary delineation and geographies of inclusion and exclusion at a more fundamental level. The fairness of certain models of representation in democratic systems is frequently disputed, and a variety of frameworks are used both in developing and industrialized countries to distribute influence in public affairs. Such arrangements also play an important role specifically in the distribution of national (and natural) resources. Among others, examples of determining representation in national legislature include proportional representation systems or first-past-the-post decisions based on tallies within an administrative unit. Electoral geographies of Western states have illustrated highly variable local-scale patterns that deviate from national scale outcomes (e.g. Shin and Agnew 2002; O’Loughlin et al. 1994), and this can be part of the criteria for evaluating place-effects. A small sampling of relevant work illustrates this. Interesting studies of election participation more specifically include Kohfeld and Sprague (2002) and Sui and Hugill (2002). Kohfeld and Sprague (2002) show that socio-economic and demographic factors can be used effectively as predictors of voter turnout in St. Louis, MO. Sui and Hugill (2002) take a slightly different approach and show that the spatial distribution of individual voter turnout influences voting patterns within a U.S. municipality. In other words, neighborhood effects are important factors in elections (in developing and developed countries) at a local scale and this relates to Agnew’s (1987) strong emphasis for considering the politics of place in social science.

Commonly, a lack of participation in national decision making is blamed for sub-national underdevelopment, as Hickey and Mohan (2004) have shown for rural India. Electoral design is therefore a critical element associated with grievances related to the provision of services. In developing countries, electoral systems are particularly important because intra-national strife can
contribute to reversals of democratic gains made in recent decades (Snyder 2000). While some similarities exist between certain democratic procedures and their social impact in both developing and developed regions of the world, some argue that electoral design has an even more profound influence on election outcomes in poorer and institutionally developing societies. For example, Barkan, Densham, and Rushton (2006, 929) argue that,

consideration of the spatial distribution of the vote is especially important for (but not limited to) the design of electoral systems for plural and agrarian societies. Geography matters more in these societies, because voters are rooted to the land and the local communities to which they belong. They... identify strongly with their place of residence and characteristics shared with fellow community members (e.g., ethnicity, language, race, religion, etc.). Not surprisingly candidates seek to mobilize the electorate on the basis of these affinities with the result that different parties draw their support from different areas.

Kenya is a case where the characteristics of a society identified by Barkan, Densham, and Rushton (2006), among other scholars, are overlapping with a majoritarian system. This combination is a particularly risky scenario for election violence.

The 2007 Kenyan election was typical in that accusations of rigging and irregularity circulated freely prior to and immediately following the day of the election. In one exit poll, Gibson and Long (2009), for example, find strong evidence of malpractice. Irregularities have been well documented in the Kenyan politics literature, especially once the county adopted a multiparty system in 1992. Throup and Hornsby (1998), for example, review the details of irregular registration practices leading into the 1992 election that were designed to keep KANU in power. The addition of two new constituencies (in Nyeri, for example) harmed opposition leader Kibaki, as did “alterations” to District boundaries is Baringo, Kericho, and Elgeyo-Marakwet, where Moi’s supporters are many (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 253). These areas are central to the disputes that are threaded throughout my following arguments. In addition to boundary demarcation irregularities, voter registration prior to the poll was troubled. This problem was “particularly prevalent in certain key marginal areas such as Trans Nzoia” (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 257). Trans Nzoia is used as one of two cases in the most similar case study design I adopt in Chapter Four. In Trans
Nzoia, Luhya (who collectively did not support KANU) were reportedly removed from registries during June leading into the election and some also experienced difficulties obtaining identification cards. Other instances of similar practices abound. “Busing” voters sympathetic to the government position was common practice in highly contested areas, such as Molo constituency, where 13,120 registered voters (out of 13,172) lived at the exact same address (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 259). In Starehe, Nyaribi Chache, Molo, Kitutu Masaba, Nakuru East, and Kajiado North constituencies the percent of eligible voters registered was over 100%, at 171.2%, 142.5%, 133.4%, 119.2%, 115.3%, and 114.2%, respectively. Precedent for such practices clearly exists, and within the contemporary political climate such manipulation represents one key trigger for the election violence.

To capitalize on client networks and reap the benefits of a patrimonial political system, it is necessary to stay in power. Existing research suggests that opposition groups resort to violence and intimidation as tools for gaining clout in the political spectrum while incumbents resort to ballot rigging (Collier and Vicente 2007). As incumbents control a country’s electoral commission, the rigging may take place after the poll behind closed doors in the capital, or it may also take place under the gaze (or even guidance) of police, which the incumbent also controls. In Kenya during 2007 there were reports of the police assisting in ballot rigging, but also that they were preparing for suspicious deployment in certain key (ODM dominated) areas (BBC Monitoring Africa, 2007). Rigging elections deprives groups of expression, feeding into cycles of blame for perceived injustices. Clearly, the effects of systematic marginalization of certain sectors of a country’s population serve as one explanation of conflict that informs my research. On December 24th, 2007, a confidential diplomatic source told a reporter, presciently, that if Kibaki claimed the victory, “then you are going to see the Raila camp go absolutely ballistic, because they’ve led the polls since September” (Cawthome, 2007).

In the following analysis, I use constituency level final poll figures from the Electoral Commission of Kenya and a statistical tool developed by Beber and Scacco (2012) to investigate electoral fraud. It is likely that these electoral data are not 100% accurate, as Gibson and Long (2009) suggest. If they are not actively fabricated, then at the very least they may be marred by the irreg-
ularities associated with political insecurity and violent conflict. Because of data accuracy concerns, I use these information only in a descriptive and cursory analysis to depict political dynamics in the country.

![2007 Constituency vote count across Kenya](image)

Figure 2.12: By constituency, election results for Mwai Kibaki (right) and Raila Odinga (left) in Kenya’s December 27th 2007 national election. Data are from the Electoral Commission of Kenya. Author map.

Figure 2.12 shows the distribution of votes for each of the primary candidates across Kenya’s constituencies. According to these data, Raila Odinga’s support is higher, overall, for certain areas of Kenya’s west, which falls in line with the support network of the ODM opposition party. This is more evident in some of the rural constituencies north of Kisumu, for example in and around Kakamega, and to the south of Kisii in Nyanza near the Tanzanian border. The measure of support is less informative, however, than the percentage of support for the total number of votes cast because there was a substantial third party running. In terms of irregularities, the naked eye
identifies some outliers. However, overall, a summary measure of fairness is not available in this simple map.

The percentage support for each candidate of the total number of votes is presented in figure 2.14. This measure much more closely represents support for the two main candidates. In the west support for Odinga is very high, and the results are nearly opposite for Kibaki, who has a large following in central provinces and some northern areas where coalition agreements with relatively smaller ethnic communities benefitted PNU. Also noteworthy is the fact that party support trends toward a mutually exclusive spatial distribution, with one regional exception in Musyoka’s support base south and east of Nairobi. For example, support for Odinga is very high in areas of West Pokot, but nearly zero for Kibaki, as with western areas generally. South of Nairobi in and around Machakos neither candidate has complete support, as this is the Kamba region of support for the third candidate (Kalonzo Muskyoka), extending into Taita Taveta and including the town of Voi.

Figure 2.13: By electoral constituency, the percent of votes within each constituency for Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga during Kenya’s December 27th 2007 national election. Data are from the Electoral Commission of Kenya. Author map.
We might expect that polarization of political party support communities would be associated with a higher risk of conflict (in line with Wilkinson’s (2004) conclusions about India’s electoral violence). To quickly examine the distribution of near-parity for either of the main two parties, I calculate the areas where both have 40% or more of the constituency’s support. For example, if Odinga carried 45% of the votes in an area and Kibaki earned 41%, then this constituency would qualify as highly polarized, the two main candidates together having 86% of the total population’s support.

**Highly polarized**

Kibaki/Odinga support = red

Figure 2.14: By electoral constituency, the areas (in red) where a high level of support existed for both of the main electoral contenders. Data are from the Electoral Commission of Kenya. Author map.

As I have warned earlier, these data must be interpreted with caution because of the high
probability that they were tampered with. Several patterns emerge in the map. First of all, and expectedly, the major “homeland” areas of Kibaki and Odinga are not highly contested (Central and Western/Nyanza provinces, respectively). Secondly, there is some evidence that polarization exists in marginalized areas, as in the northeast of the country. This is due to the fact that there are not large contingents of either candidate’s ethnic community in these areas - the tendency to vote along ethnic lines is not an option for those living in such a region. There may also be similar dynamics at play in other clusters of constituencies, including Kisii area, where there is an alliance between the Kisii ethnic community and the Kikuyu despite the area being also heavily populated by Luo and Kalenjin to the east of the red clustering. It is also worth noting that areas just in the north of Nakuru district are heavily polarized between Kikuyu (translating into a Kibaki vote) and Kalenjin (supporting Odinga). The constituencies around Nakuru area were the scene of much violence, as I have illustrated above, and this overlap lends support to some anecdotal claims that political party polarization influences the risk of conflict. In terms of ethnicity rather than political party affiliation, I test the polarization-conflict link in Chapter Five.

Moving away from straightforward maps of returns for each constituency, I use statistical tools developed by Beber and Scacco (2012) - used also by Weidmann and Callen (2013) - to detect electoral irregularities. In simple terms, the method compares the frequency that each last digit appears, for all observations (constituencies), to the frequency that a random distribution of values would produce. If a statistically significant variation appears for zeros, or any other number, this can be interpreted as an indication that this number may have been written into the data artificially. It is possible that manipulation took place at another scale within the institutional and administrative hierarchy, but with these data - the only available - figure 2.15 shows that there is not substantial deviation from the random distribution of last digits for the entire country. Constituencies are not perfectly ideal because the units themselves have no influence in the determination of presidential victory, it is simply the level at which the data are aggregated. No count passes above, or below, the confidence interval for what might have resulted from a random data generation process. It is possible that highly localized irregularities - from polling station to polling station - may line up
with violence in a manner that does not appear at the constituency scale. However, these electoral data are not available.

There is reason to believe that a strategic ballot rigging effort may be more important in
some areas of the country than others. This is especially so in Kenya’s case, where voting closely follows the distribution of ethnic communities. In contrast to the country-wide results above, if we turn our focus to a sub-national geography of voting irregularity the results of my analysis differ. At a provincial scale, there is clear evidence of tampering for certain Kenyan provinces. Pooling the constituency results within provinces, results of the analysis are presented in Figure 2.16. Highlighted provinces are those where there is a suspicious distribution of last digits for the Kibaki vote count; specifically, where the number of zeros is greater than the number found in a normal distribution. There are no provinces with suspicious voting for the Odinga returns, or for returns for all candidates combined.
As I have shown earlier in the map presenting support for each candidate, Nyanza is a stronghold of opposition to incumbent Kibaki. Because of this, it is not altogether surprising that manipulation of results for Kibaki are found there. Presumably, the tally was altered in Kibaki’s favor in the location where his support would be low - there is no need to manipulate votes in the Central region, for example, where his support is already extremely high. Alternatively, there may have been just enough support for PNU among the Kisii population in the region - a documented alliance - and with Kikuyu living in urban areas, including Kisumu, that the vote total was expected
to reach nearly the required 25% to avoid a run off. Similarly, in Eastern province, Embu and Meru communities usually side with the Kikuyu community block, but that vote block may have been threatened by the large population voting for Musyoka in the Akamba areas in and around Machakos (Onyango and Mulee 2007). Also a consideration for evidence of tampering in Eastern province is the fact that the locations are remote, and it is harder for those overseeing the implementation of the election to access polling stations. Without a hope of winning the Coast, due to an agreement between the Muslim Swahili population and ODM (Daily Nation 2007), these two provinces may have been the easiest to alter toward a 25% total.

On the whole, the national election returns exhibit a subnational geography of irregularity. Returns for Kibaki across all constituencies are suspicious when pooled at the province level. This reiterates what was reported superficially or anecdotally in the popular media at the time of the poll, but also that irregularities - one known trigger of the violence that I study - were present. That the election may have been stolen represented a spark for an already unsettled population. Interestingly, manipulation seems to have taken place, by this analysis, by altering the vote for the incumbent, by the incumbent. This finding is in line with Collier and Vicente’s (2007) analysis, but is nuanced in that the manipulation does not appear to have been in the form of reducing the opponent’s tally. The fact that this pattern emerges in the results for the incumbent and not the opposition candidate could be a fruitful avenue of future research.

2.4 Conclusion - compounded grievances as a spark for violence

Merging together the two explanations for conflict above - marginalization (especially from land), and electoral manipulation - I arrive at an explanation for the intensity of conflict following the December 2007 that can be called compounded grievances. Moving forward with my analysis of Kenya’s electoral violence, these are two of the most important elements of Kenyan political life to understand. First, serious violent conflict emerged against the Kikuyu in settlement areas of the northern Rift Valley (while there was similar violence against some other groups in different parts of the country, it was not quite as severe). Second, President Kibaki, drawing support from the
Kikuyu, is viewed by opponents as having manipulated the election results to his favor. Two forms of injustice, and vectors of grievance, were then manifested in a single election result. Because of the coupled influence of these factors, people were more susceptible to mobilization efforts by influential leaders. If it were only one or the other of the two elements described here, arguably the results may not have been so deadly. There is an abundance of evidence lending support for the notion of compounded grievances that I adopt, and the details are elaborated below. In 2008, for example, a Kalenjin resident of the Rift Valley’s Uasin Gishu district stated in the *Sunday Nation*: “Yes, we were unhappy about the election outcome. But more importantly, the presidential election results presented us with a good chance to ‘right’ some of the historical wrongs committed against us as a community” (quoted in Lynch 2008, p. 568). In my research that follows, I show how contextual level factors complicated this story about the emergence of electoral violence, adding nuance to the more general description I have just provided.

This introductory chapter has served as a review of existing research on political instability in African states as a general framework for my dissertation research questions. I have introduced Kenya, as a case study, into the discussion. While civil war is decreasing across Africa overall, there is little evidence that election violence and political militia activity is waning. To the contrary, electoral instability and violence serve as part of a logic of disorder for many African states, maintaining certain status quo conditions that favor powerful leaders. I have reviewed research on the geographic character of conflict both at inter-state scales and within countries. This work is important as a foundation for the geographic lens I use, broadly defined, but also justifies my use of spatial-statistical tools in my subsequent quantitative analysis. In this spatial modeling, I avoid problematic assumptions about the positive spatial associations found in geographically referenced conflict data. I also make the case that the clustering of conflict is a signal that allows me to hone in on the social conditions that drive violence. Political, economic, and other local level explanations for the emergence of conflict are also considered in this introduction, with an application to the Kenyan case. Certain regions (e.g. Rift Valley) of Kenya are said to be prone to conflict due to the political economy of land titling at the eve of colonial rule. According to some scholars other areas
(e.g. Western territories) ought to experience conflict as an extension of marginalization from the state. I turn now toward understanding whether these tentative explanations overlap with electoral conflict data.
Chapter 3

An Empirical Overview of Kenya’s Post-Election Violence

Such blatant election rigging is playing with fire.

- Raila Odinga, December 26, 2007

3.1 Introduction

As soon as Kenyan polls opened on December 27th 2007, accusations of electoral irregularity flared. Within the social, political and institutional context presented in the previous two chapters, this is a) not a surprise, and b) expected to translated quickly into violence. Abruptly, even to those who had lived through previous rounds of election conflict, Kikuyu shops were looted in Nairobi’s informal settlements, and in Eldoret, Kisumu, and Mombasa. To a lesser extent, in terms of severity, this wave of looting engulfed remote and sparsely populated towns like Maralal. In more rural areas of Western and Rift Valley provinces, as in Maralal, attacks on perceived “outsiders” set in within days of Kibaki’s victory announcement on December 30th. With shops in major urban areas torched and homes in rural areas being burned to the ground, nearly the entire country was engulfed by violence.

My goal in this chapter is to provide a basic empirical overview of the election violence that raged across Kenya in late 2007 and early 2008. In essence this is a view into the details of the kind of violence - “disorder as political instrument” - that I have already described analytically in Chapters One and Two. The overview of electoral violence will provide background for subsequent analysis in Chapters Four through Six by providing a portrait of the places where electoral conflict
erupts. In some cases, social tension is violent and in others, it is extinguished before becoming deadly. I rely on three main secondary sources of information for this analysis. I expect that by investigating the conflict event data in great detail I will be able pinpoint important characteristics of violence in Kenya; this is not simply an exhaustive mapping exercise. I present qualitative empirical data from fieldwork in a final section of the chapter. This section of research is designed to contextualize Kenyan electoral violence and put the localized analysis into a nuanced geographical framework. My GIS and spatial statistical analysis of election violence is carried out at fine spatial resolutions, and this approach follows the work of many others in the quantitative geographical analysis of conflict, and in other studies of electoral violence, insurgency and counter-insurgency, mass genocide, and civil war. The details of individual scholarly contributions to each area of the conflict studies literature are provided in preceding chapters. Results of my analysis in this chapter call attention to sub-national dependencies in the conflict event data and emphasize the need for localized explanations for electoral conflict in the Kenyan context.

To convey the trends in violence that emerged across Kenya, I first use georeferenced hospital records of mortality following the election. Secondarily, I present information from an alternative media-based dataset of conflict events (ACLED). To improve upon simplistic presentations of violence in maps, I quickly summarize several spatial statistical methods for identifying geographic patterns in geographical data (point or administrative unit), and apply these to each type of violent event data that I use. The third section of this chapter is an overview of a violence metric that I derive from two population-based surveys conducted one year after the election violence. The patterns of electoral violence corroborate some narratives of Kenyan election violence, but in Chapters Four and Five, I unpack the nuances of several factors that explain the specific patterns.

3.1.1 Geospatial analysis of areal unit data

One measure of the severity of post-election conflict across Kenya is presented in Figure 3.1. This information is gathered from the Commission for the Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV), or the so-called Waki Commission, which takes its name from Kenyan Justice Philip
Waki. This report was submitted to President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga in October 2008, and was intended to be a stepping stone toward the formation of a tribunal for bringing to justice those individuals who led campaigns of violence in late 2007 and early 2008. The tribunal was never formed and the International Criminal Court (ICC) finally took charge two full years later due to fears that impunity within the political system would continue. Nevertheless, the Waki Commission report represents a valuable source of data for understanding election violence. CIPEV researchers gathered information from hospitals following the election skirmishes to gauge the severity of violence across districts within the country. Cause of death is recorded in these data in addition to the rate of mortality. The greatest number of deaths, according to CIPEV hospital records occurred in the central/northern Rift Valley and in western areas of the country. Nairobi stands out as especially violent when compared with other districts, reflecting the serious insecurity that plagued informal settlements surrounding the city (Kibera, Kawangware, Mathare, and others). Below, I present the results of all analyses with population size controls. The highest deaths count is in Nakuru district, followed by Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia. The high fatality counts in these areas are informative, but further analysis is required for the empirical identification of statistically significant clusters of conflict. The results of such mapping are the first step in characterizing Kenyan electoral violence, but also have important implications for my later analysis. For example, spatial autocorrelation is common among social science data, but is a serious violation of spatial independence assumptions that are a tenet of predictive or confirmatory (e.g. regression) analysis (discussed in detail below).

It is plausible that the rate at which violence is observed is a function of population size. There are probabilistic reasons to expect that this is the case (people fight where people are), but conflict research also shows that an information sharing mechanism may contribute to violence (Shapiro and Weidmann 2010). Furthermore, groups will come into conflict more often with adversaries in urban settings than in sparsely populated areas. To account for this, I conduct all of the following analysis after controlling for population size within a district. Population data are from the Gridded Population of the World (GPW v3) produced by the Center for International Earth
Science Information Network (CIESIN 2013). I use the year 2005 for population data, because that date precedes the election violence. I calculate a zonal statistic that aggregates to each district the total sum of the raster image values that fall within that district. For CIPEV analysis of fatalities, the resulting metric is the number of deaths per 1000 people, and for event count measures I measure the number of events per 1000 people. On the whole, my findings are similar to similar analyses without the population control. Election violence clusters in the contentious central and northern Rift Valley, depending to some degree on the metric of violence I use, and these clusters differ from those for non-election violence.

Figure 3.1: CIPEV deaths population controlled (deaths/1000 people).

For the distribution of deaths resulting from election violence, controlling for the district population has a marginal effect on the observed distribution of fatalities. Uasin Gishu, Nakuru, Koibatek, Eldama Ravine, and Trans Nzoia figure prominently as areas of conflict. The rate of killing in Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu will become an important component of later analysis (Chapter Four), with the number of deaths in the latter standing at nearly the double that of the
former. I attribute the different rates of violence in these two areas to population patterns within these two different districts, and more specifically the fact that Trans Nzoia is home to a “buffer” Luhya population who have lower incentives for engaging in violence than either the Kikuyu or Kalenjin community. Importantly, the amount of conflict in Kisumu now ranks among the most violent districts. Violence in that area was largely a function of the police reaction to looting and property damage that was committed by ODM supporters, against the Kikuyu. Many rioters were shot in what was widely described as a heavy-handed response by police. Notably, violence in this area, compared with that taking place in other regions of the country, is an important component of the empirical evidence supporting the central claim of Chapter Four.

In the area of cross-country sub-national conflict event data there are three main sources of information. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (Raleigh et al. 2011) was the first publicly available disaggregated, spatio-temporal violent event data for many countries. The project uses media sources to record violent events or events associated with political conflict (e.g. non-violent transfer of territory by a non-state armed actor). Each event is coded with specific location coordinates, an individual date, and other information characterizing the actors involved, the activity type, and other information regarding the certainty of in the original report. I rely mainly on these data below because it includes no minimum number of deaths for including an event in the database. A minimum fatality threshold is one undesirable characteristic of certain similar datasets that have been released more recently, including UCDP GED, described below. A fatality threshold risks eliminating events from a conflict data record that may actually inform scholarly debates.

ACLED is a variation upon existing conflict data coding projects that use inclusion criteria that are not always compatible with conflict analysis in the post-Cold War world system. For example, the Correlates of War (COW) data require that “civil war” involve an internationally-recognized centralized government and a cohesive opposition (rebel) group. In empirical terms, this source is therefore not appropriate for the very fine spatial and temporal resolution of African election violence. The fallacy of assuming that conflict can be captured by a binary variable for
an entire country and for an entire year is clear for political geographers, and increasingly for those in other disciplines of the conflict studies field. Other data have relaxed some criteria for including conflict events, including the original Peace Research Institute Oslo/Uppsala Conflict Data Program (PRIO/UCDP) data (Gleditsch et al. 2002), where the definition of a civil war event was reduced to 25 battle-related deaths. The PRIO/UCDP data still maintain, however, the same actor requirements (rebel vs. government) as COW.

![Figure 3.2: By the location of incidents, Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset (ACLED) information for violence during the Kenyan post-election conflict period (12.27.2007 - 02.22.2008).](image)

More recently, datasets similar to ACLED are becoming available. For example, while the dataset maintains a threshold of 25 battle-related deaths within a given year, UCDP Georeferenced Event Data (GED) does include subnational data on conflict with sub-annual temporal precision. The data suffer from several deficiencies, however. First, the data do not include violence that takes place outside of a dyadic instability between two actors that killed at least 25 people in one year. Imagine, for example, three events taking place within a two month period where two, five, and then seven people were killed in a cycle of retaliatory acts among ethnic community militias.
These events are not included in UCDP GED, and nor would other events that produce injuries short of death. As a result, arson, forced eviction, and even rape are simply not included in the data. Secondly, but in relation to the above, unknown actors are not included in the data. This is unfortunate because in reality we know that violence takes these forms. If an attack took place but the perpetrators were not immediately identifiable, the event is not recorded in the UCDP GED data for analysis. While I test the influence of the UCDP GED data as a robustness check for some models in Chapter Six, it is not ideal for the research questions at hand.

In the graduated symbols in Figure 3.2, certain patterns from the earlier CIPEV election deaths (Figure 3.1) data are mirrored. It is important to remember, however, that these ACLED events include rioting and looting activity, police actions against protesters, and other instances of violence against civilians that may not result in deaths. We might expect some overlap between the sources, but not exact comparability. In terms of similarity, there is a high prevalence of conflict in Nairobi, in the central Rift Valley, and in areas of western province surrounding Lake Victoria. One immediately apparent difference between the CIPEV election violence pattern and the ACLED data above is the abundance of ACLED events in Mombasa. This is a noteworthy divergence, but accounts of conflict on the ground during the election fighting confirm that there was significant unrest in and near Mombasa following the poll. Largely, this was looting of Kikuyu owned shops. In order to facilitate a comparison between data sources, I aggregate the ACLED data to the same district level used in the CIPEV election deaths analysis above. This comes with the cost of losing some spatial resolution, but I conduct additional point-patten analysis below at the scale of individual locations.

Aggregating ACLED data to the district polygons reveals a pattern that is similar, but slightly different than the distribution of election related deaths (see Figure 3.3). This is not a surprise based on the differences between each dataset (fatalities are not a criteria for ACLED events), but some similarities remain, including high counts for Uasin Gishu (roughly 50 events, with 230 killed in CIPEV), Nakuru (roughly 70 events, with 213 killed in CIPEV), and Nairobi (roughly 70 events, with 125 killed in CIPEV). Kisumu also shares similar standing between the
two datasets (roughly 40 events, with 81 killed in CIPEV). Even the northern districts of Turkana, Baringo, and Marsabit are recorded as experiencing some violence during the two month period. None of these northern areas appear in the CIPEV deaths count.

Turning now to media accounts of conflict taking place in December, January, and February, Figure 3.3 illustrates the distribution of violent events recorded by ACLED after controlling for the number of people living in each district. Nairobi and Nakuru, which both have large populations now exhibit a lower level of violence than in the original raw event count. An interesting observation emerges in the case of Koibatek, and this district has emerged in other spatial analyses above as an important case of post-election violence. It is likely that Koibatek emerges as violent because of a large number of deadly riots that took place in and around Molo, in the southern part of the district. With 20 individual events during the post election violence period, the conflict there was large when considering the small population in that rural area (Koibatek ranks in the bottom 10 of the 69 districts in terms of population size). Anecdotal accounts of fighting in Molo confirm that it was disproportionately harsh. According to victim accounts (Njogu 2009, 145-148), fighting not only took place there at least a month before the election, but continued well into February, and after the end of the timeline for this analysis. In fact the village of Total was burned on February 22nd, the day of the peace agreement mediated by Kofi Annan (Njogu 2009, 146).
Are there qualitative differences between election violence and unrest that occurs during other times of the year? This is an important question to ask for my research, and according to the account of many observers the answer is yes. Throup and Hornsby (1982) clearly identify land conflict in the Rift Valley as increasingly visible when the possibility for shifts in power arise. Yet, pastoralist violence is a more regular feature of life in Turkana, Borana, Samburu, and other communities in the north. While pastoralist conflict can be related to electoral politics, and has been increasingly deadly during the last two decades, it is also more perennial in nature and driven by different social forces (Greiner 2013). In fact one person in rural Samburu district told me, with only slight exaggeration in his tone: “here hundreds die all of the time. Here it is the election every year, but nobody cares because no Kikuyu die” (Author Interview 4, 2011). While there is clear cynicism in his is statement, this is a common belief in marginalized, poor, and minority dominated areas where residents do not receive the amount of government support that they, as Kenyans, feel entitled to. In some cases, these areas lie in the country’s periphery, but not always.

To uncover whether there are important differences between violence during election periods
and other times, I aggregate all ACLED violent events for the period 2003-2006. I chose 2003 because it follows the election in 2002, which was generally peaceful, and does not overlap with the period of Moi’s rule, where there was known and blatant manipulation of the state security apparatus that would distort organic manifestations of violent politics emerging from contentious politics generally. I do not distinguish here between types of events. Any instability, from a food price riot, to looting following a threatening inter-community SMS messages, to quasi-criminal militia violence against civilians are all expressions of political violence. More importantly, perhaps, we know that these kinds of violence took place within the post-election conflict skirmishes and the goal is to compare two analogous series of events. The raw distribution of non-election violent events is presented by location in Figure 3.4, and can be compared directly with Figure 3.2. Immediately apparent is the greater prevalence of violence in northern areas of the country during non-election years. Also, I use no filter for whether violence in the data for whether or not the event taking place is within Kenyan territory. Many events in border areas of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Somalia are effectively Kenyan events that involve Kenyan actors crossing the porous border. As such, in a comparison between election violence and non-election violence figures, we find some events in Ugandan territory.
For the following analysis, I joined the event data file for locations within the country to the district boundaries for Kenya. The distribution of conflict events outside of the electoral contest context is notably different than during late-2007 and early 2008. Mainly, Turkana district appears as the second most affected area after Nairobi. That Nairobi appears first in the ranking is not a surprise, and reflects collective knowledge in the conflict studies literature that emphasizes the strategic importance of a country’s capital city to local conflict dynamics. That northern areas appear as especially violent is a phenomenon that, given a long term perspective, is also intuitive. This finding mirrors closely anthropological and ethnographic work in the region emphasizing the political tensions that exist outside of formal institutions (e.g. McCabe 2004). That it is persistently violent aside from institutional politics does in fact line up with our understanding that these groups are already somewhat removed from institutional politics. In the raw data for conflict we find high rates, in addition to Turkana, for West Pokot, Nakuru, Samburu, Marsabit, and several others, including Mandera. The later concentration is certainly an artifact of instability emanating from
Somalia to the east. Somalia has been an unstable and violent country since 1991. Many armed raids, including Islamist violence, have taken place in north eastern Kenya with Somalia serving as a base of operations.

3.2 Geostatistical analysis of violence

What is a geographical “cluster”? Here, my use of the term “clustering” varies to some extent upon the specific data being analyzed. I speak, separately, about clusters of death (the CIPEV mortality data), and of clusters of violence (the event data). In both of these cases, however, the goal is to capture a location where the presence of conflict is more common among locations than we would otherwise expect. So, in very simple terms a cluster of violence is an area where the prevalence of conflict among some neighboring units of analysis is higher than among other units of analysis.

For areal unit data, there are two basic methods for identifying spatial autocorrelation. Moran’s I is the classic spatial clustering statistic. The statistic indicates whether an observed distribution exhibits an overall pattern that is more clustered in space than we would expect from a perfectly random distribution. A positive score indicates a pattern of spatial clustering and a negative values suggests that the data are dispersed. Moran’s I values range -1 to 1, with perfect clustering 1 and perfect dispersion -1: a perfectly random distribution corresponds to value 0. I measure the Moran’s I statistic using \texttt{spdep} in R, and this is calculated as:

\[
I = \frac{n}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} w_{ij} (y_i - \bar{y})(y_j - \bar{y})}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} w_{ij}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (y_i - \bar{y})^2}
\] (3.1)

where \( y \) represents the value for observation \( i \) with \( j \) observation’s association captured in \( w_{ij} \). \( w_{ij} \) is a spatial weights matrix for observations that may be defined using any number of neighboring territorial units (e.g. first order neighbors, second order neighbors, etc.). The sample
mean is represented $\bar{y}$ and functionally $(y_i - \bar{y})$ and $(y_j - \bar{y})$ convert observation values to $Z$ scores.

Because the result of a Moran’s I analysis of spatial autocorrelation is sensitive to the definition of a neighborhood (spatial weights matrix) - as it considers one observation in the context of those nearby - I test how varying the neighborhood definition changes the analysis results. Figure 3.5 below illustrates the definition of linkages between Kenyan districts for queen contiguity nearest neighbors. The second or third order neighborhood simply extends the scope of the weights matrix. Finer resolution definitions emphasize local level linkages, where a larger neighborhood definition (broader inclusion of geographic units) would suggest a more regional (though still sub-national) phenomenon is generating the data.

As a second test of spatial dependencies I use the Getis-Ord $G_i^*$ statistic, which tests whether a value at a given location and its neighbors have higher than average similarity (or dissimilarity). The localized version of the Moran’s I statistic retains the direction of the input value and by mapping the result, we uncover where the higher rates of similarity occur within a broader study area. The Getis-Ord $G_i^*$ statistic is different than a Moran’s in that it identifies the sign of association among clustered observations. In other words, a positive value suggests that high values cluster, and a negative value that low values clusters, revealing slightly more information than knowing only whether clustering exists at all. By retaining the raw value this statistic is often called “hot spot” analysis. This statistic identifies values at locations by incorporating the mean across observations, and still incorporates a weights matrix (Rogerson 2007, 240). I use the \texttt{spdep} package in R and the calculation can be represented as:

$$G_i^* = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} w_{ij}(d)x_j - W_i^* \bar{x}}{s\left\{ \frac{|nS_{1i}^* - W_i^*|}{n-1} \right\}^{1/2}}$$

(3.2)

where $s$ indicates the sample standard deviations of observation $x$ values, and weight $w_{ij}(d)$ equals one (not zero) if points $i$ and $j$ are within distance $d$ from one another. As this statistic
is written in a standardized form (converted to \( Z \) scores), it is understood as a standard normal random variable, which means hypothesis testing statistics can be applied directly to the resulting value (Rogerson 2007, 240).\(^1\)

\[ \]

![Figure 3.5](image.png)

Figure 3.5: By district centroid, the structure of weights used for the Moran’s I and Getis \( G_i^* \) statistics. Here, first order queen contiguity is displayed.

I use the district shapefile with 68 districts, which corresponds most closely with the election date and with the enumeration of the surveys I use later\(^2\), and is identical to Figure 2.1. Because the decision to use certain boundaries can influence results, I elaborate upon point pattern trends in the data below. In all following localized analysis, I also allow the weights definition to vary because this definition can influence the results.

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\(^1\) Technically, this is dependent on large \( d \).

\(^2\) District shapefiles in Kenya corresponding to exact dates do not exist because the boundaries change with great frequency. Subsequent analysis in the overview is conducted also with point data, and for later chapters, the observation unit is the individual, not only the districts displayed here.
Because the study area is relatively small, as is the number of observations overall, there are potential problems associated with border effects (no neighbors on one side). Additionally, third order neighbors in this setting reach in any two opposing directions nearly all the way across the country, which is an extremely broad definition that may skew results for individual districts. I therefore interpret the results of localized clustering analysis in rather general terms here as part of an overview.

The results of a local Moran’s I analysis are presented in Figure 3.6. This includes an analysis of the CIPEV data (top), ACLED electoral violence (middle), and ACLED non-electoral violence (bottom). As I have explained above, all of these are population-controlled (the value used in the statistic is number of events/1000 people. Red indicates that death rates are similar to that of neighboring districts. The hue range represents level of statistical significance measured as a Z score. Z score values above or below (deeper hues) +1.96 and -1.96, respectively, are statistically distinct from a completely random simulated distribution. Outliers (that is low values near high or vice versa), in terms of election related deaths, appear in blue.

Using the CIPEV data, clusters of conflict using a first order neighbor weighting scheme are identified in Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Koibatek, and Kericho districts, which thereby constitute a regional bloc of violence (see Figure 3.6 (top)). This result is not especially surprising, as the area has been a site of inter-group tensions since multiparty elections started in 1992. These areas have been identified as highly politically unstable by Boone (2011, 2012) and others. In empirical terms, therefore, the pattern I find could be a function of overlap with the settlement schemes identified in Chapter Two above. It is likely that Koibatek emerges as violent because of a large number of deadly riots that took place in and around Molo, in the southern part of the district. With 20 individual events during the post election violence period, the conflict there was large when considering the small population in that rural area (Koibatek ranks in the bottom 10 of the 69 districts in terms of population size). Anecdotal accounts of fighting in Molo confirm that it was disproportionately harsh. According to victim accounts (Njogu 2009, 145-148), fighting not only took place there at least a month before the election, but continued well into February, and after
the end of the timeline for this analysis. In fact the village of Total was burned on February 22nd, the day of the peace agreement mediated by Kofi Annan (Njogu 2009, 146). Nairobi is actually a significant outlier in that its value is quite high, and thus unlike its neighbors in central province and to the east, which were comparatively peaceful. Using a very wide definition of neighboring districts (third order), the clustering trend disappears except for Koibatek. Nakuru is still identified as an area of clustering.

For the district level ACLED election violence data, Figure 3.6 (middle) shows the effect of using this relatively coarse resolution to define which districts are part of a given observation’s neighborhood. Differences from the CIPEV Moran’s I are clear. A Moran’s I statistic is statistically significant for only Koibatek. With a broad definition of what constitutes the district’s neighbors, however, there is direct agreement between the CIPEV and ACLED measures. Notoriously volatile Nakuru and also Koibatek represents centers of violence. Fighting was known, also, to have been severe in the area surrounding Eldama Ravine though it may not have been as high profile as conflict in Nakuru and Uasin Gishu. Nakuru was a site of much violence, and this appears in the raw data, but the district also has a zero value neighbor in Nyandarua to the district’s east. Main differences between the media reported violence and hospital records are that clustering analysis for the latter pick up violence in the more rural areas of Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia. This can be understood partly as a function of the reporting bias that can emerge in media accounts of conflict. To be specific, conflict events are more likely to be reported in densely populated areas than in those with sparse populations. Additionally, reporters are not likely to be fully aware violence taking place in remote areas with no strategic social or political importance.

Importantly, I have compared Moran’s I spatial clustering analysis results for violence between 2003 - 2007 (Figure 3.6 bottom), and the period following the poll (Figure 3.6 middle). This was one of the central goals of this section of research, and the expected result is confirmed. For non-election violence with population controls, Marsabit and Moyale constitute a cluster of conflict. The intuition is that raiding violence dominates in northern areas, and that form of conflict is qualitatively different than election related violence. This is not to say that Turkana,
Isiolo, Samburu and some other districts did not experience violence also during the election, but it acknowledges that on a regular basis, fighting there is far more common and can be seasonal in character. Some of the violence in Marsabit area is clearly identified as taking place between Borana and rival communities, but there is also a substantial number of events where Ethiopian militias crossed the border, presumably to conduct raids against rival communities in the competition for resources. The data record indicates that many of these events took place during 2006. Election violence clearly differs in its spatial distribution from non-election violence, as the election related violence tends to cluster in the northern-central Rift Valley area surrounding Nakuru, Uasin Gishu and Koibatek.
Figure 3.6: Moran’s I local clustering statistic using 1st (left) and 3rd (right) order spatial weights matrices for CIPEV (top), ACLED election (middle), and ACLED non-election (bottom) violent event data. Conflict data here are population controlled (events/1000 people).
For the local Getis-Ord $G^*_i$ statistics, CIPEV conflict hotspots are found in largely the same region as in the analysis above, although there exists a slightly larger number of districts included in the cluster (see Figure 3.7 (top)). Uasin Gishu, Lugari, Nandi, Keiyo, Marakwet, Koibatek, and Kericho constitute a large bloc of severe violence near Kenya’s western border with Uganda. The general subnational trend maintains when the third order spatial weights matrix is used. With similarity between the two spatial statistics used for Figures 3.6 and 3.7 there is evidence of a consistent underlying process generating the electoral violence that is observed in these key districts.

Election violence patterns change slightly between the Getis-Ord $G^*_i$ local statistics using CIPEV data and the ACLED election violence data (see Figure 3.7 middle). Country-wide, the trend in the top panel is repeated in the middle, with the addition of Taita Taveta along the Tanzanian border, which barely crosses the statistical significance threshold. This unexpected finding disappears using third order definitions of neighboring areas. Overall, the result of the Nakuru, Kericho, Koibatek areas maintains.

My hot spot analysis of non-election ACLED violence data after controlling for population has the peculiar effect of highlighting Taita Taveta and Machakos as hotspots of conflict (see Figure 3.7 bottom). This area of Kenya is not known for being violent. Because we know that raw event counts are not especially high in this area, it is safe to assume that the result is a function of the weighting scheme, including edge-effects in combination with a large area for those districts. Events in the data record for this area indicate conflicts between armed Kikuyu militia and Masai fighters, taking place during 2005 in the Uwasa Kedong river area, and also fighting between Masai and Kipsigis (both pastoralists) in Emarti, also in 2005. In total only eight events are recorded for the period outside of the post-election violence period. Despite this anomaly, Koibatek, predictably, and Kericho still appear as statistically significant areas of violence, which meets my expectations based on other analysis. However, the overall trend for this non-election violence differs in this one important way from the conclusions of the Moran’s I analysis of non-election violence above.
Figure 3.7: Getis-Ord $G^*_i$ local clustering statistic using 1st (left) and 3rd (right) order spatial weights matrices for CIPEV (top), ACLED election (middle), and ACLED non-election (bottom) violent event data. Conflict data here are population controlled (deaths/1000 people).
In this section I have illustrated important local clusters of post-election violence among Kenyan districts. Using two data sources (deaths, media accounts), various statistical methods (Morans’ I and Getis-Ord $G_i^*$), numerous definitions of weights matrices (1st and 3rd order), and comparing results with and without population controls, I have localized the character of Kenyan post-election violence. There are limitations to the areal unit analysis that I have presented above, and I therefore also use point-pattern analysis in the following section. I use edge-correction methods to remedy one of the problems identified for Getis-Ord $G_i^*$ local clustering analysis above.

Local level analysis reveals a consistent pattern of sub-national clustering in the central/north Rift Valley and in Nairobi and surrounding areas. While the lack of national level clustering for country-wide measures of violence at the district scale is surprising, the fact that a local spatial trend emerges is not. The theoretical implications of my analyses fall in line with several scholarly accounts of political geography in African states. Boone (2011), for instance, highlights the highly localized link between electoral conflict and land tenure regimes. Kenyan land tenure politics are rooted deeply in the settlement scheme distributions that I have presented above. Historical data and academic accounts introduced by Leys (1974), Sorrenson (1967), Harbeson (1973), and others show the the politics of agrarian land reform in Kenya were highly heterogenous. The state-led land management immediately following Kenyan independence contrasts the notion that the state is altogether missing or weak in African societies (Boone 2013, 3-4). There is no doubt among academic observers that a) policies during that era were place-specific, and b) that this was tied intimately into power struggles among elites in national level dialogue. Settlement schemes were managed down to the details of the agricultural practices that were appropriate for each area (based on rainfall and soil type), and, as I illustrate below, the ethnic community that would “own” a settlement scheme (Harbeson 1973, 264 - 266). It is these institutional legacies that influence politics among sub-national Kenyan regions today.
3.2.1 Point-pattern analysis of event data: media-based measurements

The Moran’s I and Getis-Ord $G^*_i$ statistics presented above are designed for areal unit data. As such, they are based on district level violence. In this section, I move toward a more localized unit of analysis by examining the specific locations where violence took place. Figure 3.2 illustrates the sub-national distribution of post election violence according to ACLED media-reported violence events. For non-election violence, I use the data displayed in Figure 3.4.

Ripley’s K statistic is a standard tool for analyzing spatial associations between observations in location data. This statistical tool pairs observations at a series of distance thresholds and compares the spatial association between those distances to the distances that would be generated by a random distribution of underlying events. By plotting these trends against a hypothetical or expected trend, the null hypothesis of a perfectly random distribution can be tested. The window used for analysis is Kenya’s national border. I use the function `spatstat` for R. The test can be represented:

$$ K(s) = \lambda^{-1} E[N_0(s)] $$

where $E[...]$ is an estimation of the Ripley’s statistic from observed data is derived from

$$ \hat{K}(s) = (n(n-1))^{-1} |A| \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j \neq i} w_{ij}^{-1} |\{x_j : d(x_i, x_j) \leq s\}| $$

where within an area $A$, the weights if $w_{ij}$ are defined by circle of radius $d(x_i, x_j)$ with center point $x_i$. The $\hat{K}(s)$ value is compared to $K(s) = \pi s^2$. This is dependent on an assumption of an homogenous processes distributing events across space. While there are options correcting for underlying risk factors (e.g. Diggle et al. 2007), something like a population “control” is not necessarily fitting for an overview of violence (e.g. O’Loughlin et al. 2010). For example, if we understand that violence has a serious effect on societies we might not want to effectively place less emphasis on heavily populated areas. I use data without population controls first in the following analysis and then test the proposition that population size explains the locations in a section below.
Figure 3.8: For election ACLED violence, an empirical Ripley’s K statistic compared with the hypothetical or expected distribution of spatial associations across distances between observations. Black (\(\hat{K}_{\text{iso}}(r)\)) shows the isotropic specification, red (\(\hat{K}_{\text{trans}}(r)\)) represents the translation-corrected estimate, green (\(\hat{K}_{\text{bord}}(r)\)) the border correction method, and blue (\(\hat{K}_{\text{pois}}(r)\)) the expected Poisson distribution. \(r\) is the paired distances and \(K(r)\) the strength of the spatial association. The horizontal axis (\(r\)) is distance in hundreds of kilometers.

The spatial associations between violent event locations within Kenya is significantly larger than the expected (hypothetical, random) distribution. Even with three separate correction methods, the spatial relationship is very strong, indicating spatial dependencies from location to location. This suggests that within the country, some spatially heterogeneous social, political or economic influences are driving the distribution of electoral violence. Our expectation of significant clustering is confirmed, and in subsequent analysis in Chapters Four through Six below my goal is to account for these distributions.
Before moving ahead, it is worth checking the election violence distribution against the non-election violence trend within Kenya, as shown above for district level data. Figure 3.9 illustrates the similar pattern. The data are slightly less clustered for non-election violence, however, with lower significant K values across the distance bands $r$. For non-election years, the country-wide trend does not deviate much from the post-election violence, but location-by-location the clustering is comparatively weak. This would suggest that violence takes place in a more highly localized fashion during election years. While the sub-national spatial patterns of violence change, as is evident in the different locations of district event clustering above, election violence exhibits a greater degree of clustering. The overall trend would suggest that certain areas of Kenya represent foci of intense election violence. The K statistic has confirmed that clustering exists location-by-location, in addition to clustering among some districts - though not necessarily study area wide at the district scale.
While the degree of clustering may vary between the two types of violence (electoral and non-electoral), a direct comparison in the form of what is known as a cross K function is helpful. Directly comparing data for the two types of conflict allows us to say whether one clusters near another. The results (see Figure 3.11) indicate that the two types of conflict do cluster near one another generally across the country (the observed level of clustering in the empirical distribution is higher than the simulated distribution). It would be a relatively tall order for the two types of violence to diverge completely, and the result is therefore not altogether unexpected. Were there
complete divergences, to give an example, all the violence for one type would have to take place on
the Coast and all the violence for the other in Western.

point.sim

Figure 3.10: Simulation-based spatial distributions of electoral (circles) and non-electoral conflict
(triangles) in Kenya. Each is distributed according to their original proportions in the raw data.

This exercise in comparing event type locations relies on simulations of the distribution of
each. An example simulation is presented in Figure 3.10, whereby the distributions of each follows
the original proportions in the raw data. Whether or not the two types cluster nearer to each other
in the real data, when compared with their nearness in simulations (above) determines whether the
two exhibit “attract”, or “repel” one another, to use common terms for this type of analysis.
array of envelopes of Kcross functions for id.ppp.small.

Figure 3.11: A Ripley’s cross K function statistic comparing the level of clustering for election violence and non-election violence.

It is possible that population size influences the rate of conflict in areas throughout Kenya (proposition tested above at the district scale). Therefore, for the locations of violence I examine whether population size explains the clustering of conflict where such clustering takes place. Overall, it does not (controlling for varying population density across the country does not change the fact that the locations of conflict cluster in space). This is illustrated in Figure 3.12.
Figure 3.12: A Ripley’s K function statistic testing whether the underlying population explains the clustering of electoral conflict.

To test whether population distributions explain any difference (though the difference is not significant on its own), the underlying population may be included as part of an inhomogenous spatial process. That is, if we expect population size to be associated with the rate of violence (the proposal tested above at the district level), we might also anticipate the possibility that it explains different types of violence (electoral vs. non-electoral). Instead, as Figure 3.13 shows, the clustering of the two remains despite controlling for the in homogenous underlying population that might produce the violence. In other words, something other than a simple population size explanation determines the clustering of conflict in Kenya.
Figure 3.13: A Ripley’s K function statistic testing whether the underlying population explains the different locations of conflict clustering (electoral vs. non-electoral).

The point-pattern analysis in this section cannot be compared directly to the district level analysis because these data (at every location) are defined for a finer spatial resolution than the district CIPEV or ACLED data. The fact that location-specific comparisons of election vs. non-election violence result in different conclusions does not overturn the more general district level conclusion, in other words. Instead, the analysis is provided because it results in an extremely important finding: that population patterns alone do not explain the clustering of conflict or the differences in electoral and non-electoral violence (though they may be minor). The conclusion leads us to believe that something more important is taking place - some social process, demographic trend, or political condition - in Kenya’s electoral conflict. It is toward these alternative causal forces that I turn in the remaining chapters of the dissertation.
3.3 Survey derived conflict metrics

Increasingly, survey data is being used - in the place of areal unit (e.g. grid cells, administrative units) - for conflict analysis. This includes interviews with participants in violent acts (e.g. Scacco 2008; Fujii 2009; Strauss 2006), victims of conflict (Blair, Blattman, and Hartman 2012; Finkel, et al. 2012), and general surveys where conflict dynamics are identified from among many survey questions (Bakke, O’Loughlin and Ward 2009). Survey analysis, in contrast with event data analysis allows for inferences actually linked to individuals rather than requiring assumptions linking the individual to characteristics of some other unit. In this section, I introduce the basic characteristics of survey data I use in subsequent analysis, including sampling procedures and the distribution of violence throughout the country according to the survey information.

First, I rely upon an Afrobarometer national probability sample (used for multiple years of data) of Kenyan voting age citizens. The details of individual indicators are included in the appropriate following chapter. Here I review the basics of the sample, and the sampling methodology. The data are a nationally representative cross section of citizens, who have equal odds of being interviewed. Across all stages (levels) of sampling, the selection of respondents is randomized and proportional population weighting is used where possible. Design of the survey follows a stratified, multi-stage, area probability procedure. For stratification, the process entails defining geographical sampling units by criteria such as area (to include large remote areas) and population (to include urban populations). The targeted 1200 respondents nationally (to achieve 95% confidence intervals) are stratified by province, and by urban or rural classification. “In each case, the proportion of the sample in each locality in each region should be the same as its proportion in the national population” (Afrobarometer sampling principles (online source), 2012). Primary Sampling Units (PSU) are the highest resolution spatial bounded administrative units: in Kenya, this is the location administrative unit. A possible shortcoming of the sampling procedure is a context of excessive violence, where it is possible to substitute another major enumeration area if the substitution does not constitute more than 5% of the number of PSUs.
For every PSU, enumerators begin at a sampling start point, selected by: random for a list of all households where such data are available, random for coordinates x, y of an arbitrary numerical grid overlaying an existing map, or a random selection of numbered households within a settlement (in extremely remote contexts). Selection of households does not include people living in a different place for work or any other reason (even if that individual is identified as the “head of household”). Selection of households is determined by individual interviewers, and not by Area Enumerators. The details of random walk procedures can be found on the survey website (http://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-and-methods/sampling-principles). Individual respondents are selected from within households using a “gender stratum” method, whereby the gender of respondents alternates between interviews. Interviewers must try one call-back and an appointment, where possible before substituting households. The Afrobarometer data used here is the same as that employed in later Chapters Four through Six.

In Figure 3.14, I present the proportion of respondents to the survey who were affected by election violence. I define the affected population not only by personal physical injury, but damage to property, forced eviction, and other types of violence that are known to take place in campaigns of election conflict (details below). I compare these data to the proportion of respondents reporting exposure to violence in a similar, but independent survey conducted by Finkel et. al (2012). Finkel et al. (2012, question “violence.k”) specifically ask respondents “Were you or your family affected by the violence that occurred after the 2007 elections?” I present the overlap where a district appears in both surveys. This must be understood as a helpful comparison, but the data are different in two main respects. First, I cannot separate out from the Finkel et al. survey those respondents who may have relocated after the election violence. There are likely to be many such respondents (in Afrobarometer it is roughly 10%), and presenting their experience for a district where they may not have lived during the conflict could misrepresent the process that lead to violence. Second, there is no detail in the Finkel et al. survey about what constitutes being “affected by” violence.
Exposure to election violence, two surveys

Across the districts within Kenya, reported exposure to violence roughly follows the patterns identified in hospital records and in the media. Districts in the central Rift Valley and parts of western Kenya (including Kakamega and Kisumu) were disproportionately affected. The two survey measurements are highly positively correlated at .643 for the district level data ($p \leq .001$). Some districts exhibit higher rates of exposure in the Finkel et al. survey, relative to Afrobarometer, including Maralal, Narok and Kajiado. Nakuru stands out as consistently violent in both the survey and other measures of violence. Tranz Nzoia also saw much conflict according to the survey. Interestingly, Mt. Elgon is more violent in both surveys than in the other measures of election violence presented above, both media based (ACLED) and for the CIPEV hospital records. In some places, the proportion of respondents who reported being affected is very high (over 50%), suggesting that the conflict had an extremely broad impact on the Kenyan population.
3.4 Spatial themes of election violence

In addition to sub-national clustering identified in the quantitative analysis above, central qualities of violence as a social process are evident from qualitative analysis. This section therefore turns from identifying patterns of violence to illustrating processes of violence. By observing certain scars on the landscape, and by interviewing survivors of election violence, inferences can be made about the character of Kenya’s electoral conflict. Reading the physical landscape and talking to locals about their experiences reveals much about the dynamics of conflict that may be overlooked in aggregated analysis.

Kenyan roads are notoriously dilapidated, filled with potholes, and unmaintained, where they exist at all. Driving north toward Kisumu from Kisii was no exception in late 2011. In that case, however, a resident of the area explained to me that certain peculiar formations of potholes were actually places where the tarmac had melted beneath the fires that armed men had set at roadblocks following the December 2007 poll (Author Interview 5, 2011). Knee-deep pits in size, often these blemishes mark the location of beatings, theft, and in some cases murder. Their location is telling. Clustering on the edges of towns, the barricades were used to filter the populations who entered and left by road. More generally, however, the damage lies on the boundary between Luo and Kisii, or Luo and Kipsigi communities. This is obvious from the locations where barricades existed, but residents of the area confirm the ethnic boundary character of this phenomenon. These regions are points of contentious interaction between communities in a setting of relatively high population density.

Kenya’s post-election violence has always been marked by dominating themes of eviction, expulsion, and territorial exclusion. In certain cases rioting and protesting is the norm, but this dominates in larger cities and towns. Where protesting activity becomes outright looting or semi-violent activity, the goal of the perpetrators is still evicting victims (mainly, in common narratives, the Kikuyu). Similar social patterns of eviction have been identified by geographers in Cambodia (Tyner 2008), Mozambique (Lunstrom 2009), Colombia (Oslender 2007), Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005; Wood 2001), and the defacto state South Ossetia in Georgia (Ó Tuathail 2008). Displacement does not take place only through verbal threats, and neither is a group’s absence maintained without some level of physical violence and coercive power.

Understanding the relationship between people and their physical and social landscapes is crucially important for studying the geography of conflict. The practice of inducing displacement, and ensuring its permanence, can be an exercise in doctoring the physical environment in a way that influences the thinking and behavior of individuals and their resulting social movements and interactions. Where this happens, the interactions of people and place, which I have discussed above, are very strong. One method of ensuring that the displaced do not return can be “domicide,” or the destruction of home (Porteous and Smith 2001, 12). At a simplistic level the annihilation of a structure is “domicide”: rebuilding an utterly destroyed house is a significant barrier to returning. However, a more important component of this practice is the destruction of the social world surrounding intangible elements of “home” including community, family, and cultural or religious symbols. In this sense, place has both absolute and relative aspects. Understood differently, and to use Agnew’s (1987, 28) phrase, a house represents place, while a home suggests a “sense of place.”

Figure 3.15: A burned and vandalized house (foreground) in the Rift Valley’s Uasin Gishu district. In the background lies a second house that was destroyed in 1997 according to area residents. Author photo, October 2011.
Figure 3.15 shows a house that was looted, destroyed by fire, and vandalized during the post-election violence in Uasin Gishu district, south of Eldoret town. The owner was a Kikuyu woman, who, as in innumerable other cases fled the area and has not returned to reconstruct the building (Author Interview 6, 2009). Reportedly, the attackers were from the broadly defined Kalenjin community (this would include Nandi, Tugen, and the other sub-groups). The building was still abandoned in 2011, though nobody was present and available at that time for interview. Several neighbors were also forced to flee, and residents told me that practices used by attackers in other nearby cases included filling in boreholes (wells) with earth and burning crops. Discussing the second house in the background of the photograph, residents explained that it was destroyed in 1997, during that election season. Clearly, the violent displacement of populations occurs repeatedly and in a somewhat predictable fashion. The cyclical nature of this destructive violence corroborates Julius’ suggestion in my introduction to this dissertation; election violence had become part of the order of politics in the Kenya.

Destroyed buildings are not necessarily empirical evidence of a political motivation for committing violence, however, and looting theft could be an alternative explanation for the destruction. Interviews with witnesses clarify that the violence was not motivated by economic incentives or opportunistic looting activity. Instead, this individual case matched the broader trends of the 1992 and 1997 election, which was to push populations that were originally from other parts of the country from this region of the Rift Valley. It is very likely that the owner of this house was a descendant of the Kikuyu population that moved from Nairobi and Central province during the settlement scheme era that I have described in detail earlier. Additional evidence of the tone that defined conflict between communities lies in the messages left by vandals at the site of this eviction, as shown in Figure 3.16. The messages, in this case, is scrawled using charcoal from the collapsed roof.
In Figure 3.16 there are faded remnants of drawings, seemingly of a bus in this case. The plaster on the wall above the mud brick is clearly blackened by fire, and has been stained by rainfall since the roof of the house was destroyed. Beneath the drawing, older writing scrawled with the charcoal from burned roofing material reads:

*Molobo na bibi
yako tutawaya
kama umbwa.*

Translated from Kiswahili, this means: “Grandmother of Molobo, you, we will chase you like a dog.” Grandmother (or grandfather, or uncle, etc.) of Molobo (or another name) is a common way to refer to people in Kenya. The suggestion here that one would be “chased like a dog” indicates a clear meaning beyond simply material theft. In this case we know that the owner of the house was a Kikuyu woman, chased away, and perhaps even killed, by Kalenjin attackers. It is possible
that the perpetrators were from the very same town, but could have been from another location within the area. Many actual accounts of the violence from victims suggest that the perpetrators were from their own community, and only in some cases were actually from afar (Njogu 2009).

Figure 3.17: A second case of vandalism inside of a burned building on the boundary between Uasin Gishu and Burnt Forest districts. Author photo, October 2011.

On the adjacent wall, inside the same house, different graffiti pictured in Figure 3.17 sends a similar but even more descriptive message. This taunt appears to be a reply to existing scrawls, reading:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Wanandi}
  \item \textit{Kamuni}\textsuperscript{3}
  \item \textit{Hatuwaogopi}
  \item \textit{Mwafikiri}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{3} This is rough Kiswahili, or slang, informally meaning something like “Kujeni”: to come, or arrive, and in this case with a “you” prefix.
As banter between the authors, this translates into: “Kalenjins, just come [or come on], you cannot scare us. You think we are children.” The challenge was probably authored by a Kikuyu resident of the area, and this note reflects the fact that there was retaliatory activity by Kikuyus after the first round of attacks against them. In some places, including Naivasha, this response included gruesome attacks committed by mungiki, a cultish Kikuyu gang, against members of other communities. Notably, this discussion taking place on the shell of a destroyed building represents the active construction of the built environment to produce a social atmosphere of threat and danger. Other places in the Burnt Forest, Uasin Gishu, and Koibatek regions were similarly affected. Even beyond the Rift Valley, such a process has also unfolded. During fieldwork in Western province north of Kisumu during October 2011, similar cycles of domicile and eviction were in evidence.

Place names play a very important part of violence cycles and contentious politics in the central and northern Rift Valley. When Kikuyu bought land as part of settlement schemes (sometimes as cooperatives) in the early 1960s, they often changed the names of places to reflect their background. In many cases, the names recalled locations in the central highlands. For example, in Langas Estate outside of Eldoret the area where a church full of civilians was burned to the ground in January 2008, is called kiambaa, or a variation on Kiambu, which is a Kikuyu town named after a heavy fog that develops in the early hours of the day. Such renaming has long aggravated Kalenjin residents of the area. On the first day of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission hearing in Eldoret on October 5th 2011 Major Seii, who is an influential elder man from the Kalenjin community in Eldoret area, made remarks concerning place names and “outside” communities. In protest to the changing of place names by some Kikuyu he claimed, “The soil is alive; it has a spirit; it has a name. When you remove that name there will be a clash.” Similarly, during an interview in Nandi Hills with a middle aged Kikuyu woman I asked whether there were
alternative Kikuyu names for small areas outside of town and she said only, “No, they will destroy.” (Author Interview 7, 2011). By “they”, the woman clearly meant the non-Kikuyu dominant group (Nandi) in that area. The politics of naming and claiming places in conflict prone societies is a common theme in conflict geography scholarship (e.g. Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005) because of its profound influences on individuals sense of belonging and their position within a country’s political and social fabric.

### 3.4.1 Where does support for violence lie?

An important question to ask for framing the issue of Kenyan political violence is simple: who supports the violence that is depicted here? Within Kenya, support for violence is not uniform across space, as violence itself is not. In this section, I briefly present the support for violent politics using responses from the Afrobarometer survey. The instrument asks: “is the use of violence to further a just cause ever acceptable in Kenya today?” I code as “yes” those respondents who say that it is sometimes or always acceptable to use violence as a means of furthering a just cause. For each district, I pool the respondents and present the proportion of respondents who approve of violence during Round Three of the survey in Figure 3.18. Round Three of the survey was enumerated in 2005, prior to the election conflict I study.

Overall, we might expect support for violence to lie predominantly among opposition communities, broadly defined as the areas excluded from power. This is a theme developed in greater detail in Chapter Four, concerning the incumbency incentive for violence. The opposition-violence narrative follows classical research about the incentives for engaging in armed conflict against an incumbent. In the Kenyan example, therefore, we might expect to find high rates of support for violent politics in Nyanza and Western province, where the Luo community dominate and who have not been represented in government at the same rate as Kikuyu and supporters of NARC (2002 election) and PNU (2007 election). We might also expect support for violence to be high in the coast, which has never had the influence of other larger population groups in the country. Figure 3.18 shows slightly higher rates, at greater than 20% in four coastal districts of Kwale,
Kilifi, Mombasa, and Malindi than in central province districts such as Nyandarua, Nyeri and S. Meru, where no more than 20% of the population support violence. In addition, during 2005 at the time of the Afrobarometer survey, and leading into the 2007 election conflict, approval of violence was slightly higher in Kisumu, Nyando, and Vihiga, near the shores of Lake Victoria, than they are in other districts. Overall, the two districts with highest support for violence include Bomet and Buret. It is worth noting that these extremely high rates of approval for the use of violence is found in the area I described in the introduction to this section, where the tarmac of major roads is scarred by blockades that were set up during the peak of election violence. Also, high for the level of support for violence are Uasin Gishu and Bungoma. Uasin Gishu is certainly an area of political tension related to settlement schemes in the early post-independence period. The presence of violent attitudes in this area matches, also, the rates of violence observed both in the raw data and some clustering analysis for post-election violence I presented above. Bungoma has a high rate of approval for violence and this area is predominantly Luo, which fits the opposition-exclusion motivation model of violence. In the next chapter I more closely examine the correlates of survey-measured support for violent politics using predictive models.
Figure 3.18: Using Afrobarometer Round Three, approval of violence as a legitimate means of political expression across Kenyan districts. White districts have no data since the survey did not take place there.

3.5 Conclusion

This overview of Kenya’s post-election conflict has shown the importance of a sub-national lens for analyzing violent politics. In terms of the actual observations of conflict - the regional clusters of violence and attitudes reflecting approval of violence - I have illustrated the local patterns within the country. It is known that the distribution of violence associated with the 2007 round of elections was broader in scope than the violence taking place during the 1992 and 1997 elections: the conflict clustered not only in the settlement schemes of the central and northern Rift Valley. Urban areas, and places with mixed experiences of settlement were engulfed by conflict well into January 2008. Upon investigation at locations within the country, some geographic clustering emerges in
some strategically important areas of the country. Certain areas of Kenya may be described as violent clusters for the post-election violence. Other - and importantly different - areas constitute clusters of conflict during the years 2003-2006, which we may classify as non-electoral conflict. Not empirically distinguishing between electoral and other forms of conflict would risk confounding to very different social processes. Even at the scale of individual locations, I have illustrated clustering of conflict among towns and villages below the district scale using point-pattern spatial statistics (Ripley’s K). The localized character of this violence indicates clearly that a placed-based and context-sensitive conceptual framework for the following research is warranted.

My clustering analyses are inferential statistics in that I test the proposition that the distribution of violence is random (this is true for district-level analysis as well as the simulations based on location specific data). The identification of clustered conflict actually represents only a descriptive statistic, however, and while a nuanced identification of conflict patterns is helpful it does not explain those trends. Even the simulation-based point pattern analysis of violence as a function of an non-homogenous underlying population distribution is bivariate in character, having the capability of measuring only the influence of population and none of the other possible influences. In Chapters Four through Six that follow, I move toward predictive and confirmatory analysis of the causes and consequences of conflict that truly improve our substantial understanding of the underlying social processes. These analyses all build upon the data introduced in the sections above (hospital records, media-based, and survey), but in each chapter I also present more nuanced theoretical frameworks for explanations of conflict dynamics, additional qualitative evidence from fieldwork, and detailed descriptions of the specific data that I configure for each section’s core propositions.
Chapter 4

Fight Fire With Fire: An Incumbency Incentive for Participation in Electoral Violence

Governments always do a certain amount of exploitation and opportunity hoarding, with government officials and ruling classes being the typical beneficiaries of the two mechanisms. They commonly incorporate categorical boundaries that already operate elsewhere, for example by excluding women or followers of heterodox religions from full citizenship. How much and exactly how governments exploit and hoard opportunities varies tremendously; much of political theory concerns just that variation. Inequality based on control of governments figures significantly in collective violence - both because it makes control of governments worth fighting for or defending and because it almost always includes differences in access to violent means.

- Tilly 2003, p. 10

The Kikuyu, they have tasted the cake and it is sweet. The Kalenjin, they have tasted the cake and it is sweet. Not the Luhyas.

- Author Interview, October 2011 (Reference number 8).

4.1 Introduction

This chapter concerns opposition party politics, and how they influence the spatial distribution of conflict across Kenya. After the descriptive analysis above, I provide an explanation for the observed clustering of conflict. I argue that it is important to distinguish between types of opposition communities in Kenya. More specifically, I make the case that it is necessary to recognize a difference based on the historical experiences of those groups with the state apparatus.
In the sections that follow I develop an argument whereby the legacy of incumbency conditions the behavior of opposition groups. Given a social context of ethnic patronage and clientelism, the incentives for participation in or supporting violent conflict for a group without experience in state house is to experience the benefits of holding power for the first time. In contrast, the incentives for participating in conflict for a group that already has experience in the executive is to experience again the benefits of past control. This argument is specific to ethnic politics in African states, where ethnocentric clientelism dominates public affairs, but it could be generalized to other settings where there are benefits of controlling the state that are not extended broadly across all sectors of the population. I provide evidence for my argument using census information, violent event GIS data, and population-based surveys.

Leading into the March 2013 Kenyan election, the alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto illustrates the principle that I further in this chapter. Uhuru Kenyatta is Kikuyu and the first son of Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta. He had served as deputy prime minister since 2008 at the time of campaigning for the 2013 poll. William Ruto had served as an MP for Eldoret North constituency since 1997, hails from the Kalenjin community, and was the minister for higher education when he joined the alliance with Kenyatta. During the campaigning season of 2007 Ruto was known for powerful support of ODM (he contested Odigna for the party nomination), but afterward was known for inciting violence against Kikuyu following the bungled poll (Economist, March 2, 2013). As I have established above, there is long standing tension between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities in Kenya. In large part this tension is related to the acquisition of land, mainly but not exclusively by Kikuyu, in the Rift Valley (traditionally Kalenjin territory) following Kenya’s independence. In the 1992 and 1997 elections violence flared in this area, with KANU state supported militias committing attacks against Kikuyu homes with great regularity (Throup and Hornseby 1998; Branch 2011; Boone 2011). Similar tensions emerged following the country’s 2007 election. Despite the animosity between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, in December 2012 Kenyatta and Ruto declared their intention to run on the same ticket together in 2013. There is a paradox buried within the alliance, but there is also historical precedent for this
line up. In December 2012, the well-known Kenyan academic Makau Mutua called the relationship an “uncomfortable embrace” in a *Nation* editorial. That precedent plays an important role in my proposal within this chapter. First, when Jomo Kenyatta (Kikuyu, as noted above) died in 1978, Moi (Tugen, of the Kalenjin group) was designated as his successor. Second, in the 2002 election Moi had openly selected Uhuru Kenyatta (Jomo Kenyatta’s Kikuyu son) to run on the incumbent KANU ticket. A Ruto-Kenyatta alliance in 2013 therefore represents the third major alliance between Kikuyu and Kalenjin. In contrast to this kind of cyclical alliance pattern, there has never been an alliance between the Luo opposition community and Kikuyu political forces.

During the 2007 presidential campaign, both Luo and Kalenjin opposed PNU in the formal political arena. While both communities represented an opposition camp, is it nevertheless possible that patterns of election violence can be explained by the distinctions between Luo and Kalenjin opposition types? I believe so, and strive to understand where the political effects of exclusion from power are most potent. Theoretically, I develop upon Peterson’s (2002) “resentment” motive for ethnic violence, and, in conjunction, Boone’s (forthcoming) handling of the conceptual differences between “statist” and “neocustomary” land tenure regimes in African states. I gather empirical support for these claims, and evidence against others, from a number of hand coded geographical data for population, income, and election conflict (from a variety of sources). Alternative motives for engaging in violence - and here there are two - result in varying patterns with regard to the timing and location of violence. These spatial trends can be identified from targeting strategies and cause of death information, and, as I illustrate below, in the form that violence takes (e.g. violent looting vs. targeted killing). In closing this chapter, I will show that the incumbency argument is related to the compounding grievances argument I introduced in Chapter Two.

A common theme expressed in the public narrative of Kenyan election violence resembles that of “ancient hatreds.” Most commonly, such accounts are found in media coverage and other forms of popular discourse. Rarely do academics grant causal explanatory power to simple linguistic, cultural, or religious differences alone. If we use targeting strategy to identify the motive for violence, following Peterson (2002, 25), the hatred model predicts that: “The target of ethnic violence will
be the group that has frequently been attacked with similar justification over an extended time period.” In Kenya, this is true, with varying degrees across regions, for the Kikuyu as victims of violence. Kikuyu have long dominated the political sphere in Kenya, from Jomo Kenyatta, through the contemporary era in the Ministry of Finance, where Mwai Kibaki and later Uhuru Kenyatta both held positions. While Kikuyu constitute the majority of the Kenyan population, their influence has been disproportionately high (and this is the case especially according to opposition community members). As a result of this perception, Kikuyu have been viewed unfavorably by many members of other ethnic communities. However, there is also present a stronger underlying motive related to the political economy of public good provision, and experiences with political power that does not involve the Kikuyu. If the resentment model holds, in contrast to the hatred model, then “The predicted ethnic target will be the group perceived as farthest up the ethnic status hierarchy that can be most surely subordinated through violence” (Peterson, 2002, 25). While, to follow the example above, the Kikuyu cannot be “subordinated” fully, or permanently, at the national level, they can, as with any population, be “subordinated” in terms of local influence, which may extend into holding public office in a locality. If, as I propose in this chapter, the logic of expelling a population from a local area in order to influence a poll result is based on the experience of that group at the country level, then I have illustrated a phenomenon that is a rooted in the political sociology of hierarchical scale.

The analysis in this chapter is more nuanced and offers further analysis of opposition politics than that presented in some existing work. For example, Klopp and Zuern (2007) present the policing of public order as a key maintenance strategy for incumbents in African states to maintain the status quo against the hopes of opposition movements, who, according to their analysis, engage mainly in protests as an act of discontent. I further this kind of thinking by looking at which types of violence take place in addition to protest, but also investigate the role that non-state targets may play.
4.2 The notion of an incumbency incentive

The notion of “recycling elites” is not new, and Chabal and Daloz (1999, 36) refer to Benin, where it was common thinking among the population that “whoever has already eaten can return to power.” Prior-incumbents know, as a result of their term in office, a) that they must reward their supporters, and b) how to reward their supporters. The notion that certain leaders have experience reaping the rewards of holding public office extends to the co-ethnic constituents supporting that leader, and this raises the stakes of the contest for control over the government for entire communities. In the Kenyan election of 2007, this argument concerns the Kalenjin community, as prior-incumbent opposition (president Moi followed Jomo Kenyatta as president beginning in 1978), and the Luo community as non-prior-incumbent opposition, because the Luo have never had a leader in executive office. I will show empirical evidence that the argument extends to non-incumbent opposition communities other than the Luo in the following analysis (e.g. including Coast province residents). Clearly, in December 2007 the contemporary incumbent in this case was Kikuyu (president Kibaki). Prior-incumbency may be immediately preceding a current poll, or prior at all. I am not claiming that non-incumbent opposition parties do not engage in violence, and that only prior-incumbent communities do. Instead, my argument is that they engage in different types of violence, and that this type of violence may be more or less deadly in nature depending on the experiences of the parties involved. By making distinctions within an overly-broad definition of “opposition,” my goal is to develop a framework for understanding spatial patterns of conflict during election cycles. The goal, in this case, is not to explain whether violence erupts or does not, but to understand the variation in types and severity of violence as it is expressed in particular places within Kenya.

Straus (2012, 345) has outlined a mass-violence research agenda that informs my line of inquiry in this chapter.

The choice by individuals and organizations to employ violence against domestic civilians is typically deliberate and instrumental. For incumbents, who generally have access to the states’ means to employ large-scale violence, the main objective
is generally to retain power and to protect their interests. Yet across time in states and across states, political and military leaders choose a variety of strategies to negotiate differences, manage instability, counter perceived threats, and keep power. Only rarely do leaders choose practices of extreme violence, even in the face of an acute crisis the key question is what prompts them to pursue policies that involve mass murder of civilians.

I propose that individuals are most likely to follow leaders’ violent appeals to commit the mass murder of civilians in the context of prior-incumbency. I develop this model of violence further by shifting scales to localities within a state. The model I propose is contingent upon important distinctions among types of violence and the perpetrators of these attacks.

Consider, briefly, anecdotal evidence for the claim proposed above that distributions and types of violence are contingent on prior-incumbency status. In and near Kisumu, there was serious turbulence following the December 2007 election. Kikuyu shops were looted and destroyed by the hundreds, and police fired upon and killed many protesters. Even outside of town, for example in Bungoma and Kakamega, Kikuyu were targeted for violence. In one interview I spoke with a Luo man from Bungoma. Asking him very broadly what happened after the election he told me, with an eerie grin, “we chased the Kikuyu.” Becoming more serious, he went on to explain, “It was bad. Even your wife, if she were Kikuyu... we were so angry... you would even chase her” (Author Interview 9, 2011). Similar accounts are well documented in NGO, official Kenyan, and media sources. In Eldoret the violence was also extreme. Testimonies from the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation hearings that I attended in Eldoret during October 03 - 05, 2011, portray the severity of the violence. Witness testimony for the church burning that killed dozens of children, of pretending to be dead in an incomplete borehole next to lifeless bodies, and of other gruesome scenes of violence brought an often visibly-disturbed group of observers to tears.

Both Eldoret and Kisumu were therefore cases of opposition led anti-incumbent community violence. However, what nuances might we be able to uncover in a comparison of violence in Kisumu to violence in Eldoret? One particular difference may be found in the type of violence. Mainly, much of the violence that took place in Kisumu might be classified as rioting and looting against Kikuyu and their property (however costly that damage may be). Additionally, where there were
many deaths in the Kisumu violence overall, it was predominantly death at the hands of the police, who by the judgement of many used severe repression, shooting to kill far too readily. In Eldoret looting and rioting took place immediately after the results were announced. In contrast to violence in Kisumu, however, the violence in Eldoret escalated rapidly in severity to the point where Kikuyu were being targeted for death and nothing less. A general message of throwing the Kikuyu out was present in both cases, but the higher level of severity in Eldoret was tangible. Returning to the introductory vignette in Bungoma (where a young man claimed he would have “chased” even his wife, were she Kikuyu), one middle-aged Kalenjin woman in Eldoret told me that “the big difference between Kisumu and Eldoret was that nobody was killed [there] - sure they were being chased and looted, but not killed outright” (Author Interview 10, 2011). According to another victim account of fighting in Eldoret, one woman recalled, “while the Luos would come beat up people and loot properties, the Kalenjins would later follow and burn anything that remained” (Njogu 2009, 21). Below, I present further empirical evidence illustrating that this is the case. I make the case that one of the factors explaining variation in violence between the two sites is the experiences, at a group level, of two different opposition communities: Luo, with no experience leading the executive; and the Kalenjin, who had benefitted from Moi’s tenure between 1978-2002.

Immediately, two scenarios for violence emerge that are worth noting. The Kikuyu Party of National Unity (PNU) support base leading into 2007 are not only contemporary incumbents, but prior incumbents (during Kenyatta era). Therefore, might their incentives for violence be the same as Kalenjin in the model I present? The answer is yes, generally, and this was seen in certain localized cases of extreme violence against Luo community members and others in Naivasha after conflict erupted in Eldoret and other major cities. Reportedly carried out by *mungiki* Kikuyu gangs, responsibility for this violence, including forced circumcision with broken glass, burning, and other forms of torture, has now been leveled against Uhuru Kenyatta at the Hague. According to one account, Naivasha “became a war zone Monday where some 2,000 people from rival ethnic groups faced off, taunting each other with machetes and clubs inset with nails” (Houreld 2008). In terms of the spatial scope of conflict, the violence committed by Kikuyu militias was nevertheless
limited in comparison with other groups because the Kikuyu emerged with an electoral victory. A risk of losing power was present in the election, but this did not come to pass, and as such, PNU supporters did not have the main incentive to cause unrest: they benefit from the status quo and the status quo was maintained.

An important note is also in order regarding the Jomo Kenyatta succession following his death. If it is true that settlement scheme status increases the risk of violence, then we would expect to have observed tension between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin when Moi took power from Kenyatta in 1978. There are two reasons that this is an altogether different scenario. First, the transition took place within a *de jure* one party (KANU) state, where competition between communities was not formalized, and even encouraged, as it was later under a multiparty system. Secondly, the Moi succession was arranged. Kenyatta and elder leaders decided that Moi would be a suitable leader compliant with the policies of the past. While there was no contest in terms of political party competition, there was also little contest even in the inter-community realm. Moi (Kalenjin) was formerly vice president under Kenyatta (Kikuyu), and considered a friendly member of the kleptocratic political elite.

### 4.3 Benefits of tenure in the executive

For the incumbent individual or group, there has been much written about the advantages of holding power in clientelistic states (Clapham 1992; Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Control over the means of coercion in society (army, police), control over the economy (regulation, taxation), and control over cultural norms and practices (religion, ethnic politics) are among these benefits. The pessimistic perspective toward African politics as the “politics of the belly” has been criticized by some. There is strong evidence, nevertheless, for an “our turn to eat” phenomenon, whereby parties recycle through positions of power acting as patrons to their supporters. The argument in this chapter is based in part on the known fact that a change of the guard from one political party (and ethnic community) to the next does not end clientelism - it simply redirects the spatial targeting for privileged treatment toward a new party (and ethnic community). Power over these elements
of society are the driving mechanism whereby political exclusion and economic marginalization translate into political violence or rebellion, according to many. In cases of group exclusion, it is being denied the benefits of control that lies at the foundation of struggles for expression (whether violent, or, justifiably, peaceful). Since independence, Coastal and Western communities have been excluded from power in Kenya. These regions and their constituents, following the model above, should see the largest amount of opposition activity, including violence against the perceived beneficiary of incumbency.

The benefits of being in Kenya’s State House are clear for the community in power, but also for the alliances that communities make with those who are in power. This displays the degree of influence the position of president holds over the provision of public goods and the supply of infrastructure. A middle-aged Samburu man made note of this with regard to transportation in and out of Maralal, which is a long and very rough path without tarmac. "Pokot support PNU, and they have tarmac to Narok. Also, Borana support PNU and there is tarmac to Isiolo" (Author Interview 11, 2011). In this claim he laments the position of the region as a result of the Samburu’s opposition to PNU. Examples of privilege extending from Moi’s tenure as president for the Eldoret area include the country’s second only referral hospital, the only major airport besides Mombasa and Nairobi, and relatively well developed and maintained roads running through from Nakuru. In its own right, an interesting consideration for the role of incumbency in explaining the Kalenjin election violence targeted at Kikuyu is the fact that Moi actively used the General Service Unit either directly, or alongside surrogate Kalenjin militia groups against “outsider” populations prior to the 1992 and 1997 elections. This was partly a function of the increasingly ethnicized politics of Kenya since independence. The use of police and GSU can be considered a benefit of the incumbency in the sphere of security provision. It is likely that this legacy of state supported violence lasted beyond those polls, and could have played a role in explaining the readiness to fight in 2007 and 2008.
4.4 Theoretical foundations for the argument

In a hypothetical scenario where groups are relatively similar in the key criteria of population size, imagine inter-group electoral competition between groups A, B, and C. A and B are opposition groups to the party in power, C. Losing control of the state for group A during one election leads to a relative deficit in terms of material status and prestige relative to other communities. If group B has never experienced such a “demotion”, it is reasonable to expect that the conduct of party politics between A and C in a current election will be different than the contest between B and C. Following this model, the social space defining inter-group relations is conditioned by the payoffs of prior political status. More importantly, for the purposes of this chapter, these relationships have a spatial expression across places within the country because of a) the high level of ethnic homogeneity within regions of the country, and b) the close pairing of ethnicity and political parties (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). The main event that defines the social process translating the conceptual model above into inter-ethnic violence is a change in power. I explain this through Peterson’s (2002) notion of “resentment” as a mechanism that raises the incentives to engage in conflict.

My conceptual framework for understanding the role of ethnicity in this chapter follows that which I presented in my introductory chapter. Mainly, I view inter-group antipathy as a function of relative positioning, social context, and historical experience. This, as indicated above, stands in contrast to the view that “ethnic hatreds” emerge somehow naturally from characteristics of the groups alone. In particular, the key event defining a group’s position vis-a-vis another is a switch between the communities in control. Peterson illustrates evidence that this sort of variation may result in the most hostile views. He writes (2002, 52), “perhaps most importantly, a belief of injustice results from status reversals. After having been on the top of an ethnic hierarchy, most groups come to see their dominant status as part of a natural order.” Violence takes place along ethnic lines, but is not driven by some innate characteristic of “the other”; though claims to this effect may exist in discourses of politics within bouts of conflict, it is not the root cause. Instead, resentment of having lost power is the key. The key explanatory factor is status reversal.
not status itself, in other words, and the relative position of groups vis-a-vis historical experience is key for distinguishing among opposition types. Again according to Peterson (2002), “status reversal creates the highest intensity of resentment and produces the highest likelihood of violent conflict. Status reversal results when a more regionally powerful group in an established hierarchy is dislodged from its position and placed below a less powerful group.” The important element of this argument to understand with regard to the non-prior-incumbent population (Luo, or group B to follow the model above), is that there can be no reversal of power if there was never an initial experience with power.

The context of an election is important for understanding how a model rooted in (some kind of) rational choice translates into practice. Mainly, the election atmosphere is important because it removes one problem of a purely-instrumental rationality that is identified by Varshney (2003, 90-91). I illustrate this in Figure 4.1. At time T1 a group is out of power and has welfare level W1. At T2 the group is in power and the welfare level is at W2. In a purely-instrumental rational choice understanding of the circumstances - say, generally, within any given country and absolute time undefined - a free-riding problem emerges because individuals cannot know when T2 will arrive. If it does not, or if it is infinitely distant, then an individual stands aside (weighing the costs), allowing others to join a collection effort that they still hope to benefit from. In contrast to the general model presented in Varshney (2003), in election circumstances T2 is known - there is a date marked on the calendar that could usher a fundamental change in who benefits and loses from holding office. In cases where electoral outcomes are uncertain, the temporal bounds on a threshold surrounding T2 are ambiguous. As I have noted above, for example, opposition party members were able to influence the eventual outcome of the Kenyan election by committing violence after the official result was announced. Not only is T2 known in a country as an election nears - and that a real potential of M2 conditions at T2 materializing (election is close) - but *for those groups with previous experience in power* a prior experience at M2 is also known. The two uncertainties, in a case of prior incumbent confrontation are no longer uncertain. This a) makes free riding no longer an impediment to collective action, but also b) makes the benefits of participating in collective
violence high relative to the costs. In figure 4.1, the incentive structures to support violence, $C_a$ and $C_b$, are a function of prior-incumbent and non-prior-incumbent status, respectively.

![Diagram of model of expectations of welfare over time](image)

Figure 4.1: Model of expectations of welfare over time, as related to the free-riding problem of collective action in the context of an election. Incentives ($C_i$), I argue, are a function of prior $W_2$, which is known for prior-incumbents but not for non-prior incumbents.

In concluding his work, Peterson (2002) explains the four primary explanations of the intensity of violence that is found when the resentment explanation holds true. Some of these could undermine my claim, but I address each in turn.

1. Status reversal creates the highest intensity of resentment and produces the highest likelihood of violent [emphasis original] conflict. Status reversal results when a more regionally powerful group in an established hierarchy is dislodged from its position and placed below a less powerful group. 2. When resentment develops from gradually changing perceptions created by slower structural processes such as modernization, the emotion is less intense and the conflict is most likely to develop in nonviolent institutional forms. 3. If the hierarchy among groups is not clearly established, cooperation [emphasis original] among them is likely, at least until a hierarchy is formed. 4. If in the period immediately dislodging the empirical or
occupying regime the remaining groups are of relatively equal status and power, then cooperation [emphasis original] is more likely (Peterson 2002, 256).

Number two does not apply to the present case because the role of communities relative to one another is decided, in very real terms, on a single day. Additionally, the degree of modernization, understood in macroscopic terms for a non-industrialized country is questionable. This is not to say that colonial authority had no influences over inter-community relationships (reviewed above), or that a capitalist political economy has not mattered at all for ethnic politics in Kenya. Neither of these considerations, however, is nearly as proximate to the case at hand. Numbers three and four do not hold in the case of Kenya’s 2007-2008 election violence because the Kikuyu controlled the state and hierarchy (or status) were not really in question. It was not simply the case of a large group imposing its will on a whim, but instead the case of a large group imposing its will through control of the state. Number three supports my position above with regard to the recycling elites (in Chabal and Deloz 1999), and with the ongoing agreements between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin.

The reversal narrative was strong in Kenya leading into and following the Kenyan election of 2007. One account from Turbo, just northwest of Eldoret illustrates the effort made by some to capitalize on the sentiment that changes in power may encourage among the population. The account comes from a young Kalenjin Man (Njogu 2009, 280-281).

What I am saying is that in 2005 during the referendum, one of our political leaders told us that there was a problem for we who were in KANU. Then he told us that we, the Kalenjins, had been oppressed; that the Kikuyus had taken over the government and our people had been dismissed from employment. Moi had employed many of our people but the Kibaki government had sent them home. They had all come home and that was the problem. He told us to vote for Orange [Raila Odinga’s political party] so that it would help us because they would take control of the government and our people will reap the fruits. They said that anybody who would not vote for Orange would be beaten and cursed by the community.

Many elements of my argument are present in this example. First, the influential leader that this man refers to has played up the notion that his community had lost control, clearly pointing toward the effect of initially having it. Second, in fomenting animosity between Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, the man also refers very clearly to the “fruits” that are to be gained from holding
office. This is clearly related to the known clientelistic practices in operation within Kenya. Finally, there is a clear reference to committing violence against those who oppose the political platform that he is advocating.

Qualitative evidence from my fieldwork in Kenya also supports the argument that I have proposed. The differences in institutional experience (and perhaps more importantly perceptions of institutional experience) is often referred to in distasteful terms. In Eldoret a late-middle age Meru man told me: “Kikuyu and Kalenjin have more in common than either has with Luo or Luhya because they have been in power. You can’t give them [Luo] control because they won’t know what to do with it; because they have nothing.” We were sitting in a restaurant at the time and he said, “Luo like to drink all the beer in the bar and not pay - they would run the country this way.” “What then?” I said. “It would become like Somalia,” he replied (Author Interview 12, 2011). At another time, one middle aged Kikuyu man living just outside of Eldoret told me that he would support any presidential candidate proposing change except Odinga. Regarding Odinga’s Luo support base, he explained their rioting and looting as a function of the fact that “they have nothing to lose” (Author Interview 13, 2011). Illustrating the key link between ethnicity and power, one Samburu man in Maralal told me “it is possible to rile neighbors by simply claiming: ‘we are not in charge anymore.’” (Author Interview 14, 2011). In addition, an early-40s Kalenjin man suggested to me that a key for explaining violence was specifically related to incumbency. The Kalenjin lost power completely in 2002, including not only the presidency but all of the associated ministries and other important political positions. When campaigning for the 2007 election began, there was a huge push to register to vote in Kalenjin areas - a kind of effort to overturn the recent shift in power toward PNU. The rhetoric surrounding this campaign effort combined with the identity of the Kikuyu population contributed to hostilities between the two communities early on in the election campaign (Author Interview 15, 2011).

Individual witness accounts from the time of the post-election violence further support these key distinctions between incumbent and non-incumbent “outsiders.” One 74 year old Kikuyu man living in Kipkelion gave a vivid account of the roots of tensions in that area. When asked what
the attackers claimed he had done to deserve violence, he replied “I will not hide it from you. They claimed that our Kibaki had stolen the votes. As for the Kisiis they fought Ruto, led by Mr. Nyachae, using the Chinkororo. I will not hide it from you - my son. We were in real danger - Kisiis and Kikuyus. We could not step into Kalenjin areas, even now as we are here. But Maragolis [Luhya] and Luos would go. They can even farm there. Not so for Kikuyus and Kisiis - we can’t plant even vegetables” (Njogu, 2009, 49). In this account of the ethnic politics surrounding election violence, there is clear evidence of an uneven level of animosity toward the Kikuyu that is not felt for other communities. Presumably, this is because of the allocation of land to Kikuyu at an disproportionate rate relative to the group’s proportion of the total population. The impression is not altogether unjustified with a cursory reflection upon the formal settlement schemes data available in Harbeson (1973, 266-267). Where data are available in the Harbeson (1973) resource, 37% of the settlements schemes were dedicated as Kikuyu, with Kalenjin groups (Tugen, Elgeyo, Kipsigis, Nandi) holding 28.1%.

Another piece of evidence in support of the incumbency incentive argument is drawn from popular opinion leading into the election of 2013. Approximately a year prior to the expected poll, an interesting series of messages were being passed among citizens of some of the most contentious districts in the country. One letter was originally an email, but had subsequently been passed among people in printed form, copied, passed again, and so on. The letter appears in Figure 4.2. The letter originally had been passed among members of the Kikuyu community (as is clearly intended by the author), but eventually was being circulated by others as well (Author Interview 16, 2011). In the case of the letter, animosity among communities is obvious. Even in the case of non-Kikuyu sharing the letter, the point was to illustrate what that community felt toward others.¹

I was given the letter by a trusted Luhya man who grew up, lives and works, and is raising children in Eldoret. The letter is anonymized, with the exception of the family name of the original author,

¹ What if the letter were fake? It is possible that a non-Kikuyu created the message as a tool to whip-up resentment about that community. The position illustrated in the letter lends credit to its authenticity, but even if the document were fake it still outlines the salience of ethnic politics, and the perceived position of communities vis-a-vis one another in the contemporary political climate.
Kamau, which is a traditional Kikuyu name. The opinions in the letter are certainly not that of the mainstream, or majority. Nevertheless, the letter was being circulated widely within the population, and not simply at a single ethnocentric rally. The sentiments are not important simply because there is animosity; the details offer strong support for my argument.
Figure 4.2: Letter passed among residents of Rift Valley districts during fall 2011. The content of the message is offensive toward members of groups other than the Kikuyu. Elements of the message relate directly to the incumbency incentive argument I have presented above. The name of the sending party has been blurred (though it was likely a throw-away address).
In this offensive letter, the Luo are presented as “confused rock throwers,” and “beggars,” who, we are to understand, would not know what to do with the presidency were a representative of that community to be elected to that position. The Kikuyu are told to “do everything at your disposal to retain power,” and the letter clearly identifies Raila Odinga as a threat who should be kept from power at all costs. Moreover, we are told that the Kalenjin (under Moi’s tenure in the executive) “ran this country to its knees.” They had an opportunity to turn the country in the right direction, but failed, and are told - remarking about their pastoralist heritage - to “go look after cattle.” The interesting paradox of the incumbency incentive is illustrated in the closing line of the letter. In conclusion, the author claims “Ruto is a friend of Mzee [meaning, “old man”, but meant specifically with regard to Kibaki] and State House [emphasis added], and is just fooling Raila and anti-Kikuyu activists.” “Fooling Raila” refers to the possibility of an alliance between Ruto and Odinga in 2013, which was a possibility at that time, but did not come to pass. More directly, the author likely refers to the alliance under ODM leading into the 2007 national election. Written prior to the December 2012 alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, the point about a Kikuyu-Kalenjin alliance is a telling remark. As with much of the evidence I have presented, this supports a paradoxical similarity that may be found between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu, and outlines the importance of tenure in the executive as a goal for entire communities.

Does the land rights issue undermine the scenario I am furthering? On the surface it may appear to, but with broad historical reference, it does not. In conjunction with Peterson’s work I engage with Boone’s (forthcoming) research to show that the land issue does not overturn the incumbency claim, and in fact supports it. It is well known that in Kenya tenuous land tenure is an extremely common cause of tension between communities, and, too often, of electoral conflict (e.g. recent work includes Kanyinga 2009, Rutten and Owuor 2009; Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2011; Boone 2011). However, even in the highly politicized case of the “million acre scheme”, where thousands of Kikuyu moved into the central and Northern Rift Valley, the land was allocated in part as a function of the fact that Kikuyu were the group in power. In other words, the power to use land as a commodity to gain favor operates through control of the state. One of the other large
ethnic communities that were viewed as having been given land outside of their home territory, the Kisii, are in fact named alongside the Kikuyu in the account above as experiencing especially harsh treatment following the 2007 election. The notion of a “statist” land tenure regime, in contrast to a “neocustomary” regime is related to colonial order. Importantly, for Kenya and other African countries, there was a shift between relatively indirect control of land by many colonial states to a very direct control over land by states after they gained independence. Where “land authority is not devolved to state-recognized customary authorities,” Boone (2002, 48) argues, “the central state itself is a direct allocator and manager of land access and land use. We refer to this type of land control regime as “statist” to underscore the directness [emphasis original] of the state’s role in allocating land, and to thus distinguish this mode of land governance from the indirect rule [emphasis original] arrangement that define the so-called customary land tenure regimes in Africa.” Indirect rule, in basic terms of colonial administration, entailed relegating authority to leaders among the local population. It also meant deferring to local custom and practices for social and cultural affairs related to land inheritance. Indirect rule is sometimes viewed in a positive light as having drawn populations into the bureaucracy of state affairs, granting them experience in the administration upon independence. A statist turn is then far from the indirect example of rule. In Kenya an analogous dynamic in the political realm was the dissolution of KADU, the party supporting federal or local level administration over affairs, into KANU, which advocated for a strong, cohesive, and nation-wide cohesion in institutional affairs. It is worth noting that neocustomary and statist regimes are not mutually exclusive, with regard to the entire territory of countries at a given moment in time. In Kenya, for example, customary tenure was recognized during the colonial administration for territories outside of those areas held by settlers during the colonial administration (Boone, forthcoming, 174). Broadly, however, and to give a comparative reference, statist land tenure regimes exist in much of Ghana and Cameroon, and the later in Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria (Boone, forthcoming, 99-100).

Examples of the statist land tenure regime tradition in Kenya are many, including settlements from Nyanza province to the Coast. The main problem with the statist land tenure regime in
Kenya is that it is tied up in ethnic inter-group relations. Boone (forthcoming, 153) outlines the crux of the problem as follows. “In zones of in-migration governed under statist land regimes, the central government itself has organized in-migration and settlement (the “implantation”) of ethnic outsiders.” In these cases a central government considers the migrants to be clients that are provided with protection. Early efforts at resettlement made by KADU were characterized by an effort to consider the ethnicity of those moving into areas relative to those already living there (Harbeson 1973), but this changed under KANU. Access to land was defined not only by access to cash or credit, but the administration in the form of titles from Land Control Boards and other areas of the new state’s bureaucracy. The fact that management of land had become a state enterprise only became clearer in the political party shift. I review this because it is important to understand the key role that controlling the state can play, in, for example, enabling the settlement population distributions identified above from Harbeson (1973, 266-267). Table 4.4 illustrates the distribution for the schemes where data are available.²

² This should be interpreted cautiously - the data are not 100% comprehensive by definition of the original source.
Table 4.1: Settlement schemes and their ID (Harbeson 1973).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Scheme name</th>
<th>Primary ethnic community that moved in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cherangani</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabisi</td>
<td>Luhya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabuyefwe</td>
<td>Luhya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mautuma</td>
<td>Luhya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumukanda</td>
<td>Luhya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndalat</td>
<td>Nandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elgeyo Border</td>
<td>Elgeyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessos</td>
<td>Nandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ainabkoi East</td>
<td>Elgeyo, Tugen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Songhor</td>
<td>Luo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhoroni</td>
<td>Luo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotik east</td>
<td>Kipsigis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manga</td>
<td>Kisii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelegele</td>
<td>Kipsigis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koyet</td>
<td>Kipsigis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leitego</td>
<td>Kisii</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perkerra</td>
<td>Tugen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sabatia</td>
<td>Tugen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Passenga</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silanga</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kipipiri</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawingo</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandarasi</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitiri</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tulaga</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karati</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
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<tr>
<td>S. Kinangop</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endarasha</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naro Moru</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uaso Nyiro</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mua Hills</td>
<td>Kamba</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ethnic politics of how the Kalenjin identity developed is, in fact, also part of the legacy of incumbency. The merger of groups under the “Kalenjin” banner in the 1940s and 1950s took place long after any organic formation the linguistic group would have emerged. In particular, it gained great importance as an organizing logic for ethnic affairs under Moi as president. Most specifically, developing the identity category was opposition to the perceived invasion of the Rift Valley by those groups who originally resided there (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu). “This ethnic consciousness of “Kalenjin” was rooted in the native-stranger cleavage – it was produced
by the land tenure regime,” Boone (forthcoming, 184) points out. When Moi came into power his policies with regard to land also illustrate opportunistic manipulation of the state for political ends. Specifically, he set out to “dissolve the political clienteles of some of his immediate rivals, Kikuyu barons of the ancien regime” (Boone, forthcoming, 189). By moving land grievance claims and titling issues to the provincial authorities instead of the courts, Moi put power in the hands of political appointees at elevated levels of rank within the state machinery. In short, the expansion of formal rights to land Moi’s policies “added new urgency to efforts to secure official recognition of land claims on the part of both settlers and indigenes” (Boone, forthcoming, 189). Acting upon these goals through these institutions represents Moi’s privileging of the the ethnic community via control over the state. “From 1986 on, government forest lands became a caisse noire of patronage resources that were used to cement elite alliances and to build political support for Moi among the Kalenjin constituencies he needed as a mass power-base” (Boone, forthcoming, 190). Evicting Kenyatta-era Kikuyu residents of the Mau forest area of the Rift Valley is one of the main examples of this policy in action, and was a point of contention leading into the 2007 election. More specifically, Klopp (2012) shows that this is the case not only for Mau Forest, but in Karura Forest and South Nandi Forest as well. More specifically, Klopp (2012) strongly argues that the allocation of land has been drawn into patronage networks. The practice is thus actually tied intimately to the democratization process, where the loyalty that is required to succeed in a context of party competition is often “purchased” with favors that include land access. Returning to the theoretical model I have outlined above, where three groups (A, B, and C) contest an election, it is important to note that there is no analogous Luo (group B) experience to the Kalenjin (group A) past I just described.

Does peace in 2002 undermine the role of the resentment motive, and of the incumbency incentive for violence? No. In 2002, the Kikuyu community saw Mwai Kibaki come to power at the helm of NARC, a broad coalition party, with Moi stepping down as president. There was little violence, and where skirmishes were reported they rarely escalated to the levels witnessed in 1992 or 1997. The peace in 2002 does not undermine the argument for two major reasons. First,
where the Kikuyu had then been an excluded prior-incumbent population, they had good reason to believe that they would be coming back into power in 2002 (even Moi had named a Kikuyu KANU successor in Uhuru Kenyatta), and they did. With regard to the Kalenjin, of course, the reversal had not yet taken place. Secondly, in other words, Moi lost power, but the effects of that had not been felt by his community of supporters overnight.

4.5 Evidence for the incumbency incentive argument

4.5.1 Evidence: most-similar comparison of Rift Valley districts

Comparing districts (now called counties) in Kenya helps to illuminate the path of logic that I apply in this chapter. In the following subsections I present three empirical arguments for the details of the incumbency incentive claim. I provide evidence that the distribution of prior-incumbency experiences explains the distribution between opposition communities and the current incumbent (Kikuyu) population. Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia are neighbors of one another in the central-north Rift Valley. Generally speaking, the two districts are home to many of Kenya’s ethnic communities, especially in Eldoret and Kitale towns. Trans-Nzoia is more socially diverse, however, and I will soon explain how this is a key point of explanation for my argument. One middle aged Kikuyu interview participant explained to me that, “Uasin Gishu, you can say that it is Kalenjin land. Tranz-Nzoia, it is nobodies. It is Luhya, everyone. It is a mix. Like Nairobi, you cannot say it is only Masaii, or Kikuyu, etc.” (Author Interview 17, 2011). In the wake of the 2007 national election each district was the site of violence between PNU and ODM supporters: Kikuyu were targeted in town, as well as in rural areas. Many of the core issues fueling tension among communities are the same in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia, including some experience with settlement schemes immediately following independence. The economy is similar in the two districts: wheat and maize farming and cattle raising dominate. While there was violence in both places, the severity and character of violence in Uasin Gishu was unique, as I will show. The rate at which Kikuyu were attacked, and the deadly efficiency with which such violence was carried out
suggested a higher level of preparation and calculation (if not simple persistent dedication to the killing agenda).

The framework I use for this comparative analysis can be defined by Seawright and Gerring (2008) as the “most similar” cases. Using this framework allows one to make inferences about the dynamics of violence. Because the districts are similar in terms of all major social indicators (population density, poverty, and others), then their variation on the dependent variable of interest (violence) can be explained largely by the one independent variable that is allowed to change between cases (here ethnic composition and the associated incumbency experience). For ethnic communities Kitale, the largest city in Trans Nzoia, is notoriously diverse, while Eldoret and surrounding areas are dominated separately mainly by the Kikuyu and Kalenjin community. Research has shown that bimodal community polarization profile increases the risk of conflict, and I discuss this in greater detail in Chapter Five. The Luhya, who are the largest group in Trans-Nzoia, generally opposed PNU and supported ODM at the time of the 2007 election. Between the Kalenjin and Luhya in that area, the political opposition to PNU may have been similar to that in Uasin Gishu. Yet, in terms of ethnic identity, rather than political party affiliation, there has never been a president representing Trans-Nzoia and the Luhya in the way that president Moi supported the Kalenjin and populations in Uasin Gishu. In Kitale a man in his early thirties made note of this in very direct terms, claiming “The Kikuyu, they have tasted the cake and it is sweet. The Kalenjin, they have tasted the cake and it is sweet. Not the Luhya” (Author Interview 8, 2011).

To compare the districts I present their relative standing for key social indicators. First, with regard to mortality during post-election violence, Figure 4.3 illustrates the severity of violence by district. The number of deaths reported in the Commission for Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) for Uasin Gishu is the highest of all districts in the country. As I have discussed above, CIPEV counts are based on public and private hospital records. Trailing behind in 4th place Trans Nzoia is much lower in terms of the actual number of people killed. Variation on this response is less dramatic than it would be in a national comparison. However, it is crucially important to hold the other known variables of influence constant to illustrate a robust effect of demographics upon
conflict.

Figure 4.3: According to the Commission for Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), the number of election related deaths by district across Kenya. I present data here for districts with at least one death.

Both districts, appearing in red and blue, fall above the national mean (yellow) and median (purple) rates of conflict. Were explaining the outbreak of violence my goal, then selecting on the dependent variable in this way would be problematic. However, the goal is to uncover patterns of violence, and to explain the variation in conflict once it erupts. The question, in other words, is not what caused conflict in Uasin Gishu. I am interested in understanding why violence in Uasin Gishu was so much worse than elsewhere, and why it emerged in a particularly deadly fashion. This is not, in other words, a full explanation of violence, but a way to isolate the effect of a key hypothesized relationship. In the figures that follow, I present evidence that neither district is a deviant outlier for housing density, population density, and poverty.
Figure 4.4: According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS 1999), the housing density of districts in Kenya.

In Figure 4.4 I have plotted the density of housing in every Kenyan district according to official Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) data gathered in Nairobi (KNBS 1999). Housing density could be an important indicator of conflict due to the stress of population pressure. Where property is passed along through families plots become smaller and smaller over generations, making the land a relatively scarce commodity. It is evident that neither Uasin Gishu nor Trans Nzoia is an extreme outlier. Trans Nzoia has a comparatively dense population, but not greater than one standard deviation above Uasin Gishu. Furthermore, they have similar, if not comparable absolute densities. Ideally, for meeting the requirements of the research design, these two districts would be close to one another, but also centrally located, together in the ranking (as they are not for violence, which is the dependent variable). The raw data reveal that Nairobi and Kisumu are housing density outliers, falling at the high density extreme.
Figure 4.5: According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS 1999), the population of each district in Kenya.

Population size has been shown to correlate with conflict in existing research, as I have elaborated in Chapter Two. This may be because of a probabilistic relationship; the chances of finding violent people rises with the total number of people living in an area. Additionally, information-sharing mechanisms (e.g., about the details of an attack) operate more efficiently in densely populated environments. Beyond only the role of housing density, above, diverse populations interact in urban areas, which increases the chances of social differences translating into conflict. The raw population data for Figure 4.5 show that Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu have similar population sizes. A very rural and sparsely population region may be conflict prone, but for difference reasons than a highly-populated area. Mixing these two sites in a conceptual model could distort the inferences drawn from this case study. For instance, pastoralist violence in certain areas of Kenya can be quite severe. Also, conflict in Nairobi’s slums was deadly and persistent following the election, but for very different reasons and under completely different contextual circumstances. In accordance with the most-similar case design, it is necessary to have close comparisons across as many key indicators as possible.
Figure 4.6: According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS 1999), the poverty rate for the population of each district in Kenya.

Poverty is often associated with participation in violence in the conflict studies literature. This is due to several factors. First, residents may hope to supplement their incomes by engaging in violence for a fee. This was known to have taken place during Kenya’s post-election violence (Kanyinga, 2009, 340). Additionally, conflict could emerge from a setting of low socio-economic status due to the fact that security from violence itself costs money. In other words, in wealthy areas people can afford security guards, gates on their property, and other measures to ensure their physical well being. This phenomena is not contingent on either the rural or urban setting. Figure 4.6 shows that both Uasin Gishu district and Trans Nzoia fall near the center of the poverty distributions, neither especially rich nor desperately poor, overall. Also, as with other social conditions, the two districts are not distant from one another for this metric.

Perhaps the most important explanatory variable for which Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia are similar is that they were both the site of settlement schemes during Kenya’s early independence period (von Haugwitz 1972; Harbeson 1973). Introducing the principal argument of this chapter, I presented a vignette of how the explanation applies to this case using Kisumu and Eldoret. Closely examining the empirical data for this argument, it is necessary to include settlement schemes as a potentially explanatory influence that should be held constant across sites. Fieldwork and popular
commentary in Kisumu shows that some residents there lament the dominating role that Kikuyu play in the city’s economy. While their population there is relatively large, the Kikuyu presence in Kisumu is not an institutional settlement in any sense. That Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu both experienced a moderate rate of outside settlement (see settlement map in Chapter Two) isolates the influence of the geographically contingent inter-group behavior proposal that I test.

Consider the additional fact that violence between Kalenjin and Kikuyu took place during the 1992 and 1997 elections as well as 2007. Building upon some research within the ethnic conflict literature, we might expect the most serious risk of conflict and the highest level of violence to take place under the condition that the Kikuyu represented a relatively small minority. A small group may have difficulty defending itself, and in forming a critical mass of defense if the group were to be confronted by aggressors. Following this understanding a large Kalenjin population would have the ability to act as it pleased, planning attacks and enjoying safety in numbers while carrying out their plans. Alternatively, it is possible that parity between the size of communities may increase conflict risk because they both have substantial clout and the possibility of altering the outcome of a conflict (or election) is higher where the percentage total of each group nears 50%.

I calculate the the size of the Kikuyu district-level population relative to the Kalenjin population using the ethnicity data from the 1989 Kenyan census (KNBS 1990). Some are wary of using these ethnicity data due to suspicions of their accuracy. In other portions of this chapter I rely on separate innovative ways of circumventing the poor data issue. However, as these are the only data available at the district scale, and they only play one part of the analysis in this chapter (the central claim does not stand on these data alone), I present the following. I start with only the Rift Valley province to isolate possible confounding influences that drive conflict in different regions of the country, and then expand outward with the analysis below. If a minority-violence logic applied to an analysis of Kenya’s election violence - that is, where a small minority is helpless in confrontation with a super majority opponent - we might expect a low proportion of Kikuyu in the most deadly district (nearly double the number of people died in Uasin Gishu than in Trans Nzoia). In contrast, Table 4.2 shows that neither district has an outlying value - that is, on the whole Uasin
Gishu district is not characterized by an extremely small Kikuyu minority, or very large Kikuyu proportion. Both Trans-Nzoia and Uasin-Gishu hover in the middle range of the distribution (table values are sorted low-to-high). If anything, the fact that the Kikuyu populations are between 32% (Uasin Gishu) and 45% (Trans Nzoia) of the Kalenjin population lends anecdotal support to the notion that parity between groups may be especially volatile. This argument is tested in detail in the following chapter. On the whole, the districts are similar in their comparative proportions of Kikuyu to Kalenjin, without consideration for the composition of the remaining population.

Table 4.2: For Rift Valley districts, the ethnic percentages of the largest groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Kikuyu</th>
<th>Luo</th>
<th>Luhya</th>
<th>Kalenjin</th>
<th>Kikuyu ratio to Kalenjin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nandi</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>17.52</td>
<td>73.64</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pokot</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>85.15</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Marakwet</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>91.32</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kericho</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>82.66</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baringo</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>83.79</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uasin Gishu</td>
<td>16.90</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>18.46</td>
<td>52.63</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narok</td>
<td>11.32</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>30.41</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Nzoia</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>52.03</td>
<td>21.29</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakuru</td>
<td>59.65</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>14.98</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laikipia</td>
<td>67.75</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>9.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajiado</td>
<td>23.76</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>45.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>19.32</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>9.73</td>
<td>46.36</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data gathered from the KNBS census (KNBS 1990).

What, therefore, explains the deadly difference between the two districts? It is possible that the role of third population groups influence the dynamics of conflictual politics. Figure 4.7 reiterates the fact that the relative number of Kikuyu vis-a-vis Kalenjin is quite similar between the two territories (they are centrally located and near to one another in the ranking). Additionally, however, it is possible that the dominating presence of a non-incumbent buffer (illustrated in yellow) explains the variation with regard to violence exposure. The difference between the Luhya percentage in Uasin Gishu and and Trans Nzoia is more than double (18.46 to 52.03, respectively). It is important to consider this comparison because we have established that the two districts are
similar for the most important other social variables. The fact that the relative size of the two groups does not change between locales, and that the absolute percentage of a third party changes, *along with* the rate of violence, suggests that absolute population characteristics of the districts matters for the rate of violence. A purely behavioral and group based account of violence is not as comprehensive as a careful consideration of interactions in particular geographic contexts. While the district scale in Kenya is not as fine a resolution as individual town or city, it is a meaningful level of disaggregation from national- (or provincial-) level discussions of conflict. In engaging with the human geography scholarship on the politics of place presented above, the following analysis is my attempt to show that place matters via legacies of incumbency.

![Relative proportions of incumbent and absolute number of non-incumbent populations](image)

Figure 4.7: According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics census 1989, and by district (x-axis) the relative proportion (percent) of Kikuyu to Kalenjin populations (y-axis) and the absolute percentage population of Luhya (z-axis). The data are sorted from low to high by relative Kikuyu-Kalenjin relative proportion. It is important for my claim that the Kikuyu to Kalenjin ratios of district populations are distributed centrally, and that the two highlighted districts are near to one another.
4.5.2 Evidence: national data for cause of death

The general hypothesis I presented in the above section applies also to post-election violence outside of the two districts that I used in a most-similar case analysis. The number of deaths in Western province was very high, although not nearly as high as the Rift Valley, where 744 perished. According to the CIPEV 98 individuals were killed in Western (CIPEV, 170). I believe looking at the cause of death is a helpful way to uncover conflict trends. This approach follows Peterson’s (2002, 23), who argues that “the quality of the violence is also relevant because the nature of violence can often help distinguish among competing explanations.” Continuing with an example, he writes, “when a religious figure, rather than a political figure, is singled out at a particular time as a target of violence, certain inferences about the perpetrator’s motivation may be made.” In my case, I distinguish between deadly and non-deadly violence, and also, on the cause of death. There is established precedent for the use of hospital records in explaining processes of political violence. For example, following 1926 riots in Calcutta, “riot investigators were often very creative in their research methods... One Indian police surgeon even attempted to assess the extent to which what we might now term (following Brass 1997) ‘riot professionals’ were involved by analyzing the type of injuries inflicted on 124 bodies in the police morgue. He found that most of the stab wounds penetrated important internal organs, and that the clean wounds on the victims indicated that ‘the weapons used had probably been especially sharpened for the specific purpose’ (De 1927, 480-481)” (Wilkenson 2009, 332). Seemingly similar rates of violence on the surface (in terms of unrest and an unspecified and type-aggregated incident rate) may be separated by understanding not only whether a death occurred, but the mode of death, which is revealed in the CIPEV hospital records that cover Kenya’s post-election violence.

Table 4.3 shows that post-mortem examinations of bodies by doctors revealed that 74 of them, or 75% of the total in Western region, died directly as a result of gunshot wounds (CIPEV, 316-317). Outside of pastoralist northern communities guns are relatively rare in Kenya, and death by gunshot wound strongly suggests police involvement. That the use of guns was predominantly
at the hands of police is also noted for areas outside of Kisumu, including areas near Kapsoit where police in a GSU lorry killed several unarmed individuals who were not engaged in protesting or looting (Njogu 2009, 52). A similar trend can be observed in Nyanza, where 79.8% of deaths were shootings. In contrast to the pattern in Western province, deaths in Rift Valley were overwhelmingly caused by “sharp pointed objects” (288, or 38.7%, of 744). Deaths at the hands of police are not somehow less important, or less interesting for analyzing election violence. However, those deaths are a response to the initial wave of violence, and are thus not as closely linked with the potential causes of non-state violence under investigation here.

Table 4.3: The rate of deaths caused by gunshot wounds in Nyanza, Western, and Rift Valley provinces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Gunshot fatalities</th>
<th>Total fatalities</th>
<th>Percent of gunshot deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data are from the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV).

Violence in Western and Nyanza provinces was therefore markably different than Rift Valley, involving mainly small arms fire. The state pursued punishment in the western regions of the country as a response to widespread looting and violence against Kikuyu (and especially their businesses). Even if the police used repressive force to maintain control of the stolen-election, and to preserve the incumbent’s position in power, the form of violence may not be compared directly with the non-state violence under consideration in the comparison above between Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu. In Kisumu, it is crucial to understand that many of the people who died were the perpetrators of looting and rioting (they were the opposition), and were not the target of opposition based violence. In Coast province a similar dynamic to that of Western Kenya emerged (Njogu 2009). Kikuyu properties were looted and deadly threats were issued with frequency against “outsiders.”
4.5.3 Evidence: nationally representative population-based survey analysis

In survey data from Kenya prior to the election violence, there is a paradox in the dynamics of opposition for key Kenyan political communities. Figure 4.8 illustrates one such relationship. For the Luo population, notoriously under-represented in the national political arena since their primary leader Tom Mboya was assassinated in 1969, we might expect support for political violence to be relatively high. This would fall in line with the more traditional characterizations of opposition mobilization and violence. As perceived injustices or unfair treatment rise, so would the willingness to take drastic measures to remedy them. The question I use to understand this phenomenon comes from Afrobarometer Round Three (enumerated in 2005). The question is worded as follows. “Which of the following statements is closest to your view. Choose Statement A or Statement B. A: The use of violence is never justified in Kenyan politics today. B: In this country it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.” Respondents state that they “agree very strongly with,” or “agree with” either of the statements. I code as approving of violence those respondents who either agree or agree strongly with the statement that violence is sometimes necessary to further a just cause. I drop those respondents who refuse to answer or reply “don’t know.” The other key indicator reflects the individual respondents perception of marginalization from the formal political sphere. The question that I use (Q80B) is: “Think about the condition of [respondent’s identity group]. Do they have less, the same, or more influence in politics than other groups in this country?” I code respondents as having low perceptions of political influence if they responded “Worse” or “Much worse.” In Figure 4.8 the two key opposition groups are highlighted in green, and the 2007 election incumbent community in red.
Figure 4.8: The proportion of respondents within a group who accept violence as a legitimate means of expression (vertical axis) compared with their perceived level of influence in government (horizontal axis). Source, Afrobarometer Round Three.

Among the two opposition communities it is noteworthy that that the Kalenjin have, overall, a higher rate of reporting that they approve of using violence than Luo. This simple result is not the relationship we would expect based on the notion that an excluded or otherwise marginalized population (the Luo, in this case), would have a higher level of support for violent politics in order to remedy their perceived exclusion. Instead, it is the population (Kalenjin) who had a president in power for decades (Moi) that views their influence to be low, and also approves of violence at a higher rate according to these data. It is time now to turn toward more sophisticated predictive analysis of level of support for violence.

Alternative explanations for opinions about violence are important to consider when gauging the role of incumbency experience. I consider level of education, socioeconomic status, gender, and ethnicity to be key controls. Education is divided between respondents completing secondary
education and low income levels are captured by coding respondents who go “without enough food
to eat” either “always” or “many times” within a year. Ethnicity is self-reported and respondents
are presented with the option of replying “none”, “Kenyan only, or does not think in those terms”,
and “other [with regard to the 42 major groups]”. The percentages of approval for several key
social groupings are presented in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: For survey Round Three, the percentage of re-
spondents by social group who support political violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Population approval rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post secondary education</td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education or none</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age &gt; 25</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>0.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalenjin</td>
<td>0.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>0.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhya</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In both surveys men support violent politics at greater rates than women, which supports the
evidence in some other conflict studies research. Interestingly, those respondents with higher levels
of education are more likely to support conflict than individuals with only a primary education or
no formal schooling at all. Low socio-economic status, as one would expect from existing research,
appears to be related to support for violence, whereby wealthier Kenyans support conflict at lower
levels. Among Kenyan ethnic communities leading into the 2007 election, Kikuyu expressed the
lowest level of support for violence (15.1%). Perhaps this is due to the fact that their interests
were represented in State House during both rounds of survey enumeration: support for violence
to further a cause could be interpreted as a threat to Kibaki’s control. This may also be due to
the fact that the community has often been targeted for (usually election) violence, as in 1992 and
1997. Kalenjin and Luhya populations have higher levels of support for conflict (31% and 28% respectively), both nearly double that of the Kikuyu. The most notable element of table 4.4 is that support for violent politics among the Luo population is lower than the Kalenjin, again leading in the opposite direction that one might expect if complete and long-term exclusion from power were the greatest influence upon violent opposition/rebellion.

These tabled results of a univariate relationship may be biased because they do not control for alternative explanations of violence simultaneously. Below, I turn to predictive multivariate regression analysis of support for violence, controlling simultaneously for all variables that might also explain violent attitudes. I present the results of straightforward generalized linear and generalized linear mixed model (\texttt{glmmML} \texttt{R} package; Bröstrom and Holmberg 2011) analysis using age, gender, livelihood, education, and self-reported ethnicity as predictors of approving violence as a binary response variable. I present results for a standard logistic and logistic random intercept model of Round Three survey data in Table 4.5 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>glm 3</th>
<th>glm mixed 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.041 ***</td>
<td>-2.2106 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>.1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.2314</td>
<td>.2548 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>.2639 *</td>
<td>.2173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.2755 *</td>
<td>.2044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>-.0359</td>
<td>.1255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalenjin</td>
<td>.8555 ***</td>
<td>.9066 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>.6385 **</td>
<td>.7686 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhya</td>
<td>.7251 **</td>
<td>.2757 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5601 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1232.5</td>
<td>1217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% uncertainty or lower, respectively; $\sigma$ represents variation of random effects across districts.

Controlling for other important characteristics, respondents were more likely to support vio-
rence prior to the 2007 Kenyan election if they were under 25 years of age, had completed secondary school or further education, and were members of the Kalenjin, Luo, or Luhya communities. In the random intercept model, with (statistically significant at $p \leq .1$) variation ($\sigma$) across Kenyan districts, the effect of youth and education disappear, but it is apparent that men are more likely than women to support violence. In both mixed and standard models Kalenjin, Luo, and Luhya populations are more likely to support violence than other groups, and in line with the tabulated results above the relationship is not significant for Kikuyu. I do not simply have one dummy for a single group (as in a control for one key experience), or group level fixed effects, because my goal is to compare the magnitude of the influence across communities.

Interestingly, and lending empirical support for the main claim in this chapter, the Kalenjin indicator is associated with the highest level of support for violence among all main ethnic communities. These findings for the attitudes of ethnic communities are not a result of some innate characteristic for any one group. Instead, I have proposed that the relationships emerging in this analysis are a legacy of institutional context. This claim is informed by my understanding that context (both temporal and spatial) influences the salience of any identity, including ethnicity in an African context. Furthermore, as I illustrated in introducing this dissertation (building upon Agnew and Massey’s work), the institutional experience and ethnic community contexts are valid geographical conceptions of the social setting that an individual is embedded within. This view is framed alongside the work of Posner (2004), and Chabal and Daloz (1999) in my earlier discussions of the African politics literature. Kikuyu, for example, may be less likely to support violent politics on the whole within Kenya during these years because they were in a position of power relative to the other largest communities. A cynic might suggest that they don’t need to use violence to influence the political atmosphere in Kenya, because of their relative position in control of the state apparatus. Existing research supports the notion that incumbents are more likely to use fraud and vote manipulation than violence, in contrast to the trend for opposition parties. However, opposition support communities are not identical, and important consideration must be given to their historical experiences in any analysis of political violence.
4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I present evidence for an incumbency incentive to participate in violence that has three levels. First, I have developed a comparative two-district most-similar comparative analysis relying on rates of violence and ethnic composition related to prior-incumbency. Secondly, I find evidence in the types of deaths that were recorded in hospitals after the election violence, that the form of violence varied dramatically between Western Kenya, where one incentive for violence dominates, and the Rift Valley, where another prevails. Finally, in a country-wide analysis, I present evidence that members of Kenya’s opposition parties support the use of violence at different rates. I suggest that this variation is linked with experience in Kenya’s executive branch of government. This incentive influences the spatial distribution of conflict within Kenya. Furthermore, the implications of the conceptual model for how incumbency influences conflict intimately also relates to geographic scale. Hierarchical scale is important in this analysis because national level experiences for a community condition local level exposure to violence. These conclusions relate to my geographical conceptual framework (and my later conclusions) in that I have illustrated an important influence of locality conditions (regional demography) on trends in violence. Regional demography matters, in turn, because of ethnic community historical experiences with the institutions of governance at the national level. The population characteristics of Uasin Gishu (heavily dominated by two prior-incumbent groups) and Trans Nzoia (more diverse with regard to level of prior-incumbent experience) have an explanatory role for the different rate of violence observed between them. In the following chapter I investigate how exposure to election violence may operate via the influences of political party (and ethnic community) competition within districts. Where the current chapter highlights the important conflict effects related to the specific identity of groups (prior-incumbent vs. not), the next chapter investigates the social conditions that may lead to conflict regardless of the specific identity of the groups in an area.
Chapter 5

Rescaling Kenyan Government and the Perils of Ethnic Community Polarization for Exposure to Electoral Violence

_Ethnic groups are mobilized or joined not because of the depth of attachment that people feel toward them but because of the usefulness of the political coalitions that they define - a usefulness determined exclusively by their sizes relative to those of other coalitions._

- Posner 2005, p. 12

_Wewe [“you”]. Listen. There are two tribes in Kenya: rich and poor._

- Author interview, 2011 (Reference number 18)

5.1 Introduction

In the name of development and political stability, Kenya’s 2010 constitution calls for the devolution of certain executive and legislative authorities from the national level to 47 new counties. Despite the government overhaul being well-intentioned, institutional change comes with risks. In particular, there is a chance that competition for newly contested elective county positions could lead to further political violence. In contrast to a context of diversity or homogeneity, existing conflict research suggests that the risk of violence is highest in cases that two large groups dominate a population. I find this to be true for electoral violence across Kenyan districts. Ethnic community polarization at the district level prior to the 2007 national poll is a strong predictor of exposure to conflict after the election. Via what mechanism does this relationship operate?
It is possible that pre-election ethnocentric preferences explain the link between polarization and conflict. Ethnocentric preferences exist where individuals prefer their ethnic, rather than civic, identity, and can be measured using surveys. Additionally, existing research suggests that inter-group tensions may be most pronounced in a context of poverty. I test these political, and separately, poverty mechanisms for conflict using average causal mediation effect (ACME) estimates. Evidence affirms the notion that conflict emerges from ethnic preferences for some model specifications. However, district level poverty emerges as a more consistently influential mechanism explaining the influence of ethnic polarization upon conflict. I also test the relationship between group polarization and settlement scheme status, which is a common political economy explanation for Kenyan election violence. This political economy explanation is largely materialist, and is based on the tensions that arise alongside competition for resources such as land. Using historical data that I have georeferenced into a GIS platform, I find an important role for the political economy explanation. Crucially important, however, is the fact that the association is contingent upon contemporary social context. Settlement scheme legacies explain election related violence only together with demographic ethnic community polarization, that acts as a mediating variable. Ethnic community polarization scores are calculated for every Kenyan district. This innovative analysis represents a merger of perspectives (political economy and behavioral) about why violence breaks out, and why it breaks out in particular locations. Limitations of the study include the fact that my survey data are not experimental by design, and that merging two rounds of data (before and after electoral violence) excludes district observations that are not included in both samples.

In August 2010, Kenya adopted a new constitution largely as a result of the country’s deadly election violence. With 1,300 citizens dead as a result of the post-election conflict, and as many as 300,000 displaced within the country, it had become widely evident that governing institutions had to change in order to avoid violence in the future. While a draft constitution failed to pass in a referendum in 2004, the new policies and institutions were approved across the political spectrum during August 2010 (by 67 percent). Woven throughout Kenya’s new constitution is a narrative of improving socio-economic development. Highlighting this sentiment David Ndii, one Committee
of Experts (CoE) architect of the new government, recently claimed that “the new constitution responds to distributional grievances, particularly the regional development disparities” (Ndii 2011). Together with land allocation disputes, it was such economic disparity that served as the background for the recent post-election violence. To revisit a portion of the literature I presented in Chapter Two, grievances in this case translated into physical conflict. I covered the institutional legacies of the early independence period in the overview above, and these also include important land-tenure related grievances in addition to poverty. In the following analysis, I test the role that local geographical variables like demography, low socio-economic status, land grievances, and ethnocentric attitudes have in explaining exposure to post-election violence.

In the past Kenyan districts were run by appointed district commissioners, but under the new constitution counties will be governed by locally elected leaders. While there is cause to believe that decentralization can combat economic disparities and political exclusion, there is certainly a risk that competition between communities for those seats will be tense. Devolution-for-development thus represents a social risk. With an eye toward future elections in Kenya, in this chapter I focus on the social dynamics of the 2007 electoral contest to establish whether local population proportions have influenced conflict. If ethnic community polarization has contributed to conflict in the past, then the possibility that it will play a role in the future is worth serious consideration as the new constitution is implemented. My data include two sample surveys, enumerated before and after violence engulfed the country.

In the following section I review the literature concerning decentralization as a remedy for conflict. I connect these to academic debates about consociational institutional arrangements. More specifically, I present decentralization as a question of geographic scale, and then discuss the Kenyan case. In the third section I discuss existing literature concerning ethnic group composition and conflict. In the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh sections I clarify my propositions, describe the data I use, explain my estimation strategy, and present results, respectively. The eighth section concludes this chapter.
5.2 Decentralization and contentious politics

Devolution, decentralization, or federated forms of government have long been proposed as a solution for political and economic disputes between groups (Lijphart 1996; Nordlinger 1973; Gurr 1970, 2000; Bermeo 2002; Lake and Rothchild 1996). Brancati (2009, 3), for example, observes: “the fact that at least under the right circumstances decentralization can bring frustrated populations closer to the government and provide them with an outlet in which to address their grievances has led many politicians, especially those representing minority groups to tout decentralized governance as the key to reducing, if not preventing, ethnic conflict and secessionism.” The most common definition of decentralization is developed upon Riker’s (1963) designation. Riker explains that decentralization is a system where for one area or territory there exists two levels of government, each of which has control over distinct policy responsibilities, and for which they make autonomous decisions. Decentralization along the lines Riker defined has been used as a management strategy for quelling the Tuareg rebellion in Mali (Seely 2001), proposed as a settlement solution to Somalia’s civil war (DeRouen, et al. 2010), and incorporated in the United Kingdom to bring Sinn Féin and Democratic Unionists together (Bradbury and Mitchell 2005). Devolution also became, in an extreme territorialized form, a tenet of the Dayton Accords ending conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005). Consociational political systems are related to decentralization with regard to the conflict-ameliorating effects that each institutional setup is said to have (Selway and Templeman 2012). Many countries have adopted consociational institutions to ease tensions between political communities, but the institutions are less spatial in their manifestation than federated arrangements. Consociational arrangements may ensure an even amount of influence for several key groups (e.g. proportional representation), or provide some degree of autonomy for a community’s decision making about laws that govern its members, but they are not necessarily territorial to the extent of Kenya’s new institutional configuration.

Despite the expectations of many scholars, decentralization may not be a universal panacea for violent conflict. Instead, “vicious cycles of higher redistribution, economic inefficiency, and
political instability” (Triesman 1999, 488) can emerge under decentralized government in divided societies. It is possible, for instance, that a regional majority will instate discriminatory policies toward minorities (Horowitz 1985). The power to govern and formulate policy for a given territory is a strong incentive for either population to take control. In addition to purposefully discriminatory policy within a devolved administrative unit, a risk of decentralization is that it may translate more generally into the solidification of sub-national social identities leading to conflict (Hardgrave 1994; Roeder 2009). In other words, if Kenyans from one group are being treated unfairly in one area, their sympathizers elsewhere in the country may introduce the pertinent issue onto the broader national level political discourse. With mixed evidence in the historical record there is little reason to declare that decentralization or federalism are a definitive solution to contentious politics (Snyder 2000; Bunce 1999; Hale 2004; Selway and Templeman 2011; Norris 2008). The most general conclusion that we may draw from experiences with decentralization is that they are highly case-specific, contingent upon historical local conditions (Boone 2003), and must be specific to institutional and ethnic configurations sub-nationally (Bakke and Wibbles 2006). Physical instability and political conflict may also easily be translated from localized devolved units outward to the entire country, as Christin and Hug (2012) have shown. In that case unrest may spread throughout territory, unsettling the whole population of a country.

5.2.1 Decentralization and contentious politics as rescaling

The question of devolution or decentralization can be considered a matter of hierarchical scale, operating from the local to the regional, and, in turn, to the national level. Especially from a purely institutional perspective scale is often understood in this type of hierarchical fashion.\(^1\) Adapting these hierarchical national frameworks to spatially heterogeneous political institutions has been a difficulty in African decentralization projects (Boone 2003). This is the case, in large part, because of extremely dissimilar interests held by local parties relative to national groups.

\(^1\) Marston, Jones, and Woodward (2005) provide a valuable summary of debates surrounding this matter, and present a critical assessment of scale as a concept. They conclude that the concept is structurally deterministic and limits the “practical agency” of individuals (Marston, Jones, and Woodward 2005, 427).
Where political and economic realities are designed and implemented at the country level, they represent the “space of engagement,” to use Cox’s (1998) formulation (also Cox and Wood 1997). More abstract, general and distant from everyday life and basic needs, relationships at the national level contrast with the local-level “space of dependence.” The social world at the space of dependence is inherently more immediate, and characterized by detail and specificity. Localizing governance places authority in the space of dependence. This can be considered rescaling because the “operative” effect of location is more important under a newly devolved system (Agnew 1993, 251). Consider locations A and B, which previously were subject only to national legislative jurisdiction. When the sub-national administrative unit encompassing location A formulates public policy that radically differs from B’s administrative unit, the effect of residing in location A is tangible when compared with B. This logic drives locational analysis in economic geography for both global (States) and sub-national (sub-State) units, with regard to taxation and government regulation in various sectors. Revisiting the research surrounding the politics of place and context in behavioral studies of political life, including violence and voting (Agnew 1987, 1996; Massey, 1994; Pred 1983,1984; Giddens 1979; Granata 1980; Johnston and Pattie 1988; Pattie and Johnston 2000; Thrift 1984), geographers have shown that local level influences are powerful. With the new Kenyan constitutional design, these local level influences, following the argument I have outlined above, will be even stronger than they already are.

The benefits of rescaling government extend from the fact that political and economic legislation is made by individuals interacting in the space of dependence. Fine-resolution policy can cater to local population demands in a way that is not possible at a relatively coarse, or general, resolution. People’s life experiences tend to be place-specific (be it a single town, region, or other area). Yet, the forum for dispute resolution exists at a more general level under centralized systems. Decentralization brings the insights and framework for managing society more closely in line with local level experience. In terms of the public financing and management of development projects, the logic behind devolution is that the people best suited to direct social and economic affairs for a region are those people with the most nuanced knowledge of the area, and the people who must
live with the policies they implement (Oates 1993, Stansel 2005, Pinto 2007).

5.2.2 Decentralization and contentious politics in Kenya

As I have discussed above, at independence in 1963 Kenya inherited the colonial Lancaster constitution. This political system granted extensive powers to the executive and has been called, for example, a “lynchpin of post-colonial dictatorship” by some academic observers (Murungi 2011, 30). Central authority was strong under colonialism, but there was also an element of regional authority, as the settlers wanted control over the fertile so-called “white highlands” that they occupied. In practice, this early decentralization materialized in the form of the Local Native Councils (LNCs). LNCs represented little more than co-optation of local Kenyan populations by colonizers in the disguise of autonomy, however. Clearly, settler-local identity politics influenced tendencies toward federalism in the colonial era. Following independence, identity politics emerged along Kenyan ethnic boundaries. Immediately at the founding of independent Kenya there was competition between Kenya African National Union (KANU), promoting a platform of centralizing power, and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), the party furthering the cause of regionalism. By 1964 KANU had prevailed over the KADU agenda, leading the way toward a de facto one party state. In 1965 the new country’s experiment with a bicameral (upper and lower house) legislature was also abandoned, further centralizing power under president Jomo Kenyatta and KANU. All authority for appointments and policy development shifted upward through the government hierarchy of institutions.

Taking office in 1978, president Daniel Arap Moi made Kenya a de jure one party state in 1982. Even prior to Moi’s appointment as president, there had been reform efforts designed to remedy perceived injustices among communities. Such an agenda was the mission of the “change-the-constitution” movement in 1977. During the 1980s the Mwakenya movement gained momentum, ushering a violent crack-down by the state in 1987. Reformers tasted success when Section 2a of the former constitution was overturned in November 1991, as this directed the country toward multi-party elections in 1992. Some hints of decentralization have appeared since, but these are
less substantial than the measures included in the new constitution. For instance, in 1998 the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) was created, which was a framework for more effectively distributing funding for development to poor and underdeveloped rural areas. Operating in an autocratic environment limited the ability of LATF to deliver, however, and it was therefore not effective.

After taking power from KANU in 2002 the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) made attempts to reform the country, including a draft constitution referendum. The so-called “Bomas draft” failed in 2005. One policy aiming for decentralization following NARC’s success was the creation of Constituency Development Funds (CDF) in 2003. CDF implementation has been criticized for being susceptible to poor direction at the hands of MPs, including nepotism and corruption. Furthermore, the CDF only allocated 2.5% of national revenue for distribution. Following Kenya’s recent electoral violence, the CoE produced a coordinated draft of the new devolution constitution. As an ultimate version of reform - complete government overhaul - the new constitution was introduced formally to the public in April 2010 by Attorney General Amos Wako. In a referendum held during August 2010, the constitution was overwhelmingly approved by Kenyans (by 67 %). It is against the backdrop of a strong executive branch and a high level of state centralization that recent trends emerge, including violence, but also institutional change.

Chapter Two of Kenya’s new constitution outlines the independence of local and national authority. “The governments at the national and county levels are distinct and inter-dependent and shall conduct their mutual relations on the basis of consultation and cooperation,” the document reads. The purpose of devolution is to “promote democratic and accountable exercise of power,” according to Article 174 of Chapter 11. At the country scale, the regulatory duties of the national government include conducting foreign affairs, the use of international waters and water resources, immigration and citizenship, national defense, and monetary policy, among other typical federal authorities (Schedule 4). Under the new rules a number of important responsibilities fall at the county level, in contrast, and these include managing agriculture (including animals), health facilities (excluding national referral hospitals), transportation, trade development and regulation,
implementation of specific national government policies, and county public works (including water and sanitation services) (Schedule 4). Most importantly, perhaps, county governments are granted authority over “planning and development, including statistics, land survey and mapping, boundaries and fencing, housing, and electricity and gas reticulation and energy regulation” (Schedule 4). In areas where historical settlement schemes have distorted property ownership (Boone 2011) there is arguably no more contentious issue than land titling and boundary-making. For managing these affairs the county’s are allocated 15% of the national budget (compared with 2.5% under CDF). Cumulatively, the autonomy and capacity being transferred to local officials is substantial.

In terms of moving between spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement, or from local experience to the national-level political dialogue, I turn to a brief review of the new legislature. At the national level there will be a bicameral legislature with a national assembly and a senate. Each county will contribute single-consituency MPs totaling 290 country-wide. There are also 47 women MPs elected at the county level, and 12 members for underrepresented populations who are nominated by parties according to their proportional representation. Every county elects one senator. Collectively they are joined by 16 women, nominated by parties according to proportion of support, two (one of each gender) representing youth, and two (one of each gender) representing persons with disabilities. While the new provisions expand representation and add balance of the local to the national executive, for the purposes of this study the national configuration is of secondary interest to the county level.

In the effort to engender accountability for the expression of power and delivery of services, each county will have a county assembly and county executive that are designed to be “closer” to Kenyans than under the previous institutions. The county assembly consists of directly elected representatives of wards, who may collectively not represent more than 2/3 one gender within a county. Special seat members (representing youth and persons with disabilities) are nominated by political parties under the principal of party proportional representation. Representatives of wards may serve for no longer than two five-year terms. The assembly speaker is elected by the assembly, but is not one of them. Directly elected governors will serve as executive administrators,
with a committee of appointed members that are approved by the assembly but are not themselves members of the assembly. In terms of tenure, members of the committee are accountable only to the governor. They are responsible for implementing county (and national, where appropriate) legislation. Otherwise their charge is to “manage and coordinate the functions of the county administration and its departments.” The governor may be removed from office for violating the law or abuse of office.

In this chapter my argument is that competition for both the executive (governor) and legislature (assembly) at the county level, will be highest in the case where parity (or near-parity) exists between the support bases of ethnic groups. Because the power conferred to the winner of an election is great, as I have illustrated above, there is reason to believe that contentious politics could become violent politics. This possibility is amplified by the tendency of some Kenyans to adhere to the principle of “negative ethnicity” (Wamwere 2008), which is the belief that when an individual achieves a position of power, supporters will be richly and unequivocally rewarded. My understanding of ethnicity (outlined in detail previously) respects the fact that specific circumstances and particular social contexts influence how Kenyans act upon their ethnic identity at any given point in time. Here the choice is being driven by individual level calculations of gain and a winner-take-all mentality. Recognizing that ethnicity is salient in African contexts is not discordant with the fact that ethnic categories and groupings are influenced by the colonial central state. A helpful consideration for understanding ethnicity in the African post-colonial settings is presented by Chabal and Daloz (1999, 57-58):

Historically, then we may consider the construction of modern [African] ethnicity in much the same light as we regard that of nationality in Europe. Invented ethnicities are, from such a perspective, no different from imagined communities; indeed they are imagined communities. What is significant in Africa, and differs from the process by which the European nation-state evolved, is that the invention of modern ethnicity was coincidental in time with the imposition on the continent of the colonial political structure - itself ostensibly modeled on the European state. So that it was the colonial state which formalized the ethnic map and conspired to define the relationship between ethnicity and politics - both of which influenced directly the complexion of post-colonial polities. What has happened since independence, has been the working through of the practical consequences of the colonial
'politicization' of invented ethnicities.

In other words, social meddling by colonial administrators was important, but should not undermine the fact that ethnic identity matters in contemporary real terms. This thinking maps onto Kenyan politics generally, but also onto the emergence of political violence more specifically. According to Chabal and Daloz (1999, 61), “the drift from the legitimate instrumental use of ethnicity to political tribalism is thus to be understood as part of the authoritarian deliquescence of political order in contemporary Africa, as it was in the former Yugoslavia.”

My fieldwork in Maralal, Samburu district, suggests that such a style of ethnicized politics will play an important role in county government and resource allocation during the future. Maralal is a traditionally marginalized area on the fringe of Kenya’s pastoralist north. The area is dominated by the Samburu group. A politically well-connected and relatively wealthy (for the area) man in his mid-forties told me of inter-group relations under the new constitution in the following terms (Author Interview 19, 2011):

[Under the new rules] Some will take opportunities to say: ‘You, you have punished us. You can go.’ Even if there is not burning houses, arrows and such there will be like a cold war... They [those favored by the government currently] will not be given tenders [Kenyan term for contracts]. Here the leaders will say: ‘We’ll give the Samburu the tender because they have been marginalized.’

Clearly not every person feels this way. My intention is to suggest that the sentiment is present in contemporary Kenya, not that it is omnipresent. In another instance in Maralal a mother in her mid-thirties expressed a very different view, for example. Reflecting on current social dynamics in town, but discussing the implementation of counties, she had a more optimistic outlook than the quote above portrays. This woman speculated that the new rules could cause those living in Maralal from outside areas (naming the Kikuyu specifically) to have more invested in that region. “There will be that sense of belonging,” she said, and when considering candidates for county office she ventured that constituents will look at a leader’s “merit” and not just “at their name” (Author Interview 20, 2011). In this case localizing government would have a harmonizing effect, rather than the violent opposite. Another middle aged woman explained to me that the decentralization
will force the new counties to have benevolent policies (informal though they may be) about ethnic communities. I asked her whether discrimination may take hold within ethnically homogenous areas. Referring somewhat directly to economic life in Kenya she argued that, “counties will compete. Those held back by being backward will not make it, they will only hurt themselves” (Author Interview 21, 2011). She optimistically had adopted the view that people will understand how antagonistic attitudes about inter-group relations would harm areas.

The more pessimistic view expressed above falls in line with other commentary on Kenya suggesting that “the devolution of power to counties identified with a specific ethnic group could have some dangerous side effects” (Brown 2011, 55). “There is reasonable concern that it [the new constitution] could reinforce the idea that certain ethnicities ‘belong’ in a certain area, creating a risk of ethnic chauvinism and even the forced displacement of so-called outsiders in ethnically diverse areas” (Brown 2011, 55). The regional character of party support and political allegiances is strong in Kenya, and Brancati (2009) has shown that this can be an important detriment to the success of decentralization campaigns in conflict prone societies. Similarly, decentralized systems where borders overlap with the distribution of ethnic groups are particularly volatile according to Lipset (1963). Christin and Hug (2012) have followed this vein of research, showing that the number of sub-national federal units that are controlled by national minorities increases the risk of conflict country-wide. While there are some protections built into the new Kenyan constitution, these provisions remain vague. One example is Article 174(e), stating as a goal “to protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalized communities.” In order to develop the argument that population distributions could be a factor leading to conflict, I turn to studies of social polarization and violence. While many of these studies are cross-national, from the comparative politics tradition, I believe the principles still carry weight because Kenyan counties will have such a high level of autonomy under the new constitution.
5.3 Population composition and violent politics

Social polarization, defined as a bimodal distribution between cohesive social groups at the country scale, may be the driving force behind large scale conflict (Esteban and Ray 1999; Østby 2008; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Forsberg 2008; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2010). “Dominance,” understood to mean that one group constitutes a proportion of between 45-90% (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) is also said to increase the risk of conflict. There are less consistent results for any link between diversity, fractionalization or social heterogeneity and conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Schneider and Weisheimeier (2006), however, show that fractionalization predicts the onset of civil war. As a background to the current analysis, Ellingsen (2000) finds that as a majority group’s share of the population within a country falls below 80% - and therefore that group has less clout vis-a-vis a political opponent - the risk of civil war rises. Speaking with one Pokot woman in Eldoret during the course of my fieldwork, simple population size dynamics at a sub-national scale did appear to lie at the root of the dynamics of violence. She pointed out that many Kikuyu had been pushed out of Kapenguria (where many Pokot live) for dominating business during the 1980s and 1990s. “By the time of the post election violence”, she claimed, “there was no need for it [expulsion] because there were no more Kikuyu” (Author Interview 22, October 2011). There are some Kikuyu in Kapenguria, of course, but they are such a vast minority that their relative position of power does not represent as serious a threat as it would if the population proportion were larger. A similar dynamic seems to have emerged in Maralal, where those Kikuyu living in town were not driven out with such extreme malice as in they were in other areas (as they are a small minority relative to the Pokot in Kapenguria, Kikuyu are a small minority relative to the Samburu in Maralal).

Under majoritarian rule, conflict is likely to rise with group polarization, but as polarization increases the intensity of conflict is also likely to rise (Esteban and Ray 2008, 172-173). Others have advanced general associations in the data by teasing out the nuances of how minority rule translates into conflict via exclusion from power (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Exclusion
from power is an important consideration for societies characterized by ethnic patronage, as in many African societies. While some of the research on polarization and conflict relies heavily on economic (or vertical) inequalities as a component of social group (or horizontal) inequalities, my focus in this chapter is on polarization between ethnic and political blocs. Rather than an economic focus (e.g. relative-deprivation based models) I pay close attention to the interaction between parties and the incentives that are associated with electoral victory. Generally speaking, I adopt the basic principle of this body of conflict research - that is, testing the influence of population dynamics upon conflict - to districts in Kenya.

Where an opposition party reaches nearly parity with a majority, the level of inter-group tension may rise, as others have shown in sub-national analyses of election politics in India (Wilkinson 2006), ethnic cleansing in Bosnia (Weidmann 2012), crime and collective violence in Liberia (Blair, Blattman and Hartman 2012) and for the Spanish civil war (Balcells 2010). With regard to elections at the country scale, Straus and Taylor (2009, 25) find that the risk of election violence rises in countries where “there is neither an overwhelmingly dominant group or many small groups, but rather where more than one group can plausibly claim to form the core of a winning coalition.” Without regard to violence specifically, the salience of ethnic identity has been explained by other scholars as a function of size relative to other groups, and this plays an important role in the Kenyan case. Posner (2005, 12) argues, as I have quoted at the beginning of this chapter, that individuals make very strategic decisions about the ethnic coalitions (formal political parties or not) that they side with in an environment of heightened political tensions. Kenyans elect to participate in ethnic conflict not due to a knee-jerk reaction or innate cultural disposition, but based on at least some calculation (it need not be 100% “rational”) of expected benefits of their actions. This thinking is in line with Collier’s (2009) opinion that ethnic community salience can be considered something like an insurance policy. Driving increasing inter-group tensions is the level of threat posed by an opposing side: “ethnic out-bidding” (Horowitz 1985) is possible in a scenario where equal (or nearly equal) odds of victory exist, because the narrow margin required to win increases the importance

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2 Østby (2008) uses a combined approach of socio-economic and ethnic influences.
of in-group associations. In the case that many groups exists, neither of the the two mechanisms is likely: the chances of one group winning are slim (in the absence of a coalition, which is unlikely at a local level), and large-scale organization for a single goal can be difficult in the presence of disparate interests among communities. There is certainly evidence that the dynamics of Kenyan election violence during previous years exhibit a related trend. Throup and Hornsby (1998), for instance, argue that it is in Kenyan areas where party politics are the most highly contested that the most severe violence emerges. Disparate interests may be based on historical political disagreements, cultural practices, or any number of factors.

Figure 5.1 shows in simple terms the concept behind the importance of group polarization. In the first scenario, two large (50% each) communities, $A$ and $B$, each support their leaders. In the second, four comparatively small groups each support leaders, but that support is distributed as 25% for $A$, 25% for $B$, and so on. Finally, the third scenario represents a context where six smaller groups, $A$, $B$, $C$, $D$, $E$, and $F$, each have leaders with 16.6% support. In the case where two small groups exist, the risk of conflict is higher, and it dissipates along with the number of groups in the society.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Communities</th>
<th>Percent Support for Each Community Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A: 2 groups</td>
<td>(A, B)</td>
<td>50% each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: 4 groups</td>
<td>(A, B, C, D)</td>
<td>25% each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: 6 groups</td>
<td>(A, B, C, D, E, F)</td>
<td>16.6% each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 5.1: Three scenarios (A, B, C) for the distribution of support for community leaders across groups within a territory.
Beyond only testing the relationship between ethnic polarization and conflict (I present strong evidence that there is one), I attempt to identify a mechanism linking the two. This is a dramatic improvement upon existing conflict studies, as identifying explanatory mechanisms has become the gold standard of social science research. One of the important possible mediators of the relationship between polarization and conflict is the prevalence of ethnocentric attitudes in an area. There is existing evidence that static “ethnic salience,” or dedication primarily to the in-group (Miodownik and Bhavnani 2011, 450-451) increases the risk of conflict in a scenario where the size of the minority group in power reaches 38%, or near parity with another group. Put differently, Miodownik and Bhavnani argue that, given control over a society, the risk of conflict is highest when a minority is comparable in size relative to other groups in that society. In addition to their basic finding with regard to population distributions, Miodownik and Bhavnani’s findings are important because they include an empirical test of an “ethnic salience” mechanism explaining how population dynamics affect conflict.

As I have indicated above, adopting this lens must not be interpreted as an overly simplistic “primordial” assignment of roles, where groups are somehow naturally hostile. High levels of affiliation with a community makes organization from the top down (by elites or leaders) easier (Brass, 1997), if one prefers the “instrumentalist” interpretation of ethnic mobilization. I also do not wish to reify an exclusive view of ethnicity. Kenyans with mixed cultural backgrounds may not identify with an individual categorized identity. Despite this possibility, in the Afrobarometer Round Four survey data (2010) 98.28% of respondents reported a definitive ethnic identity. Only six respondents (.5%) replied “Kenyan only or doesn’t think in those terms”, “other”, or “don’t know.”

Esteban and Schneider (2008, 132) refer to the personal component of any potential association between polarization and conflict, noting that “while the group members show identification with each other in a polarized society, they feel socially or ideologically separated from the members of other groups.” Considering this for the Kenyan case, it is important to establish how individual-level ethnic identity may emerge in the context of actual interaction and in a particular geographic
location (rather than on an individual basis only, as in the quotes above). A vignette from my fieldwork outside of Nandi Hills town in Nandi district of the Rift Valley during October 2011 illustrates how ethnicity matters for everyday life in a context of being a minority in a given region. The population of Nandi district is majority Nandi, which is a subgroup of the Kalenjin. At the time, I was walking on a well worn path toward town with a Kikuyu woman in her late-thirties. An old man approaching addressed her (and not me) in Kalenjin. She acknowledged him, but said nothing, and we continued walking. The following exchange between the woman and I (in bold) took place (Author Interview 23, 2011) and is transcribed from an audio recording.

Wait, so when we passed him, he said what? He questioned me. He asked me: ‘are you from our clan?’ So, I didn’t have time to answer him. **He said that to you?** Yeah, he questioned me. **Just there, he said ‘are you one of us?’** [confirming] ‘Are you one of us?’ And I didn’t attempt to answer. Did he ask about me? No. **So that mzee [old man] can just ask that?** You know they can just talk when they’re moving [along]. You know what they do, they use proverbs.3 So if you’re not used to them, or you’ve never stayed with them, you will never know what they are saying? Yeah. **What exactly did he say - the literal translation?** ‘Are you one of the group?’ ‘Are you one of us?’ **So that’s it, and you just ignored him?** Yeah. Iboga: ‘Are you from home?’ ‘Are you one of us?’ **But you speak Kalenjin.** Yeah. **So why didn’t you just say in Kalenjin ‘yes,’** I can’t answer. There are some questions that they are asking me and you just question yourself: ‘so what?’ **It’s like you could answer...** yeah... **but you would rather just...** so what?... say ‘who cares?’... yeah. So if you are in the interior4 - if he can ask you that question just now - if you were on the interior, he would ask you the same thing? Yeah, he will ask you. **And will say ‘check her’?** Yeah. Will say ‘check this one.’ They might be young people. **Has that ever happened before?** Yes, It will happen. Even in Kiambaa [another area with a larger Kikuyu proportion of the population] they will know. **What if it was in the interior?** You know what they will do. You will see the people, they will let you pass, and then they will call the other people to the place that you are heading to and then you will see others coming from back and others coming from in front. They will inform the elders. You know there are those wazees [old men] who are elders. So they will come and

---

3 Another Kalenjin (female, middle-aged) research participant specifically noted this to me as well. In her effort to explain how violence erupted in her community she said, “We have ways of talking that would bar others out. This is what we used” (Author Interview 24, 2011).

4 “Interior” implies well within the rural area, and in this case well within the rural area as a minority community member.
meet, there might be three or four. And they will come and see. That can be scary. Yeah.

While it may sound intuitive that ethnic polarization should only influence conflict where ethnicity matters most, I provide below an empirical test that can confirm whether or not pre-election violence ethnic preferences explain any link between polarization and conflict.

Other factors may also mediate the relationship between polarization and conflict, and I test the role that these may play against the ethnocentrism explanation. For example, poverty conditions may be a more important explanation for group dynamics and conflict, independent of attitudes related to ethnicity. Following the poverty argument, it might be reasonable to expect that when there is a real prospect for improving one’s livelihood, the stakes are highest where baseline standards of living are lowest. Poverty, in addition to ethnocentric attitudes, may make the polarization condition particularly salient. Research suggests that marginalization may encourage political, and potentially violent, dissent. During fieldwork in Kenya for this dissertation the role of poverty in explaining inter-community tensions became clear. This sentiment is expressed by the young Kisii male living in Nairobi who’s comment about class in Kenya opens this chapter. Similarly, but in Eldoret, I asked a middle aged Pokot woman about the prospect for future violence among ethnic communities and she replied, “the poor going for the rich. That will be the new tribe” (Author Interview 25, October 2011). Here I am not arguing that marginalization will translate into joining a rebel movement, but instead contend that the stresses of poverty may cause people to take desperate measures against their immediate political opponents, and not necessarily against the state in a formal and enduring manner. In the designation that I make on this matter, the difference between a civil war type of conceptual framework and the low-level violence that I study is clear.

Is it problematic that some perpetrators of violence were transported into a given area to commit violence? If this were the case throughout the country, then this might undermine the claim I further in this chapter. There was some evidence that Kalenjin youths were paid to fight, and driven from within rural areas of that group to Kikuyu areas to commit violence (Kanyinga 2009).
However, there are witness accounts to the violence that betray a different - or at least modified - version of this story. For example, one woman who recalled the conflict in Eldoret claims, “We would see a lorry full of young men which was claimed to be from Pokot. But at the forefront were the local youths and leaders who would go pin-pointing the houses that would be burnt and those to be spared” (Njogu, 2009, 20-21).

5.4 Specific propositions for polarization and conflict

Based on the arguments drawn from the scholarly literature above I make four propositions relating to district level Kenyan population characteristics and conflict. First, I expect that exposure to post-election violence will increase as a the district level polarization of ethnic groups prior to the election conflict nears a perfectly bimodal polarization. Second, I believe that the positive association between district level ethnic group polarization and election violence will be a function of ethnocentric preferences preceding the date of the election. Third, the level of poverty, measured at the district level, will serve as a mechanism through which polarization translates into conflict.

In a complementary set of analyses, I apply the polarization measurement that I use to an empirical test of the role that settlement scheme status plays in conflict. Previously, I illustrated a generally positive, though weak association, between settlement scheme area in a district and the number of deaths that occurred during the post-election violence. That analysis was presented without important socio-economic controls, and without considering interactive behavioral effects of social context, and the political economy legacy of settlement schemes. In this chapter, I specifically claim that the presence of settlement schemes matters in the explanation of violence, but only as it operates through group polarization. There are therefore two additional propositions. Fourth, settlement scheme tenure legacies will raise the risk of exposure to violence at a district scale. Fifth, the influence of settlement scheme status will have an interactive effect vis-a-vis polarization. In other words, where settlement schemes are important, settlement schemes combined with polarization will be even more influential in explaining exposure to conflict.
5.5 Ethnicity, violence, and control data from surveys

I use Round Three (2005) and Round Four (2008) of the Afrobarometer survey for my analysis in this chapter (afrobarometer.org). As measurements of ethnic polarization, which I consider a treatment variable in the quasi-experiment, and ethnic preferences and poverty as the mediating variables, I pool survey responses to Round Three at the district level. The district level is the closest administrative unit to the new counties. The provincial (N=8) or constituency (N=210) level are not comparable. Observations with missing data in each round are dropped, resulting in Round Four and Round Three sample size of 1,189 and 959, respectively. Merging the two rounds causes the elimination of additional observations because not every district in the surveys was sampled in the other. In the end there are 825 respondents in the pooled sample. In certain cases I made minor adjustments to the spelling of districts in the original data files (or the use of a hyphen, for example) to ensure that a district ID would merge the two files accurately. The number of districts is 45. Clearly, as the number of respondents in a district declines, the certainty that the proportions (for each measure I use) actually represent the district population also falls.\(^5\)

I test the effect of dropping districts with very few respondents.

My motivation for using Round Three as a source for ethnicity data is the scarcity of other high quality ethnicity information for Kenya. Other research has used surveys for indices of polarization (e.g. Østby 2008 uses Demographic and Housing Surveys), a precedent for the approach I adopt. Some work uses names from polling stations to construct ethnicity distribution measurements (Kasara 2011), but these data are not publicly available. Outlined in Chapter Three above, Afrobarometer employs a stratified probability sampling strategy that does not incorporate ethnicity specifically among the criteria for selecting respondents. Because ethnicity is not a key criteria, the measure cannot be considered highly biased.

I measure sub-national district level polarization using the formula of Montalvo and Reynol-

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\(^5\) Districts are Bomet, Bondo, Bungoma, Buret, Butere Mumias, Garissa, Gucha, Kajiado, Kakamega, Kericho, Kiambu, Kilifi, Kirinyaga, Kisii Central, Kisumu, Kitui, Koibatek, Kwale, Lugar, Machakos, Makueni, Malindi, West Pokot, Maragua, Meru Central, Meru North, Migori, Mombasa, Mt Elgon, Muranga, Nairobi, Nakuru, Nandi, Nithi (Meru South), North Kisii (Nyamira), Nyandarua, Nyando, Nyeri, Rachuonyo, Siaya, Thika, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Vihiga, Wajir.
Querol (2005, 798) and the respondent’s self-reported ethnic identity (survey question Q79). The calculation summarizes the degree to which the distribution of ethnic groups deviates from bimodal, or 50-50%, distribution. A region can be characterized by $RQ$ along a continuum of low polarization (0) to perfect polarization (1) by

$$RQ = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left[ \frac{0.5 - \pi_i}{0.5} \right]^2 \pi_i$$

(5.1)

where for $N$ number of groups the share that a group $\pi$ represents of the total population is known within an analysis unit($i$). Using this formula on a small population could lead to unstable or non-representative $RQ$ values for a district but, as I have indicated, I test the models after dropping small N districts (leaving 774 observations instead of 825).

Figure 5.3 illustrates the distribution of ethnic group polarization across Kenyan districts in Round Three of the Afrobarometer survey. The most ethnically mixed areas are lighter colored in lighter hues and darker areas are highly polarized (near 50-50 proportion). I use a binary indicator for the analysis of whether or not a district is above the 50th percentile for degree of polarization.
Figure 5.2: Reynal-Querol bi-modal ethnic group polarization index (used as a treatment variable) across districts in Kenya. Derived from Round Three of the Kenya Afrobarometer survey. Author calculations and map. White areas are missing data because they were not included in the survey.

To capture the ethnic preferences mediating mechanism, I rely on the question reporting ethnic identity relative to civic identity. The question (Q82) is worded: “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Kenyan and being [respondent’s identity group, Q79]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?” The respondent assumes the value one on this measurement for reporting either “I feel only [respondent’s identity group]” or “I feel more [respondent’s identity group] than Kenyan.” I then calculate the proportion of people within a district who chose the strong ethnic preferences.

To capture the poverty mediating mechanism I use the question (Q8A) asking “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough food to eat?” I code
as relatively poor those respondents who answer “Many times” or “Always.” I view this question as more appropriate for capturing poverty in the Kenyan context than one specifically referring to cash incomes (e.g. question Q8E). In all models of the poverty mechanism I use the proportion of respondents within a district who are considered poor. The greatest number of poor live in northwestern Rift Valley along the Ugandan border, and in Kajiado district along the center of the Tanzanian border. Interestingly, Nyandarua in Central province is a site of great poverty. This is not in line with the general assumption that all Kikuyu areas are wealthy. With regard to the ethnocentric proportion of respondents in a district, Kajiado, Isiolo, and Mt. Elgon are relatively high. It is interesting to note that Mt. Elgon is a region of continual ethnic conflict over land, including large ethnic group militias (for instance the Saboat Land Defense Force). Similarly, Isiolo and the surrounding area have experienced substantial levels of conflict among the Samburu, Pokot, and Borana pastoralist populations.

**Polarization–conflict mechanisms (R3)**

![Map of polarization and conflict mechanisms in Kenya](image)

Figure 5.3: Two proposed mechanisms explaining the relationship between ethnic group polarization and exposure to violence. Left, the proportion of respondents within a district who lack adequate food, and, right, the proportion of people living in districts who view themselves primarily in ethnic - rather than civic- terms. Darker hues indicate higher proportion of respondents. Author calculations and map.
I use several individual questions\textsuperscript{6} to capture whether or not an Round Four survey respondent experienced conflict during the post election violence. These are the same data that I present in the overview of violence presented in Chapter Three. This allows for the fact that violence ought not to be measured purely as a function of physical injury or death. Instead, eviction, the destruction of home, and destruction of property are certainly important manifestations of violence.

I retain several key individual level control variables from Round Four to account for socioeconomic status, reported gender, age, and controls for the main ethnic communities contesting the election.\textsuperscript{7} The socioeconomic status surrogate is coded as one if the respondent answered “always” or “many times” to the question: “over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without enough food to eat?” Age is coded as “youth” if between 18-25. Ethnicity is simply reported by the respondent. For descriptive statistics see Table 5.1.

\textsuperscript{6} Questions Q76A\_KEN, Q76B\_KEN, Q76C\_KEN, Q76D\_KEN, Q76E\_KEN, Q76F\_KEN.
\textsuperscript{7} Responses Q8A, Q101, Q1, Q79, respectively.
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for survey and contextual level data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(controls)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Min.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>livelihood</td>
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<td>0.46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gender</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youth</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalenjin</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhya</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (mediator/mechanism) | Ethic preference | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.44 | 0 |

| (treatment)         | Polarization     | 0.39 | 0.30 | 0.82 | 0 |

| (treatment - second) | Settlement area (small) | 0.62 | 0.48 | 1     | 0 |

| (treatment - third)  | Settlement area (large) | 0.30 | 0.46 | 1     | 0 |

Notes: controls are derived from Round Four of the Afrobarometer survey; ethnic preference and polarization measures are derived from the Round Three data; settlement areas are measured using author shapefiles produced from historical sources; N=825.

Some respondents in Round Four reported having moved permanently from their home following the post-election violence. Determining their status requires a series of questions\(^8\) that ask what reaction an individual or their family had to the violence (mixing these responses with the measurement of personal experience allows the elimination of family reactions). Excluding respondents who relocated is important because it is not certain whether they were influenced by the underlying social conditions I measure in Round Three (ethnic preference and polarization), or by the settlement scheme data.

The settlement scheme classification I use for this analysis is whether or not settlements existed in a district. In this modeling, settlement schemes are the second and third treatment variables (binary indicator), used in separate models of their influence upon exposure to violence. Polarization is the mediating variable for the analysis. I use two classifications of settlement scheme

\(^8\) The series Q76N.KEN, Q76O.KEN, Q76P.KEN, Q76Q.KEN, Q76R.KEN, Q76S.KEN.
data that are introduced in Chapter Two above. One is somewhat conservative, including those that are known to have existed in 1964 according to the Von Haugwitz (1972) text. Another measurement of settlement schemes allows for the fact that certain territories were distributed illegitimately by leaders beyond the early 1960s. My intention by including this second area measurement is that these areas may still be contentiously held, as they are formerly white-owned territory.

### 5.5.1 Data source validation

I assess the accuracy of the Afrobarometer Round Four measure of conflict in two ways. First, a comparison with another survey, which is also briefly presented in introductory Chapter Two. Finkel, Horowitz and Rojo-Mendoza (2012) gathered data from 3600 respondents between December 2008 and January 2009. They ask whether “you or your family was affected by the violence that occurred after the 2007 election” (Finkel, Horowitz and Rojo-Mendoza 2012, 61). The rate that Finkel and colleagues report is 27.2% - 26.6% (for treatment and control groups within their study, respectively), which is much higher than the Afrobarometer measure, recording of 17.9% exposure. Comparison between the two datasets must be made cautiously for several reasons. First, the comparison can only be made where the two surveys overlap (not all districts). Secondly, the questions are not identical, and the definitions of what constitutes “affected” in the Finkel and colleagues studies is not at all well defined (if it includes a broader definition than Afrobarometer it is likely to yield a higher ratio). Third, there is no way to assure that respondents in the Finkel and colleagues study have not relocated between the enumeration date and the time of election violence. Had they moved, a spatial comparison within the country would not be perfectly accurate - in fact agreement between the two survey measures could be higher if it were possible to make a correction. Nevertheless, the comparison is a rough check for wild irregularities in my data. The two measurements agree positively (.643) at a conventionally acceptable level and with statistically significant influence (p ≤.001).

Another approach to assessing the accuracy of the Round Four survey is comparing it against the CIPEV hospital records. In Round Four, the 43 districts have respondents who reported being
affected by violence; of those 43, 25 are recorded a having deaths as a result of post-election violence in the CIPEV data. More importantly, perhaps, only one district that recorded death does not also have at least one record of a survey respondent being affected by violence. The true positive rate (CIPEV validation) of the survey metric is .9615. Does the survey over-predict exposure? Perhaps, as the survey reports 18 districts as having at least one affected respondent that did not also have a hospital fatality recorded. The false positive rate is .5294, but understanding that the hospital records are a much more conservative estimate, this is not altogether surprising. Another helpful test is simply measuring the correlation between individuals reporting exposure to violence and the count of deaths in CIPEV. Pearson’s product-moment correlation is .7080 (p ≤ .001) for district level survey response exposure and CIPEV deaths. For CIPEV injuries, agreement is even higher, at .7807 (p ≤ .001).

In figure 5.4, I show the overlap between the Reynal-Querol metric derived from the Afrobarometer Round Four survey and the same measurement applied to the respondents of the Finkel and colleagues survey. This is a confirmation of the mechanism I test, but the same caveats noted above apply to comparisons made here with one additional consideration. For the Afrobarometer measure, I am using Round Three (2005) ethnic composition, while Finkel was gathered after the election skirmishes. The country’s ethnic composition is likely to have changed following the 2007-2008 election violence (300,000 moved at least temporarily), which would bias conclusions drawn from this comparison. However, cautious external validation is warranted, where possible. Reynal-Querol polarization index values in the two surveys values agree positively, but not at a very high level (.545, p ≤ .001).
District level ethnic community polarization, two surveys

![District level ethnic community polarization, two surveys](image)

Figure 5.4: As rough external validation of the reported Reynal-Queral polarization index in Afrobarometer round three, above is a comparison between that value across Kenyan districts and one derived from Finkel, Horowitz, and Rojo-Mendoza (2012) survey data. The comparison is only possible where the two surveys overlap (a greater number of districts are included in the analysis of only Afrobarometer Round Three and, separately, Finkel et al.). Darker hues indicate a higher level of polarization. Author calculation and map.

5.6 Estimation strategy

Recently, field experiments (e.g. Lyall, Imai, and Blair 2011) or quasi-experimental research designs for observational data (e.g. Lyall 2009) are being used to establish a more robust and causal relationship between social phenomena and conflict than was previously available using more classical (only regression based) analyses. In testing how these locality conditions (place-influences) predict conflict exposure, I use a quasi-experimental approach, called a Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) estimation. The procedure identifies “intermediate variables (or mediators) that lie in the causal pathway between the treatment and the outcome” (Imai, Keele and Tingley 2010, 309; also Imai, et al. 2011a). Identifying an important relationship between two key variables is valuable, but the best social science scholarship can identify a mechanism that explains that relationship. As I have explained, I use Afrobarometer Round Three to build the mediator and the treatment variables, which reduces the endogeneity that would appear if these influences were
measured in Round Four along with exposure to post-election conflict. Units must be independent in the analysis, which is in accordance with the design of the Afrobarometer survey. This is a quasi-experimental study, and as such the timing of each measured variable from the survey is not perfect (mediator and treatment captured in the same survey round). Admittedly, this is a limitation of the data available to address my research question.

For every individual $i$, ACME is measured in the following series of estimates. My explanation here closely reflects that of Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010, 311-312). First the procedure calculates,

$$
\delta_i(t) \equiv Y_i(t, M_i(1)) - Y_i(t, M_i(0))
$$

for treatment $(t) = 0, 1$. To identify the effect of mediating variable $M_i$ under both treatment and control conditions, we have $M_i(1) = M_i(0)$ established as a null casual mediation effect. We know that $Y_i(t, M_i(t))$ is not observed in the empirical data sample - it is the unknown outcome where treatment were not present, though it really was. Counterfactual simulations produce the conditions that result in this unobserved level of exposure to violence. The influence of each treatment variable $\phi_i$ (ethnic community polarization, and then later settlement status in a separate model) for every individual survey respondent is estimated in:

$$
\phi_i(t) \equiv Y_i(1, M_i(t)) - Y_i(0, M_i(t))
$$

for $t = 0, 1$. The influence of the mediating variable, as it influences the direct effect of the treatment is measured in:

$$
\tau_i = Y_i(1, M_i(1)) - Y_i(0, M_i(0)) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=0}^{1} [\delta_i(t) + \phi_i(t)]
$$

where a combined direct and mediation effect is $\tau_i$. Because we are interested in the causal mediation effect, we estimate for $t = 0, 1$:

$$
\delta (t) \equiv \mathbb{E}(Y_i(t, M_i(1)) - Y_i(t, M_i(0)))
$$

Averaging the mediation effect across the treated or control populations, the average direct effects (on the treated) is measured by the analysis in:

$$
\phi (t) \equiv Y_i(1, M_i(t)) - Y_i(0, M_i(t))
$$
and separately,
\[
\tau = \mathbb{E}(Y_i(1, M_i(1)) - Y_i(0, M_i(0))) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=0}^{1} [\delta(t) + \phi(t)]
\] (5.7)

The final step is parsing the direct and indirect effects of treatment status from the total effect because \(\tau = \delta + \phi\). In the results section I report each of these three values and their 95% confidence intervals.

Specific to the \texttt{mediation} package in R (Tingley 2012), I use a continuous mediator model of ethnic preference above civic identity with a linear ordinary least squares estimator (mediator one). For the percentage of a district’s population classified as “poor” I also use a continuous mediator model (mediator two). The second model used to calculate the ACME value (for exposure to violence as a binary response), is a generalized linear model of the binary family with a probit link function. I use 1000 simulations to assess levels of certainty in the point estimate. I use four configurations of controls based on the results of very straightforward baseline GLM models: no controls at all (model 1), all controls (livelihood, youth, gender, ethnicities; model 2), only those controls that are significant in a baseline model (model 3), and only those controls that are significant in a mixed model with province level random intercepts (model 4). I use a binary treatment in the ACME estimation for whether or not the polarization of a district is above the 50th percentile. Changing the analysis to capture the effect of moving from a perfectly homogenous (0) to perfectly polarized (1) status does not change the basic findings. For my complementary analysis test of how settlement scheme status influences exposure to conflict, I use a binary treatment variable and a continuous RQ polarization indicator.

5.7 Results

5.7.1 Baseline polarization influence

To initially illustrate any association between district level polarization and conflict, I present the results of a standard generalized linear model of survey respondent exposure to conflict. The model includes all (available) controls that we expect to be associated with conflict exposure:
socio-economic status, age, gender, and controls for the four main ethnic communities involved. To account for unobserved influences across districts, next I implement a generalized linear mixed model with the same controls and random intercepts at the province level using the package \texttt{glm-mML} (Bröstrom and Holmberg 2011). I present these baseline results in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Baseline Results of A Generalized Linear and Generalized Linear Mixed Model (random intercept) for exposure to Kenyan post election violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>glm</th>
<th>glm mixed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>-3.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(subsequently, treatment)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarization</td>
<td>1.228</td>
<td>1.164 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(subsequently, controls)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood</td>
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<td>0.381 *</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Luhya</td>
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<td>-0.644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma)</td>
<td>1.600</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * indicates statistical significance at 10% uncertainty or lower; polarization measure is derived from the Afrobarometer Round Three enumeration; controls are from Round Four; \(N=825\); random intercept models were estimated in the R package \texttt{glm-mML}; \(\sigma\) represents variation of random effects across provinces.

In a baseline generalized linear model the chances of experiencing violence is greater as polarization of districts increases (relative risk = 3.45). Age also influences exposure to violence. Youth (18-25 years) may have perpetrated violence more often overall, but they are no more likely to be victims. All ethnicity controls for the four major groups indicate a greater likelihood of exposure to violence than other groups in the country. In the mixed model with random province level intercepts, polarization remains a positive predictor of violence (relative risk = 3.20), as does the binary measure of Kikuyu ethnicity. This finding with regard to ethnicity is expected: Kikuyu
outside of the main Kikuyu area were attacked frequently. In contrast to the individual-level model, socio-economic status becomes important in the mixed model, with poorer individuals and males more likely to experience conflict. Notably, the random effects’ distribution across provinces, ($\sigma$) is statistically significant. Because there is evidence that regional effects influence these results, the analysis following is completed with both sets of statistically significant controls. I also estimate the models with no controls.

5.7.2 Treatment and mediation effects

In Figure 5.5, I present direct and total treatment effects of polarization upon exposure to violence and the influence of district level ethnic preferences as a mechanism for the role of polarization in violence. First, where polarization is greater than the 50th percentile, the risk of conflict measured as an average direct effect ($\phi$) rises across all four model configurations (no controls, all controls, significant controls in a GLM, and significant controls in a random intercept GLM). The actual level of exposure to conflict (direct effect, in units of the dependent variable) is .093, .070, .069, and .087, respectively. While these values seem small, the additional causal effect, on its binary scale, is rather large when compared with the mean exposure across all survey respondents, which is .179. As a difference, the direct effects of polarization can be interpreted as a 51.9 % increase in conflict risk with no controls, and a 48.6% increase with full mixed model controls (mean under treatment/ sample mean). I interpret this as a strong confirmation of my first proposition, which stated that exposure to political violence rises with pre-election district-level ethnic group polarization.
Figure 5.5: Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME, $\delta$), average direct treatment effect ($\phi$), and average total treatment effect ($\tau$) results of how ethnic group polarization affects exposure to conflict and whether ethnic preferences preceding political conflict serves as a mechanism. Estimates are made using the R package mediation (Tingley 2012). Each panel incorporates a different set of control variables, explained above. Point estimates are bound by 95% confidence intervals; where the lower end crosses zero there is no statistically significant effect.
The strength of district-level ethnic preference as a mechanism for polarization influencing conflict is captured in ACME ($\delta$). Using no socio-economic controls pre-election-violence district level ethnic preferences have a null influence (0.006 increase on a binary scale of exposure). This trend remains for all models. In other words, the link between polarization and conflict is never mediated by the proportion of people living in a district who view themselves primarily in ethnic (rather than civic) terms. Total effect ($\tau$) is simply the effect of the treatment ($\phi$) under the additional mediating variable influences ($\delta$). Understanding this, it is intuitive that a positive influence of ethnic preference, as a mechanism, drives the influence of polarization further toward increasing conflict risk. Even where the ACME estimate is not statistically significant, the mechanism does increases the total effect of the treatment. Across models one through four, increased conflict risks - total effect of .100 (+ 55.8%), .078 (+ 43.5%), .077 (+ 43.0%), and .094 (+ 52.5%) - are statistically significant and higher than direct effects alone for the comparable model. While the stand-alone effect of the ethnic preferences of an area do not contribute to conflict risk, trends in the total effect estimates suggest a minor amount of support for proposition three.

To test the possible influences of poverty as an alternative mechanism explaining the influence of polarization (proposition four), I present in Figure 5.6 the ACME of district level poverty. For every model poverty at the district scale raises the risk of exposure to conflict: with no controls (.018, or + 10%), all controls (.014, or + 7.82%), and both GLM- and mixed GLM-significant controls (.014, or + 7.82%, and .014, or + 7.82%, respectively). The locality poverty explanation is much more consistently influential across these model specifications than the ethnic preferences mechanism presented above.
Figure 5.6: Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME, $\delta$.), average direct treatment effect ($\phi$), and average total treatment effect ($\tau$) results of how ethnic group polarization affects exposure to conflict and whether district level poverty preceding election violence serves as a mechanism. Estimates are made using the R package mediation (Tingley 2012). Each panel incorporates a different set of control variables, explained above. Point estimates are bound by 95% confidence intervals; where the lower end crosses zero there is no statistically significant effect.
5.7.3 Stability of proportions in small N districts

Estimates of district level polarization are likely to be unstable where the survey sample population is small. To examine the possible effect of this problem, I drop from the analysis those individuals who live in districts with fewer than 10 respondents (reducing the sample size to 774). These districts are Bondo, Buret, Lugari, Malindi, Mt. Elgon, Murang’a, Nithi, and Nyando. In Figure 5.7 I present the results of the ACME estimation of an ethnic preferences mechanism after dropping districts with small populations. The influence of polarization itself is consistently influential in these quasi-experiments: direct effect of .106 (+ 59.2%), .076 (+ 42.4%), .076 (+ 42.4%), and .103 (+ 57.5%), for the no controls, all controls, significant GLM controls and significant GLM mixed model controls, respectively. It is evident, however, that the explanatory power of ethnic preferences as a mediating variable is not statistically significant.
Figure 5.7: After dropping districts with small survey sample populations, Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME, $\delta$), average direct treatment effect ($\phi$), and average total treatment effect ($\tau$) results of how ethnic group polarization affects exposure to conflict and whether district level ethno-centric preferences preceding post-election conflict serve as a mechanism. Estimates are made using the R package mediation (Tingley 2012). Each panel incorporates a different set of control variables, explained above. Point estimates are bound by 95% confidence intervals; where the lower end crosses zero there is no statistically significant effect.

Results for the poverty mechanism in the absence of small N districts are presented in Figure 5.8. With the restricted dataset, the direct effects of polarization are consistent and high across
all models, ranging from .093 (+ 51.9%) to .094 (+ 52.5%) increase in risk of exposure to conflict among survey respondents. This confirms my earlier analysis. The explanatory power of ethnic preferences wanes when excluding low-population districts, but this is not true for the poverty explanation of polarization’s role in raising conflict risk. Across all models, district level poverty remains a mechanism, ranging in power from .020 (+ 11.0%) to .016 (+ 8.9%). This confirms the stability of a poverty explanation in contrast to the lack of explanatory influence for ethnic preferences.

The general finding that poverty explains the salience of ethnic group polarization stands in contrast to some accounts, both academic and popular, of Kenya’s election violence. This is because the ethnic character of that violence is so prominent in narratives of the conflict. However, the finding is not at odds with existing literature about the importance of low socio-economic status influencing conflict rates. This is not directly related to the greed vs. grievance debate that surrounds the purported explanations of civil war; Kenyans are not opportunistically looting diamonds, for example, and there is no rebel group moving in to capture Nairobi. Instead, I interpret this finding as evidence that local level conditions of poverty more consistently stress the social fabric than simple ethnic differences. The harmful effects of ethnic community polarization for conflict risk are explained by contexts of poverty rather than contexts of ethnic difference alone.

These findings fit closely in line with the framing of ethnicity that I have adopted for my research. Ethnic group polarization in a local area helps to explain the risk of conflict in an area. However, polarization does not play a role in raising conflict risk because of some innate characteristic of groups, or their members. A statistically significant degree of the explanatory power of ethnic polarization for conflict rates is explained by a setting of poverty. There is no evidence that a setting of ethnocentric views contributes to the explanatory power of polarization. One possible interpretation of this result is that competition over scarce resources (land, access to markets, jobs, etc.) was driving Kenyan election violence in 2007 and 2008, rather than only more cultural and political tensions in an area.
Figure 5.8: After dropping districts with small survey sample populations, Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME, $\delta$), average direct treatment effect ($\phi$), and average total treatment effect ($\tau$) results of how ethnic group polarization affects exposure to conflict and whether district level poverty preceding post-election conflict serves as a mechanism. Estimates are made using the R package mediation (Tingley 2012). Each panel incorporates a different set of control variables, explained above. Point estimates are bound by 95% confidence intervals; where the lower end crosses zero there is no statistically significant effect.

Adding in the settlement scheme information will now illustrate the role that polarization has in explaining the salience of a key indicator of conflict according to the Kenyan conflict studies
literature: land tenure disputes. In the following models, settlement area within a district’s territory is the treatment variable, and polarization is introduced as the mediating variable. Figure 5.9 shows that the direct influence of settlement schemes (see Introduction Figure 2.5) is positive, although not statistically significant. Combined with polarization at the district scale, however, the combined effect is positive and is statistically distinct from zero effect. The combined, or total effect ranges from .081 (+ 45.2%) to .077 (+ 39.1%) and is statistically significant in each model. The ACME estimate for polarization ranges from .015 (+ 8.3%) to .028 (+ 15.6%) in increasing the risk of exposure to violence. This suggests that a substantial portion of the influence of settlement schemes upon exposure to violence operates through inter-community polarization as a causal mechanism.
Figure 5.9: Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME, $\delta$), average direct treatment effect ($\phi$), and average total treatment effect ($\tau$) results of how insecure land tenure regimes influence exposure to conflict, and how ethnic group polarization serve as an explanatory mechanism. Estimates are made using the R package mediation (Tingley 2012). Each panel incorporates a different set of control variables, explained above. Point estimates are bound by 95% confidence intervals; where the lower end crosses zero there is no statistically significant effect.

Even if the smaller, and more conservative estimate of the spatial extent of settlements (Introduction Figure 2.4) is used as a treatment variable, the relationship is generally similar to that presented above. Figure 5.10 illustrates that the influence of settlement schemes is positive,
though not always significant, but that polarization operates as an explanatory indicator. In all four model configurations the ACME estimate for polarization is statistically significant and ranges from .012 (+ 6.7%) to .027 (+ 15.1%), which alongside the direct effect of settlement schemes, results in a total effect of .055 and .072 where the confidence interval does not cross zero effect.
Figure 5.10: Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME, $\delta$), average direct treatment effect ($\phi$), and average total treatment effect ($\tau$) results of how insecure land tenure regimes (by a conservative estimate of spatial extent) influence exposure to conflict, and how ethnic group polarization serve as an explanatory mechanism. Estimates are made using the R package mediation (Tingley 2012). Each panel incorporates a different set of control variables, explained above. Point estimates are bound by 95% confidence intervals; where the lower end crosses zero there is no statistically significant effect.
5.8 Conclusion

Expert, popular and historical evidence suggests that ethnic group polarization may increase the risk of conflict. Based on past evidence, this is true for electoral violence and district level social dynamics in Kenya. It is important to take these findings into consideration as local level politics will become increasingly important in Kenya’s future due to new electoral arrangements. While my research is not a direct assessment of the effects that government rescaling have had since the Kenyan March 4th 2013 election, as the institutions are not yet fully developed, the turn toward decentralization presents some risk of increased inter-ethnic tensions. Many studies supporting the notion that polarization contributes to conflict are carried out at the national level in the comparative politics tradition. My analysis reveals a similar positive association among administrative units within Kenya, and this points toward the important influence of social context in explanations of election violence. Place-based influences have a strong influence on social lives, as I have explained previously, and illustrated in this chapter. The confirmation of my first proposition is robust to numerous estimation configurations. For two baseline models (one of which accounts for provincial effects), as well as every configuration of quasi-experimental treatment models, a bimodal district level group distribution increased the risk of exposure to violence.

Attempting to identify a mechanism through which polarization leads to higher levels of conflict risk was an additional goal of my research in this chapter. I find extremely limited support for the proposition that ethnocentric preferences explain the influence of polarization upon conflict risk. Under model specifications where the mechanism is not statistically significant (every one of them), the total effect of polarization as a treatment condition is larger with ethnic preference included in the model as a mediating influence. I find that district level contexts of low socio-economic status serve much more consistently as a mediating explanation for violence, in contrast to the result for ethnocentric views. This finding relates to key debates about whether politics or social and cultural differences matter more than poverty for the risk of exposure to electoral conflict.
The fact that ethnic group polarization mediates the relationship between settlement scheme legacies, which I have interpreted to be an indicator of insecure tenure regimes, does not underscore the importance of the land issue; my conclusion does not fundamentally overturn existing research on this topic. Instead, my framing of the analysis in this chapter modifies a simplistic relationship between land tenure and violence by adding a layer of social complexity. In other words, I have accounted for settlement scheme status and also make a strong case that contemporary social settings play an important role in explaining conflict. I also do this for data across the country, instead of focusing on only one region (e.g. Rift Valley), an area that has dominated much of the existing research (Boone 2011). The result of my effort is a merger of temporal scale and conceptual lenses for understanding electoral violence. First, the long term legacies of colonial era injustices are not lost simply because a contemporary locality level consideration is added to the story. Together, they are important in understanding violence. Second, I have merged two theoretical frameworks for understanding conflict - one in terms of political economy and land grievance, and the other in terms of the politics of collective action and electoral incentives for participating in (or supporting) violent conflict. In many respects this analysis has been a merger of two very important place-specific conditions that determine the politics of place in a setting of violence and instability. In the following chapter, I test whether violence may influence Kenyan political attitudes in manner that could affect the future risk of election related conflict.
Chapter 6

The Aftermath of an Election Crisis: Kenyan Attitudes and the Influence of Individual-level and Locality Violence

How does violent conflict affect social and political attitudes? This is a question that has gained a rising amount of scholarly attention in recent years, for studies of civil war as well as less severe forms of political violence. Pairing Kenyan survey and violent event data, I find that respondents who personally experienced electoral violence are less likely to express certain forms of inter-personal and institutional trust than individuals who did not. The association is not universally powerful, however. First, noteworthy differences emerge between the population of respondents who relocated as a result of post-election conflict, and the population that did not. Differences between these groups suggest that the nuances of locality, context, and social setting may have had an influence on Kenya’s social and political fabric in the wake of tragedy. In a limited number of cases, violence that takes place at a local scale indirectly influences attitudes. This effect is observed after considering the individual experiences of respondents, but mainly after excluding individual respondent ethnicity controls.

6.1 Introduction

My goal in this chapter is to uncover any relationship between exposure to electoral violence and subsequent opinions about Kenyan political life. The indicators that I use include measurements of social and political trust, attitudes about the use of violence, and views about contemporary Kenyan institutions. Uncovering how violence affects social opinion and behavior has become an
emerging area of interest in conflict studies (e.g. Balcells 2012; Barron, Kaiser, and Pradhan 2008; Bellows and Miguel 2008; Blattman 2009; Deininger and Castagnini 2006; Dyrstad et al. 2011; Hutchinson and Johnson 2011; Justino 2011; Voors et al. 2010). Afrobarometer Survey data for my research were gathered in October 2008, after the end of the post-election violence period (December 27 2007 - February 22 2008). Because of the many forms that election violence can take, I identify victims of conflict by a broad set of criteria, including home destruction and eviction, damage to personal property or a business, and loss of employment in addition to personal injury (for a similar definition in Kenya see Becchetti, Conzo, and Romeo 2011, 11). In terms of geography scholarship, incorporating broad experiences with conflict is important for capturing the many manifestations of violence, which include territorial practices such as “domicide” - or the destruction of home (e.g. Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005).

As I have previously explained, social phenomena should be viewed as rooted in particular histories and social conditions (Agnew 1987; Johnston 1991; Pattie and Johnston 2000). Alongside other local level socio-economic and structural conditions, political violence and instability constitutes a potent influence upon attitudes. Exposure to conflict is the explicit focus of my analysis. Considering individual respondents outside of their locale for research is somewhat common in the field of conflict studies, but the practice risks eliminates characteristics of what we know to be a place-contingent process. To remedy this problem, I adopt two main approaches to capture “place influences” (a phrase used by O’Loughlin 2010). First, I separately analyze respondents who had relocated as a result of post-election violence from those who did not. Spatial relocation has removed these individuals from their home environments, which may have implications for their views and behavior - the importance of place might be evident as a function of changing location. Second, I examine the degree to which individual- and local-level exposure to conflict may or may not have similar effects on attitudes.¹ Both approaches constitute a move toward the “recovery of context” in the study of social attitudes (Secor and O’Loughlin 2005, 67). Existing research

¹ Based on the identity and targeting practices of conflict perpetrators, Balcells (2011a) develops a typology of direct and indirect violence that is fundamentally different than how I use these terms.
in other contexts has provided important guidance for adopting local political and social dynamics into our understanding of violence. The polarization of local party politics in India (Wilkinson 2006), varying degrees of territorial control by armed actors in Greece (Kalyvas 2006) and the character of civic ties between communities in India (Varshney 2002) are key examples. A relocated population has been removed from these surroundings, and estimating any effect of relocating may reveal noteworthy distinctions between groups.

In the section that follows this introduction, I provide an overview of how using political attitudes, including inter-personal and institutional trust is important for understanding the effects of conflict in the Kenyan case and others. Following this, I provide a detailed outline of the empirical data that I use to test the social effects of violence. My estimation procedure is explained in section four. In the fifth section I present results from the analysis and in the sixth I conclude the chapter.

6.2 Conflict and Attitudes

6.2.1 Trust indicators

Evidence suggests that victimization during violence can alter identities and political allegiances (Balcells 2011a). Branch and Cheeseman (2008, 20) do not investigate trust as an empirical outcome, but reflect upon the fact that following Kenya’s 2007 election there existed “a widespread lack of trust in the ability of key democratic institutions such as courts and electoral commissions to deliver fair political outcomes.” In a cross-national study, Hutchison and Johnson (2011) find that internal violence reduces trust in the state across Africa. In this chapter I test whether experiencing Kenyan post-election violence affects social (inter-personal expectations about others’ behavior) and political (toward institutions) trust. I use preferences related to the use of violence and views about Kenya’s democratic merit as corollary measures. The inter-personal and institutional areas of Kenya’s political atmosphere are not mutually exclusive, although they must be considered distinct from one another (Zmerli and Newton 2008; Braithwaite and Levi 1998, 22). The fact that one form of trust may not follow the other speaks to the benefits of testing separate
indicators for each realm, as in this study, rather than relying on the assumption that one will capture all of the possible effects of experiencing conflict. Using an actual experimental behavioral game in Nairobi’s Kibera slum, Becchetti, Conzo, and Romeo’s (2011, 24) find that at an interpersonal level “violence experience generates negative effects on trustworthiness learning.” This study extends a similar theme to the national level, but also to institutional forms of trust.

According to Barkan and Ng’ethe (1998, 45), violence surrounding previous Kenyan elections has “entrenched ethnic divisions” between groups who feel that they have been collectively dealt injustice at the hands of others. In Maralal during October 2011, one fieldwork participant explained to me the difficulties of reconciliation between communities. The young Kikuyu man in Maralal town claimed, “there will never be reconciliation. When people know who did these crimes and the wrong people are sent [away, or to the ICC] it leaves a deep scar” (Author Interview 26, 2011). Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) have similarly shown that low levels of inter-personal trust are associated with traumatic experiences and perceived discrimination. Because of the powerful feedback relationship between social polarization and the risk of collective violence (Kanbur, Rajaram, and Varshney 2010, 151; Tilly 2003), trust is arguably nowhere more valuable - but slow to form - than in post-conflict societies undergoing institutional reconstruction and social reconciliation (Bakke, O’Loughlin, and Ward 2009). Parry (1976, 129), for instance, argues that “a feeling of trust prevents political disputes from turning into severe enmity” (see also Tapscott 2005, 76). In terms of socio-economic development and public goods, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) find that high social diversity and lack of social capital can inhibit the effective management of public education in western Kenya.

More directly in terms of the institutional atmosphere, generalizable trust (or “meso-scale” trust, according to Esman (1999)), is distinct from inter-personal trust and is said to be especially important for developing societies (Sztompka 1999), democratizing countries (see also Secor and O’Loughlin 2005), and for political security and economic development among African states more particularly (Bak and Askvik 2005, 2; Hyden 1992, 13-14).2 Prevalent and deep distrust, however,  

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2 A certain level of healthy citizen skepticism toward leaders is a tenet of representative governance and provides
marks the onset of institutional decay, whereby the chances of implementing democratic principles are poor (Chikwanha 2005, 226). Deteriorated systematically under one-party rule between 1982 and 2002, positive elements of this zone of interaction, or “governance realm” in Kenya are not easily replaced once removed (Barkan 1992, 168; see also Mueller 2008).

Furthermore, some argue that a lack of inter-community trust lies at the root of neopatrimonial or clientelistic regime structures in many African states (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Chabal and Daloz 1999). This is certainly an important matter for the Kenyan case, as I have previously shown. Conducted in a private, veiled fashion, “patron politics” is the polar opposite of “public politics” (Clapham 1982, 1-2). In Kenya, Hyden (1984, 118 - 121) shows that civil servants were seen largely as sponsors of private sector ethnic organizations, as was the case of the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association, formed in the early 1970s. Kikuyu leaders were expected to limit other groups’ access to state resources, which is a prime example of patron-client dynamics according to traditional models (Clapham 1982, 8). It is suspicion of other communities and their manipulation of government structures that fosters cohesion within these communities, and against others.

In addition to personal experiences, part of my focus in this chapter is on the context of violence and insecurity as it varies across place within the Kenya. The value of such attention follows Levi and Stoker (2000, 481), who concluded that individuals’ perspectives related to trust and distrust “reflect their varying political perceptions and values and the influence of their local social and political contexts (emphasis added).” Similarly, Luhmann (1973, 6) notes that “trust occurs within a framework of interaction which is influenced by both personality and social system, and cannot be exclusively associated with either.” There is also evidence of a geographical element to Barr’s research (2001), for instance, where local level variability among trust indicators between traditional and resettled communities in Zimbabwe is found. Miguel (2004), comparing otherwise analogous communities across the Kenyan/Tanzanian border, suggests that there is a link between cooperation at the local level and policy at the country scale (either fostering community cohesion motivation for placing institutional checks on government institutions (Barber 1983).
in Tanzania, or engendering division in Kenya). O’Loughlin’s (2010) approach in his study of trust and political instability in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as indicated above, is a dedicated geographical analysis. The arguments above linking politics of trust to geographic place are fitting for the understanding of conflict processes and identity politics that I have adopted.

6.2.2 Alternative Understanding of Conflict Effects

Contrary to my central proposition in this chapter, what are the chances that experiencing violence increases some measurements of trust? Envision, for example, a scenario where an attack was underway and the police moved to prevent the escalation of violence. An individual in this position may have greater faith in the police as a result of their experience. In the inter-personal realm it is possible that violent experiences cause individuals to understand the devastating effects it can have on others. In this vein, Douglas and Shirlow (1998, 127) debate whether persistent violence may lead to “yearning for reconciliation” in the Northern Ireland conflict. Some research also suggests that communities come together following war disasters (e.g. WWII air-raids), showing unexpected resilience (Jones, et al. 2004). In a Ugandan case study, Blattman (2009) finds conflict experiences to be associated with greater political participation. Bellows and Miguel (2008) show that those who experienced violence during Sierra Leone’s civil war are more likely to be politically engaged, including increased odds of joining local community groups. Using field experiments in Burundi, Voors et al. (2010) discover that experiencing violence can lead to more, rather than less, altruistic behavior toward others. In the Kenyan case some evidence exists for this association. Some community-based organizations in seriously affected regions of central Rift Valley have opened dialogue between their members (e.g. Kikuyu and Kalenjin) in an attempt to mend inter-community relationships (Author interviews 27 and 28, 2009 and 2011).
6.3 Survey and conflict data evidence

6.3.1 Configuring Survey Indicators

The configuration of survey indicators for this chapter’s analysis is different than the setup in earlier chapters because I use different control variables and other indicators. Eliminating missing data and refusals for the responses that I use in this chapter reduces the sample size of Afrobarometer Round Four to 1,052. First, I distinguish between the full sample population, the group who moved to a new town or city between the period of violence and the date of the survey, and the population who stayed in their town or city. Displacement is inherently a spatial social problem that may alter the political opinions of victimized populations, but it is also impossible to pinpoint the location of respondents who moved during or following the election skirmishes. Knowing respondents’ locations is necessary for analyzing the possible effects of indirect violence from data sources other than the survey. The survey instrument asks whether the respondent OR their family reacted to the violence by moving. If a respondent expressed this reaction, but that individual was not a victim of violence personally, then the relocation was that of a family member. Using these steps 120 individuals are designated as having left their town or village, and 932 as having stayed. The provincial distribution of relocated respondents is shown in Figure 6.1. Many respondents left the Rift Valley, and that this region is a common area of eviction has been documented above. However, many more fled Nyanza than Rift Valley and many also moved out of Western province.
Figure 6.1: By province, the number of respondents in the full sample population who permanently relocated from their city, town, or village as a result of violence following the 2007 Kenyan election.

I use binary measurements of several socio-economic variables that might affect survey attitudes, allowing me to isolate the influence that conflict has upon Kenyan opinions. Existing survey research has shown that age, education, urban residence, gender, and socio-economic levels are important covariates for the investigation of trust in the context of African societies (Hutchison and Johnson 2011). In my analysis, each variable assumes a value of one if: age is less than 25; the location is characterized as urban; the respondent identified as male; the individual achieved secondary school or a higher level of education. As a surrogate for low socioeconomic status I code as one those respondents who report having gone “many times” or “always” without enough food to eat. These controls are similar to those that I have used for the earlier analysis. A crucial consideration for research in Kenya is the ethnicity of the respondent and the enumerator (Kasara 2010b): I code as one those cases where the “home language” of the enumerator and respondent match. This matters more in this chapter than others because the questions I use might be considered politically sensitive, whereas in earlier chapters I have only used individual level controls (e.g. gender), or exposure to violence. I account for individual biases by controlling for whether or not a person reports their ethnic identity as being their only identity, or more important than their...
civic Kenyan identity. I expect that this would strongly influence other indicators of inter-personal distrust in a manner that is independent of, and precedes, exposure to conflict. I include controls for the four largest ethnic groups: Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin. Each of these communities was at a higher risk for experiencing violence (biased selection into the treatment group), and have historical experiences that may bias their responses to certain key responses (e.g. trusting the president). I present results without ethnicity controls in addition to the main model. Means of these controls for three subsets of the survey population are reported in Table 6.3.1 (Panel I).

As I have in previous analysis, I measure the individual-level experience with violence using six responses. The means of binary indicators for experiencing personal property damage, destruction of home, eviction, destroyed business, the loss of livelihood, and personal injury appear in Table 6.3.1 (Panel II). Loss of a job could be considered a relatively minor effect of violence but this does not have a strong influence on the findings: dropping that criterion eliminates only six observations from the category of having experienced violence because many of those individuals who lost their jobs were also affected in other ways.

My trust indicators include social and political components that are analyzed in separate models. For the first category, trust toward other Kenyans that one does not already know is coded as one if respondents trust others “somewhat” or “a lot.” In the second category I code as one those respondents who trust the president, parliament and the police “somewhat” or “a lot.” In a more general realm of political attitudes, I code as one those individuals who believe that Kenya is “a full democracy” or “a democracy with minor problems.” For the measure of accepting violence as a legitimate means of expression I code as one those respondents who disagree either “very strongly” or “strongly” with the statement: “In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.” I drop “don’t know” responses from their respective models. Means of these indicators for the three sub-populations are presented in Table 6.3.1 (Panel III).

Unfortunately, the location of respondents is sometimes a best approximation. Location (administrative level 4) is the most detailed information retained in the survey. According to the 1999 census there were 2,427 Locations. Within each Location I used coordinates for the
major town, based on village population size.\textsuperscript{3} I found that for approximately 10% of 138 locations in the Round Four data there was no match for a Location, but only for a Sub-Location (administrative level 5). There were 6,612 Sub-Locations during the 1999 census, and this is a finer spatial resolution. In these cases I also used the primary village within these areas (in some cases there are only several). Because there is some uncertainty in this designation of location information I prefer initially using a relatively wide buffer (20 kilometer radius from the estimated location) for incorporating the external conflict data. I test other distance thresholds as well.

\textsuperscript{3} An alternative solution could be to use the center point of the administrative unit. The point may land in a completely unpopulated area, however. It also would be possible to join both survey and event data to an administrative unit area rather than an approximate location, but I have additional measures of violence that follow political boundaries.
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for survey and contextual level data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>Relocated respondents</th>
<th>Respondents who stayed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel I: Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male or Female</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.500</td>
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<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.216</td>
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<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer Ethnicity</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Ethnicity</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>0.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.190</td>
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<td>Luo</td>
<td>0.120</td>
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<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
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<td>Luhya</td>
<td>0.126</td>
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<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
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<td>Kalenjin</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel II: Conflict experience</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled Personal experience</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.508</td>
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<tr>
<td>Property damage</td>
<td>0.131</td>
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<td>0.045</td>
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<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Destruction</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job loss</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal injury</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel III: Survey responses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust others</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>0.423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust president</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>0.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust parliament</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust police</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reject violence</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya democratic</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>0.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel IV: R3 Response district level control</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3 Trust others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3 Trust president</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3 Trust parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3 Trust police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3 Reject violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3 Kenya democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.638</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is possible that current trust levels and exposure to violence are both contingent upon previous levels of trust. The potentially confounding effects of *ex ante* trust are difficult to manage because the Afrobarometer data are not longitudinal. In an attempt to account for this influence I code the Afrobarometer Round Three data to create a control for previous responses to each
question I analyze. Round Three was implemented in September 2005, and includes 1,278 respondents. I joined the Round Three controls and round four surveys by district name. Not every district was visited during both rounds of enumeration. Merging by district between the enumeration dates is also potentially problematic because of changing boundaries. Thankfully, the largest change in the political administration of districts in Kenya was announced in mid-2009, after both of the surveys were complete. If and when borders changed, it was in the direction of devolution, and for this reason it is possible that in several cases the Round Three district proportions have a slightly greater spatial extent than the round four districts. There are 60 districts in the round four file and 50 in round three. Pairing the Round Four respondents who stayed with Round Three results in a loss of observations. The number of respondents lost varies depending on the response due to eliminating “don’t knows.” While the merger of the two surveys is a somewhat crude solution to the problem that level of prior trust presents, I test the effect of including this indicator in all models below. I calculate the proportion of respondents who expressed trust at the district level for every separate response. District level Round Three response descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.3.1 (Panel IV).

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4 Technically one question is not exactly the same. In R4 respondents are asked whether they trust “other Kenyans.” To make a close comparison I combined two questions from round three: Whether a respondent trusts “people from your own ethnic group,” or “Kenyans from other ethnic groups.”

5 Tana River, Suba, Baringo, Embu, Homa Bay, Laikipia, Marakwet, Marsabit North, Teso, Trans mara, Turkana, Mwingi, Taita Taveta, Narok, and Busia appear in round four but have no direct match in Round Three.
Figure 6.2: For respondents who remained in their town/village in the wake of violence, the distribution of Afrobarometer Round Four Kenya survey responses (2008) by locations (138) across Kenya. Values represent the percentage of respondents for each location that expressed the referent (=1) response.
Figure 6.2 shows that the distribution of trust across Kenya is not uniform. Overall, trust toward others is below 50% for many locations in the country. Trust in the president (during survey enumeration the president was Kibaki) is lower in western and northern Rift Valley areas of the country, where the population generally does not support Kibaki or his party. Interestingly, the distribution of trust toward the National Assembly follows a pattern that contrasts with that of trust toward the President. It is not surprising that trust toward the police is low in many areas. However, there is a slight trend toward greater trust in the northeast compared to central and western regions. Respondents reject violence, generally, although the region surrounding Lake Victoria exhibits a lower rate of rejecting violence than the national pattern. Respondents believe that Kenya is a functioning democracy at slightly higher rates in the center of the country surrounding Nairobi. This might be due to the fact that areas dominated traditionally by Kikuyu have a more favorable view of the Kikuyu-dominated Kibaki administration. Not surprisingly, approval of Kenya’s democracy is lower in Luo dominated regions and this speaks to my earlier discussions of the marginalization explanations for supporting political violence.

In addition to issues related to merging Round Three and Round Four using these survey data for my purposes has three main limitations. First, there is no effort to identify categories for the perpetrators of violence. For each victim, it would be helpful to know whether the assailant was a police officer or a member of some political party militia, as institutional and inter-personal trust may be affected differently. Secondly, standardizing respondent definitions of what “trust” means would be helpful. Anchoring vignettes, which re-scale responses based on the individual’s interpretation of a small narrative, are often used for this purpose but were not a part of the Afrobarometer instrument for these questions. Third, while I create a control for previous responses at a district level within Kenya these data are still not properly panel data, where each individual respondent is revisited multiple times.
6.3.2 Violent Event Data

I use three sources of violent event data that are external to the experiences reported in the Round Four survey. Other research has paired external violent event data with surveys (e.g. Collier and Vicente 2010; Dyrstad, et al. 2011; Bakke, et al. 2009) to capture locality level conflict rates. As in Chapter Five, I designate December 27, 2007 (election day) through February 22, 2008 (when Kofi Annan mediated a settlement between the main parties) as the post-election violence period for Kenya. Reports of ballots being destroyed and other irregularities began on election day (Gibson and Long 2008) fueling conflict based on party loyalties before the results were even announced and the most serious violence began.

First, I use the number of people killed within a district as reported by the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) (CIPEV 2008). This report is based mainly on public and private hospital records. I create two measurements from these data. One is a binary measure of whether a single election-related death was reported ($\mu=.50$). As an attempt to capture any possible effects of violence severity I also generate a binary measurement ($\mu=.195$) of whether the number of election related deaths surpassed the country-wide average of 32.19 deaths. As with the district level merger Round Three and Four, some district boundaries may have changed slightly and there may be some districts noted in the CIPEV that were not part of the Round Four sample.

The distribution of CIPEV for survey locations is presented in Figure 6.3.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{6} Changes include the following. I assigned the CIPEV count for Kisii to the Round Four districts Gucha (Kisii South), Kisii Central, and North Kisii in round four. In all other cases the issue is either name change, or devolution between round four and CIPEV. Eldama Ravine in CIPEV were attributed to Koibatek. Also, deaths attributed to Webuye in the CIPEV were added to Bungoma to match round four. The counts for Kipkelion and Sotik in the CIPEV were added to Kericho in round four. CIPEV deaths for Kiambu West were paired with Kiambu in Round Four. Similarly CIPEV deaths for Nandi North were merged to Nandi in round four. Finally, Nyandurua South in the CIPEV was merged with Nyandurua in Round Four.
Figure 6.3: The distribution exposure to post-election violence across Kenya by survey location. CIPEV information were joined by district. For ACLED and UCDP GED the date range is December 27, 2007 through February 22, 2008.
Another source for violent event data is the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh, et al. 2010). According to these data 421 events took place at 116 locations across the country during this period. I draw buffers around each survey location at five kilometer breaks between 10km - 30km and aggregate the presence of violence (or its absence) to each survey location. Using 20km initially, I also test the effect of varying this threshold. 62.9% of respondents were exposed to violence during the post-election period by this definition. The percentages fall as the buffer become smaller: 30km, 73.5%; 25km, 69.5%; 20km, 62.9%; 15km, 49.7%; 10km, 40.2%. I also include a check against the media-based UCDP GED dataset (Melander and Sundberg 2011). A shortcoming of these data is that they include only deadly events \( N = 82 \) for this period). If rolling skirmishes included arson, forced eviction, sexual violence, looting, and rioting, but not death, the event would not appear in these data. I use a 20km buffer for aggregating the data and 29% of survey respondents were affected by this designation.

6.4 Analytical strategy

In this chapter’s analysis, I adopt an approach to social science inference that is based on a quasi-experimental research design and counterfactual logic. There are two steps in the process. The first step entails sorting respondents according to their experience of violence, or into treatment (= yes) and control (= no) groups. Likelihood that the treatment applies to a given observation is based on a propensity score determined by the control variables described above. An equal propensity score ensures the random assignment of the treatment, and thereby adherence to a quasi-experimental design: The groups are identical for all controls in this multivariate analysis. I use nearest neighbor matching with replacement in the R package MatchIt (Ho, et al. 2007). This means that each observation may be assigned as a match to an analogous observation in the opposite group (treatment versus control) more than one time. Observations used more than once are weighted to reflect their frequency and this is included in subsequent analysis. I run the analysis separately on the subsets of data where the key “don’t know” dependent variable responses have been dropped from the sample. For each model, the means for controls may not be perfectly equal,
but a standard bias statistic less than or equal to .25 constitutes a desirable fit (Ho et al. 2007). Standard bias is calculated \((\mu_{t=1} - \mu_{t=0})/\sigma_{t=0}\), with treatment \(t\), mean \(\mu\) and standard deviation \(\sigma\). The only case of an unfavorable standard bias among all model configurations is the balanced set of covariates for personal experience as a treatment with violence as a control after matching on local level violence (20km) as the treatment. Other matching procedures (e.g. exact, subclass) available in MatchIt do not remedy this problem.

Using the matched treatment and control groups, the second step is to estimate the effect of experiencing violence. I use a multivariate logistic model of the response in Zelig (Imai, King, and Lau 2007). The model may be represented:

\[
Y_i = \beta_i X_i + \epsilon_i
\]  

(6.1)

where \(Y\) is the survey response for individual \(i\), \(\beta\) the coefficients for the matrix of controls, \(X\), and \(\epsilon\) captures unspecified error. After controlling for influential factors in the multivariate analysis, differences in the response may be attributed to the treatment. After matching control and treatment groups I estimate the average treatment effect of experiencing violence for victims, when compared with their unaffected peers. In-sample average treatment effect on the treated (\(ATT\)) is estimated as:

\[
ATT = [Y_i(t_i=1) - E[Y_i(t_i=0)] \mid t_i=0]
\]  

(6.2)

where \(Y_i(t_i=1)\) represents the observed response in the presence of treatment and \(E[Y_i(t_i=0)]\) the estimated counterfactual response in the absence of treatment, \(t_i=0\) (Imai, King, and Lau 2008, p. 45). I display 95% confidence intervals for the estimated effect to establish whether the influence is statistically distinct from zero effect. Controls are used in the matching process and in the subsequent regression model, but the procedure does not return coefficients for control variables.

For every response I systematically move through a series of models. First, I measure the effect of personally experiencing violence for the full survey population (model 1). Next, I run the analysis for the population that relocated (model 2), the group that stayed (model 3), and the group that stayed after including the round three district level previous trust control (model 4).
It is important to consider that it is impossible to pair the relocated respondents with any round three opinion control. Following this I control for the personal experience with violence and use the ACLED measure of conflict as a treatment without (model 5) and with (model 6) the round three control. Again controlling for personal experiences I use the CIPEV conflict data binary measure without (model 7) and with (model 8) the Round Three previous trust control. I control for personal experiences and use the CIPEV high level of violence measurement without (model 9) and with (model 10) the control for previous trust. Lastly, I present the results of the less-favorable second conflict dataset with (model 11) and without (model 12) round three opinions. In all I present 72 models of the association between exposure to violence and attitudes.

6.5 Results

Results of the matching analysis are presented in Figure 6.4 below. I present the results as absolute causal effects on the binary scale, but also as percent change from the baseline average rate of exposure for the total population. For the full population, those who experienced violence, when compared to respondents who did not, are less likely to trust the president (.129, or - 22.6%), parliament (.092, or - 18.4%), and police (.109, or - 38.2%). Among the respondents who relocated, the effects of violence are statistically significant for two responses. Experiencing violence is associated with reduced trust in the police (.271, or - 120.0%) among victims, but, interestingly, a greater likelihood of rejecting violence as a political tool (.247, or + 37%). For the population that did not relocate results vary slightly, though they are usually consistent with the results for the full population. Even controlling for ethnicity, those who experienced violence are less likely to trust the president (.114, or - 19.3%), the police (.090, or - 30.7%), and also are less likely to believe Kenya is a democracy (.113, or - 24.1%). Controlling for previous district level responses from the R3 survey does not change these results. After accounting for previous views in a district, violence is still associated with lower levels of trust in the president (.128, or - 21.6%), less trust in the police (.170, or - 58.0%), and lower chances of believing Kenya to be democratic (.086, or - 18.3%).
Figure 6.4: The estimated Average Treatment Effect on the Treated of violence upon survey responses (Panels A - F), for subsamples of data and several metrics of locality violence. The number of observations (N) and the number of people that experienced violence (Treat N) are presented after “don’t know” responses are eliminated for each data subset. The vertical line indicates zero effect, and coefficients are displayed with 95% confidence intervals. In the figure “Bin.” indicates a binary measurement of conflict and “w/r3” means that survey round 3 controls are included. The size of the symbol simply corresponds to the width of the confidence intervals.

After taking into account whether a respondent personally experienced violence, I next compare attitudes across the experience of local-level violence as a treatment. This must be understood as the influence of local level instability in addition to the personal level effects. Violence at the district or local level does not seem to have a harmful influence on trust toward other Kenyans except in the case of the ACLED (.132, or - 31.2%) measure and the high threshold of the CIPEV
(.118, or 27.8%). This result contrasts the findings of Bakke et al. (2009), who discover the opposite - and counter-intuitive - association; conflict in an area is associated with increased levels of trust. Neither of these effects remains after controlling for previous attitudes pooled at the district level. None of the local level measures influence either trust toward the president or the parliament. There is minimal evidence suggesting that local level violence reduces trust toward police in the results of the CIPEV high threshold (.113, or -38.5%), but only without the previous trust control. District level violence above mean CIPEV reported deaths is associated with increased chances that a respondent will reject violence as a political tool (.102, or 14.1%), but this does not hold after controlling for previous opinions in the area. Finally, with full model controls there is little evidence that local level instability affects opinions related to Kenya's democratic merit.
Figure 6.5: Replication of Figure 6.4 after excluding ethnicity controls.

Figure 6.5 illustrates the effects of excluding ethnicity controls from the initial models. This has a substantial effect on the district-level violence results concerning trust toward other Kenyans and whether or not a respondent views the country as democratic. Many measures of indirect violence reduce levels of trust toward others without consideration granted to the ethnicity of respondents, and this is true across measures of violence (e.g. CIPEV as well as ACLED and UCDP), and while including and excluding Round Three previous opinion controls. Similarly, there is some evidence that conflict at the local level reduces approval of Kenya’s democracy in practice. It is likely that these findings diverge from the results above because as ethnic communities cluster in certain Kenyan regions, so does violent conflict. In Chapter Four, I have elaborated upon
the evidence that patterns of violence and the ethnic composition of sub-national areas are related. Accounting for one clustered independent variable is likely to reduce the influence of a second similarly clustered indicator.

Some individual level effects also change after leaving out ethnicity controls. For example, personal experiences with conflict do not increase the likelihood of rejecting violence for the population that relocated. For the same population, the finding that violence reduces trust toward police disappears without ethnicity controls. In other cases the effect of violence becomes significant in the new analysis, as is the case where experiencing conflict tends to reduce a respondent’s likelihood of reporting Kenya to be democratic.

6.5.1 The Boundaries Of “Place”

How researchers define the scale of analysis can influence the conclusions of any study greatly. In this chapter the question translates into defining the scope of “local” for models with a spatial border surrounding a location. I test the effects of varying the distance threshold for the ACLED data model with Round Three and full ethnicity controls. Note that under this model configuration ACLED violence within a 20km buffer is never statistically significant. While the unit of analysis for the response in this case (individual) does not change, this exercise would reveal if some distance threshold other than 20km had a noteworthy powerful effect. While there is some variation evident in the figure, none of the estimates below for different distance thresholds are statistically distinct from zero. Results in Figure 6.6 nevertheless show that varying the distance threshold can change the direction of the influence that local level conflict has on attitudes.
Figure 6.6: By survey response (x-axis), the average treatment effect of violence within distance thresholds 30km - 10km (y-axis). Red shades indicate that local-level violence has the effect of increasing the likelihood of observing the response and blue illustrates a negative association. Dashed green lines through the column indicate zero ATE and solid green lines shows the value for that cell. Visualization was prepared within ggplot2 8.9.0 [2] for R.

For each response, the direction of the influence that violence has upon the indicator is sometimes consistent. With regard to rejecting violence, there is variation from negative effects at smaller distance thresholds toward increasing likelihood of rejection at 20-30km. The effect of violence on views of democracy in Kenya illustrates a similar “threshold” effect. Trust toward parliament and the president do not illustrate such a pattern, though the influence approaches zero at larger thresholds. Across spatial resolutions of defining “local” the most consistent influence is that of violence upon trust toward police.
6.6 Conclusion

Cycles of conflict are fueled by structural, political and economic conditions. However, studies based solely on aggregate level data and analysis miss the important role that individual-level preferences and opinions play in post-conflict settings. Research in a number of conflict-affected societies has sometimes illustrated a decidedly negative effect of exposure to violence upon attitudes and behavior. In contrast, another body of work identifies somewhat counterintuitive effects of exposure to violence that point in the direction of civic engagement, and even altruism. Overall, evidence for the case of electoral conflict in Kenya falls in line with the former, more pessimistic, grouping of research.

I use a series of quasi-experimental models to show that exposure to Kenya’s post-election violence can reduce the likelihood of expressing certain forms of social and political trust. For dozens of model configurations included here, no model predicts increased levels of trust for victims of violence when compared with their more fortunate peers. Additionally, there is mixed evidence that political violence is associated with a pessimistic outlook regarding Kenya’s democratic merit. These results echo Becchetti, Conzo, and Romeo’s (2011) field experiment in Nairobi’s Kibera slum, which uncovered a negative effect of experiencing conflict upon building trusting relationships. Beyond specific conclusions, the effect of violence that I have identified is contingent on spatial considerations. Whether a respondent moved between the period of election violence and the date of the survey modifies for some survey indicators our understanding of how conflict affects society. One slightly counterintuitive finding - contrasting any 'eye-for-an-eye' explanations of conflict cycles - emerges from this study: exposure to conflict in the case of relocated populations increases the likelihood of rejecting violence as an acceptable form of expression. Two district-level violence measures have a similar effect to this result, but only when excluding individual respondent ethnicity controls.

In this chapter, I have identified some effect of locality violence upon views in addition to personal-level exposure. Human geography scholarship outlines the important role that place-
influences play in determining social attitudes and behaviors. I have framed my analysis in this chapter to gauge the influence of these effects with a focus on violent conflict. While violence is only one of many social forces that may operate upon attitudes at a locality level, there is reason to believe that it is an important one. In the models that include ethnicity controls, significant effects are most consistently apparent for individual- rather than local-level exposure to conflict (aggregated number of violent incidents). Using several measurements of violence, this points toward the salience of personal victimhood above local-level instability. However, excluding ethnicity controls results in more robust locality influences toward reducing some inter-personal and institutional trust indicators. Future research could focus on how locality scale considerations other than conflict may have indirect effects on social attitudes. While I have controlled for respondent income above, for example, it might be the case that pervasive poverty at a district scale - a context of deprivation - influences views as well.

Further investigation of other cases is required in order to generalize these findings to additional settings of persistent electoral conflict. Such research might be conducted using a similar approach to the analysis above. Any simple analysis of the full survey sample reveals less information about the effects of conflict than incorporating details of a) mobility and migration, and b) conflict within a respondent’s locale. Violence may have a cyclical element, whereby the effects of one bout of electoral conflict contributes to the next. If we understand that individual-level attitudes and preferences can play a role in recurring conflict, then our understanding of contentious politics in Kenya is richer for having placed post-election violence views back on the map.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

*We are looking for explanations of variability: not general laws or total explanations of violent events, but accounts of what causes major variations among times, places, and social circumstances in the character of collective violence.*

- Tilly, 2003, p. 20

7.1 Situating sections of the research

In this dissertation I have reviewed the combined body of scholarship that investigates a politics of place in a setting of political violence. In establishing a conceptual framework for my research, I engage with influential human geography scholarship and geographical studies from within the disciplines of conflict studies, development, and African politics. Building upon this broad collection of research, my empirical analysis tests the evidence for several specific arguments about post-election violence in Kenya. To situate the Kenyan case study and introduce the data that I use throughout the dissertation, I began this study by providing an overview of key debates about the causes of election violence. In the second and third chapters, I therefore probe issues of contentious land tenure, institutional electoral irregularities, and violent conflict in Kenya using highly localized spatial statistical and GIS analysis. Understanding these issues is absolutely critical for framing Kenya’s political, institutional, and development trajectory since independence. Months of fieldwork in many areas of Kenya, which include semi-formal interviews with dozens of respondents, also provide my theoretical conceptual framework of contextualized conflict determinants additional validity. As I have outlined above, the geographical practice of territoriality is
crucially important for understanding electoral conflict. In providing an explanation of how violence emerges, when it erupts, and where it occurs, I pay careful attention to traditional themes in political geography about the politics of place, the influence of social context, and the manner in which social realities exist at multiple (flexible) hierarchical scales.

What has my analysis revealed that we would otherwise not already know about politics in Kenya? There are several answers to this question. First, understanding that ethnic community boundaries represent vectors of contentious politics in Kenya (this has been shown in existing research), I have provided new evidence that demographic patterns related to incumbency in the national executive help to explain geographies of electoral violence. To the best of my knowledge this is an unprecedented merger of political science (concerned with clientelism) and geography (concerned with local-level and “contextual” effects) sub-disciplines in explaining communal violence. My argument is that the clustering of conflict in certain areas is a function of the juxtaposition of national and local level political realities. These conclusions represent a convergence of relative and absolute conceptualizations of geographic context; group level (prior-incumbency) and locality level (district) types of communities, or social settings. As I have discussed in Chapter One, within academic human geography (and also between human geography and political science) there exist important debates about what spatial context means, how it is defined, and how it translates into behavioral outcomes. Put simply, I find an important role for substantial and carefully measured qualities of both relative and absolute types of context for explaining the various forms of Kenyan electoral violence. For my analysis, in other words, context is not simply a variable in a quantitative model that is utilized in the tradition of “controlling away” influential unobserved social processes. Where a dual condition of national and local level realities determine the distribution of electoral conflict within a country, there is also evidence of a scaled process. Often human geography scholars speak of “scaling up” social processes from the local level to the national level. The examples given for this type of phenomenon often include activist practices of globalizing a contentious issue using media technology. In the case of the incumbency incentive for violence that I argue for in Chapter Four, social circumstances exist in a manner that they are being “scaled down”: national
level politics are localized instead of the reverse. My argument is not to suggest that scaling-up and scaling-down are mutually exclusive, but that both are at play in the case of Kenyan election violence.

Recent events in Kenya lend substantial evidence to the argument that national level political alliances shape landscapes of political violence at sub-national scales within Kenya. One of the strongest reasons that violence did not break out in the March 2013 national election is that the two prior-incumbent parties (Kalenjin and Kikuyu, together in the Jubilee party) joined forces in an alliance. As I have suggested earlier, this may be because the two ethnic communities have more in common than either group has with the other major contending parties (for example Luo, Luhya, and others). More than any other explanation for election violence in Kenya, land issues dominate the academic and popular discourses, but recent events arguably warrant a re-weighting of the emphasis that this sole explanation carries.\(^1\) If land issues are to blame for violence, why did violence not emerge during 2013 in the complete absence of any actual solutions to festering land-tenure issue? After the serious electoral violence in 1992 and 1997, why did violence also not take place during 2002 in the complete absence of actual solutions to land-tenure issues? These are not trivial questions, and the lack of land related violence during the 2002 and 2013 election cycles suggests that a complex matrix of explanations for conflict exists. I have explored causes of conflict that are under-studied in the chapters above.

The importance that a political party alliance can make for the likelihood of violence is based on the substantial degree to which ethnicity matters for Kenyans in their everyday life. In my searches for ethnicity data in the library of the Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics, one long term employee (statistician and coordinator for sampling design) told me something that illustrates just how important ethnic identity is for politics in Kenya. As many know, disaggregated (e.g. district or county level) ethnic demography data are not publicly available from the Kenyan government. The data certainly exist, however, and it is perfectly clear that the actual census form asks about

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\(^1\) It is interesting that some scholars argue that land-tenure disputes are an undervalued explanation for violence, because reviews of the literature (including the 2007-2008 election violence coverage) and fieldwork illustrate the fact that there is actually much attention to the issue.
the ethnic composition of each household. Pushing the issue, and in doing so probably irritating him slightly (I was clearly not the only person with this request), he said “if I had the ethnicity data, I would sell them to politicians and they would win all of the elections with this formula” (Author Interview 29, 2011). Where voting follows ethnic lines, the value of this information would be a key component for electoral victory. In the KNBS employee’s comments there is strong evidence that ethnicity matters deeply, despite the fact that many everyday individual level interactions between Kenyans of different backgrounds are perfectly amicable.

I have extended the arguments about local ethnic demography above to test the influence of other questions about “context” in the conflict studies and political geography literatures. Specifically, as I have shown above, some research suggests that a setting of poverty is a condition that dramatically raises the risk of conflict in an area. Other scholarship suggests that it is ethnic community diversity or polarization that contributes to violence. After carefully operationalizing the variables that represent poverty and ethnocentrism as “locality” characteristics, I make a definitive claim on the side of poverty explanations for conflict being more powerful, overall, than ethnocentrism alone. Districts in this analysis are considered the boundaries of “context” and “locality.”

Second, there is mixed evidence in academic debates that exposure to violence can harm inter-group trust and other social and political attitudes. For Kenyan election violence, I have found that various types of trust are indeed more likely to be harmed by experiences with political violence than the reverse. For social attitudes and political opinions, local level political insecurity is less influential than personalized victimization. The issue of victimization is important in real terms because Kenya has not fully recovered from the election violence - or other previous violence related to land tenure and the distribution of resources. On 21 June 2013, a long special article appeared in the Daily Nation. The author reflected in great detail upon the release of the final report of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission report, which during 2011 gathered testimony about political violence and human rights injustices throughout the country (I attended several of these hearings as part of the research for this dissertation). Summarized succinctly, his main claim was that Kenyan society still has deep fissures along lines of ethnic affiliation. One of
his points was that few people commenting on the report in public forums (newspaper editorials, television and the like) had even read the entire document. This represented, he argued, a shared Kenyan tendency to accept the existence of certain social injustices, but to make little effort to genuinely understand them. He suggested that many Kenyans pay lip service to the issues that victims of violence face, but do not to truly seek solutions to the root causes of their plight. While some progress is being made in terms of ending impunity for promoting political violence (the president’s trial at the ICC is set to begin in late 2013 after several delays), there are obviously tensions remaining in Kenyan society about access to power and violence. These tensions are tied to experiences with prior injustices.

Third, in line with my Chapter Five conclusions (and those noted above in terms of context), it is worth emphasizing that poverty and low socio-economic status are powerful influences upon cycles of conflict. As I have discussed earlier, the national leaders of ethnic communities were not the ones wielding pangas during the election violence. As in so many other African cases of election violence, it was a pool of young and poor Kenyans with few employment prospects who actually committed the deadly acts of violence. Political violence in Kenya is therefore partly also economic or livelihood violence. Riots occur periodically in downtown Nairobi. While I was in Nairobi during June 2013, in a River Road area known as Coast Bus, a young man I was speaking with commented to me, “that smell is teargas.” Earlier that day the police made an effort to evict dozens of mechanics, who often operate informally in vacant lots. Those mechanics resisted the authorities. As a protest to what they viewed as the loss of their opportunity to earn a living, the mechanics burned tires and threw rocks at the police. This unrest, which the same young man explained to me as occurring between the “Haves and the Have nots,” was wrapped up in the politics of titles for the land in dispute. As is often the case, the title for this land was held by a wealthy and politically connected individual. It was not long until the discussion being held around me became one about Kikuyus dominating positions of political importance (Ministry of Finance, and, historically, the positions of District Commissioner around the country). Even if the brazen animosity (and formerly it was sometimes openly violent rhetoric) between ethnic communities has
evaporated in the wake of the election violence, the ICC trial, institutional devolution of government to counties, and other reconciliation processes that are underway will take place in an environment where politics of difference undoubtedly exist. To use the words of a Samburu man from Maralal that I interviewed for Chapter Four, there may be something like a “cold war” for influence in the country’s political economy. These disputes, playing out at the county and national levels, will not be agnostic with regard to ethnicity.

In the remaining sections of this conclusion, I explain in more particular detail how individual chapters of this research relate to one another, and to other existing scholarship. Situating the dissertation chapters requires a brief summary of each. In closing, I also echo my introduction in outlining the value of this research for understanding electoral violence in other African countries. To further the argument that this case study has comparative value, I introduced this dissertation by showing that Kenya is centrally ranked in Africa for several key country-level indicators of interest for comparativists; the country’s central position for ranked income, population, and governance measures suggests a greater ability to generalize than if it were an outlier relative to other African countries. While Kenya is surely more democratic than some other African countries, many governments on the continent are slowly opening their formal political spheres. If a trajectory toward democratic progress is maintained, then my findings based on Kenya’s experience may be helpful for understanding institutional developments in other countries that are moving away from autocracy.

To provide an initial overview of the conflict landscape in Kenya, I direct my attention in Chapter Three to the spatial statistical analysis of violent event data. The GIS data I use are derived from hospital records, and media-based accounts of the conflict provided in the ACLED database. I have several goals in providing this empirical overview of the violence. First, it is important to understand that the patterns of election violence vary clearly from patterns of non-election violence. The former type of conflict dominates in areas of the so-called “white highlands,” where the politics of territorial control are highly contentious. For non-election violence, in contrast, the hot spots of conflict are markedly different. Mainly, northern regions of the country emerge as
especially violent. There is good reason to believe that this is a function of pastoralist violence (in the north and northwest), but is also associated with instability in Somalia, which influences politics in Kenya’s northeast. Because my goal is explaining electoral violence, and not the more frequent “livelihood violence” associated with pastoralism, the later must be distanced from the conceptual framing and analysis in my research. Secondly, for electoral conflict as a distinct phenomenon, it is important to understand that violence illustrates localized clustering trends across regions of Kenya. Certain areas of the country are hotbeds of violence perpetually, and understanding the locations of such perpetual conflict is a key first step that directs subsequent inquiry into the causes of electoral violence. As I have summarized, many researchers showcase a land-politics explanation for violence, and they are right to do so. Yet, I believe that nuance can be added to these claims, and present evidence for why this is the case in subsequent chapters. Third, my point-pattern analysis in this section of the research suggests that population trends do not explain the clustering of electoral conflict itself, or the differences between electoral and non-electoral conflict (though these are less substantial in location-based analysis than at the district scale). The fact that population size does not drive the trend suggests that other social and political forces are at play and identifying these is the important focus of the remaining chapters. If population patterns alone explained the violence, then the research might have ended abruptly in Chapter Three.

In Chapter Four, I outline the notion of an incumbency incentive that influences the distribution of political violence. Using survey, hospital record, census, and fieldwork data, I present evidence that variation in opposition group types occurs along a key social vector: prior tenure for a member of the ethnic community in the presidency. I introduce empirical evidence for the argument in several stages. First, I use a most-similar comparative analysis of the severity of violence and demographic patterns in two Rift Valley districts, Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu. My argument is that a non-prior-incumbent ethnic community in Trans-Nzoia, the Luhya, represent a buffer between the two prior-incumbent populations (Kikuyu and Kalenjin). This buffer translates into less severe post-election violence within that area. Second, I investigate geographic patterns in the causes of death by province, as reported by hospitals, during the post-election violence. These
data are country-wide in scope, and the distribution of shootings indicates that while western area of Kenya witnessed serious unrest, that violence was reactive, and a result of state repression. Direct opposition community vs. incumbent community violence was more fierce in regions of the Rift Valley, where two prior-incumbent communities interact. Finally, I use nationally representative survey data from 2005 in a geographical analysis to show that the prior-incumbent community members, relative to non-prior-incumbent, support the use of violent politics at greater rates. This is true after controlling for key alternative explanations for why an individual may support the use of violence. My findings contribute to conflict studies, African politics, and human geography scholarship in several ways. Respectively, these contributions are a function of having clarified an under-researched incentive for engaging in violence and by disaggregating the category of political “opposition”, uncovering a unique and important influence of patronage ties and clientelism upon a general population, and by showing that national level politics and local level violence are linked by a previously unobserved scaled process. Using a country-wide spatial resolution, instead of narrowing in on an area where land politics are already known to have been associated with conflict, and without relying only on anecdotal evidence, I explain varying spatial distributions in the types of post-election violence as a function of national level experiences. Where looting and non-deadly property damage dominates in non-prior-incumbent zones, deadly eviction violence takes place in the areas where to prior-incumbent communities meet.

Relying on survey and GIS data in Chapter Five, I explore the socio-economic character of the contexts within which violence is most likely to emerge. Specifically, I test whether ethnic community polarization at a district scale increases the risk of exposure to electoral violence. I also test whether a context of relative poverty and, separately, prevailing ethnocentric attitudes explain the link between ethnic community polarization and conflict. I find that district level poverty more consistently than ethnic attitudes explains the polarization-conflict link. To be certain, poverty and politics interact in the social atmosphere of contemporary Kenya, but the causal effects models that I estimate test each of the separate propositions after accounting for individual level characteristics. In a complementary analysis to the testing of ethnic polarization influences, I also test
the link that insecure land tenure has with electoral conflict. Within a subset of the conflict studies and African politics literature this is an important (and common) political-economy explanation for the spatial distribution of political violence. I find, predictably, some role for the settlement scheme status of districts in predicting exposure to electoral violence. The critically important caveat that I provide in making this claim is that the association emerges only where settlement scheme status overlaps with ethnic community polarization as a key demographic characteristic of localities. Ethnic community size matters because it conditions the collective politics of perceived threat, and also the individual level expected payoffs from engaging in violence. As I have shown above, these tenets of my argument have strong support in the behavioral sciences literature. My findings in Chapter Five are important for the study of electoral violence in that I expand upon the overwhelming evidence that context matters for the explanation of social phenomena. The politics of place matter in this study not only in the historical sense, where I have measured the influence of settlement scheme policies, but also in terms of the contemporary social atmosphere. My conclusions are important, secondarily, because the political economy and behavioral schools of thinking do not always coincide, with the former being more structurally determinist than the later. The political economy approach emphasizes the important role of control over land tenure (e.g. Harbeson 1973; Boone 2011) or forced exclusion from formal institutions via clientelistic politics (e.g. Clapham, 1998). On the other hand, a behavioral approach is supported by the politics of collective violence in terms of group sizes (e.g. Tilly 2003), perceived threats from competing groups (e.g. Posner 2005), or collective action problems (as outlined in Varshney 2002). The latter body of research focuses more closely on immediate (or near-term) social contexts, while the former is characterized by attention paid to the long-term temporal processes in a country’s political fabric. Using an innovative spatial counterfactual research design, I have combined the two paradigms for research under the umbrella of human geography.

Finally, if we understand violence to be a process that takes place in a cyclical fashion - believing that, for one reason or another, conflict begets conflict - then it is important to understand what the effects of electoral conflict may be for its victims. In Chapter Six, I follow other scholars
by asking how exposure to violence influences political opinions and other social attitudes. I add a geographic component to this line of inquiry, however, in two main ways. First, I make a careful comparison between survey respondents who have relocated since the period of conflict and those respondents who did not. The effect of violence upon the population that has relocated since the period of the election conflict, additionally, is different than that for the population who did not move. I interpret this as partial support for the argument that local level social realities influenced respondent attitudes. Secondarily, I compare individual-level and locality-level violence that is measured from several different sources and geocoded into a GIS platform. In dozens of quasi-experimental models with a litany of robustness checks, which include controls for previous attitudes in Kenya’s districts, some patterns emerge in the direction of conflict reducing interpersonal and institutional trust, affecting political ideals, and influencing beliefs about institutions in Kenya. Furthermore, I have shown, by allowing the spatial definition that defines a locality to vary, that there may be important differences in how regional instability and political violence influence political opinions. The clear focus that I place on geographic contexts (measured using multiple spatial resolution definitions) and spatial relocation varies from existing research on the effects of Kenyan election violence in Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2011) and Becchetti, Conzo, and Romeo (2011).

7.2 Contributions to existing human geography scholarship

This dissertation research clearly engages and contributes to important academic debates in human geography. Political geographers have effectively illustrated sub-national spatial variation for many social phenomena, especially voting. Johnston and Pattie (1992), for example, show that a “spatial polarization” of voting trends (the link between class and party support, in their case) has taken place among the British electorate over time. The authors claim that the regional variation they discover highlights the importance of social context in shaping individual level behavioral outcomes. My contribution to to the sub-discipline lies partly in expanding the core principles (and even methodological approaches) of this style of human geography research in a merger with
the conflict studies literature. I have argued earlier that a “structuration” approach to geographical analysis - whereby individual-level and locality characteristics interact to produce social outcomes (Agnew 1987; Pred 1990) - represents a crucially important lens for understanding African politics and political violence. In order to achieve an effective merger between geography and conflict studies, I have conducted my analysis in a manner that blends the universal (or “global”) and particular (or “local”) elements of context, to use Agnew’s (1996, 130) understanding of social context. To capture absolute or territorial contextual effects I use units of analysis that vary from exact locations, to administrative units, to distance buffers, and, finally, to the national level. Agnew also identifies two primary ways of viewing context that are distinct from a simple concern with spatial resolution; I consider these as well. While territorial units are commonly viewed as the boundaries for so-called contextual effects, other vectors defining contextual effects might include socioeconomic class or ethnic community affiliation. Especially in Chapter Four, I focus on ethnic kinship as a key realm of contextual effects. In the case of ethnic community affiliation, consider that the operative membership community for an individual may be not only within a given town or city, but in other areas as well. As communication networks have become more robust in recent decades, technological change may foster a shift from the location/territorial definition of context to the group membership definition. In addition to absolute location, “social group formation and group (class, ethnic, and so-on) consciousness are also realized in the spaces of everyday life and by reaching beyond them through organizational ties to similar groups elsewhere” (Agnew 1996, 133). Reducing analysis to only single locations amounts to the elimination of “abstract or general and a-spatial social effects,” according to Agnew (1996, 133), and I have designed my research to accommodate both absolute and relative manifestations of contextual effects in the production of Kenyan election violence.

Political geographers have also long investigated the process of territoriality and the effects that it can have upon populations (Sack 1984). As an extension of earlier scholarship, I have applied the territorial lens to a highly ethnicized political-institutional African context. The ethnocentric territorial aspirations of many Kenyans are clearly established in existing scholarship about poli-
tics and social relationships in the country (Throup and Hornseby 2002; Bates 2005; Boone 2012). This influenced the distribution of Kenya’s electoral violence in 1992 and 1997, according to many (Boone 2011). There are several reasons that the territorial character of Kenyan politics is especially important to understand. First, the formalization of ethnocentric ideals has been a political platform for many Kenyans over the course of decades. As a result, territorial views and actions are commonplace, and there is a solid chance that they may be implemented in formal policy. In fact, under the new constitution, a substantial degree of local level autonomy has already raised concerns about the treatment of perceived “outsider” groups (Brown 2011). There is a real risk of conflict where ethno-territorial ideals are solidified and institutionalized, and I have addressed this possibility in Chapter Five. Additionally, the territorialized character of violence is part of an interactive production of space, which other geographers have shown (Dahlman and ÖTuthail 2005; Oslender 2010; Tyner 2008; Lunstrom 2009). The construction of physical and social landscapes that influence everyday life can be extremely powerful, in part because of its tacit and banal effects upon people living in a given area. Entire towns may be the site of competing place name debates, and the scene of graffiti campaigns to intimidate political opponents. In such cases, the histories of particular localities have a profound influence on the character of political dialogue and future trajectories of inter-group struggles.

My research in this dissertation also contributes substantially to the geographic realm of conflict studies. For years, geographical research has highlighted the sub-national dynamics of political violence and conflict (O’Loughlin, et al. 2012; Linke, Witmer, and O’Loughlin 2012; O’Loughlin, Holland, and Witmer 2011; O’Loughlin, Witmer, and Linke 2010; O’Loughlin, et al. 2010; O’Loughlin and Witmer 2009; Zhukov 2012; Weidmann and Ward 2012; Braithwaite 2010; Beardsley 2011; Braithwaite and Johnson 2012). O’Loughlin and Witmer (2011) have suggested that the diffusion of sub-national insurgent violence in Russia’s North Caucasus may be a result of changing ideologies of violence (ethno-nationalist vs. Islamist). Whether war exhibits “relocation” versus “expansion” diffusion may be an effect of the war being either irregular or regular in character (Schutte and Weidmann 2009). Boone (2011) shows that Kenyan electoral violence in 1992 and
1997 closely overlapped with sub-national distributions of settlement schemes in Kenya’s Rift Valley. More importantly for understanding the political geography of election violence, Boone’s work is highly contextualized in a fashion that political geographer’s appreciate; her research is based on analyzing the “impact of historical-geographic context [emphasis added] on a range of political activities” (a phrase used to define a political geography lens for research in Agnew 1996, 131). By moving to fine resolution scales of analysis, as have many others, I have been able to assess the role that several contextual district level factors play in conditioning the patterns of Kenya’s electoral conflict. Stated simply, I find that a context of relative poverty (in contrast to ethnocentricity) explains the link between ethnic community polarization and elevated risk of electoral conflict. Had I carried out my analysis at more aggregate spatial resolutions, these explanations for the distribution of conflict would be impossible to identify. Even where my analysis does include a crucially important national level component (in the form of an incumbency incentive for violence, Chapter Four) the evidence for (and implications of) this theoretical proposition are indisputably sub-national in spatial resolution. As I have noted in introducing my localized conceptual framework for this dissertation, an abundance of additional work in the field of conflict studies relies on sub-national data and empirical analysis even though it is not explicitly geography or political diffusion scholarship (e.g. Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013; Balcells 2011a; Balcells 2011b; Kalyvas 2006; Straus 2006; Fujii 2009; Wilkenson 2004; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011; Berman, et al. 2011; Sullivan 2012; Varshney 2002; Steele 2011b). My research is related to these recent studies in its identification of regional, location specific forces that influence Kenyan election violence.

7.3 Contributions to existing African studies scholarship

In addition to the contributions that this dissertation research makes to the fields of human geography and conflict studies, my work is situated within existing scholarly debates about politics and violence in sub-saharan Africa. I now turn to an explanation of why this is the case. Within African studies research, a first major debate that I address concerns how people view their co-ethnics, vis-a-vis other communities. In each chapter, I have cautiously integrated debates
about the politics of ethnicity into my political geography discussion of conflict. Social space is not natural, and instead is formed by the agency of individuals and the collective goals of entire communities. In many regions of Kenya, physical and social landscapes are strongly influenced by the political violence of the past, and can even be interpreted to anticipate future inter-group disputes. I have shown in Chapter Two, for example, that in one case banter between perpetrators and victims of violence takes place in an informal public forum. This communication between ethnic communities is clearly designed to influence future political dynamics of that area by intimidating some communities and emboldening others, and by setting the tone for future social exchanges (for instance by threatening death).

In contributing to this first area of African ethnic politics research, I carefully consider the role that contextual level social attitudes and poverty play in explaining any link between ethnic community distributions and electoral violence. In Chapter Five, as I have reiterated above, I show that ethnic group polarization contributes to conflict risk, but in a setting of poverty and not in a setting of heightened ethnocentric awareness. By investigating the potential influence of Kenyan settlement schemes upon electoral conflict, I have merged together spatial institutional conditions and contemporary social contexts (both those of poverty and ethnic group polarization). My consideration for these local social settings is important for taking seriously the position, furthered by Posner (2005) and others, that ethnic identity and ethnic politics are situational. The identification of causal mechanisms that I provide have strong implications for our understanding of how latent inter-group attitudes materialize and inform the realm of contentious politics, and even violence. In the most general terms, this finding speaks to key debates about whether “politics” or “poverty” raises the likelihood of violence. There are some characteristics of an ethnic community’s experiences that are somewhat perennial, however, and may not be explicitly spatial in origin (or only based on absolute location). These may still be considered “contextual” by political geographers (Agnew 1996). One a-spatial quality of an ethnic community’s experience in a country is their position within formal political institutions at the national level. Where the condition of having prior experience in the executive branch operates jointly with the spatial distributions of populations at
a local scale, the combined effect is a heightened risk of violence due to an incumbency incentive
to support violence (see Chapter Four). Those national level forces, as I have stressed above, are
to be considered latent unless activated by the spatial and temporal local setting. Because of this
framing for the conditions that result in violence, my analysis is in agreement with the general
approach that I have adopted for the study of African ethnic politics. The activation of some set of
values or political beliefs takes place within a context that is unique, and these conditions change
throughout time and across the country. While one of the primary drivers of the incumbency in-
centive theoretical model is not spatial, I argue that it is in a context of interaction between two
prior-incumbent populations that the risk of electoral violence is elevated.

A second main academic discussion about African societies concerns the politics of ethnic
patronage. In proposing that the legacy of incumbency influences violence, I rely on the role that
patron-client politics play in the distribution of resources and public goods across Kenya. There are
clear benefits of holding power and these material benefits extend (however illegitimately) also to
the supporters of those in power. This relates intimately to the Charles Tilly quote about abusing
positions of power that I presented at the opening of Chapter Four. Several scholars have shown that
land titles, for example, are used as currency to purchase the support of Kenyan populations (Boone
2012), and the general practice of developing support base areas is clear (Throup and Hornseby
1998). In an atmosphere of contentious politics, promising material gains exist for supporting
influential leaders’ official ambitions.

My dissertation has extended this second area of research into patron-client politics in several
ways. In terms of classical work on patron politics, the research in Chapter Four provides important
empirical evidence that tensions leading toward violence may arise from clientelistic management of
the national government. Additionally, patronage ties can lead to particular spatial distributions of
violence within a country. As I have noted above, these distributions of violence are fundamentally
a function of contextual level interactions among populations that have particular experiences vis-
a-vis formal institutions. It is important to consider again that the tangible and important benefits
from tenure in the executive (the roads, hospitals, schools, markets, electricity, and other quality
of live indicators) are driving the proposed relationship. This is the relatively straightforward but crucially important link between previous work and my dissertation research. I extend the classical line of inquiry into clientelistic regime politics by examining the effects of groups switching in the executive. For this modification of the traditional patron-client politics literature I use Roger Peterson’s (2002) scholarship and the theoretical model of inter-community resentment. I also provide evidence of clear linkages between patronage and the spatial distribution of types of violence that emerge across Kenya. As in Kenya, it is possible that having held control of the executive branch of government has shaped the beliefs and activities of groups in other democratizing African states. Where ethnic patronage is a known phenomenon outside of Kenya, we may find other examples of electoral conflict being shaped by the experience of having manipulated institutions from within the national executive.

A combined third area of research inquiry in the field of sub-Saharan African politics concerns a population’s attitudes about political leadership, formal and informal social institutions, and other private citizens. The legitimacy of social institutions depends largely on the confidence that individuals have in the ability of those institutions to provide services, whether the service is physical security (police, army), representation in the national political forum (representatives, legislators), or ensuring the provision of healthcare and education (executive branch, including key government ministries). I have reviewed the evidence that this is the case in Chapter Six. Among countries globally, the provision of public goods is an important issue for the study of governance. Arguably, it is most important in the context of dramatically changing political institutions, violent social instability, and abject poverty. All three of these conditions exist in Kenya, including the recent introduction of a constitutional overhaul and the election of new leaders within newly formed administrative boundaries. As the country moves forward with institutional consolidation under a new social framework, citizens must support for the process if it is to succeed. Some observers have ventured to suggest that hope about the possibility of real change among the population fostered a relatively peaceful atmosphere surrounding the March 2013 poll (e.g. Kimenyi 2013, writing for Brookings Institution).
Contributing to this third area of literature, I have reviewed the multiple positions that researchers have taken with regard to the influences that violence has upon affected populations. A paradoxical relationship emerges from some existing African conflict research, whereby exposure to violence is said to foster civic engagement, altruistic behavior, and conceptions of democratic and fair political life (Blattman 2009; Voors, et al. 2010). For Kenyan election violence - in both personal, and indirect (locality) conflict - there is little support for the optimistic outcome. Instead, it appears that violence, when a statistically significant relationship emerges between conflict and opinions, has a tendency to reduce trust in public officials, representatives of government, police, and other civilian Kenyan peers. Related studies have illustrated a similar outcome for Nairobi (Bechetti, Conzo, and Romeo 2011), but my work has expanded the spatial scope of this research to include a nationally-representative survey for the entire country. Furthermore, I have advanced the work of Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2012) by considering how local level (district, and otherwise “nearby”) political conflict and instability may influence individual level attitudes. Commonly, research is limited to the experiences reported within a survey, but there is good reason to believe that an external measure of conflict extends our understanding of how social settings may affect survey respondents.

7.4 Kenya relative to other societies

As I have illustrated earlier, the Kenyan case is similar to other politically unstable African countries. While election violence has some similar traits across cases, there are certainly some important differences. Identifying these differences and framing them carefully alongside a discussion of political transition is a fruitful avenue for comparative future research that is informed by this dissertation. In Côte D’Ivoire, as in Kenya, violence took place primarily after the election (rather than before the poll). A major difference between the two, however, is that the ethnic composition of Kenya is more diverse, and the role of ethnicity in presidential politics is different. The latter point is especially true with regard to shifting control of the executive, where two major ethnic communities have held power in Kenya, and only one in Côte D’Ivoire. Nigeria’s election
violence in 2007 was similar to Kenya’s 2007-2008 conflict in that there existed an abundance of private political militias, who fostered major unrest and killed hundreds of civilians. One major difference between the Nigerian case and Kenya is that Kenya did not experience the same degree of state support for militias (this was more a characteristic of Moi’s KANU rule in the 1992 and 1997 election). An important difference between trends of post-election violence in Nigeria and Kenya, this shows that the practices of incumbents vary depending on the social atmosphere and character of the opposition they are facing. Varying institutional legacies could explain differences in election violence within (and across) countries, but patterns of violence may also be a function of strategic alliances between support bases of key political leaders. For Kenya, such alliances played an important pacifying role during the 2002 national election. Arguably, and I have elaborated this argument above, a Jubilee party alliance between Kalenjin and Kikuyu in the 2013 election similarly fostered peace. Finally, the level of autocracy in a country also represents a variable of interest for understanding the differences between cases of election violence. Zimbabwe and Togo, for example are far more autocratic than Kenya and as a result state repression by security forces was strong during their 2008 and 2005 bouts of election violence, respectively. While the Kenyan case is amenable to generalization, it is different in important - and potentially informative - ways. Much more thorough comparative analysis is warranted to expand upon this dissertation research, and to situate my findings within a broader international perspective. What is clear from my conclusions, however, is that in moving toward other cases of electoral violence it will be imperative to pay careful attention to a complex mixture of highly place-specific historical and institutional factors alongside context-dependent social, political, and economic processes.
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Quoted interviews

Areas not listed as “town” are remote or between larger towns.

Chapter one


Chapter two


Chapter three


Chapter four

Chapter five


Chapter six


Chapter seven