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TOWARD A POST-COLD WAR FORCE AND AN ORGANIZATION-CENTRIC
MODEL OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: INSTITUTIONAL WORK IN THE
UNITED STATES ARMY, 1991-1995

by

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This dissertation entitled:
Toward a Post-Cold War Force and an Organization-centric Model of Institutional Change:
written by Wade Philip Smith
has been approved for the Department of Sociology

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Date: July 2, 2015

The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.
Smith, Wade Philip (Ph.D., Sociology)


Thesis directed by Associate Professor Jennifer L. Bair

Throughout the Cold War, the United States maintained a military prepared to confront a technologically advanced Soviet adversary. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the structure and purpose of the armed forces were called into question. In time, the U.S. military transformed from one prepared to conduct large-scale war, to one prepared to carry out a variety of missions ranging from war to humanitarian efforts. Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. Army’s senior leaders engaged in a campaign to transform the organization from its warrior-oriented mindset to a service-oriented one. I report in this dissertation my findings from an analysis of the efforts of the Army’s senior leaders in support of this transformation from 1991 to 1995. Specifically, I report my findings from an analysis of the discursive dimensions of their efforts.

Theoretically, this dissertation contributes to two emergent perspectives in organizational analysis: the institutional logics and institutional work perspectives. These perspectives highlight the fact that individual and collective actors are not only influenced by the structural, normative, and symbolic dimensions (i.e., the institutional logic) of the institutional environments in which they act, but those environments are shaped by their actions (by institutional work). Through my analysis of the efforts of the Army’s senior leaders to disrupt and replace the Cold War institutional logic, I identified three distinct forms of institutional work. Environment work included efforts to construct an extra-organizational environment that demands change, and an intra-organizational environment hospitable to change. Organizational identity work involved the establishment of an organizational sense of self that encompassed new practices. Institutional logic work involved a recursive process of textualization that established a post-Cold War logic constituted in a well-structured discourse.

In conclusion, I consider the institutional work I identified as situated within the institutional field of the armed forces. I demonstrate how the management of organizational change can influence the logic that prevails within the broader institutional field. I conclude by highlighting the utility of focusing on the organizational level of analysis in studies of institutional change, and the benefits of considering the institutional logics and institutional work perspectives as complementary.
To the men of Charlie Company

And there we were...
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my sincere appreciation for those who contributed to the completion of this dissertation. I am indebted to my advisor, Jennifer Bair, who has pushed, challenged, supported, and guided me through not only the research in this dissertation, but my development as a sociologist. To Isaac Reed and Kathleen Tierney, not only members of my dissertation committee, but supporters of my research and challengers of my thinking, I owe a great deal of gratitude. In addition, the guidance and support of Hamilton Bean and Bryan Taylor, as experts in organizational communication and members of my dissertation committee, has been instrumental, spurring my thinking and research (in this dissertation and elsewhere) in new and necessary directions.

I am thankful for financial support provided by the Department of Sociology at the University of Colorado in support of the archival research that made this dissertation possible. Moreover, I appreciate the hospitality and assistance of the staff at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Military History and Heritage Office at Fort Eustis, Virginia in support of my archival research in 2013.

Most importantly, I thank my family for their support and sacrifice in the process of completing this dissertation. First, I thank my wife, Jessica. Without her continued support and commitment to our family, graduate school and this project would never have been a possibility. Above all, however, I thank my daughters, Ainsley and Sierra, who do not yet know the sacrifices they made in support of this project.
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NOTE ON ARCHIVAL CITATION

The majority of the archival materials I analyzed for this dissertation come from two sources (discussed in detail in Chapter 4): The Collected Works of the Thirty-second Chief of Staff, United States Army: June 1991—June 1995 (Sullivan 1996) and the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Military History and Heritage Office (MHHO), Fort Eustis, Virginia. While the former is an open-published source, the latter is an open-archival collection I accessed June 3-7, 2013. Archival source citations and footnotes follow the American Sociological Association style. Each archival reference is provided in a footnote (numbered consecutively throughout each chapter), with the citation provided in full upon the first reference, and all subsequent references appearing in an abbreviated reference format. Archival references are provided in a separate section headed “Archival Sources.”

Reference to U.S. Army ranks in citations and footnotes are as follows:

CPT – Captain;
MAJ – Major;
LTC – Lieutenant Colonel;
COL – Colonel;
BG – Brigadier General;
MG – Major General;
LTG – Lieutenant General;
GEN – General.

Additional abbreviations and acronyms used by the U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO and reproduced in citations and footnotes include:

ACH – Annual Command History;
AUSA – Association of the United States Army;
Cdr – Commander;
CPG – Command Planning Group;
CSA – Chief of Staff, Army;
CY – Calendar Year;
DCSDOC – Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine;
FM – Field Manual;
FY – Fiscal Year;
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<td>LAM</td>
<td>Louisiana Maneuvers;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ops</td>
<td>Operations;</td>
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<td>OPS/CofS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Operations;</td>
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<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Office;</td>
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<td>TF</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMA</td>
<td>United States Military Academy;</td>
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<td>VCSA</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL MOTIVATIONS

The [American] Civil War and the First World War are clear-cut examples of the price military institutions pay when they fail to adapt their warfighting paradigms to meet changed conditions. The dominant military powers did adapt to change by adopting the most modern weapons—rifled muskets, machine guns, quick-firing artillery, barbed wire, poison gas, airplanes. However, they continued to employ these new weapons according to the old, offensively oriented paradigms. The price they paid was enormous: Pickett’s corps advancing in ordered gray and butternut ranks, as if on parade behind their regimental colors, mown down by the thousands before they reached the copse of trees at Gettysburg; the flower of a generation of the British Empire’s finest, lost in the course of a few summer days along the Somme. Such was the price of offensive glory in a world where the defense was dominant.

- Colonel Richard J. Dunn III, United States Army (1991:16, emphasis in original), “From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond”

In 1945, World War II came to a dramatic conclusion with the United States forcing Japan to surrender by dropping atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For some, the emergence of this war-waging technology, with its promise of total destruction, signaled the beginning of the end of large-scale war. The atomic bomb, it was assumed by many—to include the U.S. Secretary of Defense and commander in chief, the nation’s president—would deter the aggression of other state actors, at least as long as a monopoly over the technology was maintained by the United States and its allies. On August 29, 1949, however, that monopoly collapsed when the Soviet Union completed a successful test of its own atomic bomb. The ideological and territorial disputes that were simmering and giving shape to the post-war world at the time laid, then, the foundation for a Cold War as both Western and Eastern Bloc powers, each emboldened with atomic warfare capabilities, sought to ensure their own post-war security. Their efforts in these early post-war years shaped international relations and national
security affairs across the globe for the next four decades. \footnote{For a well-crafted overview of key events influencing the emergence and duration of the Cold War, see Gaddis (2005), \textit{The Cold War: A New History}.} In turn, the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War in 1991 proved to be critical events for international relations and armed forces worldwide.

Less than a decade into the post-Cold War era, prominent military scholars were observing dramatic and far-reaching structural and cultural changes in military forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain—the physical and symbolic divide that distinguished Western and Eastern Bloc powers and shaped military paradigms throughout the Cold War (Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000). In the United States, by the year 2000 dramatic changes in the composition, structure, values, and even the very purpose of the armed forces were notable (Moskos 2000). As the primary perceived threat to the nation shifted from nuclear war with the Soviet Union to concerns with subnational and non-state actors, the U.S. military establishment dramatically shrank in size; returned to the U.S. from large forward deployed bases in Europe originally established to support international alliances in the case of Soviet aggression; organized, equipped, and trained its members to engage in “new missions,” or “operations other than war,” supporting domestic, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts; altered its perception of leadership from one of management to one of statesmanship; and re-oriented the members of its ranks to assume not only the role of warrior (the identity endorsed throughout the Cold War years), but the role of diplomat as well (see, for example, Callaghan and Kernic 2003; Hajjar 2014; Hartzog 2001; Moskos 2000; Yarger 2010). Armed with hindsight, many contemporary observers assume that major changes occurring in the Cold War’s wake were, if not objective
given, in the least predictable and easy (Durant 2007). In the highly dynamic and often volatile national security arena, however, environmental pressures such as the collapse of the Soviet Union “rarely lend themselves to clear and compelling answers” (Gray 2012:21). Moreover, respectable and powerful defenders of the status quo—individuals and groups intent on preserving the world-renowned U.S. military force developed throughout the Cold War years—emerged with persuasive and well-circulated claims in the Cold War’s wake (Davidson 2010; Linn 2007; Romjue 1997; Sullivan and Harper 1996). How the dramatic changes that occurred were made possible, then, is the subject of this dissertation.

As historian C.V. Wedgwood (1967:35) observed, “[h]istory is lived forwards but it is written in retrospect. We know the end before we consider the beginning and we can never wholly recapture what it was to know the beginning only.” It is thus with hindsight that scholars all-too-often reduce rather complex military processes to fate (Johnson 2000). These processes, however, are the products of social action. It is actors, not fate, who engage the world with foresight to construct the meanings about events that may not ‘lend themselves to clear and compelling answers.’ Indeed, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, for those who ‘knew the beginning only,’ the environmental pressures that emerged were characterized by uncertainty and a future that was, as General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested in 1991, remarkably “unforeseen and unforeseeable” (as cited in Snow 1998:118). The collapse of the Soviet Union thus did not lead to changes that were self-evident, but rather resulted in the

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3 Johnson (2000) applies this quote in the beginning of his book chapter, the main points of which are discussed later in this chapter.
military force that had been developed to meet the unique demands of the Cold War being “called into doubt” (as opposed to easily replaced; Dandeker 1994:122) and “vulnerable to criticism” (and equally vulnerable to defense; Snow 1994:108). As military sociologist James Burk (1994:10) observed three years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the long-lived Cold War and emergent international scene had not shed light on a clear and transparent path for military forces, but rather “spurred a huge debate… about the [then prevailing] missions and purpose of the military establishment, about its cost, and about its proper size and organization.” This debate, and an associated reluctance by many affected actors to initiate or support change, was influenced in large part by the nation’s experience in Desert Storm just months before the collapse of the Soviet Bloc.

On February 24, 1991, the United States, along with multinational coalition partners, initiated a ground war to remove Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Within one hundred hours the fighting was over. With 245 deaths among American forces and their allies and an estimated 20,000 Iraqi soldiers killed and 50,000 captured, Desert Storm proved to be “one of the most lopsided victories on the historical record,” prompting “understandable self-congratulation” among U.S. military planners (Brown 2011:61). The Soviet Union collapsed just ten months later. For some, as Kagan (1997:xi) suggests, the altered geopolitical landscape that followed necessitated “the most serious and penetrating consideration of what should be the shape and character of the forces needed to preserve the peace and defend American interests.” For others, most notably those officers who had spent their entire military career preparing for and developing a U.S. military force capable of winning a large-scale war against the Soviet Union, “[v]ictory in the fight with Iraq… provide[d] more than adequate justification for preserving the American military status quo, which, with its few faults… perform[ed] brilliantly”
In light of these contending views, the outcomes observed today—the significant changes to the field of the armed forces in the United States that were realized—must not be presumed to have been self-evident or given. How, then, are we to explain the changes that occurred?

MILITARY CHANGE: COMMON EXPLANATIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

As within all formal organizational contexts, change is ever-present in the field of the armed forces (Van de Ven and Sun 2011). Most of the changes that occur, however, are incremental, protracted, and evolutionary in nature (Murray 1996b). Bureaucracies, after all, as Max Weber (1946) suggested, are designed not to change. Of notable interest to military scholars, then, are those instances in which state militaries undergo revolutionary change processes. To borrow from organizational theorist W. Richard Scott and his colleagues (2000:349), such changes are identifiable when the organizations and individuals that constitute a state’s armed forces “not only do things differently, they do different things,” and experience “shifts in the values that orient, guide, and motivate behavior.” When comparing U.S. military forces across the Cold War years to those that emerged (and continue to emerge) in that war’s wake, military scholars suggest that just such a change has been taking shape (see, for example, Callaghan and Kernic 2003; Hajjar 2014; Moskos 2000; Moskos and Burk 1994).

In the years following the Cold War’s end, the armed forces of the United States formally supplemented the well-understood offensive and defensive wartime operations that guided

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4 For a discussion of innovation in the bureaucratic context of the armed forces, to include reference to central features of bureaucracies identified by Max Weber, see Rosen (1991), Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military.

5 For a discussion of the differentiation between evolutionary and revolutionary military change, see Murray (1996b), “Innovation: Past and Future.”
military planning and organization throughout the Cold War years with less-well understood, and often ignored, ‘stability operations’ (Yarger 2010): the “various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” (HQDA 2008:3-10). Moreover, U.S. military organizations began a process of internalizing, to an unprecedented degree, a direct role in a peacetime environment including support for counterdrug efforts, and domestic disaster relief and civil support (see, for example, HQDA 1993). In turn, the various skills and individual identities endorsed within the U.S. military establishment began to reflect those deemed necessary for noncombat missions—including diplomacy, cross-cultural competence, compassion, and other ‘soft skills’—that contrast with those that characterize conventional warfighting and prevailed throughout the Cold War (Hajjar 2014). Among the array of explanations on offer for such dramatic changes to the field of the armed forces, many focus on changes in the environments in which military forces operate (such as altered international relations or technological developments) or a top-down model of military planning and development. It is my contention that explanations of military change that focus on such factors are incomplete.6

Military Forces from Environmental Conditions

6 My suggestion that such explanations of change are incomplete is not novel; however, my application of emergent neoinstitutional theoretical perspectives (described in detail in Chapter 2) to analyze military change is unique. For edited volumes that include critiques of explanations of military change that focus on altered environments and top-down military planning processes (among other explanations), see Farrell and Terriff (2002b), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology; Murray and Millett (1996), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period; and Winton and Mets (2000), The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941.
The ways in which armed forces conduct military operations—indeed, the ways they are organized, equipped, and trained—are influenced by geographic, political, cultural, technological, geopolitical, and experiential factors (see, for example, Huntington [1957] 1985; Linn 2007; Murray 1996a; Rosen 1991; Weigley 1973; Winton 2000). It takes little investigative work to identify the extent to which, for example, the separation of the United States from Europe by a vast ocean influenced U.S. military capabilities and organization in the nation’s infancy (Weigley 1973); the invention of the airplane (Muller 1996) and developments in submarine technology (Rosen 1991) influenced military plans and practices in the World Wars and subsequent operations; and the procurement of nuclear weapons by both Western and Eastern Bloc powers in World War II’s wake shaped national security strategies and military paradigms for more than four decades (Welch 1992). The effects such factors have on militaries, however, is remarkably indeterminate (Nielsen 2010).

As prominent sociological theorists have observed, it is the perceived, not objective, situation to which people respond (e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1966; Merton 1967). Thus, new practices and valued skills and identities within military organizations emerge not as a result of change to a given aspect of the environment in which such organizations operate, but rather as a result of shared understandings and assumptions about that aspect of the environment (Sookermany 2013). Events and environmental conditions—the geographic location of the United States, invention of the airplane, developments in submarine technology, and procurement of nuclear weapons on both sides of an emerging geopolitical conflict, to name a few—“need sponsors” if they are to influence action and organization in a common direction (Munir 2005:107). As Gray (2012:21) recently suggested, this is particularly true within the national security arena in which “[t]here is always plenty to worry about, but the vital issues of
how great a worry—when, exactly what, and then what to do about it—rarely lend themselves to clear and compelling answers.” It is thus not events themselves, but rather “people… who argue for and against the acquisition and maintenance of specific military forces” (Builder 1989:6, emphasis added). What U.S. military forces would become in a post-Cold War world depended not on the events that were beginning to unfold—most notably widespread political unrest within many Eastern Bloc nations—but rather the shared understandings and assumptions about those events that were acted upon.

As noted above, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not lead to a well-understood international environment such as that which had characterized much of the Cold War. The rapidly changing geopolitical scene led instead to a sense of “deep uncertainty” (Goldfischer and Graham 1992:3). The Cold War’s end, as Farrell and Terriff (2002a:11) suggest, thus “provided the main trigger for some kind of military change” (emphasis added), but whether that would entail a departure from the Cold War focus on large-scale war was left in question as the new geopolitical environment developed. Indeed, senior military leaders at the time were asking publically: “Is our 46-year old paradigm still in touch with reality?” (Dunn 1991:22) and, if not, “What should the outcome [of the military’s change process] be” (McDonough 1991:6)? As U.S. Army Colonel James R. McDonough, then director of the School of Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, noted in 1991, the answers to such questions “are hard to formulate” (McDonough 1991:6). Without answers to such questions—without a clear sense of what the change process should entail—the events they are concerned with have only the potential to influence action and organization. As William H. Sewell (1996) notes, such potentially disruptive events are actually an ever-present part of our social world. He demonstrates, however, that dramatic change is not. Thus, a focus on events themselves masks
the true mechanisms through which change (or stability) occurs in any given arena of social life. To spur change, any contextually dramatic, field-altering event must be interpreted and acted upon as such (Weick 1995). Munir (2005:96) is certainly correct when he acknowledges that any change-inducing event “is like a rugby ball on the ground. It cannot achieve anything on its own. A play needs to be developed around it by agents.”

Military Forces from Traditional Military Planning Processes

As government bureaucracies, modern state militaries have a limited capacity to set their own goals as they rely on broader political support to maintain the status quo or pursue change projects (Nielsen 2010). Moreover, the armed forces are only one component of a much larger national security apparatus—a system that, in modern democracies, is expected to respond to the military, political, and economic concerns of senior state leaders. In principle, each component of this system is guided by a grand strategy: the identification of anticipated threats to the security of the nation, and the establishment of capabilities—military, political, and economic—assumed necessary to combat those threats (Posen 1984). As Builder (1989) describes, military planning is thus understood in modern states to adhere to the following framework through which senior political leaders identify a grand strategy that shapes (among other things) the size, organization, goals, and character of the nation’s armed forces:

- These are the agreed-upon national objectives;
- Those are threats to these objectives;
- To secure these objectives in the face of those threats, that is the adopted strategy;
- This is the set of military capabilities needed to underwrite that strategy;

\[7\]

The quoted analogy provided by Munir (2005) is drawn from Latour’s (1987) work exploring technological innovation.
• And, thus, the following military forces are required to provide this set of capabilities (p. 5).

As this process suggests, military planning is presumed to be developed to underwrite a well understood and fully adopted national security strategy at the state level. To the degree that this process unfolds within a highly bureaucratic, vertically structured context, it is often assumed to be a state’s senior leadership—in the contemporary United States, the president (as commander in chief), Secretary of Defense, and Congress—that formally and informally influences change and stability in military forces by endorsing a clearly articulated grand strategy. In this model, military forces are believed to be reactive to directives generally beyond their control. Military change (or stability), it would seem, is the product of a top-down process. This framework, however, does not fit reality.

As Builder (1989:3) demonstrates, “[t]he most powerful institutions in the American national security arena are the military services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—not the Department of Defense or Congress or even their commander in chief.” While the president and Congress may hold significantly more power (by virtue of their bureaucratic positions) in determining the number of military forces maintained by the nation and the amount of resources devoted to the military establishment, such decisions are influenced by voices in the Pentagon (Feaver 2003; Melman 1970; Powell and Persico 1995; Snider 1995), and the individual services maintain the primary influence on the types of forces they develop and the theories that govern their implementation (Builder 1989). In part, this is due to the reality that the president, as commander in chief, does not have the resources necessary to oversee and ensure full implementation of his or her plans within military organizations (Avant 1994). Perhaps more influential, however, is the common understanding that in contemporary U.S. society neither the
president nor members of Congress are perceived to have the legitimacy to challenge the military, which—through the obtainment of high social status, development of a monopoly over a set of abstract knowledge pertaining to warfare and other military affairs, and maintenance of a distinct jurisdiction, or field, of problem-solving—developed in the twentieth century into a profession in its own right (Burk 2005).

The establishment of the military as a profession contributed in large measure to the military’s poorly challenged influence on the outcome of a number of pressing national security issues in the early years of the post-Cold War era. Of 12 such issues analyzed by Michael Desch, the preferences of senior members of the military establishment, not their civilian leaders, prevailed in seven, and an eighth included a compromise between the two (as cited in Feaver 2003). Among those for which military preferences are noted to have prevailed are settlements regarding key aspects of the nation’s grand strategy in 1994. As demonstrated in the example that follows, such a limited degree of control over military affairs on the part of the commander in chief is neither a rare occurrence, nor limited to the post-Cold War era.

Concerned with the style of warfare taking shape in Vietnam and elsewhere, President John F. Kennedy declared in 1962 that what the nation needed for success in future wars was, as compared to the then-prevailing military mindset and organization, “a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training” (as cited in Weigley 1973:457). However, even in the wake of issuing a formal directive calling for the military services to reevaluate their force structure in preparation for a potentially unconventional counterinsurgency war in Vietnam (see Bundy 1961), President

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8 In Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, Feaver (2003) provides a critique of the cases selected for analysis by Michael Desch, but nonetheless finds value in using them to demonstrate the limited scope of control the president, as commander in chief, has over military affairs.
Kennedy acknowledged that the process was not truly top-down. Addressing Elvis Stahr, then Secretary of the Army, President Kennedy said “I know that the Army is not going to develop in this counterinsurgency field and do the things that I think must be done unless the Army itself wants to do it” (as cited in Krepinevich 1986:31). As Andrew Krepinevich (1986) demonstrates, despite the president’s consistent prodding and level of authority, the Army never adopted a sincere concern for counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War. Nor would the organization do so until after the Cold War drew to a close, and even then to a questionable degree (Kretchik 2011). The change which came to pass, however, was not simply the result of a top-down military planning process.

Though the post-Cold War world had been taking shape for years, it was noted in 1995 that among senior government officials there remained “no real consensus… as to the appropriate grand strategy for the United States” (Snider 1995:14). In such a turbulent time—one in which debates about national security and military organization and development assumed center stage among senior state officials, interested academics, and concerned practitioners—General Gordon R. Sullivan, then Chief of Staff of the Army, stated in 1991 that “the Army… [was] not waiting around to be told what to do.”9 The Army was moving forward with efforts, in General Sullivan’s words, “to become something qualitatively different” than what it had become during the Cold War (Sullivan and Harper 1996:148). At a time in which the nation’s grand strategy was yet to be well-articulated, fully-adopted, and whole-heartedly endorsed by the nation’s civilian leadership, the Army’s transition toward ‘something qualitatively different’ was guided by a strategic vision developed and endorsed by the organization’s senior leadership

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Indeed, by 1993 the U.S. Army had in place a new doctrinal foundation (see HQDA 1993) from which the Army could (to borrow from General Sullivan) “stand and grow” that underscored not only the Army’s role in large-scale war, but “in activities ranging from construction of a schoolhouse in Micronesia to sophisticated ground/air combat in [Southwest Asia].” The traditional U.S. military planning process, with its emphasis on top-down civilian control over military affairs, offers, then, only limited explanatory power for the early stages of the military’s transformation from a Cold War to post-Cold War force. Indeed, as General Sullivan noted in the year following completion of his tenure as Army Chief of Staff, though his plans were influenced by the nation’s civilian leadership and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was ultimately up to him to decide whether the organization should initiate evolutionary changes or embark upon a more significant revolutionary transformation of the force (Sullivan and Harper 1996). In the face of many opposing voices, he opted for the latter.

To borrow from the analogy provided above (see Munir 2005), General Sullivan and his staff developed a well-articulated play around a questionable (to many), and thus less well-articulated strategy, then picked up the ball and ran with it. So too did the other branches of the armed forces, as Air Force and Navy senior leaders worked to reorganize and reform their branches in the early 1990s (Dunnigan and Macedonia 2001). As retired U.S. Navy Admiral William A. Owens (2002:210) observed of service-specific changes occurring in the Cold War’s wake—change processes to which he contributed—though each branch was embarking on

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10 Undoubtedly, the transformation initiated by the Army’s senior leadership was influenced by the published “National Security Strategy” and interests of civilian leaders; however, central and penetrating questions about what the Army should become, as will be demonstrated in this dissertation, were answered and acted upon by the organization’s senior leadership.

internal changes, “the mosaic [being] assembl[ed] would ultimately present a very different picture of U.S. military capabilities, for the programs [often] see[n] and treat[ed] as discrete were not only individually powerful. Together their interactions posited revolutionary changes.” In spite of the hierarchical and bureaucratic character of the field of the U.S. armed forces, it has thus been noted that in the contemporary era, military organizations—the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps—are the most influential change agents in shaping and reshaping the qualitative character and normative commitments of the nation’s military establishment (Builder 1989; Farrell and Terriff 2002a).

**New Directions: Military Forces from Institutional Work**

As suggested above, significant change within the field of the armed forces requires action. Events, altered environmental conditions, the presence or absence of a fully-endorsed grand strategy, and articulated desires of senior state leaders provide only a context within which change projects unfold. As Durant (2007:247) observed in his analysis of emergent U.S. military environmental policies and practices in the post-Cold War era, such factors are influential only to the degree that they are “filtered through the institutional, professional, program, and personal agendas of affected actors” who work diligently to “diffuse[e] and impos[e] their perceptions of problems and solutions upon other actors.” It is thus my contention—indeed, it is the primary empirical argument I advance in this dissertation—that the organizational structure and cultural character of a state’s armed forces are the result of institutional work.

As introduced by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), institutional work refers to the concerted efforts of individual and collective actors intended to create, maintain, and disrupt the relatively durable and taken-for-granted elements of social life. The key defining characteristics
of institutional work are thus effort and intentionality (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009). Institutional arrangements, the perspective suggests, are largely the result of purposive and “concrete practices employed by actors” (p. 10). Rendering institutional work poorly visible in studies of military change, however, is the common assumption that military forces are rational and functional entities with purely instrumental purposes (Farrell 2002; Kier 1997). As Frank Dobbin (1994) pointedly observes, such an assumption is reflective of one common in contemporary society more generally, as rationality is often (falsely) presumed to be self-evident and transparent. As institutional scholars have well-demonstrated, in any well-established arena of social life it is not rational, but rather rationalized (i.e., socially constructed) action and organization that is endorsed (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). Rationalization, as with any social construction, implies a process (Berger and Luckmann 1966). As demonstrated in the example below, adequate explanations of change or stability in the field of the armed forces thus necessitate a focus on the process through which organization and action become rationalized.

In April of 1917 the United States entered a world war unfolding in Europe; a war often dubbed in its immediate aftermath “the war to end all wars.” With less than 20 months of involvement in World War I, more than four million men from the United States supported the effort through service in the Army, and another 800,000 in the other military services (Ropp [1959] 1962). During that time, the United States suffered more than 116,000 military deaths and 204,000 military wounded (Hartzog 2001). To a very substantial degree, these remarkable casualty rates are associated with the battlefield effects of new technologies such as tanks, aircraft, machine guns, radios, barbed wire, and poison gas (Dunn 1991; Kretchik 2011). The

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12 For an explicit discussion of this suggestion in the context of the military, see Farrell (2002), “World Culture and the Irish Army, 1922-1942.”
effects of these (and other) factors were such that the fighting that occurred during the war “was unlike any that preceded…it” (Hartzog 2001:141). In the wake of the war, then, it is not surprising that nations worldwide reconsidered their planning, training, and development for war. For the German military this meant rethinking the very nature of warfare itself. It was between the World Wars that the German military establishment developed an independent air force with its own wartime roles and missions and a tank corps trained not for mass warfare (a paradigm which had previously dominated military thinking) but rather maneuver warfare (Corum 1992, 2000). In the United States, however, this meant incorporating recent lessons learned and new technologies into pre-war strategies and commitments.

In the years leading up to World War I, the U.S. War Department shared the concerns of the national security establishment more broadly as it committed itself in preparation to repel an enemy invasion on U.S. soil (Linn 2007). With wars at the time characterized as “wars of attrition” in which the killing of enemy soldiers, or otherwise decreasing the number of soldiers available to the enemy to wage war, was viewed as an objective in and of itself, a sizeable force whose training supported the contention that “the soldier’s job is to kill the enemy” (Peters 2004:24) was perceived to be a necessity for national security. In turn, the defense establishment endorsed the maintenance of a mass army enabled by conscription whose major mission was defense of the homeland (Moskos 2000). It was thus largely manpower, and not technology, that was of primary importance in the pre-war years when considering how to plan for, fight, and win the nation’s wars. This commitment would remain unchanged in light of wartime experience and

13 For edited volumes discussing military development in various national contexts between the world wars, see Murray and Millett (1996), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period; and Winton and Mets (2000), The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941.
evidence suggesting that new technologies—the tank, aircraft, machine gun, radio, barbed wire, and poison gas, to name a few—might bring with them an altogether new kind of warfare.

In the wake of the First World War, some War Department officials “saw technology as a way to revolutionize warfare” (Johnson 2000:173). The Army’s senior leadership, however, firmly believed that the primary lessons to be learned from an attrition-based war they recently won centered on structural and administrative corrections to further support the pre-war conceptualizations and organization of a mass Army. It was their contention that the organizational changes necessary stemmed not from technological developments, but rather from two key deficiencies exposed during the War: “providing for the manpower mobilization of a mass army and supplying its material needs” (p. 174). In turn, between the world wars “the army consistently chose to spend its money on personnel and related expenses… [and] investment in technology went wanting, since modern weapons remained secondary to manpower” (p. 202).

Moreover, the material presented in Army schools, the primary socializing mechanism for senior leaders, emphasized neither technology nor a changing face of war, but rather “existing doctrine that focused on preparing graduates to mobilize and lead a mass army” (p. 202). The Army, Johnson (2000) notes, went from a ‘manpower first’ policy to more of the same. At a time when revolutionary change seems to have been possible, and most notably at a time in which the argument was made (successfully in other national contexts) that such a revolution was necessary, the field of the armed forces in the United States returned relatively quickly to business as usual with the Army leading the charge.

Though some military scholars contend that this intellectual and structural return to normal was a result of Congressional decisions that left the Army under-manned and under-funded, Johnson (2000) suggests this was the result of conscious decisions made by Army
leaders to direct limited budgets toward, and maintain training programs that supported pre-war, mass Army commitments. In large part, he argues, a technologically-oriented revolution in military affairs was rendered improbable by the actions of key Army leaders who created an environment in which there was very little tolerance for opposition to pre-war commitments. In turn, while the German armed forces relied on emergent technology (among other factors) to develop a devastating new approach to warfare coined Blitzkrieg, or “lightening war”—a style of warfare characterized by swift and intense fire and maneuver strategies and tactics employed by an independent air force and tank corps—the U.S. military establishment clung tightly throughout most of the interwar years to the notion that such technologies were only useful on the battlefield to the degree that they supported the mass Army’s ground infantry troops (Johnson 2000; U.S. War Department 1939). Thus, while the German armed forces launched a military revolution that would, in time, “rewrite the book on modern warfare” (Citino 1999:2), the U.S. military developed evolutionary new alternatives to conventional means of waging war (Millett 1996).

Whereas military scholars have often pointed to environmental conditions—most notably Congressionally-initiated budgetary constraints—to explain the Army’s lack of innovation in the period between the World Wars, Johnson (2000) provides a more nuanced account by getting inside the Army’s experience. In turn, he describes a process that penetrates much deeper into the organization’s psyche than that commonly endorsed by the purely resource-based field-level account. His account was made possible through a consideration of the actions of the agents involved and the ideological commitments that guided those actions. An entirely different story emerges when one considers that stability was enacted by individual and collective actors who were immersed “in the day-to-day realities of an army making the difficult cultural and
institutional transition from frontier constabulary to modern army, from absolute faith in man and animal to reliance on machines and science” (p. 163). To adequately understand the processes that unfolded, the researcher must not rely on hindsight, but rather explore how the foresight of the actors involved manifested in practices that shored up the military paradigms that prevailed. I thus contend that explanations of military stability (such as that identified by Johnson (2000)) or change (such as that addressed in this dissertation) necessitate a focus not on ‘objective’ conditions or ‘rational’ action, but rather the institutional work carried out by agents with beliefs and agendas of their own. To borrow from Durant (2007:245), attention must be afforded those efforts engaged in by influential and affected actors that “diffuse[e] and impos[e] their perceptions of problems and solutions upon other actors.” To explore the U.S. military’s transition from a uniquely Cold War to distinctly post-Cold War force, I thus rely herein on the broader neoinstitutional theoretical framework from which the institutional work perspective emerged.

NEOINSTITUTIONAL THEORY: EMERGENT PERSPECTIVES AND PATHS LESS TAKEN

Central to neoinstitutional theory are institutional fields: “recognized area[s] of expertise or activity” (Green, Babb, and Alpaslan 2008:42) that provide meaning for the individuals and organizations that compose them (Scott 2008b). As Barley (2010:780) explains, institutional fields include sets of organizations that are embedded in “a social system or network with a purpose.”¹⁴ A central premise of the neoinstitutional perspective is that the relatively durable

¹⁴ While the neoinstitutional conceptualization of field has a notable affinity with that offered by Pierre Bourdieu (DiMaggio and Powell 1991), the conceptualization of an institutional field as ‘a social system or network with a purpose’ (Barley 2010) differs from Bourdieu’s conceptualization of fields as spaces inherently characterized by “conflict and competition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:17, emphasis in
elements of social life that influence thought, action, and identity are institutionalized at the societal and institutional field levels (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The perspective is inherently multilevel (see Figure 1-1) as individual and collective actors are discernibly “nested” within progressively higher levels of analysis (Friedland and Alford 1991). Though empirical efforts grounded in a neoinstitutional theoretical framework may focus on one level of analysis or another, the perspective does not privilege any one level, but rather is concerned with the interactions between them.

**Figure 1-1. A Multilevel Model of Institutional Fields**

Adapted from Scott (2008b:192)

This is not to suggest that conflict and competition are not present or even prevalent in institutional fields (to include that of the armed forces), but as described by Barley (2010) they are, by definition, structured to accomplish some end. I thus do not offer an explicitly Bourdieusian account in this dissertation.
As visually depicted in Figure 1-1, neoinstitutional scholars are interested in the dynamic and complex relationships between individuals, organizations, and institutional fields, as each is understood to be influenced by and coercive of the others. By their very presence, institutional fields—each characterized by a distinct structural, normative, and symbolic order (Thornton and Ocasio 1999)—are often presumed to be relatively formidable socializing, sanctioning, and imposing social forces. Prominent organizational theorist W. Richard Scott (2008b), however, underscores the reality that through invention and negotiation, indeed, through institutional work, organizations and individual actors are influential forces in shaping the very character of the broader fields of which they are a part. As Friedland and Alford (1991:254) meaningfully observe, “[s]ometimes rules and symbols are internalized and result in almost universal conformity, but sometimes they are resources manipulated by individuals, groups, and organizations.”

Though neoinstitutional theory has matured considerably in the more than three decades since its inception (discussed in Chapter 2), scholars continue to note that theoretical advances and emergent perspectives bring with them new questions and new directions for scholarly research.¹⁵ As I describe in the following section (and imply with the title of this chapter), this dissertation is thus not only motivated by the empirical questions described above, but also theoretically motivated to meaningfully contribute to neoinstitutional theory by responding to observed gaps in the literature to date. In the subsection that follows, I describe the theoretical gaps—those ‘paths less taken’—that are addressed by my empirical analysis reported herein.

Theoretical Motivations: Paths Less Taken

Early work in the neoinstitutional tradition emphasized the role of powerful isomorphic forces at the institutional field level (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1977). These studies offered compelling explanations of homogeneity among organizations embedded within broader institutional fields, yet were often criticized for an inability to explain heterogeneity and change (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Friedland and Alford 1991; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). The research agenda spurred by these criticisms thus began to take seriously the role of individuals and organizations in shaping their institutional environments. As various lines of inquiry developed in response, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) introduced the institutional work perspective to provide a framework within which the disconnected, yet theoretically aligned bodies of research that were emerging could serve the shared research agenda of explaining the role of effort and intentionality in processes of institutional change and stability. The primary focus of attention to date, however, has been on the creation and maintenance of institutional arrangements at the expense of affording adequate attention to practices aimed at disrupting those that prevail (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009). Moreover, Hirsch and Bermiss (2009) have suggested that much of the research efforts spurred by the perspective may be more damaging than helpful for the perspective’s future as scholars all-too-often narrowly focus on practices associated with the creation, maintenance, or disruption of institutional arrangements. Such efforts, they contend, may overlook the complexities with which actors creatively engage with their institutional environments. Indeed, in their analysis of the Czech Republic’s transition from a communist to capitalist society, they identify the presence of maintenance-focused institutional work in support of the broader change project. Additionally, they demonstrate that “[n]ew rules cannot be established [created] independent of the
deinstitutionalization [disruption] of what preceded them” (p. 280). I thus aim in this dissertation to explore not only efforts aimed at the creation of a distinctly post-Cold War force, but give equal consideration to efforts that reflect maintenance and disruption, and consider the relationships between them.

While the institutional work perspective holds much promise for neoinstitutional analyses of change, it is notable that it has emerged alongside, yet rarely aligned with, the institutional logics perspective. In their recent “primer” on the institutional logics perspective, Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012) describe its central tenet in the following manner: “the interests, identities, values, and assumptions of individuals and organizations are embedded within prevailing institutional logics” (p. 6)—that is, “frames of reference” that distinguish “unique organizing principles, practices, and symbols” (p. 2). These logics, however, are not all-powerful guides of social life, but rather socially constructed arrangements that are open for elaboration by individuals and organizations (Friedland and Alford 1991). As socially constructed, institutional logics are thus products of actions and reactions (i.e., institutional work). Though rarely treated as such in the literature, the institutional logics and institutional work perspectives are complimentary (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). With ‘unique organizing principles, practices, and symbols,’ I understand the Cold War and post-Cold War forces in the U.S. to have different ‘frames of reference,’ or institutional logics.16 In analyzing the institutional work associated with the transition from one field-level logic to another, I thus contribute to recent calls for scholars to bring these perspectives together in an effort to advance neoinstitutional theory more generally (Gawer and Phillips 2013; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012).

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16 Key distinctions between the Cold War and post-Cold War institutional logics are described in detail in Chapter 3.
Though the neoinstitutional perspective is inherently multilevel, the majority of research efforts to date have focused on the institutional field level of analysis. The emergent body of research has thus been criticized for “defocaliz[ing] individual organizations and the developmental, adaptive, and integrative work that needs to be done by their existing elites” (Kraatz 2009:70, emphasis added). Though it has been demonstrated that the structural, normative, and symbolic dimensions of institutional fields that prevail “rely” on (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006), “depend” on (Gawer and Phillips 2013), and in fact “require” (Dorado 2005) supportive actions at more local levels of analysis, theoretical and empirical attention to date has under-emphasized practices and processes occurring intra-organizationally, privileging instead inter-organizational dynamics and institutional field-level processes. I thus heed Suddaby’s (2010:18) call for institutional scholars to shift their attention from outside to inside organizations and “consider closely the possibility that organizations are much more sophisticated managers of symbolic resources than organizational theory presently admits to.” In a manner similar to Gawer and Phillips (2013:1036) in their recent analysis of Intel Corporation’s role in shaping the computer industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s, I thus focus herein on a single organization—the U.S. Army—whose senior leaders engaged in deliberate efforts to both “participate externally in” and “respond internally to” the dramatic changes taking shape in the field of the armed forces in the Cold War’s immediate aftermath.

While responding to these ‘paths less taken,’ this dissertation upholds the contention that institutional work is largely discursive (Bean 2011; Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2011; Suddaby 2010; Zilber 2009). With the key defining characteristics of institutional work being effort and intentionality, analyses of the rhetorical properties of discourse, explorations of the extent to which talk and text is “calculated to influence an audience toward some end” (Gill and
Whedbee 1997:157, emphasis added), are well-suited to contribute to the development of the institutional work perspective. Drawing on the very definition of discourse, I thus analyzed for this dissertation a “structured collection of meaningful texts” (Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004:636), paying close attention to their rhetorical properties and exploring the links between them.

CASE STUDY: INSTITUTIONAL WORK IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1991-1995

With a distinct area of expertise and shared patterns of interactions, flows of information, governance systems, and organizational archetypes providing well-defined roles and organizational templates—all key aspects of fields (Scott 2008b)—a state’s armed forces represent a recognizable institutional field.17 As Black (2002:34) observes, “[t]here is no ready availability outside the state militaries of the skills and training necessary for modern advanced aerial, naval, and land combat operations.”18 As measured by manpower, at the Cold War’s end the Army was the largest of those forces that compose the U.S. military—the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps—with 36.2 percent of the nation’s total active duty military personnel

17 Title 10 of “The Code of Laws of the United States of America” (Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives 2011:11) officially defines the nation’s ‘armed forces’ as “the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard”; however, my reference to the ‘field of the armed forces’ in this dissertation draws attention to the broader social system to which they belong. With institutional fields including “producers of specific tools or raw materials, purveyors of specialized expertise, quality controllers, regulators, standard setters, and so on” (Barley 2010:795), I treat the individual service branches as ‘purveyors of specialized expertise’ that are but one component of the institutional field. Moreover, I use the terms ‘armed forces’ and ‘military establishment’ interchangeably to identify the field I analyzed as the U.S. military has been broadly defined to include not only the individual service branches, but also Reserve and National Guard components, independent support organizations such as the Association of the United States Army, and other “entities… whose functions concern the use of arms to defend [the] nation state or to further its policies” (Siebold 2001:140).

and 39.4 percent of the defense civilian workforce in 1991 (see Table 1-1). While those percentages (inflated due to the nation’s commitments in Desert Storm in that year) decreased across time, the Army maintained the largest force among the services as the field settled into a post-Cold War era defense posture. Additionally, military scholars observe that of all the service branches, it was the Army whose identity, culture, and practices—all firmly rooted in principles of large-scale war—were most significantly called into question when the Cold War drew to a close (Builder 1989; Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995; Taw and Leicht 1992). In light of these observations, I analyzed the institutional work engaged in by the Army’s senior leadership to explore the ways in which the joint force community’s largest and senior member (Echevarria 2005) ‘participated externally in’ and ‘responded internally to’ the changes taking shape in the early years of the post-Cold War era. Specifically, I analyzed various textual materials produced or circulated during General Gordon R. Sullivan’s tenure as U.S. Army Chief of Staff from June 1991 to June 1995.19

Table 1-1. Percent of Total Active Duty Military Personnel and (Defense Civilian Workforce) by Military Service Branch, 1991-1995a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navyb</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>36.2 (39.4)</td>
<td>28.5 (35.5)</td>
<td>25.5 (25.1)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>33.8 (39.0)</td>
<td>30.0 (36.1)</td>
<td>26.0 (25.0)</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>33.6 (37.6)</td>
<td>29.9 (36.5)</td>
<td>26.1 (25.9)</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>33.6 (37.6)</td>
<td>29.1 (36.1)</td>
<td>26.5 (26.3)</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>33.5 (38.0)</td>
<td>28.7 (35.5)</td>
<td>26.4 (26.5)</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trask and Goldberg (1997)

a Excludes full time National Guard and Reservists, and non-military defense agencies and other civilians.
b Navy and Marine Corps defense civilian workforce percentages are combined, as reported in the original source.

19 The data I analyzed are described in detail in Chapter 4.
In the highly bureaucratic context of the U.S. Army, it has been observed that true transformations of the force have occurred only when the organization’s senior leadership was able to “decide on a way ahead, wrap up debate, and market the transformation inside the Army and out” (Brown 2011:17). Indeed, multiple senior leaders involved with the transition toward a post-Cold War force likened the change process to a military campaign (Sullivan and Harper 1996). As one commanding general involved with the process noted in 1992: “It’s almost like laying out a campaign, so you have your structure, your battles and engagements all leading to the final objective.” This suggestion clearly involves the defining characteristics of institutional work: effort (as ‘battles and engagements’ are fought) and intentionality (as there is a desired ‘final objective’ to be reached). I thus report in this dissertation my findings from an analysis of a collection of texts well-suited to expose the institutional work engaged in by the Army’s senior leaders as they ‘decided on a way ahead, wrapped up debate, and marketed the transformation inside the Army and out.’

In light of the discursive nature of ‘debate,’ ‘marketing,’ and institutional work in general (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006), I address the following primary research question in this dissertation:

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What discursive practices were employed by the U.S. Army’s senior leadership in the early years of the ‘campaign’ to replace the uniquely Cold War institutional logic with a distinctly post-Cold War logic?

In the process of answering this question, I explore and describe how institutional work carried out at the organizational level of analysis has implications for the broader institutional field to which the organization belongs.

**CONCLUSION**

While this dissertation is motivated by a general interest in the U.S. military’s transition to a post-Cold War force and a commitment to advance emergent neoinstitutional theoretical perspectives, it should not be lost on the reader that its empirical context is one that has far-reaching social and individual consequences. As Feaver (2003) notes, U.S. military service organizations—their structure and guiding principles, the emergence of which constitute the focus of this dissertation—and their senior leaders influence decisions to commit U.S. troops in combat and noncombat operations across the globe. Once committed, “[m]ilitary organizations… determine who will live and die, and how, who will be honored, and who will sit on the sidelines” (Rosen 1991:19). Moreover, as Robert Gates (2014:82) remarked in his memoir describing his time as Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Department of Defense has “programs and spending [that] reach deeply into every state and nearly every community. Vast industries and many local economies are dependent on decisions made in the Pentagon every day.” The practices I observed and describe herein were thus engaged in by actors who had a marked and moral interest, to quote General Gordon R. Sullivan, in not getting the structural and cultural foundations of the field “too badly wrong” for fear that doing so may lead to a future generation
of soldiers paying the ultimate price.\textsuperscript{22} As suggested in the quote provided at the outset of this chapter, it was getting it ‘too badly wrong’ that led to Pickett’s corps being “mown down by the thousands before they reached the copse of trees at Gettysburg” and “the flower of a generation of the British Empire’s finest lost in the course of a few summer days along the Somme” (Dunn 1991:16). Though the question analyzed here is not whether the changes that were realized were ‘right’ or ‘badly wrong’ (though some armed with hindsight will surely have much to say on this matter), it must not be forgotten that for those leading the change process there was an inexorable demand from the nation that they not sow “the seeds of disaster.”\textsuperscript{23}

In addition to not casting judgment on the changes that occurred, I do not claim to track in this dissertation a change process from start to finish. Indeed, the U.S. military, despite (and as a result of) spending more than a decade at war, is still developing unique forms, practices, and meanings for a post-Cold War world (Gerras and Wong 2013; Johnsen 2014)—that is, developing a distinctly post-Cold War logic. Whether current actions reflect the creation, maintenance, or disruption (or any combination thereof) of the post-Cold War logic as described herein is a question worthy of attention, yet beyond the scope of this dissertation. Or, perhaps with hindsight, scholars will distinguish between two or more military logics between 1991 and the time at which I am writing. C.V. Wedgwood (1967:35) was certainly correct in observing that “[h]istory is lived forwards but it is written in retrospect.” Nonetheless, I accept her charge,


\textsuperscript{23} The phrase quoted here is in reference to the book \textit{The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939} (Doughty 1985). In an oral history interview for the U.S. Army Military History Institute, General Sullivan stated that Doughty’s book had a strong influence on how he approached the change process (see Dabrowski 2008).
and attempt herein to “recapture what it was to know the beginning only” (an impossible, yet worthy task) (p. 35). The findings I describe in the following chapters thus reflect institutional work engaged in by influential actors at the beginning of a change process for which the outcome was not yet settled.

With a focus on institutional work—effort and intentionality—I do not attempt in this dissertation to explain the reasons for the Army senior leadership’s enactment of the change process described herein. To be sure, there are a variety of reasons for which the Army’s leaders may have sought to change the institutional logic that guided organizational thought, action, and identity in the Cold War’s wake: a sincere commitment to providing the nation a well-prepared Army, a perceived need to compete with government agencies or private organizations in markets other than warfighting (such as humanitarian assistance), a desire to establish a personal legacy, or the competition for congressionally-allocated resources, to name just a few. While the question of ‘why’ is credible, it is beyond the scope of my focus on ‘how.’ This dissertation is thus not about the motivation to enact change, but rather the practices that bring it about.

With a focus on the efforts enacted by the Army’s senior uniformed leaders, this dissertation addresses the institutional work carried out by organizational elites. My data do not reveal the extent to which the efforts I identified were successful in consolidating a new institutional logic, but rather reveal the dynamic and complex character of institutional work carried out by those organizational leaders whose efforts are noted to be key mechanisms in institutional change processes (Kraatz 2009). The findings I report in this dissertation are thus less concerned with institutionalization as a condition—that is, an outcome—than with elaborating our understanding of senior organizational leaders’ attempts to institutionalize—that is, institutionalization as a process.
In the chapter that follows, I provide an in-depth review of neoinstitutional theory, paying particularly close attention to the institutional work and institutional logics perspectives. Additionally, I describe the theoretical foundations of the discursive approach to organizational analysis on which I draw in this dissertation. In Chapter 3, I describe in greater detail the empirical case of interest. After describing the ways in which the post-Cold War institutional logic differs from those of earlier eras, I highlight the discursive dimensions of organizational change in the Army. In so doing, I demonstrate how U.S. Army doctrine and doctrinal development provides an advantageous focal point for addressing the broader empirical and theoretical interests expressed in this introductory chapter. I conclude Chapter 3 by offering the general research questions I address in the final chapters of this dissertation. I then describe in Chapter 4 the data I analyzed and qualitative research methods employed.

In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, I report the findings from my analysis. Chapters 5 and 6 detail institutional work practices I identify as ‘Environment Work’ and ‘Organizational Identity Work,’ respectively—efforts engaged in by the Army’s senior leaders to establish an organizational context conducive to change. In chapter 7, I describe the discursive practices engaged in by the Army’s senior leaders to develop, textualize, and entrench a proto-institutional logic—that is, a distinct set of principles, practices and symbols that differs from that which previously prevailed, but one that is proposed and only a candidate for institutionalization (Zietsma and McKnight 2009). Through identifying, in these three chapters, the Army senior leadership’s dynamic engagement with organizationally internal and external stakeholders, legitimate macro-level discourses, and various organizationally and institutionally meaningful texts, my analysis

\[24\] Zietsma and McKnight (2009) refer in their work to “proto-institutions” as candidates for institutionalization. With my interest in institutional logics, I incorporate “logics” into their suggestion, but understand their general observation to be compatible with the one I endorse in this dissertation.
provides unique insights into complex institutional change processes. I thus conclude this dissertation by proposing in Chapter 8 an organization-centric model of institutional change that foregrounds organizational activities, as opposed to institutional outcomes. Describing this model and identifying the limitations of this dissertation, I provide in the concluding chapter directions for future research efforts that take as their focus of analysis either the theoretical orientation or empirical interest described in this introductory chapter.
CHAPTER 2

‘LOGICS’ FROM ‘WORK’: TOWARD A MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY AND CHANGE

In his influential work *Administrative Behavior*, Herbert A. Simon ([1945] 1997:7) observed that “[t]he organization… takes from the individual some of his decisional autonomy, and substitutes for it an organization decision-making process.” Nearly six decades later, Patricia Thornton (2004) relies on a similar proposition. Specifically, she states that “[i]nstitutional logics, once they become dominant, affect the decisions of organizations… by focusing the attention of executives toward the set of issues and solutions that are consistent with the dominant logic and away from those issues and solutions that are not” (p. 13). Where Simon ([1945] 1997) focused on the local, organizational level of analysis, reflective of the “old institutionalism” in organization studies, Thornton (2004) centers her attention on the constraining and enabling characteristics of wider institutional environments that are the primary focus of what has come to be termed the “new institutionalism” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). This neoinstitutional approach has provided novel insight into the processes through which organizational embeddedness within institutional environments shapes thought, action, and identity at the organizational and individual levels of analysis. More recently, neoinstitutional scholars have tended to the reality that institutional environments are themselves the products of individual and collective action occurring at the meso and micro (i.e., organizational and individual) levels of analysis. As an emergent theoretical approach, however, neoinstitutional scholars continue to note that much remains under-analyzed and under-theorized (e.g., Gawer and Phillips 2013; Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2011; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012; Van Gestel and
Hillebrand 2011; Yu 2013; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010). As noted in Chapter 1, this dissertation thus addresses some of the observed gaps in this literature to date.

In this chapter, I first describe the maturation of neoinstitutional theory. Drawing on some of the lasting impressions of early work in the field, I then describe the emergent institutional logics and institutional work perspectives paying particularly close attention to the connections between them. Specifically, I incorporate the relationship between institutional logics and institutional work into the model of institutional change recently proposed by Ronald Jepperson and John W. Meyer (2011) to adequately account for the role of institutional work occurring at the organizational level of analysis in models of institutional logic stability and change. To conclude this chapter, I describe the applicability of discourse analysis to studies of institutional logics and institutional work to establish a foundation for the analytical focus of this dissertation.

NEOINSTITUTIONAL THEORY: FROM ISOMORPHISM AND STABILITY TO AGENCY AND CHANGE

In their highly influential work that helped spur the neoinstitutional approach in organizational analysis, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) proposed a set of mechanisms through which structural isomorphism (and ultimately field-level stability) occurs. Drawing on ecological theories, the researchers describe isomorphism as “a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (p. 149). For those scholars who embraced this perspective, organizations and the people who populate them were largely viewed as “passive” entities (Gondo and Amis 2013; Scott, Ruef, Mendell, and Caronna 2000) whose understandings of and responses to the world around them are shaped
by broader field-level environments—that is, the habits, classifications, routines, scripts, and schemas that comprise them (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The isomorphic mechanisms proposed—most notably those of mimetic and normative isomorphism (emphasizing conformity and un-reflexive behavior)—were quickly criticized for privileging structure over agency. As Thelen and Steinmo (1992:15) rightly note, with a focus on stability and organizational homogeneity, works in this tradition were able to “explain everything until they explain nothing.” Change, it was generally observed, posed a problem for the emergent perspective, which was premised on order and stability (Scott 2008b). To a notable degree, institutional theorists responded to such critiques by shifting their attention from the structural determinants of institutional stability to the agentic efforts associated with periods of disorder and change (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006).

In his introduction of the concept of institutional entrepreneurship, DiMaggio (1988:14) suggested that institutional arrangements “arise when organized actors with sufficient resources (institutional entrepreneurs) see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they highly value.” Some individual and collective actors, the perspective suggests, are motivated by relatively private interests and strategically calculative in their efforts to have specific institutional arrangements prevail (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006). Providing a means to reinsert agency where it had previously been left under- (if not un-) analyzed (Fligstein 1997), the concept of institutional entrepreneurship sparked a research program providing agentic, deliberate, and endogenous explanations of institutional change (Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum 2009). Though such analyses revealed much in the way of explanation for change, the perspective was criticized for evoking an imagery of institutional entrepreneurs as all-powerful and unchallenged (Hardy and Maguire 2008; Leca, Battilana, and Boxenbaum 2006). As Suddaby (2010:15)
suggests, with the rise of interest in institutional entrepreneurship, “[i]nstead of passive cultural
dopes, institutional theory now presents organizations as hypermuscular supermen, singlehanded
in their efforts to… transform organizational fields and alter institutional logics.” Aside from
demonstrating the institutional changes in need of explanation, the institutional context is often
relegated to the background in many empirical studies of institutional entrepreneurship, thus
leaving the institutional conditions and social context within which change takes place under-
analyzed and theoretical explanations of change incomplete (Friedland and Alford 1991;
Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012).

While the institutional entrepreneur concept has been criticized for privileging agency
over structure, the research program that emerged provided unique and lasting insights into the
agency involved in institutional processes. Though institutional entrepreneurs may not be the
relatively un-challenged “modern princes”\(^1\) suggested by some (Zietsma and McKnight 2009),
the increased focus on “interest-driven, aware, and calculative” efforts to create and maintain
social arrangements (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006:29) opened the door for observations of
more reflexive forms of agency that have the potential to shape institutional fields. It has thus
been suggested more recently that institutional change or persistence is largely the result of
‘social skill’ (Fligstein 1997).

Simply stated, institutional environments are produced by social actors who “attempt…
to create and sustain social worlds by securing the cooperation of others” (Fligstein and
McAdam 2012:17). In the process, such actors exercise social skill—that is, “tak[ing] the role of
the other,… reading people and environments, framing lines of action, and mobilizing people in

\(^1\) The phrase “modern princes” was drawn on by Zietsma and McKnight (2009) in their critique of the all-
powerful institutional entrepreneur imagery in response to an article published in the journal Organization
Studies titled “The Institutional Entrepreneur as Modern Prince: The Strategic Face of Power in Contested
Fields” (Levy and Scully 2007).
the service of broader conceptions of the world and of themselves” (p. 17). The suggestion that institutional arrangements are created and rendered stable through the exercise of reflexive and intentional social action aligns well with the observation that institutional arrangements endure not simply through inertia—through their very presence as was often argued in early works in the neoinstitutional tradition (Dobbin 1994)—but rather by remaining unchallenged (or in the least not successfully challenged) by individual and collective actors (Clemens and Cook 1999; Friedland and Alford 1991; Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009; Riaz, Buchanan, and Bapuji 2011; Scott 2008b). It is thus actions, and not the institutionalized forms, rules, roles, meanings and practices they legitimize, that explain persistence and change (Dobbin 1994; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Munir 2005; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). From this perspective, institutional arrangements persist when widely shared “rules and symbols are internalized and result in almost universal conformity,” but change is made possible when “rules and symbols… are resources manipulated by individuals, groups, and organizations” (Friedland and Alford 1991:254). This emergent focus of the neoinstitutional approach highlights the perspective’s social constructivist foundation (Munir 2005).

In their treatise on the social constructionist perspective, Berger and Luckmann (1966:61) suggest that “the institutional world requires legitimation.” In other words, the taken-for-granted elements of social life must be “‘explained’ and justified” if they are to persist (p. 61). In turn, change is made possible when these legitimizing discourses and the prevailing arrangements they justify are destabilized, and competing discourses and alternative arrangements are privileged (Hardy and Maguire 2010; Hargrave and Van de Ven 2009; Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004; Zietsma and McKnight 2009). The drivers of institutional change are thus not to be found in natural processes, but rather in actions that destabilize,
privilege, and legitimize prevailing or proposed institutional arrangements (Fligstein 1991; Munir 2005; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). Drawing, then, on the research efforts of entrepreneurship and social movement scholars, Silvia Dorado (2005:391) asserts that opportunities for institutional change “arise when individuals imagine them and persuade others to welcome them” (emphasis added). Institutional change relies in large measure on the successful mobilization of others in support of the change project—that is, the successful exercise of social skill.

As Neil Fligstein (1997) was proposing and defining the concept of social skill, Stephen Barley and Pamela Tolbert (1997) were considering the conditions within which the creative agency that the concept implies is most likely to occur. In this effort, they suggest that significant “contextual change is usually necessary before actors can assemble the resources and rationales that are necessary for collectively questioning scripted patterns of behavior” (p. 102)—that is, calling into question prevailing institutional arrangements. Contextually significant occurrences—whether termed ‘events’ (Sewell 1996), ‘shocks’ (Fligstein 1991), or ‘jolts’ (Meyer, Brooks, and Goes 1990) such as technological developments, regulatory changes, or social upheaval (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002)—thus figure prominently in many studies of institutional change (e.g. Boxenbaum 2004; Hoffman 1999; Munir 2005; Nigam and Ocasio 2010). These events, however, do not themselves bring change to the field, but rather the possibility for change as they “represent forks in the road” that may be interpreted by some individual and collective actors as “strategic opportunities” for the initiation of change-focused activities (Marquis, Huang, and Almandoz 2011:179; see also, Dorado 2005; Fligstein 1991; Munir 2005; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). It has thus been suggested that an adequate explanation of institutional change—to include changes that reflect seemingly
predictable responses to contextually dramatic events (Durant 2007; Munir 2005)—must not focus on institutional field-level outcomes, but rather on the process through which those outcomes are realized (Suddaby 2010). This suggestion lies at the heart of the emergent institutional logics (Friedland and Alford 1991) and institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) perspectives—complementary theoretical orientations that share an emphasis on practice (Gawer and Phillips 2013; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012).

‘LOGICS’ FROM ‘WORK’: TOWARD A MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF STABILITY AND CHANGE

Neoinstitutional theories of organization are inherently multi-level as they focus on the dynamic and complex relationships between organizations, the actors who populate them, and the wider fields to which they belong (Scott 2008b). The legitimacy, purpose, and goals of the organization, as well as the range of contextually appropriate activities available to organizations and their members, are understood to be informed by structural and cultural dimensions of the wider institutional environments in which they are embedded (Scott and Meyer 1994). Organizational and individual actors, however, not only adopt, but indeed adapt, the structural and cultural dimensions of these environments (Scott 1995). Lawrence and Suddaby (2006:219) thus contend that what is needed is a practice-oriented theoretical perspective—one that does not focus on a prescriptive sequence of events that result in some outcome or explain seemingly natural institutional lifecycles, but rather one that foregrounds the “activities of individuals and organizations… [that] effect those events and achieve that outcome.” As Battilana and D’Aunno

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2 In this chapter, I describe the theoretical foundation for a multi-level neoinstitutional approach to organizational analysis. In Chapter 3, I rely on the empirical case I analyzed to explain in more detail the institutional field as a level of analysis.
(2009) note, such an approach requires scholars to confront the “paradox of embedded agency” (Seo and Creed 2002)—the seeming “contradiction between actors’ agency and institutional determinism” (Battilana and D’Aunno 2009:32).

As noted above, early neoinstitutional theoretical approaches generally perceived of institutional fields as providing constraints on organization and action. The presumed outcome was generally one of organizational homogeneity and predictable individual responses as habits, routines, and schemas were presumably enacted by relatively passive recipients (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Acknowledging that the guiding principles within any given institutional sphere are subject to change—an observation early neoinstitutional theorists struggled to explain—Friedland and Alford (1991) introduced the institutional logics perspective suggesting that each institutional sphere of society is characterized by unique material and symbolic elements that both affect and are affected by actors. “Individual action,” the researchers contend, “can only be explained in societal context”—that is, as influenced by prevailing institutional logics—“but that context can only be understood through individual consciousness and behavior” (p. 242).

Drawing on the initial proposal of the concept by Friedland and Alford (1991), Thornton and Ocasio (1999:804) define institutional logics as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality.” From this description, the emergent perspective’s focus on action is evident as the structural, normative, and symbolic dimensions of a given social arena are noted to be ‘socially constructed’—that is produced through action and interaction (Berger and Luckmann 1966)—and enabling and constraining as they are used by individuals to ‘produce,’ ‘reproduce,’ ‘organize,’ and ‘provide.’ When the prevailing normative and cultural dimensions of a given
institutional context are internalized and *used* by individuals in stable and predictable ways, institutional logic reproduction is highly likely, but when the normative and cultural dimensions of the context are perceived as open for elaboration and *manipulated*, institutional logic change is made possible (Friedland and Alford 1991). A focus on how logics are constructed and used—manipulated and internalized—necessitates that scholarly attention be afforded the ways in which logics are “locally instantiated” (Berman 2012). What is needed, then, is a theoretical approach that explains the various ways in which dominant, non-dominant, prevailing, proposed, and competing institutional logics are experienced and enacted by organizational and individual actors within the field (Binder 2007; Lounsbury and Kaghan 2001; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). An adequate understanding of how institutional logics emerge, become influential, and change thus requires an adequate theory of agency (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, and Van de Ven 2009).

In their review of agency’s applicability to a practice-oriented theoretical approach to organization, Battilana and D’Aunno (2009:49) contend that “an actor’s engagement with the social world… [can], through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment… both reproduce and transform an environment’s structures.”³ Agency, and the activities it evokes, can take many forms and have differing effects on the environmental contexts in which it occurs or to which it is directed (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009). It is precisely these forms and their intended effects that are of interest to neoinstitutional scholars focusing on practice, as opposed to seemingly natural institutional lifecycles or unguided processes (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006).

³ This description of agency provided by Battilana and D’Aunno (2009) draws on the definition of human agency provided by Emirbayer and Mische (1998) whose specification of types of agency is discussed in detail below.
In their influential review of agency, Emirbayer and Mische (1998) distinguish between three dimensions: iterative, practical-evaluative, and projective agency. Each type reflects a different temporal orientation: past, present, and future, respectively. Iterative agency, involving “the selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action,” generally serves to maintain prevailing institutional arrangements as institutionally legitimate identities, roles, and practices—that is, the various dimensions of the prevailing institutional logic—are sustained (p. 971). With a focus on the present, however, practical-evaluative agency includes “the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action” in an effort to respond to dynamic and changing circumstances, periods of uncertainty, or novel experiences (p. 971). When engaging in practical-evaluative agency, actors consciously and selectively respond to emerging situations in ways that may reinforce habit by drawing on previously institutionalized practices and goals—the prevailing institutional logic—or enable change, as agents exercise their “capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment” (Battilana and D’Aunno 2009:47). With a future orientation, projective agency involves “the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action,” the prevailing institutional logic, “may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors’ hopes, fears, and desires for the future” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998:971). Projective agency may thus involve an attack on legitimate rules, roles, and practices, and even the creation of a proto-institution (Battilana and D’Aunno 2009)—“a particular set of institutional arrangements,” a distinct institutional logic, that is a “[candidate] for institutionalization, if only enough members of the field will adopt [it]” (Zietsma and McKnight 2009:148).
Through theorizing the various dimensions of agency, Emirbayer and Mische (1998) demonstrate that institutional contexts are not “iron cages” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) that place irreversible restrictions on thought and action. It is thus actors who enable institutional logic persistence through “reprod[ec]-[ing] behaviors consistent with existing institutional logics,” but also actors who “have the capacity to innovate and thus transform institutional logics” through more inventive and creative forms of agency (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012:4; see also Binder 2007; Friedland and Alford 1991; Gawer and Phillips 2013; Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, and Van de Ven 2009). Studies of institutional logics must, then, take seriously the contention that institutional contexts are “inhabited” (Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997) “by agentic, creative people, who have background knowledge and interests of different types” (Binder 2007). Studies of institutional logics must attend to the institutional work carried out by actors within the field (Gawer and Phillips 2013; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012).

As described by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006:215) in their introduction of the concept, institutional work refers to “the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting” institutional arrangements. Acknowledging the emergent, yet disparate bodies of literature exploring institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio 1988), institutional maintenance (Zucker 1988), and deinstitutionalization (Oliver 1992)—that is, efforts aimed at disrupting, delegitimitizing, and rejecting prevailing institutional arrangements—Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) sought to articulate a clear research agenda for a practice-oriented theoretical approach to institutional studies of organization. The institutional work perspective thus takes as its primary object of analysis the intentional efforts, or work, engaged in by

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individual and collective actors that are intended to have institutional effects, not the institutional effects themselves. Effort, however, “varies… in both degree and kind, and so suggests a range of forms of action we might consider as institutional work” (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009:15). This variety is reflected in the literature.

In her analysis of the use of stories in a rape crisis center in Israel, Zilber (2009) demonstrates how stories can function to maintain institutionalized meanings and practices, as meta-narratives at the institutional level are translated into more local stories at the organizational and individual levels of analysis, and vice versa. Riaz, Buchanan, and Bapuji (2011) observe that neutral positions or narratives on an issue or event can be relied on by influential actors to perpetuate prevailing institutional arrangements. Brown, Ainsworth, and Grant (2012) describe how an individual text—one that is contextually meaningful—can disrupt the institutional logic that prevails in a given field by championing an emergent and competing logic through the strategic incorporation of pathos (emotion-evoking rhetoric) and ethos (moralizing rhetoric). Further, Gawer and Phillips (2013) demonstrate how one organization’s actions intended to shape the organizational identities that are perceived as legitimate in a field can contribute to transformational change in the field’s institutional logic. Each of these studies, whether identifying the creation, maintenance, or disruption of institutional arrangements, responds to Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006:249) call for scholars “to break the dramatic spell of institutions and draw attention behind the scenes, to the actors, writers and stage-hands that produce them.” With a practice-orientation, however—with a focus on activities that are imbued with meaning (Selznick 1957)—Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) are careful to note that any analysis of institutional work must observe that the efforts being analyzed are socially situated. “[E]ven action which is aimed at changing the institutional order,” they state, “occurs within sets
of institutionalized rules” (p. 220). Institutional work, while influential in creating, maintaining, and disrupting prevailing institutional logics, is indeed shaped by prevailing and available institutional logics (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). Any model of institutional logic persistence or change must account, then, for various causal processes at multiple levels of analysis (Friedland and Alford 1991).

As noted above, institutional fields are “inhabited” (Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997) by organizations—“collective social actors’… [that] can take actions” (Scott 2003:7)—and “real people… with consequential past experiences of their own” (Binder 2007:568). Drawing on the recent work of Jepperson and Meyer (2011), I thus provide in Figure 2-1 a depiction of the various causal pathways through which field-internal dynamics may produce, reproduce, disrupt, or change prevailing institutional logics as they both influence and are produced by individual and collective actors in the field.

**Figure 2-1. A Multilevel Model of Institutional Logic Stability and Change**

Adapted from Jepperson and Meyer (2011)
In their review of social, macro-level causation, Jepperson and Meyer (2011:56) concede that “all causal social processes work through the behaviors and ideas of individual persons”—that is, through the micro-level of analysis. Nonetheless, they find conceptual models of macro-to-micro-to-macro causation\(^5\)—models of macro-social causation they note are common within sociological explanation today—to be incomplete. While a full overview of their critique of these models is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is worthy of note here that they identify a need for more explicit attention to be afforded the social-organizational level of analysis. Specifically, they contend that hierarchic and network formations, group values, organizational cultures, and other characteristics of social-organizational contexts often play a central role in explanations of macro-level stability and change. To exemplify their multi-level model of causal social processes, Jepperson and Meyer (2011) demonstrate how their model (adapted in Figure 2-1 here) can be applied to depict the primary claims made by Max Weber (1958) in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*—his analysis of the relationship between the rise of Protestantism and the emergence of a capitalist economic system. The macro-social changes Weber observed, they note, relied to a notable degree on altered religious and economic rules and roles within the more formal and complex organizational contexts in which individuals experienced and gave meaning to social life. Models of causation that move between the macro and micro levels of analysis only—models that privilege individual level responses to salvation anxiety and psychological impulses (e.g. Coleman 1986)—often ignore causal processes occurring at the organizational, meso-levels of observation in which economic and religious organizational roles and structures were transformed. Prevailing macro-to-micro-to-macro causation models, they thus suggest, are incomplete.

Where Jepperson and Meyer (2011) tailor their model to demonstrate the various pathways through which Protestantism influenced the emergence of capitalism, in a manner similar to Abell’s (2001:61) elaboration of models of causality I incorporate “an evolving time signature” into the model (see Figure 2-1). While one may be interested in applying the model to demonstrate causation across institutional fields (such as from religion to an economic system in the case of *The Protestant Ethic* (Weber 1958)), my interest herein is in explaining institutional logic change and stability within a single field across time. In Figure 2-1, I thus tailor the model provided by Jepperson and Meyer (2011) to demonstrate the potential pathways through which the logic that prevails in a given field may be maintained or disrupted through distinct causal relationships working through the organizational and individual levels of analysis across time. These pathways provide entry points for studies of institutional work.

As depicted in Figure 2-1, institutional logics emerge and become influential at the institutional field level; however, the institutional environment “is never completely fixed” (Greenwood et al. 2011:318). Indeed, prior research has demonstrated that even when a single and distinct institutional logic prevails in a given field, previously dominant logics persist as “legacies” (e.g. Hirsch and Bermiss 2009; Reay and Hinings 2005, 2009); elements of prevailing logics from other institutional fields and social spheres may influence thought and action (e.g. Berman 2012; Thornton 2004); and the “flotsam and jetsam” of incomplete institutional change projects and paths less taken often remain available and accessible to individual and collective actors within the field (Schneiberg 2007:48). As such, neoinstitutional scholars have borrowed Swidler’s (1986) repertoire approach to culture, suggesting that the presence of “multiple and competing versions of institutionalized belief systems” (Scott 1991:169) provide individual and collective actors with “a symbolic grammar [that] can be drawn upon as if from a toolkit”
(Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbry 2012:135). In the model proposed above, I thus include at t₀ a reference to ‘institutional logic(s)’ to encapsulate all perceivable “principles of organization and action” (Thornton 2004:2). Moreover, I include the same at t₁, as the actions occurring in the interim may very well make logic variability publically comprehensible or close off such perceptions. It is precisely these actions that are of interest in a study of institutional work.

Of primary interest in a study of institutional work are those efforts that are intended to (1) affect the institutional logic(s) in the field directly, and (2) shape the organizational forms, rules, roles, practices, networks, values, etc. that (as depicted in the model provided above) are (a) themselves institutionally influential, and (b) coercive of the attitudes, values, beliefs, and perceptions of other field-level actors who then act and behave in desired ways. As suggested by the inclusion of a temporal element in Figure 2-1, these efforts of ‘institutional workers’ are capable of—though certainly not always successful in—reinforcing or altering the institutional logic(s) that influence organizational forms and practices, and individual attitudes and actions in the future. Through the exercise of iterative, practical-evaluative, and projective agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998), ‘institutional workers’ may, to borrow from W. Richard Scott and his colleagues, enable institutional logic change as they enlist field-level actors to “not only do things differently…[but] do different things” through enacting “shifts in the values that orient, guide, and motivate behavior” at both the organizational and institutional field levels (Scott, Ruef, Mendell, and Caronna 2000:349). Such ‘shifts’ rely on the active construction of new forms or practices as appropriate via “a significant and deliberate discursive effort” (Gondo and Amis 2013:237).

A DISCURSIVE APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL WORK
Acknowledging the central role of discourse in processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006:239) note, in their introduction of the perspective, that “institutional work is often-language centered.” Moreover, as Brown et al. (2012:299) observe, “institutional logics are encoded in discourses.” With a focus on the practice-orientation of language, Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012:150) thus contend that “[l]anguage… provides a critical linchpin by which institutional logics are constructed and meanings and practices are brought together” (emphasis added). With an explicit focus on the dynamic relationship between institutional logics and institutional work, I thus rely herein on a discourse-centered approach to enhance neoinstitutional explanations of change and explore the empirical context of interest—the U.S. military’s transition from a uniquely Cold War logic to a distinctly post-Cold War logic.

As described by Bean (2011:20), a discourse-centered approach to organizational analysis focuses on exploring “patterns in the production, distribution, and consumption of texts to understand processes of stability and change within organizations and institutions.” A study of institutional work, he contends, necessitates an analysis of the talk and text that is used by stakeholders to effect some outcome. With a focus on the ways in which talk and text is “political and persuasive” (Symon 2008:79), analyses of the rhetorical properties of discourse are suggested to be well-suited for studies of institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). As summed by Suddaby and Greenwood (2005:8), such an analysis “restricts its focus to explicitly political or interest laden discourse and seeks to identify recurrent patterns of interests, goals, and shared assumptions that become embedded in persuasive texts,” whether written, spoken, or presented by some other means. It has thus been observed that institutional change is often the result of the selective and strategic deployment of language—the result of persuasive discursive
strategies (e.g. Brown, Ainsworth, and Grant 2012; Green, Babb, and Alpaslan 2008; Heracleous and Barrett 2001; Vaara and Tienari 2008).

In their oft-cited work, Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy (2004:635) contend that institutions—and as I suggest here, institutional logics—“can be understood as products of the discursive activity that influences action.” A focus on ‘activity’ renders their understanding of institutionalization processes amenable to studies of institutional work. Their focus on ‘discursive’ activity calls the attention of institutional work scholars to those “structured collections of meaningful texts” (p. 636)—that is, the discourse—that ‘rules in’ certain ways of talking about a topic, defining an acceptable and intelligible way to… conduct oneself… [and] ‘rules out,’ limits and restricts other ways of talking, of conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge about it” (Hall 2001:72).6 In assuming a discursive approach to institutional analyses, they propose a model of institutional persistence and change that focuses on the recursive relationship between actions, texts, discourse, and institutions. Their model, adapted to reflect my interest in institutional logics, is provided in Figure 2-2.

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6 Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy (2004) note that there are multiple conceptualizations of discourse in the academic literature (an ongoing debate that is beyond the scope of this dissertation), but draw on Hall’s (2001) description provided here to situate their understanding. Similarly, I accept the central premise that discourses not only describe things, but they accomplish things as well.
Figure 2-2. A Discursive Model of Institutional Logic (Re)Production

Adapted from Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy (2004)

With a focus on actions, Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy (2004) pay particularly close attention to those actions that foreground distinct issues, interests, identities, and practices through the production and distribution of contextually salient texts. To be sure, those actors involved with processes of institutionalization engage in various actions—various forms of institutional work—as they “meet, argue, make claims, define options, conduct studies, tell stories, and generate discursive output” (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006:210, emphasis added). The ‘discursive output’ of primary interest to Phillips et al. (2004:640), however, are not those texts that are “localized, limited, and inconsequential,” but rather those texts that “leave traces and… act as organizing mechanisms” (Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004:640). Drawing on an extensive body of organizational communication research, they contend that some texts—by virtue of the perceived legitimacy of their producer, connection to convention through form and style (the text’s genre), and links to other perceptibly legitimate texts and well-established discourses—are more likely than others to be ‘taken up’ and embedded in broader discourses and social constructions. It is these discourses—those shaped by existing and meaningful texts—that influence the production of the structural, normative, and symbolic dimensions of organizational
contexts and institutional fields. Through the generation of salient texts, some actors are able to influence the discourse that ‘rules in’ certain ways of thinking, talking, and acting, and ‘rules out’ others. Those actions that generate contextually meaningful texts, however, are constrained and enabled by various dimensions of prevailing institutional logics. Munir (2005:94) is certainly correct in observing that actions and the contextually meaningful circumstances and events to which they respond “figure in an already developing narrative.” The discursive model of institutionalization provided by Phillips et al. (2004) (see Figure 2-2) thus aligns well with the model of institutional logic persistence and change proposed above (see Figure 2-1) in which institutional logics notably constrain and enable, but are also produced by, actors. The discourse-centered theoretical approach proposed by Phillips et al. (2004) and endorsed by others thus provides an analytical focus of attention for the study of institutional logic change presented herein.

CONCLUSION

As Denzin ([1970] 1989) suggests, research projects are undeniably influenced by theoretical commitments. As will become evident in my description of the empirical focus of this dissertation (in Chapter 3) and of the sampling strategy and analytical methods employed (in Chapter 4), the theoretical orientations described above guided my practices and observations throughout the research process. In this respect, this dissertation provides an ‘instrumental case study’—one focused on the refinement of existing or emergent theory through the analysis of a single case (Stake 1998). It must be noted, then, that the neoinstitutional theoretical orientation described in this chapter thus does work itself, as it ‘rules in’ certain empirical interests and
methodological considerations, and ‘rules out’ others. This, however, reflects the utility of instrumental case studies.

Simply stated, “[a] researcher’s treatment of a historical episode must be selectively focused in accordance with the type of theory that the investigator is attempting to develop” (George and Bennett 2005:70). It is precisely the application of theoretical constructs to explain the ‘historical episode’ of interest that allows the researcher “to grasp some essential aspect of social life that is not given up easily by the facts” (Reed 2011:18). Accepting that discursive institutional work constitutes an ‘essential aspect of social life’—one that establishes ‘settled’ or ‘unsettled’ lives, to borrow from prominent sociological theorist Ann Swidler (1986)—I thus focus in this dissertation on applying neoinstitutional theoretical constructs to the U.S. Army’s role in the transition of the nation’s military establishment from a Cold War to post-Cold War institutional logic.
CHAPTER 3
FROM FORCE TO FORCES: TOWARD A U.S. ARMY FOR A POST-COLD WAR WORLD

Quoting Machiavelli, Rosen (1991:1) begins his analysis of twentieth-century military innovation and organizational change by suggesting that “there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.” The suggestion that significant change is ‘initiated,’ ‘carried out,’ and ‘handled’ supports the observation that “[m]ilitary revolutions are the purposeful creations of people” (O’Hanlon 2000:24; see also Builder 1989; Nielsen 2010). As with significant change in any institutional sphere, revolutionary change in the field of the armed forces is not determined by fate or even rationality, as many contemporary observers may be wont to suggest (Dobbin 1994; Durant 2007), but rather action (Corum 1992; Johnson 2000; Nielsen 2010; Watts and Murray 1996; Winton 2000). In the institutional field of the armed forces, the replacement of one institutional logic with another requires institutional work.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, institutional work carried out at the meso, organizational level, can have highly influential field-level effects. The actions taken by and occurring within organizations shape the availability and authority of institutional logics (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012, see also Figure 2-2, Chapter 2 of this dissertation). As Carl Builder (1989) observes, this is particularly true in the field of the U.S. armed forces as dramatic changes in military theory, practice, and structure are only made possible when military organizations—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—endorse and actively pursue them. In other words, the institutional logic that guides thought, action, and identity in the field of the armed forces changes when military organizations and the actors who compose them
engage in institutional work. To adequately understand the complex dynamics of change in the context of the contemporary American military, Farrell and Terriff (2002a) thus suggest that the analyst look within these organizations—within those organizational entities that both “respond internally to” and “participate externally in” institutional change processes (Gawer and Phillips 2013:1036). I thus focus herein on the U.S. Army’s participation in, and response to, the ‘incontestable’ (Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000) ‘fundamental transformation’ (Moskos and Burk 1994) of the nation’s military in the Cold War’s wake—the military establishment’s transition from a distinctly Cold War to uniquely post-Cold War force.

As the U.S. military establishment’s oldest service branch, largest organization at the dawn of the post-Cold War era (Trask and Goldberg 1997), and the service branch whose goals, culture and organization were most significantly called into question with the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union (Builder 1989; Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995; Taw and Leicht 1992), the U.S. Army serves as an organizational context ripe for analysis. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, senior Army leaders initiated efforts to reshape the organization into “something qualitatively different” from what it had become during the Cold War era (Sullivan and Harper 1996:148). Moreover, and of notable interest here, the Army’s senior uniformed leaders were keenly aware of the role of discourse in the change process. As stated in a first-hand account of the Army’s initiation of the transition toward a uniquely post-Cold War force, the Army’s most senior uniformed leader—Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan—stated that “[i]n the military... concept and intent must be clearly and unambiguously stated and then emphasized, over and over and over” (Sullivan and Harper

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1 The reference to size here regards personnel. See Table 1-1 (Chapter 1) for a size comparison between branches of the U.S. military, to include active duty and defense civilian workforce personnel, from 1991 to 1995.
1996:107; italics in original). In the process of transforming the organization, the Army’s most senior leaders thus “used all the means of communication [they] could” to include “videos, newspaper and magazine articles, conferences and meetings, speeches, and even letters” (p. 164)—indeed, “the entire communications spectrum” (p. 173)—to foster support from both internal and external stakeholders. To the degree that these efforts were intended to foster a transformation of the force and a collective redefinition of the Army’s role in national security, they reflect institutional work. To the extent that the changes taking shape occurred alongside transformative efforts in the other service branches (Owens 2002) and at more senior levels of decision making (Snider 1993) in which “ideas about how [the military] should be organized and what [it] should do were fundamentally transformed” (Moskos and Burk 1994:142), the changes reflect the transition from one institutional logic to another in the institutional field of the armed forces.

In the section that follows, I explain my conceptualization of the nation’s armed forces as an institutional field. I then describe the three distinct eras of U.S. military organization and culture in the twentieth century identified by military scholars—distinctions I understand to reflect unique institutional logics. After describing the military paradigm that characterized the Cold War era, I describe the ‘incontestable’ cultural and structural changes to the field of the armed forces taking shape in the Cold War’s wake (Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000). To demonstrate the role of agency and institutional work in processes of institutional logic maintenance and change, I then describe the efforts of senior Army leaders that were intended to maintain the Cold War logic in the wake of the Vietnam War and replace it after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the process, I demonstrate the central role of Army doctrine in these
processes. In conclusion, I provide the general research questions that guide the research reported in the remaining chapters of this dissertation.

**CONCEPTUALIZING ARMED FORCES AS AN INSTITUTIONAL FIELD**

In the previous chapter, I provided an overview of the neoinstitutional perspective on which I draw in this dissertation. Thus far, I have demonstrated the multi-level focus of this maturing theoretical approach, but provided little detail with regard to what, precisely, constitutes an institutional field. I elaborate on the concept here, drawing on the field of the U.S. armed forces.

As Stephen Barley (2010:780) explains, an institutional field is an assemblage of organizations “and the relations that embed [them]… into a social system or network with a purpose.” Institutional fields may be organized to create and provide, for example, information, entertainment, products, or services. Regardless of the field’s ‘purpose,’ however, institutional fields are generally structured social spaces which have their own guiding institutional logic (though certainly not always characterized by a single monolithic logic) (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). Indeed, the concept of ‘field’ “connotes the existence of a community of organizations that partake of a common meaning system” (Scott, as cited in Scott et al. 2000:13).

As a ‘community of organizations,’ Barley (2010:795) states that fields are populated by organizations that “play unique roles, such as producers of specific tools or raw materials, purveyors of specialized expertise, quality controllers, regulators, standard setters, and so on.” In the institutional field of the U.S. armed forces, the individual service branches—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—constitute the ‘purveyors of specialized expertise’ that are central to the field. To be sure, these organizations serve a shared purpose as they constitute those
entities that are “responsive to the governmental leaders heading a nation state… and whose functions concern the use of arms to defend the nation state or to further its policies” (Siebold 2001:140). As the notion of field suggests, however, these organizations are but one set of actors that serve this purpose. For example, hierarchical relationships and governance systems within the federal government and Department of Defense have been established to formalize the roles and reach of ‘quality controllers,’ ‘regulators,’ and ‘standard setters’ that influence the service branches and other actors within the field. With notable connections to the industrial sector, various ‘producers of specific tools’ are situated firmly within the field of the armed forces as corporations and industries maintain distinct network ties with the service branches and other actors in the field (Dunlap 2011). Moreover, public policy and service-connected think tanks ‘play unique roles’ as they produce and disseminate information throughout the field (RAND Arroyo Center 1998). By encompassing the variety of players and stakeholders within the social system (of which the list I provided above for the field of the armed forces is certainly not exhaustive), a study of the armed forces as an institutional field is inherently a study of relations.

As Barley (2010) explains, institutional fields are characterized by the movement of, for example, money, information, personnel, persuasive communications, and ideas between and among the various organizations that populate the field (such as the individual service branches, regulatory agencies, industrial suppliers, and think tanks mentioned here). As noted previously, the key players in the institutional field of the armed forces are not the ‘regulators’ and ‘standard setters’ established at the state and Department of Defense levels, but rather the individual

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2 The definition provided here is of “the military” and comes from Siebold (2001), “Core Issues and Theory in Military Sociology.”
service branches (Builder 1989)—the primary ‘purveyors’ of the ‘specialized expertise’ that define the field.

Composing a distinct organizational population, these state military organizations generally share structures, routines, ideas, and goals. As Barley (2010) demonstrates, it is in large measure the ideas and goals of the most influential population in an institutional field that are served, supported, and indeed amplified by members of the other organizational populations present within the system. In the institutional field of the armed forces, it is the routines, ideas, and goals of the military services to which the other populations in the field are generally responsive. To provide just a few examples here: industrial suppliers generally produce equipment to support service-defined goals and needs; think tanks support the analytical desires of their client; and the Department of Defense is organized to include a Joint Chiefs of Staff, manned with representatives from each service branch, whose responsibilities include advising the nation’s civilian leadership. To explore how the structures, ideas, routines, and goals of this central organizational population change, I focus here on the role that the Army, the oldest and largest of the service branches, plays in the process.

With my interest in elaborating emergent theoretical perspectives in organization studies through an analysis of change in the field of the armed forces, it is worthy to note that military organizations—the U.S. Army being no exception—have unique characteristics that distinguish

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3 The concept of organizational population is grounded in population ecology, with ecological studies of organization generally focusing on the rise and decline of organizational forms (Hannan and Freeman 1977); however, my focus here is on the characteristics of organizational populations that Scott (2008b) notes to be central for the institutionalist’s interest in them.

4 To be sure, the military industrial sector has its own corporate goals. Moreover, the equipment it produces is sometimes sought less by service branches and more so by Congresspersons who represent the district in which it is produced in an effort to retain the jobs of, or maintain support from their constituents. Nonetheless, as Dunlap (2011:137) explains, the military industrial sector is largely influenced by “how the Pentagon identifies and responds to threats.”
them from other types of organizations. As state-run bureaucracies, their effectiveness is largely assessed by external stakeholders (such as Congress) rather than the organization itself (Arellano-Gault, Demortain, Rouillard, and Thoenig 2013); as public organizations, their actions are regularly influenced by external political processes (Warwick 1979); and their members are sworn to obey the lawful orders of their superior officers (see, for example, the U.S. Army Oath of Enlistment (U.S. Army 2015)). While these properties may be shared across many state-run bureaucracies, they are largely unique to such organizations and thus warrant acknowledgment here; however, many noteworthy properties of military organizations that may differ from those that characterize some privately owned organizations are not unique to the military, but rather variables that must be taken into account in any study of organizations.

To be sure, military organizations have a high degree of centralization—that is, a clear hierarchy of authority and decision-making. Organizations, however, are not simply ‘centralized’ or ‘decentralized,’ but differ in the degree to which key organizational decision-making is carried out by a limited set of actors or diffused (Hage 1965). The U.S. Army, as with some other organizations, is highly centralized with a clear set of elite actors officially responsible for making decisions and implementing plans. In turn, my findings may be limited to organizational contexts characterized by a high degree of centralization.

Characterized as “one of the world’s largest, most complex organizations” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:cover), it has been observed that within the U.S. Army, “[u]niformity in responses is not possible” through verbal communications, and thus organizational leaders rely on extensive written communications to “make… changes explicit in order to communicate with all the elements concerned” (Demchak 1991:7). The discursive model of institutional logic (re)production described in the previous chapter (see Figure 2-2), while distinctly applicable to
the large organizational context of the U.S. Army (as will become evident in the chapters that follow), may thus be more applicable in large (as opposed to small) organizational contexts that necessitate such formal and extensive forms of communication.

As one more example of distinguishable characteristics of the empirical context analyzed here, it is noteworthy that as part of a much larger national security apparatus, the U.S. Army is overseen by a well-established governance system that relies on explicit forms of regularized control; that said, actors in all institutional fields are subject to the mandates and controls of formal governance systems (Scott et al. 2000) as all organizational activities fall under the purview of “some kind of governmental authority” (Arellano-Gault et al. 2013:154). When considering the applicability of organizational theory to the study of public organizations, Arellano-Gault et al. (2013:155) thus suggest that “it is less important to consider whether or not an organization is owned or controlled formally by the state,” and more fruitful to assess the degree to which the organization “has discretion to define its own criteria of success and its ultimate goals.” As will become evident in the final chapters of this dissertation, U.S. Army leaders, while subject to a formal governance system, exercised a notable degree of discretion in managing the direction of organizational change in the Cold War’s immediate aftermath.

In light of the particular organizational characteristics described above, future research will need to consider the degree to which the findings presented here may or may not be generalizable to other state-run bureaucracies and, for example, less-centralized and smaller organizations, as well as those acting within institutional fields characterized by stronger and weaker governance systems. The findings presented here, however, elaborate our understanding of the discursive, relational, and organizational dimensions of institutional change. Before

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5 I revisit and elaborate some of the limitations of this dissertation with an eye toward future research in Chapter 8.
discussing the discursive and relational dimensions of the Army’s establishment and diffusion of a guiding logic—most notably through the production and dissemination of doctrine—I describe in the next section the changes in institutional logics evident in the field of the armed forces across the twentieth century. In that section, I describe the structures, routines, ideas, and goals that emerged and diffused in the post-Cold War era.

**INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN THE 20TH CENTURY**

Recall that institutional logics include “unique organizing principles, practices, and symbols” (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012:2) that, if dominant, “shape and create the rules of the game” in an institutional field (Thornton and Ocasio 2008:112). In looking back across the twentieth century, military scholars have observed three distinct eras in which the U.S. military was characterized by particular ‘rules of the game’ that influenced the military establishment’s organization, culture, and purpose in distinct ways (see, for example: Hajjar 2014; Kretchik 2011; Linn 2007; Moskos 2000; Moskos and Burk 1994). These eras—the ‘pre-Cold War,’ ‘Cold War,’ and ‘post-Cold War’ eras (Moskos and Burk 1994)—are demarcated by the Cold War, the emergence and end of which served as watershed events that influenced the development of unique structural and cultural arrangements in the field of the armed forces. With unique structural and cultural characteristics (see Table 3-1), I understand these eras to be characterized by distinct institutional logics.
### Table 3.1. Ideal Types of Institutional Logics in the Field of the Armed Forces in the United States across the Twentieth Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Cold War 1900-1945</th>
<th>Cold War 1945-1990</th>
<th>Post-Cold War 1990-</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Threat</td>
<td>Enemy invasion</td>
<td>Nuclear war</td>
<td>Subnational and nonmilitary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Structure</td>
<td>Mass army</td>
<td>Large professional army</td>
<td>Small professional army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Mission Definition</td>
<td>Defense of homeland</td>
<td>Support of alliance</td>
<td>‘New missions’ and ‘operations other than war’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Military Professional</td>
<td>Combat leader</td>
<td>Manager or technician</td>
<td>Soldier-statesman; soldier-scholar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Relations</td>
<td>Incorporated</td>
<td>Manipulated</td>
<td>Courted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Employees</td>
<td>Minor component</td>
<td>Medium component</td>
<td>Major component</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Moskos (2000:15)

As within any institutional context, change is ever-present in the field of the armed forces.

To be sure, notable changes to state militaries have occurred across time as they respond to (among other factors) wartime experiences (Corum 1992), technological developments (Boot 2006), altered international relations (Burk 1994), and shifting threats to national security (Posen 1984). Though often quite significant, not all such changes are revolutionary. Most change in the field of the armed forces is evolutionary, with discontinuous change being the exception (Murray 1996b). Discontinuity, however, is observable with the emergence and end of the Cold War, as with each transition individual and collective participants in the field, to borrow from W. Richard Scott and his colleagues (Scott et al. 2000:349), “not only [did] things differently, they [did]...

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6 The identification of these distinct eras of the U.S. armed forces as representing distinct institutional logics is made by the author of this dissertation, not in the original source (Moskos 2000).
different things” as a result of “shifts in the values that orient, guide, and motivate behavior.”

Over time, both the beginning and end of the Cold War proved to be field-altering events.

At the dawn of the twentieth century, the primary threat to the nation perceived by the U.S. military establishment was one of invasion (Moskos 2000). Leading up to the nation’s involvement in World War I, war planning—and in turn the organization and development of the nation’s armed forces—was largely driven by concerns with the potential arrival of hundreds of thousands of foreign forces, primarily from Britain, Japan, and Germany, on America’s shores (Linn 2007). As Weigley (1973:190) demonstrates, the perceived threat of invasion was even partially responsible for U.S. preparation for, and involvement in, World War I as some “campaigners” promoting U.S. involvement at the war’s outset championed and spread “visions of vast German columns making another Belgium of the United States.” In the minds of influential leaders, the seemingly imminent threat of an enemy invasion necessitated a large ground force, or plans to train and mobilize one with relative ease (Linn 2007), to defend the homeland (Moskos 2000). In the early part of the twentieth century, the U.S. Army thus supported and maintained what Johnson (2000:182) dubs a “‘manpower first’ policy”—a relatively single-minded focus on “active duty manpower… to… support mobilization plans.”

In World War I’s wake, partially as a result of the relatively brief participation of the U.S. in that conflict (Cassidy 2003) and partially as a result of the success of the U.S. and its allies in the war (Johnson 2000), the U.S. military establishment returned relatively quickly to its “‘manpower first’ policy,” focused on the development and maintenance of a mass ground force to provide for adequate defense. One U.S. War Department directive circulated in 1920 implored that the Army give “‘the adequate defense of all permanent fortified or garrisoned possessions of the United States the top priority’” (as cited in Linn 2007:117), a suggestion noted to have
“received little challenge.” Even on the heels of a World War fought on foreign soil, for Army planners the primary perceived threats were those of invasion by British, Japanese, or Mexican forces. The U.S. Army thus organized, equipped, and trained at the time with an eye toward the following threats: “a two-ocean war with an Anglo-Japanese coalition, a Pacific war with Japan alone, and the ever-turbulent Mexican border” (Linn 2007:118). Worthy of note here, however, are not only the similarities in the primary perceived threats before and after the First World War—threats of a large-scale enemy invasion on U.S. soil—but the fact that the proposed solutions before and after that war were also similar: “continental defense, a mobile horse cavalry on the border, and the means to mobilize a large field army in the event of a major conflict” (p. 118). With this emphasis, the Army largely valued the size of the available force as opposed to the skill of its members—what Echevarria and Shaw (1992:76) dub the “‘Johnny get your gun’ era.” In turn, the Army focused on the development of leaders who were “skilled in the arts of war” (Moskos 2000:19) as the self-image of the military professional was that of “a specialist in violence, ready for combat” (Moskos and Burk 1994:154; see also Janowitz [1960] 1971). Indeed, Army leaders were trained to mobilize and lead a mass Army (Johnson 2000).

The prevailing ideas about soldiering and leadership at the time thus emphasized what Gerhard Weinberg (1994:917) identifies as “traditional military virtues”: “decisiveness, courage, an eye for terrain, [and] a sense of the capabilities of one’s own and the enemy’s forces.” In turn, as the Army was faced with declining budgets in the years following the First World War and even more so during the Great Depression, the organization “clung to its position that ‘everything except personnel, training, and civilian components could be sacrificed’” (as cited in Johnson 2000:182). The Army was investing in the pre-Cold War institutional logic by maintaining the
distinct virtues and organizational forms, practices, and structural arrangements that characterize it (see Table 3-1).

Leading up to the Second World War, the prevailing institutional logic of the U.S. armed forces remained relatively unchanged as military organizations generally equipped, trained, maintained, and deployed their troops in a similar manner. To be sure, these organizations did many things differently; however, they did not do and value different things, as a change in institutional logic would necessitate (Scott et al. 2000). Such a change, however, did materialize as the Cold War began to take shape following the dramatic conclusion of World War II.

Whereas U.S. military affairs were largely driven by a concern with enemy invasion in the pre-Cold War years, new concerns assumed center stage as the bifurcated Cold War world began to take shape in the aftermath of the Second World War. As world powers on both sides of the Iron Curtain obtained and developed nuclear weapons capabilities, new fears, and in time new military forces, emerged alongside these weapons that promised total annihilation and the destruction of civilizations (Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000). In the U.S., as within other national contexts, the military establishment underwent dramatic changes in an effort to establish a force capable of both waging and deterring nuclear war (Moskos and Burk 1994).

With the emergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the end of World War II, the United States found itself dedicated to defending Western Europe (Gaddis 2005), and thus committed to defending many of the nations it feared at the dawn of the twentieth century. The U.S. military establishment thus shifted its attention from defense of the homeland—defense against an enemy invasion on U.S. soil—to the support of allied nations abroad to deter, or if necessary defend against, acts of Soviet aggression that were presumed most likely to occur on European soil (Dunnigan and Macedonia 2001). In relatively short order,
the Army’s “own definition of war shrank to a single colossal land campaign against the armies of the Warsaw Pact in Europe” (Linn 2007:152). In the 1950s, the Army thus “radically transformed itself, acquiring new weaponry and a new tactical organization” (p. 152). By the end of the Korean War in 1953, the U.S. military had transitioned to an overseas constabulary maintaining a relatively large force with forward deployed units in Europe and Asia (Brown 2011). This force was “optimized… to defeat a single threat—the Soviet Union.” With the international environment characterized by the hegemonic and impending war between world powers, the Cold War era quickly became typified by a “big battle” concept of war, and U.S. military “[s]trategy, weaponry, training, and organization were directed to that end” (Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995:35). As observed by one retired U.S. Army General,

[a]lmost everything that the Army did during the Cold War centered on defeating a Soviet invasion in Western Europe. The Army wrote doctrine to counter the Soviet Red Army, trained at its Combat Training Centers against opposing forces structured like the Red Army, and modernized its equipment to defeat the Red Army (Hartzog 2001:250).

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. Army not only prepared to do things differently than before; it prepared to do different things.

In support of doing different things—that is, deterring and, if necessary, fighting a nuclear-armed and increasingly technologically advanced Soviet force in Europe—the nature of military service began to reflect that of the civilian economy to an unprecedented degree (Moskos and Burk 1994). As Segal (1989:67) notes, the “[c]rucial technological differences”

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between the military and civilian spheres that persisted throughout the pre-Cold War era increasingly disappeared. As the force became progressively professional in its nature, the structure of military organizations began to reflect that of civilian organizations like never before. Moreover, it was during this era that the Army increasingly abandoned its “‘manpower-first’ policy” (Johnson 2000). In turn, “the military budget… shifted to equipment rather than personnel, and the philosophy underlying personnel policy… shifted from one of equipping the man to one of manning the equipment” (Segal 1989:75). Throughout the Cold War the Army thus transitioned from a mass force requiring “physically able individuals” to a professional Army dependent largely upon the recruitment and development of “skilled technicians” (Rosenau 1994:47). The incessant fear and seemingly imminent war with a nuclear-armed and technologically advanced Soviet Union during the Cold War led the U.S. to maintain a large, well-supplied, and steadily modernized fighting force (Brown 2011)—a force distinctly different from that of the pre-Cold War era that prioritized defense of the homeland (Moskos 2000) and placed “absolute faith in man and animal” (Johnson 2000:163).

With a “[f]ocus on high-end mechanized conventional combat in Central Europe” (Brown 2011:16), the Cold War Army valued highly trained, professional soldiers (Linn 2007; Moskos and Burk 1994) as opposed to those who were “skilled in the arts of war,” as had been the case in the pre-Cold War era (Moskos 2000:19). As Morris Janowitz ([1960] 1971:22) observed in his seminal work *The Professional Soldier*, as the post-World War II era evolved “the military establishment [became] progressively dependent on more complex technology, the importance of the military manager [increased]… [and] he [or she undermined] the long-standing traditionalism of the military establishment.” As warfare became increasingly complex—indeed as military organizations reinvented themselves to fight a technologically advanced form of
warfare—the U.S. military became progressively reliant upon managers or technicians capable of supervising complex battlefield conditions (Linn 2007). The Army no longer focused on the application of “brute force” (Moskos 2000) by developing leaders capable of leading soldiers into battle who were grounded in the ‘traditional military virtues’—those of courage, decisiveness, and battlefield awareness (Weinberg 1994). During the Cold War, the U.S. military generally, and the Army specifically, emerged as a uniquely “Industrial Age force, optimized for World War III”8—one organized, equipped, and trained for large-scale conventional warfare of a uniquely technological sort.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, the maintenance of a large professional fighting force developed explicitly to confront a capable, nuclear-armed, and technologically advanced adversary was called into question. By the year 2000, it was “incontestable that the demise of the Soviet Union ha[d] ushered in a new era of international relations and with it concomitant changes in the structure and culture of the armed forces” (Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000:3). The changes observed reflect paradigmatic shifts as the very mission and purpose of state militaries worldwide were reconsidered (Moskos and Burk 1994). As Williams (2000) observes, it was in the Cold War’s wake that low-intensity threats—such as concerns with non-state actors, terrorism, and domestic unrest—became increasingly accepted as legitimate military concerns, thus diverging from the long-standing focus on conventional, state-centric, warfare (Linn 2007; Moskos and Burk 1994). Even humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts became “increasingly seen as firmly in the mainstream of military missions, rather than a distraction from the ‘real’ purpose” of the military, as had been

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the case in the Cold War era (Williams 2000:266). In turn, the transition from a Cold War to post-Cold War force involved the development and institutionalization of an “expeditionary mindset” (Sookermany 2012)—a transition from force to forces.

In the Cold War’s wake the Army initiated a transition from a force “optimized for World War III” to an organization that values versatility—an Army designed, trained, and equipped to provide “‘mix and match’ capabilities to respond to a very diverse market, not a single market.” Moreover, the post-Cold War era has seen an unprecedented diffusion of the emergent private military and security industry—a change that involves the spread and legitimation of new organizational forms and practices in the field (Baum and McGahan 2013). The dramatic changes taking shape in the Cold War’s wake thus involve the transition from a large, war-oriented professional military, to a small professional force capable of accomplishing a variety of missions through an array of partnerships. As the Army reconsidered its very purpose in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, senior organizational leaders placed unprecedented value on versatile forces capable of succeeding in a range of military activities—“activities ranging from construction of a schoolhouse in Micronesia to sophisticated ground/air combat in [Southwest Asia].” Alongside this “expeditionary mindset” (Sookermany 2012), emerged new professional roles and military values (Hajjar 2014; Moskos 2000).

With an explicit emphasis on ‘irregular warfare’ and ‘operations other than war’—political and strategic actions that do not align with the large-scale, state-centric warfare mindset

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9 Ibid., 446.


that dominated military thinking and organization in the Cold War years (Davidson 2010)—the military establishment supplemented its long-standing “warrior spirit” with a desire for soldiers and leaders “adept in the intricacies of international diplomacy” (Moskos 2000:19). With what Hajjar (2014:137) identifies as a “peacekeeper-diplomat cultural orientation,” the emergent post-Cold War military emphasizes effective collaborative relationships between the military organization and its members and, for example, host nation governments, nongovernmental organizations, coalition partners, and even domestic populations. The relatively one-dimensional soldier of earlier eras is increasingly supplanted in the post-Cold War era by the multi-dimensional soldier who is expected to establish secure and stable environments through a range of activities (Broesder, Buijs, Vogelaar, and Euwema 2015). Whereas the Cold War era largely supported the relatively narrowed technical training of specialists, the post-Cold War logic calls for a broadening of soldier and leader development (Williams 2000), as soldiers are understood to be “the first line of diplomats on the ground.”

Indeed, by the mid-2000s the U.S. Army War College was in the process of “shifting from an exclusive focus on conventional warfare… to emphasizing irregular conflict, cultural awareness, the necessity of working with civilian federal agencies and private organizations, and nonmilitary solutions to complex contingencies” (Linn 2007:241). This shift, to include the transition from an ‘exclusive focus’ on conventional warfare to ‘emphasizing’ something altogether different among the ranks, reflects a shift in the prevailing logic. Indeed, the Army’s recently published “Strategic Planning Guidance” states that American landpower “[s]uccess depends as much on understanding the social and political fabric of the situation as it does on the ability to physically dominate it” (HQDA 2013:4). This is a distinct

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difference from the Army of the Cold War for which “victory was defined as the physical
destruction of materiel and personnel” (Linn 2007:204). The contemporary U.S. Army is
preparing its post-Cold War leaders and soldiers to not only do things differently, but to do and
value different things when compared to the Army of the Cold War.

Though some have criticized the contemporary U.S. military for allowing its thinking to
“[linger] too long in the Cold War past” (Yarger 2010:1), numerous military scholars note the
undeniable trend in which military planners and professionals are “reaching out to embrace new
ideas” in the still-developing post-Cold War world (Lovelace 2010:v). Though the degree of
change taking place may be up for debate, it is evident that the Army is no longer the “huge
ocean liner” Janine Davidson (2010:76) suggests it was during the Cold War, “set to course” and
constrained by its culture and systems—that is, I contend, ‘set to course’ and constrained by the
Cold War logic that prevailed. Though change is ongoing, the U.S. Army—indeed, the military
establishment more generally—is no longer “comfortably on [the] azimuth it had been on for
forty years” (Brown 2011:41). In the wake of the Cold War, many military forces worldwide
appear to be on “transformational azimuths” (Fasana 2011:142) as they work to become, to
borrow from the U.S. Army’s senior uniformed leader, “something qualitatively different”
(Sullivan and Harper 1996:148). As suggested at the outset of this chapter, such a transformation
does not occur naturally, but rather involves a process that must be ‘initiated,’ ‘carried out,’ and
‘handled’ by actors. The process relies on institutional work.

MILITARY LOGICS FROM INSTITUTIONAL WORK

As within any institutional field, the field of the armed forces in the United States is
influenced by a governance system that exercises, to one degree or another, normative and
regulatory control over field-level activities (Scott et al. 2000). The traditional military planning process in the U.S.—one formally established through bureaucratic regulations—presumes a hierarchical, top-down model in which the nation’s senior civilian leaders establish and communicate clear national security objectives and corresponding guidance that become the foundation for the development and maintenance of specific military forces, capabilities, and practices. As Builder (1989:4) demonstrates, however, though actors external to the military service organizations—such as academics, the Secretary of Defense, or the President—“may propose military strategies and concepts, these can be implemented only if and when military [organizations] accept and pursue them.” As historian Richard Neustadt suggested, “[t]o become ‘Grand Strategist in Chief,’ the President must first become ‘Persuader in Chief’” (as cited in Abshire 2013:52)—that is, engage in discursive strategies that gain the approval and support of various stakeholders. Even the President—a bureaucratically authoritative individual who, by position, is imbued with relational power (Reed 2013)—must successfully engage in institutional work if his or her plans are to be fully carried out. Proposals for changing strategies and concepts, even those originating from actors who are perceived to have the legitimate right to make such proposals, are indeed “filtered through the institutional, professional, program, and personal agendas of affected actors” who may work diligently either in support of or against such proposals (Durant 2007:247). Moreover, proposals for, and efforts in support of, change projects may originate from individual and collective actors within the field who exercise agency of their own (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). Pressures for change are, after all, “interpreted, given

meaning, and responded to by actors within organizations” (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott 2002:49).

**Maintaining the Cold War Logic: Institutional Work in the United States Army**

Recall that institutional logics, once dominant in a field, “affect the decisions of organizations… by focusing the attention of [leaders] toward the set of issues and solutions that are consistent with the dominant logic and away from those issues and solutions that are not” (Thornton 2004:13). Moreover, as Berman (2012:13) suggests, when a single logic prevails in a given institutional field, “local innovations based on the dominant logic will find it easier to acquire the resources needed to perpetuate themselves than will practices based on other institutional logics.” If the Cold War logic described above was indeed dominant during the Cold War years, it should take little effort to find support for these claims in the context of the U.S. Army. As I demonstrate below, the vast body of literature on the Army’s experience in, and response to, the Vietnam War supports these suggestions and lends credit to Janine Davidson’s (2010:76) contention that the Army of the Cold War—at least by the time the Vietnam War was in full swing—was “like a huge ocean liner set to course.”

Through the 1960s and into the early 1970s the United States was involved in a counterinsurgency war in Vietnam. It has been well-documented that the U.S. Army, as described by Builder (1989:130), “was not prepared to cope with the style and nature of the [Vietnam War] because of the way it had conceived of ground warfare, and, therefore, because of the way it had equipped and trained its forces” in the years leading up to that conflict. In the wake of World War II, the U.S. military had predominantly spent its time preparing for a large-scale clash with the Soviet Union on a European battlefield. This contingency differed
remarkably from the enemy’s counterinsurgency operations taking shape in Vietnam. Whereas the Army had organized, equipped, and prepared itself for large-scale conventional war reliant upon large, mechanized divisions, overwhelming firepower and the minimization of American casualties, counterinsurgency efforts emphasize the use of smaller, light infantry units and a restraint on firepower (Krepinevich 1986). While the military establishment had adopted a prevailing institutional logic supportive of an Army whose mission is “closing with and destroying” the enemy, counterinsurgency warfare relied on “the resolution of political and social problems” (p. 5). Nonetheless, the prevailing Cold War logic focused the attention of some of the most influential military strategists and Army leaders during the Vietnam War toward issues and solutions grounded in a Cold War mindset. The Cold War logic was maintained by military professionals and the most influential Army leaders who engaged in present-oriented, practical-evaluative agency during the war and future-oriented, projective agency after the conflict. In each instance, these leaders reactivated and shored up prevailing ideas and practices.

Though U.S. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson sought limited means to achieve political ends in Vietnam, influential military planners—perhaps most notably U.S. Army General William C. Westmoreland as commanding general of the American military command in Vietnam—consistently sought to bring conventional means of war to the theater of operations (Krepinevich 1986). As prominent military historian Russel F. Weigley (1973:464) observes, this involved, by 1965, the replacement of emergent counterinsurgency-style efforts with “a ‘search-and-destroy’ strategy, aimed at… carrying the war to the enemy, and… the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces.” When questioned about how best to deal with the enemy’s guerilla forces in Vietnam, General Westmoreland responded, “Firepower” (Archer, Ferris, Herwig, and
Travers 2002). This strategic orientation, Weigley (1973:464) suggests, was enacted in an effort to have military action “meet the American military’s conception of the proper conduct of war”—that is, to ensure that the solution proposed and practices enacted aligned with the prevailing institutional logic.

In addition to shaping perceptions and solutions, institutional logics influence the reception and response to innovative organizational forms and practices. As Krepinevich (1986:106) aptly demonstrates, this was indeed the case during the Vietnam War as “the Army’s approach to force structuring for counterinsurgency was to take what forces were available and dress them up a bit, attempting to satisfy the civilian leadership, while at the same time diverting as few precious resources as possible away from” what was perceived by the Army’s senior leaders to be “the ‘real’ Army mission”—the destruction of the enemy’s forces in combat. Moreover, as Berman (2012:168) suggests, individuals endorsing innovative practices that do not align with the prevailing logic “might experience disapproval, or professional repercussions.” Conversely, we should expect that individuals proving successful, as defined by the prevailing logic, should experience approval and positive professional outcomes. Such was the case in Vietnam as assignments to units supporting counterinsurgency efforts were understood to be ‘career killer’ assignments, and ammunition expenditures and body counts became the content of evaluations for Air Force and Army units and officers (Archer et al. 2002; Jenkins 1970; Krepinevich 1986; Lewy 1980). As Linn (2007:185) observes, the Army was so enamored with measuring success by standards of conventional war that many of the Army’s most senior leaders “made a fetish out of firepower expended and kill ratios.” Citing kill ratios—referencing friendly-to-enemy KIAs (i.e., Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines killed in action)—the Army’s senior leaders maintained that the U.S. was winning the war and could bring the conflict
to a relatively swift conclusion if only the nation’s civilian leadership would support the deployment of more troops needed to defeat the enemy in combat (Krepinevich 1986). Thus, in the wake of the Vietnam War, the Army specifically, and the Pentagon generally, maintained the ‘illusion’ that “conventional war’ plans are oriented to winning [nontraditional] wars with immense firepower superiority” (Melman 1970:224), but require the resource support of the civilian leadership (Krepinevich 1986). It was this mindset—a filtering of the war effort through the lens of the prevailing Cold War logic that guided the Army’s reconstruction in the wake of the lengthy Vietnam conflict. Through the exercise of projective agency in the war’s aftermath, the Army’s most senior leaders engaged in efforts aimed not at reconsidering and replacing the dominant Cold War logic, but at shoring it up.

To be sure, in the wake of the Vietnam War senior Army leaders were engaged in projective agency as they ‘looked ahead’ (Lock-Pullan 2003) to ‘redirect’ (Linn 2007) the organization in an effort to prepare it to win “the next war” (HQDA 1976:2-3, emphasis added). The trajectory of these efforts, however, was not foreordained. Throughout the Vietnam War there remained influential voices within the military planning community contending that the style of conflict unfolding in Vietnam (to borrow from the editors of Armed Forces Management in 1966) “rather than being the exception, is the pattern for the future” (as cited in Melman 1970:139). These voices echoed that of President Kennedy at the war’s outset—his call for the establishment of “a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training” (as cited in Weigley 1973:457). Calls for the military establishment generally, and the Army specifically, to organize, equip, and prepare for new contingencies equate to calls for the military establishment to reconsider the very foundation of its organization, identity and practices—calls for a reconsideration of the prevailing logic.
Amidst these calls, however, many senior military leaders upheld the contention that the war in Vietnam was an anomaly (Davidson 2010), “an exotic interlude between the wars that really count” (Jenkins 1970:7). As direct U.S. involvement in Vietnam came to an end, senior Army planners thus viewed the 1973 Arab-Israeli War—a “surrogate conflict between the U.S.-supplied Israelis and the Soviet-supplied Arab states” (Linn 2007:202)—as a “godsend” (Krepinevich 1986) and “a template for the future” (Linn 2007:202).

Privileging large-scale, technologically advanced, conventional warfare like that observed in the Arab-Israeli War, senior U.S. Army leaders, in relatively short order, reduced the proportion of the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College devoted to low intensity conflict by almost 80 percent (Nagl 2002); had all counterinsurgency materials at the Special Warfare School destroyed (Tierney 2010) (lest the Army learn the ‘wrong’ lessons); and published a new keystone doctrinal manual (see HQDA 1976) that failed to mention counterinsurgency (Vought 1977) and deliberately “[took] the Army out of the rice paddies of Vietnam and [placed] it on the Western European battlefield against the Warsaw Pact” (General William E. DePuy, as cited in Gilmore and Conway 1994:194). While the Army undoubtedly initiated significant organizational changes, it was the Pentagon’s and Army leadership’s concern with the European theater and the impending Soviet threat that shaped the Army’s orientation, identity, organization, and practices in the wake of the Vietnam War (Davidson 2010; Kretchik 2011; Linn 2007; Lock-Pullan 2003). Leading the change effort was the newly formed U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Established in 1973, TRADOC brought, for the first time in the Army’s history, the following under the purview of a single command: Branch schools, Army colleges, the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), basic and advanced training, combat developments and
analysis, and doctrine development (King 2013). At its inception, the perceived need among those senior officers guiding TRADOC’s activities was for efforts in each of these areas “to reorient the Army’s thinking toward the Soviet Union’s dangerous and growing strategic threat to the North Atlantic alliance” (p. 1). As the Vietnam War drew to a close, what these leaders desired was a shoring up of those institutional paradigms, values, and organizational forms and practices that characterized the Cold War logic. General William E. DePuy, TRADOC’s first commanding general, viewed doctrine—and more specifically, the Army’s ‘keystone’ doctrinal manual, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations—as “the means to regulate the Army’s behavior and to compel conformity” (Kretchik 2011: 195).

While the history of Army doctrine is rather complex, the Army’s Operations manual has, for more than seven decades, been understood to be, and generally accepted as, the foundation for Army organization, equipment development, personnel policies, leader development, training, procedure, and all other official Army manuals (Kretchik 2011; Macgregor 1997; Nielsen 2010; Odom 1999; Romjue 1997). As summed by one U.S. Army General, “[d]octrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose and a unity of effort” (General George H. Decker, as cited in Kretchik 2011:158). In the wake of the long, protracted, counterinsurgency conflict in Vietnam, the ‘philosophy,’ ‘language,’ ‘purpose,’ and ‘effort’ endorsed in Army doctrine maintained its Cold War focus. As General DePuy stated, the drivers for the Army’s post-Vietnam doctrinal development included the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, developments in weapons systems, European defense, and the German Army’s complex military-political situation (DePuy 1988). Counterinsurgency generally, and the Vietnam War experience specifically, were notably absent in the final product (Taw and Leicht 1992) and, as
General DePuy admits, peripheral during its development.\textsuperscript{14} While the publication of a new *Operations* manual brought significant change to the Army of the late-Cold War period, those changes reflect a commitment to, and shoring up of, the prevailing Cold War logic. It was not until the publication of a new edition of the manual in 1993 (following updates published in 1982 and 1986) that a new era of Army doctrine—and in time, organization—was discernable (Kretchik 2011).

**Toward a Post-Cold War Logic: Institutional Work in the United States Army, 1991-1995**

In his analysis of the Army’s doctrinal foundation from the organization’s inception in 1776 to the current War on Terror, Kretchik (2011) separates doctrine into distinct eras characterized by texts that serve a specific vision and maintain unique definitions of organizational success. His periodization includes a discrete focus of Army doctrine from 1945 to 1991—a time period coinciding with the periodization provided by Moskos (2000) and described above (see Table 3-1). Materials published after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, he notes, have a doctrinal orientation that distinctly differs from that of any other era in the Army’s history. Army doctrine produced in the post-Cold War era reflects an acceptance (or in the least, an endorsement on behalf of the doctrine’s producers) of a unique institutional logic. As with the military establishment’s response to the Vietnam War, however, the shift in attention from the prevailing Cold War logic to something unique in the post-Cold War era was (and continues to be) neither the result of fate nor foreordained. Indeed, I demonstrate through my

\textsuperscript{14} Led personally by General DePuy, the 1976 version of FM 100-5—the first published in the post-Vietnam War era—was written almost exclusively by a small group of officers known as “the boathouse gang” (so named because they worked out of an old yacht club building at Fort Monroe, Virginia where TRADOC Headquarters was at the time) with little input from others (Wass de Czeg 2006).
analysis reported in this dissertation that the changes that occurred were the result of institutional work carried out by organizational actors exercising projective agency.

Though accepting that the Army might be called upon to engage in ‘low-intensity conflict’ or even ‘operations other than war’ in the future, some senior military leaders maintained in the Cold War’s aftermath that no major doctrinal or organizational changes were needed, as soldiers prepared for high-intensity, large-scale combat could easily adapt to succeed in any ‘lesser’ contingency (Davidson 2010). Moreover, many influential military planners identified the nation’s swift and decisive victory in Desert Storm in 1991 as proof-positive for prevailing organizational design, values, and practices (Cassidy 2003; Macgregor 1997; Taw and Leicht 1992). Further, the military’s most senior leaders—those organizational elites that Kraatz (2009) contends are the ones who must do much of the heavy lifting during periods of institutional development and adaptation—had matured in, advanced through the ranks of, and helped develop the very military force that was called into question (Kretchik 2011; Linn 2007; Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995). With the end of the Cold War, then, change was anything but given (Durant 2007). For U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan—appointed as Chief in June 1991 (six months prior to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact)—ensuring that the Army embarked upon a transformational path was precisely what he felt compelled to accomplish during his four-year tenure in that position (Dabrowski 2008; Davidson 2010; Harper and Sullivan 1996; Romjue 1997).\(^{15}\)

In an organizational context that is “doctrine-based,” General Sullivan adamantly maintained that FM 100-5—the manual that “furnishes the authoritative foundation for

\(^{15}\)In addition to being noted in the sources cited here, General Sullivan’s commitment to initiating a transformation of the Army is clearly evident in various letters, speeches, and published works provided in *The Collected Works of the Thirty-second Chief of Staff, United States Army: June 1991-June 1995* (Sullivan 1996).
subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training” (HQDA 1993:iv)—was to be “the Army’s engine of change” (p. vi).\textsuperscript{16} As he noted retrospectively in an oral history interview, “until we got the doctrine right we couldn’t structure our forces and we couldn’t buy the equipment” (Dabrowski 2008:255). Intellectual change, he declared, had to precede physical organizational change (Sullivan and Harper 1996).\textsuperscript{17} In a co-authored National Security Paper subtitled “Leading America’s Army into the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century,”\textsuperscript{18} General Sullivan provided a visual depiction of the Army’s change strategy with the crafting of a new Operations doctrine as the foundation for the change process (see Figure 3-1).

\textsuperscript{16} The quoted selections provided here come from the “Preface” and “Introduction” of the June 1993 update of Field Manual 100-5, Operations (HQDA 1993). General Sullivan, however, referenced doctrine as “the engine of change” in many instances, such as in his official oral history interview for the U.S. Army Military History Institute (Dabrowski 2008) and in various letters, speeches, and published works provided in \textit{The Collected Works of the Thirty-second Chief of Staff, United States Army: June 1991-June 1995} (Sullivan 1996).

\textsuperscript{17} General Sullivan’s understanding that an intellectual transformation had to precede physical organizational changes is clearly evident in various letters, speeches, and published works provided in \textit{The Collected Works of the Thirty-second Chief of Staff, United States Army: June 1991-June 1995} (Sullivan 1996).

As depicted, the development of doctrine was not only temporally prioritized, but also understood to entail the most essential and complex dimension of the change process. To manage the process of doctrinal, and in turn, organizational change, General Sullivan turned to the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command—the organizational entity charged in its more recent history with “adopt[ing] the spirit and intention of… adaptation” (U.S. Army TRADOC 2011).

As demonstrated in Figure 3-2 (reproduced from a 1991 TRADOC brief), at its inception in 1973, TRADOC’s purpose was to prepare the Army to fight the next war. To be sure, this entailed projective agency as the command was tasked with ‘improving,’ ‘supporting,’ and ‘emphasizing’ aspects of the organization to meet future demands. It was largely through the actions of TRADOC’s senior leadership—a select group of actors who perceived the ‘next war’ as being characterized by the ‘big battle’ concept that dominated Cold War thinking—that the Cold War logic was maintained by the Army in the wake of the Vietnam War. By 1991, however,

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the primary mission of TRADOC had been diversified. Under General Sullivan’s watch, not only was TRADOC tasked with preparing the Army for war through training, but also serving as the “architect for the future.”

Figure 3-2. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC): Purpose, 1973-1991

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Get the Army ready to fight the next war</td>
<td>Prepare the Army for war</td>
<td>Prepare the Army for war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Improve individual training</td>
<td>-- Doctrine</td>
<td>-- Train the warfighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Better support unit training</td>
<td>-- Combat developments</td>
<td>Architect for the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Emphasize combat developments to win the first battle</td>
<td>-- Training</td>
<td>-- Design the future Army</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>-- Base operations</td>
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Source: 1991 TRADOC brief

As noted in Figure 3-2, TRADOC assumed direct responsibility for “design[ing] the future Army,” a task which inherently calls for projective agency. Where General DePuy and his command group understood their task to be the maintenance of the Cold War logic—a return to the monolithic European theater and its demands—General Sullivan noted that under his watch it was made clear to those in charge that “[t]here [was] no answer written on a tablet” (as quoted in Dabrowski 2008:240). He and his senior-level colleagues were thus not reactivating prior forms, meanings, and practices; they were, in his words, “trying to invent something” (p. 240). What they were ‘trying to invent’ was an Army optimized for “activities ranging from construction of

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a schoolhouse in Micronesia to sophisticated ground/air combat in [Southwest Asia].”²¹ What was sought was an Army capable of responding across a range of contingencies—an Army that values and develops those unique aspects of the post-Cold War logic provided in Table 3-1.

As noted, the meanings, values, identities, and practices that characterize the post-Cold War logic distinctly differ from those that prevailed in the Cold War era (Moskos 2000). Accepting that “[t]rue revolutions in military affairs… require new… doctrines” (Kagan 1997:xii), one would expect that as the post-Cold War logic took shape, military organizations would—if contributing to the change effort—propose, develop, and disseminate doctrine that accepted the range of activities suggested previously. Various ‘operations other than war’ would, to borrow from Williams (2000:266), be endorsed as “firmly in the mainstream of military missions.” As demonstrated in Figure 3-3—providing a reproduction of a graphic included in a variety of senior-level Army briefings taking place between June 1991 and June 1993—this was precisely the proposed change in scope for U.S. Army doctrine in the early years of the post-Cold War era.

Figure 3-3. Proposed Change in Scope of U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, 1991

Whereas the 1986 edition of the Army’s *Operations* manual is noted to provide the foundational concepts governing the Army’s involvement in war, the proposed 1993 update was developed to include those ideas and practices that regulate the Army’s role in low-intensity conflicts, and even during peacetime competition. This proposed change came to fruition in the June 1993 update of FM 100-5 (see HQDA 1993)—the first edition of the Army’s keystone doctrine published in the post-Cold War era. Figure 3-4, a reproduction of the Figure titled “Range of Military Operations in the Theater Strategic Environment” in that manual, exemplifies the change. With explicit descriptions of the goals, distinction of the type of military operations

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Source: 1991 TRADOC brief

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(specifying operations as either ‘war’ or ‘other than war’), and examples, the range of operations addressed in 1993 observably differs from the limited focus on war present in the manual throughout the Cold War era. The significance of this change is perhaps best demonstrated by observed changes to the principles to which the Army is oriented and by which it is organized.

**Figure 3-4.** Range of Military Operations, as Provided in FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES OF THE ENVIRONMENT</th>
<th>GOAL</th>
<th>MILITARY OPERATIONS</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>Fight and Win</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>- Large-scale combat operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Defend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Deter War and Resolve Conflict</td>
<td>Other Than War</td>
<td>- Strikes and raids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Peace enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Support to insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Antiterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- NEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime</td>
<td>Promote Peace</td>
<td>Other Than War</td>
<td>- Counterdrug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Disaster relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Civil support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Peace building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Nation assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The states of peacetime, conflict, and war could all exist at once in the theater commander’s strategic environment. He can respond to environments with a wide range of military operations. Noncombat operations might occur during war, just as some operations other than war might require combat.

Reproduced from FM 100-5, *Operations* (HQDA 1993:2-1)

As Theodore Ropp ([1959] 1962:12) contends, “[w]hen soldiers speak of the ‘principles of war,’ they are referring to… the maxims of the soldier’s trade.” Throughout the Cold War, the
Army endorsed nine principles of war, formally codifying them in FM 100-5. In the last version of the manual published in the Cold War era, it was noted that though “[t]he original principles of war adopted by [the] Army [between the World Wars] have been slightly revised… they have essentially stood the tests of analysis, experimentation and practice” (HQDA 1986:173). Seven years later, in the 1993 update, doctrine writers formally acknowledged that “the Army must supplement these with three principles more suited to… noncombat operations” (HQDA 1993:13-3): perseverance, “the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims”; legitimacy, “sustain[ing] the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions”; and restraint, the application of the “appropriate military capability prudently” (p. 13-4). By 1998, senior Army leaders were reconsidering the distinction between principles of war and operations other than war and proposing, instead, a single set of “principles of operations” (Glenn 1998). The post-Cold War logic, it seems, was firmly taking root in an organizationally, and indeed institutionally, meaningful text and, presumably, in the minds of those actors tasked with its development. So significant were such changes to the field of the armed forces during this period that one U.S. Navy Commander suggested in 2000 that “the basic military ethic, obedient and unselfish service to the state, is, perhaps, the only consistent principle remaining in the post-Cold War military” (Trainor 2000:1). The military establishment generally, and the Army specifically, were indeed becoming “something qualitatively different” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:148).

**A STAGE FOR CHANGE AND A SITE FOR ANALYSIS**

As U.S. Army Major Robert A. Doughty suggested (1979:47), “one cannot simply erect a new doctrine, organize new formations, and procure new equipment without an intense effort to
redirect the thinking of individuals in the Army” (emphasis added). True doctrinal transformations, this quote suggests, rely on institutional work. Moreover, he notes, if the U.S. Army doctrinal changes he assessed—those occurring between 1946 and 1976—“have a consistent theme, it is the earnest and sincere objection by individuals in and out of the system that the envisioned changes were tampering with the sacrosanct and should be halted or greatly modified” (p. 47). Here again we see implicit reference to neoinstitutional observations. First, ‘incumbents’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2012) or ‘status quo defenders’ (Misangyi, Weaver, and Elms 2008)—those individuals who sincerely object to proposed changes—are, and must be understood to be, part of the “institutional story” (Suddaby 2010). Significant change projects face opposition, thus the need for discursive institutional work if the changes are to be successful—the need, as Major Doughty (1979) notes, ‘to redirect the thinking’ of others. Second, both internal and external stakeholders—those ‘individuals in and out of the system’ referenced by Major Doughty (1979)—are of significant import in institutional work occurring in organizational settings. As Gawer and Phillips (2013) contend, institutional work occurring at the organizational level entails both external work intended to influence the attitudes and perceptions of organizational-external stakeholders, as well as internal work focused on shaping the attitudes, values, beliefs, and perceptions of organizational members. Thus, while “[t]rue revolutions in military affairs… require new… doctrines” (Kagan 1997:xii), it is my contention that true doctrinal change requires internal and external institutional work.

23 Through his assessment of U.S. Army doctrinal development during this period, Major Doughty’s (1979) primary conclusion supports the periodization described above and presented in Table 3-1. Specifically, he concludes by stating that “[e]ven though all of America’s military conflicts since World War II have been outside Europe,” the Army has “invariably refocused [its] concerns after these conflicts upon the defense of Western Europe. And doctrine for the postwar [post-World War II] Army has centered on a European-type battlefield” (p. 46).
In his in-depth review of Army doctrinal history, Kretchik (2011:169) characterizes editions of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, published at certain pivotal moments in the organization’s history as not only an organizational guide for action, but also “a political statement… addressing both internal and external audiences”—an organizationally and institutionally meaningful text that is “designed to convince.” As U.S. Army Captain Timothy Lupfer (1981:viii) keenly observed, “doctrine that influences nothing beyond the printing press is stillborn”—that is, organizationally and institutionally inconsequential. To capture the discursive institutional work engaged in by senior Army leaders in support of sweeping organizational and institutional change, I must, then, afford attention not only to the doctrine produced—its development, dissemination, and consumption—but also the institutional work involved with breathing life into it. In addition to considering the Army’s keystone field manual as a rhetorical artifact, I thus ask: Where are the other ‘political statements’? As a study of institutional work necessitates, my analysis of such statements seeks to answer the following: What do they say, and why? What meaning does their form and content have for the audience? How do they relate to each other? To what and to whom do they respond? What do they create? What do they maintain? What do they disrupt? How do they perform *work*? These are the questions I address in the remainder of this dissertation. With an explicit focus on the period encompassing General Gordon R. Sullivan’s tenure as U.S. Army Chief of Staff from June 1991 to June 1995, I ask:

What discursive practices were employed by the U.S. Army’s senior leadership in the early years of the ‘campaign’ to replace the uniquely Cold War institutional logic with a distinctly post-Cold War logic?

In light of the contemporary Army’s doctrinal orientation and General Sullivan’s conceptualization of doctrine as ‘the engine of change,’ I also ask the following:
How is the Army’s keystone doctrinal manual—its development, circulation, and consumption—relied on to perform institutional work?

In the chapter that follows, I describe the data I analyzed and the research methods I employed. I also describe where I found various ‘political statements’ that shaped the change campaign and doctrine development process. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, I present the findings from my empirical analysis. In the final chapter, I present an organization-centric model of institutional logic change that responds to the questions posed above. Therein, I describe how institutional work carried out at the organizational level—by the Army’s senior leadership—not only led to the development and entrenchment of a post-Cold War logic within the United States Army, but had broader implications for the institutional field of the armed forces.
CHAPTER 4
DATA AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

Recent developments in organizational and neoinstitutional theory have been well-served by theoretically grounded narrative analyses (e.g., Berman 2012; Nigam and Ocasio 2010; Ran and Golden 2011; Swan et al. 2010). Such analyses are well-suited for studies of institutional work as they focus on the ordered and temporal dimensions of events, choices, and most notably, activities (Langley 1999). To explore the discursive activities—that is, the institutional work—engaged in by the U.S. Army’s senior leadership in the early years of the post-Cold War era, I thus assembled for this dissertation a dataset that sheds light on choices made, the events they construct and to which they respond, and the discursive activities that both influenced and were developed in response to those choices. My development of a narrative account of the Army’s response to and participation in the development of an emerging post-Cold War force, however, necessitated extensive consideration of materials beyond the dataset I assembled. Simply stated, “[a]ll discursive practices have historical specificity” (Clegg 1998:29). A common plea among historians, then, is for the researcher to interpret the data as situated in the context within which they are produced, circulated, and understood (Scott 1990); a necessity echoed by military historians more specifically (e.g., Jessup and Coakley 1988), sociological theorists (e.g., Reed 2009), organizational sociologists (e.g., Vaughan 1996), organization communication scholars (e.g., Symon 2008), qualitative researchers (e.g., Denzin [1970] 1989), and social science researchers promoting case study methodologies (e.g., George and Bennett 2005). The findings I report in the chapters that follow were thus made possible not only through my systematic analysis of the data described in this chapter, but through my interpretation of the
meanings these materials had for the actors who produced, circulated, and consumed them. To situate the socio-historical context of interest, I consulted a variety of sources including publications of historians and social scientists concerned with the U.S. military establishment generally, and military change and the Cold War/post-Cold War eras specifically; ¹ official publications of the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff (such as the “National Security Strategy,” “National Military Strategy,” and Joint operations doctrine) produced prior to and during the period of interest; editions of FM 100-5, Operations, and other influential Army manuals published in the years leading up to and throughout the period of my observation; and articles from various U.S. military journals including Military Review (“The Professional Journal of the United States Army”), Parameters (“The U.S. Army War College Quarterly”), and Army (“The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army”) published prior to and throughout General Sullivan’s appointment as Army Chief of Staff. As Symon (2008:79) contends, such consultation is essential, as “we must understand the organizational context in which [discourse] was produced” if we are “[t]o understand the rhetoric and appreciate how it functions as political and persuasive discourse.”

In the section that follows, I describe the dataset I assembled. Following a description of each data source I analyzed, I describe some of the strengths and weaknesses of these data. I conclude this chapter with a description of the analytical strategy I employed.

**DATA: SOURCES AND COMMENTS**

As noted previously, Army transformations rely on the organization’s senior leaders “decid[ing] on a way ahead, wrap[ing] up debate, and market[ing] the transformation inside the Army and out” (Brown 2011:17)—an assemblage of practices neoinstitutional scholars might recognize as institutional work. To identify data sources for this dissertation, I thus sought out archival materials that influenced decision-making processes, circulated among various venues in which debates about transformation took place, and supported the promotion of change or stability to organizational internal and external stakeholders. As demonstrated in Table 4-1 and detailed below, this effort resulted in the identification and inclusion of both open-archival materials (those maintained at a single facility, but made available to the public) and open-published materials (those printed and circulated for public consumption) (Scott 1990).

Table 4-1. Data Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Open-archival</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army TRADOC Military History and Heritage Office (non-classified archives)</td>
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<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Open-published</strong></td>
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<td>Military Review</td>
<td>Issue</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Published Book</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Oral History of General Gordon R. Sullivan</td>
<td>Interview Transcript</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Oral History of General William W. Hartzog</td>
<td>Interview Transcript</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Open-archival Source

As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) “adopts the spirit and intention of institutional adaptation that will enable it to assist the Army in meeting its strategic focus” (U.S. Army TRADOC 2011). Moreover, TRADOC was the Army command tasked with the development of the 1993 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*. As Romjue (1997) demonstrates, TRADOC (most notably General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., serving as TRADOC Commander from August 1991 to October 1994) thus played a central role in influencing decision-making processes, managing debates, and even marketing change to internal and external stakeholders. Various actions taken by members of TRADOC, he notes, were highly influential in “build[ing] Army debate and discussion” (p. 43), “stimulating thinking” (p. 50), and “energetically support[ing]… all-important consensus-gathering” (p. 110). I thus include various textual materials produced by or circulated within TRADOC from June 1991 to June 1995.

In June 2013 I conducted archival research at the TRADOC Military History and Heritage Office (MHHO) at Headquarters, U.S. Army TRADOC, Fort Eustis, Virginia. Though I accessed material from various records groups maintained at the MHHO, the majority of the data I analyzed for this dissertation were provided as supporting documents for TRADOC Annual Command Histories prepared in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995. These Histories provide an annual narrative account of the activities conducted by the Training and Doctrine Command. As described in the 1994 History,

The Annual Command History consists of the narrative volume, supplemented by several volumes of supporting documents produced in one set only. The narrative volume provides a perspective on the year's significant activities from the
commander level. Sources for the history consist of the headquarters correspondence, study and planning documents, oral interviews, and a series of semiannual staff historical reports. The latter reports outline, from staff-agency perspective, the hundreds of development projects and initiatives for which Headquarters TRADOC was responsible, and are maintained as an important component of the total year’s history (Stensvaag 1996:n.p.).

Though I accessed thousands of documents at the MHHO, I photographed for analysis those that addressed Army development, change, and continuity; the post-Cold War era; doctrinal development of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, and other supporting manuals; and other materials that were produced or circulated between June 1991 and June 1995 that relate to the general questions of interest I address in this dissertation.\(^2\) I then converted these photographs to digital documents to be analyzed in-depth at a later date. In total, I copied 311 documents with more than 3,800 pages of material (document counts by document categories are provided in Figure 4-2 later in this chapter). The vast majority of this material—such as conference, meeting and briefing materials, and official and unofficial communication—was originally produced for private, not public, consumption. These data thus largely enable observations of discursive practices occurring ‘behind-the-scenes’ as the Army initiated its transition from a Cold War to post-Cold War force.

\(^2\) The TRADOC MHHO data include one exception to the dates listed here: an oral history interview conducted with General William W. Hartzog (TRADOC commander from October 1994 to December 1998) near the end of his term at TRADOC in 1998. In this interview, General Hartzog recalls his experience and role in the change process during the last year of General Sullivan’s tenure as Chief of Staff.
Open-published Sources

Of all the actors involved in the change process, General Gordon R. Sullivan, as Army Chief of Staff, “did more than any other single person to get Army transformation as it came to be defined under way” (Brown 2011:3). I thus analyzed the documents provided in *The Collected Works of the Thirty-second Chief of Staff, United States Army: June 1991 – June 1995* (Sullivan 1996; hereafter, *The Collected Works*). This volume is a 456-page collection of materials produced and circulated by General Sullivan during his tenure as Chief of Staff from June 1991 to June 1995. In the Preface, General Sullivan describes *The Collected Works* in the following manner: “This volume… is a compilation of the words and writings that have expressed my thoughts and my emotions over the four years I was privileged to serve as the Army’s thirty-second Chief of Staff” (p. v). This 124-document collection is divided into three types of works and includes 61 speeches and statements, 38 letters and messages to the Army’s general officers (the Army’s most senior-level officers),\(^3\) and 25 monographs, articles, and interviews published in various venues during his time as Chief of Staff. Where the MHHO documents provide insight into institutional work occurring largely in private, *The Collected Works* provides a collection of materials that reflect both relatively private (in the form of letters to the Army’s general officers) and public forms of communication (in the form of speeches and published works targeting both internal and external stakeholders).

While analyses of General Sullivan’s works offer insight into the institutional work engaged in by the Army’s most senior uniformed leader, Brown’s (2011:17) suggestion that Army leaders have to “wrap up debate” to effect change suggests a lack of consensus within the

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\(^3\) General officers include all officers with a rank above colonel to include brigadier generals (one-star generals), major generals (two-star generals), lieutenant generals (three-star generals), and generals (four-star generals).
organization more broadly prior to the successful conclusion of any change project. Lending insight into the shared perceptions and highly contentious topics prevalent in a given field, trade journals are a valuable resource in research concerned with field-level consensus, stability, and change (Hoffman 1999; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, and Caronna 2000). *Military Review* (published monthly through November 1994, and bimonthly thereafter)—distinguished as “The Professional Journal of the United States Army”—is produced by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and has been suggested to be a source capable of lending insight into Army thinking to include consensus and topics of debate (Brown 1996; Kretchik 2011; Van Fleet and Yukl 1986). I thus analyzed all issues of *Military Review* published from June 1991 to June 1995, analyzing in-depth those contributions that address organizational- and field-level change and continuity, doctrinal development, the post-Cold War force, and other contributions that directly or indirectly relate to my interests expressed above. With my general interest in the transition from a narrowly Soviet-focused Army to one prepared to engage in “military operations other than war,” the article counts reported in Figure 4-1—tracking contributions focusing on the Soviet Union (or Russia), future army, War on Drugs, and peacekeeping from 1985 to 1995—demonstrate some of the observable shifts in attention occurring during the period of my analysis, thus validating my inclusion of this source. As the focus on the Soviet Union diminished (see Figure 4-1a), the journal emerged as a discursive space for issues dealing with the Army’s future (see Figure 4-1b). Moreover, as the Army began its transition from force to forces (as described

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4 The article counts reported in Figure 4-1 are calculated using the annual subject index provided in the December (or November-December 1995) issue of *Military Review*.

5 Beginning in the last half of 1987, *Military Review* included articles published in the category “future war,” with the article count increasing each year until 1989. My decision to report article counts for the “future Army” category only (first appearing in 1990) was influenced by the larger shift in attention suggested by differentiating between the future of war and the Army of the future, the latter of which is the focus of this dissertation.
in Chapter 3), it is notable that articles dealing explicitly with “operations other than war” emerged—such as those concerned with the War on Drugs and peacekeeping (see Figures 4-1c and 4-1d).6

**Figure 4-1. Military Review Article Count by Subject: Soviet Union (USSR)/Russia, Future Army, War on Drugs, and Peacekeeping, 1985-1995**

<table>
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<th>a. USSR / Russia</th>
<th>b. Future Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><img src="image2" alt="Graph" /></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. War on Drugs</th>
<th>d. Peacekeeping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Graph" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The mission of *Military Review* (as stated throughout the time period for which I analyzed the journal’s contents) “is to provide a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military

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6 Though the emergent concern with the War on Drugs in 1990 was undoubtedly influenced by formal initiatives endorsed by President George Bush just one year prior (most notably the Andean Initiative that formalized the military’s mission in the fight against drugs), it is noteworthy that the U.S. military had maintained a direct role in the “War” since 1983, and the Department of Defense a significant role since 1981 (see Zirnite 1997).
affairs; to focus on concepts, doctrine and warfighting at the tactical and operational levels of war; and to support the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms and the Command and General Staff College” (U.S. Army CGSC 1991:n.p.).

With a primary audience of senior company and field grade officers (officers between the ranks of second lieutenant and colonel, as differentiated from general officers), and the majority of contributors being active duty soldiers, the journal uniquely provides insight into the organizationally internal debate and dialogue occurring in the Cold War’s wake. As Hoffman (1999:356) notes, however, such journals not only “act as a historical record of key issues and events as perceived from within,” they “are themselves organizational players whose output influences issue interpretation and is subject to the political pressures exerted by powerful figures.” Indeed, the issues of Military Review I analyzed include numerous contributions from General Sullivan and other senior Army officers intended to instruct and enlighten the journal’s readership (Brown 1996). Moreover, as military historians have observed, the forum and contents of Military Review have contributed—in both formal and informal ways—to the development, dissemination, and justification of FM 100-5, Operations (e.g., Brown 1996; Krepinevich 1986; Kretchik 2011; Romjue 1997). I thus analyzed Military Review in an effort to identify the situated perspectives of its audience and the rhetorical properties of its content.

In addition to the larger collections of data described above, my data include four additional publications. With my focus on the Army’s development of its keystone doctrine, I analyzed the version of FM 100-5, Operations, published in 1993 (HQDA 1993). Additionally, I treat the book Hope Is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America’s Army (Sullivan and Harper 1996; hereafter Hope Is Not a Method) as an important data source. This book, published in the year following General Sullivan’s tenure as Army Chief of Staff, was co-
authored by General Sullivan and Colonel Michael V. Harper, his strategic planner who played a central role in the Army’s transition toward a post-Cold War force (as stated by General Sullivan (Dabrowski 2008)). As described on the back cover of the book:

In *Hope Is Not a Method*, Sullivan and Harper provide an overview of their strategy, complete with anecdotal examples of how it was carried out and thoughts on the meaning of leadership and a commitment to shared values, how to identify objectives and maintain a long-term vision, when to challenge the status quo, and how to invest in and nurture employees. *Hope Is Not a Method* is a program for change that provides lessons and tactics that all business people can benefit from (Sullivan and Harper 1996:cover).

With detailed descriptions of what actions were taken during the change process and why, I treat this data source as a (co-authored) memoir. Moreover, embedded throughout the text are 14 narrative accounts authored exclusively by General Sullivan. These accounts, ranging from two to six pages in length, detail his thought processes, concerns, and actions throughout his time as Army Chief of Staff focusing intently on the change process.

Lastly, I include two published interview transcripts. In support of the Senior Officer Oral History Program, the U.S. Army Military History Institute has published oral histories for Generals Sullivan and William W. Hartzog (who served as TRADOC commander from October 1994 to December 1998). *An Oral History of General Gordon R. Sullivan* (Dabrowski 2008) is a 319-page verbatim transcription of a series of tape-recorded interviews with then-retired General Sullivan conducted between February and June 2002, and in November 2008. Though these interviews include discussions of various aspects of General Sullivan’s life before, during, and after his Army service, there is extensive discussion of his vision of, and role in, Army
development and change as the Army Chief of Staff from 1991 to 1995; commentary on the
development of FM 100-5 (1993); details about his idea of what TRADOC is and should be as
an organization; and descriptions of his relationship with the TRADOC commanding generals
and TRADOC organizations. Similarly, An Oral History of General William W. Hartzog
(Dabrowski 2004), including transcriptions of interviews conducted in April and May 2004,
includes a discussion of General Hartzog’s time and experience as the commanding general of
TRADOC, the earliest year of which was during General Sullivan’s time as Chief of Staff.

Data: Overview and Comments

As demonstrated in Figure 4-2, the majority of the data I analyzed were issues of Military
Review; official reports, fact sheets, or white papers; official communication (primarily in the
form of memoranda from and to various individuals and groups (MHHO) or letters to the
Army’s general officers (The Collected Works)); statements, speeches, addresses, and remarks
(primarily delivered by General Sullivan during his tenure as Chief of Staff (The Collected
Works) and Generals Frederick M. Franks, Jr. and William W. Hartzog during their terms as
TRADOC commander (MHHO)); and conference, meeting, and briefing materials including, for
example, “read-ahead” material provided to conference attendees in preparation for an upcoming
meeting, briefing slides and notes, and meeting minutes. Among those data less prevalent (with
20 or fewer documents of each type) are industry publications, interview transcripts,
memoranda for record, personal correspondence, draft TRADOC publications, and TRADOC
organizational brochures and news releases.

7 Because I include in my data all issues of Military Review published during General Sullivan’s tenure as
Chief of Staff, the industry publication count reported in Figure 4-2 excludes the six Military Review
articles authored by General Sullivan and reproduced in The Collected Works.
While the data I analyzed are well-positioned to allow me to address the questions posed above, they are not without limitations. First and foremost, a reliance on archival data for organizational analysis inherently includes a reliance on a collection of materials that is selective and partial. When consulting documents, one must be aware that those accessible have in most cases (and remarkably so in the context of the military (Demma 1988)) been subject to a ‘weeding’ process in which “the weeders… decide not only which documents are likely to be of value to historians but also whether any are too politically sensitive to be released into a public archive” (Scott 1990:25; see also Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest 1966). Document analysis thus necessitates that the researcher ask (likely unanswerable) questions regarding “Who saved them and why?” and “Who sorted them and how?” (Tuchman 1998:254) In considering

### Figure 4-2. Data Document Count by Type and Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Type</th>
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<th>The Collected Works</th>
<th>Independent Published Source</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Field Manual 100-5, Operations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memoir (Hope Is Not a Method)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOC Brochure, News Release</td>
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<tr>
<td>Draft TRADOC Publication</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Correspondence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Memorandum for Record</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview Transcript, Published Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Review (Issue)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Official Report, Fact Sheet, White Paper</td>
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<td>Official Communication</td>
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<td>Statement, Speech, Address, Remarks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conference, Meeting, Briefing Materials</td>
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While the data I analyzed are well-positioned to allow me to address the questions posed above, they are not without limitations. First and foremost, a reliance on archival data for organizational analysis inherently includes a reliance on a collection of materials that is selective and partial. When consulting documents, one must be aware that those accessible have in most cases (and remarkably so in the context of the military (Demma 1988)) been subject to a ‘weeding’ process in which “the weeders… decide not only which documents are likely to be of value to historians but also whether any are too politically sensitive to be released into a public archive” (Scott 1990:25; see also Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest 1966). Document analysis thus necessitates that the researcher ask (likely unanswerable) questions regarding “Who saved them and why?” and “Who sorted them and how?” (Tuchman 1998:254) In considering
such questions with regards to the archival data I analyzed, I am able to shed light on both limitations and benefits of the data.

The material published in *The Collected Works*—much of it Army internal documents (such as letters to general officers) that were not originally intended for public consumption—is most certainly a selective record compiled after-the-fact with the public audience in mind. It was because of this that I turned to the MHHO to locate a more un-tempered source of data. To be sure, the MHHO data I accessed and analyzed are selective and partial. Indeed, my access to materials at the Office was limited to those housed in the non-classified section of the archive.

As a direct result of a formal weeding process, those documents that maintained a security classification were unavailable as they have been determined to be ‘too politically sensitive to be released into a public archive.’ It is also true, however, that analyses of organizational change is often difficult, as formal organizations often “fail to record or retain much data on their decision processes and activities” (Barley and Tolbert 1997:105; see also Vaughan 1996). Fortunately for my analysis, the TRADOC Military History and Heritage Office was developed with the explicit mission of combating this all-to-common failure within the command. The Annual Command Histories produced and maintained by the MHHO reflect a continuous written record of TRADOC since its establishment in July 1973.

[They fulfill] the Command's regulatory requirement to the Army Historical Program. TRADOC's annual histories provide current and future Army planners, decision makers, and researchers a detailed record and historical perspective on the work of the Army's overall development agency from the end of the Vietnam War, through the Army reform era of the 1970s-1980s and the end of the Cold War, to the onset of the new strategic era of the 1990s (Stensvaag 1996:n.p.).
The supporting documents for these histories—the material that composes the majority of the archival collection I analyzed—thus provide a unique data source with which I can explore, to a degree often not possible, the ‘decision processes and activities’ that are regularly lost to history in other organizational contexts.

Just as archival materials are selective, so too is the material provided in professional journals such as Military Review. As Hoffman (1999:356) notes, coverage within such journals “is, by definition, a biased interpretation of events and issues, where the bias reflects the interests of a journal’s core readers and its sources of information.” While this reality may serve as a limitation for other studies, this inherent bias serves my interests. Any study of institutional logics and institutional work is expressly a study of the attention—and more specifically the institutionally ‘situated perspectives’—of the producers and consumers of discourse (see Chapter 2). It is thus precisely the biases of Military Review that render the publication useful for this dissertation.

ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

Similar to Catino and Patriotta (2013:444), my analysis was both deductive and inductive, drawing on “a minimal conceptual framework” grounded in neoinstitutional theory. To be sure, my application of this theoretical perspective allows the orientation to perform work itself as it ‘rules in’ certain observations and ‘rules out’ others. Having selected a case and assembled a dataset capable of exposing internal and external institutional work practices, I thus presumed such work would be present and observable in the data. Relying on a ‘minimal conceptual framework,’ however, I also believed the form, content, and intertextual dimensions of that work would be discoverable only through an inductive analytical process. The initial stages of my
analysis thus involved a relatively traditional qualitative analytical strategy of identifying in the data particular themes, the categories that compose them, and the larger patterns they signal (Janesick 1998).

As suggested by Berg (1998:226), qualitative analyses call for researchers to explore the “surface structure” of the data—that is, for example, key terms, phrases, concepts, stories, and references that are physically present in the data—and “the deep structural meaning” expressed in that surface structure. To identify this ‘surface structure,’ my initial reading included an open coding strategy in which I identified in the data particular statements and representations. Using NVivo qualitative analysis software, I assigned limited textual passages and visual materials to in vivo codes where possible (applying the meaningful and descriptive language used by the producer of the text) and descriptive coding elsewhere (summarizing the general topic addressed in the data) (Saldana 2009). As an “expanding procedure” involving the development and re-development of codes and the creation of research memos that allowed me to “sort and weigh up… interim results” by considering the ‘deep structural meaning’ of the datum for its producers and audience, this initial open coding strategy allowed me to identify, with some clarity, a set of concepts that “are important for [my] own questions and therefore require deeper analysis” (Bohm 2004:271).

Revisiting the coded material, a second stage of coding thus involved both recoding the raw data as my ideas about and understanding of the data developed alongside my coding of them, and moving from codes to categories. As Saldana (2009:8) suggests, such axial coding involves the “organiz[ation] and group[ing] [of] similarly coded data into categories or ‘families’ because they share some characteristic.” Axial coding processes, however, persisted throughout the latter stages of my analysis. Just as this stage involved the reconsideration of codes
developed during open coding, the categories developed in this stage of the process were consistently reconsidered as the ‘story’—as I came to understand it—unfolded. Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin (1998:174) are certainly correct in observing that the researcher is always in the process of “becoming increasingly theoretically sensitized… largely through the continuing conversation with ‘the data.’” Nonetheless, as categories assumed a solidified presence in my understanding of the emergent ‘story,’ I began to consider their presence, meaning, and power in physical (in reference to the audience) and temporal space. Accompanied by a continued reconsideration of the categories themselves and a persistent review and scrutiny of applicable theoretical literature, these considerations enabled the development of thematic and theoretical codes supporting the development of a theoretically grounded narrative analysis of the emergent change process.

In a manner similar to that employed by Nigam and Ocasio (2010:829) in their analysis of changes to the health care industry spurred by President Clinton’s health care reform initiative, I “integrated [my] formal coding into a narrative account”; a process that “provid[es] systematic rigor” (p. 828) to the analysis of any event or change project’s life course. As my understanding of the discursive institutional work I observed developed, I thus relied on a (re)turn to both the data and literature in the field to facilitate interpretation. This ‘theoretical sensitivity’ and ‘constant conversation with the data’ (Strauss and Corbin 1998) was intended to avoid the losses in specificity and oversimplifications that are suggested to characterize much case study research as the researcher moves away from the data and toward theoretical abstraction (George and Bennett 2005). The narrative account of institutional work I provide in the chapters that follow was thus enabled by inductive and deductive processes occurring simultaneously; a process that
Langley (1999) notes to be remarkably effective for studies of organizational change, yet often shied away from by social scientists more generally.

To be sure, “the actual act of reaching theory is much more complex and messy” than the relatively sterilized version implied here and elsewhere (Saldana 2009:11). Moreover, the research process, especially a process of socio-historical analysis, is always fraught with tough decisions that necessitate the acknowledgment of the limitations they affect (Denzin [1970] 1989; George and Bennett 2005; Scott 1990). Nonetheless, as Reed (2011:171) contends, for those researching in the human sciences “[t]he instructions for the traveler are, in the end, rather simple: build a good ship, bring as many books and maps as you can, and try to understand the people you meet, as a way to explain why they do what they do.” To this end, I present my findings—my observations and interpretations of who did what and why—in the remaining chapters of this dissertation.

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8 I discuss some limitations of the decisions made and research methods employed in this dissertation in Chapter 8.
CHAPTER 5

TOWARD A CONTEXT FOR CHANGE: ENVIRONMENT WORK

With his tenure as U.S. Army Chief of Staff drawing to a close in June 1995, General Gordon R. Sullivan, along with a member of his personal staff—Lieutenant Colonel Anthony M. Coroalles—outlined what they perceived to be the most important elements of the change strategy initiated by the Army’s senior leaders in the Cold War’s immediate aftermath. “Making change happen,” they suggested, involved:

- Understanding the Environment
- Articulating a Vision
- Developing Consensus for Change
- Creating a Learning Organization
- Fostering Innovation and Growth
- Establishing a Convincing Demonstration of Value
- Implementing (Resourcing) the Change.¹

Articulated in verb form, these elements of the change strategy represent institutional work as they identify deliberate efforts intended to disrupt and replace the taken-for-granted characteristics of Army organization, identity, and practice—efforts intended to challenge and in time replace “the fundamental assumptions of the profession.”² The strategy outlined was thus

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² Ibid., 416.
not intended to make physical changes to the force to accommodate downsizing and budget constraints imposed by Congress, but rather to begin the “difficult and challenging journey” to achieve “a change in orientation.” Indeed, General Sullivan stated in a number of speeches and publications that the emerging post-Cold War force would not be “just a smaller version of the Cold War Army.” The Army’s senior leaders were less interested in establishing a force quantitatively different from that of the Cold War era, focusing instead on creating “something qualitatively different” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:148)—that is, seeking to disrupt and replace the prevailing Cold War logic.

Though the actions cited above are seemingly ordered—beginning with understanding the environment and ending with implementing change—my observations reported in this dissertation demonstrate that the process of significant military change, as military scholars have suggested, is not sequentially rigid (e.g., Lupfer 1981). Though some of the institutional work practices I identified and describe herein changed in character across time, each of those I report on persisted throughout the four-year period of observation. My findings thus support the contention that significant military change occurs across lengthy periods of time extending well beyond a single Chief of Staff’s four-year tenure (e.g., Nielsen 2010).

To be sure, U.S. military organizations are presently confronted with and continuously involved in the development and refinement of uniquely post-Cold War forms, practices, and meanings (Gerras and Wong 2013; Johnsen 2014). Significant military transformations often

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3 Ibid., 416.

take decades to materialize (Nielsen 2010). General Sullivan was well-aware that change efforts undertaken during his time as Chief of Staff were not capable of completing the transformational changes he sought. His focus was thus on implementing a process that would enable and support ongoing change efforts beyond his time in service (Dabrowski 2008; Sullivan and Harper 1996). As he told General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Commanding General of TRADOC, in a letter in 1993, “I expect to... begin a... process of change that will go beyond our tenure.”5 Recall, then, that those institutional work practices I describe in this dissertation are representative of deliberate efforts undertaken to make change possible. As General Sullivan recalled during his final year as Chief of Staff, “my job, as the leader, was to create conditions for change... my legacy as a leader would be the process and some way stations—not an end state.”6 The findings I report in this chapter and the chapters that follows are thus less concerned with institutionalization as a condition—that is, an outcome—focusing instead on elaborating our understanding of attempts to institutionalize—that is, institutionalization as a process.

INSTITUTIONAL WORK: OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS

Recall that the key defining characteristics of institutional work are effort and intentionality. As Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca (2009:17) explain, an adequate exploration of institutional work necessitates “understanding the conditions and motivations that lead to [institutional work], the practices and strategies that constitute it, and its effects, intended and


otherwise.” Before describing in detail the practices and strategies I identified and their intended effects (the focus of the remaining chapters of this dissertation), I describe here the motivations for institutional work revealed in the data I analyzed.

Motivations for Institutional Work

Numerous military scholars note that at the dawn of the post-Cold War era there was a significant amount of resistance within the Army’s ranks to the organization’s reorientation from a warfighting to a warfighting-peacekeeping organization (e.g., Brown 2011; Davidson 2010; Hajjar 2014; Macgregor 1997; Owens 2002). This resistance is reported to have been most significant within the officer corps, as these Army leaders had been subjected to extensive professional education grounded in the Cold War logic (Linn 2007; Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995). Martin Cook (2005:686) articulates the issue well with the following observation:

The core jurisdiction of the Army… [was] large-scale armored and combined arms land warfare throughout the Cold War… and the culture, values, and professional standards of the Army remained linked to that core jurisdictional function… One sees that individuals raised in that professional culture may well experience professional confusion and uncertainty in the face of new and different tasks. So much of their professional self-understanding was bound to those tasks. So much of their body of professional knowledge, expertise, and agreed-upon ways of functioning were tied to that context.

The data I analyzed show that those leaders most heavily involved in the change process were aware of (or in the least perceived the presence of) the ‘confusion’ and ‘uncertainty’ referenced here.
Early in the period of my analysis, General Franks observed that the dramatic changes pushed for by the Army’s senior leadership were “tough for an Army that feels good about what it has accomplished.” As Linn (2007:224) notes, Army officers at the time generally believed that their Army—the Army that was the victor in the Cold War and won decisively in Desert Storm—was, as the organization’s slogan implied, “the best trained, best led, and best equipped army in the world.” In turn, General Sullivan reported near the end of his term as Chief of Staff that a call he “heard over and over” during his time as the Army’s senior uniformed leader was: “‘for God’s sake Chief, don’t change anything!’” (emphasis in original). It was thus the (perceived) hesitance to accept, uncertainty about, and resistance to change among stakeholders that led the Army’s leaders to embark upon a concerted effort to “[build] the type of consensus required to effect lasting change.” These leaders believed that such a change effort necessitated that they “communicate constantly” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:132) and strategically leverage “the entire communications spectrum” (p. 173) in order to (as Durant (2007:247) suggests of such efforts) “diffuse[e] and impos[e] their perceptions of problems and solutions upon other actors.” This is the motivation for the institutional work practices and strategies I describe below.

**Categories of Institutional Work**

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Through my analysis of the data described in Chapter 4, I identified a variety of forms of discursive institutional work that coalesce into three broad categories: environment work, organizational identity work, and institutional logic work. The first two categories, those of environment work and organizational identity work (which I describe in this chapter and the chapter that follows), support the change process as they collectively establish a context within which significant organizational change is made possible, rendered desirable, and given direction. The latter category, that of institutional logic work (the subject of Chapter 7), involves those efforts explicitly intended to manipulate the institutional logic that guides thought, action, and identity within the organization and, through a process of textualization, within the broader institutional field of the armed forces.

What I identify as environment work involves efforts intended to creatively construct an extra-organizational environment that legitimately demands change, and an intra-organizational environment that is hospitable to the change project. These efforts focus on establishing environmental conditions within which change is understood to be necessary, valued, and the accepted responsibility of knowledgeable and capable organizational actors. Organizational identity work entails the resourceful management of emergent claims regarding central and enduring characteristics of the organization. Specifically, these efforts involve establishing a vision of the organization’s future and constructing a new organizational identity in support of that vision. Institutional logic work involves the establishment, formalization, and embedding of a distinct set of organizing principles, practices, and symbols that differs from that which previously prevailed. These efforts include the development, textualization, and entrenchment of distinct characteristics of a proto-institutional logic—that is, a distinct set of principles, practices and symbols that is proposed, but not institutionalized and fully adopted in the field. As
organizational scholars suggest and I demonstrate in Chapter 8, proto-institutional logics present as candidates for institutionalization and prove central in institutional field-level change processes (Zietsma and McKnight 2009).

Though the efforts associated with each of these categories of institutional work are individually meaningful, a change process that is evident when they are considered in coordination (the explication of which is the task I take up in the final chapter of this dissertation) demonstrates the complexities and persistence of efforts involved in “making change happen.”\(^{10}\)

As I demonstrate in Chapter 8, the deep involvement and complex character of the change process I observed is characterized by the creative and resourceful ways in which senior Army leaders engaged in institutional work through interacting with not only the intra-organizational environment, but various aspects of the extra-organizational environment as well. Therein, I rely on my findings reported in this and the following chapters to provide an organization-centric model of institutional change and shed light on new directions for scholars working in the neoinstitutional tradition. The type of work I describe below provides unique insights into the often ignored “developmental, adaptive, and integrative work that needs to be done by [organization’s] existing elites” for field-level change process to be complete (Kraatz 2009:70).

**ENVIRONMENT WORK**

In a presentation on strategic leadership, General Sullivan suggested that in an organizational change “campaign” as significant as that which he led in the early 1990s, it is

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\(^{10}\) Ibid., 415.
necessary to “create a climate in which change is okay.”¹¹ Many of the discursive practices I identified were directed toward such ends as they construct an extra-organizational environment that justifiably demands that the organization undergo fundamental change, and an intra-organizational environment that is supportive of, and equipped to enact such change. As identified in Table 5-1 and described in the subsections that follow, the forms of institutional work I identify as environment work include constructing redefining events, creating a culture of change, and empowering responders. Through these efforts, it is made to seem that ‘what’s out there,’ beyond the boundaries of the organization, is a turbulent world that necessitates the organization’s sustained attention, and ‘what’s in here’ is a change-oriented organization composed of individuals and groups who know how to ensure a progressive organizational response. In such an environment, it is indeed made to seem that ‘change is okay.’

Table 5-1. Types of Environment Work Engaged in by U.S. Army Senior Leaders, June 1991—June 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Institutional Work</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constructing Redefining Events</td>
<td>Specifying the scope and characteristics of events that necessitate a reconsideration of prevailing structural and cultural arrangements in the organization or institutional field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating a Culture of Change</td>
<td>Establishing a normative foundation within the organization that supports change, as opposed to stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowering Responders</td>
<td>Ensuring stakeholders that those responsible for managing the change process are responsive to the needs of others, knowledgeable, and capable</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Though a variety of discursive efforts were enacted to influence perceptions of various characteristics of the organization’s internal and external environments, Figure 5-1 provides the data structure for those persistent practices that form the foundation of the categories of institutional work I describe below. Therein, I support with brief examples the first-order concepts and second-order themes that compose the aggregate dimension of environment work.
**Figure 5-1. Data Structure for Environment Work Engaged in by U.S. Army Senior Leaders, June 1991—June 1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manifest Content</th>
<th>First-order Concepts</th>
<th>Second-order Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>— “Today’s reality is a very significant departure from the pattern of the post-World War II world.” — “Today, we are at a strategic crossroad. The Cold War is over… [and] we are clearly in the midst of a technological revolution.”</td>
<td>Identifying Critical Events</td>
<td>CONSTRUCTING REDEFINING EVENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— “The altered political and military situation dictates that we make significant change in the Army.” — “[The new] national military strategy is creating demands for a new kind of United States Army. It requires something far different.”</td>
<td>Externalizing Demands for Change</td>
<td>Establishing Ambiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— “[There is a] high degree of uncertainty about the emerging international security environment.” — “While our recent performance… gave clear evidence of current capabilities, the yardstick for measuring future prowess is not yet clear.”</td>
<td>Normalizing Change</td>
<td>CREATING A CULTURE OF CHANGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— “The Army… must change. This is not new—we have always been undergoing some type of evolution.” — “We cannot cling slavishly to preconceived notions… we must change them. We must break out. Others have done it.”</td>
<td>Encompassing Change within the Organization’s Mission</td>
<td>Attributing Recent Successes to Change Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— “Our values enabled us—even required us—to change… we had to change to be able to serve.” — “We are not wringing our hands over the challenges that we face. We have received our marching orders, shouldered our rucksacks, and moved out.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>— “Our experience in the Gulf was truly historic… Our victory there was 20 years in the making.” — “The Army that won… in the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait was not created overnight. It has been carefully rebuilt over the last 15 years.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>— “Everybody has a seat at the table … One Voice—One Army—one blueprint for the future.” — “I have a full-time National Guard Office at TRADOC… They assist me in addressing the issues that are important to you.”</td>
<td>Ensuring Representativeness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— “I have tremendous confidence that we know what is required and how best to accomplish it.” — “Managing the change is a leadership challenge. We understand the challenge, we have a plan, and we are changing.”</td>
<td>Guaranteeing Knowledgeable and Capable Change Agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Constructing Redefining Events

As identified at the outset of this chapter, a key element of the change strategy employed by the Army’s senior leadership was developing consensus for change.\textsuperscript{12} Recalling their efforts in this regard, General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles state the following:

After doing things in a certain way for long periods of time, we grow comfortable with the process and resistant to change. To overcome this bias we needed a broad based dialogue on the need for change. The Army had to be led to change, not pushed into it. The head had to know why change was needed, the hands had to be capable of performing the task, and, most importantly, the heart had to be committed (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{13}

My observations reveal that a central component of the Army’s change strategy was thus a desire to construct not only ‘critical events,’ but ‘redefining events’—that is, contextually dramatic occurrences that necessitate a reconsideration of prevailing structural and cultural arrangements in the organization and institutional field (Pride 1995).

Potentially disruptive events are an ever-present part of the social world. As prominent social theorist William H. Sewell (1996, 2005) notes, however, dramatic change is not. Organizational scholars thus suggest that objective features of the environment in which organizations operate that may illicit change may themselves be inconsequential, but are nonetheless available to organizational leaders to be singled out, ignored, reconsidered, and


constructed to serve their interests (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012; Weick 1979). While there may be “radical discontinuities in the real world,” organizational change is made possible when those discontinuities become ‘critical events’ (Pride 1995:5). As Nigam and Ocasio (2010:823) state, such events attract “sustained attention and invite the collective definition and redefinition of social issues.” In my analysis, one of the most persistent forms of institutional work I identified was indeed the attempt to construct critical events that may, through sustained attention, result in dramatic cultural and structural transformations of the Army. Through identifying critical events and justifying external demands for change, senior Army leaders attempted to single out and construct ‘redefining events’—that is, critical events that are “followed by an important shift in public and elite perceptions of reality” that support social change (Pride 1995:7). 

In *Hope is Not a Method*, General Sullivan and Colonel Harper note that in 1991 the Army confronted two fundamental changes in the extra-organizational environment that provided strong catalysts for change (Sullivan and Harper 1996). First, with the end of the Cold War, senior Army leaders were “beginning to appreciate that its missions were changing” (p. 7). No longer was the overarching mission of the Army, or the U.S. military for that matter, to defeat a large mechanized force on the open battlefields of Europe. Second, these leaders were “beginning to understand that the tools of war were changing rapidly and dramatically. Information was becoming the critical component of [Army] weapons” (p. 8). General Sullivan

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14 I rely on Pride’s (1995) conceptualization of ‘critical events,’ a concept recently applied in theoretical proposals of institutional logic change (Nigam and Ocasio 2010; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012), as my analysis demonstrates the active involvement of Army leaders in ensuring that identified ‘critical events’ become ‘redefining events.’ Nonetheless, there is notable overlap between this conceptualization of the eventfulness of change and others such as ‘critical junctures’ that produce ‘legacies’ (Collier and Collier 1991), and ‘punctuated equilibria’ in which periods of revolutionary change are followed by periods of relative stability (Gersick 1991).
thus suggested that warfare was entering an ‘Information Age.’ Alongside these trends, however, the authors note that the Army’s remarkable success in Desert Storm in 1991 provided, for many, a reaffirmation of Cold War forms and practices—confirmation that the Army’s focus on large-scale, mechanized warfare supported by industrial age technology was sound. With a felt need to develop an Army capable of accomplishing new post-Cold War missions (including peacekeeping missions and other ‘operations other than war’) while leveraging emergent information age technology, General Sullivan and Colonel Harper note, then, that “[t]hus began a purposeful journey of change” (p. 9). More specifically, these leaders initiated a strategic “campaign” for change in which they felt compelled to “communicate constantly” (p. 132).

As I demonstrate below, through my analysis I identified remarkably prevalent and persistent discursive practices that sought to construct both the Cold War’s end and emerging technological developments—the emergence of the ‘Information Age’—as critical events worthy of becoming redefining events. As depicted in Figure 5-1 above and described in the subsections that follow, these efforts primarily involved identifying critical events, externalizing demands for change, and establishing ambiguity.

**Identifying Critical Events**

From the outset of General Sullivan’s tenure as U.S. Army Chief of Staff, discursive efforts aimed at identifying critical events are clearly evident. These efforts did not identify evolutionary changes, but rather revolutionary, discontinuous breaks from the past. Aligning with Pride’s (1995:5) conceptualization of critical events, a great deal of discursive effort engaged in by the Army’s senior leadership was devoted to identifying and demonstrating “radical discontinuities” in the extra-organizational environment. These discontinuities were
suggested in various venues to bear heavily upon Army organization, identity, practice, and purpose. Whether specifying a discontinuous break in international relations brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War or a distinct technological break that characterized a transition from an ‘Industrial Age’ to an ‘Information Age,’ these efforts were rhetorically linked to calls for change and included appeals for support of the change project.

In a speech given at his Arrival Ceremony in June 1991, General Sullivan stated the following: “Both at home and abroad the environment in which the Army operates is undergoing fundamental transformation. As a result the Army too must change.” General Sullivan made this same statement in a letter sent to the Army’s general officers that same month and echoed this sentiment elsewhere, such as in an October 1991 article in which he stated that “fundamental changes in our environment both abroad and at home require the Army to set a new course for the future.” While general statements such as these imply that there are fundamental transformations occurring in the world—transformations the Army suggestively should be concerned with and responsive to—specifying the discontinuous character of these changes in more detail was a persistent practice I observed.

Among the data I analyzed, I identified an extensive discursive effort undertaken to ensure that the Cold War’s end was understood by various stakeholders to be an event worthy of sustained attention. In various speeches, statements, remarks, and publications, senior Army

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leaders touted the war’s end as, for example, “the seminal event of our lifetimes,”\textsuperscript{18} “the single most significant moment in modern history,”\textsuperscript{19} and a “watershed”\textsuperscript{20} signaling “the end of one time and the beginning of another in a whole variety of dimensions”\textsuperscript{21}—a momentous event spurring a “New World Order.”\textsuperscript{22} As the Army’s senior leaders emphasized in the 1994 “United States Army Posture Statement”—an annual report on the state of the Army provided to the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives—“[t]he ending of the Cold War after more than four decades is one of the major events of [the twentieth] century.”\textsuperscript{23} In the concluding chapter the


authors of the report go so far as to suggest that “[r]ealistically, the 20th century as we knew it ended with the demise of the Soviet Union.”24 In turn, the authors state that the Army must undergo “the most pervasive restructuring in four decades.”25 These and similar statements imply that the discontinuous break evidenced by the end of the Cold War establishes a need for change; however, as expressed by General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles, those individuals leading the change effort believed that “[f]or change to be effective, the need and direction of the change [had] to be accepted and internalized” (emphasis added).26 Further efforts thus made distinct the defining characteristics of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras referenced—that is, clearly specified the direction in which the world was moving.

The message carried by the Army’s senior leaders was not just one of the end of an era, but equally a description of “the truly new nature of the world”27—a purported “new strategic era” (HQDA 1993:vi). In the October 1991 ARMY ‘Green Book’—a special, annually published issue of the official publication of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) intended to communicate the Army’s vision to interested government, military, and industry experts—General Sullivan described the emergent era in the following manner:

In the international arena the rules of the game are now different. Bipolarity, the fundamental condition since World War II, began fading with the overall decline of the Soviet Union… and expired finally with the dissolution of the Warsaw

24 Ibid., 39.
25 Ibid., 6.
Pact… The world is making a transition to a condition where multiple centers of military, political, and economic power exist. This multipolarity is likely to be less predictable, less stable, and perhaps a bit uncomfortable while we adjust to new rules of the international arena. There are dangerous trends as well, such as the proliferation of sophisticated weapons… These new realities combine with the enduring conditions of radical nationalism, religious and cultural rivalries, disputes over boundaries, and competition for scarce resources. The net effect is a dangerous world, a world no longer restrained by bipolar competition.28

That same month, Colonel James R. McDonough, then Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, made a similar observation in a Military Review article. Specifically, he stated that

no longer is this a bipolar world… The strategic order that held the West together… is irretrievably altered. In its place comes fragmentation and a resurgence of ethnic animosities, national strife, contentious border disputes, aggressive religious fundamentalism and a growing number of regional instabilities (McDonough 1991:3).

Statements such as these identify a distinct break in the geopolitical environment from the bipolar, Cold War past and, in many instances, were connected to calls for changing the roles and missions for which the Army should prepare. In a July 1992 Officer Review article, General Franks, Commanding General of TRADOC, suggested that while the Army of the Cold War “had quantifiable roles, identifiable threats, and a fixed battlefield mentality designed to defeat massed Soviet armies on the central European plains,” the emergent post-Cold War Army was

confronted by an environment that lacks such certainty and is faced with “rapidly expanding roles, against a wide range of potential threats, in a dynamic and changing world.”

“This new era,” he thus stated, “requires leadership with the mental agility to look at roles and future demands in a new light.” Indeed, in response to newly perceived national security threats posed by developing ‘regional instabilities,’ General Sullivan suggested (one month before General Franks’ article was published) that the “the new era has placed increased emphasis on new or expanded uses for the military—everything from fighting drug lords to humanitarian assistance to civic action… to peacekeeping operations.” In turn, he suggested that the Army would “need to change… to fit the new world”—one in which “every region… has ongoing conflicts or seething tension that can erupt overnight and threaten American interests.”

Organizational leaders thus called for an Army prepared not only for warfighting, but also one prepared to engage in various peacetime missions that “keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of conflict” (HQDA 1993:2-0) such as “counterdrug operations, arms control, treaty verification, support to domestic civil authorities, and peacekeeping” (p. 2-1). Portrayed as a critical event, the Cold War’s end was indeed “invit[ing] the collective definition and


30 Ibid., 2.


redefinition of social issues” (Nigam and Ocasio 2010:823) as the Army contemplated not only ‘new means,’ but also ‘new missions.’”

Alongside the active construction of the changing geopolitical environment as a critical event, General Sullivan suggested that it was not only “the dissolution of the Soviet Empire,” but also “the onset of the Information Age” that presented the Army with “a vastly changed world.” By January 1992, General Sullivan was writing and talking publicly about a “technological revolution.” In a speech titled “The Army in the Post-Industrial World” given at the Land Warfare Forum in that month, General Sullivan stated succinctly that “[t]he world is different today. Warfare is different. The industrial period is now history.” The microchip, he stated, was giving rise to a ‘post-industrial’ age of warfare enabling increased precision; an expanded battlefield in width, depth, and altitude; and increased speed and tempo that “make the battlefield of today fundamentally different than in the industrial period” (emphasis added). As he reminded the Army’s most senior leaders in a letter to general officers in July 1994, “no one can deny that there is an enormous change under way in the technology of our profession.”

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37 Ibid., 25.

38 Ibid., 25.

As with the end of the Cold War, the emergence of the ‘Information Age’ was cast as a discontinuous break from the past. Indeed, the very reference to a “revolution” as opposed to an evolution signifies discontinuity. This distinct break is visually depicted in Figure 5-2, reproduced from a National Security Paper co-authored by General Sullivan, and demonstrated in the following selection from a speech given by General Sullivan to the Department of History Faculty at the United States Military Academy at West Point:

Between 1865 and the 1950s, America based her military power on her industrial strength… During the Cold War… mass American industrial potential, directed temporarily to a war effort, and coupled with our reserve component, would win the day for us… We now live in a different world. We have passed the first wave—agricultural society and muscle power warfare. We have exited the second wave—industrial society and machine warfare. We have entered the third wave—information society and microprocessor warfare, what I call the post-industrial world.40

The suggestion that the world has “exited” one era and “entered” another and the visual break depicted in Figure 5-2 surely identify the ‘radical discontinuity’ that characterizes critical events. As General Sullivan later explained to military and industry leaders at an AUSA symposium, “[w]hile the core weapon of the 20th century land warfare has been the tank, the core weapon for the 21st century will be the computer.”42 The Army’s leaders thus suggested that the organization was “at a strategic crossroad”43 and a “historical watershed”44—its members

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“stand[ing] at the beginning of the Information Age,” and, in turn, capable of producing a force that fundamentally “differs from the mass production army of the Industrial Age.”

In a March 1995 Strategic Studies Institute publication, General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles noted that

[b]y themselves, either the collapse of the Cold War strategic paradigm or the coming of the Information Age would have presented the Army with a formidable task. As we contemplate not only new missions but also new means, these twin events present us with both an unprecedented challenge and unparalleled opportunity.  

Statements such as this support the leadership’s contention that the emergent post-Cold War Army must transition not only away from its narrowed, Cold War focus on large-scale war, but also toward new forms of organization and new practices enabled by changes in technology. As General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dubik (a member of General Sullivan’s personal staff) stated in a 1993 publication, “the details provided by the [technological] trends… [and] the passing of the Cold War strategic paradigm… provide a forecast clear enough to begin


positioning the Army for these developments.\textsuperscript{48} Indeed, General Sullivan’s commitment to ensuring the organization’s responsiveness to these geopolitical and technological changes is evident as he communicated to others his intent to ensure the sustained attention of the force on these issues.

In a memorandum for General Franks, one month before he assumed responsibility as TRADOC Commander, General Sullivan stated the following:

We are now at a point at which raw industrial might and large manpower intensive armies are neither necessary nor supportable. Rather, technology has provided us an opportunity to achieve decisive victory with rapidity heretofore only a dream in the minds of a few. The microchip/processor has brought us to the point that we can achieve the decisive victory which our predecessors were able to achieve only after total mobilization and at great expense in lives and national treasure. We are able to project ourselves onto the battlefield in spatial and temporal parameters heretofore deemed impossible… As the architect of our future Army, your challenge is to evolve our doctrine in such a way that it retains the principles and fundamentals which have brought us to this new era and at the same time accommodate change—it must be a doctrine for today and tomorrow… You will be the catalyst of the discussion process and the creator of document…

[\textsc{I\textsc{n today’s world our strategy demands that our Army is involved in activities ranging from construction of a schoolhouse in Micronesia to sophisticated ground/air combat in [Southwest Asia]. Our challenge is to recognize and}]

accommodate the demands of all aspects of the continuum of war in a way which achieves decisive victory anywhere on that continuum… This is perhaps the most difficult dimension of your task since we have not previously accommodated the spectrum of conflict in FM 100-5.49

As TRADOC Commander, General Franks was tasked by General Sullivan with managing the Army-wide “informed discussions” that would guide the development of a uniquely post-Cold War Operations manual.50 It is my suggestion here that General Sullivan’s message to General Franks is an attempt to ensure that the new missions brought on by the end of the Cold War and the new means enabled by Information Age technology receive sustained attention. In effect, this was an attempt to ensure that the geostrategic and technological discontinuities observed emerge as critical events that shape the ‘informed discussions’ regarding doctrinal, and in turn, Army development and change. In time, General Franks referenced these larger transformations as he implored others in various venues and in various ways to “break the time capsules in [their] thinking.”51 Efforts such as these reflect a strategic attempt to identify ‘critical events.’

Externalizing Demands for Change

49 U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, memorandum from GEN Gordon R. Sullivan to LTG Frederick M. Franks, Jr., July 29, 1991, p. 2. For a depiction of the continuum referenced by General Sullivan here, see Figure 3-4, Chapter 3 of this dissertation.


Presented as “radical discontinuities in the real world” (Pride 1995:6), those critical events identified by senior Army leaders were cast as exogenous drivers of change. It was ‘the world out there’—the world beyond the boundaries of the organization—that senior organizational leaders suggested was “undergoing fundamental transformation,” thus necessitating an organizational response. As some scholars contend, however, the identification of critical events may not be enough to spur dramatic change. To become redefining events, such instances must sustain the attention of stakeholders and spur a reconsideration of what is presently taken-for-granted. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, for example, the nation’s experience in Vietnam surely had the potential to become a redefining event, however, the power of the Cold War logic served as a roadblock to change.

In Logics of History, William H. Sewell (2005:228) suggests that contextually dramatic occurrences “spiral into transformative historical events when a sequence of interrelated ruptures disarticulates the previous structural network, makes repair difficult, and makes a novel rearticulation possible” (emphasis added). Similarly, organizational scholars Weick and Quinn (1999:365) suggest that episodic, discontinuous organizational change often results from “a growing misalignment between an inertial deep structure,” here the long-standing Cold War logic, “and perceived environmental demands” (emphasis added). In highly institutionalized social contexts, a single dramatic happening or low-levels of misalignment created by relatively limited environmental demands may be absorbed by the ‘inertial deep structure’ of the social context—that is, by the prevailing institutional logic. As became evident in the materials I analyzed, senior Army leaders were keenly aware of this and, in turn, strategically and persistently identified a host of external demands for change being placed upon the Army.

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General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles understood the power of the ‘inertial deep structure’ that prevailed as they acknowledged that “[m]ilitary organizations operate within a generally accepted body of knowledge” and the tendency is thus “to fit change into the current framework, rather than reconstruct the fundamental assumptions [of the profession].”[53] “[T]he organizational instinct,” they note, “is to frame the external change in such a way that the current system can cope with the problem, rather than changing the system.”[54] Similarly, General Franks, as TRADOC Commander, stated in a 1993 address to National Security Fellows at Harvard University that there are many “[o]bstacles to change. Organizations have personalities, for biases and perceptions. Institutional inertia. Change is painful.”[55] With an expressed interest in communicating not only “the need for change” but also having that need “internalized by the profession,”[56] it is not surprising that the Army’s senior leaders, throughout the four-year period of my analysis, ‘grew’ the environmental demands placed on the organization by highlighting ‘a series of interrelated ruptures’ occurring in the external environment.

As a clear and early example of this practice, Figure 5-3, reproduced from TRADOC briefing materials presented to former TRADOC Commanders in October 1991, visually depicts the various external demands suggested to bear heavily upon the fundamental principles of Army organization and practice expressed in the organization’s keystone manual. Therein, it is not only the “new world order” and “changing threat” spurred by the Cold War’s end, along with the

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[54] Ibid., 416.


“impact of new technologies” that are suggested to establish the need for organizational change. In addition to those factors, the presentation lists the emergent “National Military Strategy” (an unclassified strategy document communicating the direction and advice of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Meinhart 2013)); emergent joint forces doctrine and agendas of the other services; and recent lessons learned in the Gulf War, to include both U.S. and potential enemy lessons learned.

**Figure 5-3.** Factors Influencing the Revision of FM 100-5, *Operations*, as Presented in an October 1991 TRADOC Brief

Source: Brief to former TRADOC Commanders, 1991

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In a similar manner, in a Department of the Army Military Operations brief on “The Army Modernization Plan” given one year later (in October 1992), not only were “the new security environment” and the “battlefield of the future… characterized by… real time information” suggested to place new demands on the organization, but so too were the “National Military Strategy” (published that same year); new “national security objectives” expressed by the nation’s civilian leadership; and recent “analyses and lessons learned (including [Operation Desert Storm]).” In conclusion, the presenter notes accompanying the final presentation slide for that brief state the following: “In summary, the modernization vision flows from the confluence of many global and national political/military factors.” In these and similar examples, it is a variety of exogenous demands being placed upon the organization that are suggested to establish the ‘need’ to develop new organizational principles, practices, and capabilities.

Though it was often stated unequivocally that the Army had to change, senior leaders engaged in the change process were keenly aware that [it would have been easy to make yesterday perfect, perfecting the Cold War systems on the basis of Persian Gulf War lessons learned. It would have been easy to glide along in the wrong business, continuing to focus on a hypothetical World War III fought by large armored formations in central Europe or someplace like it… And it would have been easy to rest on our laurels, doing things well. We


59 Ibid., n.p.

were, after all, the best army in the world—we had proved it in the Gulf War

To be sure, the Army did not have to initiate episodic change, just as the Army “could have done
other things” during the Cold War, choosing instead (as General Sullivan noted) to be an
organization “designed to defeat one enemy.” Nonetheless, the demands of the extra-
organizational environment were generally depicted in my data as leaving the Army with no
option but to do so. Moreover, the various exogenous forces identified were often linked to those
critical events described above that suggestively warranted the sustained attention of the force.

In many of the speeches, letters, and publications I analyzed, the authors and presenters
implied that various changes in the external environment had created such misalignment between
the highly successful Cold War Army and emerging post-Cold War demands that the Army had
to change. Various audiences were told, for example, that “the altered political military situation
dictates that we make significant change in the Army” (emphasis added)62; the articulated
“national strategy of enlargement requires a different kind of Army from the one we built for
[the Cold War strategy] of containment” (emphasis added)63; or “the new national military
strategy… require[s] the Army to set a new course for the future” (emphasis added).64 These
statements imply that the Army had no choice but to “confront the requirement to adapt to a new


“environment” in which a host of exogenous factors “combined” to establish “fundamental changes” (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{65} Those combining factors were often discursively justified by referencing the critical geopolitical and technological events described above.

As General Sullivan suggested in a September 1991 speech given at the 113\textsuperscript{th} General Conference of the National Guard Association,

With the end of the Cold War, a forty-five year period of history is coming to a close. The bilateral superpower competition of the past is giving way to a more diverse and dispersed set of international power centers… As we would expect, there are related changes here in the United States. The end of the Cold War has caused us to make a prudent decrease in the defense budget… At the same time, we are adopting a new National Military Strategy (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{66}

Similarly, a white paper circulated among those involved with the doctrine development process that same year suggested that “[r]ecent changes in external conditions have caused significant revision of both the National Security Strategy and the resulting National Military Strategy.”\textsuperscript{67} That paper states further that this shift “places a premium on” missions, organizational forms, and practices that diverge from those prioritized during the Cold War era.\textsuperscript{68} Given that the Cold War’s end was, at this time, being actively constructed as a critical event worthy of sustained attention, the ‘interrelated ruptures’ mentioned here—the articulation of a new “National

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 64.


\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 1.
Security Strategy” by the President and “National Military Strategy” by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each ‘caused’ by the Cold War’s end—are presented not only as demands, but legitimate demands placed upon the organization.

Among various stakeholder groups, General Sullivan expressed the following idea: “The particular conditions we find in the world today require us to make specific adjustments in roles and missions, force structure, training and leader development, and doctrine.” Moreover, senior leaders stated that it was “[t]he changing global political condition” that led to the formulation of the new National Military Strategy… with new roles for the Army.” Combined, such statements legitimize the leadership’s call for the organization to respond to the new “National Military Strategy” by “looking closely at those roles, [and] adapting operational doctrine to address [them].” With “a new world order” (or, in the least, the socially constructed perception of one) it is reasonable for the president and the senior uniformed leader of the U.S. military to respond by articulating a new approach to national security. In turn (to borrow from the examples provided here) the Army is not just ‘required,’ but legitimately ‘required’ to ‘make adjustments’ and ‘adapt’ as a reconsideration of missions and means called for by the civilian and military leadership appears to be appropriate. As seen previously with the case of President Kennedy’s call for organizational change at the outset of the Vietnam conflict, this perception of legitimacy may be necessary for true change to unfold. Through externalizing the demands for

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change, key Army leaders established a set of interrelated ruptures that, as Sewell (2005:228) suggests, make maintaining the status quo difficult and “a novel rearticulation” of structures possible.

**Establishing Ambiguity**

To be sure, the Army’s senior-most leaders were interested in spurring “a novel rearticulation” of prevailing structures (Sewell 2005:228) as they elicited a collective reconsideration of “the fundamental assumptions of the profession.”73 As General Sullivan and Colonel Harper suggest, however, “[t]oday’s problems can be so close, so intense, that they become like blinders. Getting beyond today begins by imagining your organization out in the future” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:83). What these leaders sought, then, was the development of a “critical mass” (p. 185) of change agents that engage in projective agency—a pool of influential stakeholders who, in their words, “look beyond today and participate in creating the new organization” (p. 187). Though the development of such a critical mass of change agents is supported by the identification of critical events, I identified the establishment of ambiguity as a related strategy capable of encouraging, indeed, requiring (if successful) actors to engage in projective agency.

Recall that practical-evaluative agency “responds to the demands and contingencies of the present” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998:994). Conversely, projective agency, that which enables dramatic change, entails “an imaginative engagement of the future” (p. 984) that allows for the reconsideration of prevailing rules, roles, and practices (Battilana and D’Aunno 2009). To remove the ‘blinders’ put in place by ‘today’s problems’ (Sullivan and Harper 1996), Gioia and

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Chittipeddi (1991:439) suggest that organizational members leading strategic change may rely on the establishment of ambiguity to get others to, as one executive in their study suggested, “talk and think and worry and look around.” Such “ambiguity-by-design” (p. 439) calls the prevailing logic into question and opens up space for organizational members to “look beyond today and participate in creating the new organization”—the precise interest of senior Army leaders (Sullivan and Harper 1996:187).

Throughout his time as Chief of Staff, General Sullivan carefully noted that in the Cold War’s wake the Army was “in the midst of uncertain times,” a period of “increased uncertainty,” embedded in “a new world order… a new environment where threats are both diffuse and uncertain and where conflict is inherent yet unpredictable.” Even as the Army’s change process was well-underway, General Franks declared in the introduction to a July 1994 TRADOC publication that “[i]n the absence of a relatively fixed, strategic environment, [the Army is] faced with a far more complex world that defies authoritative forecasts of the future.” Six months earlier General Sullivan stated in a Military Review article that the Army is “resisting the temptation to quantify or precisely define what in essence is unknown, and quite possibly unknowable… Under conditions of relative uncertainty, we are concentrating on… versatility of mind, organization, and execution” (Sullivan 1992:12). Indeed, General Franks, speaking to


military and industry leaders at an AUSA symposium one month later, said “we need your help. We need your spirit, your continued participation and your experience… Help us to think our way through all of this.”78 With ambiguity, it seems, comes opportunity.

For General Sullivan and Colonel Harper, it was the presence of a definitive threat that prevented significant change during the Cold War era (Sullivan and Harper 1996). The Soviet ‘problem’ most certainly placed ‘blinders’ on their predecessors. Those blinders, however, were perceived by the Army’s senior leaders to still be present and remarkably influential in 1991, even after the Soviet Union collapsed (Dabrowski 2008; Sullivan and Harper 1996).79 The identification of critical events called these blinders into question. Moreover, the use of these critical events to not only recognize, but legitimize external demands for change and signal the emergence of a period of ambiguity is directed at opening up space for the exercise of projective agency. These critical events were established as redefining events. To support my suggestion that these practices are indeed deliberate efforts intended to disrupt and replace taken-for-granted elements of organization and practice, I conclude this section with an example of how they were relied upon to overcome what General Sullivan and Colonel Harper identified as a potential roadblock to change: the U.S. Army’s overwhelming success in Desert Storm.

Given that the Army’s senior leaders were engaging in “a purposeful journey of change” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:9) and that they understood the organization’s recent success in Desert Storm to provide a potential roadblock to change, it was evident in the data I analyzed that situating Desert Storm within the geopolitical and technological eras identified was of


importance. As one example, senior leaders stated in multiple publications that it was “the mobilization based Cold War Army [that] had been extremely successful in the war” (emphasis added). Similarly, in a speech given at an Armor Conference including military and industry leaders, General Sullivan suggested that “DESERSTORM truly was the culminating achievement of the Industrial Age and one of the first of the new Information Age” (emphasis added). This suggestion is visually depicted in Figure 5-4, reproduced from a 1994 Military Review article co-authored by General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Dubik. Therein, the authors credit the Gulf War as being undeniably unique and representing a dramatic advance in warfare; however, by separating Desert Storm from “Tomorrow,” the authors imply that the Army can, and as suggested in the text of the article, should, be something altogether different in the future. The Gulf War is thus situated between eras, and most notably, as not belonging fully to the emergent Information Age. As General Sullivan succinctly stated in a 1993 Army Research, Development and Acquisition Bulletin, “[w]hile our recent performance in DESERT STORM gave clear evidence of current capabilities, the yardstick for measuring future prowess is not yet clear” (emphasis added). Inserting ambiguity regarding future measures of success renders the exercise of present-oriented, practical-evaluative agency careless.

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While the Army’s leaders could have “ma[de] yesterday perfect, perfecting the Cold War systems on the basis of Persian Gulf War lessons learned” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:37), the authors of these sources imply that such a move would be irresponsible. What was called for was projective agency premised on the observation that “[i]n the wake of [the Gulf War victory] the world is changing dramatically, posing new and ambitious challenges for our nation and the Army.” As General Sullivan stated in the 1993 ARMY ‘Green Book,’ “to change, we must reach beyond day-to-day concerns. If we do not, the best we can aspire to is to be trained and

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ready for today’s challenges, which will not be enough to deal with tomorrow’s conflicts.”

With senior leaders consistently suggesting that ‘tomorrow’s conflicts’ would take place in ‘new’ geostrategic and technological environments, what was needed was a new Army.

**Creating a Culture of Change**

In addition to constructing redefining events occurring in the world ‘out there,’ my findings demonstrate that the Army’s senior leaders also engaged in efforts intended to shape perceptions regarding the intra-organizational environment. Recall that General Sullivan believed that because “there was enormous resistance to change” in the Army in 1991, he and the Army’s senior leaders had to work diligently to “create a climate in which change was okay.”

A significant interest among the Army’s leaders was thus transitioning the organization’s culture from one of change avoidance, the Cold War culture they inherited, toward one that embraced change (Sullivan and Harper 1996). Acknowledging that organizational contexts that avoid, endure, or only accept change pose constraints on the change project, General Sullivan and Colonel Harper report that they relied heavily on communicative practices to lead the organization’s members toward not only accepting, but embracing organizational change. As Randall and Coakley (2007) note, effecting such a commitment among key stakeholders is the primary component of transformational leadership. Indeed, General Sullivan and Colonel Harper contend that if the organizational context is one in which change is embraced, the change process becomes a tool used by others in support of the transformation (Sullivan and Harper 1996). The


creation of a culture of change was thus a central component aimed at obtaining the critical mass of change agents Army leaders desired.

As demonstrated in Figure 5-1 above, creating a culture of change primarily entailed three practices: normalizing change, encompassing change within the organization’s mission, and attributing recent successes to change processes. As I describe below, these efforts, if successful, may indeed create an environment in which change is not only ‘okay,’ but embraced.

**Normalizing Change**

At his Arrival Ceremony in June 1991, General Sullivan not only suggested that the Army was being confronted by critical events; he also sought to normalize change. Following his observation that “the environment in which the Army operates is undergoing fundamental transformation,” he not only stated that “[a]s a result, the Army too must change,” but suggested that “[t]his is not new—we have always been undergoing some type of evolution.” He reiterated this statement in a letter to the Army’s general officers that same month. The following year he told military and industry leaders that “[f]rom the warfare of muscle and mass in the 18th and 19th centuries to the warfare of machines and maneuver in the 20th, America’s Army has always pursued and adopted innovation to ensure a force that could meet the call of the country.” In 1993 he reminded the Army’s general officers that “[w]e have withstood the

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buffet of change before."\(^{89}\) Similarly, the entire first (two-sentence) paragraph of a TRADOC brochure published that same year reads: “National defense needs do not remain static. Neither do the organizations that provide for that defense.”\(^{90}\) Indeed, the 1995 “Army Posture Statement” provided to members of Congress stated that “[t]he underlying historical strength of America’s Army has been its ability to adapt so as to serve the Nation in countless different ways over the last 218 years.”\(^{91}\) To be sure, statements such as these normalize change, establishing, in the least, evolutionary change as a constant.

While general statements noting that change has been carried out by the organization in prior eras were common in the materials I analyzed, still other means of normalizing change were present. As one example, senior leaders often referenced specific instances of change or engaged in storytelling to reiterate and demonstrate the persistence of change. As General Sullivan noted in a speech given to military and industry leaders at an AUSA meeting in 1994,

> We have an enormous task to transform this organization. Others in this Army have done it before. Certainly George Marshall and his generation did it after the deliberating period of the 1920s and 1930s. We put a great Army together. We must now transform ourselves… Marshall, [General William] DePuy, and their people, many here in this room, conceived new organizations, then built them.


They did not cling to old ways... We cannot cling slavishly to preconceived notions... we must change them. We must break out. Others have done it.\(^{92}\)

As yet another example, with the post-Vietnam era Army touting itself as “doctrine-based” (HQDA 1993:iv), the acknowledgment in various venues that doctrine is “ever-evolving” (e.g., Sullivan 1993:n.p.) signifies the persistence, and indeed the regularity, of change to the very foundational principles of Army service. Moreover, various visual depictions of organizational transitions across time in briefing and presentation materials I analyzed demonstrate the persistence of change as a characteristic of the Army’s long history. As one example, Figure 5-5, reproduced from a December 1992 TRADOC brief addressing post-Cold War force restructuring, visually depicts ongoing and significant changes to the size, structure, and organization of Army divisions since World War I. For the audience that is asked to reconsider the organization and structure of Army forces, change, it is made to appear, is anything but unique to the current period.

To be sure, messages and images such as those described and provided here normalize change as they embed change in the “socially patterned, knowledge and practices” of the organization (May and Finch 2009:540). In turn, these efforts contribute to the establishment of a culture of change and, if successful, may (to borrow from organizational scholars) “enlist [others] in the battle for change” (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2009:130).

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Recall that the Army’s senior leaders were aware, to borrow from General Franks, that organizations have “forbiases and perceptions” that lead to “[i]nstitutional inertia.” 94 Significant change, he states, “is painful.” 95 Through normalizing change, however, change becomes part of the organization’s “inertial deep structure” (Weick and Quinn 1999:365)—a central feature of the organization’s history and culture. As Karl Weick (1995:189) contends, culture is “not what we do around here,” but rather shared perceptions of “what we have done around here” (emphasis added). By making past experiences salient, organizational leaders can create what he terms “a culturelike effect” (p. 189). This, I suggest, is precisely the intended outcome of the efforts described here. By making change a salient characteristic of the organization’s long history, change in the present is non-threatening and, indeed, business as usual.

*Encompassing Change within the Organization’s Mission*

In addition to normalizing change, senior leaders often discursively aligned change with the organization’s mission and purpose. For those Army leaders leading the change effort, the foundation for the organization’s post-Cold War vision (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6) was that of “service to nation” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:74). In essence, service referred to meeting the nations’ needs whether that entailed conducting large-scale wartime operations, assisting with natural disaster response domestically, or anything in between (HQDA 1993). Having inherited an Army with a Cold War mindset narrowly focused on large-scale war, being confronted by the radical discontinuities in the geopolitical and technological environments describe above, and facing a host of demands for change in the external environment, Army

94 U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, untitled address by GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., March 11, 1993, p. 4.
95 Ibid., 4.
leaders often stated that transforming the force was necessary to continue to serve the nation. In turn, they suggested that significant organizational development and change was the post-Cold War generation’s responsibility—change was the mission.

Six months into his tenure as Chief of Staff, General Sullivan wrote, in a letter to the Army’s general officers titled “Impressions from the First 6 Months,” “America’s Army is adapting in order to continue our long tradition of service to this nation.”96 At the end of his tenure as Chief of Staff, in a letter to general officers titled “A Chief’s Farewell,” he reiterated this point, stating the following:

We have, without question, changed the Army profoundly. We have made change a way of life… Our values enabled us—even required us—to change. We value service to nation; we knew that we had to change to be able to serve. We value our people; we knew we had to change to take care of them.97

Speaking at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations that same year, he stated that “[f]or over 200 years, America’s Army has protected and defended this Republic; fought and won your wars. We are building on that tradition… we are transforming ourselves for the Information Age and beyond.”98 “We must change our institutions to conform to our new realities,” he suggested at a commencement ceremony in 1993, “[t]here is really no alternative if… in the case of the Army


we are to continue to serve our nation.” Statements such as these highlight the continuity in mission—indeed, the continuity of service—enabled by enacting significant reform. The Army, it seems, is not in the business of changing for change’s sake, but rather “building an Army that continues [a centuries old] tradition.” As implied in such statements, change is the Army’s current mission.

With change established as the mission—the means to continue to serve the nation—it is notable that senior leaders often relied on a war metaphor to characterize the change process. In the speech given at his Arrival Ceremony in June 1991 and in a letter to the Army’s general officers that same month, General Sullivan stated that

[w]e will face the challenges in the years ahead with the same professionalism and energy as when we attacked the diverse challenges of the Cold War, and Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and PROVIDE COMFORT. We will be just as successful. At an AUSA meeting later that year, General Sullivan told military and industry leaders that “we are not wringing our hands over the challenges that we face. We have received our marching orders, shouldered our rucksacks, and moved out.” At that same meeting one year later, after

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commenting on some recent successes in the process of change, he stated the following: “I liken where we are today to a force on an intermediate objective—we are consolidating, redistributing ammunition and supplies, checking task organization, putting our arms around our buddies, and preparing to move out again.”103 The change process, indeed, the change mission, was advancing, it seems, as would a lengthy military operation. Indeed, at the U.S. Army Armor Conference in May 1994 General Franks, in his keynote address titled “End of the Beginning,” stated that “[n]ow is not the time to dig and consolidate”—that is, prepare to defend against an enemy counterattack—but rather, “[w]e must… continue the attack.”104 As General Sullivan stated in a letter to the Army’s general officers later that year,

[w]e knew clearly when we started this journey we would face unknown challenges. We are now not unlike commanders on a battlefield—a bit overextended in our lines. It is now time to consolidate our lines while at the same time maintaining momentum, movement, and initiative… I do not intend to stop our movement nor retreat—I need your support.105

As a means of structuring not only one’s conceptualization of an issue, but structuring actions in turn, the war metaphor can be quite powerful (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Indeed, with this metaphor in mind, General Franks understood the change process not as a game to be played, but rather a war to be won. As he suggested of the change process in an oral history interview


conducted in January 1992, “you have your structure, your battles and engagements all leading to the final objective.” 106 I thus suggest that encompassing change within the organization’s mission is a strategy capable of contributing to the development of a critical mass of change agents. If stakeholders accept that change aligns with the organization’s post-Cold War vision of service—and indeed constitutes the organization’s mission—the Army may amass a force large enough to fight the status quo. There was, however, the shared perception among those leading the change effort that in the minds of many stakeholders, the Army’s recent successes justified maintenance of it. This (perceived) mentality among stakeholders was targeted by the practice I describe below.

**Attributing Recent Successes to Change Processes**

Recall that the Army’s successes in Desert Storm in 1991, “one of the most lopsided victories on the historical record,” prompted much self-congratulation (Brown 2011:61) and, in turn, was understood by senior Army leaders to stand in the way of change (Sullivan and Harper 1996). 107 Indeed, organizational scholars observe that structural inertia can result from organizational successes (Weick and Quinn 1999). Senior Army leaders relied, then, on the construction of redefining events as one means of addressing this roadblock. Another practice directed toward the same end was crediting recent successes—to include that experienced in the Gulf War—as resulting from change processes. Explaining successes in this way contributes to

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the establishment of an organizational culture that values and embraces change. As I demonstrate below, distinct efforts were made to valorize the change process, and not the force produced by it, as the factor that deserved congratulation.

Upon assuming responsibility as Chief of Staff, General Sullivan quickly set out to confront the nation’s recent experience in Desert Storm. This is clearly evident as he spoke and wrote regularly about the organization’s experience and success. Less than three months into his tenure, he suggested at a National Guard Association conference that one of the two primary lessons to be learned from Desert Storm was that “it took us 15 years of hard work and dedication to build today’s Army.”108 In a speech given to the Union League of Philadelphia one month later (and elsewhere), he elaborated on this point and made explicit the connection between this observation and the current conditions faced by the Army. Specifically, he stated that

the Army that won such an impressive victory in the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait was not created overnight. It has been carefully rebuilt over the past 15 years to remedy the tragic effects of our Vietnam experience. With that in mind I want to take a few minutes to talk with you about the impact of the changing world environment on the Army and the challenges we face as we seek to shape the Army not only for the security demands of today and next year, but for the uncertainties of the next century.109

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He further described in this speech the change process implemented by Army leaders in the post-
Vietnam Army. Specifically, he described how they began to “restructure and build for the
future… to help the force transition from Vietnam to the demands posed by the Soviet threat.”\textsuperscript{110} There were, General Sullivan stated, specific actions taken to “provide the underlying foundation
for building the Army into the force that is the best we have ever had,”\textsuperscript{111} indeed, “the Army that
won Desert Storm.”\textsuperscript{112} These actions, he notes, fall into six categories, what he termed
“imperatives”:

(1) quality soldiers who are; (2) trained to a razor’s edge based on a; (3) solid
warfighting doctrine, who are equipped with the; (4) leading technology and the
most modern equipment configured in the; (5) proper mix of forces, and who are;
(6) led by competent, confident, professional sergeants and officers.\textsuperscript{113} 

After reiterating and describing in further detail these imperatives among various audiences,
General Sullivan stated that “[t]his formula for success is not a passing fad. It is a fundamental
prescription for victory.”\textsuperscript{114} It is thus not the Army of Desert Storm that is to be valued (and in
turn maintained), but rather, as he explained, the “investment in tough realistic training, leader
development, modernization, sound warfighting doctrine, developing the proper mix of forces,
and… recruiting and retaining quality young men and women”\textsuperscript{115} that created it.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[110] Ibid., 11.
\item[111] Ibid., 11.
\item[112] Ibid., 12.
\item[113] Ibid., 12.
\item[115] Ibid., 141.
\end{footnotes}
In the materials I analyzed, General Sullivan referred less and less to the explicit development of the Army of Desert Storm across time. What is notable, however, is that the imperatives persisted as points of emphases in his speeches and writing. As General Sullivan recalled in an oral history interview, it was his belief that “[t]hese six imperatives were the reason that Army leaders were able to rebuild the Army” in the wake of the Vietnam War (Dabrowski 2008:205). In turn, he notes that maintaining them—indeed, relying on them to support the transition of the force he sought to enable—was a commitment he made at the beginning of his tenure.

Valorizing these imperatives, as opposed to the force they developed, is, I contend, a shrewd tactic applied to disempower those perceived to be determined to maintain the status quo. What is to be valued is the process—the “prescription for victory” (emphasis added)\(^\text{116}\)—not its product. In turn, this practice provides discursive support for related calls for doctrinal development (‘establishing sound doctrine’), technological development and change (‘modernization’), and force restructuring (‘developing the ‘proper’ mix of forces’). These efforts, coupled with the practices described above—those of normalizing change and encompassing change within the organization’s mission—seek to establish an intra-organizational environment that not only accepts, but embraces change and the means to bring it about.

**Empowering Responders**

Though the practices discussed in the prior sections may, if successful, establish an environment in which ‘change is okay,’ still other roadblocks to change may exist. One such

\(^{116}\) Ibid., 141.
roadblock is a lack of trust in those leading the change effort. As organizational scholars observe, “[f]ollowers must have a sense that the organization and its leadership are stable and capable before they are willing to enlist in the battle for change” (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2009:130). Moreover, in contexts with diverse stakeholder groups, maintaining support requires that stakeholders believe that their needs and desires are being adequately considered (Reynolds, Schultz, and Hekman 2006). As my findings reported below suggest, the Army’s senior leaders were aware of, and responsive to such conditions. To enlist others ‘in the battle for change,’ these leaders ensured stakeholders that those leading the change process not only had the interests of these stakeholders in mind, but were also aware of the changes needed and capable of successfully carrying them out.

**Ensuring Representativeness**

After suggesting that the Army understood the emerging post-Cold War world and had a logical plan to respond to the changes taking shape, General Sullivan noted in his opening statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee in February 1992 that “we are executing that plan with an eye firmly on the responsibilities we have to you and the citizens of the United States of America.” This statement suggests that the Army’s plan for change was actively responsive to the needs and desires of the nation’s citizens and civilian leadership. General Franks provided similar reassurance to members of the National Guard Association of Mississippi later that year when he stated the following at a group meeting:

I have a full-time National Guard office at TRADOC… They assist me in addressing the issues that are important to you. Things that will help you stay

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trained and ready… We are working closely with [Major General] Rees at the National Guard Bureau to ensure these individuals are properly positioned within TRADOC to do the job, to work for you.  

Further elaborating on the degree to which the Army’s program for change was responsive to a variety of stakeholders, General Sullivan stated the following at a National Conference of the Reserves Officer Association the following year:

To shape change in the Total Army, I depend upon the advice and counsel of a unique high-level working group. This picked group includes senior leaders from all organizations that have an interest in keeping our Army trained and ready—your own Reserve Officers’ Association, the National Guard Association, the state adjutants general, the Association of the United States Army, the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, the National Guard Bureau, and a few other key folks… I have a direct personal interest in every subject, question, and concern raised by this select group… Everybody has a seat at the table. Everybody has a voice. I can tell you that in the past year, literally hundreds of initiatives have come up through this working group… I listen to all of them, and we are pursuing good ideas. Spurred on by this new thinking, we are moving into the future together. One voice—One Army—one blueprint for the future.  


While consistent statements such as these ensure the variety of stakeholders concerned with the Army’s change process that their interests are being given appropriate consideration, statements made elsewhere consistently called for others to participate in the change process—to have their voice heard. At two separate conferences in April 1992, for example, General Franks implored those in the audience to participate in the Army’s doctrinal development process by outlining the changes being considered and then asking audience members to “bring your ideas on how we can work through these doctrinal ideas,” and telling them to “[t]alk to each other, and talk to us.” In a similar manner, following his description of the organizational changes underway, General Sullivan reminded U.S. Army reserve officers that

While we work within the parameters set for us by the Constitution, the Congress, and the President, we have a certain responsibility for our destiny. You need to think about what all this means to you and to your units. You cannot be passive. You have a seat at the table, and I—and your country—need your best thoughts on how to do all this.

Alongside acknowledgements that specific stakeholder groups held a formal position in the decision-making process, statements such as these further reinforce the notion that the needs and desires of stakeholders are indeed being heard and considered. Nonetheless, in a highly


bureaucratic, hierarchical organizational context like that of the Army, it is the senior leaders who make final decisions and carry out plans. As my findings reveal, these decision-makers and key actors were actively depicted as knowledgeable and capable change agents.

**Guaranteeing Knowledgeable and Capable Change Agents**

At an October 1991 AUSA meeting, General Sullivan shared the following story with a group of U.S. Army sergeants major:

World War II. Sicily. The 2d Armored Division can’t move because a mule and a wagon are in the middle of a bridge. General George Patton arrives, shoots the mule, throws the mule and the wagon off the bridge, and the division continues. George Patton knew which mule to shoot. There were thousands of mules there, but he knew which mule to shoot. Your Army knows which mule to shoot. We know where to put our emphasis... And we know how to achieve victory.  

Addressing industry leaders at a luncheon the following day, he relied on a different example to make the same point:

This luncheon commemorates President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who, when confronting a changing world, commented: “We cannot face the future simply by walking into the past backwards.” His point is evident in the action plans the Army is executing today—we are walking forward, confident we are on the correct azimuth.  

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These examples imply that it is a necessarily knowledgeable Army that is making the ‘right’ decisions. Those leading the change efforts are depicted as well-versed in the needs of the emergent post-Cold War world. As General Sullivan stated succinctly in 1994, “[t]he Army knows and is training the capabilities required to perform in our new national security environment.”\(^\text{125}\) Beyond depicting knowledgeable change agents, however, I observed a distinct interest in ensuring that these knowledgeable actors were understood to be equally capable of managing the change process.

In a speech given at the 1992 Dallas Council on World Affairs, General Sullivan stated that

Our task is to draw the right conclusions from a bewildering set of data points. I want you to know that your Army, (1) understands the world that we are living in; (2) has a plan to address that very uncertain world; (3) recognizes the high standards that you expect of us; and (4) deserves your support… as we move to the 21\(^\text{st}\) century.”\(^\text{126}\)

As he reiterated in various speeches and statements, the Army’s senior leaders not only understood the changes necessary, but had a plan—a proven process in place to enact change. At times these statements simply stated as such—generally noting that “we have a plan.”\(^\text{127}\) At other times, such as in the following example from a speech given at a 1994 Armor Conference, the


details of that plan were highlighted: To build the Army of the twenty-first century, General Sullivan stated, “we must change how we change. We have some mechanisms in place: Battle Labs, Louisiana Maneuvers, acquisition reform, and innovation in the way we design and develop new weapons systems. We can manage change; we can lead change” (emphasis in original). The discursive strategies described here imply that those leading the change effort know where to go, know how to get there, and have the interests of various stakeholders in mind as they make decisions and carry out the plans.

CONCLUSION

The findings reported in this chapter demonstrate that the Army’s senior leaders were actively involved in deliberate and strategic efforts intended to make change possible. In summary, the efforts described above were intended to establish the following perceptions among various stakeholder groups: (1) The extra-organizational environment is undergoing fundamental transformations that (a) necessitate the Army’s sustained attention, (b) justify a range of external demands currently being placed upon the Army, and (c) usher in an era of uncertainty which can only be reconciled through the exercise of projective agency; (2) the Army (a) has a long and rich tradition of enacting change when necessary, (b) must implement significant changes today to continue its tradition of service to the nation, and (c) has recently experienced unparalleled success as a result of a formalized process of change; and (3) I am confident that (a) the interests of my group, as stakeholders in this process, are being adequately

128 As key components of the Army’s change process, these change mechanisms (Battle Labs and Louisiana Maneuvers) are discussed in some detail in Chapter 7.

considered during this period of change, and (b) those leaders managing the change process are knowledgeable about, and equipped and prepared to carry out the changes necessary. With the overarching goal of disrupting and replacing the long-standing, taken-for-granted, “fundamental assumptions of the profession”\(^{130}\)—the explicit focus of the organizational identity work and institutional logic work I describe in the next two chapters—I contend that the efforts described in this chapter constitute institutional work.

To be sure, the practices described here were not carried out by institutional entrepreneurs engaged in direct attempts to transform structural and cultural arrangements at the institutional field level. The environment work described in this chapter was carried out by organizational elites managing their organization’s response to external events perceived to necessitate a significant shift in thought, organization, and action. As will become evident in Chapter 8, these efforts were intended to contribute to the institutional logic work that did, however, have wider implications at the institutional field level. Accepting that “[a]ctions become institutional work when they… advance institutional projects” (Boxenbaum and Strandgaard Pedersen 2009:178), the environment work described above and the organizational identity work described in the chapter that follows must, then, be understood as institutional work—indeed, key chapters in the “institutional story” (Suddaby 2010).

CHAPTER 6

TOWARD A SERVICE-ORIENTED ARMY: ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY WORK

While the environment work described in the previous chapter focused on making dramatic organizational change possible and even desirable, the efforts described do little, by themselves, to influence the direction of change. According to General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles, what the Army needed was “a unifying force which lends internal coherence to change and impetus to the organization.”¹ As I describe in this chapter, that coherence and impetus came in the form of a managerially endorsed vision of the Army’s future and, relatedly, the strategic management of the organization’s identity.

Acknowledging that the Army’s leaders during the period of my analysis were pursuing “aggressive changes,” General Sullivan recalled that for those actively involved in the change process, “our challenge was to redefine our vision—our view of ourselves… in a way that could guide a process of change.”² Herein, I describe these attempts at redefinition as organizational identity work, as those discursive actions I identified attempted to shape the characteristics of the organization perceived to be central, enduring, and worthy of pursuing.

ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY WORK


In a general sense, an organizational identity answers, for organizational members, the question of ‘who we are’ as a collective (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). As with individual identities, this collective sense of self then shapes thought, action, and desire as those that align with the organizational identity are deemed appropriate and others untenable (Albert and Whetten 1985). While organizational identities are informed by history, they are also social constructions. The strategic management of organizational identity thus equates to the strategic management of appropriate thought, action, and desire. In turn, Thornton et al. (2012:135) conceptualize organizational identity as a “key conceptual [linkage] between institutional logics and intraorganizational processes.” Specifically, they suggest that when embodied in collective identities, logics shape organizational forms and practices, and individual thought and action in ways that align with that logic. The development and management of organizational identities either in alignment with or in opposition to institutional logics may thus be understood as institutional work aimed at creating, maintaining, or disrupting them.

While organizational identity establishes ‘who we are’ and ‘what we do,’ an organizational vision portrays ‘who we want to be’—it is an abstract image of the organization’s future capabilities, physical form, and ideological orientation. A vision can thus be interpreted as “a preliminary identity claim” as it limits the otherwise extensive range of viable identities (Gioia, Price, Hamilton, and Thomas 2010:16). Through establishing organizational desires and priorities, an organizational vision thus informs organizational identity as it legitimizes some identities and delegitimizes others. In the data I analyzed, it was clear that the Army’s senior leaders relied heavily on the crafting of a vision as an expression of the organization’s desired identity and, relatedly, strategically managed organizational identity claims to support that endorsed in the vision.
In the 1991 *ARMY* ‘Green Book,’ General Sullivan suggested that for successful change to occur, those influential actors involved in the process “must share a clear aiming point, a vision of the Army, in the future.”\(^3\) With a desire to foster projective agency—that is, with an interest in developing among influential stakeholders a commitment to conduct “an imaginative engagement of the future” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998:984)—the establishment of such an aiming point was a central enabling strategy for change in the data I analyzed. As depicted in Table 6-1, the establishment and communication of a vision was of notable interest to General Sullivan. His extensive participation in this aspect of the change process is to be expected, as the Chief of Staff’s responsibilities are largely characterized by “deal[ing] with external players and longer-term visions” for the Army (Brown 2011:25).

**Table 6-1.** Types of Organizational Identity Work Engaged in by U.S. Army Senior Leaders, June 1991—June 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Institutional Work</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishing a Vision</td>
<td>Creating an abstract image of the organization’s future capabilities, physical form, and ideological orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing Organizational Identity</td>
<td>Specifying a set of distinctive organizational attributes that are central and enduring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alongside General Sullivan’s efforts aimed at establishing a vision, it is notable that he and other leaders sought to actively construct an organizational identity in support of those central characteristics that, as expressed in the vision, were meant to define the essence of the future Army. Through managing organizational identity alongside the establishment of a vision,

the Army’s key senior leaders were, in their own words, attempting to enact a “paradigm shift” by “redefining service” (Sullivan and Harper 1996).

The establishment of a vision and management of the Army’s identity emerged as clear and persistent themes in the data I analyzed. Figure 6-1 provides the data structure for those persistent practices that constitute these forms of institutional work. Therein, I support with brief examples the first-order concepts and second-order themes that compose the aggregate dimension of organizational identity work.

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Establishing a Vision

Recall that among those crucial elements of the Army’s change strategy identified by General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles was articulating a vision—more specifically, “a vision for change.”\(^5\) In their words, such a vision is

\(^5\) Ibid., 417.
an articulation of a future state, a statement of being that codifies the essence of
the organizational purpose… It reflects the larger objective toward which the
organization is moving and unites the organization by providing a common
understanding of the direction the organization is to take.⁶

Though organizational scholars may not agree on a consistent definition of organizational vision,
what is noteworthy here is that the conceptualization of vision endorsed by the Army’s leaders—
the conceptualization that influenced their use of a vision in the change process—was that of
vision as a form of leadership. As organizational scholars explain, a vision, from this standpoint,
is the means through which “a ‘visionary leader’… bring[s] others to understand, accept, and
carry forward his or her plans for the organization” (Larwood, Falbe, Kriger, and Miesing
1995:741). Indeed, General Sullivan and Colonel Harper note in Hope is Not a Method that they
used a vision “as a tool for distributing leadership… so that the independent actions of many
people [were] powerfully aligned” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:92). The establishment of a vision
was thus another practice enacted by senior Army leaders in an effort to assemble the critical
mass of change agents desired. In General Sullivan’s words, the vision was meant “to empower
people”⁷ by serving as “a blueprint for growing into a qualitatively different force.”⁸

As General Sullivan recalled in an oral history interview, for the Cold War Army that he
inherited “[t]he vision… was trained and ready” (Dabrowski 2008:287, emphasis added). As
expressed in the 1986 Operations manual, that meant “be[ing] prepared to fight battles of

⁶ Ibid., 417.


unprecedented scope and intensity” (HQDA 1986:1). For General Sullivan, that vision was inadequate for a post-Cold War Army. As he recalled in 2002: “I felt that we really needed a vision because we were going to go through some profound changes” (Dasbrowski 2008:287). More specifically, he stated, “we needed a broader vision to take us beyond the defense of Central Europe”9—“a coherent vision crafted from the perspective of the future, not to make yesterday perfect but to make tomorrow acceptable.”10

With the prevailing emphasis on large-scale mechanized, and global nuclear war, the Cold War Army’s vision was to be ‘trained and ready to fight and win the nation’s wars.’ In the process of constructing a vision for a distinctly post-Cold War Army, General Sullivan and Colonel Harper thus recalled that the Army’s senior leaders asked themselves in 1991 the following question about the future force: “What business will we be in?” In response, they note, we saw four major roles for the Army. (1) We would fight and win on land, as we did in the Gulf. (2) We would deter war… as we did for so many years in Europe. (3) We would provide reassurance to friends and allies, as we are doing today in the Sinai and Bosnia. (4) We would provide support—both international humanitarian support, such as in central Africa in the refugee crisis of 1994, and domestic support, such as in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in the summer of 1992. The common denominator of all these was service to the nation, and that became the basis of our vision (Sullivan and Harper 1996:87, emphasis added).

That vision, articulated in part or in full in various venues among various stakeholders, was:

“America’s Army, Trained and Ready to Fight, Serving the Nation at Home and Abroad, A

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10 Ibid., 344.
Strategic Force, Capable of Decisive Victory—into the 21st Century” (p. 87, capitalization in original).

While a vision may be meaningful and organizationally influential, scholars observe that successful organizational change is made more likely when there is not only a clear vision, but also extensive communication of that vision (Larwood et al. 1995; O’Connell, Hickerson, and Pillutla 2011). General Sullivan was well-aware of such a need. As he recalled in the interview mentioned above: “My articulation of the vision was a multi-faceted campaign; I went all over the Army. I talked about it constantly” (Dabrowski 2008:286). Indeed, as General Sullivan and Colonel Harper recalled, the process of spreading the vision among various internal and external stakeholders “took several years of purposeful action” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:90). That ‘purposeful action’ is well represented and clearly evident in the materials I analyzed and manifests, as depicted in Figure 6-1, in two distinct ways: articulating a vision and legitimizing the vision.

**Articulating a Vision**

As organizational scholars note, a vision is more likely to be contextually meaningful and influence individual action and organizational outcomes when it is well communicated (O’Connell, Hickerson, and Pillutla 2011). As General Sullivan and Colonel Harper state in *Hope is Not a Method*, “the importance of a well-articulated concept and intent cannot be overstated… In the military and elsewhere, concept and intent must be clearly and unambiguously stated and then emphasized, over and over and over” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:107, emphasis in original). Discussing the Army’s change strategy during his final year as Chief of Staff, General Sullivan suggested that
[t]he essential task is to reach every nook and cranny of the organization so the vision can be used to focus the energy of every component. This articulation and dissemination of the vision is nearly as important as the vision itself, because unless it can be shared, it cannot be brought to bear.\textsuperscript{11}

Reflecting on his first six months as Chief of Staff, General Sullivan thus told the Army’s general officers in 1992 that the vision (as described above) “is the foundation of the message I have been carrying throughout the Army.”\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, as noted in a March 1992 document with “key copy points” provided to senior Army leaders—a document distributed to provide recipients with the “‘party line’ message” General Sullivan “wants Congress to hear… over and over again”\textsuperscript{13}—General Sullivan stated that “it’s vitally important that the Army leadership explain a coherent vision to the American people.”\textsuperscript{14} Articulating the vision among both internal and external stakeholders was of central importance to the Army’s senior leaders.

Throughout the four-year period of my analysis, General Sullivan stated and restated the entire vision or elements of it in various speeches, letters, and publications targeting a variety of internal and external stakeholders: the Army’s general officers in a letter sent the month he

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{11} \textit{The Collected Works} (Sullivan 1996), “Leading Strategic Change in America’s Army,” speech given by GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, April 24, 1995, p. 357.
\item\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 3.
\end{itemize}
assumed responsibility as Chief of Staff;\textsuperscript{15} Army noncommissioned officers in a speech given one year later;\textsuperscript{16} industry leaders attending an Association of the United States Army (AUSA) symposium in May 1993;\textsuperscript{17} civilian members of the Heritage Foundation, a public policy think tank, in April 1994;\textsuperscript{18} an international audience at a global panel in the Netherlands later that year;\textsuperscript{19} and members of Congress in the Foreword—indeed, the very first paragraph—of the 1995 “Army Posture Statement,”\textsuperscript{20} to mention just a few. The vision—“America’s Army, Trained and Ready to Fight, Serving the Nation at Home and Abroad, A Strategic Force, Capable of Decisive Victory—into the 21st Century”—was at the forefront of the Army’s change strategy (Sullivan and Harper 1996:87).

Notably, the vision articulated by the Army’s senior leaders is concept-based—that is, composed of words and phrases that reflect various standards and goals for the organization at a


future state (O’Connell, Hickerson, and Pilluta 2011). In the letter to the Army’s general officers mentioned previously, General Sullivan followed his articulation of the vision by highlighting and distinguishing between key words and phrases within it. “There is a lot in this vision,” he stated, “[s]trategic… trained and ready… decisive victory… for America” (ellipses in original). As suggested by senior Army leaders, each of these elements of the vision “was carefully chosen to be a beacon for the future.” As General Sullivan stated, “[e]very word in the Vision Statement is important; there are no throw-aways” as “it is packed with meaning.” Indeed, each of the key words and phrases in the vision were given detailed specificity, as demonstrated in the following excerpt from a National Security Paper published in 1995:

- **America’s Army**: A unique Army in a unique republic. An Army of active, National Guard, and Army Reserve components with an increasing role for our civilian work force and an increased understanding of the role of our families.

- **Trained and Ready to Fight**: Our purpose is to fight and win America’s wars—anywhere, at any time, under any condition.

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21 The suggestion made by O’Connell et al. (2011) that some visions are ‘concept-based’ is derived from their application of Densten’s (2002) differentiation between concept-based and image-based inspiration in organizations.


• **Serving the Nation:** The Army is the nation’s servant performing many legitimate roles and functions other than war.

• **At Home and Abroad:** America’s Army must be a power projection force, but has an important, domestic support role at home as well.

• **A Strategic Force:** The Army is the ultimate expression of the nation’s will—the strategic weapon of the 21st century.

• **Decisive Victory:** America’s Army must achieve success at whatever it is asked to do—America’s Army fights to win, be it disaster relief, deterrence, or armed conflict.²⁶

Through such claims making, the Army’s senior leaders were undoubtedly engaged in persistent efforts to articulate a clear and unambiguous vision intended to take the organization “beyond the defense of Central Europe”²⁷ and toward a distinctly post-Cold War force that ‘performs many legitimate roles and functions other than war.’ As stated in the 1994 “Army Posture Statement” provided to members of Congress, “[t]he vision broadens the Army’s strategic focus beyond a Cold War orientation.”²⁸

While articulating the vision was of notable importance to Army leaders, through my analysis I identified a second means of establishing a vision that is contextually meaningful and

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influential. As I describe below, the practice of legitimizing the vision was aimed at ensuring that the vision was not only received, but understood to be appropriate—a key element to successful organizational visioning identified by organizational scholars (Dvir, Kass, and Shamir 2004).

**Legitimizing the Vision**

As defined by Suchman (1995:574), legitimacy refers to the “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” In modern democracies, one such system—one socially constructed set of norms, values, and beliefs—is that of civil-military relations characterized by civilian control of the military. This state-military relationship is characterized by an institutional arrangement in which military forces are subordinate to civilian political authority that represents society more broadly (Kohn 1997). Indeed, General Sullivan acknowledged that “[c]ivilian control of the military is an important tenet of American politics” and the 1993 *Operations* manual states in the opening chapter that “[p]roper subordination to political authority” is among those enduring values that “directly influence the Army’s behavior in peace and war” (HQDA 1993:1-2). Through my analysis, I found that such prevailing notions of democratic civil-military relations provided a legitimate macro-level discourse through which the Army’s vision was discursively legitimized. As the examples provided below demonstrate, the vision articulated by the Army’s senior leaders in the Cold War’s wake was rendered proper and appropriate by endorsing the notion that “the professional military’s client is society”—an external stakeholder that rightfully “demands of its military readiness, obedience, and

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professional excellence” (Moten 2005:744). As General Sullivan often stated, it was “America’s Army” that was being developed.30

In the speech given at his Arrival Ceremony in June 1991, General Sullivan, immediately prior to stating the vision described above, suggested that “[t]his view of the future Army reflects capabilities the nation expects of us.”31 As he further emphasized in a letter to the Army’s general officers that same month, each element of the vision is “for America.”32 Similarly, the 1994 “Army Posture Statement” states that the vision not only communicates “the purpose of our Army,” but reflects “what the American people expect from us”33 and provides the Army with a means to ensure that the force remains “capable of delivering what the American people demand.”34 As General Sullivan told senior Army noncommissioned officers in 1992, “[w]e must focus on our vision… Your Army and your country are relying on you and your willingness to share the responsibility for keeping vigilant and prepared.”35 In a speech given to military, government, and industry leaders later that year, General Sullivan made a similar call to action:


34 Ibid., 2.

Our vision statement guides us on our journey. Our Army is and will be a Total Force, trained and ready to fight, serving the nation at home and abroad—a strategic force, capable of decisive victory...

We live that spirit—that determination and striving for a vision—just as our predecessors did. Think of some of them. Abrams—whose vision gave us the victorious force we have today. Eisenhower who looked into the leaden sky of June 5th and made the decision that set [Operation] OVERLORD into motion… Grant in Virginia—forging ahead with a vision of the restored Union as his unwavering purpose. Men of selfless service and vision.

So must we be men and women of character who serve selflessly and who have vision… We have a plan. We are executing our plan… *Your efforts will give America the Army it deserves and expects* (emphasis added).[^36]

Backed by a well-accepted macro-level discourse of civil-military relations in a democracy, statements such as these legitimize the Army’s vision and, in turn, the associated efforts intended to move the Army—to borrow from that vision—‘into the 21st century.’

While various statements such as those described here legitimize the vision, still others identify specific elements of that vision as capabilities demanded by the American people. Take, for example, the following statement from a 1993 Army Research, Development and Acquisition Bulletin:

the shift from focus on potential global warfare to pressing domestic concerns

does not free us from our responsibilities to provide for America’s defense. The

American people still look to us to remain trained and ready, to provide decisive victory in the missions we are called upon to perform (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{37}

Similarly, General Sullivan stated later that year that “America needs an Army that is trained and ready to deliver decisive victory” (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{38} As he told senior military leaders attending the U.S. Army War College, “[t]he American people will judge us by only one standard: were we trained and ready, capable of achieving decisive victory when called upon to do so?” (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{39} Here again, such statements are meaningful in a social context characterized by a shared understanding of military subordination to civilian control. In such a context, the ‘needs’ and ‘judgments’ of the American people are understood to have a legitimate right to shape the Army’s vision and, in turn, organization and capabilities. Worthy of note, then, is that the identity expressed in that vision—the Army as “the nation’s servant” that not only fights its wars but also performs “many legitimate roles and functions other than war”\textsuperscript{40}—is itself legitimized by the prevailing discourse on civil-military relations.

Though explicit statements of the vision in whole were less common in the latter years of General Sullivan’s tenure as Chief of Staff, reference to the Army’s identity as the nation’s faithful servant persisted throughout the period of my analysis. Whereas the vision articulated


‘who we want to be’ as an organization, these identity claims implied that the desired future identity is precisely ‘who we are’ and ‘who we’ve always been.’

**Managing Organizational Identity**

As defined by Albert and Whetten (1985), an organization’s identity is composed of those organizational attributes that are understood to be central, enduring, and distinctive. Once established in the minds of organizational members and stakeholders, those attributes that collectively constitute the accepted organizational identity become inertial and can render organizational disruption and change difficult, thus necessitating calculative and strategic efforts by change agents if the organization is to see itself in a new light (Ravasi and Phillips 2011; Ravasi and Schultz 2006). Indeed, the inertial power of the Army’s Cold War identity was acknowledged and targeted by the Army’s senior leaders. As General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles observed in 1995:

> Today, the Army is being used across a broader range of missions than in the recent past. As this is being written, the United States Army has nearly 165,000 soldiers deployed in nearly 100 different countries. Some of these soldiers are performing missions such as building school houses, digging water wells, and improving roads. Others are in more tradition roles—deterring aggression, participating in combined military exercises, performing peacekeeping missions, and the like. The common thread that runs through all of these operations is a familiar one. America’s Army, as it has for two hundred and twenty years, is striving faithfully to support our national security policies and to perform whatever tasks our nation calls on us to perform. But today’s reality is a very
significant departure from the pattern of the post-World War II world and that strategic shift presents a major challenge to our Army (emphasis added).  

As they note, the Army was actively engaged in a variety of operations other than war, the type of missions they suggest would become increasingly more common as the post-Cold War world evolved. A central concern for the Army’s senior leaders, then, was that “[f]or a generation of soldiers steeped in the Cold War and the stories of our big wars”—indeed, for the generation of soldiers toward which their organizationally internal change efforts were aimed—the idea that “service means much more than fighting and winning the nation’s big wars… was not an easy concept to grasp” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:74).

In his influential book The Masks of War, Carl Builder (1989:37) notes that “[t]he Army’s identity as the nation’s ‘handyman’ or loyal military servant is a fair characterization of most of its history” (see also Huntington [1957] 1985). The Army had, after all, assisted with mapping and exploring the American frontier; built key roads and ports for the nation; and helped the city of Chicago rebuild in the aftermath of a devastating fire in 1871, to provide just a few examples. That changed, however, in World War II’s wake. As Builder (1989:38) suggests, “something happened to the Army in World War II that it liked.” By 1991 the Army thus “saw [itself] very narrowly,” commonly relying on the phrase “‘to fight and win the nation’s wars’ as a slogan to help define [its] essence” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:88). With an organizational identity grounded in the ability to conduct large-scale war, the Army in the post-World War II

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41 Ibid., 408.

era was thus intellectually and physically “optimized for World War III.”\textsuperscript{43} This was the precise condition senior Army leaders sought to change in the aftermath of the Cold War.

With an interest in enacting a “paradigm shift”\textsuperscript{44} that involved an explicit attempt at “redefining service” (Sullivan and Harper 1996), my findings reveal that the Army’s senior leaders were, as organizational scholars might predict, calculative and strategic in their efforts aimed at managing organizational identity. As depicted in Figure 6-1 above and demonstrated below, those efforts I identified involved the following practices: expanding identity claims, providing identity referents, and aligning identity claims with the articulated vision.

\textit{Expanding Identity Claims}

For the Army of the Cold War, the essence of the organization was often understood to be ‘to fight and win the nation’s wars’ (Sullivan and Harper 1996). With a distinctly different view, it was suggested by General Sullivan and Colonel Harper that warfighting is not the essence of the organization, but rather “a core competency” (p. 88). Fighting and winning the land war was only one among a number of legitimate roles for the Army perceived by the organization’s senior leaders at the dawn of the post-Cold War era. As General Sullivan suggested at a Global Panel in the Netherlands in 1994 and reiterated in a number of speeches and publications, while

[f]ighting and winning our nation’s wars remains at the heart of our purpose… we are learning to see ourselves much more broadly... America’s Army is learning to


involve itself around the world in four ways: When our national interests or the interests of an ally or a friend are threatened, we can compel the aggressor in the way that we compelled Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait. We can deter an aggressor in the way that we helped deter the North Koreans. We can provide reassurance to our allies and would-be friends… [and] provid[e] support such as the humanitarian support that we provided in Central Africa last summer (emphasis in original).  


its interests and, *when called upon*, to fight and win the nation’s wars” (emphasis added)\(^\text{48}\). As he suggested in his last few months as Chief of Staff, “[t]he Army exists to serve the nation. It is that simple.”\(^\text{49}\) This shift in attention away from warfighting and toward serving the nation as the organization’s essence is clearly reflected in, perhaps the most influential of all places, the introductory chapter of Field Manual 100-5.

Recall that in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War senior Army leaders sought to revitalize the Cold War logic by developing and maintaining a large professional force capable of responding to nuclear aggression and supporting European allies in large-scale mechanized war. It is thus notable that the 1976 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*, opens with the following: “THE ARMY’S primary objective is to *win the land battle*—to fight and win in battles, large or small, against whatever foe, wherever we may be sent to war” (HQDA 1976:1-1, bold, capitalization, and italics in original). In stark contrast, the opening statement of the 1993 edition of the manual, the first published in the post-Cold War era, states that “The United States Army exists to support and defend the Constitution of the United States” (HQDA 1993:1-1). As becomes clearly evident in this latter version of the manual, the various tasks required to ‘defend the Constitution’ extend well beyond ‘fighting and winning in battles.’\(^\text{50}\) Whereas the Army’s identity in 1976 centers on the organization’s contribution to national security whenever the nation is mobilized and its Army ‘sent to war,’ the identity endorsed in the 1993 version is


\(^{50}\) The changes incorporated in the new field manual are discussed in some detail in Chapter 7.
grounded not only in the organization’s capacity to fight and win the nation’s wars (to be sure, a central focus of the manual), but also its enduring commitment to engage in “operations other than war” which “are not new to the Army” (p. 13-1). While fighting and winning the nation’s wars may persist as the Army’s “primary mission… the Army’s frequent role in operations other than war is critical” (p. 2-1)—a seemingly central and enduring characteristic of an organization that “exists to support and defend the Constitution” (p. 1-1, emphasis added).

As General Sullivan suggested in various ways during his tenure as Chief of Staff, “the essence of the organization is selfless service to country.” This suggestion directly confronts the ‘fight and win’ slogan he and Colonel Harper note was often applied by the Army they inherited to define its essence (Sullivan and Harper 1996). These efforts thus reflect an explicit attempt to expand those identity claims limited to the Army’s warfighting role that were commonly endorsed throughout the Cold War era. As General Sullivan noted in the final months of his tenure as Chief of Staff, “[w]e are remaining a values-based organization… We must put in the men and women who serve in the Army, who serve in the armed forces, the notion of selfless service to nation.” Managing the values that define the organization in such a way is assuredly an explicit attempt to manage the central and distinctive characteristics of the organization.

While ‘service to nation’ emerged as a new slogan meant to establish an expanded organizational sense of self, it is noteworthy that General Sullivan did not abandon the well-accepted central and enduring organizational essence of ‘fighting and winning the nation’s wars.’

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While General Sullivan often suggested that “the essence of the United States Army [is] selfless service to nation,” warfighting, as a necessary core competency, was regularly referenced as a key component of service to nation.

In a speech given at an AUSA meeting in 1992, General Sullivan stated that “[o]ur mission—then, now, and for the future—to fight and win the nation’s wars—to protect and defend the Constitution” (emphasis added). Similarly, in a speech given in January 1994 he stated that “[o]ur task is clear—fight and win, serve the nation, today, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow in a very turbulent world” (emphasis added). In a letter to the Army’s general officers sent the following month he stated that “[w]e should be proud of where we have been, of who we are and what we do, and we must never forget that we exist to fight and win our nation’s wars, to serve America… America’s Army has internalized that fundamental message” (emphasis added). While existing to fight and win the nation’s wars was suggested to be a key defining characteristic of the organization’s identity, the Army’s ‘mission’ and ‘task,’ indeed the organization’s perception of ‘who we are and what we do,’ was actively constructed to encompass much more. Fighting and winning the nation’s wars was presented as one of the many ways that the Army provides service to nation—the seemingly ‘true’ foundation of the Army’s identity.

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53 Ibid., 348.

54 The Collected Works (Sullivan 1996), untitled speech given by GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, October 13, 1992, p. 120.


As organizational scholars note, in the midst of change projects, “[p]reserving the attractive elements” of prevailing institutional arrangements may ease the change process, as doing so makes new arrangements “more recognizable” and makes the changes taking place seem “less abrupt” (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2009:130). As will become evident in Chapter 7, those leading the change process I analyzed indeed made explicit attempts to ensure that those changes proposed, as General Franks recommended, “avoid[ed] a direct confrontation” with prevailing beliefs and ideas in order to “provide an easier transition.” The discursive practices described here were, then, as organizational scholars might presume, calculative and strategic. As I demonstrate in the subsection that follows, so too were those discursive efforts aimed at providing identity referents to support the expanded identity claims described here.

**Providing Identity Referents**

As Ravasi and Phillips (2011) propose, when strategically managing organizational identity in support of a change project, calculative change agents may work to refocus the attention of internal and external stakeholders with regard to the organization’s history. Specifically, they suggest that those leading the change effort may focus on “the crafting of a self-referential narrative aimed at recovering past referents, by increasing their salience in members’ beliefs about the organization” (p. 122). The intent is not to impart seemingly novel conceptualizations of the organization, but rather to provide ‘reminders’ of what the organization is. The purpose is to provide key referents that identify organizational attributes not presently perceived to be central, enduring, and distinctive organizational characteristics. As I describe

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below, the Army’s senior leaders were actively engaged in such practices throughout the period of my analysis.

As General Sullivan and Colonel Harper observed, the various missions that characterize non-warfighting service engaged in by Army forces “were unfamiliar to soldiers who, up to 1989, had experienced one of the least active periods in [the Army’s] history and for whom such operations had been a diversion from the vital business of deterring the Soviet Union” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:74). In response, they state, “we drew on our sense of history to make sure that soldiers understood that, in a democracy, service means much more than fighting and winning the nation’s big wars” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:74). In the data I analyzed, these reminders came in the form of recalling prior ways in which the Army provided ‘service to nation’ beyond fighting the nation’s wars, and referencing recent exemplars that, through being referenced, imply continuity in the Army’s identity as the nation’s faithful servant.

Recall that the 1993 Operations manual thoroughly incorporated, to an unprecedented degree, the range of operations engaged in by military organizations—a continuum of operations ranging from peacetime engagement to war. To be sure, the incorporation of this continuum codifies the Army’s involvement in operations other than war as a legitimate and indeed central characteristic of the organization. The manual identifies the Army’s involvement in such efforts as ‘critical’ organizational endeavors (HQDA 1993). Being codified in the manual, however, does not inherently lead to the shared perception that the Army’s sense of self should be grounded not solely in warfighting, but rather a broader sense of service to nation. The following observations are thus noteworthy.

In June 1993, the month in which the Army published the updated FM, General Sullivan stated the following in remarks given to senior Army leaders at the U.S. Army War College:
In the 218 years the Army has been around, we’ve done a lot of things. We mapped the United States; we explored the frontier; we literally opened this country up; we cleaned up after the San Francisco earthquake and rebuilt Chicago after the fire; we built the ports, the locks, and dams. You name it; the Army has done it. Service to nation.\textsuperscript{58}

In a letter to the Army’s general officers celebrating the Army’s 218\textsuperscript{th} birthday written that same month, General Sullivan stated the following:

the American debate over how to best field a credible, capable Army demonstrates our critical role in service to nation. That debate has continued through to today in many trials—the Civil War—the opening of the West—efforts at nation building at home and abroad… The people that have worn the uniform, in whatever state of organization and preparedness, have always been there for the country. That legacy of selfless service… connects us to our past and to each other. It is continuity—strength—our purpose and our anchor.\textsuperscript{59}

In a similar manner, the updated \textit{Operations} manual included the following:

Army forces have participated in operations other than war in support of national interests throughout its long history. They have protected citizens at the edge of the frontiers of an expanding America; built roads, bridges, and canals; assisted nations abroad; and served our nation in a variety of other missions. Thus, operations other than war are not new to the Army (HQDA 1993:13-1).


Describing the updated manual in a *Military Review* article, General Franks, as TRADOC Commander, stated that while the manual describes Army operations other than war in some detail, explaining “for the first time how to think about and conduct them,” such missions “are not new to our Army” (Franks 1993:8, emphasis added). As General Sullivan stated in the introduction to that same issue:

> doctrine now more robustly addresses the Army’s supporting role in diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives… Although FM 100-5 is the first published statement to address some of these issues, they are hardly without precedent in the Army’s experience; we have had to grapple with such missions since the Spanish-American War, and even earlier (Sullivan 1993:n.p.).

As these examples demonstrate, there was an active effort to provide identity referents—reminders of the Army’s long history of service to nation—in an effort to demonstrate the central and enduring aspect of those expanded identity claims described above. To borrow from Ravasi and Phillips (2011:122), the Army’s senior leaders were “crafting… a self-referential narrative” that reminded various stakeholders of the Army’s long history of peacetime operations in an effort to “increas[e] their salience in members’ beliefs about the organization.” These efforts were not limited to the FM or the conversations surrounding its publication. As the following examples demonstrate, they were present throughout the four-year period of my analysis.

As one Army doctrine writer at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College stated in an April 1992 *Military Review* article, Army peacetime operations include nation assistance, counterdrug, antiterrorism, arms control, support to US civil authority and peacekeeping operations. In fact, our soldiers serve daily in this capacity. Engineers build roads to improve infrastructure; medics provide
inoculations against disease; and mobile training teams enhance friendly foreign
national military expertise, to mention only a few. This use of forces to assist our
allies and preserve the peace includes the entire Army… It is not a new mission; it
is one in which the Army has a rich heritage (Thurman 1992:30).

One year later, General Sullivan noted in an article published in *Parameters*, the quarterly
publication of the U.S. Army War College, that
domestic assistance, where the armed forces are used to service the civilian sector,
is a traditional mission going back to the early days of the Republic when soldier
Zebulon Pike explored the West, and to the early days of this century when
soldier George Washington Goethals built the Panama Canal. 60

Similarly, In June 1995, in the final month covered in my analysis, the TRADOC deputy chief of
staff for doctrine, Brigadier General Morris J. Boyd, stated the following in a *Military Review*
article:

While the Army has always existed primarily to fight the nation’s wars, it has
historically been used under presidential authority to carry out a full complement
of [Operations Other Than War] missions. These have ranged from the
suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, to Robert E. Lee’s channel work
on the Mississippi River in 1839, to the protection of American westward
migration, to sanitation work in the Philippines, Cuba and Panama. In the early
1900s, US forces conducted peace enforcement operations in Cuba… From that
day forward, US forces have participated in disaster relief and humanitarian

assistance operations, like those in Florida and Rwanda, and peace operations in places such as the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, the Sinai, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia and Haiti (Boyd 1995:20).

In light of the examples provide above, those Army missions that are central and enduring—“the legacy of selfless service” suggested to provide the organization with its “purpose and… anchor”61—extend well beyond fighting and winning the nation’s wars. For an Army whose mission necessitates that the organization be prepared to succeed in any task given to it by the nation—one whose vision defines decisive victory as “success at whatever we are called on to do”62—the preparation for, and commitment of troops in operations other than war represent not a break from the past, but indeed business as usual. Being prepared and, more importantly, willing to engage in such efforts are presented as enduring elements of the organization’s identity. As General Sullivan noted in a speech given at a Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Award Ceremony in April 1994:

We are changing from a Cold War focus and returning to more and more of the diverse missions that [World War II era General George] Marshall—himself a veteran of the Philippines and the Civilian Conservation Corps—would easily recognize; missions as diverse and demanding as peacekeeping in Somalia and disaster relief in Florida (emphasis added).63

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Reference here to General Marshall, a highly celebrated general serving as U.S. Army Chief of Staff during World War II and later Secretary of State, is particularly noteworthy when one considers that General Sullivan is addressing an audience that generally saw something in World War II “that it liked” (Builder 1989:38).

While prior referents were often cited as reminders of the Army’s identity as faithful servant to the nation, so too were recent military operations that did not involve warfighting. Incorporated into the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, *Operations*, for example, are descriptive exemplars of then-recent successes in operations other than war. Whether detailing Army efforts in disaster relief operations in the wake of Hurricane Andrew in Florida in 1992; Operation Provide Comfort involving the supplying of refugee camps and medical assistance in Northern Iraq in 1991; or medical assistance provided to the people of the Republic of Cameroon in 1991—a nation not remarkably war-torn, but rather “devastated by disease” (HQDA 1993:13-6)—these accounts serve as referents for the types of military action that are not new, but rather, as suggested in the manual, persistent throughout the organization’s ‘long history.’

As General Sullivan noted at a Veterans of Foreign Wars National Conference in March 1995, near the end of his tenure as Chief of Staff,

Just a few years ago it would have been very difficult to imagine that America soldiers serving in Germany would ever do anything except fight the Soviet Army. Now they have cared for Kurdish refugees and have saved Rawandan children. We are providing support at Guantanamo Naval Base during the Cuban refugee crisis. In recent years, we have provided support to American citizens after disasters like Hurricane Andrew, the Midwest Floods, and the Northridge
Earthquake… Whatever the mission, wherever the task—America’s Army delivers victory.\textsuperscript{64}

Discussing such missions, General Sullivan often noted that “very little of what we are seeing today is ‘new.’”\textsuperscript{65} The problem, he stated, was that “in the 1970s and 1980s our cultural focus had been on Central Europe—we saw ourselves very narrowly.”\textsuperscript{66} Near the end of his tenure, however, he noted of the Army that “we are learning to see ourselves much more broadly.”\textsuperscript{67} It is my contention that such ‘learning’ (however extensive) was supported by the provision of referents upholding the organizational identity grounded in service to nation described here. As General Sullivan conceded, such efforts were intentional actions engaged in to help the organization see itself ‘much more broadly.’ As he recalled in 1996:

Knowing that our roots give us a sense of identity, I knew I could draw on the Army’s history to find symbols of its enduring values. Thus, I began to use my speeches, articles, and other communications to emphasize normative themes… to capture the essence of our shared values… our sense of commitment, and our sense of duty and service to nation (Sullivan and Harper 1996:60).\textsuperscript{68}


\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 339.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 341.

\textsuperscript{68} The material quoted here is provided in the introductory section of Chapter 4 of Hope is Not a Method titled “Touchstones” authored solely by General Sullivan.
The provision of identity referents was, then, one of the ways in which senior Army leaders sought to manage those organizational characteristics that are perceived by others to be central, enduring, and distinctive.

**Aligning Identity Claims with the Articulated Vision**

As General Sullivan and Colonel Harper explain, “[t]he vision was crafted as an expression of the Army’s *most basic competency*—*service to nation*” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:9, emphasis added). Moreover, they state that “by articulating a clear sense of purpose, [the vision] allowed us to *define the Army today and tomorrow*” (p. 9, emphasis added). The vision (to borrow from organizational scholars) served as “a preliminary identity claim” (Gioia, Price, Hamilton, and Thomas 2010:16) as it validated the leadership’s attempts to ‘define’ the organization’s present identity as the nation’s faithful servant.

In defining the various elements of the vision, General Sullivan described ‘serving the nation’ as “*a concept consistent with our ethos, our values, and our history*”—the Panama Canal, settling the West; protecting the settlers; fighting and winning your wars” (emphasis added). To be sure, this description is meant to depict service to nation as an organizational attribute both central to the organization—a key element of the organization’s ‘ethos’ and ‘value’ system—and enduring—that is, consistent with the organization’s ‘history.’ This description of the vision projects service to nation as not only the foundation for the future Army, but a defining characteristic of the organization’s current and long-standing identity. The articulation of the vision is used here (and elsewhere) to expand organizational identity claims beyond their warfare-oriented Cold War form. In a manner similar to that observed by organizational scholars

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in other contexts, the Army vision was indeed “a preliminary identity claim” that, if embraced by stakeholders, may limit what organizational identities are perceived as viable and legitimate, not only for the future, but in the present as they work to achieve that vision (Gioia, Price, Hamilton, and Thomas 2010:16).

While broadening the understanding of service among stakeholders was of interest, still other elements of the vision were aligned with the expanded scope of service endorsed by the senior leadership. As noted in *Hope is Not a Method*, some stakeholders “were troubled by the phrase ‘decisive victory’” in the vision, feeling that it signaled “backward, not forward, thinking” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:91). The question, General Sullivan and Colonel Harper contend, was: “What is decisive victory, after all, when the mission is not combat?” (p. 91) The answer offered by the Army’s leadership acknowledged that “America’s Army must achieve success at whatever it is asked to do—America’s Army fights to win, be it disaster relief, deterrence, or armed conflict.”⁷⁰ As General Sullivan explained, “[d]ecisive victory today and into the next millennium is success at whatever we are called on to do.”⁷¹ As he noted in a letter to the Army’s general officers in July 1992:

> Our vision is a touchstone in a sea of change. This is a time when leaders must internalize the vision and move their organizations toward the achievement of that vision. In the final analysis, how well we accommodated change will not be measured in short tons moved, end strength, or dollars saved; but rather it will be measured in how well we respond the next time we are called, whether that be for


a DESERT STORM or a forest fire. This is a time for leaders at every level in America’s Army to focus on the future and make our vision a reality.\textsuperscript{72}

To be sure, the measure of success implied in this statement—that of accomplishing any mission ranging from combat operations (‘a Desert Storm’) to domestic assistance (‘a forest fire’)—demonstrates that the organization’s purpose is to serve the nation. To ‘make the vision a reality,’ then, is to move the organization toward one that grounds its sense of self in service to nation.

Though General Sullivan stated that there were “no throw-aways” within the vision,\textsuperscript{73} in a variety of forms of communication the articulated vision either excluded the phrase ‘trained and ready to fight,’\textsuperscript{74} or amended that portion of the vision to state ‘trained and ready’ only.\textsuperscript{75} In a speech given at a National Guard Association Conference in October 1993, General Sullivan immediately followed his statement of such an amended vision—stating only ‘trained and ready’—with the following: “Every word in the Vision Statement is important.”\textsuperscript{76} Warfighting, it seems, was not. Given the expanded identity claims made by the senior leadership, it is my


contention that this is anything but a minor alteration, providing instead a notable separation of
the organization’s future sense of self from the narrowed focus on warfighting that prevailed
throughout the Cold War.

In a speech given just two months before his retirement, General Sullivan stated that
“Our vision is fairly simple: America’s Army… serving the nation at home and abroad; a
strategic force capable of decisive victory… into the 21st century” (ellipsis in original).77 Aside
from excluding the phrase ‘trained and ready to fight,’ the remainder of the vision is intact. This
articulation of the vision thus disassociates the Army from its warfighting identity. Indeed, as
General Sullivan continued in that speech, he described ‘decisive victory’ broadly as “success at
whatever we are called on to do” and reaffirmed ‘service to nation’ as consistent with the Army’s
history and values.78

Whereas some statements of the vision excluded the phrase ‘trained and ready to fight’
altogether, still others stated only ‘trained and ready’ or elaborated on what the Army was to be
trained and ready to accomplish beyond succeeding in combat. In 1995 the vision articulated in
the “Army Posture Statement” provided to Congress was amended throughout the document to
state only ‘trained and ready,’79—changed from prior versions which included the original
statement of ‘trained and ready to fight.’80 Indeed, in the “key copy points” providing senior
Army leaders with the “‘party line’ message” General Sullivan “want[ed] Congress to hear…

77 The Collected Works (Sullivan 1996), “Leading Strategic Change in America’s Army,” speech given by

78 Ibid., 357.

79 U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, “Challenges and Opportunities,” United States Army Posture Statement,
FY 1995.

80 U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, “Change and Continuity,” United States Army Posture Statement, FY
1994.
over and over again,” the “coherent vision” that was to be “explain[ed]… to the American people” is stated as follows: “America’s Army, Trained and Ready, Serving the Nation at Home and Abroad as her Strategic Force, Capable of Decisive Victory” (capitalization in original, emphasis added). In a NATO publication that same year, General Sullivan not only excluded the phrase ‘to fight,’ but continued to state that the “Army will be a highly trained, superlatively well-equipped, advanced-technology flexible force, ready and able to carry out a large variety of possible missions” (emphasis added). Similarly, the ‘trained and ready’ portion of the vision reads in both a letter to the Army’s general officers and a speech given at a Defense Advisory Committee Dinner later that year: “trained and ready to serve this nation at home and abroad.”

In light of the senior leadership’s expansion of identity claims to establish warfighting as a core competency that is but one of a variety of ways that the Army provides service to nation, these changes are notable; they align such identity claims with the articulated vision.

As Rodrigues and Child (2008:886) contend, organizational identity “is informed by collective views as to what the organization’s priorities should be.” With vision providing a framework for organizational priorities, a vision may thus inform the organization’s identity.

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82 Ibid., 3.

83 Ibid., 5.


Indeed, Gioia et al. (2010) demonstrate that the establishment of a vision rules in some organizational identities and rules out others. When a vision is accepted as constituting the desired end state—that is, the preferred organizational identity for the organization in the future—it limits the otherwise extensive range of viable identity claims in the present. With the vision lending credibility and legitimacy to the expanded identity claims being made, the Army’s vision may indeed be interpreted as “a preliminary identity claim” (Gioia, Price, Hamilton, and Thomas 2010:16)—a strategic means to enact a “paradigm shift” by “redefining service” (Sullivan and Harper 1996).

CONCLUSION

For an Army whose members were, to a notable degree, “hanging on to an image of the Army at its finest year, the last year of World War II” (Builder 1989:38), the organizational identity work described above is noteworthy. As Thornton et al. (2012) observe, at the organizational level, true shifts in institutional logics will manifest in problematizing extant organizational identities. To be sure, those discursive efforts described here and the organizational identity they endorsed directly confronted the war-oriented identity that persisted throughout the Cold War era. With the conventional warfighting role being confronted in such a way, military sociologist Charles Moskos (2000:17) suggests that in the Cold War’s wake “the American military underwent something of an identity crisis.” The problematization of a well-entrenched organizational identity is crisis-like. By relying on the organization’s history to “find symbols of its enduring values” and to “give [the Army] a sense of identity” grounded in service to nation (Sullivan and Harper 1996:60), senior Army leaders implied that no such crisis was

occurring. Moreover, by assuring stakeholders that the identity expressed in the vision is a legitimate and desirable one, those efforts intended to disrupt and replace the principles, practices, and meanings that served the war-oriented identity of the Cold War are themselves rendered legitimate and desirable. The organizational identity work described here thus works toward accomplishing the stated goal of “lending internal coherence to change and impetus to the organization.”

The efforts described here support and (if successful) make desirable the institutional logic work I describe in the next chapter.

While General Sullivan and Colonel Harper suggested that the dramatic changes they pursued required “a clear vision of the future,” they further stated that “words were not enough” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:37). What they felt was needed was “an effective strategy for real change” (p. 37). As I demonstrate in the chapter that follows, that strategy involved the continued development of the Army’s keystone doctrinal manual—FM 100-5, Operations—to align with the vision and organizational identity described here.

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87 Ibid., 418.
CHAPTER 7
TOWARD A POST-COLD WAR FORCE: INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC WORK

As the Army’s senior uniformed leader limited to a four-year tenure as Chief of Staff, General Sullivan believed that his responsibility to the organization in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War was “to create the conditions for change.”\(^1\) As described in the previous two chapters, the environment work and organizational identity work carried out by the Army’s senior leaders during his tenure were geared toward this end. As I have demonstrated, those efforts were intended to make the changes sought by the Army’s senior leaders not only acceptable, but desirable. To further create the conditions for change, however, General Sullivan was firmly committed during his tenure to initiating a “substantive intellectual transformation” of the force.\(^2\) As an explicit attempt to disrupt and replace the guiding principles and “fundamental assumptions of the profession,”\(^3\) I describe herein the main efforts supporting this intellectual transformation as institutional logic work.

For an Army that is “doctrine-based,” those efforts that constitute institutional logic work center on a significant revision of the Army’s keystone doctrinal manual—the “authoritative foundation” in organizational matters (HQDA 1993:iv). In the section that follows, I thus trace


the process through which post-Cold War Army doctrinal development occurred during General Sullivan’s tenure as Chief of Staff. It was at this time that the Army was, as General Sullivan suggested, beginning to “contemplate not only new missions but also new means”⁴—that is, contemplating replacing the prevailing Cold War logic with a distinctly new one. I thus explore how doctrine was not only touted during this period to be, but actively established as, “the Army’s engine of change” (HQDA 1993:vii).

The presentation of my findings in this chapter differs in style from that of the previous two. While those efforts associated with environment work and organizational identity work were persistent in similar form across time in the data I analyzed, the practices I describe below were temporally situated and, as I demonstrate, reflect a recursive process of institutional logic change. In the section that follows, I describe those key efforts that emerged as salient in my analysis of the data with regard to the Army’s use of doctrine as ‘the engine of change.’ Therein, I provide a narrative account of the change project’s life course from June 1991 to June 1995 (i.e., throughout General Sullivan’s tenure as Army Chief of Staff). This account establishes the manifest content I analyzed to identity the first-order concepts and second-order themes that constitute institutional logic work. In the next section, I then present these concepts and themes, and draw on them to propose a recursive model of institutional logic change.

**INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC WORK: A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT**

Recall that institutional logics are “frames of reference that condition actors’ choices for sensemaking” and provide “the vocabulary they use to motivate action” (Thornton, Ocasio, and

As organizational scholars contend, prevailing institutional logics “provide a symbolic grammar” that may “be drawn upon as if from a toolkit” (p. 135). This conceptualization of logics aligns well with the discourse-centered model of institutional persistence and change proposed by Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy (2004) and described in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2-2). Their approach to institutional analysis foregrounds the recursive relationship between actions, texts, discourse, and institutions (as I contend here, institutional logics). From this perspective, institutional logics are created, maintained, and disrupted by actions that produce texts that “embed in discourse” (p. 641) and, in turn, “act as organizing mechanisms” (p. 640). Institutional logics are thus constituted by discourse: “the structured collections of texts that exist in a particular field and that produce the social categories and norms that shape the understandings and behaviors of actors” (p. 638). Broadly defined here as concerted efforts intended to shape logic availability, legitimacy, and activation, institutional logic work entails those efforts intended to shape the principles, practices, and meanings present and predominant in the discourse(s) available to actors within a particular field. In large, bureaucratic, contemporary military organizations, those elements of organizational life are expressed in formal doctrine.

Studying a ‘doctrine-based’ Army, it should come as no surprise that my analysis of the development and use of FM 100-5, *Operations*, supports the model of institutionalization proposed by Phillips et al. (2004). The efforts of senior Army leaders I describe in this chapter highlight “the importance of… not only the content of texts… but also their trajectories: where texts emanate from, how they are used by organizational actors, and what connections are

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5 The reference to a ‘toolkit’ here is credited to Swidler (1986) in her influential work titled “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” Though not referencing institutional logics specifically, W. Richard Scott (1991:169) also references this ‘toolkit’ approach when he suggests that organizational actors may have multiple “institutional belief systems” on which to draw.
established among texts” (p. 646, emphasis added). It is thus the deliberate management of the ‘content’ and the ‘trajectory’ of Army doctrine—its development, use, and intertextual connections—that constitute what I identified as institutional logic work.

In the distinctly ‘doctrine-based’ post-Vietnam Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, serves as the organization’s keystone doctrinal manual. As expressed in the TRADOC “Desk Guide to Doctrine Management,” the purpose of doctrine is to “[d]escribe what, why, and when of military actions”; it is “authoritative” in nature; and it is “comprehensive and exhaustive” in breadth with regard to the “activities and conditions” addressed therein.\(^6\) As cited in the “Desk Guide,” doctrine provides the “fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions.”\(^7\) Moreover, as General Sullivan explained, “[d]octrine is the basis for translating ideas into… weaponry, organizational designs, tactical concepts, and training and leader development programs.”\(^8\) It is the central and far-reaching effects of Army doctrine described here that enable it, when fundamentally transformed, to serve as ‘the engine of change.’

In 1992, General Franks noted that General Sullivan wanted “to use doctrine as the engine of change to build an Army that is responsive to the range of requirements to serve the nation’s needs in the current time frame and in the future, which is different, decidedly different from the Cold War era.”\(^9\) In turn, the Army’s senior-most leaders initiated a concerted effort to

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\(^7\) Ibid., 5. This definition is endorsed by TRADOC in the “Desk Guide to Doctrine Management,” but cited therein from Joint Publication 1-02.


replace the Army’s Cold War, Soviet-oriented Operations manual with one aptly suited for the ‘decidedly different’ post-Cold War world as they saw it. In large measure, this change process was overseen and guided by General Sullivan as Army Chief of Staff and General Franks as TRADOC Commander. In their vision of the future, the Army would be confronted with new means enabled by ‘Information Age’ technology and new missions, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, necessitated by a ‘new world order.’ The idea that operations other than war were legitimate Army missions, however, challenged the then-dominant idea that ‘the Army exists to fight and win the nation’s wars’ (Sullivan and Harper 1996). Moreover, as General Franks noted, “ideas are the most difficult thing to change in a conservative organization like the U.S. Army.”

The concerted efforts of those senior leaders involved with the doctrine development process—the process of infusing the Army’s “common basis of knowledge and understanding” (Drew and Snow 1988:171) with new ideas—were thus deliberate and strategic. As depicted in Figure 7-1, this process relied on a series of deliberate and strategic textual accomplishments. It is the content and trajectories of these texts that constitute the focus of my analysis reported here.


 Providing the ‘fundamental principles’ that guide organizational and individual thought and action, all Army doctrine is ‘authoritative.’ As stated in the introduction of FM 100-5, that manual “furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training” (as stated in HQDA 1986:i and HQDA 1993:iv). FM 100-5 is the Army’s keystone doctrinal manual. Whereas doctrine is ‘authoritative,’ the material presented in ‘525’ series TRADOC pamphlets is distributed “for use and examination” (emphasis added).\(^{11}\) As stated in the doctrine “Desk Guide” referenced above, “[t]hese publications document approved operational concepts, which then serve as a basis for developing future doctrine.”\(^{12}\) As depicted in Figure 7-1, these pamphlets (of which TRADOC Pam 525-5 relates to the Operations FM) do not replace, but rather supplement current doctrine


\(^{12}\) Ibid., 10.
and inform future doctrine. These conceptual pamphlets are thus ‘disruptive texts’ (Brown, Ainsworth, and Grant 2012) as they challenge prevailing doctrine by championing alternative principles and practices. In addition to these formally recognized publications, General Franks relied on a 27-page précis to ease the doctrinal changes sought in the early stages of the doctrine development process. As I explain below, I identify this text as a ‘bridging text’ as it was used to link the well-entrenched Cold War paradigm expressed in the 1986 Operations manual and the new, distinctly post-Cold War principles endorsed in the TRADOC pamphlet published in August 1991.

As depicted in Figure 7-1, at the beginning of General Sullivan’s tenure as Chief of Staff in June 1991, the Army had an authoritative Operations manual infused with Cold War principles. Relying on the production and circulation of disruptive and bridging texts in the interim, that manual was superseded with one focused on the ‘decidedly different’ post-Cold War world in June 1993. With the publication of an updated TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 in August the following year, the Army had in place, at the end of General Sullivan’s tenure, not just an authoritative doctrine endorsing post-Cold War principles and practices, but also a disruptive concept—a ‘basis for developing future doctrine.’ It was through this ongoing process of textualization that the Army’s senior leaders guided the Army through a “substantive intellectual transformation” as new principles and practices, and new missions and means—indeed, key characteristics of an emergent post-Cold War logic—were textualized in Army doctrine and concepts.

This section is composed of three subsections that correspond to the timeline provided in Figure 7-1. First, I describe doctrinal development efforts occurring between June 1991 and June

1993. It was during these early years of General Sullivan’s tenure as Chief of Staff that Army leaders relied on doctrine to disrupt the Soviet-oriented, Cold War *Operations* manual and initiate the development of a manual uniquely suited for the post-Cold War world. In the next subsection, I describe the *Operations* manual published in June 1993, treating its publication, to borrow from General Sullivan, as “singularly important” (Sullivan 1993:n.p.). In the last subsection, I describe those efforts occurring after the publication of the 1993 manual and through the end of General Sullivan’s tenure as Chief of Staff in June 1995. I conclude each of these subsections with a conceptual summary in which I focus on the key elements of the narrative account that contributed to my development of a model of institutional logic change.

**Initiating ‘The Front-End Work’: June 1991—June 1993**

For General Sullivan and Colonel Harper, the revision of the Army’s keystone doctrinal manual and the actions that made such a revision possible constituted “the front-end work” necessary to enact transformative and lasting change (Sullivan and Harper 1996:9). As I describe in this section, the initiation of this ‘work’ during the early years of the change process (from June 1991 to June 1993) involved 1) disrupting the Army’s Soviet-oriented doctrine, and concomitantly developing a manual for the post-Cold War era as the Army’s senior-most leaders envisioned it, and 2) developing processes that enable organizational learning and experimentation.

**Starting ‘The Engine of Change’: Disrupting and Developing FM 100-5, Operations**
With the publication of the 1986 FM 100-5, *Operations*, manual, the Army reaffirmed a “doctrinal thrust” initiated in 1976 and solidified in the 1982 edition (HQDA 1986). That ‘thrust’ was the introduction of ‘AirLand Battle.’ As described in the 1986 FM,

The US Army’s basic fighting doctrine… is called AirLand Battle in recognition of the inherently three-dimensional nature of modern warfare. All ground actions above the level of the smallest engagements will be strongly affected by the supporting air operations of one or both combatants (HQDA 1986:9).

With a focus on war between militarily advanced nation states capable of conducting and sustaining large-scale land and air warfare, AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s “set as its priority the defense of NATO Europe against a quantitatively superior Warsaw Pact” (HQDA 1993:v). With this Cold War focus, the Army reemphasized and crystalized in the 1986 edition of the manual the “basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine—initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization” (HQDA 1986:ii). In turn, General Franks stated near the end of his tenure as TRADOC Commander that in 1991 he and the Army’s senior leadership “began the campaign [to change the Army] by designating the revision of… doctrine as [the] main attack toward the future.”

With FM 100-5 formally identified as the “authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training” (HQDA 1986:i), any ‘attack’ on doctrine would have to call into question the document’s authority. The explicit ‘attack’ on AirLand Battle doctrine thus began with the publication and circulation of a 49-page TRADOC Pamphlet titled *AirLand Operations: A*

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Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond in August 1991. As depicted in Figure 7-1, this was indeed a ‘disruptive text’ as it challenged the dominant Cold War paradigm by advocating alternative goals and means.

As stated in the Foreword of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *AirLand Operations* (hereafter, Pam 525-5 or 525-5), the document “sets forth… the operational level umbrella concept describing how Army forces will operate in the future.” Describing “how future operations are to be conducted by the various levels of command during war, conflict, and peacetime competition,” the shift from AirLand ‘Battle’ to AirLand ‘Operations’ reflects a shift from an exclusionary wartime focus to the explication of military operations, broadly defined. Throughout the pamphlet, new concepts and new principles for approaching, planning for, and executing missions across the continuum of operations are described in some detail. As a means to ‘attack’ AirLand Battle doctrine specifically, Chapter 6 of the pamphlet titled “Implications” states that

as an umbrella concept, AirLand Operations will have a ripple effect throughout the Army’s concepts and doctrine… TRADOC must identify what changes are needed and develop a program for transitioning from current doctrine (e.g., from the 1986 edition of FM 100-5), to future doctrine.


\[16\] Ibid., 1.

\[17\] Ibid., 35.
The proposed changes to ‘how Army forces will operate’ suggested in the 49-page pamphlet were intended to guide the next iteration of Army doctrine and shape the first keystone doctrinal manual for a post-Cold War Army.

As General Franks recalled, Pam 525-5, published under the direction of outgoing TRADOC Commander General John W. Foss in August 1991, the month General Franks assumed command, was intended “to inform the discussion and debate about the changes to 100-5.” General Franks was well aware, however, that the changes proposed in the AirLand Operations concept constituted a significant departure from the well-entrenched ideas expressed in AirLand Battle doctrine. Additionally, he understood the Army to be a “conservative organization” with Cold War-oriented “forbiases and perceptions” that create “[i]nstitutional inertia.” General Franks thus enacted a strategic method of developing support for the doctrinal changes proposed in the pamphlet.

In a December 1991 letter to General Sullivan, General Franks explained his concerns regarding the dramatic changes expressed in Pam 525-5.

It was my sensing that the Army has not yet assimilated or internalized all the lessons that we have learned from our victories in JUST CAUSE, in DESERT STORM, perhaps even the Cold War. Yet we already have a concept for future battle 525-5 published and on the street. We might have been premature with that concept paper. I believe that we have two things going on simultaneously;

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18 U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, oral history interview with GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., November 17, 1994, p. 3.

19 Ibid., 2.

internalizing lessons of DESERT STORM while also attempting to accommodate some new thoughts, new language, new words, new definitions, new diagrams in 525-5. This is tough for an Army that feels good about what it has accomplished.\textsuperscript{21}

The solution enacted by TRADOC, he continues,

was to bridge this gap between the current [1986 version of] 100-5 and 525-5 by using a précis which, in a sense, is a summary of thoughts related to the larger lessons of DESERT STORM, some of the key thoughts as laid out in 525-5, yet that avoids a direct confrontation with some of the key thoughts in 100-5 and avoids new language. Thus the précis is an attempt to provide an easier transition.\textsuperscript{22}

Produced just one month after the publication of Pam 525-5, the précis was indeed less confrontational, providing in comparison to the pamphlet a remarkably less definitive statement on the changes taking shape. As General Franks suggested, the précis was indeed a bridging concept.

In light of the expressed concern with the ‘new thoughts, new language, new words, new definitions, and new diagrams’ in Pam 525-5, it is noteworthy that the précis states the following: “AirLand Operations does not radically change AirLand Battle; rather it expands and refocuses the concepts inherent in AirLand Battle for our Army in a changing strategic environment”


\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 1-2.
As General Franks’ statements above imply, this language was assuredly strategic given that Pam 525-5 proclaimed the following: “AirLand Operations explains what the Army must do to succeed in an environment that is already upon us… this concept… will provide the azimuth for reshaping and modernizing the Army” (emphasis added). While the introduction to 525-5 states succinctly that the pamphlet “introduces [new] precepts for future military operations” (emphasis added), the précis concludes with the following: “This précis suggests areas to expand or improve upon our already solid AirLand Battle doctrine” (emphasis added). Indeed, where 525-5 is suggested to ‘provide the azimuth,’ the précis suggests that its “intent is to foster an examination and discussion that ensures a fully understood, well-reasoned, and disciplined evolution of AirLand Battle doctrine” (emphasis added). As these differences in presentation suggest, the précis was indeed less prescriptive, and in turn less doctrinally confrontational, than Pam 525-5. Moreover, the précis expanded the justifications for doctrinal development beyond those cited in the TRADOC pamphlet: those of technological developments and new geopolitical realities.

As the Army published and circulated TRADOC Pam 525-5 in August 1991, President George Bush issued a new “National Security Strategy”—a document that outlines the primary threats to national security perceived by the executive branch and explains the administration’s


25 Ibid., 1.


27 Ibid., 15.
means of addressing them. In the introduction to the TRADOC précis (circulated in September),
the authors justify a reconsideration of prevailing Army doctrine not only by highlighting a
dgeostrategic environment that has been “fundamentally changed,” a suggestion also made in Pam
525-5, but by stating that with the emergence of a new “National Security Strategy,” the nation’s
“former strategy of containment”—the nation’s national security strategy that persisted
throughout the Cold War era—“is gone.”28 The précis continues by outlining the “four-point
strategy” the nation’s long-standing commitment to containment “has been replaced by,”29 and
suggesting that such change poses new challenges to the Army. Here, senior Army leaders drew
on an emergent “National Security Strategy”—one characterized by newly centralized principles
and new grammar found among the president’s four-point strategy—to both elicit and legitimize
refinement of current Army doctrine to support it.

In addition to referencing the “National Security Strategy,” the précis explicitly solicited
an examination and discussion of prevailing doctrine. The process enacted for this purpose—a
process managed by TRADOC generally, and General Franks personally—was purposefully
inclusive and strategically discursive.

In mid-September 1991, General Franks distributed the précis to senior Army leaders at a
Total Army Analysis meeting.30 As noted in a memorandum extract from that meeting, General
Franks suggested to the audience that “our current doctrine is not deficient; rather, the issue is

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28 Ibid., 1.
29 Ibid., 1.
accommodating change.”

This message aligns well with the précis’s call for an ‘expansion’ and ‘refocusing’ of AirLand Battle concepts as opposed to the provision of ‘new precepts’ offered in 525-5. Drawing on the précis, General Franks thus did not propose solutions at that meeting, but rather, as stated in the extract cited above, offered “the intellectual framework within which to address the enabling concepts set out in TRADOC Pam 525-5.”

With his call for future “substantive discussions” at the Total Army Analysis meeting, General Franks was indeed using the précis for its stated purpose—‘to foster an examination and discussion’ of current doctrine. As minutes from that meeting note,

> [t]hroughout the discussion, [General Sullivan] emphasized the need for senior leaders of the Army to be involved. He charged them each, personally, to communicate with General Franks and with each other on the content of the précis, on the scope and breadth of FM 100-5, on the implications for the force, etc.

With this call for participation, it is noteworthy that just eleven days after the conference, a formalized means of enabling and managing participation in the doctrine development process was enacted. In a memorandum widely distributed on September 30, 1991, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Concepts and Doctrine, Brigadier General Timothy J. Grogan, provided and solicited points of contact to and from various stakeholders as a means of, in his words, “establishing a network of communications, internal and external to the Army, to ensure we

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31 Ibid., 1.

32 Ibid., 3.

33 Ibid., 1.

34 Ibid., 4.
obtain the collective wisdom of all key personnel.”

The intent, he suggested, was not only to gain input in support of doctrinal change, but also “to build consensus.”

As General Franks noted, the consensus sought through this inclusive doctrinal development process was not only oriented toward the product—that is, focused on obtaining consensus among key stakeholders that the doctrine produced was appropriate and desirable—but also a shared understanding that a revision of the doctrine was necessary.

As General Franks recalled of the doctrine development process leading up to the publication of a new edition of FM 100-5,

At every major Army commanders conference that [General Sullivan] held, I would lead a discussion on major points to be included in the doctrine… we would include… an exchange and stimulate a dialogue with the Army for revision… In the process of the revision, we would inform the Army about the need for revision.

In General Franks’ view, these efforts were successful as the précis had not only eased the transition, but also guided the informal discussions in useful directions in relatively short order.

By December 1991 General Franks suggested in a letter to General Sullivan that not only was it his belief that the Army’s senior leaders had “accepted the need for revision of FM 100-
but these leaders were already “actively engaged” in a “genuine intellectual exchange” in support of doctrinal development and change. Indeed, key actors were, by early 1992, drawing on Pam 525-5 in their discussions and considerations of future doctrine. By that time, for example, students at the U.S. Army War College were reviewing and studying TRADOC Pam 525-5 and the pamphlet was cited as a viable ‘force’ for doctrinal change in TRADOC briefing materials. The pamphlet—endorsing uniquely post-Cold War era principles and practices—not only called for (in its content) but also guided (via its trajectory, or use) the debate and discussion leading to the development of a new Operations manual.

With these developments, General Franks reported in December 1991 that he had moved forward with a rewrite of FM 100-5 by assembling a doctrine writing team and working to further formalize the process through which insights from individuals serving in all corners of the organization could contribute to the discussion. The ‘front-end work’ of establishing among those influential stakeholders a perceived need for new doctrine; encouraging and enabling participation in the doctrine development process; and using a disruptive text infused with new

40 Ibid., 3.
41 Ibid., 2.
44 U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, oral history interview with GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., November 17, 1994.
language, principles, and practices (TRADOC Pam 525-5) to influence the manual’s content, was successful. In relatively short order (given the enormity of the undertaking) the Army had a new *Operations* manual in June 1993. As will become evident later, however, for those leading the change effort, this was to be only the beginning of a more significant overhaul of Army doctrine. Indeed, the 1993 edition of the manual only included “the changes the Army appear[ed] ready to accept.” Nonetheless, with the manual endorsing new language, principles, and practices, the Army had produced ‘an engine of change.’

*Building ‘A Vehicle for Change’: Developing Processes for Learning and Experimentation*

In a 1994 oral history interview, General Franks recalled that upon assuming command of TRADOC, he felt that the Army needed not only new ideas expressed in doctrine, but a “mechanism… to experiment with the ideas.” With an interest in “foster[ing] an entrepreneurial spirit” within the Army’s ranks, the Army’s senior leaders thus sought to establish and institutionalize a means for the organization “to do new things in a learning atmosphere” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:239). The result was the development of Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) and Battle Labs (each described in some detail below) relatively early in the Army’s process of transformation. As General Franks recalled in a speech given at an AUSA symposium in 1994:

In 1991… we began the campaign [to change the Army] by designating the revision of our doctrine as our main attack toward the future—“Doctrine is the engine of change,” General Sullivan reminds us. And in 1992 we shifted our main

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46 Ibid., 1.

47 U.S. Army TRADOC MHBO, oral history interview with GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., January 2, 1992, p. 11.
effort to the way we modernize and grow—the way we experiment with new force capabilities, technology, and organizations… Thus two years ago—we created LAM and Battle Labs—an institutional approach to experimentation. Our objective was to begin to experiment where battle and other operations appear to be changing.48

By mid-1992 this focus of attention was reflected in the senior leadership’s description of the Army’s change process. As suggested in a TRADOC brief given that year, the change was not being driven by new doctrine alone, but rather a range of “intellectual change components” of which FM 100-5 was acknowledged as the “engine of change,” Battle Labs were identified as constituting the “practice fields,” and the Louisiana Maneuvers process was designated as the “journey to the future.”49 To borrow an expression from General Sullivan, with the creation of LAM and Battle Labs, the Army was building “a vehicle for change.”50 This ‘vehicle’ was powered by doctrine as its ‘engine’; however, where the engine was new, the vehicle was intentionally and meaningfully grounded in the organization’s history.

With U.S. involvement in World War II on the horizon, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall initiated in 1940 a series of experiment-based field exercises in Louisiana involving large numbers of both draftees and regular Army personnel. As Yarrison


(1999:1) explains, these “Louisiana Maneuvers” were designed “to train troops and units, test newly developed doctrinal and organizational concepts, identify equipment requirements, and evaluate the future senior leaders of the wartime Army.” In time, the dramatic structural and doctrinal changes borne out of these exercises were celebrated as contributing to World War II successes. With an interest in a qualitative transformation of the force, General Sullivan drew on this history as the Army’s senior leaders sought to establish, in his words, “a deliberate strategy to adapt the Army more quickly.”

In 1991, General Sullivan settled on a modern Louisiana Maneuvers as a means of wargaming, experimenting, and transitioning the Army toward a future force (Dabraowski 2008). In early 1992 he established a LAM Task Force and initiated the establishment of a LAM Office. As he suggested to the Army’s general officers in March of that year, “I want to be able to try out ideas—and to be free to decide whether or not they are good ideas. Louisiana Maneuvers will be the laboratory in which we learn about the Army of the 21st century.”

The LAM “concept of operations,” as described in guidance given from General Sullivan to the LAM Task Force, was to implement a formal process of assessment within already scheduled training exercises (to include computer-based simulations and large-scale unit training rotations at the Army’s training centers) to support a formal means of “provid[ing] timely analysis and evaluation.” As General Sullivan explained in a May 1992 memorandum for the LAM Task Force Director, the process was intended to allow the Army “to learn and use what


52 Ibid., 104.

we learn to... adjust our doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development and soldiers.” As he told the Army’s general officers, “[m]any policies that shaped us since 1945 are enduring; others are no longer appropriate. LAM will help us know the difference.”

Similarly, a 1993 Army Bulletin noted that with the LAM program “[e]very level of warfighting and every Departmental function is open to review.” Through the LAM process, even the most firmly institutionalized characteristics of the organization were open to reconsideration and evaluation.

As an example of the LAM process, General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles provided the following exemplar in a 1995 National Security Paper:

The Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, Louisiana, trains Army units to operate in mid to low intensity environments. A recent rotation... permitted training in a full range of tasks likely to be encountered in a peacekeeping environment, including refugee relief operations, separation of combatants, operation of checkpoints and convoy operations, and humanitarian assistance.

Working with actual NGOs and media, as well as numerous role players, afforded the participating units an opportunity to try to examine new ideas and develop techniques and procedures to share with the Army at large.

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Characterized by a formal process supporting the ‘examination,’ ‘development,’ and ‘sharing’ such as that described here, the LAM process was intended to contribute to the post-Cold War Army’s maturation as a “learning organization” (Sullivan and Harper 1996). Indeed, the LAM process was designed to support not only evolutionary, but revolutionary change when perceived to be necessary. The very use of the Louisiana Maneuvers concept strategically implied that dramatic change was both on the horizon and being carefully and systematically considered. As General Sullivan and Colonel Harper state in *Hope is Not a Method*,

> [t]he name was a historical metaphor. Our task force neither was a maneuver nor had anything special to do with Louisiana, but using the name signaled our intention of making major changes; at the same time, association with [World War II General] Marshall’s exercises appealed to our sense of history and seemed to make new processes less threatening (Sullivan and Harper 1996:12).

Indeed, the first of 18 documents provided in a 1992 LAM Task Force packet was an article about the original Louisiana Maneuvers from the periodical *Smithsonian*: “Warming Up on the Sidelines for World War II.” In a similar manner, in testimony before the U.S. Senate in June 1993, General Franks drew on this historical connection when he suggested that with General Marshall’s Louisiana Maneuvers “the Army has a history of doing battlefield laboratory type things” (emphasis added).

Near the end of his term as TRADOC Commander, General Franks recalled that early in the doctrine development process, pressing questions in light of the nation’s recent successes in

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the Gulf War included the following: “Where is the battle changing?” and “What should we really be paying attention to?”

As a result of considering these questions, the Army’s senior leadership settled on what came to be termed “battle dynamics,” described by General Franks as a “grouping of thoughts as to where the land battle is changing.”

In turn, he recalled, “we needed to come up with a mechanism, an organizational mechanism that would allow us to begin to experiment with ideas. We called those battlefield laboratories.”

As described in the 1994 “Army Posture Statement” provided to members of Congress, six Battle Labs, established at separate military installations, “provide a forum, in partnership with industry, to use advanced simulation technologies to experiment with and validate new ideas and technologies.”

As General Sullivan stated, alongside Louisiana Maneuvers, these Battle Labs were “part of a networked effort to control change.”

With these two processes, he stated, the Army has in place “testing and mechanisms,” “very sophisticated measures,” and “the systems... to enable us to experiment, to test, to simulate, to analyze, and to replicate in great detail.”

As General Franks observed, through enacting these processes, the Army was “tak[ing] a pragmatic approach and

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60 U.S. Army TRADOC MHMO, oral history interview of GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., November 17, 1994, p. 9.

61 Ibid., 10.

62 Ibid., 11.


experiment either in laboratories or out at the ranges and on the training practice fields” to not only experiment and assess, but to decide.\textsuperscript{66}

With each Battle Lab focusing on one of the six ‘battle dynamics’ identified by the Army’s senior leadership, the prioritization and integration of Lab results, managed by a task force, was designed to inform future doctrine and force requirements.\textsuperscript{67} As with the Louisiana Maneuvers process, however, the work completed at these Battle Labs was not only intended to inform future doctrine, but designed to test current doctrine and emergent doctrinal precepts as a means to do so. These ‘vehicles’ for change, developed during this early period of the change process, thus figure prominently in the latter period in which they were enacted to assess and evaluate the new doctrine and proposed doctrinal precepts (as discussed below).


In the narrative account provided here, I have described the key components of the doctrine development and, more broadly, organizational change process I identified in the early years of the Army leadership’s attempts at transformation. In my analysis of this narrative account, a variety of efforts emerged as significant and, when combined with those described in the sections that follow, contributed to my development of a conceptual model of institutional logic change. As I describe here, the practices described above involved the textualization and entrenchment of new principles, practices and meanings; the establishment of intertextual


linkages; the establishment of a developmental process; and, for a variety of elements of the change strategy and the products of that strategy, the provision of legitimacy.

With the publication of “new thoughts, new language, new words, new definitions, and new diagrams” (emphasis added) in Pam 525-5, the Army’s senior leadership introduced key characteristics of an emergent post-Cold War logic into the “structured collections of meaningful texts” (Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004:636) on which interested stakeholders could draw as they made sense of, and acted within and upon the world around them. Produced as part of TRADOC’s ‘525’ series of publications, this text was not only made available, but rendered legitimate as a source to be both applied in practice and evaluated for viability. As key actors drew on the pamphlet’s contents to inform the Army’s first post-Cold War era Operations doctrine, they were indeed entrenching the principles and practices of the emergent post-Cold War logic expressed in its pages. It was the ‘taking up’ of the text in this way—the trajectory of its content—that established this text as part of the discourse, the corpus of texts, that ‘rules in’ certain ways of thinking and talking and ‘rules out’ others. Further entrenching emergent elements of a nascent post-Cold War logic was the reference to the new “National Security Strategy” in the précis as the new language and strategic concepts expressed in its pages served as the foundation for calls to reconsider prevailing Army doctrine. Moreover, the macro-level discourse on civil-military relations in a democracy—the subordination of the military to civilian control described previously (see Chapter 6)—legitimizes the suggestion made in the précis that the emergence of the new Strategy necessitates that the Army reconsider its keystone doctrine.

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Alongside the circulation and legitimation of emergent principles and practices, the Army’s leaders established processes during this period that not only produced new principles and practices, but legitimized them. Indeed, the decision to include the Army’s senior leaders from throughout the organization in the doctrine development process was motivated by a drive for legitimacy.\(^7\) As General Sullivan and Colonel Harper observe, by actively participating in the “complete revision of the Army’s basic concepts about operations… the senior generals not only legitimized the process of change but also signaled their best judgments about the Army’s new operational realities” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:11). The inclusive aspect of the doctrinal debate and development lent credibility to both the process itself—a process in which the Army’s most highly (militarily) educated and presumably experienced leaders assumed direct responsibility—and the principles endorsed in the final product: the 1993 *Operations* manual.

In addition to establishing an inclusive network of leaders to develop doctrine, the establishment of Louisiana Maneuvers and Battle Labs to assess doctrinal principles and practices provided the Army with not only a means to develop principles and practices, but a legitimate means to do so. Recall that the use of ‘Louisiana Maneuvers’ was itself contextually meaningful as it drew on the organization’s World War II history, thus lending legitimacy to the process—a process for organizational and doctrinal development noted to have contributed to U.S. success in not just any war, but ‘The Big One’ (World War II). Additionally, the LAM and Battle Labs processes were legitimized by appeals to the legitimate macro-level discourse of science and rationality. Communicating with a contemporary audience that understands the

\(^7\) It was not inevitable, but rather a conscious and strategic decision made by General Sullivan and his advisory team to establish an inclusive process of doctrine development. As noted in Chapter 3, other leaders opted for a much smaller, relatively excluded group to manage the process. For an example, see Wass de Czeg (2006) for a description of the development of the 1976 manual that relied on a small, excluded doctrine development team.
scientific process to produce valid and reliable results, it is notable that senior leaders highlighted the Army’s “experimentation” in “laboratories,” and the organization’s reliance on “testing and mechanisms,” “very sophisticated measures,” and “systems” that allow the Army “to experiment, to test, to stimulate, to analyze, and to replicate in great detail.” In turn, their product—those principles, practices, and meanings expressed in published (in FM 100-5) and proposed (in TRADOC 525-5) doctrine—are afforded legitimacy. As General Sullivan stated: “What we think based on doctrinally focused experimentation is right” (emphasis added).

From these observations emerged general themes that informed my development of a conceptual model of institutional logic change. The narrative account described thus far includes the textualization of defining principles and practices of the nascent post-Cold War logic in TRADOC Pam 525-5 and the précis; the legitimation of those principles and practices through the inclusive and scientific means through which they were developed, and the establishment of intertextuality with the higher-order texts that informed their development (the “National Security Strategy” and “National Military Strategy”); and the embedding of these principles and practices in discourse as the meaningful texts that convey them were ‘taken up’ and used as a means to guide dialogue and debate. Each of these elements of the change strategy figure prominently in the model of institutional logic change I propose below. In the sections that

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follow, I highlight how my observations of the other key aspects of the doctrine’s content and trajectory further contributed to the development of these elements.

**Furnishing ‘The Authoritative Foundation’: FM 100-5, Operations, June 1993**

Though the 1993 *Operations* manual incorporated some significant changes (as I describe here), doctrine writers reiterated in the manual’s introduction that the FM “furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training” (as stated in HQDA 1986:i and HQDA 1993:iv). It is in this way that doctrine serves as an intellectual ‘engine of change.’ Thus, as General Sullivan suggested in his description of the new manual in the December 1993 issue of *Military Review*, with new concepts and new ideas the publication of FM 100-5 “is a singularly important event in the development of our 21st-century Army” (Sullivan 1993:n.p.). In light of the central role this doctrinal manual played in the change process I observed (described in the section that follows), I thus treat its publication as ‘singularly important.’

To demonstrate the significance of this publication’s content, I describe here some of the most notable additions that overtly challenged the narrowly focused Cold War ‘paradigm’ senior Army leaders sought to replace. As General Sullivan stated in an article published in the *ARMY Green Book* shortly after the new manual’s publication, the most significant changes made in the

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74 I understand this manual’s publication to be ‘singularly important’ not because of its content, but because of the trajectory of its content; however, here I focus on content, and discuss its trajectory below.

updated FM “represent substantial challenges” to the Cold War way of business.\textsuperscript{76} Indeed, he suggested, the changes reflect the codification of a “new paradigm.”\textsuperscript{77}

Distinguished from earlier editions, the writers of the 1993 FM describe doctrine in the manual as “the condensed expression of the Army’s fundamental approach to fighting, influencing events in operations other than war, and deterring actions detrimental to national interests” (HQDA 1993:1-1). This is a notable change from the previous manual’s war-oriented statement that the FM is “the condensed expression of [the Army’s] approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements” (HQDA 1986:6). The manual emerged as ‘the condensed expression’ of the Army’s identity as the nation’s faithful servant. Indeed, the renaming of Chapter 2 of the manual demonstrates this broader shift in attention, as the title was changed from “Fundamentals of Airland Battle Doctrine” (HQDA 1986:9) to “Fundamentals of Army Operations” (HQDA 1993:2-1). This change was both deliberate and significant. As General Franks recalled of the decision in an oral history interview conducted upon his completion of service as TRADOC Commander:

I… felt that the previous doctrine was perhaps too narrow in its applicability… too simplistically tailored to the Soviet model to be universally applicable… So I felt that, first, we needed to retain the essence of AirLand Battle but we needed to rename it. We needed to go beyond it and describe that as but one framework, or


\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 277.
way of thinking about a particular operational area. But we needed to go on and
expand that thinking.78

As he stated later in the interview, the doctrine “needed to break with the term AirLand Battle,
because it came with too much association with central Europe and the Cold War.”79 The
acceptance of this view among those involved with the doctrine development process (to one
degree or another) is reflected in the following excerpt from notes from a November 1992
document development conference:

This is a doctrine for a new era… it is far more than a refined treatment of
AirLand Battle doctrine. It builds on the strengths of [AirLand Battle]… but is
crafted to address the conditions, environment and wide range of operations
within the environment of the national military strategy. Therefore, dropping the
term—AirLand Battle—is not just an insignificant name change, but a deliberate
maneuver intended to send a [sic] unmistakable signal that this doctrine is
something new (emphasis added).80

That signal was strengthened by the material included in the “Fundamentals” chapter.

Where the “Fundamentals” chapter in the 1986 edition of the manual begins with a
section titled “Structure of Modern Warfare” (HQDA 1986:9), the 1993 manual begins with a
section titled “The Range of Military Operations”—the first subsection of which describes, as the

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78 U.S. Army TRADOC MHMO, oral history interview with GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., November 17, 1994, p. 4-5.

79 Ibid., 47.

subtitle suggests, “Operations Other than War,” with the second subsection addressing “War” (HQDA 1993:2-1). Where the 1986 manual focused on the Army’s responsibilities in wartime—conducting ‘AirLand Battle’ operations—the 1993 version depicts the array of activities the Army may be called upon to perform—‘Military Operations’ ranging from war to peacetime engagement including disaster relief, civil support, and nation assistance (see Figure 3-4, Chapter 3 of this dissertation for a visual depiction of the range of operations covered in the 1993 manual).

As another example of the transition from a doctrine focused on warfighting to one focused on operations, broadly defined, the 1993 edition of the manual included a notable addition to the “four basic tenets” provided in AirLand Battle doctrine—those of initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization (HQDA 1986:15). To these, 1993 doctrine writers added versatility, defined in the manual as “the ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements” (HQDA 1993:2-9). As the manual continues:

Commanders must be able to shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently. Versatility implies a capacity to be multifunctional, to operate across the full range of military operations, and to perform at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels… Versatility denotes the ability to perform in many roles and environments during war and operations other than war (HQDA 1993:2-9, emphasis added).

The Army’s role as ‘servant to nation’ was indeed codified and legitimized in the Army’s keystone doctrinal manual.

To be sure, changing the ‘tenets’ of an organization does not connote a minor alteration. This is particularly true of those tenets expressed in the Army’s Operations manual. As the FM
states, “[a] tenet is a basic truth held by an organization... All training and leadership doctrine and all combat, combat support, and combat service support doctrine derive directly from, and must support the fundamental tenets” (HQDA 1993:2-6). With the U.S. Army being a “doctrine-based” organization (HQDA 1993:vi), adding to the tenets expressed and supported therein most certainly reflects a central, and not marginal change, as they are intended to have far-reaching effects throughout the organization.

Alongside the notable addition to those tenets meant to inform subordinate doctrine, force design, and training, the 1993 manual included a new chapter titled “Operations Other Than War.” As with the decision to drop the AirLand Battle moniker, the language used was contextually meaningful. As General Franks recalled,

> We thought that in this post-Cold War world that the Army would be continually asked to do a variety of… things. We had been buffaloed in the past by terminology. We called it low-intensity conflict, we called it operations short of war, the Marine Corps called it small wars in the late 30’s and early 40’s. So we wrestled with this… [and] we finally decided on operations other than war as the label… And we also decided we needed to include a chapter in the manual that would describe those characteristics of operations other than war that are different from warfighting, so our soldiers and leaders knew how to think about operations other than war when they were given such a mission.\(^{81}\)

As implied here, the decision to avoid terminology that associated the range of legitimate operations engaged in by armed forces with conflict (though ‘low-intensity’) or war (to include those missions suggested to be comparable in scalar terms to large-scale war) was intentional.

\(^{81}\) U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, oral history interview with GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., November 17, 1994, p. 17.
Indeed, separating war from ‘other operations’ allowed for the specification of new principles meant to govern such operations.

In the newly penned “Operations Other Than War” chapter, the long-standing ‘principles of war’ were supplemented with three “principles more suited to… noncombat operations” (HQDA 1993:13-3): perseverance, “the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims”; legitimacy, “sustain[ing] the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions”; and restraint, the application of the “appropriate military capability prudently” (p. 13-4). As with the addition of versatility as an organizational tenet, the addition of these ‘principles’ signifies an expansion of the fundamental assumptions that govern action. With these changes, the manual’s content directly confronted the narrowed wartime focus of the Cold War paradigm.

To be sure, numerous doctrinal changes are observable in addition to those described here. Joint force and coalition operations, for example, received increased prominence and attention in the 1993 manual when compared to earlier editions (Romjue 1997). As another example, while prior editions focused on the execution of operations, the 1993 edition underscored the role of planning alongside execution (Kretchik 2011). Nonetheless, those changes described in some detail above reflect some of the most significant alterations that directly challenged the large-scale war-oriented Cold War logic. Indeed, those doctrinal changes described above were described by TRADOC leaders as being among the “main lines of thrust” in the doctrine’s development. No longer were organizational tenets and principles narrowly focused on warfighting. The Army’s involvement in and preparation for operations other than war was

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codified and legitimized by incorporating new tenets and principles in the Army’s keystone manual. Moreover, these changes were legitimized through reference to the new “National Military Strategy” and “National Security Strategy,” with each of these texts receiving extensive attention in the manual.

To borrow from General Franks, the new FM 100-5 was “far more than a refined treatment of AirLand Battle doctrine.”83 Whereas post-Vietnam doctrine was intended to mentally “[take] the Army out of the rice paddies of Vietnam” (U.S. Army General William E. DePuy, as cited in Gilmore and Conway 1994:194), the post-Cold War doctrine described here was intended to mentally take the Army out of Central Europe—out of the strategic theater that provided, during the Cold War, “[t]he central organizing principle of the Army.”84 Indeed, the new manual was oriented toward a future in which the nation was expected, as General Franks suggested to the TRADOC Staff in October 1991, to “make more use of forces, and less use of force” (underlining in original).85 Acknowledging the manual’s centrality for the organization—noting, for example, that the 1993 manual “precipitated changes in training, force mix, leader development and modernization priorities”—General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles state succinctly that “[t]he Army’s [1993] FM 100-5, Operations, transitioned the Army from the Cold War to a… contingency force, prepared to perform a variety of combat operations and


operations other than war.” In this way, the publication of FM 100-5 was indeed ‘singularly important’ as it signaled the transition from concept (as expressed in Pam 525-5) to ‘authoritative’ doctrine. While the Army’s senior leaders continued to aggressively pursue an intellectual transformation which included supplementing the new Operations manual with a new TRADOC Pam 525-5, the trajectory of FM 100-5 (described in the next section) proved to be highly consequential for the trajectory of the new ideas—indeed, the emergent post-Cold War logic—endorsed in its pages.


With the publication of this seminal field manual in June 1993, the Army not only provided a manual that superseded the prior version, the Army textualized a set of fundamental principles—a guide for thought, action, and identity—that superseded that which previously prevailed. Through textualizing defining characteristics and central principles of the emergent post-Cold War logic in the Army’s keystone Operations manual, the organization’s senior leadership responsible for the manual’s content also communicated their legitimacy. As General Sullivan stated in 1994, “[f]or the first time ever, [the new] basic ‘capstone’ manual includes a chapter on operations other than war and provides doctrinal legitimacy to such things as humanitarian support and other important missions” (emphasis added). Moreover, this change was further legitimized by references in the manual to the new “National Military Strategy” and “National Security Strategy” that lent some support to the notion that such missions are


legitimate military affairs in the new geostrategic environment. The publication of FM 100-5 was thus ‘singularly important’ not because it provided ‘the authoritative statement’ for a legitimate discourse, but because it provided, by virtue of its producer, genre, and intertextual linkages,88 ‘the authoritative statement’ for the only legitimate discourse.89 In turn, the principles and tenets described in the manual provided the foundation for further intellectual, and future physical changes to the organization. The doctrine provided ‘an engine of change.’

**Getting it ‘Just About Right’: June 1993—June 1995**

The June 1993 FM signaled the emergence of a uniquely post-Cold War paradigm in Army thinking; however, those leading the change effort believed that the development of the post-Cold War world called for much broader intellectual and, in time, physical changes to the force. As I describe in this section, these organizational leaders thus engaged in doctrine-focused change efforts during general Sullivan’s last two years as Chief of Staff by 1) disrupting the authority of the 1993 FM to elicit the exercise of projective agency among those who would inform the next iteration of doctrine, 2) using the Louisiana Maneuvers and Battle Lab processes to support doctrine development, 3) relying on key characteristics of the emergent logic, as expressed in the 1993 *Operations* manual, to inform subordinate Army doctrine and joint service doctrine, and 4) relying on those same key characteristics to call for physical changes to the force.

**Thinking ‘Beyond Current Doctrine’: From Doctrine to Concept**

88 The producer and the genre of a text, as well as the degree of intertextuality are identified by Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy (2004) as influencing the likelihood that a text will embed in discourse.

89 I do not imply here that no other discourses were consequential, but rather suggest that though actors may choose to adhere to prior principles and practices or those endorsed elsewhere, when they conflict with those endorsed in FM 100-5, the adherence to them is organizationally deviant.
For an Army that entered the post-Cold War era with a relatively narrow view of itself, the changes in the 1993 FM were undoubtedly significant. Following on the heels of more than four decades of doctrine “fixated upon countering Soviet aggression” (Kretchik 2011:221), the larger cultural shift they signaled was indeed a notable break with the past. For those leading the doctrinal change process, however, more change was perceived to be necessary. Even before the 1993 edition went to press, there was already consideration and concern among senior Army leaders about developing the conceptual shift that would be reflected in the next FM 100-5.

In December 1991, just four months into his tenure as TRADOC Commander and a year and a half prior to the publication of FM 100-5 in 1993, General Franks communicated the following in a letter to General Sullivan:

I, as you, believe it is important that we complete a revision of our doctrine early, rather than later, in order that it may function as the engine of change for our Army… Meanwhile… I do not believe [our field Army] is ready to make that bold leap to the future as envisioned in 525-5. Therefore, my intent to accommodate your guidance is to proceed rapidly with a change to 100-5 which describes all of the changes the Army appears ready to accept (emphasis added).

Echoing this concern, the notes from a doctrine development conference held eight months later in August 1992 open with the following statement: “Set the stage of the conference with the guidance to ‘accommodate change with an objective of getting it about right’ while cautioning ‘that… our revision of FM 100-5 can not be so revolutionary that it is rejected by the

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For those seeking revolutionary doctrinal change, it was not to be carried out with one dramatic overhaul—lest the organization reject the doctrine. As General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles suggested, true change would not be possible if the organization was “pushed into it.”

As General Franks recalled in a 1994 interview, the system established to ensure that the doctrine was shaped by an ongoing informed discussion among various stakeholders—a process he led and in which he actively participated—afforded him the all-important opportunity “to gauge which ideas… would have great difficulty being accepted by the Army.” It was his contention that “[a]n organization can only absorb so much change in a given time period.” He thus credited the development process with the following: “It helped me determine how hard to push some ideas and what ideas to include in the doctrine, and what ideas to leave for later to be included in the next edition of TRADOC Pam 525-5.” Indeed, following the publication of FM 100-5, a new Pam 525-5 appeared in relatively short order.

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94 Ibid., 48.

95 Ibid., 48.
Just six months after the publication of the 1993 edition of the Army’s *Operations* manual, General Franks and TRADOC personnel initiated the writing of a draft Pam 525-5. The introduction to this early draft, signed by General Franks, acknowledged and attempted to justify the document’s timing with the following statement: “Written less than one year after the publication of FM 100-5, *Operations*, the need for providing our Army this vision of future conflict reflects the dynamic nature of recent world events and the unpredictability of future challenges.” Shortly thereafter, the draft Pam 525-5 provided the foundational concept for a Future Warfare Symposium. At this meeting, TRADOC leaders suggested that publishing an updated Pamphlet was the means through which Army doctrine was capable of “remaining relevant” in a rapidly changing world. Indeed, it was noted at the symposium that the pamphlet was designed to “cause discussion” and ensure that attendees would “think out loud on things beyond current doctrine” (emphasis added).

Three months after the Future Warfare Symposium, General Sullivan and a member of his personal staff suggested in a *Military Review* article that the next edition of FM 100-5 would not only “capture the variety of the Information Age,” but elaborate on “flawed” distinctions made in the 1993 edition and “flesh out” the principles of operations where necessary (Sullivan

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99 Ibid., n.p.
and Dubik 1994:59). One month later a complete draft of Pam 525-5 addressing these and other changes sought by the senior leadership was produced by TRADOC, and a final version was published and distributed in August 1994, just 14 months after publishing the new FM 100-5 (Romjue 1997).

Whereas the transition from the combined wisdom expressed in the 1986 FM 100-5, 1991 Pam 525-5, and the 1991 précis to a new Operations manual signaled the change from concept to doctrine, the publication of this new Pam 525-5 signaled the transition from doctrine to concept—that is, from the presence of an “authoritative foundation” in the FM (HQDA 1993:iv) to a “baseline,” supporting “the formulation of more definitive follow-on concepts” in TRADOC Pam 525-5 (emphasis in original). As General Sullivan explained to the Army’s general officers in a letter dated September 2, 1994, just one month after the publication of the new TRADOC Pamphlet:

Over the past three years, we have steadily laid the intellectual and doctrinal groundwork that prepares the way for our Army’s collective journey into the 21st century. You are intimately familiar with our work: FMs 100-1, 100-5, 100-17; JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] Pubs 1 and 3.0; and others. Now it is time to take the next—and perhaps most important—step. The publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, marks the beginning of our doctrinal trek into the

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101 Through my archival research at the TRADOC Military History and Heritage Office, I did not locate the final version of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 published in August 1994. Herein, reference to the 1994 Pamphlet is to the complete July 1994 draft I was able to obtain for analysis.

future. It is a powerful piece of work. Fred Franks and his doctrine writers at
TRADOC have done a masterful job of causing us to think hard about how Army
operations will change in the coming years. In 525-5 they have provided us with
the institutional framework for our experiments and doctrinal debates.¹⁰³

With the publication of Pam 525-5, the intellectual foundation for Army operations had
again transitioned from doctrine to concept as the precepts proposed therein were not
‘authoritative,’ but rather open for ‘experimentation’ and ‘debate.’ As General Sullivan
succinctly stated, “525-5 is not ‘Truth with a capital T.’”¹⁰⁴ Having just publically celebrated the
publication of FM 100-5 as providing “the authoritative statement on how the Army thinks,”¹⁰⁵
however, senior Army leaders were faced with the challenge of fostering the “entrepreneurial
spirit” they desired among those stakeholders tasked with carrying out the desired
experimentation and debate (Sullivan and Harper 1996:239). It is thus notable that military
document, though ‘authoritative,’ was suggested to be inherently imperfect.

When addressing doctrine in various forms of communication, General Sullivan often
cited historian Michael Howard who, he stated, “predicts that [military organizations] will almost

to the Army’s general officers, p. 431.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 431.

executive summary, p. 6.
certainly ‘get it wrong.’”106 Elaborating on this notion, General Sullivan provided in various communications the following excerpt from Howard’s work:107

> I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working on now, they have it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives… [It] is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.108

In turn, General Sullivan could confidently state the following: “I believe we have the doctrinal framework for thinking about the future just about right.”109 Indeed, those senior Army leaders participating in the process of developing the 1993 version of FM 100-5 were tasked not with getting it perfect, but rather “‘getting it about right.’”110

In light of Michael Howard’s ‘dogmatic declaration’ that military doctrines will be ‘wrong,’ suggesting that the doctrine is ‘about right’ lends credibility and legitimacy to the final product, as those governing the change process are suggested to have succeeded at not getting it

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‘too badly wrong.’ Additionally, and of notable interest here, is the suggestion that doctrine is not perfect, but only ‘about right.’ To reconsider, reevaluate, debate, and test current imperfect doctrine is not only a legitimate endeavor, but indeed the responsibility of those tasked with not getting it ‘too badly wrong.’ The publication and circulation of Pam 525-5; the senior leadership’s call for others to rely on it as a framework for “think[ing] out loud on things beyond current doctrine”; and the call for military and industry leaders to use the pamphlet “to inform… experiments”¹¹¹ are rendered appropriate by the suggestion that doctrine is inherently imperfect. Indeed, this conceptualization of doctrine allows LAM and Battle Labs to serve their intended purpose and ‘test’ current and proposed doctrinal principles and practices.

‘Generating Power for the Engine of Change’: Experimentation and Analysis

After suggesting that the Army had “the doctrinal framework for thinking about the future just about right” at a 1993 AUSA symposium, General Sullivan stated that “[w]hat we think based on doctrinally focused experimentation is right.”¹¹² The LAM process was thus initiated as a response to “evolving doctrine” which would need to be tested to determine if it was ‘right.’¹¹³ With LAM, General Sullivan noted in his description of the program’s intent, “[w]e will examine our revised doctrine in the new FM 100-5.”¹¹⁴

were focused on testing recent doctrinal changes. As General Franks recalled, for example, one of the “battle dynamics” identified by the Army’s senior leadership “was what we called battle command. We put that name and idea into FM 100-5. We created a battle lab for it. We said we are on the edge of a revolution in the way we command and lead in battle.”

Focused on testing doctrinal precepts, it was thus the LAM process and newly formed Battle Labs that were implied when TRADOC leaders stated that the purpose of the 1994 TRADOC Pamphlet was “to inform our experiments.” Indeed, the 1994 Pam 525-5 outlined in some depth the ‘battle dynamics’ identified by the Army’s leadership, and the Battle Lab regulation produced that same year stated succinctly that the “Battle Labs foci are the changing nature of warfighting, embodied in TRADOC Pam 525-5, ‘Future Full Dimension Operations;’ and identified Army vulnerabilities” (emphasis added).

As General William W. Hartzog, General Franks’ successor as TRADOC Commander, stated in an article published in ARMY (the official publication of AUSA) in May 1995, “[t]he thoughts in [TRADOC Pam 525-5] must be converted to hypotheses and tested through analysis and experimentation.” LAM and Battle Labs were the ‘vehicle’ through which such scientific analysis and experimentation occurred.

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As noted by General Franks, it was Louisiana Maneuvers and Battle Labs that provided “an institutionalized means to experiment with ideas, concepts, and technology.”\textsuperscript{120} As suggested by General Sullivan and Colonel Harper, it was through institutionalizing these change mechanisms and calling upon organizational members “to do new things in a learning atmosphere” that fostered among organizational members “an entrepreneurial spirit of innovation and growth” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:239). While having an Operations manual that was ‘just about right’ rendered doctrinal development and change acceptable, Louisiana Maneuvers and Battle Labs provided a means for the exercise of projective agency in support of that development. As General Franks suggested, Louisiana Maneuvers and Battle Labs provided “an innovative partnership… generating the power to drive the engine of change”\textsuperscript{121} as they were developed as a means to both test and inform those ideas being “put… into FM 100-5”\textsuperscript{122} and “embodied in TRADOC Pam 525-5.”\textsuperscript{123}

\textit{‘Setting the Pace’ for Intellectual Change}

The doctrine development process described above was made possible by the textualization of new principles and practices in FM 100-5 and TRADOC Pam 525-5. It was


these texts that informed the ongoing deliberation, debate, experimentation and, in turn, the next iteration of doctrine or concept development. With this process, the Army’s senior leaders had in place a systematic means of supporting persistent intellectual development of those ideas endorsed in the organization’s keystone manual. As the discursive model of institutional development and change applied here suggests, however, it is not a single text, but rather a discursive corpus that shapes institutional logics. It is thus noteworthy that the ideas expressed in the 1993 FM quickly spread throughout the collection of meaningful texts designed to guide thought, organization, identity, and action within the organization and, indeed, the broader field of the armed forces.

As “the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine,” (HQDA 1993:iv), the publication of the new Operations manual “set the pace for a whole series of supporting doctrinal manuals.”124 As General Sullivan noted at the end of his tenure as Chief of Staff in 1995,

“[a] few years ago, there was no formal doctrine for [Operations other than War]. Today it is an important feature of our capstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, Operations, and we have fielded implementing doctrine in FM 100-20, Operations Other Than War; FM 100-23, Peace Operations; and FM 100-17, Mobilization.”125

Similarly, among the recent doctrinal contributions reported by TRADOC in a 1994 quarterly report was the publication of FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, shortly after the

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publication of FM 100-5. As described in the TRADOC report, that manual “recognizes the requirements dictated by the National Military Strategy” and “[d]escribes the concepts, interface, and process of providing Army assistance to U.S. civil authorities.” As yet another example, “[a]dded emphasis [was] given to Operations Other Than War” in the updated version of FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, published in late 1994. In addition to changes to subordinate Army doctrine, the emergent ideas expressed in FM 100-5 also informed joint service doctrine.

Joint doctrine is defined as “[t]he fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services of the same nation in coordinated action toward a common objective.” This doctrine is developed with input and participation from each of the service branches and endorsed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—a military advisory group that includes each of the service chiefs. Three months after the publication of FM 100-5 in June 1993, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. As characterized by TRADOC in 1994, this publication “is the joint keystone operations equivalent of FM 100-5 and affects most other important publications in the joint system.”


127 Ibid., 4.


As noted in a 1994 U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Joint Publication 3-0 and FM 100-5 “were developed concurrently,” and the “Army doctrinal thinking” that produced the 1993 Army Operations manual “took direction from the emerging joint warfighting doctrine.” Furthermore, once published, Joint Publication 3-0 was cited in addition to the new FM 100-5 as a force necessitating the reconsideration and potential revision of subordinate Army doctrine. Indeed, General Sullivan referenced the “expanded new joint and Army doctrinal base” as the foundation for “build[ing] the enabling doctrine and the tactics, techniques, and procedures for new units.” Those principles and practices expressed in joint doctrine were embedded within the Army’s intellectual foundation as they were relied on to inform those expressed in FM 100-5. The relationship between Army and joint doctrine, however, was two-way as those uniquely post-Cold War precepts endorsed by the Army’s senior leaders shaped the content of the joint publication.

With Joint Publication 3-0 and FM 100-5 being “developed concurrently” and each service branch—to include the Army—playing an active role in joint doctrinal development, the Army Modernization Plan cited above notes that “Army doctrinal thinking” was not only influenced by, but indeed “fed… the emerging joint warfighting doctrine.” Moreover, TRADOC was the organizational entity responsible for writing joint doctrine. In a 1994 oral history interview, General Franks noted that as TRADOC Commander, he appointed—more

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134 U.S. Army TRADOC MHMO, the United States Army Modernization Plan, n.d., p. 5.
specifically, “deliberately wanted”\textsuperscript{135}—Colonel Ricky Rowlett, a U.S. Army officer who served as the team chief for the 1993 FM 100-5 writing team (Romjue 1997), to work on the writing of Joint Publication 3-0. This was a strategic move as the decision was made because “[Colonel Rowlett] was familiar with 100-5.”\textsuperscript{136} When asked about his personal involvement in the writing of Joint Publication 3-0, General Franks stated that he “went over the book… read it cover to cover, was briefed on it, instructed some change… [and] wrote some things in there, personally.”\textsuperscript{137} As General Franks recalled, the timing of the completion of Joint Publication 3-0 was fortuitous, in that it allowed us to publish Army 100-5 and then go to work on JCS Pub 3-0. And so, we were able to introduce some key ideas into JCS Pub 3-0, operations other than war, the whole idea of depth and simultaneous attack, the idea of battle command, the idea of logistics, split-based intelligence, broadcast intel. Some of these ideas out of Battle Dynamics we had put in 100-5 certainly have applicability in a joint world.\textsuperscript{138}

It is thus noteworthy that while the joint publication’s “focus is on joint warfighting,” it “also addresses those military operations that do not include the use or threat of use of force, doctrinally referred to as ‘military operations other than war’” and reflects other “strong shifts” evidenced in the new Army FM.\textsuperscript{139} The trajectory of the fundamental principles of military service endorsed by the Army’s senoir leaders thus extended beyond the organization’s boundary.

\textsuperscript{135} U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, oral history interview with GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., November 17, 1994, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 49.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 49.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 49.

\textsuperscript{139} U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, the United States Army Modernization Plan, n.d., p. 5.
Signaling ‘The End of the Beginning’: Calling for Physical Change

Among those key elements of the Army’s change strategy identified by General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles (provided in Chapter 5), “implementing (resourcing) the change” rounded out the list. As they note, transformative change necessitates not only intellectual change, but attendant physical change as well. As General Sullivan often suggested and General Franks regularly echoed, however, the belief among those leading the change effort was that “intellectual change leads physical change.” In an oral history interview, General Sullivan articulated what, precisely, this meant for the U.S. Army when he stated that “until we got the doctrine right we couldn’t structure our forces and we couldn’t buy the equipment” (Dabrowski 2008:255). To the degree that Army doctrine “furnishes the authoritative foundation for… force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training” (HQDA 1993:iv), without a solid doctrine, those elements of Army organization are ungrounded. “[W]ithout the tough up-front work of intellectual change,” General Sullivan and Colonel Harper suggest, changes to such elements of Army organization “will be unfocused, random, and unlikely to succeed” (Sullivan and Harper 1996:237). Because Army organization and action is guided by Army doctrine, the doctrine had to come first. Once in place, supportive physical change was possible. Explaining this in an Autumn 1994 article published in Parameters, General Sullivan provided the following example:

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Field Manual 100-5… was a significant step in the Army’s adjustment to the post-Cold War environment. Our doctrine now includes substantive considerations of operations other than war… We are putting theory into practice. November 1993 saw the first rotation of the Joint Readiness Training Center specifically designed to exercise units in a scenario akin to “ethnic conflict”… The simulated battlefield was arrayed with soldiers, civilians, and representatives from… non-governmental organizations… to simulate their roles on the battlefield.\footnote{The Collected Works (Sullivan 1996), “The Challenge of Peace,” article written by GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, Autumn 1994, p. 391.}

As yet another example, he noted that the Army school system was, for example, “training the leaders of the Army to recognize, understand, and react to the environments of ethnic conflict.”\footnote{Ibid., 391.} The new training scenarios enacted at the Army’s training centers and curricula developed at the Army’s schools responded to the changed doctrine.

Prioritizing the intellectual transformation, senior Army leaders intentionally waited to enact significant physical changes until the intellectual shift signaled with the publication of FM 100-5 and, in some instances, the publication of a new TRADOC Pam 525-5 in 1994 was complete. To borrow from materials referenced above, some dramatic physical changes in the organization did not come after the Army published in its keystone doctrinal manual “the changes the Army appear[ed] ready to accept” at the time,\footnote{U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, letter from GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr. to GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, December 5, 1991, p. 1.} but rather once the organization’s
leaders were “think[ing] out loud on things beyond [the 1993] doctrine”\textsuperscript{145} that included such liminal changes.

Prior to the publication of the new \textit{Operations} manual in 1993, senior Army leaders initiated a project to redesign the Army’s organizational structure.\textsuperscript{146} In a December 1992 TRADOC presentation titled “Division Redesign for a Force Projection Army,” the stated tasking and guidance from General Sullivan in this effort was to “[m]ove now to reshape our combat organizations” and to “[u]se 100-5 as a base.”\textsuperscript{147} Initiated before emergent changes were formalized in FM 100-5, however, the project was notably short lived and shelved relatively quickly.\textsuperscript{148}

Toward the end of his tenure as TRADOC Commander, General Franks recalled that while he and General Sullivan agreed early on that a redesign of the Army’s divisions was necessary, they also came to the realization that they “needed to lead with ideas first.”\textsuperscript{149} Specifically, General Franks stated that

what we needed to do was introduce the idea of versatility, and other doctrinal ideas in 100-5 before we began any redesign of our tactical organizations… so we decided to lead with ideas and publish a change to the doctrine first before we

\textsuperscript{145} U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, TRADOC presentation materials, April 5, 1994, n.p.

\textsuperscript{146} U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, oral history interview with GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., November 17, 1994.


\textsuperscript{148} U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, oral history interview with GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., November 17, 1994, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 50.
even talked about any organizational redesign… we wanted to get the ideas in place first.\textsuperscript{150}

Indeed, it was not until General Sullivan’s tenure as Chief of Staff was drawing to a close—not until the Army had not only a new doctrine, but an emergent TRADOC Pam 525-5—that senior leaders suggested that the Army was adequately poised to enact significant physical change. As General Hartzog, TRADOC Commander, stated in 1995, TRADOC Pam 525-5 was the “starter set of ideas and thoughts” for change—the “solid intellectual foundation” on which “physical change is constructed.”\textsuperscript{151}

Just 18 days before his retirement ceremony, General Sullivan told the Army’s general officers that

\textit{[t]he journey [of change] is only beginning. Ahead lie the specific decisions about the force. What will the battalions look like? The [Army] school system? Will the technology mature? What will be the best way to integrate active and reserve capabilities? How many divisions will we need?}\textsuperscript{152}

Though he stated that questions such as these “will take time to answer,” he noted that the Army had already “put in place the \textit{concepts} and \textit{process} for a totally new Army” (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{153}

With FM 100-5, TRADOC Pam 525-5, Battle Labs, and Louisiana Maneuvers, the Army had

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 444.
\end{flushright}
developed a context within which dramatic conceptual and physical change could be supported by a new intellectual foundation and an institutionalized developmental process.

With these developments, General Franks told military and industry leaders at an AUSA symposium near the end of his tenure as TRADOC Commander that while “much work lies ahead,” the Army has in place the “conceptual underpinning” and “experimental method” necessary to establish the intellectual and physical foundation of the Army of the twenty-first century. Quoting Winston Churchill at the beginning of his speech—citing remarks given by the Prime Minister in 1942 as allied performance in World War II appeared to be improving—General Franks stated the following: “‘Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.’” Ten months later, his successor as TRADOC Commander, General William W. Hartzog, reiterated this notion as he communicated the following to the National Security Committee in Congress: “We have invested a lot of energy in developing our vision of the future. We have named it TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5… It is how we envision Army operations in the future, a lighthouse, a starter set of ideas and thoughts to lead us forward.” By 1995, under General Sullivan’s watch, the Army had thus achieved what he set out to accomplish upon assuming responsibility as Chief of Staff:

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155 Ibid., 17.

156 Ibid., 5.

157 Ibid., 1.

to develop the doctrinal “foundation upon which the Army will stand and grow.”\textsuperscript{159} The Army had not reached a desired end state in just four years, but rather completed ‘the front-end work’ senior organizational leaders perceived to be necessary to enact a fundamental transformation of the organization (Sullivan and Harper 1996).


As with the publication of Pam 525-5 in 1991, the 1994 pamphlet expanded the ‘collection of meaningful texts’ on which those shaping future iterations of the Army keystone doctrine could draw. Additionally, its genre legitimized this trajectory. As part of TRADOC’s ‘525’ series, the document was designed to elicit and support this end. Army leaders thus \textit{rightfully} called upon the new 525-5 to support the exercise of projective agency as influential stakeholders were implored to think ‘beyond current (imperfect) doctrine’ and rely on the pamphlet to ‘inform experiments.’ With LAM and Battle Labs in place, this latter intent was enabled by seemingly scientifically-sound and historically-grounded processes. Their products, the principles and practices found to be ‘right’ through ‘doctrinally focused experimentation,’ are thus themselves legitimized by their having been subjected to a seemingly rigorous method of experimentation and analysis.

As the Army reconsidered the fundamental principles expressed in the \textit{Operations} manual, the trajectory of the ideas endorsed in its pages was extensive. As the ‘authoritative’ statement on organizational matters, the new, distinctly post-Cold War era precepts were entrenched as they were ‘taken up’ and applied to develop both subordinate Army and joint

doctrine. Through this developmental process and the textualization of its product, the Army’s leadership was building a textual corpus that was remarkably consistent across doctrinal sources (Salter 1996). By establishing consistency with the precepts endorsed in the new Operations manual, joint doctrine, the new “National Military Strategy,” and the new “National Security Strategy,” that consistent message was afforded legitimacy. The discourse grounded in those principles, practices, and meanings that characterized a uniquely post-Cold War logic was not only expanding, but via that expansion being rendered legitimate. In turn, near the end of the period of my analysis Army leaders drew on this expanding discourse to call for doctrinally legitimate physical changes in the organization. By the end of General Sullivan’s tenure as Chief of Staff, the U.S. Army was revving its ‘engine.’

INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC WORK: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Drawing on the narrative account of doctrine development I identified in the data, I provide in Table 7-1 the first-order concepts and second-order themes that emerged in my analysis. Including the development, textualization, and entrenchment of the distinct characteristics of a proposed institutional logic—in my case, a proto-Cold War logic—the efforts reflected in these concepts and themes constitute institutional logic work.

Table 7-1. Types of Institutional Logic Work Engaged in by U.S. Army Senior Leaders, June 1991—June 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Institutional Work</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing a Proto-Institutional Logic</td>
<td>Forming a particular set of organizing principles, practices, and symbols that distinctly differs from others that are prevalent, proposed, or institutionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing and Legitimizing a Developmental Process</td>
<td>Formally implementing, and rendering appropriate the means by which emergent organizing principles, practices, and symbols are developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing and Legitimizing New Principles and Practices</td>
<td>Producing a formal expression of, and rendering appropriate new principles and practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Textualizing a Proto-Institutional Logic</strong></td>
<td><em>Formalizing the key characteristics of a proposed institutional logic through the production and distribution of organizationally or institutionally meaningful texts</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entrenching a Proto-Institutional Logic</strong></td>
<td><em>Relying on the distinct language and unique characteristics of a proposed institutional logic to support intellectual and physical organizational developments</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informing and Legitimizing Ideological Change</td>
<td>Referencing, and rendering appropriate the reference of the unique vocabulary and characteristics of a proposed institutional logic to support the development of principles, practices, and meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing and Legitimizing Physical Change</td>
<td>Enacting, and rendering appropriate physical organizational changes by relying on the distinct language and unique characteristics of a proposed institutional logic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: First-order concepts are provided in regular type, and second-order themes are italicized.

As the narrative account provided above reveals, these efforts did not occur in a linear, but rather a recursive fashion. I thus present in Figure 7-2 a recursive model of institutional logic change. This model depicts the ongoing process through which the efforts presented in the narrative account above intentionally shaped the discourse(s) available to organizational and field-level actors in an attempt to influence the institutional logic(s) they activated. In essence, my interpretation of the efforts described in this chapter is that they were concerted attempts to expand the discourses and construct the ‘toolkit’ from which influential stakeholders, organizational members, and field-level actors could draw as they made sense of, and acted within and upon the world around them.
Figure 7-2. A Recursive Model of Institutional Logic Change

Relying on a style of presentation applied by others (see Gawer and Phillips 2013; Nigam and Ocasio 2010), the visual depiction in Figure 7-2 reflects the degree to which institutional logics in mature fields are not abruptly replaced, but rather supplanted across time. As implied by the overlapping circles along the bottom of the figure, the replacement of one logic with another occurs as an ongoing change process imposes upon—disrupts and replaces—distinct characteristics of the prior dominant logic. Similarly, the overlapping ovals representing the specific practices involved with the change process demonstrate that the process is not linear, but rather recursive, with interdependent practices occurring across extended periods of time. Along
the bottom of the figure, I list those organizationally and institutionally salient texts that both influenced, and were influenced by, the institutional work practices I identified; in so doing, I highlight the model’s focus on discourse. As the narrative account I provided above demonstrates, the institutional logic change process I observed is characterized by an ongoing process of textual production and entrenchment; the development of an ever-strengthening and further-reaching discourse.

Recall that in December 1991, early in the period of my analysis, General Franks reported the following in a letter to General Sullivan:

> I, as you, believe it is important that we complete a revision of our doctrine early, rather than later, in order that it may function as the engine of change for our Army… my intent to accommodate your guidance is to proceed rapidly with a change to 100-5 which describes all of the changes the Army appears ready to accept (emphasis added).\(^{160}\)

While the breadth of changes these leaders sought was perceived to be untenable, they still felt compelled to move quickly with the publication of a new Operations manual. Relying on the textualization of emergent precepts in TRADOC Pam 525-5 to disrupt the Cold War logic, and the précis to ease the change process, these leaders managed the use of these documents—that is, their entrenchment—to support the publication of a new FM. By injecting new ‘content’ (though limited) into the organization’s textual corpus with the publication of the 1993 Operations manual, these leaders were then able to shape the ‘trajectory’ of the nascent institutional logic endorsed in its pages. Following the publication of this manual, the Army’s leaders were able to pursue *doctrinally legitimate* change in support of the nascent logic they sought to

institutionalize. Their desires increasingly came to fruition as the contents of that manual were used, for example, to revise subordinate Army doctrine; incorporate key principles into joint service doctrine; and craft a disruptive concept—TRADOC Pam 525-5—poised to confront the ‘legacies’ of the Cold War logic the Army appeared not ready to give up in 1991.

While the publication of the keystone manual was of notable importance, so too were the intertextual connections mentioned in the narrative account provided above. Recall that discourses are ‘structured’—that is, composed not only of texts, but interrelated texts. As Phillips et al. (2004:644) suggest, “[w]hen texts contradict each other, or when the relationships among them are less clear, their implications for action are necessarily more negotiable.” The intertextual connections established among the Army’s keystone manual and, for example, subordinate Army doctrine, joint doctrine, the “National Military Strategy,” and the “National Security Strategy” were thus meaningful in the process of discourse development. Through drawing on and contributing to these texts in the development of Army and joint doctrine, the Army’s senior-most leaders were not only growing an organization-level discourse, but a strategically aligned field-level discourse grounded in the foundational principles of an emergent post-Cold War logic.

As the discursive ‘toolkit’ was increasingly populated with new language, new meanings, new practices, new missions, new means, and new identities, Army leaders turned to implementing and legitimizing physical organizational change by putting those new ‘tools’ to work. As described above, the Army’s senior leadership felt that prior to enacting physical organizational change, it was important “to get the [doctrinal] ideas in place first.” As the Army’s senior leaders strategically sought to make not only physical changes, but “informed

161 U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, oral history interview with GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., November 17, 1994, p. 50.
investments for the future” (emphasis added), the ‘information’ available was, near the end of General Sullivan’s tenure as Chief of Staff, increasingly grounded in emergent post-Cold War principles and meanings. As TRADOC Commander General Hartzog suggested in 1995, TRADOC Pam 525-5 published in August 1994 was the “starter set of ideas and thoughts” for change—the “solid intellectual foundation” on which “physical change is constructed.” By relying on the distinct language and unique characteristics of an emergent logic (as expressed in new doctrine and Pam 525-5) to enact physical changes, senior Army leaders further entrenched the logic, as its defining characteristics were relied upon to legitimize changes to, for example, Army organization and force structure; Army training plans and practices; leader development programs; and the Army’s investment strategy. If fully resourced and enacted under the direction of General Sullivan’s successor, the Army would not only have an ideological ‘toolkit’ populated to a notable degree with the principles, practices, identities, and meanings of an emergent post-Cold War logic, but a force organized, equipped, and trained to support it.


163 Ibid., 4.


166 U.S. Army TRADOC MHHO, 4th Qtr – FY 94 Update, n.d., p. 5. See also Davidson (2010), Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War.

Because institutional logics, when dominant, are embedded in both the material and symbolic dimensions of organizations (Friedland and Alford 1991), the Army was on the road to a post-Cold War logic with doctrine providing the engine by the end of General Sullivan’s tenure as Chief of Staff. As historian Walter Kretchik (2011:263) suggests, “no doctrine could expunge an entrenched Cold War mentality in the short term.” As my findings reported here demonstrate, however, during the early years of the post-Cold War era, senior Army leaders were engaged in practices and processes intended to entrench a post-Cold War mentality for the long-term.

CONCLUSION

In his “End of Tour Report” issued to General Sullivan upon being replaced as TRADOC Commander in October 1994, General Franks stated that with “the publication of revised FM 100-5 in June 1993, and Pam 525-5 in August 1994 I believe our Army has set a bold course for the present and the future.”\textsuperscript{168} “Moreover,” he continued, “we created in 1992 an experimental entity called Battle Labs, that together with your vision for Louisiana Maneuvers gives us, for the first time, an institutionalized approach to experimentation with new ideas.”\textsuperscript{169} Notably, the key components of the Army’s change strategy identified by General Franks constitute the central focus of those efforts I identified as institutional logic work. Through tracing the development, textualization, and entrenchment of uniquely post-Cold War principles, practices, and meanings, I proposed above a recursive model of institutional logic change that foregrounds the centrality of the texts and developmental processes highlighted by General Franks. By giving


\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 7.
explicit attention to the ‘content’ and ‘trajectories’ of those organizationally salient texts referenced, I have demonstrated that the process I propose explains not only their development and emergence, but also their long-term effects on the discourse made available to actors who act within and upon the world around them. It is through the expansion of discourse with the inclusion of new principles, practices, and meanings in contextually meaningful texts that institutional logic change is made possible.

In the concluding chapter that follows, I discuss how the forms of institutional work described in the previous two chapters—those of environment work and organizational identity work—made possible the institutional logic work described here. Further, I situate my findings within the broader field of the armed forces to provide an organization-centric model of institutional logic change that highlights organizational action as opposed to field-level outcomes. Therein, I describe not only the empirical, but also the theoretical insights supported by my analysis of the initiation of a transformational process by the U.S. Army’s senior leaders in the early years of the post-Cold War Era.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION: TOWARD A POST-COLD WAR FORCE AND AN ORGANIZATION-CENTRIC MODEL OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The primary empirical question I address in this dissertation is: ‘What discursive practices were employed by the U.S. Army’s senior leadership in the early years of the ‘campaign’ enacted to replace the uniquely Cold War institutional logic with a distinctly post-Cold War logic?’ The conceptualization of change expressed in this question is 1) informed by the observation that the change process I analyzed was indeed perceived by the Army’s senior leaders to reflect a military ‘campaign’1 and 2) purposefully aligned with the neoinstitutional theoretical framework in which this dissertation is grounded. In the sections that follow, I thus first provide an overview of my empirical findings, focusing on how the three forms of institutional work presented separately in the previous chapters collectively constitute a concerted campaign for change. In the next section, I propose and describe a model of institutional logic change that emerged from my analysis of the data, demonstrating how an organizational change campaign undertaken by a core organization in a field can contribute to institutional logic change processes at the broader field level. I conclude by describing the primary theoretical contributions of this dissertation along with the limitations of it, with an eye toward future research.

TOWARD A POST-COLD WAR ARMY: A CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR CHANGE

In Hope is Not a Method, General Sullivan and Colonel Harper use the military campaign plan as a metaphor for organizational change processes (Sullivan and Harper 1996). They state that whether in war or in the midst of significant organizational change, “[a]chieving the vision will generally be the result of several simultaneous or sequential campaigns” (p. 134). As I have demonstrated, the Army leadership’s ‘campaign plan’ for change included three simultaneous campaigns to achieve the vision of a ‘paradigm shift’: environment work, organizational identity work, and institutional logic work (see Table 8-1). Though presented individually in the previous chapters, when considered as not only co-occurring, but coordinating efforts, a more strategic ‘campaign plan’ is evident.

Table 8-1. Types of Institutional Work Engaged in by U.S. Army Senior Leaders, June 1991–June 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Institutional Work</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment Work</strong></td>
<td>Constructing an extra-organizational environment that demands change, and an intra-organizational environment that is hospitable to the change project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructing Redefining Events</td>
<td>Specifying the scope and characteristics of events that necessitate a reconsideration of prevailing structural and cultural arrangements in the organization or institutional field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating a Culture of Change</td>
<td>Establishing a normative foundation within the organization that supports change, as opposed to stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowering Responders</td>
<td>Ensuring stakeholders that those responsible for managing the change process are responsive to the needs of others, knowledgeable, and capable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Identity Work</strong></td>
<td>Developing, managing, and aligning distinctive organizational attributes that characterize those facets of the organization perceived in the present to be central and enduring, and desirable for the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing a Vision</td>
<td>Creating an abstract image of the organization’s future capabilities, physical form, and ideological orientation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Constituting deliberate attempts to discursively disrupt the Cold War logic and develop, textualize, and entrench the unique characteristics of a distinctly post-Cold War logic, it may be tempting to focus primarily, if not solely, on the institutional logic work I observed to answer the research question of interest here. The Army did, after all, understand doctrine to be, and use doctrine as ‘the engine of change.’ The textual accomplishments described in the previous chapter were, however, meaningfully and strategically supported by the other forms of institutional work I identified. Collectively, these three forms of work were powerfully aligned as they confronted sources of competing legitimacy claims and opened up space for the exercise of projective agency. To demonstrate the coordinating character of the forms of institutional work I identified, I focus here on how the institutional logic work described in Chapter 7 was supported and enabled by what I identified as environment work and organizational identity work.

**Confronting Sources of Competing Legitimacy Claims**
In the midst of institutional logic change, defenders of the status quo may rely on ‘reference points’ to undermine the emergent logic (Misangyi, Weaver, and Elms 2008). These ‘reference points’ are relied on to legitimize the prevailing logic, and render the proposed logic objectionable. For true logic change to occur, however, the new logic must be perceived to be legitimate (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). Indeed, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter, legitimacy was a key element of the institutional logic work I identified. Those efforts could, however, be undermined by the use of reference points by status quo defenders. Relying on each of the forms of institutional work I identified, senior Army leaders strategically targeted such reference points. These efforts directly confronted potential sources for legitimacy claims in support of the Cold War logic. The primary sources targeted include the geostrategic environment, ‘authoritative’ doctrine, and organizational identity.

To be sure, the Soviet Union’s looming presence was a reference point used to legitimize the Cold War logic’s dominance throughout the Cold War era. It was this reference point that led Army doctrine writers to focus solely on European defense in the wake of the Vietnam War, even in the face of dissenting voices (as described in Chapter 3). Through the construction of redefining events evident in my data—through making explicit the demise of the Soviet Union and, in turn, the large-scale, mechanized war its presence evoked—senior Army leaders actively engaged in discursive efforts that confronted this reference point. These efforts (described in Chapter 5) involved the emphatic declaration that it was not only the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact that had disappeared from the geostrategic landscape, but the presence of any single colossal threat. With no Soviet-type adversary, senior leaders suggested the Army faced a
“new era” characterized by “rapidly expanding roles” for the Army.² The new geostrategic environment alluded to by the Army’s senior leaders delegitimized the Cold War logic’s dominance. These efforts thus assisted with the disruption of Soviet-oriented Cold War doctrine, and the development of doctrine with principles governing actions that accommodate those ‘rapidly expanding roles’ for the Army—contingencies ranging from war to peacetime engagement.

As stated in the 1986 Operations manual, “[t]he Army must be ready to fight enemies whose capabilities... [include] modern tank, motorized, and airborne forces like the Warsaw Pact armies or other similarly organized forces including Soviet surrogates” (HQDA 1986:2). The loss of the Soviet threat and emergence of a distinctly ‘new era’ called into question the prevailing doctrine and supported the publication of a disruptive text with TRADOC Pam 525-5 in August 1991. Indeed, that pamphlet opens by stating that “[t]he AirLand Battle Concept of 1981 was set in the context of U.S.-Soviet conflict.”³ The Soviet-oriented doctrine itself thus no longer served as a valid reference point in support of the Cold War logic—its foundation had disappeared, and, in turn, so too did its authority over organizational matters. As my data reveal, the Army’s senior leaders were thus actively involved in constructing the Soviet Union’s demise as a redefining event in order to capitalize on its implications for doctrinal and, in turn, institutional logic development and change.


As Scott et al. (2000:349) observe, for organizations that undergo a fundamental change in their guiding logic, they “not only do things differently, they do different things.” With institutional logic change, comes a change in practices (Gawer and Phillips 2013). Indeed, the 1993 *Operations* manual embraced, for the first time, the Army’s role in operations other than war. Though these contingencies were legitimized by the nascent logic, they were delegitimized by the Army’s Cold War, warrior-oriented identity. Endorsing these missions, even in the organization’s ‘authoritative foundation’ for organizational matters (FM 100-5), would not be enough to ensure their acceptance by organizational members. Army leaders were aware that if new doctrine was too revolutionary it could be rejected by those who were responsible for implementing it.\(^4\) For an organization whose sense of self was grounded in the singular purpose ‘to fight and with the nation’s wars,’ the new principles and practices might be perceived as too distant from ‘who we are’ and ‘what we do’ to be enacted. It is thus noteworthy that alongside the institutional logic work that included the development and textualization of the principles and tenets that guide new practices (as discussed in Chapter 7), General Sullivan and others were busy managing the organization’s identity as ‘the nation’s faithful servant’ to encompass them. In essence, these leaders were dislodging a ‘reference point’ that upheld the war-oriented Cold war logic. As organizational scholars suggest, institutional logic change may indeed require that organizational identities that delegitimize new practices are reconstructed to render them appropriate (Gawer and Phillips 2013; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). The Army’s senior leaders were seemingly well aware of this need, relying on organizational visioning and, relatedly, management of the organization’s identity to support it.

Fostering Projective Agency

According to institutional scholars, proto-institutional logics are generated through the exercise of future-oriented, projective agency (Battilana and D’Aunno 2009). Moreover, their development is made possible when prevailing arrangements are called into question. As Zietsma and McKnight (2009:147) observe, when existing arrangements are disrupted and there is no “ready-made solution” on which to draw, such conditions “leav[e] much institutional work to be done.” This is precisely the condition the Army confronted during the period of my analysis. As General Sullivan recalled of ideas for the future force at the time, “[t]here [was] no answer written on a tablet” (Dabrowski 2008:240). The Army’s leaders were not activating available forms, meanings, and practices; they were “trying to invent something” (p. 240). They were developing a proto-institutional logic for the post-Cold War era. While the ‘invention’ process took the form of institutional logic work, it was enabled and given direction by what I identified as environment work and organizational identity work.

Recall that the Soviet Union’s demise and the end of ‘Industrial Age’ warfare were established as redefining events—that is, constructed as contextually dramatic occurrences that necessitate a reconsideration of prevailing structural and cultural arrangements. In this effort, the Army’s leaders sought to establish uncertainty about the future. This was indeed ‘ambiguity-by-design’ (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991) as those leading the change effort believed that it was the presence of a definitive, Industrial Age, mechanized threat (the Soviet Union) that prevented otherwise possible changes to the force during the late-Cold War period (Sullivan and Harper 1996). These leaders desired a ‘critical mass’ of change agents that would “look beyond [the

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5 The authors cited in this concluding chapter refer in their works to “proto-institutions.” With my interest in institutional logics, I incorporate “logics” into their suggestions, but understand their general observation to be compatible with the one I endorse here.
present] and participate in creating the new organization” (p. 185), and relied on the construction of redefining events and the ambiguity ushered in by their presence to bring it into being.

Alongside the construction of critical events in the extra-organizational environment, these leaders sought to create a culture of change within it. In the process, they not only portrayed change as normal and the responsibility of the post-Cold War generation of soldiers, but provided those involved with the change process “a ready-made formula for success… a fundamental prescription for victory” that had seemingly proven its worth in Desert Storm. This formula—composed of the ‘imperatives’ outlined by General Sullivan—included ensuring that the force had ‘up-to-date doctrine.’ For Army leaders who “fe[lt] good about what [the Army had] accomplished” in Desert Storm, the suggestion that not only doctrine, but up-to-date doctrine enabled those accomplishments supported the call to update it, even in the wake of its successful implementation. With the end of the Cold War and emergence of ‘Information Age’ warfare—that is, with the organization being confronted by redefining events—the Army seemingly needed to update its doctrine to stay ‘up-to-date’ and win the next Desert Storm.

Whereas the efforts discussed thus far were intended to make doctrinal change possible and desirable, the crafting and dissemination of a vision was designed to give it direction (Sullivan and Harper 1996). With an abstract image of the Army in the future, the vision was not only communicated to a wide range of stakeholders to foster an understanding of and

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7 Ibid., 141.

appreciation for what the Army was working to become, it also provided those involved with doctrine development an idea of what organizational identity should be endorsed in its pages. In turn, the 1993 *Operations* manual provided “the condensed expression of the Army’s fundamental approach to fighting, influencing events in operations other than war, and deterring actions detrimental to national interests” (HQDA 1993:1-1). The manual was the condensed expression of the Army’s identity as the ‘nation’s faithful servant.’

To be sure, the ‘campaign plan’ to disrupt and replace the long-standing Cold War logic’s influence in the Army was focused on the development, publication, and dissemination of a new keystone doctrinal manual—the ‘engine of change.’ That campaign, however, was supported by others conducted simultaneously. As demonstrated here and throughout Chapters 5 and 6, many of the ‘battles’ and ‘engagements’ that constituted those ‘campaigns’—the types of institutional work that compose environment work and organizational identity work—have been noted by organizational scholars to be important elements in organizational and institutional change processes. To fully explain how change is made possible in contemporary, ‘doctrine-based’ military organizations, scholars must move beyond the doctrine itself, and afford more attention to the ‘campaigns’ that make its development possible and its contents acceptable. Doctrine does not make an Army, an Army makes doctrine.

**TOWARD AN ORGANIZATION-CENTRIC MODEL OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE**

With its predominant focus on societal and field-level environments, neoinstitutional theory has been criticized for “defocaliz[ing] individual organizations and the developmental, adaptive, and integrative work that needs to be done by their existing elites” if true institutional change is to occur (Kraatz 2009:70). This critique is noteworthy given that the structural,
normative, and symbolic dimensions of institutional fields that prevail “rely” on (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006), “depend” on (Gawer and Phillips 2013), and in fact “require” (Dorado 2005) supportive actions at more local levels of analysis. In this dissertation I thus focused on a single organization (the U.S. Army) within an institutional field (the field of the armed forces) to identify what the ‘developmental,’ ‘adaptive,’ and ‘integrative’ work carried out by organizational elites might entail. Having already described in detail those efforts I identified, I turn here to the broader institutional field in which they occurred to explain how those efforts might be applied to explain broader field-level change processes—in my case, the transition from a distinctly Cold War to uniquely post-Cold War logic within the field of the armed forces.

Working in the neoinstitutional tradition to study change in the field of the armed forces, one might expect a researcher to study, for example, the development and implementation of plans at the level of the Department of Defense; actions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or the process of “National Security Strategy” development by the executive branch of the U.S. government. Recall, however, that institutional fields are ‘inhabited’ (Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997) by organizations—“‘collective social actors’… [that] can take actions” (Scott 2003:7)—and “real people… with consequential past experiences of their own” (Binder 2007:568). To revisit the relationships expressed in the multi-level model of institutional logic change and persistence described in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2-1, adapted from Jepperson and Meyer (2011)), to understand what institutional logic(s) is (are) available to individual and collective actors at any given point in time (t₁), the researcher must consider practices and processes that unfold at multiple levels of analysis between t₀ and t₁. Relying on the case study presented here, I thus provide below a model of change that demonstrates how the practices and process I identified at
the organizational level of analysis contributed to the emergence of a structured discourse with potential field-level effects.

**An Organization-Centric Model of Institutional Change: The U.S. Army as Case Study**

In this section, I rely on the case study presented here to provide a model of institutional logic change that foregrounds organizational action within the broader institutional field to which it belongs. Here, I present my case-specific findings and interpretations of them as embedded actions within a field. While I do not trace a change process through completion in this dissertation, the observations presented here lend credit to the suggestion that more attention should be afforded organizations in explanations of how logics emerge, change, and gain strength in institutional fields (e.g., Berman 2012; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012).

Recall that institutional fields are characterized by the relations between organizations and other actors that bind them into a social system that serves a purpose (Barley 2010). To study a single organization within this system—the ‘focal organization’ of analysis (Evan 1965)—the researcher must consider not only what happens internally, but also how the focal organization manages relations with external stakeholders (Barley 2010; Scott et al. 2000) and navigates the structures and meanings present in the field (Scott 2008b). Incorporating the forms of institutional work I identified and the prevalent aspects of the institutional field that figured prominently in my findings—to include societal-level discourses, external stakeholders, and contextually salient texts—Figure 8-1 provides an organization-centric model of institutional change.
In this model, the focal organization is distinguished from the institutional field by a dashed line to demonstrate the inherent flow of ideas and information across organizations in institutional fields (Barley 2010). Carried out by focal organizational actors, the three forms of institutional work I identified in my analysis are depicted within the organization; however, the arrow referencing external institutional work demonstrates that the messages associated with...
these forms of institutional work were carried to external audiences as well. Depicted in this field-level model in the same style as in Chapter 7 (see Figure 7-2), institutional logic work includes the organization’s contributions to (via textualization), and entrenchment of contextually salient texts. This constitutes the discursive nature of the institutional logic work I identified, as the reliance on these texts ‘rules in’ certain ways of thinking, talking, acting, and organizing, and ‘rules out’ others. Of notable interest here is that this corpus of texts resides in the field, and not within a single organization. The discourse(s) is (are) thus available to be ‘taken up’ (i.e., entrenched) by a host of organizations as they engage in their own processes of logic development and textualization (whether creating, maintaining, or disrupting them) by drawing on available texts to inform ideological and physical change. As implied with the overlapping circles along the bottom of the figure, this is the process through which organizations shape the institutional logic(s)—as constituted in discourse—available to others and to their own organization at a future date. Lastly, the model includes societal-level discourses that are contextually meaningful and emerged as influential in my analysis. Relying on this model, I describe below some of the ways in which senior leaders in the focal organization of my analysis interacted with these elements of the institutional field.

Societal-Level Discourses

One element of the extra-organizational environment that figured prominently in my findings is societal-level discourse. As Hardy and Phillips (1999:6) explain, such discourse is structured “through a broad range of mass media” and affects field-level discourse. In my analysis, I found that Army leaders often evoked societal-level discourses of technological modernization, civil-military relations, democracy, and science to legitimize emergent principles,
practices, and technologies; the processes through which they were developed and adopted; and organizational identity claims. I include these discourses as a component of the institutional field-level environment in Figure 8-1 because they are not only societally, but also institutionally meaningful for a contemporary professional military that relies on “technological sophistication” (Moskos 2000) and adheres to a democratic model of subordination to civilian authority (HQDA 1993). Below, I provide two examples that demonstrate how these discourses were relied on by Army leaders to legitimize.

As one example, Army leaders relied on the discourse of science to legitimize the experimentation-oriented Louisiana Maneuvers and Battle Labs processes (see institutional logic work, Chapter 7). In turn, the products of these processes—the principles, practices, and technologies they supported—were themselves legitimized as they were the outcome of a seemingly rational and valid approach to decision-making. As another example, Army leaders drew on the societal-level discourse of civil-military relations to legitimize the expansion of organizational identity claims and their depiction of the Army as the nation’s faithful servant (see managing organizational identity, Chapter 6). By evoking this societally and institutionally legitimate discourse, they rendered appropriate the inclusion of those non-combat operations a ‘nation’s servant’ performs in the Army’s Operations and other manuals. In fact, these leaders meaningfully evoked this societal-level discourse in these manuals.

First and foremost, it is notable that the 1993 Operations manual includes a one-half page description of the Army’s subordination to civilian authority—a topic notably absent in the 1986 edition of the FM. Included in this section of the new manual is the following:

The Army serves as a repository of its national values and embeds them into its professional ethos. Proper subordination to political authority, loyalty, duty,
selfless service, courage, integrity, respect for human dignity, and a sense of justice are all part of the Army’s identity… The responsibility for the conduct and use of military forces is derived from the people and the government. The Army commits forces only after appropriate direction from the National Command Authorities (NCA). In the end, the people will pass judgment on the appropriateness of the conduct and use of military operations. Their values and expectations must be met (HQDA 1993:1-2—1-3).

Still other manuals and publications evoked the discourse on civil-military relations. The introduction of FM 100-23, Peace Operations, published a year after Operations, for example, begins with the following quote from the Clinton Administration’s Policy on Peace Operations: “Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives” (HQDA 1994:iv). Peace operations are thus presented as a tool used by the president (civilian leadership) in the interest of the people (the Army’s client). Here, non-combat operations are given meaning and legitimized by the broader, institutionally meaningful discourse on civil-military relations that is inherently bound up with the post-Cold War logic and expanded organizational identity it entails. This interdiscursivity is powerful as it legitimizes the contested new roles and new missions assigned to the organization. As I demonstrate next, legitimacy was also a desired outcome of the external institutional work I observed.

External Institutional Work

Recall that the dashed line embodying the organization in Figure 8-1 reflects the permeability of organizations with regard to the movement of ideas and information within a
field. Indeed, Barley (2010:794) observes that among those things that “flow” throughout an institutional field are “information” and “persuasive communications.” The arrow depicting external institutional work in Figure 8-1 demonstrates explicit attempts by the focal organization’s leaders to establish and control the flow of information and persuasive communications to external stakeholders.9

Within the field of the armed forces, there is a wide array of organizational populations and actors with which the Army interacts. The list of external stakeholders provided in Figure 8-1 is limited to those that were predominant in my data. As the Army managed its organizationally internal transformation toward a post-Cold War force, its senior leadership carried messages about the transformation—indeed, those messages described in the previous chapters that constitute the forms of institutional work I identified—to a host of internal and external stakeholders. The leadership’s extensive interest in external institutional work is demonstrated by the following list of stakeholders identified in a late 1991 TRADOC brief as necessary targets for a “consensus building campaign” to garner support for Army doctrine development: non-allies, allies, opinion leaders, Congress, Army leadership, Army Staffs, Air Force, Joint, USMC [United States Marine Corps]/Navy, DOD [Department of Defense], Media, and the American people.10 The various audiences included in the examples I provided in

9 To be sure, the flow of information is two-way, with external stakeholders managing their own ‘flows’ of information and persuasive communications to include those directed at the U.S. Army, the focal organization here; however, my data that expose external institutional work (primarily in the form of speeches and publications) do not capture the ‘flows’ managed by other actors. Because I provide in Figure 8-1 a model that depicts only what I observed in my data, the arrow is one-way; however, theoretically the arrow would be two-way, demonstrating the reciprocal relationship between the external institutional work carried out by the leaders of the U.S. Army and that enacted by other field-level actors. I revisit this observation in the limitations described later in this chapter.

previous chapters further demonstrate the reach of the campaign for change. The Army’s senior leaders indeed ‘communicated constantly’ with both internal and external stakeholders (Sullivan and Harper 1996). These efforts both communicated the changes taking shape, and relied on the institutional work practices I observed to legitimize them.

Worthy of note here is not just the breadth of stakeholders addressed, but the Army leadership’s desire to ensure that those carrying the message were carrying the same “party line message”\(^{11}\) across stakeholder groups. While one may assume that the message would differ dependent upon the audience, I found evidence of the opposite: a highly consistent message across audiences. I interpret this as the Army’s attempt to clearly communicate and legitimize the emergent post-Cold War logic. As the Army’s senior leaders worked “to invent something” (Dabrowski 2008:240)—new principles, new practices, new missions, indeed, a new identity (as compared to that endorsed throughout the Cold War years)—these leaders sought approval for it.

A long-standing observation of neoinstitutional scholars is that for organizations to garner support for their actions and obtain the resources necessary to produce their products or provide their services, they must be perceived to be engaging in legitimate ways of organizing and acting (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Developing a proto-institutional logic that was yet to be legitimized and adopted by the field, the organizational leaders in my case worked diligently to ensure others that the changes pursued were, for example, necessary as a response to those critical events occurring in the world (see constructing redefining events, Chapter 5), the means through which the Army could continue its long history of service to nation (see managing organizational identity, Chapter 6), and just the next chapter in the Army’s long history of

changing to meet the strategic demands of the time (see creating a culture of change, Chapter 5). The overarching message was that new missions and new means were legitimate. For an organization that relies on Congressional support for resources, support from strategic partnerships for accomplishment of its mission (such as from the U.S. Army Reserves and National Guard Bureau, and weapons developers), and whose client is society, that message had to be widely diffused to garner the support necessary for its actions to be supported and its resource needs met.

As General Sullivan told senior Army officers, “it’s vitally important that the Army leadership explain a coherent vision [the official Army vision statement] to the American people.” After explaining the changes on the horizon and the Army’s plan to achieve its vision in January 1994, he implored military and industry leaders at an AUSA meeting to “tell the Army story.” In a letter to the Army’s general officers in November 1994, he stated the following:

I need all of you to get your head into the game of working with Congress. Now is the time for us to begin telling our story for next year and laying the groundwork for our issues in the [fiscal year 1996] budget… We must be trained and ready for missions ranging from regional conflicts, to peacekeeping, to humanitarian assistance… We must be versatile; we must have the wide range of capabilities to

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12 Ibid., 3.

accomplish any mission the nation asks us to take on… The effects of the current and future budgets on these vital aspects of the force are critical.\textsuperscript{14}

The ‘story’ to be told was largely one of legitimacy for the new missions and new means that characterized the emergent post-Cold War logic. The desired consistency in message with internal and external stakeholders within the field demonstrates, then, the leadership’s desire to leverage the field itself—that is, the voices and actors that populate it—as a resource to legitimate the contested changes. To provide a quote from Barley (2010:795) through which he references the power of relations in an institutional field: “Everyone knows a choir’s tune is stronger and carries further than that of a soloist, even a Pavarotti.”

\textit{Intertextuality as Institutional Logic Work}

As depicted in Figure 8-1, a variety of contextually salient texts reside in the field, and are thus available, through the process of entrenchment depicted, to inform ideological developments and physical changes in organizations. To borrow from phrasing used in FM 100-5, these salient texts provide ‘the condensed expression’ of institutional logics. They constitute the discourse(s) available to organizational actors within the field. To the degree that these texts may provide competing discourses, they constitute the ‘toolkit’ available to those actors (Scott 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012).

With a focus on both the content and trajectory of texts, the model of institutional logic change proposed above relies on an organization or other actor producing and making available a text that is then entrenched elsewhere, as another organization or actor relies on its content to

influence ideological or physical change. As the content spreads and actors recirculate it through production of their own texts (written, recorded, or depicted in some other retrievable manner), the discourse(s) available to other actors, and at future points in time is altered. In this sense, institutional logic work is a process of intertextuality—that is, a process through which a well-structured, coherent discourse emerges.

Consider the following: to inform the 1993 update of the *Operations* manual, Army leaders relied on the new “National Security Strategy.” Specifically, they drew on (i.e., entrenched) the new language and new precepts in its pages to inform and justify new principles and practices endorsed in the FM (see HQDA 1993). Through a process of entrenchment, this new manual was then itself relied on by Army leaders to inform joint doctrine and subordinate Army doctrine. Recall that Army leaders at TRADOC had a hands-on role in the writing of joint doctrine. It is thus noteworthy that the 1995 Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, includes versatility (a new tenet of Army operations introduced in FM 100-5 in 1993); endorses the three principles of operations other than war expressed in the new Army FM (described in Chapter 7); and shares exemplars of such operations with the Army’s *Operations* manual.

Worthy of note is that this manual, endorsing the fundamental principles of operations developed by Army leaders during the period of my analysis, then served as a foundation for service-specific training programs for peace operations for all service branches (Sewall 1997). These organizations were applying and, presumably internalizing (even if in a locally adapted manner) the fundamental principles of post-Cold War doctrine developed by Army leaders.

By the end of General Sullivan’s tenure as Chief of Staff, the Army had produced a well-structured collection of meaningful texts that served as ‘the condensed expression’ of a uniquely post-Cold War logic. To a notable degree, this discourse was ‘structured’ by intertextual
connections between Army doctrine and other texts within the field that were understood to have a legitimate right to influence Army doctrine. Take, for example, the opening statement of FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*, published in May 1995:

> This manual delineates the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, joint doctrine, and Army doctrine—that is, FM 100-5. It applies to the conduct of operations across the range of military operations… [and] implements relevant joint doctrine, incorporates lessons learned from recent operations, and conforms with the Army's keystone doctrine (HQDA 1995:1).

As with interdiscursivity, such intertextuality provides meaningful structure to the discourse, and through connections to contextually meaningful texts, legitimizes their content. By the end of General Sullivan’s tenure, the Army thus not only had in place a post-Cold War logic constituted in a well-structured discourse, but constituted in a legitimized well-structured discourse.

**Intra-Organizational Action and Logic Availability: Carriers, Reference Points, and Ready-made Solutions**

Neither General Sullivan, as the initiator and leader of the change effort I analyzed, nor the Army worked as an institutional entrepreneur attempting to mold the field to serve their interests (DiMaggio 1988). Moreover, the Army’s leaders were not explicitly imposing their vision and desires upon the other service branches. Their efforts at change were organizationally-oriented, not social movement-like; however, as depicted in Figure 8-1, the discursive ‘toolkit’ from which organizations and field-level actors can draw (with notable texts in my case listed along the bottom of the figure) includes the textual accomplishments of various actors within the field. Aptly described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983:149), in field-level environments,
organizations “respond to an environment that consists of other organizations responding to their environment, which consists of organizations responding to an environment of organization’s responses.”\textsuperscript{15} The responses to which other organization’s respond emerge as ‘discursive output’ (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006). The textual accomplishments of actors within the field thus influence logic availability. As I describe here using my case as an exemplar, the texts organizations produce as they respond internally to characteristics of their environments can serve as ‘carriers’ (Zilber 2002),\textsuperscript{16} ‘reference points’ (Misangyi, Weaver, and Elms 2008), and ‘ready-made solutions’ (Zietsma and McKnight 2009:147) that may lead to the solidification of the emergent logic as the predominant logic in the field.

Simply stated, “[o]nly after a proto-institution [here, a proto-institutional logic] appears in the field can it be adopted by other organizations and become institutionalized” (Lawrence, Hardy, and Phillips 2002:283). This seemingly straightforward observation identifies the central first step toward the institutionalization of a proto-institutional logic. To ‘appear,’ the proposed logic must be textualized in some accessible form. The notion of text as a ‘carrier’ implies that the meanings, interpretations, principles, practices, etc. that are endorsed within its pages are taken up and endorsed in social spaces beyond that in which it was produced. My findings suggest that how the logic ‘appears in the field’ is important. In the field of the armed forces, doctrine provides a recognizable genre of text that is ‘authoritative’ and signals the collective wisdom of its producer. Through textualizing emergent principles and practices in FM 100-5 in 1993, the Army’s leaders signaled the validity of its content. Indeed, as I demonstrated in Chapter 7, the Army’s senior leaders leveraged this contextually salient genre as a means to

\textsuperscript{15} DiMaggio and Powell (1983) note that this statement paraphrases the observations of Schelling (1978).

\textsuperscript{16} The concept of ‘carriers’ comes from Zilber (2002) who argues that individual actors are ‘carriers’ of institutions.
include emergent tenets and principles in Joint Publication 3-0. Secondly, my findings suggest that who introduces the emergent logic matters. Recall that the August 1991 edition of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5—a document proposing new principles and practices to confront those characteristic of the prevailing Cold War logic—was not well received. In drafting the précis, the Army’s senior leaders thus strategically referenced the new “National Security Strategy” in its introduction to signal that the changes proposed were responsive to the desires and plans of a legitimate authority in the field. The proposed changes thus legitimately warrant consideration.

In addition to serving as a carrier of ideas, organizationally produced texts can provide reference points for others to legitimize their adherence to an emergent logic. Just as Army leaders used higher-level texts, such as the “National Security Strategy” and the “National Military Strategy,” as reference points to signal the need to alter the predominant ‘paradigm’ within the organization, organizations may refer to texts produced by members of their organizational population to legitimize change. Indeed, in a late 1995 issue of Airpower Journal (the U.S. Air Force equivalent of Military Review) for example, it was stated that the Army had in place doctrine that addressed unconventional warfare and operations other than war, while “Air Force doctrine addresses the issue in a marginal way,” generally focusing on “only conventional wars” (Corsini 1995:8). Shortly thereafter, General Ronald R. Fogleman, then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, posed the following questions in a presentation reprinted in the Summer 1996 issues of Airpower Journal: “Have we provided our sister services sufficient doctrine for… peace operations?” and “Do we have a doctrinal framework” for operations other than war (Fogleman 1996:45)? The implied answer is ‘no,’ or in the least, ‘not sufficiently.’ The implied solution is, ‘let’s consider writing it in.’
Lastly, organizationally produced texts may provide others with ‘ready-made solutions’ for the problems and needs they face. As Zietsma and McKinght (2009:147) note, when organizations confront uncertainty and there are no ‘ready-made solutions,’ “there remains much institutional work to be done.” To be sure, this was the case for the Army in the early post-Cold War years. The institutional work I identified was likely extensive because there was no ready-made solution—implying that the future end state was altogether new. However, for organizations making similar changes at a later point in time, other organizations may have stock solutions available. Indeed, shortly after the period of my analysis the U.S. Marine Corps formally assessed U.S. Army peacekeeping doctrine to determine if it was relevant for the development of Marine Corps doctrine (Sewall 1997).

Recall that the model provided in Figure 8-1 is a visual depiction of the following suggestion: which institutional logic(s) is (are) available to individual and collective actors at any given point in time (t₁) is influenced by practices and processes that unfold within organizations between t₀ and t₁. As I have demonstrated thus far, the textualization of the defining characteristics of an emergent logic—that is, the carrying out of institutional logic work—does influence logic availability. Perhaps more important, however, is logic activation (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). I thus conclude this section by highlighting the fact that which institutional logic(s) is (are) perceived to be viable at any given point in time (t₁) is influenced by the various forms of institutional work carried out by organizations between t₀ and t₁.

The persuasive, discursive institutional work strategies I identified in my study were carried out by Army leaders seeking to garner an understanding of, and support for the fundamental transformation the organization was undergoing. It is noteworthy, however, that in the process they actively confronted sources of competing legitimacy claims by discrediting
those reference points that could be relied on to uphold the long-standing Cold War logic. Through such claims-making among both internal and external audiences, these leaders challenged not only the Cold War logic’s hold over Army affairs, but over the entire military establishment. Indeed, as I suggest above, Army leaders sought to form a choir with one voice—for change. Given that this central organization has the ‘ear’ of many of the same individual and collective actors that provide support and resources to the other service branches, the ability of these other organizations to maintain the status quo (if so desired) is undermined. Institutional logic change (or stability) is not always the result of intentional actions directed at the institutional field level, and may more commonly be the result of organizations “respond[ing] to an environment that consists of other organizations responding to their environment, which consists of organizations responding to an environment of organization’s responses” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983:149).

IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Neoinstitutional theory has matured considerably over the past four decades. No longer are institutional contexts perceived to be monolithic, all-powerful guides of thought, action, and identity. In light of more recent perspectives that foreground agency and change, however, there are perhaps more questions than answers—a good space for a maturing field of study. Here, I discuss some of the implications of the research reported here and note some of the limitations of this study with an eye toward future research.

While I observed a breadth of institutional work practices in support of the broader vision endorsed by the Army’s leadership, I do not argue that all of those I identified will be present in every organization’s attempt to disrupt and replace a prevailing logic. First, however, I do
propose that the recursive institutional logic work process I identified does characterize institutional logic change processes. Accepting that institutional logics are constituted in discourse, and that dominant logics are characterized by coherent, intertextually structured discourses, the entrenchment and textualization processes I describe are necessary. The process may not always entail the need to establish and legitimize a new process for the development of principles and practices, and the process may, in some contexts entail less or more iterative processes than that I identified in my case. It is, however, the intertextual nature of what I identity as institutional logic work that enables the emergence of a dominant institutional logic.

The environment work and organizational identity work I identified will likely differ across contexts. It may be, for example, that the Army’s notoriously stubborn resistance to change in the wake of wartime successes led the leaders in my analysis to work diligently to create a culture of change. It is noteworthy, however, that the management of organizational identity to ensure that the identity embraced by organizational members encompasses those practices endorsed by the new logic may be necessary for true logic change (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). Future research efforts should analyze change in other institutional fields to identify when, and why there are similarities and differences in the forms of work identified, and whether organizational identity work may be necessary.

Additionally, I accept that situating intra-organizational change processes within the institutional field in which it occurs is essential to understand why the process unfolds as it does, and why the institutional workers do what they do. In doing so in this final chapter, however, my ability to speak definitively about the influence of the change process I analyzed was limited by the content and temporal limitations of my data. Future research efforts should ensure that the data analyzed can better unpack both the intra-organizational change process and its field-level
effects. As a specific direction for research in this area, future efforts should explore the role of
texts as ‘carriers,’ ‘reference points,’ and ‘ready-made solutions’ to identify when, why, and how
they work in these or other ways.

Before turning to the limitations of my study, I address here pressing questions currently
confronted by institutional work scholars. With their introduction of the institutional work
perspective, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) provided an answer to the question of how individual
and collective actors affect institutional arrangements—they engage in practices that create,
maintain, and disrupt them. As Lawrence, Leca, and Zilber (2013) note, however, scholars are
now grappling with the following questions: Who engages in institutional work and what
constitutes it?

Early answers to the question of who carries out institutional work focused largely on
those efforts of institutional entrepreneurs and organized actors working at the macro level of
professions. Increasingly, scholars have suggested that leaders within organizations carry out
institutional work as they shape organizational commitments and external perceptions of them
(e.g., Gawer and Phillips 2013; Kraatz 2009; Rojas 2010). Contemplating the question of who,
precisely, are institutional workers, my findings strongly support these recent observations that
organizations, and more specifically their leaders, perform institutional work. In the case I
analyzed, those organized actors with formal and legitimate authority over the leaders of the
organization I analyzed did little to influence either the decision to enact, or direction of, the
transformational changes pursued. As they sought to create and legitimize a new way of thinking,
organizing, identifying, and acting, their efforts were undoubtedly intentional—certainly meeting
the definitional characteristics of institutional work. I thus echo Suddaby’s (2010:18) call for
scholars to shift their attention from outside to inside organizations and “consider closely the
possibility that organizations are much more sophisticated managers of symbolic resources than
organizational theory presently admits to.”

By definition, what constitutes institutional work are efforts intended to create, maintain, or disrupt institutional arrangements. The focus of research efforts to date is thus on direct and explicit attempts to effect these institutional outcomes. To be sure, studies of institutional work heed Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006:249) call for scholars to “break the dramatic spell of institutions” by highlighting their malleability. In their introduction of the concept, however, Lawrence and Suddaby suggest that this ‘dramatic spell of institutions’ is to be broken by “draw[ing] attention behind the scenes, to the actors, writers and stage-hands that produce them” (p. 249). The production metaphor applied here implies that much pre-production (and even post-production) work is necessary and that the process includes a storyline that unfolds across a number of scenes. As I have sought to demonstrate in this dissertation, the U.S. Army senior leadership’s campaign plan involved much more than the development, textualization, and entrenchment of new doctrine—those efforts that explicitly disrupted and replaced the long-standing logic. These efforts were made possible, tolerable, and even desirable by a concerted campaign that involved ongoing environment work and organizational identity work. It is my contention that these supportive efforts are indeed important chapters in the ‘institutional story’ (Suddaby 2010). To more fully account for institutional work designed to effect some institutional outcome, attention must be afforded those intentional efforts—indeed those institutional work practices—that make it possible.

To be sure, the case I analyzed—the field of the armed forces generally, and the Army specifically—has unique characteristics that distinguishes it from others. Moreover, not all

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17 Some distinguishing characteristics of military organizations that warrant acknowledgment are described in Chapter 3.
organizations have the equivalent of Army doctrine, and surely less have in place a ready-made
genre designed to stimulate thinking (as with the TRADOC Pam ‘525’ series). Future efforts
should conduct analyses similar to that reported here in distinctly different contexts to determine
what characteristics of the process and practices I identified may be generalizable, and which
might be specific to my case. Additionally, future research efforts should track a change process
from start to finish to determine what might change across time in the process, why, and with
what consequences.

As a collection of archival sources, the dataset I assembled for this dissertation is limited
and, as I described in Chapter 4, systematically limited. Moreover, it is important to note that my
data do not reveal the situated perceptions of the audiences toward which the institutional work
was oriented. While my data reveal what was communicated, they only rarely reveal why and
with what reception. Moreover, with my focus on institutional work associated with the
development of Army doctrine, I assembled a dataset largely composed of materials produced by
individuals in senior level Army officer ranks. This afforded me limited insight into the
perceptions of and actions taken by others. Lastly, with the level of opposition to the change
process implied in the materials I analyzed, it is likely that some spoke out in support of the
status quo; however, my data do not reveal the means through which they may have resisted,
undermined, or shaped the institutional work practices I observed. Future research efforts will
need to identify and incorporate materials that can address these data limitations.

By focusing only on the Army—one organization within a larger population—I present a
somewhat sterile version of the events that unfolded. My data reveal much in the way of external
institutional work, for example, but little with regard to the Army as influenced by the external
institutional work of others. How, for example, the efforts of other service branches, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, or the industrial sector influenced the Army’s plans, decisions, and action was not given up in my data. Future research would benefit from gathering data from actors throughout the field to expand on the relations that are inherent in institutional fields.

Lastly, while I report here that I did not have insight into the situated perspectives of recipients, recall that my decision to include *Military Review* as a data source was premised on the assumption that the contents of the professional journal would provide insight into both the situated perspectives of its (primarily Army) audience, and its use by Army leaders as a socializing mechanism. In my analysis, I found clear evidence of the latter, but not the former.

While my analysis of the journal’s content revealed much discussion about the means with which the Army should accomplish its ends (a focus on the tactical level of Army operations), there was a remarkable lack of contestation over the new ends that were unique to the post-Cold War era (that is, the emergent strategic orientation of the post-Cold War military). There was general acceptance that emergent post-Cold War missions (such as low-level conflict with non-state actors and peacekeeping operations) were legitimate military endeavors for which the Army should organize and prepare. While it could be that the journal’s target (Army) audience had, by June 1991, largely accepted the unfolding shifts in the strategic orientation of the U.S. military and internalized the need for concomitant organizational development and change, the observations of military scholars and Army leaders mentioned throughout this dissertation suggest otherwise. I explain my reasoning for this below.

*Military Review* is produced by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, an organizational entity whose responsibilities include contributing directly to the development, writing, distribution, and teaching of the Army’s keystone *Operations* manual. While the journal’s mission begins by stating that it “is to provide a forum for the open exchange of ideas
on military affairs,” it concludes with the following: “to support the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms and the Command and General Staff College” (U.S. Army CGSC 1991:n.p.). With a ‘mission’ that includes developing doctrine and doctrine-based education, the Command and General Staff College would undermine its mission if it published and distributed challenges to the doctrinal principles it endorsed (and in turn, the emergent post-Cold War logic they supported). I thus suggest that the lack of contestation in its pages reflects the Army leadership’s management of what, precisely, was open for debate and discussion, and what was not—indeed, an example of institutional work.
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