Chinese Tourists in Taiwan: Tourism and State Territoriality

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Chinese Tourists in Taiwan: Tourism and State Territoriality

by

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A thesis submitted to the

Faculty of the Graduate School of the

University of Colorado in partial fulfillment

of the requirement for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Geography

2012
This thesis entitled:

Chinese Tourists in Taiwan: Tourism and State Territoriality

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The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.

IRB protocol # : 11-0615
ABSTRACT

After years of travel bans and despite an ongoing dispute over sovereignty and territory, Chinese tourists have poured into Taiwan since 2008. In this thesis, I develop an argument, based on theories of governmentality and performativity, that treats borders and territories as dynamic processes rather than places. I use this theory first to argue that tourism should be treated as a technology of state territorialization in general, and then to analyze the spatial politics of tourism between China and Taiwan in particular. I apply this analytical framework to ethnographic data collected during fieldwork in tourist sites in Taiwan in summer 2012. I conclude that tourism is producing multiple sensations of stateness in Taiwan, and exacerbating contradictions between China and Taiwan’s programs of state territorialization.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the National Science Foundation’s EAPSI program for financial support for my fieldwork in summer 2012, and the Institute of Sociology (IOS) at Academia Sinica for hosting me during my stay in Taiwan. Personal thanks are owed to Dr. Mau-Kuei Chang and Director Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao at IOS, and of course to my adviser, Professor Tim Oakes, and thesis committee at the University of Colorado.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

In May 2012, Han Han, China’s most popular blogger, published a post, “Winds of the Pacific”, about his recent trip to Taiwan:

I don’t want to delve into the politics. As a writer from the mainland, I just feel lost. A pervasive feeling of loss. The society I grew up in spent a few decades teaching us to be violent and vengeful, and then a few more decades teaching us to be selfish and greedy. Our parents destroyed our culture, our ethics, our ability to trust, our faith and consensus, but failed to build the utopia that was promised. We may have no choice but to keep doing the same things. As a writer, I have to constantly worry about whether my words will step on some line somewhere. I assume people have ulterior motives when they treat me with warmth. Other than self-survival and competition, we have lost interest in everything else. This is how we have come to define ourselves.

…

Yes, I have to thank Hong Kong and Taiwan, for protecting Chinese civilization. Even when we have the Ritz Carlton and the Peninsula, Gucci and Louis Vuitton, wives of local officials with more money than their leaders, movie budgets 20 or 30 times theirs, the World’s Fair and the Olympics, but, on the streets of Taipei, I didn’t feel any bit of pride. Whatever we have, they already had; whatever we are proud of, their taxpayers will never approve; whatever we should be proud of, we’ve already lost (Han 2012, translated in Yeh 2012).

Despite the disclaimer in the first line, Han Han’s post is nothing if not political. His post may skir the question of Taiwan independence, but he uses Taiwan as a tinted mirror for
what the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could be but is not, or was but is no longer. Filled with anecdotes of the kindness of strangers in Taiwan—the taxi driver who returned a phone that Han Han had dropped in the back seat, or the eyewear store owner who gave his friend a free pair of contact lenses with no ulterior motives—Han Han’s post treats Taiwan not as a renegade province under the thumb of the United States, as do so many nationalist bloggers, or as an exotic tourist destination, but as a rhetorical device for an indirect critique of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) role in the corruption of “Chinese values”.

Han Han’s taxi driver was not just a taxi driver—in the retelling, the cabbie came to represent of the generous spirit of all Taiwanese people. Except, in Han Han’s reading, the driver’s generosity was not so much Taiwanese as it was Chinese, free of the corrupting influences of the CCP. In his mind, Han Han, was not helped by a Taiwanese as much as he was by a more authentic Chinese. The driver’s own feelings about his national identity remain, as far as I know, unreported. And Taiwan’s history as a Japanese colony and US protectorate, and how this may have in part produced the social interactions he so cherished, remain unmentioned in Han Han’s post.

Many Taiwanese newspapers and bloggers picked up Han Han’s post with a mix of pride and bewilderment. In Han Han’s telling, kindness and generosity are presented as explicitly Chinese (zhonghua) values that have been better preserved in Taiwan than in China. Yet Taiwanese blogger Lin Shu-Shu (2012) disputes Han Han’s analysis, suggesting that Taiwan’s current state of high social order, hygiene, and generosity has nothing to do with its purported Chinese-ness. Rather, these pleasant features owe more to Taiwan’s colonial history and later democratization and with it, the free circulation of information. It is owed to a “society of citizens” (gongmin shehui) that practices self-rule (zizhi) and democracy—something China
could perhaps attain but has not yet. Before 1895, writes Lin, when Taiwan was handed over to Japanese colonial authorities, islanders were illiterate, dirty and backwards—just like people in China—and it took until the 1990s for Taiwan to achieve its current level of progress, which owes nothing to its purported Chinese-ness. In fact, Lin might point out that a majority of Taiwanese respondents in public opinion polls do not even identify as Chinese culturally or politically (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese. (Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 2012. http://esc.nccu.edu.tw)
Watching the rise in Taiwanese self-identification and the consolidation of Taiwanese democratic culture, Chien-min Chao observed nearly ten years ago, “The concepts of China (Zhongguo) and Chinese (Zhongguo ren) are being increasingly regarded as irrelevant or even ‘alien’ by the people of Taiwan” (C.-min Chao 2003, 291). While this may be arguably true when it comes to Taiwanese national subjectivity, the concept of China is nothing if not extremely relevant for understanding Taiwan’s unusual sovereign status and unstable territorial definition.

Han Han’s post and his responders make clear that not only is cross-Strait tourism an occasion for recreation, but that stories about simple encounters take on important symbolic value in the context of this ongoing political struggle. Moreover, the trajectory and meanings of such narratives are not determined solely by the political arrangements between state or travel industry elites in Taiwan and the PRC. On its first day of publication, Han Han’s post was read by over 400,000 people and forwarded to at least another 170,000 (Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in San Francisco 2012). Cross-Strait tourism does not require a superstar blogger to provoke widespread discussion about the different cultural values or behaviors of Taiwan and the PRC—in another case, a report on Chinese tourists who carved their names into plants east Taiwan park provoked online protest and depictions of Chinese people as poorly behaved bumpkins overrunning the countryside (Fauna 2012). Importantly, tourism has been not only the subject of such free-wheeling social debates, but also the driver for the establishment of the first cross-Strait quasi-state offices since the founding of the PRC, with Beijing opening a tourism office in Taipei, and Taipei opening an office in Beijing in April 2010 (China Times 2010b).

This growing flow of tourists and diplomatic exchanges between China and Taiwan is taking place against the backdrop of a sovereignty dispute whose roots go back at least a century.
In 1895, China’s Qing imperial administration ceded Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity as part of a war settlement in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Sixteen years later, while Japan colonized and industrialized Taiwan, the Qing Dynasty fell and a new state entity, the Republic of China (ROC), led by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang, or KMT) claimed sovereignty over China. The ROC was soon challenged militarily by the forces of the Japanese imperial army and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, control over Taiwan was transferred from Japan to an ROC military administration with the support of the United States. With the fall of the KMT to the CCP and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the ROC leadership withdrew to Taiwan, where they continued claiming sovereignty over all of China (and even Mongolia) as the Republic of China in exile in Taiwan. Under Chiang Kai-Shek, the KMT implemented a “sinicization” campaign to instill “Chinese” identities in the Taiwanese population in preparation for a reconquering of China with US support, something that never happened.

A military detente prevailed for the next several decades, with bans or strict limits on the movement of people across the Taiwan Strait. With improved official bilateral ties beginning in the 1980s, and new economic opportunities in the PRC, cross-Strait flows of people, goods, and capital across the Strait have been increasing. This has come in the form of investment, family visitation, and tourism, first solely or predominantly flowing from Taiwan to China, and more recently, going in the opposite direction. The former British and Portuguese colonies of Hong Kong and Macau typically served as transit points for visitors, but 2008 marked the beginning of regularly scheduled direct flights between China and Taiwan. Since then, Chinese tourists have rapidly overtaken Japanese to become the largest tourist segment in Taiwan. That
While Taiwan democratized in the 1990s and its leadership has gradually dropped claims to sovereignty over China, the PRC continues to claim Taiwan as part of its territory. Despite the PRC’s denial of Taiwan’s sovereignty, PRC tourists, whatever their feelings and education about Taiwan’s sovereign status, must nonetheless comply with Taiwan’s visa regime and follow its border-crossing procedures when they arrive at Taiwan’s international airport terminals. Even if they may feel they are in a territory that rightly belongs to China, upon arrival in Taiwan, they are confronted with the specter of the “Republic of China”, the name still used in official documents of Taiwan’s state administration, as well as its flag, national anthem, public holidays, and all other symbols of a state the PRC leadership describes as illegitimate.

The strategic deployment of outbound tourism, argues Arlt (2006), is part of China’s foreign policy apparatus. Nyíri (2006) has likewise argued that PRC state agents use tourism and tourist sites to articulate hegemonic claims about cultural identity and state authority, even beyond China’s borders. If this is true, then tourism to Taiwan should be no exception. Yet, it remains to be seen exactly how this tourism may be serving China’s claims to sovereignty over Taiwan, or possibly even producing unintended effects of alienation.

Though mediated by state and market forces, the narratives of tourists and toured seem to be taking on political meanings or trajectories of their own, potentially reconfiguring the modes in which Taiwanese and Chinese subjects engage with each other. What would otherwise be (extra)ordinary encounters between a tourist and the toured thus become animated by, and
may themselves animate incompatible nationalisms. With this may come reimaginations of the
cultural character and extent of the territories claimed to belong to Taiwan or the PRC.

Han Han is one of several million PRC citizens who have toured Taiwan in the last
several years. While more typical PRC tourists in Taiwan don’t have the opportunity to shake
hands with Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, as did Han Han, or have their reflections read by
millions, they are (re)forming political opinions about the relationship between the PRC and
Taiwan. If we accept Anderson’s (2006) definition of the nation as an imagined community, the
contours of these imagined communities may very well be shifting through the practice of
tourism. Shifting with it may be claims of attachment to or sovereignty over these incompatibly
imagined territories.

While cross-Strait tourism may seem an extraordinary case, it is precisely its
extraordinariness that makes it valuable for a discussion of the territorial politics of tourism in
general. So much of the modern interstate system is taken for granted in the literature of tourism
that the study of an extraordinary situation may uncover what, through repetition, has come to
seem ordinary—a world split into nation-states with mutually exclusive territories, a global
mobility regime of visas and passports, and so on—but is in fact a quite peculiar and contingent
configuration of space and bodies. This configuration, I suggest, is performed and transformed
by the practice of tourism.

This thesis will use the case of cross-Strait Taiwan to argue that tourism should be
viewed as a technology of state territorialization. I take as my starting point that these subjects
and objects—tourists, states and nations, borders and territory—have no essential existence.
They emerge discursively and are recognized and reconfigured through social practice. I treat the
state not as an autonomous or unitary entity and territory not as a place, but rather as processes of which tourism may play a constitutive part.

Millions of tourists cross borders every year. Passports in hand, these tourists act as the citizen-subjects of the various nation-states of the world. They travel for any number of reasons. When they cross borders from their own country into another and then return home, they, I suggest, are not only carrying memories and souvenirs—they, along with border agents and airlines, travel agents and tour operators, are performing, indeed enacting, the borders that they are crossing and the state territories that they are traversing. This process is certainly not unique to China and Taiwan, but the controversy of this case should help to clarify the high political stakes of tourism more broadly, as well as the particular touristic practices that are constitutive of state territorialization.

Territorial and geographic assumptions about the nation-state permeate the academic and industrial discourses of tourism: thus we have the fundamental divisions of domestic tourism versus international tourism, and inbound versus outbound tourism, produced and reproduced in scholarship and state and industry practice. Such a division presupposes a shared understanding of fixed borders and exclusive state territory, a peculiar and historically contingent conception of geography. As Wainwright and Robertson (2003) write, “…[territoriality] is something materialized through socio-spatial practices that separate ‘us’ from ‘others’. The concept of exclusive state territory, where territory is the coordinate space occupied by a nation-state, is fundamental to the way modernity has been ‘worlded’ – in pieces, with each piece a part of one or another nation-state’s territory.” This effect is manifested through borders, which “comprise the basic element in the construction of territories and the practice of territoriality” (Paasi 2003, 112). But as I will argue, borders are not simply lines on the map, or state institutions or
practices that are manifested or enacted in specific sites, but also “processes that exist in socio-cultural action and discourses” (Paasi 1999).

I suggest that tourism should be construed as one such “bordering” process, and therefore an instrument or technology of state territorialization. Cross-Strait tourism, with its flows of people, goods, and capital through contested and blurred borders, provides a compelling case for such research. This thesis is therefore intended in general to explore how tourism can function as a technology of state territorialization, and in particular to build a conceptual framework required for future empirical study of this process in Taiwan. While this discussion is based primarily on theoretical and historical analysis, rather than empirical research, pilot fieldwork undertaken in Taiwan summer 2012 informs the conclusion to the thesis.

Tourism has been researched from a variety of academic fields, including geography (Oakes 1998; Cartier and Lew 2005), anthropology (Graburn 1983; V. L. Smith 1977), and sociology (MacCannell 1976), and more recently political science (e.g. Richter 1983; Matthews and Richter 1991). Tourism’s place-making power has received extensive attention, especially in the case of heritage sites (Nuryanti 1996; Cartier and Lew 2005; Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge 2000; Johnson 1999; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998). Relationships between tourism and borders have also been explored by scholars, particularly with attention to how tourism flows may be enhanced or impeded by the presence of a border (Timothy 2004; Timothy 1995), but little to nothing has been written about tourism’s more fundamental role as a technology of state territorialization. This thesis is intended to open such a discussion.

In order to rigorously investigate tourism’s heretofore unexplored role in state territorialization, I will first endeavor to provide a sufficiently robust theoretical account of the
state, one that draws particularly from Foucault. This will include a review of Foucault’s work on governmentality, as well recent theoretical developments regarding the state itself, sovereignty, territoriality, and borders, and tourism’s underexamined relationship with these concepts and practices.

Before presenting a political geography of tourism, or examining the specific case of China and Taiwan, it would be best to suggest a definition of tourism adequate for the scope of this thesis. While academic researchers, industry actors, and governmental agencies may differ in their specific understandings, this paper adopts the International Union of Tourism Organization’s (IUTO) broad definition of a tourist as “any person person visiting a country, region or place other than that in which he or she has their usual place of residence” (Williams 1998). This is similar to but more generalized than Smith’s (1977, 2) definition of a tourist as a “temporarily leisured person who voluntarily visits a place away from home for the purpose of experiencing a change”. Either of these definitions is adequate for the case of Chinese people who are traveling to Taiwan for primarily non-business purposes.

Tourism research has not been the exclusive domain of any particular discipline. While geographers have been researching tourism at least since the 1920s, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and even economists have also contributed to the field. Inter-disciplinary collaboration and the needs of industry have led to the establishment of industry training-focused research and educational centers, and schools of leisure and hospitality management have proliferated throughout academia. Meanwhile, theoretical discussions of tourism have developed in multiple directions, leading some researchers to complain about a lack of theoretical coherence (Holden 2005) or communication between disciplines (Coles, Hall, and Duval 2006).
At least until the 1980s, if not later, a number of scholars complained that their peers found tourism research frivolous, an excuse for an academic junket, and not worthy of serious study (Richter 1983). However, following major contributions that situated tourism in wider discussions of social change (MacCannell 1976; Urry 2002; Rojek 2005; Graburn 1983), tourism arguably came into its own as both a worthwhile object for study in its own right, and as a lens with which to analyze other sociocultural phenomena in ways that are unbound to traditional academic divisions. Such phenomena include but are not limited to leisure culture and mobility.

Indeed, there has been a call for a “post-disciplinary” approach in which “epistemological space exists within studies of tourism for post-disciplinary approaches based on even greater flexibility, plurality, synthesis and synergy by abandoning the shackles of disciplinary policing” (Coles, Hall, and Duval 2006, 312). It is in this spirit that I wish to advance the discussion within and beyond the discipline of geography, and treat tourism as a political practice and process that is constitutive of and even fundamental to state territorialization.

The state politics of tourism remain understudied and undertheorized within geography and elsewhere. Despite increasing scholarly interest in tourism geographies (Gibson 2009) and territory/territoriality (Brighenti 2010; Elden 2010), there has been little work explicitly linking these two realms of inquiry. Where tourism scholars have directly addressed the interstate politics of tourism, they usually treat as an instrument of reconciliation (Guo et al. 2006) or peace-promotion (Jafari 1989), rather than as a basic technology of modern state territorialization. State territorialization programs, directed or mediated by actors invoking the state to achieve territorial goals and extend or consolidate state power, have rarely been explored in the tourism
literature. This thesis is intended to correct this gap, both with a theoretical re-consideration of the politics of tourism, and an empirical study of cross-Strait tourism.

The outline of this thesis is as follows: Following this introduction, Chapter Two will develop fundamental theoretical concepts based on a review of the academic literature regarding state territoriality, sovereignty, borders, the spatiality of the modern state, and globalization. My treatment of the state will draw particularly from Foucault’s account of governmentality, Mitchell’s description of the state as a “structural effect”, and Painter’s definition of the state as an “imagined collective actor” (Painter 2006). This chapter will specify exactly what is meant by a technology of state territorialization, and provide the theoretical framework necessary for treating tourism as such a technology.

Chapter Three, building on the political theory of Chapter Two, will introduce the notion of performativity as a way to link tourism with the processes of state territorialization. This will include a review of past work on migration and borders and an extension of such scholarship’s insights to the field of tourism. This chapter will explore how the “global mobility regime” (Salter 2006), with its passports and visas, functions as a technology for governing mobility. The chapter will conclude by looking at what past research about the interstate politics of tourism, including tourism in conflicted or contested areas such as the Koreas, may have to tell us about the cross-Strait case.

Chapter Four will provide the historical background necessary to understand the recent rapid rise of Chinese tourism to Taiwan. I will first describe Taiwan’s unique sovereign and territorial status. This will include a review of Taiwan’s transformation from a Chinese-claimed territory to a Japanese colony to the putative base of the Republic of China in exile, to its current
manifestation as a de facto, if not de jure, independent state. While Taiwan’s sovereign status will be clearly distinguished from that of Hong Kong and Macau, I will discuss scholarly treatments of Taiwan as part of “Greater China” or a “Chinese axis”. Following this discussion, I will review the history of Chinese tourism to Taiwan, and explore tourism’s past and present instrumentality for Chinese foreign policy.

Chapter Five applies my theorization of state territorialization and performativity to ethnographic data and media reports collected during fieldwork in Taiwan in summer 2012. Based on interviews with PRC tourists and tour guides, as well as Taiwanese guides, vendors, and other actors in the area of cross-Strait tourism, it explores the productions of multiple, ambiguous sensations of stateness within Taiwan, the touristic performance of state territory, and tourism’s exacerbation of political contradictions between the state territorialization programs of Taiwan and the PRC.

The conclusion will re-examine how the concepts of state territorialization and tourist performativity developed in this thesis illuminate the particular case of cross-Strait tourism, and suggest what Chinese tourism in Taiwan may tell us about tourism’s role as a technology of state territorialization in general. The conclusion ends with an agenda for future research.
Chapter 2

Technologies of state territorialization

What makes cross-Strait relations so compelling is that they challenges the neatness and exclusivity of borders, state territory and sovereignty in the modern inter-state system. What makes cross-Strait tourism so compelling is that it is a timely chance to observe tourism’s role as a technology of government and an instrument of high-stakes foreign policy. But to understand exactly why this matters, it is necessary first to explore the historical development and conceptual underpinnings of the modern inter-state system’s “peculiar and historically unique configuration of territorial space” (Ruggie 1993, 144), before presenting tourism as a technology of state territorialization.

To explore tourism’s role as a technology of state territorialization for China and Taiwan, I will first of course have to address what I mean by a technology of state territorialization. While reticent to jump from supposed universals to particulars, from “the State” to “China” and “Taiwan” (entities whose very statehood, territory, and borders are at issue), I
will begin this chapter by providing a treatment of state territorialization. To do this, I will be adopting a primarily Foucauldian “analytics of government” (Lemke 2007; Rose and Miller 1992), one that does not treat the state as an a priori unitary subject with autonomous powers or necessary or timeless functions. I rather look instead to ensembles of relations and practices of government. These will include those from which the effect or idea of a state emerges and is then appropriated and deployed by heterogenous individuals who invoke the state as an imagined collective actor (Painter 2006). I choose this approach both because I find it more specific about the past and present, because it clarifies the relevance of ethnographic research of everyday “micro-powers” for understanding “macro-powers” like those attributed to the state, and because it is far more appropriate to the ambiguity and complexity of stateness in a territory as contested as Taiwan. Any theoretical position—be it that of mainstream international relations, structural Marxism, or otherwise—that takes the coherence and unity of the state for granted, or attempts to reduce the structure or motivation of its constituents to competing economic interests will miss the messiness, complexity, and ambiguity of Taiwan’s stateness. Therefore, rather than taking the state for granted as an a priori entity, or explaining it away with arguments of economic determinism, I am more interested in the practices and representations that mutually constitute it and its subjects.

Likewise, I will make the case for treating state territory not as a neutral container of sterile space, but rather as a dynamic set of sociospatial processes. This argument will be followed by a discussion of recent challenges to and possible changes to state territorial sovereignty in the modern interstate system. A treatment of borders as the basic constitutive element of state territory will close the chapter.
2.1 Governmentalities and the State

“…I do, I want to, I must do without a theory of the state, as one can and must forgo an indigestible meal,” said Foucault in his *The Birth of Biopolitics* lecture series (Foucault 2008, 76-77). If only it was so easy. Of course, Foucault was not attempting in his analyses to “cancel the presence and the effect of state mechanisms” (77), nor deny histories of state violence, regulation, and so on. Foucault proposed instead to view the state through the lens of “governmentalities”, mentalities or modes of government, “the way[s] in which one conducts the conduct of men [sic]” (186). “Government” here refers to relations and apparatuses of power broader than those typically attributed to the state. This use of “government” is an older, pre-18th century, more general sense of the word, which referred broadly to the management of one’s self, one’s family, the spiritual world, and other spheres of action (88-9).

Foucault turned the analysis from one that treats the state as a real entity, with its own essence and capacity to act autonomously, to one that allows a more precise look at the different practices, both discursive and material, that allow various powers and apparatuses of regulation, discipline, security, surveillance, and care to be attributed to something called the “state”. Thus, instead of the “state’s takeover of society”, we rather have the “governmentalization’ of the state” (2009, 109). As clarified by Rose and Miller (2010, 275):

…[t]he question is no longer one of accounting for government in terms of ‘the power of the State’, but of ascertaining how, and to what extent, the state is articulated into the activity of government: what relations are established between political and other authorities; what funds, forces, persons, knowledge or legitimacy are utilised; and by means of what devices and techniques are these different tactics made operable.
Foucault noted that he was not suggesting that various “institutions” or “elements” now attributed to the state, such as the military, or courts, or taxation, did not exist prior to the emergence of the state, but that the “the state” may be usefully approached as a “schema of intelligibility for a whole set of already established institutions, a whole set of given realities” (Foucault 2009, 286).

In addition to the historical and theoretical precision suggested by this argument, there is an additional methodological reason for shifting the scale of analysis from the state to government and governmentalities: The broadening of the lens to include “micro-powers” in addition to “macro-powers”, suggested Foucault, should afford an analytical approach as applicable for the management of mental patients as for debating economic policy. “[T]he analysis of micro-powers is not a question of scale, and it is not a question of a sector, it is a question of a point of view” (186).

How to put this proposed point of view to work? As Lemke notes, “Foucault's 'genealogy of governmentality' is more of a fragmentary sketch than an elaborated theory, and most of it is to be found in lectures that were never prepared for publication” (Lemke 2007, 45). Rose and Miller provide a schematic framework for Foucault’s proposal, distinguishing between political rationalities—moral, epistemological, and idiomatic ways of imagining the political that have a kind of “temporary durability”—and programs and technologies of government:

Problematics of government may be analyzed, first of all, in terms of their political rationalities, the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors… problematics of government should also be analyzed in terms of their governmental technologies, the complex of mundane
programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions. Through an analysis of the intricate inter-dependencies between political rationalities and governmental technologies, we can begin to understand the multiple and delicate networks that connect the lives of individuals, groups and organizations to the aspirations of authorities in the advanced liberal democracies of the present. (2010, 274).

Connecting political rationalities and governmental technologies are programs of government. If government is considered as a “problematizing activity”, one in which problems of government are identified and solutions pursued, the programmatic is “the realm of designs” put forward by various actors “that seek to configure specific locales and relations in ways thought desirable” (279). The relation between political rationalities and programs of government is not one of derivation or deduction—a consideration of the complexity, diversity, and multiplicity of various social actors and their often contradictory programs should make it clear why this is so. Rather, Rose and Miller suggest the relation is one of “translation—both a movement from one space to another, and an expression of a particular concern in another modality” (279). As an example, they mention the translatability between American political cultural and economic management—the ways in which the political rationalities of personal freedom and initiative could be translated to the economic problem of modern corporate management. In this, it should be noted that programs are not epistemologically neutral, they “lay claim to a certain knowledge of the sphere or problem to be addressed…” (280), drawing upon certain fields of expert knowledge and calculation. Moreover, programs imply a certain faith that the identified problem can be solved, that the objects of government can in fact be governed.

Technologies of government refer to those mechanisms by which different forces attempt to realize or instantiate programs of government:
Government is a domain of strategies, techniques and procedures through which different forces seek to render programmes operable, and by means of which a multitude of connections are established between the aspirations of authorities and the activities of individuals and groups. These heterogeneous mechanisms we term technologies of government. It is through technologies that political rationalities and the programmes of government that articulate them become capable of deployment. (281).

These technologies often function at the level of the everyday, the “mundane”, the “prosaic” (Painter 2006). They are the census and survey, schools and maps, “the standardisation of systems for training and the inculcation of habits; the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies; building designs and architectural forms – the list is heterogeneous and in principle unlimited” (Rose and Miller 2010, 281). They occur at the level of the “micro-physics of power” (Foucault 2006; Foucault 2008; Foucault 2009; Lemke 2007; Elden 2007). They need not act in concert—in fact, different technologies of government may impinge on each other, or destabilize each other’s programs.

Using this language, I will argue later how tourism—itself managed through its own technologies or devices such as passports, visas, and border stations—can be usefully treated as a technology of government, a mechanism to manage mobility, a tool even of foreign policy, i.e. to achieve the shifting and possibly mutually contradictory governmental programs of those heterogenous individuals collectively referred to as the state.

To get there, I have now to provide a definition of the state adequate for my argument. Foucault, for his part, having displaced the state as the scale of analysis in favor of government and governmentalities, concluded that the state should be seen as “nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” (2008, 77). Borrowing from Foucault and making a somewhat similar point, Mitchell has suggested that the state has no material reality,
should not be treated as separate from society, and would better be viewed as a “structural effect”:

That is to say, it should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist... The state should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society (1991, 94–5).

While I will not be treating the state as anything real, material, or unitary, there is no question that the powers attributed to the state are quite real, or that the actors drawing on it as a resource are not calling on a powerful idea. Reconciling the state’s elusiveness as an object of analysis with its apparent power presents some conceptual and definitional difficulties. Abrams sees the state as “itself the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is” (1988, 82). His solution is to abandon the study of the state as a real entity and rather study it as an idea used by individuals and institutions acting in its name. Putting Mitchell and Abrams together, Painter offers the following definition of the state as an imagined collective actor. It is in this sense that I will be referring to the state, whether PRC, ROC, Taiwan, US, or otherwise, in this thesis:

Building on Mitchell’s and Abrams’ interpretations, it makes sense to define ‘the state’ as an imagined collective actor in whose name individuals are interpellated (implicitly or explicitly) as citizens or subjects, aliens or foreigners, and which is imagined as the source of central political authority for a national territory. The use of ‘imagined’ here does not mean that relationships and processes involved are illusory: social imaginaries can have very real effects. Moreover, the practices, mechanisms and institutions through which processes of interpellation take place are very real. (Painter 2006, 758)

Painter elaborates this definition using the passport in a very travel-appropriate analogy:

When I apply for a passport identifying me as a citizen of a state, the passport, the office and the officials that issue it, and the border post through which it allows
me to pass all exist. However, the state in whose name they function is neither an aggregation of these elements, nor a separate reality behind them, but a symbolic resource on which they draw to produce their effects. (Painter 2006, 758)

This treatment of the state, I hope, will be the most productive approach for a study of practices attributed to it, without reifying its actual existence. It implies that studies of the practices and products of the foreign policy elite, the border guard, and the passport holder are all essential for understanding state technologies for the control of mobility in general and tourism in particular.

2.2 Territoriality and the modern interstate system

The passport holder in general is of course not moving in a space-less world. Having defined the state in a way that directs our focus to the practices that invoke its name and give rise to state effects while acknowledging the state’s power as an idea, it is time to explore the state’s connection with its territory, to look at how forces of government operate in, create, and maintain spaces defined as sovereign territory. How has space come to be imagined and be continually (re)configured as state territories—bounded, mutually exclusive domains of sovereign power?

As valuable as I hope the approach laid out above is for an account of the history and behavior of what has collectively been imagined as the modern state, Foucault’s formulation is not without peril when applied to territory. Despite the title of his lecture series, Security, Territory, and Population, Foucault made it clear early in the course that he was really more interested in his “history of ‘governmentality’” than in the three keywords of the title (2009, 108). In his narrative of the development of our modern governmentality that was “discovered” (109)
in the 18th century and that persists to the present-day, Foucault explicitly de-emphasized “territory” in favor of “population”.

Foucault begins his Euro-centric history of governmentality with an account of medieval conceptions of statecraft, as exemplified by Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, which posits a monarch not part of, but external and transcendent to his principality, whose primary concern is maintaining control over a principality defined in terms of a given bounded space in which his sovereignty prevails. In this conception, the primary object of rule is the territory itself, and secondarily the things and people within this territorial container. But Foucault claims that with the development of new political rationalities in the 16th and 17th centuries, the target of sovereign power changed from territory to things, masses of people, a new entity called a “population”. This “population”, irreducible to the family which is now only an element and instrument of it, needed to be managed by new “arts of government”, which later became reformulated as “political economy”. These arts of government are not merely the techniques used by the sovereign to maintain control over a territory to which he is external, as in the medieval or Machiavellian conception, but include calculative tactics and strategies for regulating and promoting the well-being of the population, and through the development and deployment of “apparatuses of security”, allowing for the circulation of people and goods within the sovereign’s domain of influence. This is all fine and well, and consistent enough with the schema outlined above, but what purchase does it give to territory, which still seems intrinsic to the way we still imagine our world, and yet is displaced in Foucault’s account? As Elden notes, “what is striking is how territory itself is marginalized in Foucault’s telling of the story… [but still] Foucault is providing an important way to understand the relation between governmental
practices and territory… The same kinds of mechanisms that Foucault looks at in relation to population are used to understand and control territory” (2007, 577).

Elden emphasizes “calculation” as the key link between political rationalities and governmental technologies of population and territory, as does Hannah (2009), but here I would rather suggest that, as usual, Foucault’s insight lies in his emphasis on process, on relation, on practice, on the “the reciprocal constitution of power techniques and forms of knowledge and of regimes of representation and modes of intervention” (Lemke 2007, 44). Certainly, measurement of land, compilation of statistics, and so on, are key mechanisms in what I will refer to as “state territorialization”, but an over-emphasis on calculation threatens to obscure other features of this process.

Territory remains a key component of attempts to theorize the state. Some have attempted to treat it as a bounded “power container” (Giddens 1985), or even as a power container, wealth container, and cultural container, serving different functions at different times, depending on the stakes and aims of state elites (Taylor 1995). Others have argued that the state is a real “arena, a place” in which autonomous powers reside, (Mann 1984; see also Murphy 1990). While I disagree with such container-style approaches that threaten to reify the state, all of these attempts do reveal the necessity of a robust account of territory. But instead of treating territory as a given space that a (reified) state entity simply encloses, I suggest that treating territory as a process—dynamic, shifting, multiple, relational—will allow for more conceptual rigor, and that an ethnography of territory as a living practice is an appropriate methodology for its study.
Elden’s general gloss serves as a useful starting point for exploring territory as a concept and set of practices: “Territory is more than merely land, but a rendering of the emergent concept of ‘space’ as a political category: owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered, and controlled” (2007, 579). I will use *state territorialization* to refer specifically to those practices and processes by which space is rendered or configured as belonging to, bounded by, and subject to the sovereignty of that collective actor imagined as a particular state.

To specify and contextualize this concept of state territorialization through the lens of shifting governmentalities, it is now apropos to briefly trace the development of the modern interstate system, specifically its construction and division of space into (nation-)state territories, which is a relatively new practice. As put by Ruggie (1993, 144), “[T]he central attribute of modernity in international politics has been a peculiar and historically unique configuration of territorial space”; that is, the modern interstate system. This concords with Hobsbawn’s argument that, “The basic characteristic of the modern-nation state and everything connected with it is its modernism” (1990, 14) and Gellner’s assertion that, “It is modernity which produces nationalism and it is nationalism which engenders the nation, and not the other way round” (1983, 55).

The establishment of the modern interstate system is typically traced to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, although Osiander (2001) has argued that other forms of sovereign statehood existed earlier outside of Europe, and that the actual establishment of Europeans institutions and sovereignty along Westphalian lines arguably occurred much later, in the 19th and 20th centuries. Established in order to put an end to religious warfare (the Thirty Years War) that had resulted in the deaths of a third of the European population, the Treaty of Westphalia established a system of separate sovereign states intended to replace Europe’s previously overlapping political
jurisdictions. This reconceptualization, in principle, split Europe into exclusive state territories, with absolute power concentrated in the hands of monarchs, although inviolable sovereignty was not necessarily widely practiced (Krasner 1988).

This modern configuration was reciprocally constituted along with new, even “revolutionary” (Philpott 2001) rationalities of state sovereignty and territoriality, which both enabled and were enabled by the emergence of the modern state. Apart from concurrent political developments (peace, conflict, revolution, democratization, or otherwise), these modern governmentalities were also of course predicated on the conceptualization of space as calculable and divisible into discrete units (Brenner and Elden 2009; Elden 2007).

The transfer of sovereign power and territorial jurisdiction from the monarch to the “people”, and the equation of state with nation and people occurred later with democratization in Europe in general (Hobsbawm 1990), and arguably the French Revolution in particular (Keitner 2000; Kolossov and O’Loughlin 1998), after which “the idea of a nation as a popular political entity possessing a state entered world politics” (Flint and Taylor 2007, 161). The nation was born, and with it, the ties between culture and land, ethnie and territory.

The idea that every nation possesses the right to its own state—the modern “principle of nationality”, in Hobsbawm’s terms—connects nation with state. But what constitutes the nation? Is it a pre-existing, timeless, ancient cultural unit—as the so-called primordialist position would maintain (A. D. Smith 1986), or an “imagined community” (Anderson 2006), produced and exported with the tools of “print-capitalism”? Is it a product of elites promoted for the development of industrial capitalism (Gellner 1996), or an accretion of ethnic and cultural
identities and memories that have been linked with political purpose (A. D. Smith 1986)? And can tourism contribute to nationalism and in part constitute the nation?

Though I plan to explore the last question in more detail after collecting empirical data in China and Taiwan, I take no strong side in the debates of the previous questions, apart from distancing myself from a primordialist position. I rather sympathize with Yiftachel (2002), who has suggested that grand theories that attempt to account for all forms of nationalism, such as those of Anderson, Gellner, and Smith, are likely to prove inadequate for all cases. His work on Israel/Palestine has demonstrated that it is not only possible for a nation to claim territory after developing its own ethnic or cultural identity, but there are cases where “territory acts as the kernel of the nation”. In such cases, “the where dominates the when as a center of ethno-national politics, cultural production and collective mobilization” (Yiftachel 2002, 243, his emphasis). With good evidence that “[post-1990] Taiwanese identity and citizenship… [has been] based on affiliation—those who lived in Taiwan—rather than essence—those who had Taiwanese origins” (Callahan 2004, 203), Taiwan may well turn out to be another case where territory may be at least as important a driver of nationalism as shared cultural memory or identity.

2.3 State sovereignty and globalization

The claim of states over territory has proven to be an effective and persistent tool for the assertion of control over space (Ruggie 1993; Kratochwil 1986; Taylor 1994), but territory and sovereignty are not necessarily conceptually tied to the existence of the state. Sovereignty itself is best examined following an analytic disaggregation. First, to distinguish between
sovereignty and state territory: Sovereignty has typically referred to the authority exerted by a “sovereign” power (monarchs, emperors, populations of nation-states, religious leaders) over a given space or people. Sovereignty does not necessarily require territory. For example, religious leaders such as the Pope have had putatively absolute authority or sovereignty over subjects in jurisdictions defined not by territory, but by religious community or personal affiliation.

The rise of the modern state, along with the modern interstate system resulted in a conceptual transformation and (re)territorialization of sovereignty into a new interstate system, which (in principle if not in practice) required the mutual recognition of sovereign power over populations that were territorially split into exclusive units of calculable territory. The state was not imagined to exist a priori, but emerged along with the interstate system—in Agnew’s words, “A state emerges and is recognized as such within a set of relationships that define the rules for what is and what is not a ‘state’” (Agnew 2005, 440). In the Westphalian legal formulation of sovereign states, a sovereign was said to have “supreme authority” (Morgenthau 1948, as cited in Rudolph 2005) over domestic affairs, and no authority over affairs in external territories.

At least, that is how Westphalian sovereignty is “supposed” to work. “Classic” sovereignty (Agnew 2005), which assumes that state institutions have absolute authority within their claimed territorial borders and are not subject to interference from outside states, has rarely (if ever) been practiced (Krasner 1999). Krasner, who has caustically referred to state sovereignty as “organized hypocrisy” (1999), has persuasively argued that rather than treating state sovereignty as a unified, singular concept, it would be more productive to distinguish between multiple forms of state sovereignty. Krasner’s typology includes four classes: Westphalian, domestic, interdependence, and international legal. Domestic sovereignty refers to the ability for state actors to exert authority within their claimed territory, while Westphalian
sovereignty refers to freedom from interference by external states in a state’s domestic affairs. Interdependence sovereignty refers to shared responsibility over mutual borders, while international legal sovereignty refers to a state’s position and power in an international legal system. More simply, Taylor (1994) distinguishes between inward-looking and outward-looking sovereignty. Putting these two different typologies together, Krasner’s domestic sovereignty would match Taylor’s inward looking sovereignty (or “internal”; Steinberg 2009)), while the three other classes would fall under the super-category of external sovereignty. These typologies will be useful later when considering the PRC’s claims to sovereignty over Taiwan, and Taiwan’s own status.

Contingent analyses of sovereignty in “exceptional” cases have already contributed to innovative conceptualizations about the connections between sovereignty and territory, and the flexibility, malleability, and slipperiness of these ideas and practices. For example, McConnell’s provocative account (2009) of the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGiE) in India argues that the TGiE performs some state functions—such as administration and public welfare—within spaces like Dharamsala that are internationally recognized as within India’s sovereign territory, while claiming to perform other state functions, including diplomacy and symbolic projection of power, for territory over which it has no administrative control (the “Tibetan Autonomous Region”, occupied and administered by China). To account for this, she proposes the idea of “displaced sovereignty”, suggesting that “the idea of displacement breaks down the assumed correlation of sovereignty with a single bounded territory, yet does not eschew the link between sovereignty and territory altogether” (348-9). Such an idea may ultimately find traction in cases beyond Tibet.

Going farther than McConnell, and recognizing, as did Krasner, that different state actors use different strategies of sovereignty for different aims at different times, Agnew (2005)
has argued that “de jure” (legal) sovereignty is a meaningless and confused concept, that “effective sovereignty” or “de facto sovereignty is all there is” (437). Disconnecting sovereignty from territory, Agnew notes that “effective sovereignty is not necessarily predicated on and defined by the strict and fixed territorial boundaries of individual states” (2005, 438). Syria’s influence in Lebanon, or the US’ use of Cuba’s Guantanamo Bay for military detention are just two of the several recent historical examples of contested, mixed, or shared sovereignty deployed in his argument.

To specify these strategies, and to emphasize their flexible and opportunistic use by states, Agnew (2005) has proposed the term, “sovereignty regimes” and listed four possible configurations. These include the “classic” regime (e.g., as used by contemporary China, although Agnew oddly overlooks the mixed sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macau), “globalist” (e.g. the US), imperialist (e.g. “Latin America”, passively), and “integrative” sovereignty regimes (e.g. the EU). While his choice of examples may be over-determined by the later part of his article, which is an application of his theory to national currency policies, the concept of flexible sovereignty regimes should, like Krasner’s typology of sovereignty, prove useful for a contextual discussion of Taiwan’s sovereign status and state practices vis-a-vis China.

Indeed, Chengxin Pan (2010) has suggested that the “Taiwan conundrum” is precisely due to a “cross-Strait normative convergence on the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty”, that is, the “classic” sovereignty regime referred to by Agnew. Wu (2007) has argued that the PRC’s only possible claim to Taiwan uses the arguments of Westphalian sovereignty—freedom from external meddling in a state’s domestic affairs—but only if one accepts that Taiwan falls within PRC borders. Yet, the PRC has shown conceptual and practical flexibility in the nominal sovereignty and administration of Hong Kong and Macau, and official PRC foreign policy
publications have offered a similar multiple sovereignty-type arrangement for Taiwan (Callahan 2004).

The case of Taiwan and China is a prime example of why rather than staying stuck with a singular concept of state territoriality or sovereignty, scholars if not states should look for multiple, potentially overlapping forms of sovereignty and non-sovereignty, or even “graduated sovereignty” (Ong 1999). This accords with McConnell observation of and call for a turn towards “a more flexible approach…with sovereignty posited as labile, divisible…” (2009, 350).

Scholars have long suggested that ruptures of the Westphalian model of state sovereignty have been accelerating in an age of globalization. Challenges to the structure and stability of the modern interstate system were observed by Herz (1957) following World War Two, the establishment of NATO and the Soviet Bloc, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Herz speculated that the territorial state may be in practical decline as the possibility of total mutual annihilation rendered the nation-state less autonomous, and led to the emergence of transnational military and economic alliances. One possible “radical” response to this “condition of permeability” (491) would be the institution of a global rule from a fixed center as the only way to guarantee the security of any nation-state.

Herz’s pioneering work has been described as a “locus classicus” by John Agnew (1994), who famously argued that scholars of international relations had fallen into a “territorial trap”, in which they made three unwarranted assumptions: that states were fixed units of sovereign space, were clearly divisible into foreign and domestic poles, and served as containers of society. Both heeding his call, and responding to other scholarship about historical processes of globalization, further challenges to “territorial trap”-type thinking were produced by scholars
from a variety of disciplines who argued that the territorial sovereignty of the modern nation-state was being replaced by new territorial configurations in a borderless world of “flows”.

The rise and influence of powerful multinational corporations, which operate across borders and at scales from the local to the national to the transnational, caused some scholars to suggest that state-territorial space was being obliterated by capital. One of the most notorious examples comes from Ohmae, who wrote in 1995 that, “Put simply, in terms of real flows of economic activity, nation-states have already lost their role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy of today’s ‘borderless world’” (11), but such work was prefigured by a variety of postmodern scholars (Harvey 2000; Jameson 1991). However triumphant and premature Ohmae’s pronouncement may have been, challenges to state-centric thinking have been described as the “unifying theme of contemporary globalization research” (Brenner 1999, 40), which emerged along with a postmodern turn in social and political theory (Ruggie 1993).

Further challenges to the supposed territorial integrity and exclusivity of the modern nation-state have been observed with the rise of supranational organizations such as the EU and ASEAN (Brenner 1999), and the “resurgence of security-oriented geopolitics” following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Falk 2002, 311).

Facts “on the ground”, however, do not indicate that the state, here still treated as an imagined collective actor, has simply disappeared in the face of globalization. In some cases, new states have even formed following eruptions of ethnic nationalism in the Balkans and elsewhere. In fact, Kolossov and O’Loughlin have argued, using a world-system theoretical perspective, that the demise of states in the face of globalization would essentially be an impossibly paradoxical outcome:
…globalization will never lead to a ‘spaceless’ world, or to a world without national boundaries. On the contrary, globalization depends on the partition of space between states, and to the increasing extent, between regions and cities, because capital can only circulate between different legal spaces created within the states and/or regions and with the support of their guarantees. (1998, 261).

Fully addressing this long ongoing debate is beyond the scope of this thesis, but in sum, I suggest that instead of fooling us into prematurely bidding goodbye to the idea or practices of state sovereignty, globalization research should instead prompt us to reconsider it.

As put by Brenner:

[T]he effort to escape the “territorial trap” of state-centrism does not entail a denial of the state's continued relevance as a major geographical locus of social power, but rather a rethinking of the meaning of both state territoriality and political space in an era of intensified globalization. (1999, 41)

Therefore, rather than seeing the disappearance of the nation-state as an idea or set of practices, we are witnessing reconfigurations and reinterpretations of it. As much as my thesis is arguing against reifying the state or centering it in our analyses, the power wielded by actors that invoke its name shows no sign of withering. Even if we do not take it seriously as a unitary, autonomous subject, the state as collectively imagined and practiced still remains an important target of analysis.

The relevance of the state in territorial disputes is made plainly obvious by PRC foreign policy elites’ perpetual invocation of Westphalian sovereignty as a justification for their claims to Taiwan. Moreover, assuming this “intensified globalization” is in fact occurring, the PRC and Taiwan, with both their immense two-way capital flows and global economic significance, form a prime case for a study of the interplay of geo-economic and geo-political forces in processes of state territorialization.
2.4 Borders as processes, everywhere

“The activity of drawing boundaries, while in many cases implicit and even invisible, is the constitutive process of territorialization.” (Brighenti 2010, 61)

Borders are typically treated as fundamental components of the modern world of sovereign territorial states, demarcating where the territory of one state begins and another ends. However, borders are not simply lines on the map that serve to bound territories but are also “processes that exist in socio-cultural action and discourses” (Paasi 1999). Importantly, and however counter-intuitive this may seem at first glance, a case can be made that borders are not only located at territorial boundaries. I will argue, with Paasi (2009, 215), that, “borders should not be seen solely as phenomena located at the ‘edges’ of territories, but rather as ‘all over’ territories… Borders literally take place at, and bring together, diverging ‘historical scales’: episodes, events, and institutional structures.”

Paasi explains that the “borders as everywhere” concept can be divided into two components: First, that a border is part of the “discursive landscapes of social power that manifests itself both in national ideology and in material landscapes… in the first sense, borders are ‘located’ in the perpetual nation-building process and nationalist practices, and their roots have to be traced in the histories of these national practices” (Paasi 2009, 225). In this sense, borders are performed or enacted whenever the nation is evoked, in books and newspapers, in speeches and performances, from the Declaration of Independence to the daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in US schools, or from the state daily newspapers to the Mass Games of
North Korea. Moreover, this process is reciprocal—as subjects enact borders, so do borders enact subjects. A second sense of the “borders as everywhere” concept is that they function as part of “technical landscapes of control”, and exist in places like airports which are located well within the conventional territorial boundaries, but contain signage and institutional apparatuses that explicitly declare and enact a national border, and perform functions of control and surveillance. This important sense of “borders as everywhere” is owed to Balibar (2002), but as Salter (2008) argues, “border functions occur at specific sites”. That is to say, even if borders can be viewed as extending everywhere in sovereign space, the functions of the border—inclusion and exclusion, interrogation and questioning, surveillance and control—cohere at designated sites such as immigration checkpoints and physical borders. In other words, even if “borders are everywhere”, they still have distinct geographies that deserve contextualized study.

The relations between borders, memory, identity, and consciousness are ripe fields for a study of the performance of spatial politics even well within the territorial confines of borders. As Kolossov and O’Loughlin have noted, “A starting point for border studies…should be the analysis of identity formation and change, with territorial dimensions as a central theme” (1998, 260). The complex processes that link these fields and dimensions have engendered their own terms. Paasi has proposed the term “spatial socialization” to describe the way in which individual actors or collectives are socialized into territorially bounded units, and participate with and reproduce the identities thus engendered by such a process. Newman uses a more specific term, “territorial socialization”, and has observed that it is often places that are just outside the political border but still within a nationally imagined boundary that become perceived as crucial to the integrity of the political unit, and therefore become potential sites of conflict (Newman 1999).
Sites such as the Tomb of the Patriarchs in the West Bank are perhaps the most reported examples (at least in the US press) of the religious possibilities of such perception. While religion is not an important factor in the cross-Strait, Taiwan, like Hong Kong and Macau before it, serves a similar function in the Chinese national imagination.

The airport, a nexus of borders and bordering practices, has been examined in depth by Salter, who not only examines its functions of control and surveillance, but also suggests that since an airport “connects the national and the international (also the national to itself), the domestic and the foreign, in a way that problematizes those connections” (Salter 2007, 49), that airports are a prime example of Foucault’s “heterotopia”, a site which is in ‘in relation with all other sites, but in such a way to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect’” (Foucault 1986). With Taiwan itself a fine example of a heterotopia—a sovereign state that is not a sovereign state, a province that is not a province, a nation that calls into question the very concept of nationhood, a place “capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several places, several sites that are in themselves incompatible” (1986, 25)—the airport in Taiwan can thus be treated as a heterotopia within a heterotopia, a promising site for exploring the role of tourism as a technology of state territorialization. The next chapter will trace out how, by linking together the performance of the state with the performance of tourism.
Chapter 3

Performing borders, performing tourism

The case of cross-Strait tourism, with travel across and between contested borders and territories, is an exceptional opportunity to observe how tourism may reconfigure forms of territorial sovereignty. If borders are the constitutive elements of state territorialization, then I contend that tourists and the apparatuses that facilitate and restrict their flows play a part in the processes of state territorialization. A study of this will require an examination of the particular sites, nodes, tools, devices, state practices, and performances that constitute interstate tourism and state territory. The passport and visa, the border crossing and the border guard, the tour guide and the tourist, the promotional website and the destination information book—all of these not only represent, but I suggest, perform both tourism and state territory. Examining tourism between China and Taiwan, states for which there is a fundamental dispute as to who has sovereignty over whom, and where travel documents, border-crossing protocols, and even the border itself are in contest, will demonstrate quite clearly the performative aspects of state territory and tourism.

Inasmuch as Taiwan is unusual as a nation-state, its performance of state territory, and with it its regulation of citizenship, migration and tourism call international norms about state sovereignty and regulation of mobility into question. While there is a burgeoning recent literature
relating migration, one mode of mobility, to state sovereignty and the performance of borders and state territory (Wonders 2006; Salter 2006; Salter 2008; Parsley 2003; Dauvergne 2004), tourism has rarely entered the conversation. There have indeed been some examinations of the role of borders in encouraging or restricting tourism (Timothy 2004; Timothy 1995; Sofield 2006), the potential instrumentality of tourism for global peace or for reconciliation or unification between nation-states (Guo et al. 2006; Seongseop, Timothy, and Han 2007; D’Amore 1988; Jafari 1989), and the use of tourism as an instrument of foreign policy (Richter 1983; Arlt 2006), but tourism, I contend, has not yet been given the attention it deserves as a political practice. It is time to extend the arguments of mobility and citizenship studies to tourism, to explore how tourism functions as a technology of state territorialization.

The various regimes of sovereignty described in Chapter 1 can be seen as articulations of multiple, shifting political rationalities, but how do the many individuals involved in tourism—tourists, border guards, foreign policy elites—whether acting in the name of the state or not, collectively participate in state territorialization? In this chapter, I will argue that the idea of performativity will be a productive way of linking the state with the tourist, and indeed, to understand them as mutually constitutive. Using this analytic, an examination of tourism and tourists as a tool of foreign policy will become more incisive at a variety of scales, allowing the anticipation of possible tensions or contradictions between various and potentially incompatible programs of government.

This chapter will proceed in five parts. The first part will be a brief exposition of the particular concept of performativity I will be using. This will be followed by an elaboration of performativity as a lens for understanding the state and the performance of foreign policy. The following part will extend this argument to the “global mobility regime”—borders, citizenship,
and migration and mobility controls—by which the global circulation of bodies is regulated in space, and which will be treated as a modern form of governmentality. I will then bring tourism, as a particular mode of mobility, into the discussion by exploring the growing literature on tourist performance, to conclude that tourists can be treated as agents—and subject and objects—of state territorialization programs. The chapter will conclude with a review and critique of past scholarship on the state-scale politics of tourism, with particular emphases on cases with thematic or geographical relevance to cross-Strait tourism. The direction of analysis will proceed in consonance with the micro-physical themes of the previous chapter, to look first at how tourism functions as a technology of state territorialization on the level of mundane, everyday production and circulation of tourist bodies, before discussing tourism as an instrument of state foreign policy elites.

Before I continue, I would like to offer a brief reflexive note on the disciplinary role of the tourism scholar. I suggest not only that tourist practice should be viewed as a component of state territorialization, but that the practices of tourism researchers play a part in the state territorialization of tourists. Much of the tourism studies literature is concerned with typologies of tourists who are characterized based on their sending country or region (S. Wong and Lau 2001; Defranco 2000; Guo, Kim, and Timothy 2006 are just a few China-specific examples). Such analyses not only often obscure the complexity and heterogeneity of tourists, but contribute to the reification of the state that I am attempting to move past in this thesis. I do not mean to suggest that all such aggregations or simplifications are devoid of any utility—Dutch passport-holders, for example, may very well behave quite differently in general while on tour than Chinese—but I simply wish to point out the state-centric epistemology of much applied tourism research, and to the subjectivating and disciplinary effects of this epistemology. A study of
tourism that does not reify the state or assume the subjectivities of its citizen-subjects may
provide more insight into the state territorialization processes of tourism, particularly into the
ways in which national identities are performed and (re)inscribed in tourist spaces, and indeed
into the ways in which tourism can be said to reproduce the state.

3.1 Performativity

Performance as a metaphor for social life has been used in Anglophone discourse at
least since Shakespeare’s famous line, “All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women
merely players.” The question of subjectivity—of who is doing the performing, and how is this
subject formed—is key to any theorization of performance that hopes to have any purchase for
an analysis of social life. Goffman’s work on performance and roles (1959), with its focus on
dramaturgy, staging, front and back sections and so on, has been influential through the social
sciences. But as Butler points out, Goffman “posits a [pre-existing] ‘self’ which assumes and
exchanges various roles within the complex social expectations of the ‘game’ of modern life”
(Butler 1988, 528). This ontological assumption is not only unnecessary, but also obscures the
practices and relations of power that produce essentialized subjects. Butler’s response was to de-
essentialize pregiven categories of self, particularly those of sex and gender; to not look at
essentialized categories of the self or its roles but rather the “‘act’, broadly construed, which
constructs the social fiction of its own psychological interiority”. This suggests that “this self is
not only irretrievably ‘outside’, constituted in social discourse, but that the ascription of
interiority is itself a publically regulated and sanctioned form of essence fabrication” (Butler
1988, 528). Butler’s reworking of performance and performativity does not deny social
experience—it is not a “repudiation of the subject, but, rather a way of interrogating its construction as a pregiven or foundationalist premise” (Butler 1992, 9). This approach is explicitly in the spirit of Foucault’s work on the genealogies of knowledge, in which attention to the contingencies of subject formation reveals the relations of power that underlie them. This focus on practice allows Butler to question assumptions of pre-given, autonomous selves, without ruling out agency or room for subversion or resistance (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007, 407).

Butler’s theory of performativity, as articulated in Bodies that Matter (1993) borrows from the speech act theory of J.L. Austin (1962), which explored how a performative speech act can enact or produce that which it names—for example, the “I do” of the wedding ceremony is not just to say something, but to do it—without assuming anything about the ontological status of the actor. This is to say that the stylized repetition of social acts can constitute social subjects that do not necessarily precede the acts themselves. Unlike the simple example of the wedding ceremony, this is not a usually a one-off performance. “Instead of there being a singular moment of constitution or invention that brings subjects into being, there is a process of recitation and repetition… that is constrained by cultural and historical practices, but which also gives rise to new formations and possibilities” (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007, 407). In the case of gender, or I suggest also, nationality or other forms of identity, these performatives are reiterated over time. Butler’s argument is also owed to Derrida’s reformulation of the performative, in which “the performative utterance becomes a derivative citation rather than a founding act by an originating subject” (Allen 1998, 462). That is to say, the “I do” of the marriage act can only have meaning if it is derivatively citing a norm or model that is given meaning or power by those present. It is not only verbal utterances or citational practices that may function as performatives. Foster, applying Butler’s gender theory to dance choreography, has explored the performativity of other,
non-verbal gestures (Foster 1998). And it is not only gender that has been deconstructed using Butler’s iteration of performativity theory—Mahtani, for example, has explored the intersections of the performance of race and gender at the border (Mahtani 2002).

While infused with power and shaped by sociospatial constraints, performativity does not completely determine any outcome. As Butler writes, performativity “is not a singular ‘act’ or event, but a ritualized production, a ritual reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death controlling and compelling the shape of the production, but not, I will insist, determining it fully in advance” (Butler 1993, 95). Butler’s caveat here—her room for openings, ruptures, and dissonance—was anticipated by Austin’s and Derrida’s focus on the possible failure of performatives. As McKinlay writes in an insightful consideration of Austin’s influence on Butler, “The ways that performatives fail are their most interesting theoretical and empirical feature, not the limit cases where there is near perfect citation of established rituals and identities” (McKinlay 2010). This important point will be returned to in the conclusion of this chapter and the thesis, which will discuss the possible contradictions between incompatible governmental programs as articulated through cross-Strait tourism.

Despite Butler’s version of performativity being used increasingly frequently in cultural geography, particularly in discussions of embodied subjects (Nash 2000), it is relatively underutilized in political geography (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007). I suggest that tourism, with its sensuous, embodied, and semiotically-rich characteristics, as well as its neglected political stakes, is an important and even less explored domain for an application of Butler’s performativity theory. While there is already a growing body of literature on tourist performance (Edensor 2000;
Jordan and Wiley 2008; Haldrup and Larsen 2010; Crang 2006), there is less to be found on tourist performativity.

To understand why this matters, it is important to both distinguish and link performance and performativity. As noted by McKinlay (123), Austin’s coinage of the word *performativity* was itself performed only reluctantly. He saw it as a “new and ugly word”, feeling perhaps the same discomfort as Barthes did when he used *governmentality*, a “barbarous but unavoidable neologism” (quoted in Lemke 2007, 44), or Foucault with his reuse of the “ugly word” (2009, 115) as the center of his theory of the state. But as with “governmentality”, “performativity” is a useful coinage, as performativity points to something much broader and deeper than performance. As described by Bialasiewicz et al:

Performativity is a discursive mode through which ontological effects (the idea of the autonomous subject or the notion of the pre-existing state) are established. Performativity thereby challenges the notion of the naturally existing subject. But it does not eradicate the appearance of the subject or the idea of agency. Performance presumes a subject and occurs within the conditions of possibility brought into being by the infrastructure of performativity (2007, 408).

Gregson and Rose make much the same point, however blunter ontologically, and then proceed to help push Butler’s theory beyond linguistics, or even human actors, and towards the production of space:

…[P]erformance—what individual subjects do, say, “act-out”—and performativity—the citational practices which reproduce and/or subvert discourse and which enable and discipline subjects and their performances—are intrinsically connected, through the saturation of performers with power… Space too needs to be thought of as being brought into being through performances and as a performative articulation of power. And… we want to insist on the complexity and uncertainty of performances and performed spaces (Gregson and Rose 2000, 434).
Gregson and Rose note that much geographic discussion of performance and performativity in the geographical literature focuses on the former sense, that is, on Goffman’s formulation, with its “separation of performer and performance; the sense of performances occupying pregiven kinds of spaces; and a notion of a ‘constraining script’” (2000, 438). They suggest, and I agree, that Butler’s “radical antifoundationalism” offers a better opening for understanding subject formation. With it, we have more hope of understanding the tourist as a mobile subject who not only moves through, but mutually constitutes the modern interstate system. But before further elaborating this point on tourist performativity, it is first necessary to provide a performative reading of the state and mobility in general.

3.2 The performativity of the state

A performative reading of politics is a useful way for understanding the processes that produce the collective imagined actor or structural effect known as the state, and one that has been used by a stream of critical IR scholars. Ashley’s post-structuralist account of state sovereignty has pointed explicitly to its contingency and peculiarity (1988). Walker has likewise called for a detailed examination of the practices that materialize state sovereignty (1993). Taking this farther is David Campbell, who explicitly applied Butler’s work to state and interstate politics. Connecting the individual border crosser to analysis of the state, Campbell’s practice-oriented, performative view of foreign policy is illuminating:

Foreign policy is… to be retheorized as a boundary-producing practice central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates. The consequence of this argument is a fundamental reorientation of foreign policy that
shifts from a concern with relations between states across ahistorical, frozen, and pregiven boundaries to a concern with the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the state and the international system, the domestic and the external, the sovereign and the anarchic. (1990)

In other words, the practice of foreign policy itself constitutes the effect of the nation-state, self and other, internal and external, domestic and foreign, home and abroad. This idea of foreign policy as performative has been used in particular to explore the statements of foreign policy elites (in all their diversity and heterogeneity) as themselves performative of foreign policy functions, or even partly constituting the state. In particular, Campbell has focused on the discursive practices by which the “United States” is produced (1998). This approach from critical IR complements the concern about discourse and representation within critical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail 1996; Dalby and O’Tuathail 1996). A more recent collaboration between Campbell and political geographers has also analyzed the performance of security, particularly in the strategy statements of foreign policy elite think tanks in the post-9/11 United States (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007). Another writer who has examined the state in light of performativity is Cynthia Weber, who “consider[s] the sovereign nation-state not only as a performative body, but also as a sexed and gendered body” (Weber 1998, 78). However, while Weber’s attention to gender politics is welcome, her use of the gender-transgressive performer RuPaul to center her article, however faithful to Butler, and her focus on the gender of the state, limits the scope of her argument. For example, her claim that “sovereignty is always in part an effect of sex, sexuality, and gender codings” (94) remains undemonstrated. I therefore prefer Campbell’s approach, with a caveat: Crucial to Campbell’s conception, informed by the historical moment of the end of the Cold War and US military intervention in Iraq and Bosnia, is the discursive production of the “enemy”, the Other, the foreign, the outside, to which the Self, the domestic, the inside of the home state is constructed. I suggest that this is as unnecessary assumption—that while an opposition between
self and other may be required for a politics of difference, an “enemy” is not necessary for foreign policy. The case where the other is portrayed as the self, or vice versa, as in cross-Strait relations, should make the instability of the “enemy”, even as an abstract construct, quite clear.

### 3.3 The global mobility regime and the production of international subjects

Assuming that boundaries are enacted or activated not only by restricting flows of bodies but by enabling them, regimes of border-crossing are essential to the performance of foreign policy. Therefore, ethnographic study of border-crossing, and tourism with it, should have much to add to discussion about the imaginative geographies of foreign policy. Moreover, I contend that this discussion belongs squarely in the domain of the political, and is not merely an economic question, as is the concern of so much tourism research. As put by Steinberg:

> If indeed the modern system of territorial sovereignty—with its binary distinction between insides and outsides—rests on a discursive construction of fixity as the domain of the political and mobility as the domain of the economic, then a good place to begin deconstructing the distinction between inside and outside might be through an investigation of the (hidden) role of mobility in the construction of the political (2009, 473).

My particular concern here is to demonstrate how the regulation of mobility produces nationalized and internationalized mobile subjects which mutually constitute the modern interstate system of sovereign nation-states. I argue, with Salter, the following:

> The nascent global mobility regime through passport, visa, and frontier formalities manages an international population through and within a biopolitical frame and a confessionary complex that creates bodies that understand themselves to be international. (2006, 168).
The border performances of the global mobility regime, I suggest, constitute the tourist and the sovereign nation-state. Again, borrowing from Salter, “Routine performance of the border (on both citizens and foreigners) creates the subject and the sovereign through the submission of the traveler and the recognition of the sovereign” (2008, 373). These performances are reiterated, stylized, and structured, both producing and produced by the state.

The existence of this mobility regime and these performances is, like the division of space into mutually exclusive state territories, a modern, contingent development. The global control of mobility and its linkage to citizenship is relatively recent—a “twentieth century phenomenon” (Dauvergne 2004, 589). While Dauvergne notes that devices such as passports emerged earlier, their use was not necessarily mandatory to cross between the generally more fluid national boundaries that prevailed prior to the 20th century. But it is not just migration or the right to resettled that became regulated, but all forms of mobility between international borders. “The first modern institutionalization of the global mobility regime” was the 1920 Conference on Passports, Customs Formalities and Through Tickets (Salter 2006, 177). This formalized a move of responsibility for controlling travel from the sending to the receiving state, through the linkage of the passport—a device which represents a sending state’s permission for an individual over whom it has sovereignty to cross the border—to the visa, which represents a kind of permission to enter a receiving state.

Hindess has argued that the key governmental technology which links individuals with populations and state territory, and deployed to regulate both internal and external mobility, as well as political rights and privileges, is citizenship. “In a world of politically independent and competing nation-states, citizenship plays a fundamental role in rendering governable a global population of thousands of millions by dividing it into smaller subpopulations of particular
nation-states” (Hindess 2000, 1487). Stated this way, citizenship and migration controls can be
seen not simply as the prerogative of particular states, but as part of a distinctly modern and
global governmentality in which the global circulation of people is to be managed on behalf of
both the global population and smaller national subpopulations. Citizenship grants rights of
affiliation and belonging while circumscribing others, including the right of mobility. This
technology allowed for new modes of control of mobility, predicated on new understandings of
inclusion/exclusion from a population or territory, and with it, the identity of the state territory
itself. As the modern state territorial system congealed, human mobility, national identity, and
state territory became rationalized and spatially circumscribed. Migration law has thus become
an opportunity for state elites to define national ideals and attract ideal citizens, often based on
skills, income, education, or other markers of identity. Even in an era of supposedly intensifying
globalization, migration law, writes Dauvergne, is now “the new last bastion of sovereignty”
(2004, 588), and shows no sign of disappearing any time soon.

The border is where the global mobility regime materializes. At stake at each border-
crossing is the definition of the border-crosser, and the determination of whether or not the
“arrival” belongs to the population. It is a judgment of inclusion or exclusion, and as
demonstrated by ethnographic accounts, the many embodied contingencies—the details of accent,
of dress, of race and gender and class—have led several scholars to conclude that
pronouncements by border guards, as well as the answers and self-definition by border crossers
are intrinsically performative (Amoore 2006; Wonders 2006; Salter 2008).

*Border performativity*, a term coined by Wonders, links the state, mobile subjects, and
the border:
Border performativity takes as its theoretical starting point the idea that borders are not only geographically constituted, but are socially constructed via the performance of various state actors in an elaborate dance with ordinary people who seek freedom of movement and identification (2006).

Exploring this “dance”, in all its specificity, will be key to understanding how borders are produced, performed, experienced throughout state-territorialized space. I therefore find Wonders’ concept quite useful, while recognizing that her definitional opposition of state actors and ordinary people threatens to reinforce the state-society divide that this thesis is attempting to elide (many of the individual state actors performing the border are no less ordinary in other contexts). The key point here is that if borders function as the key component of state territorialization, then border performativity points to the practices with which the border and mobile subjects are mutually constituted. It is with these practices that the state is produced as an effect, and constituted as a resource with its own symbolic productive power.

If, as Salter argues, that the global mobility regime produces international subjects, then performances of the border are appropriate sites for research into the performance of the modern interstate system. These of course include sites designated for border crossing, such as land border stations, airports, and so on. But if, as Balibar and Paasi insist, borders are produced everywhere, not just in the frontier, then border performativity, like the performance of the nation, should be examined wherever borders are discursively produced. In the case of the international tourist, such research must, as much as possible, cover all temporal stages of the tourist’s journey, from pre-departure planning, to the border crossing, to the journey in the receiving country, and then the return home. The utterances, the photographs, the stories and reminiscences about self and other, domestic and foreign, internal and external during the tourist
journey, at “home”, “abroad”, and “in-between”—all of these belong in a complete study of border performativity in the practice of international tourism. In other words, all of these belong in a study of tourism as a technology of state territorialization.

The border is not a neutral space. Even welcome migrants may be subject to interrogation. Salter writes, “In the border interrogation, what is a natural right – mobility – is presented as deviant, as abnormal, as requiring explanation. What is invented – state sovereignty – becomes unquestionable” (2008, 373). While I take no issue with his latter point about the reiteration of state sovereignty, I am not persuaded that international mobilities are portrayed as deviant in all border crossings. Salter insists that “the structure of the global mobility regime reinforces the act of crossing the frontier as an exceptional act” (2006, 174). I think that many business or leisure travelers, accustomed to border-crossing formalities, may disagree with this characterization, particularly in supra-national blocs with relatively loose and unpoliced borders, such as the European Union. This points, however, to the inequalities inherent in international mobility laws and border practices (Wonders 2006; Mahtani 2002; Dauvergne 2004; Parsley 2003), including visa regimes that permit, for example, citizens of OECD states to more easily cross more borders than citizens of other states (Salter 2006). These issues deserve further attention, but I here would like keep focus broadly on the performativity of any border crossing.

As opposed to the migrant, the tourist’s mobility, instead of being presented as deviant or abnormal, may even be encouraged, if constrained, by both economic and political forces. This recalls Foucault’s discussion about the transition from pre-modern forms of juridical control to liberal apparatuses of security, with infrastructure that supports circulation of people and capital (Foucault 2009; Foucault 2008). But still, as with any migration control predicated on national identity and citizenship, the institution of state sovereignty is no less questionable. What
this suggests is that alongside a liberal regime of mobility must come a technology of the self that produces mobile subjects who still understand themselves as citizens of particular nation-states with the right to travel, however constrained.

### 3.4 The performativity of international tourism

Both the economic migrant and the leisure tourist move in space. Both cross borders. Both carry documents if they have or need them: passports and visas, bank statements and health records. Both are subjected to the ritual of the border crossing process, to interrogation and confession upon arrival in foreign or even their own state territories (Salter 2007; Salter 2008). But while the migrant moves for a relatively long duration, and may even surrender his citizenship and right to inclusion within their previous domain in order to join a new national body, the tourist typically travels more temporarily. A migrant may give up his state political identity and assume a new one, even if flexible (Ong 1999), while the tourist maintains her citizenship. But while on tour, the tourist may also find herself identifying more or less with her home country or her destination. Her political affiliations may change. She may move through various national imaginaries. Her performance of state territory may become, as with gender drag (Butler 1990), ironic, parodic, subversive. Ruptures may appear, affiliations may shift, identities may be assumed or discarded, if still constrained by normative discourses.

Performance has a long history as a metaphor in tourism studies. Tourists have often been portrayed as audiences, as spectators, or instead as actors that “gaze” at locals (Urry 2002, borrowing from Foucault). Taking a page from Goffman’s dramaturgical metaphors, MacCannell
(1976) wrote influentially about the stage production of “authentic” local culture for the tourists that came to see them. He distinguished between the front stage, what is produced by locals for tourists, and the backstage of the life space. There is no question that many performances for tourists are altered, fabricated, edited, shortened or extended from their previous iterations, which may cause some confusion or angst for the modern tourist in pursuit of authenticity. But we need not assume the *a priori* reality of some true, pure, or static source for such performances, especially when there are well-documented cases in which initially tourist-oriented performances have been reappropriated and re-interpreted as local, non-tourist practices. For example, Bruner (2005) has discussed the case of a Balinese couple who requested the performance at their own wedding of a particular frog dance that had initially been developed for tourists. Likewise, the kecak monkey chant, now so emblematic of Balinese religious art culture that it is performed not only for visiting heads of state, but also for the President of Indonesia during domestic trips, was developed and refined in collaboration with European artist for an international film production. Such cases demonstrate that while certain practices or performances may be developed initially for presentation to tourists, they may later find new and unanticipated significance for the “locals”.

Not only are the cultural (re)appropriations of touristic practices not unidirectional, but tourists perform no less than the toured, despite difference in stakes, staging, and choreography. Again Bruner is a fine guide for this theme, discussing delicately his own experience as an “academic expert” accompanying international group tours. He describes the subtlety of group dynamics, and the often ironic self-awareness of his tourists. In my own experience working as a tour director in China, I saw different group members shifting between roles—one might play the anxious hypochondriac, the other the well-traveled cosmopolitan. One aimed for consensus
in group decisions, while another might try to dominate the table. One man expressed ardent conservative values, in counterpoint to another who told stories about their minority or same-sex married friends. Couples presented themselves in the group space as they wished they might be at home—loving and harmonious—while often evincing discord in more private moments. As in any performance, these roles shifted, reversed, softened or hardened with the passage of time, new experiences on tour, and changes in overall group dynamics.

Edensor (2000), borrowing from Adler’s description of tourism as “performed art” (1989), has elaborated on such performances of tourists. He highlights three aspects for analyses: Temporal and spatial dimensions—where and how tourism is practiced; social and spatial regulation, how the tourist stage is managed, for example by tour directors, industry actors, or state officials; and issues of power, including self-monitoring of behavior and the disciplinary gaze of fellow tourists or onlookers. These dimensions extend through the various staging sites of tourism, including those he terms “enclavic”—the walled gardens, exclusive hotels, “purified” spaces (Sibley 1988)—versus the “weakly classified” or heterogeneous spaces where the materiality of everyday life and local practices may impinge on the stages that had been set explicitly for tourists. By distinguishing between such spaces, while noting that they need not be treated as strictly discontinuous, we can identify the contributions of various actors to the politics and performances of tourism.

Edensor’s contribution is extremely useful for reconceptualizing productions of tourist space in which not only state and industry actors are seen to be performing roles, but in which the tourists perform as well. Connecting this with Salter’s work on airports and Wonders’ definition of border performativity, we can begin to trace out spaces of tourism that are not only constructed and performed in sites explicitly deemed as touristic, but at airports and other sites of
border crossing, or indeed anywhere where tourists go, perhaps even before or after their return to their home country. Indeed, a trip can be said to start as soon as the tourist goes out the door.

Treating tourism as performance, we can begin exploring how national borders may be continuously performed by tourists wherever they are, as iterated and cited through their choice of dress, their patterns of speech, their use of national visual, auditory, or even olfactory symbols, their discussions about their place of origin with locals and each other. Tourism can thus be treated as a mode of territorial socialization (Newman 1999) that occurs at least as profoundly outside the home country as inside it. An American walking atop the Great Wall of China, surrounded by domestic tourists and vendors, may be more acutely aware of his national identity than he would while singing the national anthem at a home baseball game. And when traveling in a group of fellow nationals, this effect may be even more pronounced.

The three dimensions specified by Edensor are excellent starting points for analyses of the politics of tourist performance. For example, how are spaces and social interactions regulated? How are foreign tourists permitted to engage with locals? For the latter question, in the case of present-day North Korea, almost not at all, even for South Koreans (Seongseop, Timothy, and Han 2007), very little in 1980s China, and quite freely nowadays. Tour guides often adjust their itineraries and cultural explanations based on the nationality of tourists—how do tourists experience this? But a related and deeper question that has only begun to be explored yet is how the performative practices of tourism produce tourists and the toured as national subjects.

There is already much excellent work about the place of domestic tourist sites in cultural heritage production at home, and its relationship with national imaginaries and development (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998; DeLyser 1999; Nuryanti 1996; Johnson 1999). What
is needed is more research into how the tourists’ experience of the Other affects their own sense of Self, and how the selves and others of the tourist matrix are mutually, performatively constituted. Looking then at tourism through the lens of national identity, or at national identity through the lens of tourism, should shed insight on both fields. To do this properly, the question of subject formation must be addressed. This is to ask how the tourist is discursively produced as an (inter)national subject in the first place, and what constitutes the tourist in opposition to the toured. A viable approach may be found in performativity theory. The citational practices—the boundary-producing acts that divide self and other, the repetitive, stylized rituals labeled as touristic—produce the tourists and the toured, whether as national and/or international subjects. Such practices materialize as the stages and subjects of tourism.

The production of difference and the constitution of (inter)national subjects through tourism is clearly a kind of bordering process. Recalling Kolossov and O’Loughlin’s observation, cited in Chapter 1, that, “A starting point for border studies…should be the analysis of identity formation and change, with territorial dimensions as a central theme” (1998, 260), we can now bring theories of tourism and state territoriality into dialogue with each other to conclude that tourism can be treated as a technology of state territorialization. If as Paasi has argued, “borders are ‘located’ in the perpetual nation-building process and nationalist practices” (2009), it is now time to “locate” the border in the practices of tourism.

Therefore I maintain that the appropriate targets for an ethnographic inquiry into tourism as a technology of state territorialization must be the processes of bordering and territorial socialization immanent in the staging and performance of interstate tourism. These include the normative performances of tourism in the articulation of (possibly) multiple and contradictory discourses of national identity. These are best explored through observation of as
many tourist “stages” as possible—not just theatrical, but spatial and temporal stages as well, from pre-trip preparation, to departure from home, arrival and engagement the destination, to the return home and after. The particular sites and practices relevant for a study of the cross-Strait case will be outlined in the conclusion of this thesis.

3.5 Tourism and state-scale politics

Having discussed the micro-politics of tourism and state territorialization, it is time to turn to the state-scale politics of borders and peace-making, particularly those relevant to China and Taiwan. Despite its traditional neglect by political scientists, tourism, as Richter pointed out in a special 1983 issue of the Annals of Tourism Research, “has political ramifications that touch on key problem areas in most of the discipline’s subfields… [including] policy studies, American politics, comparative politics, international relations, public administration, and political thought” (Richter 1983a, 316). The subfields most germane to a discussion of cross-Strait relations are international relations, policy studies, and comparative politics. Questions relevant to these subfields have been explored by scholars from wide variety of disciplines, not necessarily just political science (Matthews and Richter 1991).

Richter’s 1983 article posed a number of general questions that could be asked about tourism. These questions have indeed been applied to the case of cross-Strait tourism:

So many questions of potential importance remain not only unanswered but unasked. Under what circumstances can tourism promote reconciliation among nations? Why is tourism so often the earliest component of a normalization process between two nations? To what extent does becoming a host nation improve national understanding of other societies? Under what conditions does it
intensify hostility, friction, and feelings of relative deprivation? How and by what process do travelers' views become politically important? (Richter 1983a, 328)

The general relationship between tourism and borders has been explored most extensively by the geographer Dallen J. Timothy. Building on the work of Matznetter (1979), Timothy offers the following three categories for understanding the relation between tourism and borders: The border as a barrier, the border as destination, and the border as a modifier of the tourism landscape. He gives each of these three (sometimes overlapping) possibilities a full chapter in his book *Tourism and Political Boundaries*, before considering tourism in the context of globalization, the unification of divided contiguous states, and shifting supra-national alliances. Cross-Strait tourism gets a mention, with Timothy stating that the main obstacle to increased cross-Strait tourist flow, which he characterizes as “inter-Chinese” (119), is Taiwan’s state policy.

Timothy paints with a broad brush, and his discussion is based entirely on compilation and analysis of other scholarship. He does not specify any particular conceptual framework for approaching states and state behavior, beyond a brief review of the general field of border studies. What would make his important line of inquiry both theoretically and empirically richer would be an ethnographic account of the practices that constitute particular tourist flows, and with them, I might contend, the borders themselves. His characterization of cross-Strait tourism as “inter-Chinese”, for example, demonstrates the need for a more critical interrogation of the conceptual framework that may underlie his approach, as well as his geopolitical assumptions.

Timothy has indeed turned his attention to particular case studies, often collaborating with scholars with more specific regional and theoretical expertise. These have included a speculative piece on North Korean domestic tourism (Seongseop, Timothy, and Han 2007), and a
general discussion of tourism in the context of security (Hall, Timothy, and Duval 2004). He has also contributed to a journal article, “Tourism and reconciliation between Mainland China and Taiwan” (Guo et al. 2006), which treats Taiwan and China as partitioned states, offers suggestions for promoting cross-Strait tourism flows, and asserts that Hong Kong’s “smooth reversion” to the PRC demonstrates that “‘one country and two systems’ could solve the problems of the unification of China, which is the most referenced model for the settlement of Taiwan’s problems.” The authors provide no references for this last claim, ignore widespread, ongoing popular protests in Hong Kong that belie this purported “smooth” reversion, and continue with the very questionable and utterly unreferenced conclusion that, “More and more people believe that ‘one country and two systems’ is practical for both sides” (1002). Such a position is shared in one of the few other pieces that has discussed the politics of cross-Strait tourism (Larry Yu 1997). What is missing here, apart from a more accurate regional geopolitical history and appraisal of current conditions, is an appreciation that tourism is not necessarily a virtue in its own right, but has political instrumentalities that serve particular, even competing interests or programs of government.

Policy prescriptions that promote international tourism as a palliative for conflict owe to past work on tourism’s potential instrumentality for peace-making and reconciliation. Particularly high profile was a 1988 conference in Vancouver, “Tourism—A vital force for peace”, convened by Louis D’Amore. In his call for participation, he wrote that:

…people and nations increasingly recognize the role of international travel in promoting understanding and trust among different cultures and, therefore, as a force for world peace…Tourism, properly designed and developed, can help bridge the psychological and cultural distances that separate people of diverse races, colors, religions, and stages of social and economic development. Through tourism, we can come to appreciate the rich human, cultural, and ecological
diversity of the world mosaic and to evolve a mutual trust and respect for one another and the dignity of all life on earth (1988, 269-270).

In addition to its academic presentations, D’Amore’s Vancouver conference included a number of international diplomatic and travel industry elites, as well as live video appearances from US President Reagan and Pope John Paul II (Jafari 1989). Such participation underscores Richter’s argument about the high political stakes of international tourism.

While it would be nice if tourism indeed functioned as a peacemaker, as D’Amore hopes, there is little evidence to warrant this belief. Litvin (1998) has argued that while tourism can be a beneficiary of peace, it is not necessarily productive of it. That is to say, “the health of tourism is always the result of peace, never the cause of peace” (64). In fact, Litvin points out that tourism has often been used contra peace-making efforts, as in the case of threats against or even kidnapping of tourists.

A corrective case study to the fantasy of tourism’s intrinsic peace-making functionality is Park’s work on tourism from South Korea to North Korea (2005). Rooted in ethnography, it focuses on the complex and contradictory political motivations, practices, and outcomes of tourism. Park instructively pays attention to the mundane details of North Korean border stamps and tourist identity cards, with their coded phrases and differently named state entities, suggesting that North Korean authorities use these instruments to articulate North Korean state sovereignty. Therefore, while noting that tourism can produce both feelings of internationalization and de-territorialization, Park allows that it may also produce “retrenchment of identities in a territory”, making tourism “a double edged sword when it comes to identity”(116). The practical outcome is that despite hopes for tourism as an enterprise of piece, or as a simple reflection of diplomatic status, “tourism in international diplomatic relations is an
arena of contestation and cooperation where different states compete, negotiate, manipulate, and maneuver cultural meanings and representations to find their places in the complex and changing international political order.”

In the case of the Koreas, as in Taiwan and China, the places of these states in the international order remain unsettled. But unlike the Korean case, which both states characterize as intra-national tourism (with each side pointing to the other as a false state), or which Park suggests is “inter-state tourism where two states, however hostile, belong to one nation” (125), authorities in Taiwan stopped claiming sovereignty over China long before permitting inbound tourism from China. This is to say that while North and South Korea still officially recognize themselves as a divided nation, the same cannot necessarily be said for both Taiwan and China. Rather than assume a normative trajectory of reconciliation or greater mutual understanding, it is better to observe, as Park suggests, the ways in which state actors use tourism for possibly contradictory ends. The key point in this discussion is that tourism is a politically messy enterprise with uneven and unclear outcomes. Even if tourism is a performance, not all performances have neat or happy endings.

This messiness and indeterminacy brings us back to what I described earlier in the chapter as a fundamental feature of performativity—its frequent failure. Returning to Butler, we recall that performativity “is not a singular ‘act’ or event, but a ritualized production, a ritual reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death controlling and compelling the shape of the production, but not, I will insist, determining it fully in advance” (1993). This is to say that, despite structural constraints, the citational process often breaks down, allowing for the possibility of resistance or the formation of new subject positions.
The interstate tourist, I have argued in this chapter, is constituted through an ensemble of rituals, from passport and visa applications, to border crossing, to site visitation and everything else enabled by the infrastructure of tourism, including performances of the state and its territory. The interstate tourist, in turn, constitutes states and their territories. Like other performative processes, the ritualized practices that produce these subjects harbor the possibility of a failure of repetition. With touristic performance subject to changing constraints, prohibitions and taboos—when the contours of state territory and national identity are vague, shifting, and in constant contest, as in the case of China and Taiwan—the potential for breakdowns, ruptures, or innovation may multiply. With the conclusion to the sovereignty dispute between China and Taiwan still to be written, tourists and tourism may yet have major parts to play.
Chapter 4

Sovereignty, Territory, and Tourism across the Taiwan Strait

Having begun the argument that tourism functions as a technology or instrument of state territorialization, I turn now to Taiwan. As I will explain, there is of course a conflict between the state territorialization program of the PRC and Taiwan. But even within Taiwan, and largely due to the threat of PRC military action, Taiwan itself harbors multiple, ambiguous, contradictory, and competing state territorialization programs

“Why study Taiwan at all?” asked Eskildsen (2005, 281) in his introduction to a special Taiwan-focused issue of the Journal of Asian Studies. “Taiwan, as a territory at the periphery of the dominant powers in nineteenth-century East Asia, disrupts the most important historical narratives—nationalism and imperialism—that have been used to explain the modern history of the region, and for that reason its history is quite illuminating.” Of course, not only does Taiwan disrupt historical narratives of East Asia, but it also disrupts common assumptions about the sovereign nation-state and the interstate system. As Shelley Rigger points out, “When it comes to Taiwan, even the simplest questions are hard to answer. Is Taiwan a nation? If so, what should we call it? If not, what is it?” (1999, 3-4).
Despite these open questions, Taiwan and the PRC’s struggles over sovereignty, and the usually very different perspectives on questions of history and sovereignty held by most people in the PRC and Taiwan (Copper 1997), in 2010, PRC tourists surpassed Japanese to become the top tourist segment in Taiwan (Republic of China Ministry of Transportation and Communications Tourism Bureau 2011). This phenomenon muddles the usual foreign/domestic polarity of tourism. As the “Taiwan issue”—that is, the trajectory of Taiwan’s sovereign and territorial status vis-a-vis China and the inter-national system—remains undetermined, the controversies surrounding these human flows also expose the high political stakes of tourism. Therefore, Taiwan presents an intriguing opportunity for a study of the political geography of tourism in general, and the role of tourism as a bordering process in particular.

This chapter will begin by providing the historical background necessary to understand the current unusual sovereign status of Taiwan and its relationship with the PRC. This will include a review of the history of Taiwan’s political transformation from a Chinese-claimed dynastic territory to a Japanese colony to the putative base of the Republic of China in exile, to its current manifestation as a de facto, if not de jure, independent democratic nation-state that maintains a politically tense but economically promiscuous relationship with China. It will thus be distinguished from Hong Kong and Macau, two territories ruled by the PRC under a “one country, two systems” scheme, even if official PRC discourses frequently group the three territories together. A discussion of Taiwan’s international legal and sovereign status will treat Taiwan as a place that challenges the neatness, stability, and consistency of international regimes of exclusive territory and equal sovereignty. I will then provide a history of cross-Strait tourism, with particular emphasis on tourism from the PRC to Taiwan, including a discussion of the controversy it has sparked within Taiwanese society. Finally, I will discuss tourism’s political
instrumentality for the PRC, particularly in the reconfiguration of regional ethno-territorial formations and the articulation of hegemonic cultural authority, and to explore how cross-Strait tourism may function as part of the PRC’s state territorialization program for Taiwan.

4.1 Taiwan: From frontier to colony to contested nation-state

The main island of Taiwan sits about 100 miles off of China’s southeastern Fujian province. Said by many of its residents to resemble the shape of a yam (the root itself, long cultivated as a staple crop on the island, has even been politicized as a symbol for self-identified Taiwanese, as opposed to the newly arrived mainland Chinese “pigs” in the 1940s; see Kerr 1965), much of the island is mountainous and sub-tropical. Most of its residents have lived and continue to live in the fertile western coastal plain. Covering roughly the same land area as the Netherlands, Taiwan also includes several outlying islands or island groups including Penghu, Green Island, Lanyu, Mazu, and Jinmen (Quemoy).

Befitting a politically “floating island” (Hamrin and Wang 2004), even Taiwan’s geological history is an arena of political dispute—scholars in Taiwan frequently treat the island as part of the Pacific Rim, closer in physical features to those of Japan or the Philippines than to China, while many PRC scholars maintain that Taiwan physically broke off from mainland China eons ago (Copper 1997). What is undisputed is that the current human population arrived in waves of settlers. The earliest settlers, believed to be the ancestors of the present-day indigenous people (yuanzhumin) are usually characterized as Austronesian. These were followed by immigrants mostly from Fujian, beginning sometime in the 15th century. In addition to the
Hoklo-speaking Fujianese, a significant number of Hakka people (an ethnic group, also from China, with a distinct language and wide distribution in southeast Asia) later joined the migration. As these new settlers arrived and began farming rice and vegetables in the western coastal plain, indigenous peoples were killed, assimilated, or pushed into the high central and eastern mountains.

Several colonial powers, including the Portuguese, British, and most famously, Dutch, made incursions into Taiwan in the 17th century. Portuguese explorers named the island “Formosa”, meaning “beautiful island”. The name is still occasionally heard or read today on Taiwan, and is still used by some Taiwanese people and associations abroad. The Dutch East Indies Company built forts and established administrative regions in both the north and south ends of the western plain, and briefly used them to control economic colonies until they were repulsed in 1662 by Zheng Chenggong (also known as Koxinga), a Ming Dynasty loyalist and alleged pirate who was fleeing from the ascendant Manchu Qing Dynasty. Zheng Chenggong’s fiefdom was later put down by a Qing naval force in 1683.

The Qing rulers then nominally annexed Taiwan as part of Fujian province but, argue some scholars, “did virtually nothing to govern or develop Taiwan” (Chen and Reisman 1972, 609), apart from ensuring that Taiwan did not become a launching pad for anti-Qing rebel activity as it had been under Zheng Chenggong (Shepherd 1993). Taiwan was a site of exile for troublemaking scholar-officials, an exotic and barbaric travel destination (Teng 2004) that was imagined rather differently than the now “sacred territory” (Moody 2007, 27) claimed by the PRC. Taiwan, and especially its aboriginal areas, were represented by Qing scholars in China as wild sites of savages, “quite literally ‘off the map’” (Jacobs 2005, 17). Even the Chinese
immigrant areas were prone to rebellion, hence the then-common saying, “Every three years a small revolt, every five years a big one” (Chen and Reisman 1972, 609).

Given the Qing’s weak control over Taiwan, it may be both more faithful to the historical record and theoretically productive to treat Taiwan as a site of “hybrid colonialisms managed by statist organizations that relied on a frontier that shifted over time” (Eskildsen 2005, 285), rather than a contiguous region administered continuously and coherently as a part of China since the Qing claim of annexation. An obvious early example of such a “hybrid colonialism” would be the Dutch-administered and Chinese and aboriginal-staffed business activities of the Dutch East Indies Company in the 17th century (Andrade 2005). One might argue that the colonization of Taiwan didn’t end with the expulsion of the Dutch occupiers, but instead its management passed to a colonial Chinese statist organization, the Qing administration. Meanwhile, the frontier continued shifting as the arrival of immigrants from Fujian pushed indigenous people farther into the mountains, and the Qing administration asserted shifting and uneven control over the expanding region.

Such a postcolonial perspective is supported indirectly by a number of scholars who have suggested that not only European powers, but other contemporary imperial formations including the Qing functioned as colonizing or conquest empires (Perdue 1998; Hostetler 2001). Such a perspective helps to broaden Said’s critique of “Orientalism” (1979), raising the possibility that similar colonial logics of exoticization and exploitation were prevalent in areas that have only recently been subjected to postcolonial critique (also see X. Chen 2002). Teng’s extensive and well-documented study (2004) of Qing “colonial travel writing” about Taiwan supports such a view, suggesting that Taiwan should be treated as a site of colonization even (or
rather, especially) by Chinese powers, despite (or rather, precisely because of) their historical claims to territorial sovereignty and cultural hegemony.

By the late 19th century, and even though Taiwan was named a province of imperial China in 1887, Qing authorities ceded Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, as part of the settlement of the Sino-Japanese War. A Republic of Taiwan (Taiwan Minzhuguo) was declared by local elites, who even raised a flag of their own design, but it was quickly put down by the Japanese occupying forces. The Japanese launched ambitious development initiatives in Taiwan, including new transportation and education infrastructure, technological upgrades, and meticulous urban planning, which treated the thorough colonization of Taiwan as part of Japan’s own drive towards modernization and international parity with European colonial powers (Chu and Lin 2001).

Meanwhile, in mainland China, the Qing dynasty collapsed and was replaced by the Republic of China (ROC), established in 1911 by Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT). Sun Yat-sen was eventually succeeded by Chiang Kai-Shek, who presided over a famously corrupt administration that was at war with both imperial Japan and the People’s Liberation Army of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong.

In 1945, following Japan’s defeat by the US in World War II, the US military presided over the departure of the Japanese occupiers and the inflow of KMT forces. The KMT claimed to restore (guangfu) Taiwan to Chinese rule by bringing it under the flag of the ROC. Early KMT rule over Taiwan was characterized by mismanagement and brutality, culminating in an island-wide revolt in 1947, known as the 228 incident (for February 28, the beginning of the revolt). A
subsequent bloody crackdown, known as the “White Terror” (baise kongbu) in resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and the suppression or eradication of local elites, and animosity between the so-called Taiwanese (benshengren) and newer Mainlanders (waishengren) (Makeham and Hsiau 2005). Martial law was declared and not officially lifted until 1987. Some Taiwanese, nostalgic for the relatively efficient rule of the Japan, felt that one colonial administration had been traded for another, and many preferred the former (Kerr 1965).

Following the KMT’s final defeat by the CCP and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, most ROC and KMT officials and soldiers retreated to Taiwan and expected only a brief stay before militarily retaking the mainland with US support. Driven by the anti-communist agenda of Western powers during the Cold War, the “Republic of China” was widely recognized internationally as the legitimate government of China in exile, and, incredibly, occupied China’s seats in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council until 1971.

In 1951, as part of its World War II settlement signed with 51 Allied powers in San Francisco, Japan formally renounced its claims to Taiwan as specified by the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. The San Francisco treaty, however, did not specify to which entity sovereignty over Taiwan would be transferred, and neither representatives from the ROC nor from the PRC were signatories to this treaty. In 1952, Japan and the ROC concluded their own treaty, but sovereignty over Taiwan was left deliberately ambiguous (Charney and Prescott 2000). However, subsequent notes exchanged by diplomatic representatives of the ROC and Japan suggest that ROC diplomats understood that Japan was effectively transferring to the ROC sovereignty over a territory limited to what was then practically under its control—that is Taiwan, the Pescadores, and several other offshore islands (Chiang and Huang 2008). The United States,
which provided military protection to the ROC, also remained deliberately ambiguous about Taiwan’s sovereign status.

KMT rule transformed Taiwan’s politics, economy, and culture. Politically, Taiwan was administered as a province of China with its own provincial administration, and a National Assembly of pensioned officials who claimed to represent their home provinces in China. Political society was stratified between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, with party, military, police, and educational positions reserved for the latter. Despite its vociferous anti-communist rhetoric and claim to represent “Free China”, the KMT during this period could be fairly characterized as a Leninist regime, due to its identification of the state with the party, its authoritarianism, and the party’s permeation into all facets of society (Cheng 1989).

Economically, the KMT eventually implemented land and other reforms, converting landowners into capitalists and stimulating the creation of small and medium-scale businesses. Along with the economic infrastructure remaining from the Japanese colonial period (K. Chen 2010), preferential trade policies with the United States, and the hard work of people across Taiwan (Tu 1996), this eventually resulted in the so-called “Taiwan miracle”, a booming export-driven economy that rapidly raised the standard of living for all social classes.

Culturally, the KMT implemented a “sinicization” campaign to inculcate Chinese values into the Taiwanese, whom the KMT claimed to liberate from Japanese colonial exploitation. The Hoklo (southern Fujianese) language of most Taiwanese was forcibly suppressed in favor of Mandarin, the official language of the ROC. Textbooks emphasized Chinese history and gave little or no attention to Taiwan. Any advocacy for Taiwanese
independence, or even mention of a historically distinct Taiwanese identity was strictly prohibited.

As the PRC consolidated its rule in China, the impossibility of retaking the mainland became increasingly clear to the KMT leadership, which realized it would have to make due with Taiwan. Following his death in 1975, Chiang Kai-Shek’s leadership of the KMT and ROC eventually passed to his son, Chiang Ching-Kuo, who pragmatically recognized the need to bring members of the Taiwanese majority into the KMT in order to maintain party rule.

A series of international and domestic crises in the 1970s precipitated major reforms in the KMT. Internationally, the US’ recognition of the PRC and the United Nations 1971 decision to recognize the PRC as the representative of China left the ROC on shaky diplomatic ground. Domestically, a vigorous grassroots human rights and democracy movement challenged the legitimacy of the KMT’s martial law rule. Led primarily by ethnic Taiwanese, and strengthened considerably by international ties with Taiwanese activists in Japan and North America, this movement was known as the dangwai (meaning “outside the [KMT] party”) movement, and centered around a pro-democracy magazine, Formosa (Meilidao) (Jacobs 2005). Violent government response to several rallies organized by the Formosa Magazine group, including what later became known as “the Kaohsiung Incident” in 1979, led to the arrest of dangwai activists.

The KMT’s unexpected decision to publically try the Kaohsiung rally leaders is usually attributed to its desire to appear more open and democratic in order improve its ties with the US, which had officially switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC a year earlier in 1978. The

1 The ROC was offered a new seat in the General Assembly as the representative of Taiwan, which it refused on the grounds that it was still the sole legitimate government of China.
accused were defended by Chen Shui-bian, who went on to become the mayor of Taipei and then the first non-KMT elected president of Taiwan in 2000, and Frank Hsieh, who later became the mayor of Kaohsiung. Though the rally leaders were convicted and sentenced, many scholars now describe this as the beginning of the transformation of the authoritarian KMT regime, which continued to shed whatever public support it had (Bedford and Hwang 2006; Chu and Lin 2001).

Facing continued dangwai activism, dwindling numbers of Mainlander administrators, and the hemorrhaging of international diplomatic support, a number of electoral and administrative reforms were initiated by President Chiang Ching-Kuo and stewarded by his Taiwan-born appointed successor, Lee Teng-hui. These reforms ultimately led to the lifting of martial law in 1987 and to rapid democratization including Taiwan’s first open and transparent presidential election in 1992, in which Lee was easily elected in a contest against the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which had grown out of the dangwai democracy movement (Rigger 1999) and initially had a pro-independence plank in its 1991 party charter (Clark 2008). This election led some to acclaim Taiwan as “the first Chinese democracy” (L. Chao and Myers 1994), although as we will see, Taiwan’s “Chineseness” is not to be taken for granted. In fact, it was in 1991 that Lee’s government proclaimed its end of the civil war with the CCP and the relinquishment of claims to sovereignty over China. This move indicated a profound shift in the ROC’s program of state territorialization. For the first time, apart from Taiwan and several offshore islands, the ROC no longer actively claimed sovereignty over PRC territory.

Lee garnered widespread electoral support by promoting the idea of the “new Taiwanese”, a new national category that encompassed both Taiwanese and Mainlanders, many of whom who had by now spent most of their lives in Taiwan, where their children were also born and raised. This new identity downplayed historical animosity between Taiwanese and
Mainlanders. Lee also accelerated the Chiang Ching-Kuo-initiated drive to incorporate more Taiwanese into the KMT. Accentuating the “new Taiwanese” identity was the vast sociocultural gulf between Taiwan and China, which had developed along very different socioeconomic paths. Crucially, democracy was presented by Lee as a key component of the new Taiwanese identity, as opposed to the authoritarianism of the PRC (S. H. Tsai 2005).

In June 1995, Lee was issued a US visa for a “private visit” to his alma mater, Cornell University, enraging the PRC, which argued that the head of a “separatist” government should not be given permission to enter the US. Lee delivered a speech in which he referred nine times to the “Republic of China on Taiwan”, provoking further consternation from the PRC leadership which had already accused him of separatism. In response, the PRC cut off all formal talks with the ROC. It also conducted missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, prompting the US to briefly send in naval forces in a show of support for Taiwan (although the US continued to insist that it supported the “status quo”) (Romberg 2004). PRC Premier Zhu Rongji made a televised address warning Taiwanese against voting for Lee in the 1996 presidential election. If anything, the PRC’s PR strategy backfired—Lee was comfortably re-elected with 54% of the vote.

In 1999, in an interview with Radio Deutsche Welle, Lee famously called for “a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship”. This was a profound statement from the leader of the KMT, which had previously claimed to be the true legitimate leader of an undivided China. The so-called “two state theory” was predictably denounced by PRC, and publicly criticized by the US Clinton administration, which maintained its publically-declared support for the “status quo”. Lee later abolished the provincial government, claiming it was a needless redundancy, and removing from office the popular provincial governor, James Soong, who left the KMT in protest.
In 2000, the KMT, led by Vice-President Lien Chan lost a three-way presidential race (also including James Soong, leading his own new pro-unification party) to Chen Shui-bian, the DPP standard-bearer and former mayor of Taipei. This marked the first time the KMT would not rule Taiwan since 1945. As part of his election campaign, Chen had agreed to “five no’s”, including no declaration of independence, no change to the ROC’s official name, and no inclusion of Lee Teng-Hui’s “special state to state relations” terminology in the ROC constitution. Despite this, and a conciliatory inauguration speech, China, wary of Chen’s affiliation with a formerly formally pro-independence party, reacted by freezing communications with the ROC.

Under Chen, the DPP instituted a number of “Taiwanization” (bentuhua) initiatives, including increased Hoklo-language (so-called “Mother tongue”, for the “Taiwanese” majority) education, and produced new maps for pedagogical purposes that symbolically placed Taiwan closer to other Pacific nations than to China (Callahan 2009). Moreover, despite Chen’s prior “five no’s promise”, in the face of a challenging 2004 election campaign, which he won by a very small margin, Chen’s administration pursued provocative cross-Strait policies, including the failed attempt to require a national referendum on formal independence (Bedford and Hwang 2006). Later, in 2005, the Chen administration did abolish the National Unification Council, but this did not do much change the already icy relations (Clark 2008).

The KMT returned to the presidential office with the 2008 election of Ma Ying-Jeou, who had earlier beat Chen Shui-bian in the 2000 mayor’s race. Ma, the Hong Kong-born son of a KMT general, holds a Harvard law degree and had served as Chiang Ching-Kuo’s secretary in the 1970s. He promised, and delivered, tighter political and economic cooperation with the PRC,
which was much more amenable to him than to Chen Shui-bian, and won a tight re-election race in 2012.

The history related above should shed some light on Taiwan’s demographic composition, so vital to understanding Taiwan’s political geography. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Interior May 2012 figures, approximately 523,000, approximately 500,000, or 2% about Taiwan’s present-day population is composed of Austronesian peoples (yuanzhumin, “indigenous”, “aboriginal”, or literally “original residents”), whose ancestors arrived far earlier than subsequent waves of immigrants. The ethnic composition of the remainder of the population is typically split between the majority “Taiwanese” (benshengren, literally “people from this province”) and “Mainlanders” (waishengren, literally “people from outside the province”). The “Taiwanese” are composed primarily of the descendants of pre-20th century south Fujianese (minnan, or Hoklo), and secondarily by the Hakka (kejiaren, who despite originally speaking a different mother tongue are often treated as benshengren in political analysis due to their pre-20th century arrival; see S.-C. Shen and Wu 2008 for one example). The “Mainlanders” consist of the descendants of more recent arrivals from throughout China who came with the Chinese Nationalist Party following their defeat by the Chinese Communist Party in the 1940s.

It must be emphasized that these categories are increasingly porous and decreasingly important due to large-scale sociopolitical change and the passing of the last generation of Mainlanders that was actually born in China. Nonetheless, this demographic mix has influenced and continues to influence Taiwan’s politics and national imagination vis-a-vis China, with self-identified “Taiwanese” generally supporting independence, and “Mainlanders” evincing relatively more support for unification with China and identification as “Chinese” (National Chengchi University Election Study Center 2012). Note that this distinction between “Taiwanese”
and “Mainlanders” is being made here only to clarify a common domestic ethno-political division within Taiwan, and one that is crucial for understanding Taiwan’s modern political history. In the absence of this specific context, my use of the word “Taiwanese” will encompass “Mainlanders” and members of any other group that identifies as belonging to Taiwan, regardless of ethnic affiliation.

4.2 Taiwan’s current legal status, and its distinction from Hong Kong and Macau

How best to legally describe the political-territorial entity that is denoted by “Taiwan”? Legal commentators note Taiwan’s strong and stable central administration and satisfaction of typical criteria for statehood under international law, particularly those of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention) of 1933: a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the ability to maintain international relations with other governments (Charney and Prescott 2000; Cooney 1997; Geldenhuys 2009). Despite this, Taiwan (or rather, the Republic of China) has formal diplomatic relations with only 23 countries as of 2009 (Rich 2009), is stymied by the PRC in its efforts for participation in international arenas, and has no clear legal sovereign status as specified by international treaties. Moreover, no Taiwanese administration has ever declared de jure independence. Therefore, in Peter Taylor’s (1994) terms, Taiwan could be described as a state with clear and strong internal sovereignty, and ambiguous and weak external sovereignty.
Taiwan is of course not the only unusual state-type entity in the contemporary international order. Just a few other examples include Transnistria, South Ossetia, or even the Principality of Hutt River Province in Australia. Like these other entities, Taiwan engages in nation-building and identity-building projects, and conducts creative diplomacy with other states, state-like entities, and international bodies. The ROC, with its relatively high degree of political stability, global economic power, and institutional longevity, differs from some of these newer state-like players; but like them, it suffers from unclear terminology. Several terms have been used to describe such outliers. The concept of the “quasi-state” was put forth by Jackson (1993), largely to describe post-colonial nation-states in Africa that possessed international recognition in the nation-state system, i.e. these states possessed external sovereignty, but their state institutions exerted little control over their citizens or institutions within their borders, i.e. these states lacked internal sovereignty. In the ensuing debates, a variety of other terms, including “failed state”, “pseudo-state”, and “para-state” have been used for such states that lie on the margins of the international system. These latter terms are clearly inappropriate for Taiwan, which has strong and stable state institutions, including military and police forces, and an active judiciary. Kolsto has revised Jackson’s “quasi-state” term to accord to the following three criteria: its leadership exerts control over most of its claimed territory, it has “sought but not achieved international recognition as an independent state”, and it has maintained such status for over two years (2006, 726). Kolsto describes Taiwan as being in an “intermediate position between a recognized state and a quasi-state”, as it is recognized by a number of other states.

An alternative but not incompatible term, the “contested state”, has been put forth by Geldenhuys (2009), for an “entity” that has “been existing as a purportedly independent state for at least three years, desiring to be treated as a peer by confirmed states” (4). In his estimation,
Taiwan is an “entity not claiming to be a state, even if it satisfies the basic criteria of statehood... What complicates matters, though, is that Taiwan insists on exercising the rights that states enjoy in international law” (23). Historically, of course, ROC administrations on Taiwan have in the past claimed statehood, particularly as the sole legitimate state with authority over all of China. In this sense, they claimed a kind of displaced sovereignty (McConnell 2009), and one that was widely recognized as such until the 1970s, when the PRC finally surpassed the ROC in the international recognition race by forming more formal diplomatic ties than the ROC. Following de-recognition from the US and the UN and the gradual relinquishing of the ROC’s territorial claims to China, the ROC leadership’s territorial claims to external sovereignty went from fantastical (over all of China) to deliberately ambiguous in order to prevent PRC military action. Given these conditions, Taiwan is therefore best described as a “de facto state”, a terminological revision to Kolsto’s formulation that has fairly been described as “the most appropriate and most neutral” for such cases (O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 2011, 2).

Taiwan’s de facto statehood consists of limited international recognition and contested external sovereignty. Taiwan thus can be distinguished in both de facto and de jure terms from Hong Kong and Macau, territories which were respectively colonies of the United Kingdom and Portugal, but were handed over to PRC rule in 1997 and 1999 and designated as “Special Administrative Regions” (SAR) under a “one country, two systems” (OCTS) scheme. The OCTS scheme was initially designed by the PRC in the early 1980s to bring Taiwan under PRC rule, but with a high enough degree of autonomy for Taiwan to maintain its capitalist economic system. Hong Kong and Macau have been described as test-runs for this approach for Taiwan (Cooney 1997), and the three regions are frequently grouped together in official PRC discourse. For example, airports in the PRC distinguish between “Domestic” and “International and Hong
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (Gang Ao Tai)” departure zones. Such signage was evident even before the beginning of direct cross-Strait flights. Airports in Taiwan, on the other hand, list PRC cities, Hong Kong, and Macau as international destinations.

The “One Country, Two Systems” SAR scheme requires further elaboration as one of China’s various “zoning technologies” (Ong 2004), and as distinct from the Special Economic Zone (SEZ). While the practice of state demarcation of different economic zones did not originate in East Asia—European colonial powers have specified different economic zones under the same sovereign at least since the 19th century—Ong has argued that the PRC has used zoning technologies in order to allow for “variegated sovereignty” in a “Chinese axis” in a way that is qualitatively different from the economic regional formations of, for example, the European Union or the North American free trade zone. That is to say, the PRC has established a variety of different zones to flexibly manage political and economic affairs across the vast territory over which it claims sovereignty. Ong has identified the following types of zones: Major Border Zones, including the Special Economic Zone (SEZ, e.g. Shenzhen, Zhuhai), Open Coastal Cities (e.g. Shanghai, Dalian), and Open Coastal Belts (e.g. Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta); Domestic Interior Zones (e.g. free trade zones and state-level economic and technology zones); and Special Administrative Zones (e.g. Macau SAR and Hong Kong SAR).

The purpose of the SEZ, as formulated by Deng Xiaoping and approved by the National People’s Congress in 1980, was to experiment with market activity, economic development, and international investment within clearly demarcated zones (although of course there have been major spillover effects for the rest of the PRC’s political economy). These were, at least according to Ong’s interpretation, modeled on free trade zones that had been set up elsewhere, particularly in Taiwan and South Korea. These zones were granted “a wide array of powers,
including substantial autonomy for the local creation of business opportunities, as well as simplified administrative regulations for planning, banking, and insurance” (Ong 2004, 78). SEZ exceptions included lower business taxes, increased access to international capital (often drawn from overseas Chinese communities), and more lenient labor regulations. Migrant laborers from elsewhere in the PRC had to apply for special permits, and were not privy to the same labor protections or trade union requirements as they would have been in their home provinces. Meanwhile, the appointed leadership of SEZs, while autonomous in principle, reported directly to Beijing instead of to provincial governments.

It is worth mentioning that apart from the establishment of the SEZ scheme, urban administration rescaled and decentralized rapidly throughout China during the Deng era, leading one Chinese scholar to observe “the emergence of cities as autonomous local states” (J. Shen 2008, 12). That having been said, SEZs represent a distinctive zoning technology with different political considerations than other rescaled urban divisions, such as special municipalities like Shanghai or Chongqing. The first SEZs were located in border cities/areas such as Shenzhen, adjacent to Hong Kong; Zhuhai, adjacent to Macau; Xiamen, facing Taiwan across the Strait; and Hainan Island, relatively close to the overseas Chinese communities of southeast Asia. These sites were chosen not only for reasons based on the intrinsic economic conditions of those sites, but also, Ong argues, because the “economic linkages, wealth, and capitalist experiments in SEZs also served explicit political goals by managing the eventual integration of Hong Kong, Macao [Macau], and Taiwan with mainland China” (2004, 78). This political strategy apparently succeeded in the case of Hong Kong and Macau, both of which were incorporated as Special Administrative Regions.
The Special Administrative Region is distinct from the SEZ in that the SAR is permitted to have its own administrative, legislative, and judicial systems, at least for a predetermined period of time (Cooney 1997). The 1984 agreement between China and Great Britain specified that Hong Kong’s administrative structure, including its British-style legal system, would remain distinct intact for 50 years following the “handover” to the PRC in 1997. However, there would be no question as to the PRC’s sovereignty over Hong Kong. A similar arrangement was prepared for Macau, formerly a colony of Portugal. Despite the minimal direct involvement of the people of Hong Kong or Macau in these arrangements, and a series of anti-PRC protests, particularly in Hong Kong, there is no state apparatus in either of these territories that is not answerable to the PRC. Unlike Taiwan, neither Hong Kong nor Macau maintain or have attempted to establish country-to-country relations with other states. Whether or not the PRC leadership has public support in Hong Kong or Macau, there is no evident alternative. There is likewise no international debate as to whether China has territorial sovereignty over these territories, however unusual its arrangement. Clearly, Taiwan’s sovereign status is distinct in both de facto and de jure terms from that of Hong Kong and Macau.

As useful as Ong’s concept of “variegated sovereignty” may be for analyzing the various zoning strategies within the uncontested borders of the PRC, such as the SAR and SEZ, and however provocative her theory may be for understanding how economic strategies coupled with cultural ties may continue reconfiguring regional political formations in east and southeast Asia, there remain a serious problem in her approach. This problem is an uncritical assumption of an implicitly timeless, ahistorical Chinese ethnicity that extends beyond state borders, and with it a failure to address the complex dynamic between nation, state, and identity. Ong refers repeatedly to the existence of overseas Chinese communities in east and southeast Asia, and to
their links with Chinese individuals and institutions within nominally Chinese polities, without addressing how these Chinese subject positions are formed, maintained, or even discarded. Her argument about how Beijing’s flexible zoning strategies are producing a “Greater China” vis a vis overseas Chinese does not address how overseas Chinese are constructed as ethnic or national subjects in a complex dance between various state policies, economic opportunities, and mobile cultural practices. Her economistic focus ignores the cultural policies, associations, and media events designed to promote Chinese identity abroad (Barabantseva 2005). This oversight is all the more striking, given that this particular article’s implicit assumption of an ahistorical transnational Chinese subjectivity overlooks even her own past work demonstrating that overseas Chinese identities are claimed or disclaimed flexibly and pragmatically (Ong 1999), and that even within the PRC, Han Chinese identity is a dynamic category affected by state policy (D. Y.-C. Wu 1991). While Ong discusses Taiwan in detail, treating it as a “breakaway territorial possession” (2004, 76), she fails to note how Taiwanese popular opinion has dramatically shifted away from Chinese identification and towards Taiwanese identification. In 2010, more respondents identified as “Taiwanese” than they did as “Chinese” or even “Chinese and Taiwanese”, and this general trend was already evident in the late 1990s.

This shift in Taiwanese national identity happened precisely during the period of increased economic integration between Taiwan and the PRC, an integration so deep that Ong suggests it has made “political unification of China and its breakaway parts inevitable” (2004, 76). But even if we allow that an economic “Chinese axis” can be said to emerging, the shared cultural identification of all of its supposed subjects should not be taken for granted, especially in the context of the territorial dispute between the PRC and Taiwan, and Taiwan’s volatile internal ethnic politics. Thus, at least one branch of the “Chinese axis” may arguably be said to be
coming apart culturally and politically even as it is economically coming together. My argument here, however less normative, echoes that of Chien-Min Chao, who has suggested that the “positive effects” of economic integration have been “offset” by “political cultural gaps”, and have even opened up rifts not just between, but within the respective societies (C. Chao 2003). This is tantamount to a shift, split, or rupture in Taiwan’s state territorialization program not only vis a vis China, but within Taiwan’s polity viewed in isolation. That this process appears to have accelerated during a period of increased mobility between Taiwan and the PRC, both for business and for leisure travelers, warrants all the more investigation.

4.3 The rise of cross-Strait tourism

All travel from Taiwan to the PRC was strictly prohibited from 1949 until 1987, although many Taiwanese traveled to China via a third country or territory (typically, Hong Kong or Macau) and did not get their passports stamped. In 1987, Taiwan rescinded the ban and gave special travel permission to certain groups, particularly veterans or others who had been separated from their families in China due to the KMT’s retreat to Taiwan. In 1988, 473,000 Taiwanese visited the PRC. As restrictions on leisure and other forms of travel were gradually loosened, the number of annual tourist visits rose to 1.2 million by 1992, and 3.7 million in 2004 (Guo et al. 2006).

Travel from the PRC to Taiwan was permitted by the ROC in 1988, but only for the visitation of sick relatives or attendance at funerals. Gradually, visits for other purposes were permitted, including media projects, attendance at special cultural events, and business. The
years from 1988 and 2004 saw a total of roughly 858,900 PRC visitors to Taiwan, not an inconsiderable amount, but still a fraction of the flow from Taiwan to China (Guo et al. 2006). Without direct air or sea links, all such travel had to pass through Hong Kong, Macau, or another transit point.

In 1990, two quasi-state, quasi-private, semi-official agencies were set up in Taiwan and the PRC to facilitate communications and negotiations: the Taipei-based Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), and the Beijing-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) (C. Chao 2003). Negotiation between these agencies has been the initial primary avenue for agreements on cross-Strait transportation and tourism.

Following many rounds of negotiations, charter flights to bring PRC-based Taiwanese businesspeople home for the Lunar New Year holidays began in 2003, but were canceled the following year amid Taiwanese election-year controversy. In 2006, an agreement was reached between China's General Administration of Civil Aviation and Taiwan’s MAC to permit direct charter passenger flights during other major holidays, as well as cargo and humanitarian flights that could occur throughout the year, with individual approval. New York Times writer Keith Bradsher portrayed the agreement as a ploy by President Chen, who was facing impeachment proceedings based on corruption charges, to boost his sagging approval ratings (2006). With MAC polls showing 75 percent support for expanded charter flights, this was not an unpopular move. Yet an even higher percentage of respondents, 85 percent, supported maintenance of the de facto independent “status quo” of Taiwanese de facto sovereignty (Huang 2006), suggesting that the Taiwanese public wished to improve cross-Strait transportation infrastructure without sacrificing its right to autonomy and self-determination.
Taiwan’s administration began planning to receive Chinese leisure tourists as early as 2001 (T.-I. Tsai 2006b). The Chen cabinet prepared a report advocating for direct regular flights in 2003, according to its Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairman Joseph Wu (Pulse/CNA 2005). Holding up tourism promotion was the sovereignty dispute, and a matter of names—specifically the PRC’s unwillingness to list Taiwan as a foreign country, and Taiwan’s unwillingness to refer to itself as a province. In 2006, MAC vice-Chairman David Huang said, “Taiwan is not listed as a travel destination. There is currently no legal basis for Chinese tourists to apply to visit Taiwan… When we negotiate this… we will continue to express our stance that the Republic of China is a sovereign, independent, country and that the People's Republic of China is a separate political entity” (Rickards 2006). In the meantime, limited sight-seeing had in fact been permitted in some form by China (China Post 2005), but continued diplomatic wrangling kept the numbers down. Only 173,000 PRC tourists visited Taiwan in 2004, while 4.1 million Taiwanese visited the PRC, causing concern about unbalanced economic flows and underdevelopment of tourism infrastructure and resources in Taiwan (Bradsher 2006). The Chen administration wanted the negotiations to proceed via “official government” channels without preconditions, but the PRC leadership was unwilling to speak with the Chen administration, which it repeatedly criticized as pro-independence. The PRC insisted on holding the talks via “private” channels and organizations, so as not to lend legitimacy to the Chen administration. One impasse was solved in 2006 by China’s founding of the Cross-Strait Tourism Association and Taiwan’s founding of the Taiwan Strait Traveling and Tourism Association. Though private in name, the negotiations between these two entities were still “dominated” by state actors (T.-I. Tsai 2006b). The names of the organizations had been a major sticking point, with China initially...
refusing to deal with any organization with the name, “Republic of China”. Even inclusion of the name “Taiwan” was initially rejected (T.-I. Tsai 2006a).

Ma Ying-jeou, of the pro-unification KMT party, was elected President in March 2008. A few months later in July saw the first entry to Taiwan of a Chinese tour group on a direct flight. Though some kind of milestone had finally been reached, subsequent Chinese tourist numbers were kept down by China’s rigorous screening process, at least according to the MAC. Instead of maximum of 3,000 tourists per day permitted by Taiwan, there was only a daily average of several hundred. Prospective tourists were, among other things, required by PRC authorities to prove employment, pay a bond of 50,000 yuan (over US$6000 in 2008), and submit to other paperwork and screening checks (Reuters 2008). All tourists were required to join group tours. Such PRC rules and regulations were not particularly different for Taiwan than for some other approved destinations (Arlt 2006).

Regular cross-Strait flights finally began in August 2009, following yet more rounds of talks, with flights from destinations in China including Beijing, Shanghai, Fuzhou, and Xiamen, to Taipei’s Songshan Airport, Taoyuan International Airport, and Taichung Airport in Taiwan. Average occupancy was a low 62.7% in the first months (Shan 2009). There were 972,123 total PRC arrivals for 2009, of whom nearly 540,000 listed “Pleasure” as their primary purpose. Total numbers of PRC arrivals were just 28,000 shy of Japan, still number one (Republic of China Ministry of Transportation and Communications Tourism Bureau 2010).

PRC tourist numbers spiked sharply in 2010, seeing the PRC pulling solidly ahead of Japan to become the number one sending country to Taiwan, and earning PRC tourists recognition as the “bread and butter of Taiwan’s tourism industry” from Taipei-based English
language newspaper *The China Post* on January 4, 2011. Total numbers of PRC arrivals in 2010 were over 1.6 million, with over 1.2 million listing “Pleasure” as their primary purpose.

Significantly, in May 2010, the PRC-based Cross-Strait Tourism Association set up office in Taipei, and the Taipei-based Taiwan Strait Traveling and Tourism Association set up office in Beijing. This marked the first establishment of reciprocal state offices of any kind since the founding of the PRC. In Taiwan, this was presented as a non-political and purely functional arrangement to facilitate tourism. Said Tourism Bureau Director-General Lai Seh-jen, “The new offices will focus on promoting cross-Strait tourism, assisting tourists and resolving emergency situations. Issues relating to politics and foreign affairs will not be involved” (China Times 2010b). PRC officials expressed hope for broader significance from the office openings. Fan Liching, spokeswoman for mainland China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, said, “The move is conducive to facilitating future cross-Strait development” (China Times 2010a).

Tourist numbers continued their rise in 2011, with a total of nearly 1.8 million PRC arrivals, of whom nearly 1.3 million listed “Pleasure” as their primary purpose. Another major milestone was Taiwan’s reception of independent, non-group tourists, who were first allowed to arrive from Shanghai in June 2011. A total of 500 per day was permitted from Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen (Kang and Chen 2011). The quota was doubled to 1,000 less than a year later, in April 2012, with several more sending cities permitted (AFP 2012).

The arrival of PRC tourists has been met with major controversy in Taiwan. While some politicians and former Chen administration officials have portrayed PRC tourists as security threats (for example, see Cole 2010; V. Y. Chao 2011), polls and blog reports have also indicated something of a Taiwanese public backlash against the more mundane behavior of PRC
tourists. A 2009 government poll indicated that only 24.9\% of respondents had a “good impression” of PRC tourists, with 33\% holding a “bad impression”, and the rest neutral or having no opinion (Republic of China Executive Yuan Research Development and Evaluation Commission 2009). A number of critical blog entries have been posted in Taiwan with photos of PRC tourists washing their feet in public restrooms, urinating in public, and otherwise behaving in ways deemed inappropriate by commenters. Such blogs have been common in Hong Kong for years, and have even been reposted in the PRC. ²

While public opinion polls in Taiwan have sometimes reflected support for PRC tourist arrivals (Huang 2006), the rapid developments have not been received uniformly positively, even by a Taiwanese travel industry that had initially been eager to receive new business. Lower arrival numbers than expected in early 2009, even as Taiwanese tourist outflow to the PRC rose, as well as reports of poor behavior by Chinese tourists (Lee and Lin 2009), provided fodder for DPP politicians who accused President Ma and the KMT of pursuing a cross-Strait policy that benefited China more than Taiwan (Hsu 2009), despite the fact that much of the policy had in fact been initially planned by the DPP. Numbers improved in in early 2009, with an average of 3,000 tourists a day in April, only to plummet again a few months later, reportedly due to Chinese tourist concerns about the H1N1 influenza outbreak in Taiwan, producing a “sense of shock” in the previously optimistic Taiwanese travel industry (United Daily News 2009).

Even with tourist numbers soaring in 2010 and 2011, a number of tour operators in Taiwan said that they were actually losing money. According to a report in the Associated Press (AP), a number of businesspeople complained of late payments from Chinese industry partners:

² See for example http://luo.bo/20395/ or http://biz.cn.yahoo.com/newspic/biz/6573/.
the total delinquent amount was claimed to be as high as US$169.5 million, which meant late payments for local tour guides and other industry employees. Of the 300 operators licensed by the Taiwan government to receive PRC tourists, 13 Hong Kong-based operators took 50% of the revenues. Also, Taiwanese operators were said they were forced by their partners in China, who paid as low as US$20 a day per tourist, to cut costs by offering sub-standard accommodations and service, and gouge customers on shopping excursions to stores with high commissions. "Chinese tourists are getting up earlier than roosters, eating worse than pigs, and are totally exhausted from spending most of their days on intercity buses," said an official at the Taiwan International Tour Manager Development Association. (Associated Press 2011). The same AP report also took issue with the Ma administration’s claim that PRC tourists brought US$2 billion in spending to the island, pointing out that the figure was based on airport surveys of 1,896 tourists, rather than on data received from hotels, shopping malls, or other industry actors. The AP report, based on an analysis of tour prices, suggests that the government’s number may have been exaggerated by as much as US$700 million.

That tourism was the rationale for the establishment of the first cross-Strait quasi-state reciprocal offices underscores its political importance, from which its economic impact cannot be divorced. The interplay between and relative importance of the political and the economic is a long-standing concern of cross-Strait researchers. For example, Sutter has argued for the primacy of the economic, suggesting that there is a “dynamic of business interests pulling government policy along as policy makers struggle to keep pace with commercial reality” (2002). It has been suggested following the failure of the more aggressive cross-Strait policies of his predecessors, PRC President Hu Jintao’s administration has been attempting to use economic leverage to increase Taiwan’s dependence on the PRC. This corresponds with the slogan, “yi
“shang cu zheng, yi min cu guan”, quoted by Kastner, meaning to “peddle politics through business, to influence government through the people” (2006). It should not be forgotten that this comes in tandem with a PRC military buildup, of which one of the two primary purposes, says Shambaugh, has been “to develop a range of capabilities with respect to Taiwan” (2004, 85). This last point validates Kastner’s skepticism about economic integration necessarily leading to reduced chance of war. In fact, he points out that the pro-independence Lee Teng-hui once used signs increasing economic interdependence between Taiwan and China to argue that Taiwan should push harder for formal independence, because the costs of war would be too great for China to bear.

Regardless of whether it’s US$2 billion as the Ma administration claimed, or much less, as the AP argued has argued, annual revenues from PRC tourism are still a fraction of Taiwanese GDP. Whether or not economic integration is a viable strategic choice to achieve unification, and as important as cross-Strait tourism revenues may eventually become to Taiwan’s economy, the controversies touched upon above suggest that even tourism becomes more economically vital to Taiwan, it may also be widening cross-Strait political and cultural divisions. With cultural affinity and shared historical roots serving as the most typically cited justifications for the PRC’s territorial claims to Taiwan, the possibility that tourism may increase Taiwanese society’s political and cultural alienation from the PRC cannot be ignored. There is therefore the potential that the PRC may be sabotaging its own goal of reunification by promoting cross-Strait tourism. Here we then have the crux of the issue: The possibility of a contradiction between the PRC’s state territorialization program and its chosen technology of tourism. Moreover, should there be any evidence that the tourists’ political opinions about unification change as a result of
experience in Taiwan, the situation may become all the more intriguing. Such research has yet to be performed.

4.4 Tourism as diplomatic weapon and technology of PRC state power

Since 1978, tourism has been a weapon in the PRC and Taiwan’s fight for international political recognition and support, particularly from overseas Chinese (huaqiao or huaren). This marks a major turnaround from the PRC’s Cultural Revolution-era persecution of people with ties to overseas Chinese, partly by which, “most overseas Chinese communities became affiliated with the government on Taiwan and experienced a reduction in their ties with mainland China” (Arlt 2006, 33). The ROC used this position to shore up its international diplomatic support, as well as to finance infrastructural projects. After the PRC re-opened its borders in 1978, overseas Chinese were targeted as sources of capital and international support. This campaign was successful—as inbound tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI) increased, “sympathies started to move from Taibei [Taipei] to Beijing” (Arlt 2006, 30).

The PRC’s targeting of overseas Chinese was prefigured by its tourism industry’s two-tiered structure, as well as state record-keeping practice. Two of the major state tourism companies, China Travel Service (CTS) and China International Travel Service (CITS), had been set up earlier to explicitly serve different markets, overseas Chinese and foreigners, respectively. Given that these were state enterprises, a distinction between overseas Chinese and other tourists was thus made not just in industry strategy or operations but by calculative state institutional practice. Arlt also notes that all PRC inbound tourism statistics carefully distinguish between
foreigners (waiguoren), “compatriots” (tongbao, including Taiwanese), and overseas Chinese (huaqiao). Likewise, ROC statistics have always distinguished between foreigners and overseas Chinese (huaqiao, including mainland Chinese), but subtly different from the PRC’s records, does not include a compatriot category.

Overseas Chinese were targeted by the Deng-era PRC as key to its modernization and development campaign. The purpose was not just to profit from foreign currency (a major goal of inbound non-Chinese tourism), but also to strengthen links with overseas Chinese sources of investment capital and to use transnational Chinese cultural affinity to strengthen the regime in Beijing. The results, both in terms of tourist numbers as well as FDI have been remarkable. All PRC inbound tourist numbers went up following 1978, but overseas Chinese arrivals dwarfed others—between 1978 and 1985, foreign arrivals grew six-fold from 230,000 to 1.37 million, while overseas Chinese arrivals grew ten-fold from 1.58 million to 16.48 million. That is to say that there were nearly 15 times as many overseas Chinese visitors as foreign visitors in 1985. Overseas Chinese (or “compatriots”) became the major source for FDI in the PRC, with 76 percent coming from Hong Kong and Macau between 1978 and 1993, and 9 percent from Taiwan (Fan 1997, 148, quoted in Arlt 2006, 33). Simultaneously, PRC tourism policy also called for outcompeting the ROC in the game of international recognition and support, “especially by parading the economic success of China vis-a-vis Taiwan” to overseas Chinese visitors (Arlt 2006, 37).

The situation can be summarized as follows:

…by claiming the Chinese identity of all ethnic Chinese and their ‘natural’ affiliation towards the People’s Republic, the government in Beijing has quite successfully used a transnationalistic approach (Nyíri and Breidenbach 2005) to utilize the Chinese living in Hong Kong, Macao, other countries and even Taiwan
to support the modernization of China economically and the status of China politically. This happened within the framework of the long-term goals of regaining control over Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, *winning the support of overseas communities in competition to the Taibei [Taipei] government* and turning the brain drain of Chinese students not returning, but staying outside of China, into an advantage. *Tourism has been a major tool in achieving these goals* (2006, 34; emphasis mine).

Such politically-motivated tourism policies and practices have included: the permitting of visa-free entry for overseas Chinese, the official organization of “visiting relatives” tours to Hong Kong and Macau prior to those territories’ integration to the PRC, regulations that encouraged outbound travel to countries with large overseas Chinese communities, including Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and the operation of summer camps within the PRC that targeted overseas Chinese youth participants. All of these tourism policies have served to strengthen ties between overseas Chinese and the PRC regime. Inasmuch as they have established PRC regional hegemony, they have weakened the ROC’s overseas affiliations, destabilizing Taiwan’s political position even in a “Chinese axis” or “Greater China” in which it is undeniably a major economic player. This view of China’s tourism policy supports Arlt’s general argument that “the political needs of those who wield power” are one of the “main forces shaping the development of tourism in general and outbound tourism in particular…” (3).

China’s outbound tourism has, since 1995, been regulated by a system that confers Approved Destination Status (ADS) to countries that have signed bilateral agreements with China. Facing pressure from an increasingly mobile and wealthy population, the central government instituted this system to bring tourism under its control. Three agencies are involved in its administration and international negotiation: The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Public Security, and the China National Tourism Administration. The initial main purpose of the ADS was to prevent Chinese nationals from bringing too much hard currency abroad (Arlt 2006). At
that time, Chinese travelers were already permitted to go to Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines as part of a “Visit Friends and Relatives” program. Those countries soon received ADS status, followed by South Korea in 1998 and Australia and New Zealand in 1999. Since then, more than 100 countries have signed ADS agreements with China. As ADS is negotiated with other countries, it is not used for territories administered by the PRC, such as Hong Kong or Macau. ADS is certainly not on the table for Taiwan, as it would be tantamount to an acknowledgment that Taiwan is a separate and sovereign country.

ADS status allows outbound group tourists to apply for visas through travel agencies, saving them a trip to the consulate. It also encourages greater marketing of group tours. Therefore, it is a highly desirable designation for countries that are eager to boost inbound tourism revenue. As ADS rules stipulate that the receiving country should “have good political relationships with China”, it may be used as a political tool to encourage China-friendly attitudes and policies. For example, it took Canada over 18 ministerial visits to China and a change to more pro-China rhetoric and policy-positions before it earned ADS in 2009. This so-called “gift” is expected to bring over US$100 million in additional annual tourist revenues (Lo 2011).

Although Taiwan cannot officially earn ADS, it still must deal with agencies that are used to using tourism to extract political concessions.

Complementing these political and economic tactics, the cultural authority exerted via the construction and management of tourism sites is an additional dimension for analysis of Chinese state practice. Nyíri has argued in his book, *Scenic Spots*, based on content analysis of tourism promotional brochures, historical review of Chinese literati travel discourse, and ethnographies of Chinese domestic tourism practices, that the PRC “sponsors a discursive regime in which scenic spots and their state-endorsed hierarchy are tools of patriotic education and
modernization, and in which the state has the ultimate authority to determine the meaning of the landscape” (2006, 75). Nyíri traces the organizational conditions that allow this to happen, including the deep institutional and personal overlaps between state regulatory agencies, tour operators, and site developers and management. He likewise discusses the use of scenic spots as symbols of state authority, as components of the late socialist nation-building project, and borrowing from Oakes (1998), the use of ethnic minority sites to present China as a modern and territorially bounded nation.

Nyíri’s book ends with a brief examination of outbound Chinese tourism to Europe, as well as the PRC’s use of foreign scenic sites to articulate its authority. By way of example, he describes how the Eiffel Tower was turned red during an official state visit of President Hu Jintao. Nyíri concludes, “One thing is certain: the Chinese state, as long as it exists in its current form, will attempt to assert its cultural authority over foreign landscapes” (108).

Bringing this back to Taiwan, we can expect a complex and contentious interplay of state and market forces in the struggle over the operation and representation of tourist sites, particularly those of symbolic political significance. This has already been observed, for example, in the case of the Jiang (Chiang) Cultural Park in Taoyuan, a county in northern Taiwan. In 2005, in the midst of a national anti-Chiang Kai-Shek campaign led by the then-ruling DPP, the KMT-led Taoyuan county government, anticipating a future influx of PRC tourists, began planning a Chiang Kai-shek themed-park around a complex of Chiang-related heritage buildings. Chiang Kai-shek was transformed from a dictator into a cool or even cute figure, his image in a souvenir postcard literally transforming from the stern “Generalissimo” into “Mickey Chiang”, the late dictator wearing a Mickey Mouse hat. Taoyuan County Magistrate Chu Lu-luan described Chiang as an “essence” of modern Chinese history, thereby placing Taoyuan in a Chinese
“cultural trajectory” (Woo 2011). Chiang is by no means beloved in China, but he remains an object of great historical interest. Even if he was an enemy of the Chinese Communist Party, he was at least a Chinese nationalist, and thus vastly preferable to the contemporary PRC than the separatist Lee Teng-hui. With this presentation of Chiang, we can observe a local government within Taiwan, motivated by potential revenues from PRC tourists, attempting to construct a Chinese scenic site within Taiwan, without any apparent direct involvement from PRC state agencies or industry actors.

As PRC tourists continue entering Taiwan in great numbers, there are increasingly many similar cases. Yet, with Taiwan’s vastly different political management and tourism economy, the discursive coherence and visual uniformity that Nyíri observes in Chinese scenic spots is traveling inconsistently across the Strait. The Chinese tourist engagement with Taiwanese tourist sites thus presents the possibility for rupture and breakdown of the PRC’s cultural authority over “Chinese” tourism sites. Alternative versions of Chinese-ness or Taiwanese-ness are already be competing politically and economically, as tourist site construction and management is debated within Taiwan’s polity, reformulated by market logics, and sold to and consumed by Chinese tourists. At stake, as with any such cultural production, is the identity of the nation and the performance of its territory. My next chapter will provide an ethnographic account of such performances, and an analysis of their consequences for the state territorialization programs of Taiwan and the PRC.
Chapter 5

An ethnographic analysis of cross-Strait tourism

This thesis has argued that tourism should be treated as a technology of state territorialization, and that the case of PRC tourists going to Taiwan is a timely one to apply such a theory. Based on fieldwork conducted in Taiwan during July and August, 2012, this chapter will use the concepts developed in previous chapters to explore such political and territorial implications of cross-Strait tourism. In particular, I will examine the production of the state and state territory in the cross-Strait tourist encounter, and discuss the contradictions inherent in the PRC’s use of tourism as a technology of state territorialization.

My research methods were primarily ethnographic. In Taipei, I identified several popular sites, including the Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Hall, National Palace Museum, and conducted interviews with a total of 36 tourists. I also conducted research at Songshan Airport in Taipei, a major transit point for PRC tourists, and a necessary site for this study of border performativity and state territory. Due to tight tourist itineraries, these interviews ranged in length from ten to 75 minutes. I also interviewed 10 Taiwanese tour guides and 6 PRC tour directors. Most of these interviews took place on-site while tourists, guides, and tour directors had free time or were
waiting for their groups to reassemble; the other interviews took place in hotel lobbies or cafes.

My deepest single engagement came when I accompanied a group of six tourists from Shanghai on two different day tours in Taipei, including visits to the Taipei 101 skyscraper, the Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Hall, the National Palace Museum, the former residence of Chiang Kai-shek in Shilin, and, significantly, transport time on the tour bus between sites, during which much of the verbal interaction between guide and tourist occurred. I also conducted research at Sun Moon Lake in central Taiwan, the Koxinga Shrine in the southern city of Tainan, and various stops on the eastern coast. At each site, I observed and took notes on guide explanations and tourist questions; observed tourist behavior, particularly interaction between tourists, guides, and vendors; and whenever possible, interviewed tourists, guides, and tour directors after introducing my research project and receiving verbal consent. I also interviewed vendors and site staff at numerous locations. When convenient and permitted by informants, I conducted audio recording. Otherwise, I took written or electronic notes.

I will focus in this chapter on two interweaving issues: One, how cross-Strait tourism is producing multiple, ambiguous, overlapping, and contradictory sensations of stateness within Taiwan, and two, how tourism is both ameliorating and exacerbating contradictions between and within the territorialization programs of the PRC and Taiwan.

The first point—that cross-Strait tourism has produced multiple, ambiguous, and overlapping sensations of stateness and state territory within Taiwan—illustrates Mitchell’s and Foucault’s argument that the state should be viewed as an effect, and not a unitary actor. This is demonstrated by the remarks of many PRC group tourists that feel as if they are still within China—not just because of the PRC’s territorial claims—but because state and industry actors
shape their touristic experience of Taiwan in ways that are very similar to their experience of
tours within the PRC.

On the other hand, ordinary Taiwanese suggest that they don’t want to go to sites popular
with PRC tourists, because they don't want to feel like they are “in China”. This leads to the
second point: The more PRC group tourists engage with Taiwanese, the more they express a
sense of cultural affinity, admiration, and crucially, identification with them as fellow Chinese
nationals. Yet, the more Taiwanese engage with PRC group tourists, the more culturally, socially
and politically alienated Taiwanese feel from China and Chinese nationals. Such a contradiction
between the delight of guests and the distaste of hosts is certainly not unique to cross-Strait
tourism. What makes this case remarkable is that PRC tourists, invariably believing that Taiwan
is a part of China, identify with Taiwanese hosts as fellow (ethno)national subjects that should
rightfully be under the sovereign jurisdiction of the PRC, even if these tourists acknowledge the
existence of Taiwan’s different state administration. Therefore, the push and pull of this
encounter is of consequence for the territorial socialization of tourists and the toured, as well as
for the trajectory of cross-Strait diplomatic engagement, especially given Taiwan’s democratic
political system.

Overlapping sensations of stateness and multiple sovereignties are also evident in Hong
Kong and Macau, as are tensions with PRC tourists. However, as described in Chapter 4, the
stakes are far greater in de facto independent, democratic Taiwan. Sovereignty over Hong Kong
and Macau was signed over to the PRC by past European colonial administrations. No such
process is forthcoming for Taiwan. As the PRC appears to be using economic methods to
manipulate Taiwan’s electorate, in the absence of war, popular sentiment in democratic Taiwan
is likely to play a determining factor in any resolution of the longstanding cross-Strait dispute over sovereignty and territory.

The touristic production of PRC stateness in parts of Taiwan—that is, the apparent territorialization of tourist areas as parts of the PRC—coincides with the deterritorialization of these same areas as Taiwanese. The more that PRC tourists go to tourist sites, the more that Taiwanese tourists avoid them. As one middle-aged Taiwanese man told me, “I don’t go to the beach at Kenting any more. There are too many mainlanders there now. It’s like going to China.”

Even experienced Taiwanese tour guides who are gaining economic benefit from increased work opportunities, complained about the “mess [zao]” that rapid tourist development has brought to such destinations. Meanwhile, PRC tourists, even if they sometimes say they feel like they’re in China, often comment on their pleasant interactions with Taiwanese people. The sentiments of the writer, Han Han, who praised Taiwan and Taiwanese people in his blog, were widely shared by my informants from the PRC.

Nearly every PRC tourist I spoke with said that they found people in Taiwan generally more “civilized” [wenming] than people in China. Even group tourists who had little interaction with Taiwanese who weren’t guides or vendors uniformly praised the superior customer service and personal warmth [reqing] and kindness [tiexin] of the local people. Like the popular blogger, Han Han, many of them attributed these qualities to Taiwan’s supposedly better preserved Chinese culture. “People here didn’t go through the Cultural Revolution, so they treat each other with more trust than we do,” said one typical female tourist.

On the other hand, Taiwanese locals, including vendors, complained to me about the poor behavior of Chinese group tourists. Common complaints included loud talking, smoking in
inappropriate places, poor hygiene and public urination and spitting, and refusal to wait in line. “They send us all the worst, lowest quality [su\-zh\-i] people in China,” said a woman working the door at the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall.

This points to a fundamental contradiction: The more that PRC tourists engage with Taiwanese, the closer the affinity they express for Taiwan and Taiwanese people, supporting a unificationist territorialization program. Yet, the more that my Taiwanese informants engaged with PRC tourists, the more alienated they felt from China’s people and culture, undermining the unificationist program. Such an uneasy outcome suggests that tourism, as a technology of state territorialization, is a fundamentally problematic and potentially self-sabotaging tool in the arsenal of foreign policy elites.

Before I develop these arguments, I must note that the above conclusions are drawn primarily from considerations of group tourism, which is having a quantitatively and qualitatively larger impact on Taiwan’s society than FIT (Free Independent Travel) tourism. As noted in Chapter Four, PRC group tourists were permitted to enter Taiwan several years earlier, in 2008, while FIT tourists were not permitted to enter until 2011. Group tourists still compose the majority of arrivals in Taiwan, although FIT tours are increasingly popular. Group tours, due to bulk discount pricing, are almost always less expensive than FIT tours, and have much more tightly regimented itineraries with fewer opportunities for interaction with locals in heterogeneous, non-enclavic space. Taiwanese respondents generally expressed higher regard for the social and educational background of FIT tourists, as well as their behavior on tour. FIT tourists also usually expressed different perceptions of Taiwanese stateness than group tourists. I will argue below that is the structure of the group tour in particular that produces the effect of PRC stateness, and that FIT tourists may experience a very different kind of Taiwan.
Group tours can be split typologically into sightseeing (guanguang) and inspection (canfang). At the state-institutional level, the sightseeing tours are supervised by the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, while the inspection tours are supervised by the Ministry of the Economy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or another relevant agency. Sightseeing tours emphasize shopping—and due to the pricing structure, these tourists often eat and sleep at less-expensive, lower-quality sites, but spend large sums on Taiwanese products. Significantly, the social class and spending habits of the inspection tours are quite different—usually these tourists possess higher educational degrees and social status, including Communist Party membership. As their tourism expenses are paid for by state agencies, they stay in higher-quality accommodations while spending far less on souvenirs. These groups typically had more flexible itineraries, and included some (usually brief) non-explicitly touristic activity, including visits with collaborating companies or state agencies.

5.1 Multiple, contradictory sensations of stateness in tourist sites

Sun Moon Lake, in Nantou County, is one of Taiwan’s most popular tourist sites. Originally two lakes, the Japanese colonial administration connected and expanded the zone after building a hydroelectric dam. Traditionally popular with Taiwanese families and honeymooners, Sun Moon Lake is now a near-mandatory stop for all PRC group tours. Reliable statistics on visitor identity remain sparse, but according to every vendor I interviewed, the PRC tourists already vastly outnumber Taiwanese visitors, and their proportion continues rising.
Sun Moon Lake is, along with Alishan, one of the two tourist sites in Taiwan that all PRC tourists reported learning about in their high school textbooks. As one Shanghainese tour director told me, “If we don’t go to both places, it’s like we’ve never been to Taiwan.” These sites combine several themes that are familiar for PRC tourists: The “scenic spot”, with mountains and water, that has been inscribed with meaning and relevance by state-sponsored literati (Nyíri 2006); and the cultural attractions of indigenous people and practices. Sun Moon Lake’s major draws are its alpine lake views and indigenous Thao ethnic culture. Indeed, one visitor from Anhui remarked, “This is just like back home in China proper [neidi]. We also have minorities too, and song and dance shows.”

The influx of PRC tourists has dampened the Taiwanese desire to visit Sun Moon Lake. “It’s pretty but I don’t go there anymore. If I wanted to feel like I’m in China, I’d just go to China,” said one man from Taipei. But Sun Moon Lake is not just viewed by Taiwanese as a “Chinese” space—PRC tourists themselves reported feeling as if they were still in China. Although this effect is not limited to Sun Moon Lake, I will first focus on this particular site before extending this observation to the entire island. I argue that this perception is not simply due to the large number of PRC tourists in the area, but is produced by the structure of the tourism industry itself. Essentially, the Taiwanese tourism industry, in concert with Hong Kong and PRC-based sales agents and tour directors, has begun producing an experience so similar to that of PRC domestic tourism that PRC tourists are able to ignore other markers of national-territorial difference. This effect is primed and multiplied by the PRC’s territorial claims to Taiwan, and a vast system of ideological control that pervades the PRC’s education system, mediascape and even its devices of mobility. PRC tourists don’t just learn about Sun Moon Lake from their high school textbooks and TV shows about tourist destinations—now they see it
printed in the new PRC passport as an image that represents and performatively claims Taiwan as a province of China (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. 2012 PRC passport pages with images of Sun Moon Lake, Taiwan. (Source: renren.com)

Sun Moon Lake’s leisure travel itinerary is straightforward. Most PRC tourists arrive in large buses driven from Taipei or Taoyuan. The vast majority stays in hotels in Shuishe, a lakefront tourist town, and eat pre-ordered group meals of so-called local specialty dishes like “President Fish”, so named because it was supposedly a favorite of the late President Chiang Kai-shek. Either the same or the following day, they charter a boat from the Shuishe Port and circle the lake, taking in sights including Lalu Island, the legendary origin of the Thao tribe, now off-limits to non-Thao people, and area temples. The boats stop at Itashao, the home of the several hundred member-strong Thao tribe, on the opposite side of the lake from Shuishe. Nearly
all of the Thao people of Itashao live in pre-fabricated temporary housing provided by state authorities after a disastrous 1999 earthquake that destroyed many structures in town, and caused widespread damage throughout central Taiwan.

Itashao, in addition to being the home for the few remaining Thao people, is also home to the Formosan Aboriginal Culture Village, an ethnic theme park with replica villages of nine different indigenous groups in Taiwan. The theme park is connected to the boat dock via a cable car. Popular with Taiwanese tourists, it is rarely visited by PRC group tourists. One tour director guide from Hangzhou explained that, “Mainlanders aren’t really interested in Taiwanese aborigines. We have our own minorities. Our tourists are more interested in seeing scenery and maybe some Nationalist history.” However, according to three area vendors, shopping-focused itineraries and the high entrance price of the park (over US$20, even with a group discount) are more likely explanations for the park’s dearth of PRC tourists. Indigenous heritage is certainly for sale throughout Itashao, and serves as the theme for large restaurants and souvenir shops that now cater almost exclusively to PRC group tours.

The structure of tourism in the area is now so commercially regimented and socio-spatially segregated that it was difficult for me to even enter these shops as an individual visitor. After rejections from staff at five shops who explained that they only host pre-arranged tour groups, I finally found two shops where I was able to browse products while watching as groups entered and exited. The basic group sale sequence proceeded as follows: A large group of tourists entered the store and sat on chairs in front of a counter filled with products for sale. These products included royal bee jelly, medicinal mushroom, and other high-value items marketed as health supplements. After the tourists took their seats around the corner, a female store employee dressed in aboriginal regalia, including feathers, animal skins and a headdress,
welcomed the group with a Mandarin Chinese-language song about local aboriginal culture. Several male tourists lit cigarettes in direct view of the store’s anti-smoking signs, and were not admonished by store staff. After finishing her song, the store hostess offered a few more words about the local Thao people, and then explained that their products were “National Treasures of Taiwan [Taiwan guobao]”, an unintentionally provocative phrase that I will analyze later in this chapter. Staff behind the counters began pouring copious amounts of tea and aggressively selling their products to the tourists, who seemed mostly disinterested.

The above description of ethnic-themed shopping tourism should be familiar to anyone who has personally observed or read reports of such tourism in the PRC. The structure of the sale process, as well as the indigenous aesthetic theme, was almost identical to what I’ve seen in ethnic minority-themed tourist shops in the PRC’s Hainan Island. What is remarkable is here is how commission-based group tour shopping, previously uncommon in Taiwan, has become the dominant model, and how this along with the territorial ideology of “One China” is producing an effect of PRC stateness for PRC tourists.

One tourist from Anhui stated it clearly: “I feel like this is more or less the same as touring in China proper [neidi]. We get on the bus, get off the bus, take some photos, eat, shop, jump back on the bus, and go back to the hotel. It’s all the same. We all know that Taiwan is a part of China, anyway.” I heard similar remarks from nearly every other PRC tourist I spoke with in Taiwan, both in formal interviews and as passing remarks. Sometimes these sentiments were bookended with phrases from a nationalizing strain of discourse, for example, “Same race, same culture [tongzhong, tongwen]”, were terms first used in the late 19th century among proto-pan Asianists to posit commonalities between Chinese and other Asians in opposition to imperialistic Europeans and Americans (Karl 1998). This phrase has a complicated and ironic heritage. It was
used in its Japanese form (*dobun dotsu*) in the 1930s to justify Japanese colonialism in China. Several Taiwanese businessmen have told me that while doing business in the PRC in the 1980s, they also used the phrase, “*tongzhong, tongwen*”, to advertise their relative cultural advantage and knowledge when competing for business with other non-PRC investors. Later in the 1990s, Jiang Zemin used “*tongzhong, tongwen*” to argue that Taiwan is a part of China (Sautman 1997). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that PRC tourists in Taiwan speak from this same nationalizing script.

This effect of PRC stateness is perceived not just by first-time tourists at Sun Moon Lake, but also by PRC tour directors who have been to Taiwan many times. In an interview in Taipei at the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, a shrine to the founder of the KMT, Cai Cai, a young tour director from Hubei Province told me, in between taking photos with her iPhone, that she felt like she “hadn’t really left China proper”. She explained that this is because the people look similar, the language is similar, and after directing several tour groups, she was already familiar with Taiwan. More importantly, the commercially-mediated experience of space and time was nearly identical. “I might as well be touring in the mainland [*dalu*]. The tour sequence is almost the same…except for having to get a permit and pass immigration lines.” This perception confirms the importance of border performativity, discussed in Chapter 3, for the construction of national territory.

As a comparison, I asked her to contrast this with her experiences leading tours in Europe. “Yes, itineraries are also rushed there, and we do lots of shopping, but mostly for international brand name products. Everything there looks and feel so different from China. The language is totally different, the people don’t look like us. We don’t have a common history, or common race or nation.” Again, the “same race, same culture” phrase emerged, showing how effective the
territorial socialization (Newman 1999) engendered by PRC education has been for producing effects of PRC stateness in Taiwan.

The Taiwanese travel industry is collaborating in the touristic performance of Taiwan as a part of China. Much of the performance is linguistic. On numerous occasions, I observed Taiwanese tour guides and souvenir salespeople conversing with PRC tourists and using expressions like “China proper [neidi],” and “we Chinese [zanmen Huaren],” which are almost never heard otherwise in Taiwan. A saleslady at an Apple electronics reseller at Taipei 101, once the world’s tallest skyscraper and now a mandatory stop on the PRC tourist circuit, told me, “Yes, we adjust our speech to make them more comfortable. We’re not really trained to do it, but we just learn what makes them comfortable. Look, we even list the renminbi [Chinese currency] price on all the items.” Another Taiwanese tour guide I interviewed at Taipei 101 explained that he consciously modifies his speech to avoid language that suggests that Taiwan is politically independent, even when tourists asked about political differences. He did this, he said, in order to keep his work day smooth and enhance guest satisfaction.

Other tourism professionals confirmed that they alter their language largely in order to reduce the possibility of tension. One tour guide, Howard, told me how he, as well as his colleagues, will often use PRC euphemisms to refer to Taiwanese political institutions. For example, he sometimes refers to the “Presidential Office [zongtongfu]” as the “Taiwanese Leader’s Office [Taiwan lingdaoren bangongshi]”, which is the expression used in PRC media. However, while accompanying Howard and a small group from Shanghai on a two-day tour of Taipei, I observed inconsistent usage of such euphemisms. Sometimes, Howard would compare Taiwan with “China proper [neidi]”, which is a politically acceptable term for comparison. Sometimes, however, he would compare Taiwan with “China [Zhongguo]”, something quite
common for a Taiwanese to say, but likely to get one into trouble with a PRC citizen who believes that Taiwan is part of China. In the recreational context of the tour and the rapport that Howard had already developed with his guests, this slip was not mentioned out loud by the tourists.

Howard’s comparisons were not the only cases of inconsistent language usage I observed. I frequently heard other Taiwanese speakers slipping and using expressions that predate the arrival of PRC tourists and may be potentially politically provocative for them. For example, the indigenous-attired store hostess from Sun Moon Lake referred to her health-enhancing fungal products as “National treasures of Taiwan”. Her language, which implied that Taiwan was a nation or country, could have provoked a heated dispute in less regulated circumstances.

To me, PRC tourists often referred to Taiwan as “Taiwan region [diqu]” or “Taiwan Island”, as it’s often named in PRC public discourse, to emphasize their feeling that Taiwan is a part of China, or to at least express a kind of PRC territorial “political correctness”. After I asked a woman from Anhui, who had used the expression “Taiwan region”, about cultural similarities and differences between Taiwan and mainland China, she said “no difference… same race, same culture”, and then waved her finger while announcing to me in front of her companions, “Anyway, this [Taiwan] is our national territory [guotu]!” When I asked for elaboration on her opinion about national sovereignty, she said, “We are just commoners [laobaixing] and don’t want to talk politics,” despite having initiated the issue.

5.2 The business of territorialization across the Strait
Business cooperation with Hong Kong travel agencies, who have years of experience in managing PRC domestic and outbound tourism, is driving changes in the industry that help produce the effect of PRC stateness. As I noted in Chapter 4, Hong Kong has long played an essential role in bridging business and cultural communications between Taiwan and the PRC. In the case of tourism, they are not only responsible for buying and selling tour packages, but for driving structural changes in the Taiwanese travel industry.

A November 2012 report in Taiwan’s bilingual CommonWealth magazine explored the extent of Hong Kong’s involvement in Taiwan’s travel industry. Based on interviews with travel industry players, it says that Taiwan has been divided into six “special product areas”. For example, Sun Moon Lake is oriented towards medicinal mushroom sales, as I observed in Itashao. The southern port city of Kaohsiung, long skilled in polishing diamonds thanks to the ROC’s past relations with apartheid-era, diamond-exporting South Africa, has become a “diamond shopping mecca”. The three largest diamond stores in Kaohsiung—Zeta Jewelry, Ou Ya Jewelry, and Lin Hong Jewelry—account for 80% of sales, and are owned by Hong Kong investors who share close relations with Hong Kong-based travel agents.

Due to intense pricing competition, Taiwan’s tour operators have been forced to cut the average per-day prices charged to travel agencies in the PRC or Hong Kong from US$60-65 to as low as US$24. In some cases, Taiwanese operators offer their tours free of charge and attempt to make up the operating shortfall through commission shopping, allowing PRC or Hong Kong-based agencies to keep most of the revenue from tour sales. Such a shopping-centric tourism model, long commonplace in the PRC, has quickly become standard for PRC group

3 These figures from the CommonWealth article match the data collected during my interviews with Taiwanese tour guides.
tourists within Taiwan. This shopping focus is enforced for nearly all the waking hours of group tourists, who often don’t return to their hotels until 9pm, and have little chance to engage with Taiwanese outside the controlled context of the tour. There is some irony in this result—cross-Strait capitalist collaboration and competition appears to be producing the effect of PRC stateness, one that is nominally communist.

Cross-Strait media business partnerships, often involving Hong Kong, are also driving changes in the political landscape. As with Hong Kong since the 1997 handover, Taiwanese businessmen with close ties to the PRC leadership have gained substantial control over print and television media, while PRC critics are finding it harder and harder to do business. In 2007, the originally anti-communist newspaper of the KMT, the Central Daily News, was purchased by insurance magnate Eric Teng and other PRC-friendly entrepreneurs, and relaunched as an online publication devoted to “cross-Strait peace” (R. Lin 2012b). In October 2012, Jimmy Lai, the Hong Kong-based owner of Next Media, which publishes the Apple Daily, Taiwan’s most popular newspaper, and Next magazine, a popular periodical—both of which are banned in the PRC for their anti-Beijing stance—sold his Taiwan interests to Jeffrey Koo Jr., whose family’s Chinatrust Bank gained PRC approval to operate a foreign exchange business in Shanghai earlier in the same year. This sale followed heavy losses in Lai’s business, caused by a failure to win TV station licensing rights from Taiwan’s current pro-unification and increasingly unpopular Ma administration, which enjoyed a 13% approval rating as of November 2012 (Wang and Ong 2012; The Economist 2012). Tsai Eng-meng, the chairman and chief executive of Want Want Group, a large conglomerate with extensive interests in the PRC, purchased several newspapers and TV stations, including the pro-China Times and China Television Co, provoking large public protests against media conglomerations. Reports that Tsai is now involved
in Next Media’s operations triggered protests at Apple Daily offices throughout Taiwan in November 2012 (China Post 2012).

Apart from such protests, there are other counter-currents that threaten the appearance of cross-Strait state and business harmony. Taiwan’s visual landscape, particularly in tourist sites, has been transformed by activists from Falun Gong, a quasi-Buddhist spiritual group that is banned and persecuted in the PRC. Falun Gong billboards have proliferated on all major Taiwanese highways with regular tour bus traffic, and are particularly prevalent near hotels that receive PRC tour groups. Chinese tourist sites are magnets for Falun Gong religious activists, missionaries, and other actors whose activities are curtailed or banned outright within China. Falun Gong activists maintain graphic displays and distribute flyers and booklets not only at major tourist sites, but also at duty-free shops.

Falun Gong activists, having received permits from the Taipei City administration, maintain a permanent presence at, among other places, the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, a major PRC tourist destination. Adjacent to the tour bus parking lot, they display anti-PRC billboards with graphic, sometimes bloody imagery of PRC state repression, play audio recordings exhorting Chinese Communist Party members to abandon the party, meditate in public areas, and attempt to distribute flyers and booklets to PRC tourists, most of whom ignore them. Likewise, Christian missionaries target the same site and others, and distribute bibles in simplified Chinese, the written language of the PRC and not Taiwan. One Falun Gong activist, a retired professor, told me that a PRC tourist, perhaps confused about what country he was in, attempted to call the local police to report illegal, anti-government activity. The police took no action.
The Taiwanese travel industry has been compelled by its PRC partners to keep tourists away from anti-PRC activists, particularly Falun Gong. Several Taiwanese guides told me that their agencies instructed them to warn tourists against taking Falun Gong handouts, by telling them that they would be in trouble if they brought any materials home. The guides said their employers instituted this policy in response to requests from PRC-based agents. This is an instance of not only the perception of PRC stateness within Taiwan, but actually the realization of PRC social prohibitions beyond its effective territory. This is not dissimilar to what the PRC attempts to do with countries that have earned “Approved Destination Status” (Arlt 2006), but the stakes and terms are different, as the ROC and PRC don’t even officially recognize each other as countries.

A popular claim, also related to me in an interview with a staffer from the opposition DPP party, is that the PRC is using the spending power of its tourists to increase Taiwan’s economic dependence on China and foreclose space for anti-PRC action. This has caused significant debate and confusion within the DPP. Southern Taiwan, traditionally a pro-independence and DPP stronghold, and now a major fruit exporter to the PRC, has been a particularly contentious site. About 60% of international tourists in Kaohsiung now come from the PRC, twice as high a percentage as the national average (R. Lin 2012a). In 2009, following a visit from the Dalai Lama, and the Kaohsiung Film Festival’s screening of a documentary about exiled Uighur Muslim leader Rebiya Kadeer, who is considered a terrorist by the PRC, PRC tourist numbers collapsed. Occupancy rates at Kaohsiung hotels dropped from 60% to 30%, and department store and restaurant revenues plummeted. A goodwill tour of collaborating Taiwanese legislators and PRC leaders was launched to patch up relations, and KMT politicians ended public funding for the Kaohsiung Film Festival. Said a DPP legislator, Chao Tien-lin, “"I
have a hard time imagining what kind of an impact it would have if one day Chinese visitor numbers fell by half or suddenly disappeared…The economic benefit that the mainland gave to Taiwan evidently came with thorns” (R. Lin 2012b).

Yet, the PRC’s apparent political benefits are thorny as well—if PRC tourism is indeed producing greater social and cultural alienation among Taiwanese, as my research suggests, then tourism may be undermining the unificationist territorial program. My results therefore point to the problems and pitfalls inherent in the PRC’s deployment of tourism as a technology of state territorialization. Even if tourism may be used as an economic lever to encourage political unification, and even if PRC group tourists continue to perceive Taiwan as part of China, the effects on Taiwanese popular sentiment may diminish the apparent success of the PRC’s territorialization program for Taiwan. Further research will be necessary to determine how Taiwan is perceived differently by FIT tourists, and whether their sensations of PRC stateness and state territory are less stable than those of group tourists, potentially further undermining the PRC’s territorialization program.

Taiwan is not navigating alone in Asia’s dense battlegrounds of tourism, mobility regulation, and territoriality. The PRC’s performance of state territory via the mechanisms of mobility has entered a new phase, engulfing the broader region in what TIME magazine has termed a “Passport War” (Tharoor 2012). In May 2012, the PRC released a new passport that includes images not only of Sun Moon Lake in Taiwan, as seen earlier in the chapter, but also of disputed territories in the Himalayas, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, including parts of Kashmir (controlled by India), the Spratly Islands (claimed by Vietnam and the Phillipines, among others), and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (claimed by Japan). The legal import or relevance of these representations of internationally disputed territories—or “stray maps”, as a
US State Department spokesperson dismissed them—is dubious. Nevertheless, in November 2012, the passport began drawing strong objections from India, Vietnam and the Philippines, whose foreign ministries are now refusing to stamp the new passports for fear of legitimizing the PRC’s territorial claims. They are instead providing entry stamps on specially-issued, separate forms. Going a step further in reciprocation, India has even begun issuing visas to PRC nationals that includes a map of India that claims the disputed territories. Even if the territorial claims implicit in PRC passports have no international legal relevance, such tactics of bureaucratic-procedural resistance demonstrates that state foreign policy elites take the performative power of mobility regulation quite seriously. For its part, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council issued a sharply-worded statement in mid-November: “This is total ignorance of reality and only provokes disputes.” My research demonstrates that such disputes can be expected to continue, and that the territorial stakes of tourism deserve more attention.

In this chapter, based on interviews and participant-observation at a variety of tourist sites, I have demonstrated that cross-Strait tourism is producing multiple, overlapping, and contradictory sensations of stateness and state territory within Taiwan. These effects are produced in part by the highly regimented structure of group tourism as managed by industry actors from Taiwan, the PRC, and Hong Kong, which reproduces a tourist experience very similar to that of the PRC. Subtle and inconsistent linguistic performances of national identity take place throughout the tour, both reproducing and undermining the multiple performative infrastructures of state territory.

I have also argued that tourism is producing a contradiction between PRC tourists’ admiration and identification with their Taiwanese hosts, and Taiwanese hosts’ alienation from their guests. PRC tourists praise Taiwanese for their manners and kindness, attributing such
charms to an idealized Chinese essence projected onto the people of Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwanese people avoid PRC tourists and, according to opinion polls, increasingly identify themselves as Chinese. The PRC’s strategy of using the economic incentives of tourism to project political power over Taiwan has stimulated public debate in Taiwan, as have tourism’s uneven economic benefits. Even if PRC group tourists continue to believe that Taiwan is a part of China, outbound tourism to Taiwan should therefore be seen as a potentially double-edged sword for the PRC’s territorialization program.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

While doing fieldwork in Taipei, August 2012 at Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Hall, a monument to the founder of the Republic of China, I overheard a PRC tourist complaining loudly during the changing of the guards. He shouted, “This is all just for show!”, and then stormed outside. Of course, the military guards in their starched white uniforms, marching with bayonets in precisely timed drills were for show. Of course the monument, with its grandiose, dilapidating facade and gigantic statue of Sun Yat-sen, was for show. And, the tourist’s loudly public dismissal was likewise a kind of show. But such showiness makes these things no less powerful or productive. In fact, these practices and sites are powerful and productive, I have argued in this thesis, precisely because they are performances. In a very real sense, this performance, with both the PRC tourist and ROC military on stage, like this tourist’s encounter with the border guard on his arrival to Taiwan, or his application to enter Taiwan in the first place, reproduces the state and interstate system and articulates authority over mobility, identity, and territory. This performative infrastructure forms the ontological cradle of the tourist and the
toured as national subjects. Together, through an ensemble of related practices, they constitute state territory.

The 2012 London Olympics, a major global tourist event, happened to be going on during the same week as this field observation. The ROC flag disappeared without explanation from a prominent international flag display in the commercial district of Regent Street. A few days later, ROC Tourism Bureau instructed Taiwan nationals to not carry ROC flags into the 2012 London Olympics. Rather, they were to carry, if anything at all, “Chinese Taipei” flags, which is the name that the then-KMT ROC leadership agreed to compete under in the early-1980s when it still claimed sovereignty over all of China, but plainly could not use athletes from beyond Taiwan. A number of Taiwanese across London responded by flying their ROC flags higher, thumbing their noses at both the ROC and PRC, demonstrating disconnects between the states that claim to represent them and the ambiguous nations they are so tensely connected to (Loa 2012).

Also in the same few weeks, the US Department of Homeland Security changed its border control policy to allow Taiwanese to list “Taiwan” as their place of birth, rather than “China (Taiwan)”. This change was petitioned by Howard Berman, a high-ranking congressman from California, following a complaint from the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (Lowther 2012). It followed past legislation that allowed Taiwan-born US citizens to list “Taiwan” as their place of birth on their passports, rather than China. All of these cases demonstrate clearly that the identification and representation of Taiwanese nationality, and Taiwan’s territory with it, remain in contention.
I have argued in this thesis that these performances of tourism—at tourist sites, performed on the streets and inscribed in passports—articulate power through space. Through the behavior of the tourist, the tourism-enabling or restricting mechanisms and devices of the state, and the staging of the nation—visitation at tourism sites, the use of passports and visas, the crossing of borders and submission to border guards, the staging and the viewing of the national military guard, and so on—the tourist is produced as a national subject. As the tourist traverses between the territorial spaces of states, he, along with the agents of the state, enacts state territory and borders. And in so doing, he may become an instrument of his state’s foreign policy apparatus. Whether as a political, economic, or social subject, his behavior may then help to both fix and destabilize borders, to both deterritorialize and reterritorialize the state.

Taiwan’s sovereign status may indeed be exceptional in the modern inter-state system, but this merely serves to highlight the exceptionality of the modern inter-state system itself. Global space did not used to be configured in this way—there is nothing inevitable about its current division into discrete, exclusive units. Attention to the shifting contours of “Greater China”, the “Chinese axis”, or even just Taiwan itself, reveal the political, economic, social, and cultural processes that underlie state territorialization. Treating tourism as both a strategy and field of action reveals new sites and practices for research.

There are several avenues deserving attention for future research in China and Taiwan. These include, at minimum, the struggle over names, territorial definitions, and national symbols in the development and promotion of cross-Strait tourism; the PRC’s use of tourism’s economic power to attain political ends; the reconfiguration of tourist spaces within Taiwan; and tourism’s impact on national identity and political sentiment.
The first avenue can be explored through attention to the details of changes to visa, passport, and travel controls. Such changes are most directly negotiated by the Taipei-based Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), and the Beijing-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), but a variety of other state agencies, including the Tourism Bureau, Foreign Ministry, and Economic Ministry on both sides are also involved. Official announcements must be monitored to anticipate change in tourist sources, destinations, and mobility controls.

The second avenue can be explored by analyzing PRC state and industry behavior. For example, one of my informants, a political analyst, has suggested that the PRC slowed down tourist departures prior to the March 2012 elections in Taiwan to provoke a sense of economic crisis and swing support to the more pro-PRC KMT party. This particular assertion awaits further confirmation, but based on past PRC behavior as described in Chapters 4 and 5, it is not unreasonable to expect such tactics.

The third and fourth avenues are best examined through more sustained ethnography in both tourist and non-tourist spaces. For example, how is Chiang Kai-shek-themed tourism transforming former KMT political spaces into Chinese tourist spaces? How are sites like the National Palace Museum, with its vast treasure of Chinese imperial antiquities, transformed into sites primarily aimed at Chinese tour groups, and how does this affect their place within Taiwanese society? How is Taiwan’s national economy being redirected away from manufacturing and towards tourism, or away from Japanese tourists and towards PRC tourists? How does this affect differential regional development in Taiwan?
As for tourism’s impacts on national identification and political sentiment, the periodic polls conducted by academic and other institutions are excellent starting points for analysis. More interviews and participant-observation among PRC tourists, Taiwanese vendors, and other affected groups are essential to supplement and deepen this data. Such research should pay attention to the specific embodied practices which engender or alter sentiments of national identification, and thereby construct affective geographies of the nation-state. Analysis of these practices will further make plain the performativity of the border, of the tourist, and of the nation-state. Such research must distinguish between the many different modes and styles of PRC travel, including group (tuanti) and individual (FIT, or ziyouxing) tourism, and sight-seeing (guanguang), business (canfang), and official (guanfang) tourism. Attention to all of these dimensions will reveal how cross-Strait tourism fits into the PRC and ROC’s state territorialization programs, and the extent to which it may complicate or even contradict them.

This particular research agenda is designed specifically for the case of China and Taiwan, but its conceptual framework has broader applicability not only for bringing tourism into its rightful place as a field of political research, but also for exploring the reconfiguration of other regions that harbor tensions between national and supra-national modes of government. One obvious contemporary possibility would be an examination of the role of tourism in mediating European national identity and borders in the context of the changing political and economic configuration of the European Union. As new regional blocs continue to form and reform elsewhere, such as in ASEAN countries, and as the spaces of the nation continue to be challenged by the spaces of flows, this research agenda may yet travel farther.
References


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