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Potential Fighting Capability and State Concessions: A Study of Violent Rebellion and Nonviolent Resistance

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*Potential Fighting Capability and State Concessions:
A Study of Violent Rebellion and Nonviolent Resistance*
By Christopher Cyr

A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
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This thesis entitled:
Potential Fighting Capability and State Concessions:
A Study of Violent Rebellion and Nonviolent Resistance
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The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we
Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards
Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.

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Abstract

Cyr, Christopher J (Ph.D., Political Science)

Potential Fighting Capability and State Concessions: A Study of Violent Rebellion and Nonviolent Resistance

Thesis Directed by Professor Jaroslav Tir

This dissertation examines the reasons that some non-state actors choose to engage in nonviolent resistance while others, with similar goals, engage in violent rebellion. I then look why, among groups that do use violence, some see longer and more intense conflicts than others. I argue that the variance in the potential that these groups have to grow in strength during the process of fighting has an impact on all three of these variables, with groups that have less potential being more likely to use violence, and fighting longer and more intense conflicts. I test my hypotheses quantitatively with several indicators of potential rebel strength and new data on the economic standing and level of education of the group membership. I find that the economic standing and education level of the group membership are strong negative predictors of the use of violence. The impact of ethnic groups size, territorial control, access to natural resources, and third party support are more nuanced. I then test these hypotheses qualitatively with case studies involving Serbia in the 1990s and the Arab Spring in the 2010s.

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Chapter 1:

Introduction

During the breakup of Yugoslavia, several different groups rebelled against their government. These groups had very ambitious goals, trying to bring down leadership and secede territory from larger states. In many cases, these groups used violence to accomplish their goals. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, militant Serb groups tried to form their own breakaway republic of Srpska. They formed paramilitary units to work towards this goal, and fought one of the bloodiest civil wars of the 1990s (Judah: 2000). In the enclave of Kosovo, which was officially located on Serbian territory, ethnic Albanians similarly thought the violence was the best strategy to achieve their goal of independence. Hacim Thaci led a guerrilla movement that eventually gained NATO support and achieved independence for Kosovo, a movement that has since been labeled the “most successful” guerrilla movement of the 20th century (Judah: 2002).

While these violent movements were going on, other groups in the region mobilized against their government using predominately nonviolent strategies. Slovenia, for example, achieved its independence mainly through protests and a referendum. While there was a brief violent conflict, the main thrust of the independence movement came from nonviolent resistance (Zapp: 1993). Similarly, citizens in Serbia sought to bring down the government of Slobodan Milosevic through a mass nonviolent protest movement. This movement had broad popular support, eventually gained the support of the military, and led to Milosevic not only losing office, but also getting turned over to an international court for war crimes charges (Tucker: 2007). In each of these cases of nonviolent resistance, the groups targeting their government had broad goals that were similar to the goals of the groups engaged in violent rebellion. Their tactics,

however, varied significantly. Some decided that violent rebellion was the best way to achieve their goals, while others felt that nonviolent resistance was a superior method.

In this dissertation, I aim to answer the question of why some groups engage in violent rebellion while other groups, targeting similar governments, with similar goals, use nonviolent resistance. The Kosovo Liberation Army and the protests in Serbia that happened a few years later both attempted to win concessions from the government of Slobodan Milosevic, but used very different strategies to achieve their goals. The former Yugoslavia is not an outlier in this. Many different states have experienced both violent conflicts and nonviolent resistance movements with similar goals.

Current theories of violent rebellion generally focus on state-level variables such as level of economic development, regime type, and military strength, which cannot explain variation in tactics among groups that rebel against the same state at the same time. The groups in the cases outlined above faced the same structural features because they targeted the same regime at a similar time, but nonetheless had significant variation in their use of violence or nonviolence. Because of this, it is necessary to look at why some groups use violence while others use nonviolence.

To answer this question, I examine features of the groups themselves. This is an important half of the interaction between a state and a group with a grievance, but has largely been left out of analysis of how this interaction can result in civil war in some cases. After I address this question, I push this analysis further by looking at the subset of cases where violent rebellion is used. Among these cases, there is much variation in the duration of the conflict. India, for example, experienced several different insurgencies throughout its history. Some of these rebellions were very short lived. Shortly after India achieved independence, the predominantly

Muslim region of Hyderabad attempted to break away, but the insurgency only lasted a year (Raghavan: 2010). The Marxist oriented Naxalite insurgency also fought a short conflict, which lasted from 1967 to 1971 (Bhatia: 2005). Others violent conflicts in India, however, have been very long. The separatist movement in the Mizo region lasted for two decades. Similarly, the Kashmiri Muslim separatist movement lasted from 1988 to 2006 (Chenoweth & Stephan: 2011). Structural features of India as a whole cannot account for this variation in the use of violent tactics, as these variables were constant for each group. In this dissertation, I look to features of the groups themselves to understand why some fight very long violent conflicts, while others fight relatively short ones.

Finally, I examine the question of why some groups fight more intense conflicts than others. By intense, I refer to the number of battle deaths. When the Soviet Union was breaking apart, Russia faced separatist movements in the regions of Dagestan and Chechnya. Both resulted in conflict, but the Dagestan conflict was only minor, with under a hundred battle deaths (Giuliano: 2005). The conflict in Chechnya, on the other hand, was extremely bloody. The first war in the 1990s produced several thousand deaths on each side (Trenin & Malashenko: 2010). Additionally, the Chechen conflict resulted in an even more intense second war shortly after, and the conflict is still not entirely resolved. As these examples illustrate, there is substantial variation in the intensity of fighting, even in conflicts that take place under similar structural conditions. Once again, I look to features of the groups themselves to explain this variation.

While the three questions above deal with different aspects of conflict, I address them together because they all fit into a common theoretical structure. I develop a theory for how states interact with groups that are mobilized against them with a major grievance that they want to see addressed. Similar variables associated with the group itself can explain the ways that

states decide on what actions to take, which has implications for all three aspects of conflict mentioned above.

I explain this variation by developing the concept of potential rebel strength. At the forefront of their decision-making, the state must assess how much of a military threat a group could potentially represent during the process of conflict. Are they one that has the potential to grow into a large, effective fighting force? Conversely, are they one that is likely to either remain small or ineffective on the battlefield? The factors that help states answer this question play a big role in the types of concessions that states are willing to make to the group, and the level of repression that they are willing to use. Expectations about this decision play a role in the choice of the group mobilized against the government to use violence or nonviolence. These expectations also impact how long the violent conflicts that they fight last, and how intense these conflicts are. In this way, all three questions are tied to a common theoretical model.

Why It Matters

Civil conflict has long been an interest of political scientists, and scholars have produced much research into why violent rebellions occur. Much of this previous scholarship is monadic in nature, using country-years as units of analysis. This can tell us why some countries have a higher probability of experiencing rebellion than others in a given year, based on state level features. Much of this scholarship, however, is framed around rebel motivations. Do people violently rebel against their government because they have deep grievances that the government is unwilling to address, or do they rebel because they rebel because the opportunity presents itself due to the factors that favor successful rebellion? While this debate remains unresolved, two of the most influential pieces favor the idea that rebellion is most likely to happen in places

where there is an opportunity. In their influential article on civil war, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that rebellion is most likely when states have weak governments, political instability, and rough terrain. Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that rebellion is most likely when there are opportunities provided by a large group of male citizens with low opportunity costs for participation, dispersed populations, and mountainous terrain. Both of these articles paint rebellion as rational in the sense that groups generally choose to rebel in situations where rebellion is likely to be successful.

This body of literature has taught us much about why some countries are more likely to experience conflict than others. By focusing only on state level features, however, it leaves out an important part of the story. Rebellion comes as a result of an interaction between a state and a group with a grievance against the state. By focusing only on state features, scholars leave out an important half of this interaction.

This monadic scholarship on civil war stands in contrast with much of the scholarship on interstate conflict, which tends to be dyadic in nature. In this body of literature, countries are analyzed in pairs. This allows scholars to understand how variables between the countries, such as relative military power, level of economic interdependence, and mutual democracy, impact the interaction that sometimes results in violent conflict (Oneal & Russett: 1997; Gartzke et al: 2001; Reed et al: 2008). Since interstate war starts from an interaction between two states, dyadic analysis allows for a more complete understanding of the interaction that leads some states to choose to go to war with each other.

Scholars of civil war have long known the advantages of dyadic analysis, but have nonetheless generally used monadic analysis. This is because it is difficult to identify the relevant universe of cases. In interstate war, this is not a problem. Since this type of war can only

take place between two governments, and there is general agreement on which entities count as states (controversial cases such as Taiwan and Palestine notwithstanding), there is general agreement on the universe of dyads that represent potential interstate wars. There is some disagreement as to which dyads are relevant. For example, some scholars argue that noncontiguous states do not always belong in the analysis (Quackenbush: 2006). These problems, however, are minor compared to the difficulty in identifying the universe of cases of potential civil wars.

While states exist as entities all the time, rebel groups are generally only observed as entities when they take up arms against the state. No scholar, no matter how specialized in Syrian politics they were, would have been aware of the Free Syrian Army prior to the outbreak of the war against Assad in 2011 because the group was not yet organized prior to that. They may have been aware of various opposition groups, but they did not know which ones were relevant for the risk of war, and how they would organize. This makes it difficult to identify those groups that represent the universe of potential rebel groups.

This difficulty has long been acknowledged as a problem within the study of civil war, and recently scholars have begun to address it. In one of the first attempts to study civil war dyadically, Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) construct dyads consisting of states and rebel groups. They code data on each rebel group's fighting capacity relative to the state, and use that data to better understand variables associated with civil war such as war duration and war outcome. This analysis is useful in understanding some aspects of civil war, but suffers from only being able to examine cases of groups actively engaged in rebellion. This means that the set of cases does not allow for the analysis of violent conflict onset, as there is no variance on this variable. The authors acknowledge this, stating that they "sidestep the problem of classifying the

population of potential rebel groups *ex ante* (Cunningham et al: 2009).” As this illustrates, important work has been done in the past few years in studying conflict by looking at group features in addition to state features. This body of literature, however, remains a work in progress. In particular, scholars have yet to completely solve the problem of identifying potential rebel groups, which makes it very difficult to study conflict onset while looking at group features.

In this dissertation, I address this challenge by examining groups mobilized against their government in both violent rebellion and nonviolent resistance. The groups considered in this analysis all have the maximalist goals of overthrowing their government, seceding a piece of territory to form a new state, or expelling a foreign occupation. Because of this, they represent the universe of groups that have a major grievance with their government and are mobilized to address it. They vary, however, on the use of violence. Some used violence as a tactic, engaging in campaigns of terrorism or guerrilla warfare in their attempt to see their demands met. Others, however, used nonviolent tactics such as rallies, sit-ins, and general strikes to voice their demands.

This research design allows for the analysis of conflict onset, which is absent from previous analyses that consider group features. This is an important step for understanding the cases mentioned above. Monadic research on violent conflict onset can help us understand the baseline probability that Serbia would experience a civil war in the late 1990s, but cannot tell us why Albanians in Kosovo chose to use violence in their efforts to secede while, shortly after, the general population rallied nonviolently to oust President Milosevic. By looking to group features in addition to state features, we can better understand how they interact to produce violent conflict in some cases, and nonviolent resistance in other cases.

In addition, this dissertation builds on the growing body of literature on group features by

using data that can be observed prior to battle. The key variables in the Cunningham et al (2007) study; fighting capacity, arms procurement capacity, mobilization capacity, territorial control, and strong central command are all observed during the process of conflict. Since they are not observed at the time that the group mobilized, they cannot be factored into state decisions about when to concede to avoid fighting and when violence is preferable to making a concession.

In this dissertation, I focus on factors dealing with features of the group membership. In particular, I code new data on the economic standing and education level of the group membership. Additionally, I identify the leader of the group in cases where there is a clear-cut leader, and code new data on his or her educational background and military training. These variables can generally be observed prior to the process of fighting, and therefore factored into state decisions. In this way, they can impact the probability of violent conflict onset.

This dissertation also builds on existing research by creating a unified theory of conflict onset, duration, and intensity. These three features of conflict are generally treated separately in existing literature. There is reason to believe that they are linked in the eyes of decision-makers, though. We can see an example of this in the case of the American Civil War. Most people involved in making decisions before the first battle expected the war to be short and lacking in intensity (Ferguson: 2011). This impacted expectations about whether concessions to avoid war would be beneficial, or it would be less costly to simply fight the war. By incorporating similar causal mechanisms in my theory about how group features impact onset, duration and intensity, I make this link more explicit. This allows for a more unified understanding of conflict, showing how similar variables can impact aspects of conflict, and how different features of the conflict process are related to each other.

In addition to being of academic interest, this dissertation also has policy relevance. At the time of writing, the United States is attempting to craft a policy response to a rapidly changing situation in Ukraine. In February 2014, President Viktor Yanukovich was ousted following three months of mass, largely nonviolent protests against his decision to sign a trade agreement with Russia rather than the European Union (Booth: 2014). Following that ouster, pro-Russia militias have mobilized in the Eastern part of the country, Russia has annexed the Crimea region, and the situation in Ukraine has turned into a full-scale civil war. In the time since, there has been much uncertainty about the political situation in Ukraine.

When discussing the United States policy response, United States Secretary of State John Kerry stated, “Through its occupation of Crimea and its subsequent destabilization of eastern Ukraine, Russia seeks to change the security landscape of eastern and central Europe. So we find ourselves in a defining moment for our transatlantic alliance, and nobody should mistake that, and we are prepared to do what we need to do, and to go the distance to uphold that alliance (Kerry: 2014).” Part of the challenge in crafting a policy response is predicting the security situation in Ukraine. Understanding why the situation turned into a civil war, and how long and intense the civil war is expected to be will be vital for United States policy.

While much work has been done to study violent conflict, comparatively little work has been done to study nonviolent resistance. This is surprising, given that many nonviolent resistance push for similar goals as the groups engaged in violent rebellion. By better understanding nonviolence, we can see why groups with similar goals choose different tactics. Additionally, understanding nonviolent resistance can help us understand violent conflict beyond the country-year level of analysis, and gives the opportunity to examine how group features impact the decisions of those groups that have potential to engage in violent rebellion.

Theoretical Argument

To build my theoretical model about violent conflict onset, intensity, and duration, I begin by looking at rebel strength. This refers to the effectiveness of a rebel group on the battlefield. There is much variation in this, even among rebel groups that have targeted similar governments. Both Hezbollah and Hamas have engaged in battle with the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) over the past two decades. They have had different records of success on the battlefield, though. While Hamas has been carried out terrorist attacks and found success in the political arena, they have typically come up short in open combat with the IDF.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, has been able to mount a relatively effective challenge to the significantly more powerful Israeli military. It receives substantial foreign support from Iran and Syria, is well armed, and carries out a variety of different types of military operations using more advanced tactics than most other rebel groups. It has become such an effective fighting force that many other rebel groups copy its strategies, and it has won the grudging respect of some IDF officers for its ability to hold its own on the battlefield (Byman: 2011).

This variation in fighting capacity has an impact on state decisions regarding concessions. In the case of Israel and Hezbollah, Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 in response to Hezbollah's ability to inflict harm on Israel militarily (Hof: 2001). While Hamas has achieved some concessions from Israel, it has not achieved the level of success that Hezbollah has in doing so (Byman: 2011). As this variation indicates, rebel strength is an important determinant of a state's decision to make a concession to a rebel group to avoid further violence.

Other scholars have considered rebel strength as an important variable in their work (Cunningham, Gleditsch, Salehyan: 2009). They generally treat it as something that is static

throughout the process of fighting, however. This is at odds with many cases of civil war, where we have observed rebel strength vary greatly over a relatively short period of time. These changes in rebel strength throughout the process of conflict have important implications for the decisions that states make about whether to make concessions to avoid conflict. When a group makes a demand of them, the state has to assess how much of a threat the group could represent. When groups represent a large threat, the state has incentives to make concessions in order to avoid fighting. When a group represents a small threat, on the other hand, fighting may be cheaper for the state.

There is an information problem because the state cannot directly observe rebel strength. In addition, the fact that rebel strength sometimes changes so rapidly means that the state usually cannot fight a short war in order to size up their competition, as they generally can in an interstate war. This means that the state must look to proxies in order to predict the maximum strength of a rebel group throughout the whole process of conflict, known as potential rebel strength. The state's expectations about this potential rebel strength impact the incentives it has to make large offers to avoid violent conflict.

Just as states have expectations about the potential strength of a group, groups have expectations about how much of a threat they present to the state. These expectations are factored in when they decide whether to use violence or nonviolence. Violence is costly, and civil war involves sunk costs on all sides that can be avoided if they are able to come to a mutually acceptable solution without violence (Fearon: 1995). Therefore, it is assumed that groups would rather gain concessions through nonviolence when this is possible. There is reason to believe that groups do factor in this consideration. Albanians in Kosovo, for example, mounted a nonviolent resistance campaign before deciding to turn to violence (Woodward:

1995). Violence, then, is expected to occur in cases where groups are unable to gain concessions through nonviolence. Expectations about this determine which strategy groups have incentives to pursue.

In order to gain concessions through nonviolence, a group must represent a large threat to the state and the state must be able to observe this. Even when these groups do not use violence, the state may anticipate that they will turn violent and make concessions to avoid this. For example, in Egypt in 2011, President Mubarak was forced to step down from power after protests grew in size and momentum and represented a significant threat to the state. When he stepped down, the military issued a statement saying that his replacement happened “out of a belief in the national responsibility to maintain stability and the security of the homeland (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces: 2011).”

Groups that do not have the potential to grow into a large military threat, however, give the state little reason to make these sorts of concessions when they only mobilize using nonviolent resistance. While the Mubarak regime was falling in Egypt, there was also a nonviolent resistance movement in Iran. The Iranian government, however, was able to put this down without making serious concessions to the protesters (Dalacoura: 2012). In these cases, groups generally must use violence to demonstrate their ability to inflict harm on the state before the state has incentives to give concessions to avoid further violence. Because of this, I predict groups are less likely to use violence and more likely to use nonviolence when they are strong relative to the state. This is somewhat counter-intuitive, in that it leads to the expectation that the groups that would be most effective in armed rebellion are actually the least likely ones to be observed engaging in armed rebellion.

After examining the impact of potential rebel strength on the use of violence relative to nonviolence, I look at the cases where violence does occur. I first look to the question of conflict duration. One might initially think that potential rebel strength would not make as much of a difference in these cases. After all, while states cannot observe rebel capabilities prior to conflict, they can observe rebel capabilities during conflict by looking at how they perform on the battlefield. This might lead to the expectation that, while proxies for potential rebel strength help determine the choice of tactics, they lose their importance during fighting itself. Violent conflict is a process, however. This process of fighting battles and attempting to negotiate an end to the conflict takes time. As mentioned above, rebel strength can change very rapidly during this process. This dynamic is very important for our understanding of violent conflict because it points to a previously underappreciated information problem.

Previous scholars have painted war as a method for solving problems relating to uncertainty about each side's relative capability. Essentially, parties have incentives to misrepresent their capabilities prior to conflict, rendering this information incredible. Information revealed on the battlefield, however, is difficult to misrepresent and is therefore credible. In this way, expectations about who would prevail in a total war converge throughout the process of fighting. This helps parties come to a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement that they both prefer to continuing to fight to the point where one side is disarmed (Wagner: 2007).

For this logic to work, capabilities must remain static during the process of conflict. If parties can change in their relative strength during a war, then information revealed on the battlefield during one stage may not represent a good proxy for who would win in a total war. This points to a previously unstudied information problem in civil conflict, one created by

changing capabilities. Fighting, thought to credibly reveal information on the battlefield, may not cause expectations to converge in ways that previous scholarship would lead us to expect.

Because of this, expectations about how much a group could grow in fighting capability, or their potential rebel strength, matter not just for conflict onset but also for the process of conflict itself.

Parties to a conflict generally negotiate while they fight, and at any given stage have the options of settling or continuing to fight in hopes that they can get a better settlement in the future. Changing rebel strength, however, means that this negotiation happens in an environment of incomplete information. While fighting can credibly reveal information about current capabilities, it does not necessarily tell parties to a conflict about how powerful a rebel group will be at a future stage. The state must consider this growth potential when they decide how big of an offer to make to settle the conflict. If they make too small of an offer, they risk continued fighting and will continue to pay the costs associated with that. If they make too large of an offer, however, they risk giving up more than they have to in order to settle, and their concessions may be more costly than continued fighting.

The size of the state's offer is a function of its expectations about the rebel group's potential strength. If it expects that a rebel group has the potential to grow very large and powerful in a future time period, then it has incentives to make larger offers in order to avoid the costs of violent conflict in the future. If the state expects that a group has very little potential to grow more powerful in the future, however, then it has incentives to make small or nonexistent offers. While fighting may have costs associated with it, these costs are expected to be lower than the costs of settling. In Spain, for example, the ETA fought a conflict with the government for decades. The group was always relatively small, both in terms of its size and the costs it was able to inflict on the Spanish government. Because of this, it failed to gain significant

concessions in forty years of fighting. When the ETA announced a ceasefire in 2010 and called on the government to negotiate peace, the Spanish government rejected negotiations. Interior Minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba responded to the ceasefire by saying, “The word ‘truce’ as a concept of limited peace to have dialogue is dead. That’s the past (Goodman: 2010).”

This suggests that states will make larger settlement offers to those groups that have a large potential strength in order to avoid even more costly conflict in future period. In turn, groups are more likely to settle in any period because the larger offers increase their utility in settling at present. Groups with a small potential strength, or those whose potential strength is difficult to observe, are likely to receive smaller concession offers from the state in any given period, and therefore have greater incentives to continue fighting. This leads to the prediction that groups with larger potential strength, when they do mobilize violently, will fight shorter conflicts.

After I examine conflict duration, I turn to conflict intensity. This refers to the number of battle deaths that happen in the conflict. Some conflicts see fairly low-level violence, while others result in very intense fighting with many battle deaths. The potential for rebels to grow in strength and fighting capability helps account for this variation in conflict intensity. In order to understand why this is the case, it is important to recognize that potential fighting capability refers how powerful a rebel group may grow, not how powerful they do grow. Some rebel groups never realize their potential fighting capability, while others do.

State decisions regarding repression have an impact on this variation. Just as states must decide how large of offers they make to avoid conflict, they also must decide what sorts of strategies they will use to repress violent rebellion. In some cases, they use the harshest means available. In Rwanda, for example, the Hutu led government responded to a Tutsi-led rebellion

by carrying out genocide against the Tutsi population, tragically resulting in over half a million deaths (Kuperman: 2000). In other cases, however, we observe states holding back and not using every tool at their disposal. During the Troubles in Northern Ireland, for example, the British government showed restraint in their repression of the IRA (Woodwell: 2005).

There is variation in the level of repression that states use because repressive measures are a double-edged sword. On one hand, repression can materially weaken rebel groups. It is difficult to recruit individuals when participation in rebellion involves the risk of jail, death, and opportunity costs. As these costs increase, incentives to participate in rebellion decrease, meaning that state repression can undercut recruitment and effectively put down rebellion (Lichbach: 1995). In Chechnya, for example, the Russian government was able to weaken the insurgency through mass violence, which also killed many civilians (Lyall: 2009). There are several moral problems associated with harsh repression, and it can also backfire for the governments carrying out the repression.

At times, harsh repression can also be a recruitment aid for rebel groups. As potential recruits see the state using harsh tactics, they may be more motivated to join rebellion. In this way, repression may act as a focal point to fuel recruitment (Khawaja: 1993; Rasler 1996). Repression can also cause an international backlash, which can cause an influx of foreign money, weapons, and military support on behalf of the rebel group. The Assad regime in Syria learned this when its increasingly repressive measures gave its neighbor, Saudi Arabia, a reason to pay members of the Free Syrian Army (Chulov et al: 2012). Because of this, repression can sometimes fuel rebellion rather than weaken it.

States must consider these tradeoffs they decide what level of repression to use. The potential strength of a rebel group has an impact on state incentives in this decision. Repression

can put down rebellion, but it can also help rebel groups reach their potential strength. As this potential strength increases, states have incentives to use less harsh measures in order to avoid having to fight a rebel group at its most powerful. Groups with a low potential strength, however, do not cause the same concerns for states. While repression may trigger additional recruitment, states are less concerned about these groups reaching their full potential because this is lower. This logic leads to the prediction that, as potential strength increases, states are expected to use less repressive tactics, making it less likely that rebel groups will reach their potential strength. Both of these factors lead to the prediction that conflicts will be less intense as the potential strength of a rebel group increases.

Above, I outline the three key hypotheses tested in this dissertation. I predict that, as the potential strength of a group increases, the likelihood of violent conflict, the duration of violent conflict, and the intensity of violent conflict all decrease. All three involve the impact of potential rebel strength on state and rebel behavior before and during conflict. In this way, similar variables can impact several phases of conflict.

Contributions of Dissertation

This dissertation furthers the study of conflict in several ways. From a theoretical point of view, it contributes to bargaining models of the process of conflict. In particular, it points out a previously unappreciated information problem in models of conflict. Over the past decade, there has been a growing body of literature that models violent conflict as a part of the negotiating process. While conflict is costly, it gives parties a credible way to reveal information that is incredible prior to fighting (Wagner: 2000; Filson, Werner: 2002; Slantchev: 2003; Powell: 2004; Wagner, 2007).

These models treat capabilities as static during the process of fighting. While information about capabilities and expectations about who would prevail converge during conflict, the underlying capabilities do not in these models. In this dissertation, I build on these models by considering the fact that capabilities can vary. We have observed many rebel groups grow during the process of fighting. When the capabilities of parties are considered to be dynamic rather than static, it becomes clear that expectations about who would prevail in a total war may not converge in the ways that previous models predict.

While this dissertation examines changing capabilities in the context of violent rebellion and nonviolent resistance, the logic has implications for other types of conflict. This means that the model could be modified to apply to phenomena such as interstate conflict. In World War II, for example, the United States developed the atomic bomb, which significantly altered the bargaining situation with Japan. It is possible that the two countries had expectations about who was more likely to achieve a technological breakthrough like this, and that these expectations impacted this behavior. The theoretical model developed in this dissertation could be modified to understand how these expectations influenced the dynamics of the conflict. This is just one example of how the theoretical model developed here can contribute to our understanding of political violence broadly.

This dissertation also contributes to our understanding of how features of potential rebel groups can impact conflict onset, and how the variance in these features among groups that do rebel impacts the dynamics of conflict. In particular, this dissertation gives more attention to the importance of human capital than most previous conflict scholarship. Anecdotally, there is much reason to believe that human capital is an important variable. In Iraq, for example, we have seen insurgents use their technical know-how to make and remotely detonate more advanced IEDs,

and even monitor drones (Gorman et al: 2009). We have also seen groups such as Hezbollah invest much of their budget to set up schools and educate their support base (Cammett: 2006). Despite all of this, very few pieces of scholarship have systematically looked at how human capital influences conflict processes. This dissertation takes the role of human capital seriously, and provides a beginning to build further scholarship on the importance of human capital.

In addition to adding new elements to our theoretical understanding of conflict, this dissertation will also contribute new data on groups mobilized against their government. I examine each case in the NAVCO dataset from 1950 to 2006, and code the economic standing and level of education of the support base. This is done on a three point ordinal scale depending on how the support base compares to the country as a whole.

In addition, I identify the primary leader of each group, and code data on their level of education and military training. These variables will help scholars understand the potential effectiveness of the groups' membership beyond just what they show on the battlefield. Since these variables can generally be observed ex ante, this will allow scholars to study conflict onset dyadically in ways that were not possible before this dataset. In this way, this dissertation builds on previous scholarship by building new theoretical models and new data for future conflict researchers to further their own scholarship.

Chapter Outline

The remainder of this dissertation is divided into five chapters. In Chapter 2, I outline my theoretical model in greater detail. This involves defining the concept of potential rebel strength, which refers to the state's belief about how much a rebel group could grow in strength during conflict. I then detail the logic behind how it impacts the interaction between a state and rebel

group. I use this to form a testable hypothesis about how proxies for potential rebel strength impact the likelihood that a group will use violence or nonviolence. I then use this logic to derive testable implications for conflict onset and conflict intensity.

In Chapter 3, I develop proxies for the concept of potential rebel strength that can be observed *ex ante* by states. These impact conflict dynamics by creating state expectations about a group's ability to become effective on the battlefield. I then outline the measures of these variables and the data sources used to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. In particular, I focus on the role of the economic standing and level of education of the group membership, two variables that have been understudied in conflict research. I also detail the coding rules used to collect original data on these variables.

Chapter 4 presents the quantitative tests of my hypothesis about conflict onset. I test the impact of potential rebel strength on conflict onset with a multi-level logit model using violence relative to nonviolence as the dependent variable.

Chapter 5 presents quantitative tests of my hypotheses about conflict duration and intensity. I use a negative binomial regression to do this, with the number of years that the conflict lasts and the number of battle deaths as my dependent variables.

Chapter 6 presents a qualitative test of my theoretical model, which gives additional focus to the mechanisms. I employ a most similar systems design by examining the violent Kosovo Liberation Army and the nonviolent campaign to oust Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Both of these campaigns targeted the same regime at a similar time period, but varied in their use of tactics. This allows us to observe the interactions between states and potential rebel groups while controlling for country-specific features that are harder to control for in statistical models, such as the attitudes and personalities of the state leadership. I then present

case studies of four countries that experienced campaigns as a result of the Arab Spring: the nonviolent campaigns in Egypt and Tunisia, and the violent campaigns in Libya and Syria. This allows for the comparison of why some used nonviolence while others used violence, and the violent cases allow for the study of why the violent conflict in Syria was longer and more intense than the violent conflict in Libya.

In Chapter 7, I conclude with a brief summary of my main findings and suggest a direction for future research built on this dissertation. In particular, I urge scholars of conflict to consider that the capabilities of political actors can change greatly during violent conflict, and that this can impact the dynamics of conflict in ways that most existing models would not predict. I also suggest that scholars should look beyond simply the size of rebel groups, and consider factors like human capital that can impact the effectiveness of the membership on the battlefield.

Chapter 2:

Building a Theory of Nonviolence and Violence

In this chapter, I outline the logic behind my main hypotheses regarding the use of violence, the duration of violent conflict, and the intensity of violent conflict. I focus on the idea that the strength and fighting capability of a rebel group can change throughout the process of conflict. Actors in a conflict consider this possibility throughout their interaction, both before conflict breaks out and during conflict. In order to understand how this dynamic impacts conflict, I develop the concept of “potential rebel strength”. This represents the maximum potential that the rebels have to grow in strength during conflict. I then argue that this potential has an impact on the decisions that states make regarding the size of concessions they should offer to avoid fighting, and the level of repression that they use to put down a group engaged in rebellion.

This logic yields three main predictions about violent conflict onset, duration, and intensity. I predict that, as potential rebel strength increases, and states can observe proxies of this, the likelihood that groups will mobilize violently rather than nonviolently decreases. Among groups that do mobilize using violence, those with higher potential strength are predicted to fight shorter conflicts, and these conflicts are predicted to be less intense. In order to understand why this is expected to be the case, it is first necessary to look at previous research on civil conflict and show why the possibility of changing rebel strength alters our understanding of violent conflict.

Previous Scholarship

Information Problems

In one of the most influential pieces of scholarship on violent conflict of the past several decades, Fearon (1995) looks into the question of why war occurs. Violence has several costs associated with it. There is a human cost associated with war, and all sides of a conflict, even when victorious, generally see some level of human casualties. It is also costly from a monetary point of view because it is expensive to train, equip, and pay soldiers. It destroys infrastructure that generally has to be rebuilt, which is also extremely costly. There is also an opportunity cost, because resources devoted to political violence could be devoted to other things if war was avoided. United States President Dwight Eisenhower famously captured this spirit when he said “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed (Eisenhower: 1953).”

These costs are considered to be sunk costs, meaning that each party pays them regardless of the outcome of the conflict. These sunk costs, however, would have been avoided if the outcome at the end of war had been reached through negotiation rather than fighting. Because of this, war is considered to be ex post irrational. This means that, in hindsight, there is always some sort of agreement that would have left all parties better off than fighting. In World War I, for example, a long and costly war was fought that resulted in the redrawing of the borders in Europe. Had these same borders been drawn through negotiation rather than fighting, it would have saved the millions of lives while leading to a similar overall outcome.

If war is ex post irrational, this leads to the question of whether violent conflict is simply the result of warring parties acting irrationally. Fearon argues that this is not necessarily the case.

While war is always considered irrational *ex post*, it can be a rational *ex ante*. Put differently, parties to a conflict can have individually rational reasons to fight beforehand, even though, in hindsight, negotiation would have left them better off. The two big reasons for this are information problems and commitment problems.

Information problems play most heavily in the theory that I develop in this dissertation. These information problems refer to the fact that parties to a conflict are not fully informed of each other's capabilities prior to the onset of conflict. This can create divergent expectations about the outcome of a conflict. Each side could expect that, should a conflict occur, they would be victorious. This can hinder negotiations because each side may be reluctant to make concessions at the negotiating table, believing that they will be able to get a better outcome for themselves by fighting.

These sorts of information problems are difficult to resolve because parties to a conflict have incentives to misrepresent their capabilities in the pre-conflict phase. When parties are negotiating prior to a conflict, trying to come up with a settlement that they all prefer to fighting, they have incentives to appear strong in order to get a bigger offer from the other side. There are also strategic reasons to create uncertainty about their capability. It is costly for actors to build up and maintain their fighting capability, and these resources can be devoted to other things. By creating a level of strategic uncertainty about their capability, parties can create the possibility that others will overestimate their strength (Meirowitz & Sartori: 2008). This all points to the idea that it is very difficult to get an accurate read on the other party's capabilities on the battlefield, which makes it difficult to find a settlement that all parties prefer to fighting.

These incentives to misrepresent information about capabilities mean that, even if parties are being honest when they reveal information about their fighting capability, this information is

incredible. A party to a conflict is expected to represent themselves as strong regardless of their true strength, meaning that there is not always a good way to distinguish between actors being honest about their strength, and actors that are merely feigning strength to get a better position at the negotiating table. This is a problem, but it is not always an intractable one. Some actors develop a reputation for honesty, and this reputation can make other parties more likely to believe what they say during bargaining (Guisinger & Smith: 2002). This could be problematic in the case of civil conflict, however, because most rebel groups are never observed until they begin rebellion. This means that they do not have reputations formed already, making it difficult for parties to gauge whether they are being honest.

In the context of violent rebellion and nonviolent resistance, this scholarship would suggest that, *ex post*, nonviolence is preferable to violence for all parties. Outcomes achieved through civil war involve sunk costs, which can be avoided if similar outcomes can be achieved through nonviolence. This raises the question of why groups with a grievance against the government would ever pay the costs of violence when they can instead demand change through nonviolence. Rationalist models of conflict point to a classic information problem as an explanation. Both states and non-state actors with a grievance are not fully informed about each other's capabilities, which can hinder their ability to find negotiated outcomes that both find to be *ex ante* preferable to fighting. Civil conflicts, however, create another type of information problem that has not been previously recognized by scholars. To understand this, it is necessary to examine a more recent body of literature built on Fearon's rationalist explanations of conflict.

Conflict as a Process

In much of the scholarship that followed Fearon (1995), war is seen as a costly lottery. Parties are unable to reach an agreement due to differing expectations about who would win in a total war, so they take the risk of fighting. In the past decade, we have seen an important body of literature that builds a more nuanced understanding of war than the costly lottery models. This body of literature is based on the idea that parties to a conflict generally negotiate while they fight. For example, the United States has included the Taliban in negotiations to end the conflict in Afghanistan, even as it fights the group on the battlefield (Sheikh & Greenwood: 2013). 19th Century Prussian General Clausewitz famously said, “war is the continuation of politics by other means” (Clausewitz: 1873). Many scholars take this idea seriously, and consider these wartime negotiations to be part of the political process. Furthermore, conflicts rarely end with one actor completely disarming the other. Rather, conflicts usually end with some sort of negotiated settlement. The war between the government of Mozambique and the right wing RENAMO, for example, did not end with the defeat of RENAMO but rather a compromise settlement designed to turn RENAMO into a legitimate political party. This means that, after fighting starts, actors generally are able to come up with negotiated settlements that they both prefer to continued fighting.

The fact that conflicts typically end in negotiated settlement raises the question of why parties to a conflict are able to come up with these settlements after fighting starts, but not beforehand. In this line of scholarship, war is seen as a way to aid the negotiation process by solving information problems. To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to look at the difference between information revealed prior to conflict and information revealed during conflict. As mentioned above, information revealed prior to a conflict is not credible because

each party has strong incentives to misrepresent their strength. Information revealed during a conflict, however, is generally seen as more credible because it is observed by both parties on the battlefield (Wagner: 2000; Filson, Werner: 2002; Slantchev: 2003; Powell: 2004; Wagner, 2007). While it is possible for a party to misrepresent their strength during negotiations prior to fighting, it is very difficult for actors to do this when they are actually fighting.

If information revealed on the battlefield is more credible than information revealed prior to violent conflict, then fighting can be seen as part of the political process that helps parties find settlements that they all prefer to continued fighting. It does this by altering expectations about who would win in a total war. Just as it is easier to predict who would win a football game one quarter in than it is before the game starts, it is easier to predict who would win a total war after fighting has begun than it is prior to fighting (Wagner: 2007). Because information revealed on the battlefield is more credible, it can converge expectations about who would win in a total war. Since information problems arise from parties not agreeing on what the outcome of a war would be, fighting can help them agree on this. This can aid in the political process of negotiation by creating agreement on each side's relative capability. In this body of literature, conflict can be considered to be a process.

These models treat the capabilities of actors as static during the process of fighting. Information about each actor's capabilities, as well as expectations about who would win a war, change during fighting. The underlying capabilities, however, remain unchanged. In practice, capabilities are not as static as these models suggest. In conflicts around the world, we have seen rebel groups grow rapidly in their size and strength. Below, I briefly summarize two cases that demonstrate this idea, and then discuss how this creates a previously unappreciated information problem.

Changing Rebel Strength

Free Syrian Army

In early 2011, citizens of countries around the Middle East, inspired by the protests that ousted the Tunisian President Ben Ali, began to protest against their autocratic governments. This series of protests became known as the Arab Spring, and additionally brought down governments in Egypt and Libya. As part of this wave of protests, Syrian students began to rally in the small southern town of Dara'a, where several students had been incarcerated for writing anti-government graffiti (Abouzeid: 2011). These protesters clashed with police, leaving several civilians dead. The state's repression backfired, and triggered an escalation of the protests in the larger cities of Damascus and Aleppo. More citizens became involved, people began using increasingly violent tactics, and "what had begun as a food and water issue gradually turned into a political and religious cause" (Polk: 2013).

The clashes between the protesters and the regime ended up escalating into a full-scale civil war, pitting the Assad regime against many groups of rebels loosely allied under the banner of the Free Syrian Army. As of 2014, the opposition claims that the war has left over 160,000 people dead, many of them civilians (Karimi & Abdelaziz: 2014). The regime has been accused of using chemical weapons, which has triggered international involvement in the conflict (Sengupta & Gladstone: 2013). As the conflict has escalated, the Free Syrian Army has grown. What was once a small protest movement is now an army numbering over 100,000 fighters, one that gets paid and equipped by foreign countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and is recognized by foreign governments such as France (Balci: 2012; Chulov et al: 2012; Erlanger: 2012).

Comparing the Free Syrian Army of 2014 to the protest movements that gave it birth, it is clear that it has changed quite a bit. What was once a small group of students rallying with mainly nonviolent methods has now become a large army that is well trained and well equipped. This change in capability means that the 2014 Free Syrian Army represents a much greater threat to the Assad regime than it did just a few years ago. When he publically discussed the conflict in 2013, United States President Barrack Obama stated, “I’m confident that Assad will go. It’s not a question of if, its when (Entous & Gorman, 2013).” This brings up the question of whether, during the early protests, the Assad regime could have predicted how large the Free Syrian Army would grow. If they could, what factors did they use to make this prediction and how did it impact the way that they treated the protesters?

Irish Republican Army

The fact that rebel groups can grow in strength during the process of conflict is an important phenomenon because there is significant variation on this. While the Free Syrian Army quickly grew in size and effectiveness on the battlefield, not all rebel groups see this growth. There has historically been Irish nationalist opposition to British rule in Northern Ireland. In 1960s, in response to discrimination by British Protestants in the region, Irish Catholics began to protest nonviolently. These protests triggered a renewal of violence between Irish nationalists and British loyalists, which led to the formation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and an armed campaign against the British government.

For the next three decades, the IRA waged a small-scale war, using tactics such as bombings and targeted assassinations in a conflict known as The Troubles. At its peak in the 1970s, the IRA had about 1,000 active members and the conflict produced about 700 deaths per

year (English: 2004). While this was certainly significant for the people living in the region, the IRA never grew into a significant enough fighting force to pose a serious threat to the British government, and declined in its ability to inflict damage after the 1970s. While Britain made some concessions to the IRA in the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the British government remains in control of the region.

While the IRA and Free Syrian Army both grew out of small protest movements, there is significant variation in the amount that they grew after fighting started and the level of threat that they eventually presented to their respective governments. As a result, the dynamics of the conflict were quite different, especially on the variables of interest in this dissertation. The conflict in Syria has been much more intense than the conflict in Northern Ireland, with some individual days producing a greater death toll than the three decades of The Troubles.

The conflict in Syria is still going on at the present so it is not currently possible to say which conflict lasted longer. Towards the end of 2013, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that the conflict would last a decade (Entous & Gorman: 2013). Time may prove this estimate to be incorrect, but conflicts of the intensity of the Syrian Civil War almost never last three decades and it appears likely that The Troubles will ultimately be the longer-lasting, though less intense conflict.

Rebel Strength as a Dynamic Variable

These two examples are anecdotal, and the differences between Syria and Northern Ireland mean that it is very unlikely the amount that each rebel group grew fully accounted for all of the differences in how each conflict played out. Nonetheless, these examples suggest that there is important variation in the ability of rebel groups to grow during the process of conflict.

This variation undercuts existing models of conflict processes. As mentioned above, most models treat the fighting capability of each actor as static during the fighting process. Information about this fighting capability changes during each period of the conflict as it is revealed on the battlefield, but the underlying fighting capability remains constant. In this way, fighting is expected to solve information problems and expectations about who would win in a total war converge during fighting. If rebel strength can change drastically during fighting, however, this may mean that fighting cannot solve information problems.

Information revealed on the battlefield is credible, but it only reveals how powerful the actor is at the current stage of the conflict. Since rebel groups are observed rapidly changing in their power relative to the state, their strength at the current stage is not necessarily an indicator of their strength at future periods. Because of this, fighting will not always cause expectations to converge in the way that most models of conflict processes claim they will.

A rebel group may suffer a defeat early in the war, but anticipate that they will gain support from the population and grow stronger throughout the process of fighting. This could lead them to anticipate that they will ultimately prevail, even if they appear to be weak at the moment. In the early 2000s, for example, Hamas appeared to be defeated but ultimately grew and gained enough support to win elections in 2006 and continue their campaign against Israel (Byman: 2011). The state may not share this expectation, and take their early success as a sign that the rebel group is weak and that they will be able to defeat it without making serious concessions. In cases like this, information revealed on the battlefield will not solve all of the information problems that prevent peace settlements. This points to previously unrecognized information with conflict.

When the capabilities of actors are considered to be dynamic throughout conflict, it becomes clear that parties do not have complete information about the potential of their adversaries to grow in strength. When this information problem is severe, this means that fighting may not facilitate negotiation in the way that it would in cases when this information problem is small. In the theoretical model that I develop in the remainder of this chapter, I consider this information problem. I look at how the severity of this information problem, and the state's beliefs regarding the potential that a rebel group has to grow in strength, impact the use of violence relative to nonviolence, the duration of violent conflict, and the intensity of violent conflict.

Theoretical Model

Previous literature paints violent conflict as a costly way of revealing information about each actor's capabilities. When fighting capabilities can change during the process of war, however, this suggests that conflict dynamics may play out differently than how previous models, which treat fighting capabilities as if they static throughout the conflict. In order to understand dynamic rebel strength impacts conflict, I develop the concept of "potential rebel strength". This refers to the maximum potential that a rebel group has to grow in strength during the process of fighting. There are several factors that can impact the ability of rebels to be effective on the battlefield, such as manpower, funding, weapons, control of territory, tactical ability, civilian support, and international support. These factors are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

It is important to remember that potential rebel strength represents the potential that they have to grow, not how much they actually grow. Some rebel groups are observed on the

battlefield with a very high fighting capacity, and are thus able to inflict a lot of harm on the state. In Liberia in the 1990s, for example, the rebels were able to control the majority of the country and were stronger than the state on the battlefield (Hegre et al: 2009).

Others rebel groups, however, are never observed with a high fighting capacity on the battlefield but still give us reason to believe that they have a lot of power that could potentially be mobilized during fighting. In the 2006 Thai coup, for example, the military forced President Thaksin to flee the country (Pongsudhirak: 2008). Here there was a large implicit threat because the military supported the coup, but they were never actually observed fighting because Thaksin made concessions before they could. Because of this dynamic, potential rebel strength is not a variable that is directly observable. Rather, it should be treated as something unobserved that actors have beliefs about, and these beliefs impact the decisions that they make.

The units of analysis for the theoretical model in this dissertation are dyads consisting of states and potential rebel groups. Potential rebel groups represent the universe of cases of groups that could conceivably engage in armed rebellion. Observing these groups empirically is difficult due to the problem of observing potential rebel groups *ex ante* mentioned in Chapter 1. This issue is discussed in further detail when I outline my empirical research design in Chapter 3, which argues for using groups engaged in either violent rebellion or nonviolent resistance as the relevant universe of cases of potential rebel groups.

For the purposes of the theory, potential rebel groups can be conceived of as any group with a grievance against the government that is large enough that the membership could be mobilized to demand that the government addresses these grievances, and with a large enough potential support base that they at least merit some sort of government response, even if this response is repression. Some examples of these potential groups could include territorial

concentrated national groups that wish to secede from their state, oppressed ethnic groups that want greater rights, disenfranchised citizens who would like to see a more representative form of government, or people living in a colony that want to expel a foreign occupier. In the remainder of this chapter, I outline a theoretical model for how states interact with these potential rebel groups, with beliefs about their potential rebel strength as a key consideration in the decisions that they make, as well as the decisions that the potential rebel group makes based on their beliefs of how the state will react to their potential strength. This interaction has implications for the decision on the part of the potential rebel group to use violence or nonviolence, along with the duration and intensity of war when violence does occur.

I assume that states and potential rebel groups are rational in their interaction. This simply means that they weigh the costs and potential benefits of each choice that they have, and choose the option that they believe will best help them achieve their goals. The word “rational” does not say anything about the normative implications of what these goals are. I also assume that the choice between violence and nonviolence is instrumental. Violence is costly, and this assumption of instrumentality means that parties would rather avoid violence if they can achieve the same goals through nonviolence.

There are times when this assumption that violence is instrumental might not perfectly mirror the mindset of those that choose to engage in violence. It is possible that some decision-makers in potential rebel groups may prefer violence to nonviolence for ideological or personal reasons. Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara, for example, shunned nonviolence when he said, “Is it possible or not, given the present conditions in our continent, to achieve it (socialist power, that is) by peaceful means? We emphatically answer that, in the great majority of cases, this is not possible” (Guevara: 1962). There are also cases when decision-makers may prefer

nonviolence for personal reasons. Mahatma Gandhi opposed violence in every situation as a matter of principle, arguing, “nonviolence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind, it is mightier than the mightiest weapon of destruction devised by the ingenuity of man (Gandhi & Attenborough, 2001: 59).”

Even in cases such as where leaders have strong personal beliefs about violence that are based on factors than instrumentality, however, it seems likely that leaders who favor nonviolence will be most likely to rise to the top in movements where nonviolence is expected to best help the group achieve its goals, and leaders who favor violence in groups where violence is expected to be the best option. Because of this, the simplifying assumption that groups employ violence and nonviolence rationally, and prefer nonviolence if it is able to achieve their goals as effectively as violence, appears to be reasonable.

Finally, I assume that the state and a potential rebel group are engaged in a zero sum game. This means that the state would prefer to offer nothing to the potential rebel group if it can, because any concessions that it does give will detract from what it has. A critique of this assumption may be that rebellion can produce goods that are beneficial for all actors. If this were usually the case, however, the state would make those concessions without an explicit or implicit threat of rebellion.

Violence or Nonviolence

Potential rebel groups, when they begin to mobilize against their government, must decide if they are going to use nonviolence or violence. Each strategy has its advantages and drawbacks. As mentioned above, nonviolence avoids the costs associated with violent conflict. That is not to say that participants in nonviolent resistance do not risk life and limb. Participants

in nonviolent resistance risk injury, jail, social sanctions, and sometimes even death. In the protests in Egypt that overthrew President Mubarak, an estimated 800 protesters lost their life in the rallies (Spencer: 2013). Mubarak was eventually charged in these deaths, but cases like this are rare and many leaders go unpunished for their harsh repression against nonviolent protesters.

In general, the risks associated with nonviolent resistance are lower than those associated with violent rebellion. This is due to the advantages of nonviolent resistance. Nonviolent resistance movements have an easier time recruiting large numbers of people, meaning that the risk that each individual will be punished is reduced. There are also strong international norms against using harsh repression against nonviolent protesters. Leaders who have tried to do this have often found themselves ostracized by the international community, making them the target of sanction and intervention. South Africa, for example, became an international pariah and got sanctions levied against them due to their treatment of civil rights leaders like Nelson Mandella (Levy: 1999). Nonviolence also has a significantly higher success rate than violence, and groups may observe how successful nonviolence has been around the world when they select their strategy (Chenoweth & Stephan: 2011).

Nonviolence has many advantages over violence, but it also has some disadvantages. While it can impose normative and image costs on the regime in charge of the state, it does not impose the same types of physical costs that some violent rebellions do. In addition, nonviolent resistance relies on voluntary participation to attract members. This may be feasible in cases like pro-democracy movements or anti-colonial movements that are ideologically attractive to a broad cross-section of society, but Marxist movements and ethnically organized movements, which appeal to a more selective group in society, may not be able to get those large numbers of recruits through voluntary participation (Cyr: 2013). In these cases, violent rebel groups can rely

on more coercive strategies such as abduction to gain participants (Humphreys & Weinstein: 2008). These groups can also establish territorial control in areas of the country, which can influence civilian fence sitters to come over to their side (Kalyvas: 2006).

This means that there are tradeoffs between nonviolence and violence. While nonviolence can be a very effective strategy for some groups, it is not the most effective option for every group, and there are some that may have rational incentives to choose violence. In order to understand why groups have incentives to choose one over the other, it is necessary to look at the options that the state faces in how to respond to groups mobilized against them. Since the state is ultimately the one that will make or not make any concessions that a potential rebel group seeks, expectations about the state's decision regarding these concessions are an important driver of potential rebel group's strategy.

When confronted with a demand from a group mobilized against them, the state must decide how much of a concession to offer to address this grievance. Concessions refer to two different types of actions taken by the government: Giving into at least some the demands of rebels or nonviolent protests, or yielding power because they have been defeated. The former refers to times when the government attempts to quell revolution by taking actions to satisfy the membership. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, for example, has offered power-sharing arrangements from time to time in order to get potential rebel groups to demobilize.

I do not consider concessions that are offered but without the serious expectation that they will be sufficient to satisfy the membership. After the initial phase of the Syrian Civil War, for example, Assad made some vague promises of reforms in the future, but was generally seen as defiant in the face of the rebellion that he faced (Lesch: 2013). When I refer to concessions, I

do not refer to cases such as this, but rather cases of governments making offers with the genuine expectation that it might calm down rebellion.

I consider yielding by the government to be a form of a concession. This involves key government officials giving up power and, in some cases, leaving the country. At times, yielding may not be a voluntary choice on the part of key government leaders. When Gaddafi gave up power in Libya, for example, it happened due to the fact that he was killed rather than the fact that he gave in to protests. Even in these examples, however, other members of the regime must choose to stand down when key leaders get killed. In this way, they are still making concessions in response to the costs inflicted upon them by the rebel group.

While many campaigns make maximalist demands, there is evidence that concessions that fall short of fully yielding can cause campaigns to demobilize. The Irish Republican Army, for example, demanded full independence for Northern Ireland. They failed to achieve this, but demobilized after receiving political concessions from the British government. Cases like this are not rare. Between 1950 and 2006, 41 cases of violent rebellions and nonviolent resistance campaigns have demobilized after achieving some, but not all of their goals. This provides evidence that potential rebel groups seek concessions from the government, and could potentially demobilize even if what they receive falls short of total government defeat.

The state's concession can range anywhere from offering nothing to completely giving in to the group's demands. In the case of groups with major, zero-sum grievances, such as replacing the government or seceding a piece of territory, this is a difficult decision for the state. If they offer too little, they risk not satisfying the group and seeing continued rebellion. This can be especially problematic in the context of changing rebel strength, because leaders that do not offer large enough concessions can see groups mobilized against them grow in strength and have an

even better bargaining position in the future. In the Libyan civil war that took place during the Arab Spring, for example, Muammar Gaddafi learned this lesson the hard way when the war ultimately cost him his life while other leaders targeted during the Arab Spring that stepped down from power were able to escape to relative comfort in exile. If the state offers too much, however, they risk giving up more than they need to in order to calm rebellion. This can be very serious in cases where offers to address grievances could involve leaders stepping down from power.

In order to decide how much of an offer to make, the state must assess the level of threat that a group may present if it is not satisfied by the offer. It has an information problem, however, because it cannot directly observe a group's potential rebel strength. While this is a problem, it does not mean that the state makes their decision in an environment of a complete lack of information. They can look to proxies to try to gauge this with variables that are observable *ex ante*. For example, the state might look at the economic resources at the potential rebel group's disposal, or to the size of the ethnic group that they represent (this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3).

When it decides how much of a concession to offer, the state weighs the costs of a concession vs. the cost of fighting based on their beliefs about the group's potential rebel strength. When the state believes a rebel group has very little potential to grow in strength, it has an incentive to offer small or nonexistent concessions. In these cases, it anticipates that fighting will not be very costly and is unlikely to trigger an anti-state movement, and therefore has very little incentives to give into demands in a zero-sum situation. In Spain, for example, the government did very little to make concessions with the Basque separatist ETA, which only had a few hundred members throughout its decades of violent rebellion (Tremlett: 2004).

As a group's potential rebel strength increases, so does the state's incentive to make big offers to the potential rebel group. Rebel groups with a large potential support base that the state has reason to believe will be effective on the battlefield present a much larger threat. Because of this, the state has greater incentives to avoid fighting, and there is a larger range of concessions it can make that will leave it better off than fighting. In Serbia, for example, Milosevic's rule withstood war with separatist movements in regions such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but he was ultimately brought down when a large cross-section of Serbian society rallied against his rule using nonviolence (Bass: 2003). Because of this threat that potentially powerful groups can present, it is expected that states will offer larger concessions to groups with greater potential rebel strength.

Just as states interact with potential rebel groups in an environment of incomplete information, rebel groups interact with the state in an environment of incomplete information. They do not know much potential they have to grow in strength, but also can look to proxies to try to get a rough estimate of this. If states are expected to make larger offers to groups with a larger potential rebel strength, this means that groups that believe that they have a larger and more effective support base can anticipate larger concessions than groups that do not believe they have as large a support base, or those that believe they do but anticipate that the state will be unable to observe it due to a lack of good proxy variables for the state to gauge this.

Since violence is costly, it is assumed that potential rebel groups will employ nonviolence if they believe this will accomplish their goals effectively. This means that, if the size of the demands of the group mobilized against the government are held constant, there is reason to believe that groups with a larger potential rebel strength are more likely to employ nonviolence

over violence. These groups have the greatest reason to believe that the state will offer them large concessions.

Groups with smaller observable potential rebel strength, on the other hand, have difficulty extracting concessions from the governments using nonviolence. Since the state does not anticipate that they will grow strong during the process of conflict, they have fewer incentives to give in to their demands to avoid conflict. In these cases, groups must use violence to demonstrate their capability to the state, and make fighting costly enough that the state will give in to their demands to avoid further conflict. This leads to the somewhat counterintuitive prediction that the groups that would likely be most effective on the battlefield are also the ones least likely to be observed on the battlefield, as they will rally using nonviolence rather than violence.

Hypothesis 1: As the potential rebel strength of a group mobilized against the state increases, the likelihood that they will use violence rather than nonviolence decreases

Conflict Duration

Information about potential rebel strength is not perfect before fighting, which is why some groups have to fight to demonstrate their capabilities. Even during violent conflict, however, states are not fully informed of the potential that a rebel group has to grow throughout the process of fighting. Information revealed on the battlefield can reveal how powerful a rebel group is in the current period, but may not be an indicator of rebel strength in a future period. The FARC in Columbia, for example, has been able to regroup in the mountains during parts of the conflict when they appeared weak on the battlefield (Dudley: 2004). This is important because, as discussed above, negotiations generally take place during conflict. The state's

expectations about how much potential rebel groups have to grow during conflict matters, even when fighting can solve some of the information problems that led to conflict in the first place.

During wartime negotiations, both the state and the rebel group must weigh the utility of settling against the utility of holding out and continuing to fight. As the size of an offer from the other side increases, so does the utility of settlement. When the state makes offers during fighting, it faces similar incentives to the ones it faces in the pre-conflict phase. When it anticipates that a rebel group will grow stronger in future periods, it has incentives to make bigger offers to end the conflict and avoid the higher costs of fighting that it will face in the future.

If the state anticipates that a rebel group's strength has a smaller cap, it has fewer incentives to make large offers. Thus, rebel groups with a higher potential strength are likely to see higher offers during conflict, increasing the utility of settling at any given stage. This means that groups with a high potential strength, when they do mobilize using violence, are predicted to fight shorter conflicts than those with a smaller potential strength.

Hypothesis 2: Among groups that mobilize using violence, the duration of the conflict will decrease as the group's potential rebel strength increases

Conflict Intensity

It is important to stress that potential rebel strength is just that, potential strength. Not all rebel groups achieve their full strength. Sometimes this is because of the reasons discussed above, that states will offer bigger concessions to end conflict before a rebel group has reached its full potential. Other times, however, a rebel group does not reach its full potential strength because of the state's decisions regarding repressive measures during conflict.

The state has a variety of repressive actions in its toolbox, with varying levels of harshness. At the low end, the state may disseminate propaganda against a rebel group or target its members with legal action. In the Troubles, for example, the British government showed high levels of restraint towards the IRA, arresting many key members after they committed crimes but generally not deliberately targeting civilians.

At the high end, the state may attempt to erode a rebel group's civilian support base with mass violence and targeted killings of civilians in towns where the rebel group is known to be powerful. Russia has employed this strategy several times throughout its last two centuries of conflict with Chechen separatists. This has involved indiscriminate shelling of Chechen villages, a military presence, and clearing of forests and other areas where insurgents could potentially hide (Lyll: 2007).

Harsh repressive measures have advantages for the state, but also have drawbacks. They can raise the costs of rebellion immensely, especially for participants. This can hurt recruitment because it makes participation extremely risky (Lichbach: 1998). Harsh repression can also materially weaken rebels in several ways. It reduces the number of fighters in the group, and may eliminate key leaders, which can hurt strategic planning. Towns that are leveled can also make it more difficult for rebels to hide due to fewer buildings, forests, and other structures conducive to guerrilla warfare. Violence can also displace civilian populations, offering the state an indication that everyone who remains is an active supporter of rebellion. This can help distinguish fighters from civilians (Azam & Hoeffler: 2002). Because of this, states generally face at least some incentives to use maximum levels of force to put down armed rebellion.

While harsh repression can weaken rebellion, it can also strengthen it in several ways. Rebellion can delegitimize the state in the eyes of civilians, producing a backlash (White: 1989).

This can bring people who were previously fence sitters onto the side of rebellion. This can give rebellion additional support (Kalyvas: 2006). It can also trigger micromobilization among people who are supporters, growing the number of active fighters (Khawaja: 1993, Rasler: 1996). Since harsh repression means that all civilians are at risk, not just those actively supporting rebellion, this can increase the costs of nonparticipation, which reduces the relative cost of participation. This can help rebel groups overcome the collective action problem associated with individual rebellion (Lichbach: 1998).

Repression can also help rebel groups recruit outside help by hurting the state's image in the eyes of the world. This can bring international sanctions, third party support, or even direct military intervention on the side of the rebel group. All of this can increase the rebel group's strength relative to the state. In addition to strengthening rebellion, repression also influences the tactics that rebels use. It can cause nonviolent sections of a campaign to turn violent (Sambanis & Zinn: 2005, Asal et al: 2012). This all means that, in addition to the normative reasons to avoid harsh repression, states can have strategic reasons to do so.

When states decide how to respond to rebellion, they must choose a level of repression to use, knowing that repression can weaken rebellion, but also strengthen it. Potential rebel strength weights into this calculation. If rebel groups have the potential to become very strong, states have incentives to hold back in order to avoid triggering a backlash. In cases where the state believes that a rebel group has low potential strength, they have fewer incentives to hold back since the opportunity to crush rebellion outweighs the risk of backlash. This decision also impacts how powerful rebel groups grow. If the state holds back, then the rebel group will not reach its potential strength, which means it will not be able to fight as hard as it would if a backlash was triggered.

The state's decision on its level of repression plays an important role in the intensity of conflict. If states use harsh repressive methods, this helps rebel groups reach their full potential in terms of their ability to inflict harm on the state. Because of this, each side is likely to cause higher casualty rates on the other side when the state uses harsh repressive strategies. This leads to the prediction that, in conflicts with a potentially powerful rebel group, states will hold back and rebel groups will not grow in power as much as they could, leading to less intense fighting. In conflicts with less powerful rebel groups, states have incentives to use more of the harsh tactics at their disposal, leading to more rebel mobilization and more intensive conflicts.

Hypothesis 3: Among groups that mobilize using violence, the intensity of the conflict will decrease as the group's potential rebel strength increases

The three hypotheses outlined above suggest that several different variables associated with the conflict process are linked through similar logic, and that similar factors impact the decisions of states and rebel groups in many different phases of conflict. The story that they tell is also somewhat counterintuitive. Previous research suggests that rebellion is a function of opportunity, and that it is most likely to arise in cases where it is most likely to be successful (Fearon & Laitin: 2003). While it may be true that countries with factors that favor rebellion are more likely to see rebellion, this theoretical model suggests that groups that could potentially be the most powerful on the battlefield are less likely actually be observed on the battlefield. This is because they are less likely to engage in armed violence, and when they do engage in armed violence are less likely to reach that potential because war is shorter and less intense.

These hypotheses deal with the idea of potential rebel strength, something is by definition unobservable. As mentioned above, however, there are observable factors that the state can look to that predict the potential for a rebel group to grow in power during fighting. In Chapter 3, I

outline several propositions about measurable variables that predict this. I then test these hypotheses quantitatively in Chapter 4 and qualitatively in Chapter 5.

Chapter 3

Indicators of Potential Rebel Strength

In Chapter 2, I developed the concept of “potential rebel strength”. This represents the size and fighting capability that a group would likely be able to reach in a sustained conflict. Potential rebel strength, however, is fundamentally unobservable *ex ante*. This creates an information problem for the government of the state, both before and during warfare. Government leaders must decide what sorts of concessions to offer to the group without knowing the costs that armed rebellion could potentially inflict on them, should it occur. This problem is not an intractable one, though. Proxies exist that are observable *ex ante*, and in many cases allow states to get a rough idea of the potential fighting capacity of a group mobilized against them.

In the case of the Syria, the Assad regime could not directly observe, prior to the outbreak of conflict, that the Free Syrian Army would grow into a force of over 100,000 well-equipped individuals. Nonetheless, it is not surprising that it did become so large and powerful. Mobilization had religious undertones, and membership was drawn largely from the Sunni sect, which makes up around 70% of Syria’s population. This is in comparison to Assad’s Alawite sect, which makes up around 12% of the population. In 2005, years before the outbreak of the conflict, Laverett wrote,

“This unresolved cleavage is an important challenge to (Assad) for a number of reasons, most immediately because of the widely perceived minoritarian character of the regime. As was seen earlier, Hafiz al-Assad was able to win the backing of other minority communities in Syria beyond his Alawi base... These efforts,

though, never succeeded in definitively closing the sectarian split in Syrian society (Laverett: 2005, 35).

This example illustrates one of the ways that states and potential rebel groups can predict potential fighting capacity *ex ante*, by observing proxies that signal whether that potential is high or low. This can alleviate the information problem that exists prior to the outbreak of conflict. Because of this, they can alter both the state and the potential rebel group's expectations about how powerful the rebels would grow if a conflict were to occur.

In Chapter 2, I predict that increases in potential rebel strength decrease the likelihood of violence relative to nonviolence, the duration of violent conflict, and the intensity of violent conflict. If these hypotheses are correct, then we should see a negative relationship between observable proxies of potential rebel strength and the three variables mentioned above. In this chapter, I describe these proxies by looking at variables that impact rebel recruitment, mobilization, and effectiveness. Before this, however, it is necessary to define what a "potential rebel group" is.

Defining Potential Rebel Groups

Much of the previous research on civil conflict has been monadic in nature, meaning that scholars have looked at features of states that make some more likely to experience civil war than others. In an influential article, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that the conditions that make an insurgency likely to be successful, namely weak central government, rough terrain, and political instability predict conflict. Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that factors that increase opportunities to fund a rebellion, such as a large group of male citizens, dispersed populations, and mountainous terrain are all significant predictors of rebellion.

Interestingly, these studies find that these opportunity factors tend to be more robust predictors of rebellion than many of the factors that are commonly portrayed as root causes of civil conflict, such as ethnolinguistic fractionalization, economic inequality, and repression. Much of the research on civil conflict that has followed these two seminal pieces use a similar approach, looking at country-years as units of analysis and finding different variables that impact this baseline probability of conflict.

Looking at state features, however, leaves out an important half of the conflict puzzle. As described in Chapter 2, conflict begins as an interaction between a state and a potential rebel group, where the leaders of a potential rebel group decides that violence is the best means to achieve their goals. Studies that only look at state features leave out the role that potential rebel groups play in this interaction. This has long been acknowledged as a problem in civil conflict research, and recently scholars begun to produce research examining the role that rebel groups play in the civil conflict interaction. This body of literature, however, has run up against difficulty in identify the relevant universe of cases for potential civil wars.

This difficulty stands in contrast to dyadic studies of interstate war, which have been around for some time. In these studies, each pair of countries in each year represents a dyad that could potentially engage in war, making every dyad-year part of the universe of cases. In civil conflict, however, this is not so clear-cut because rebel groups are generally not observed until they actually begin fighting. This makes it difficult to put together a dataset of groups that represent the population of “potential rebel groups”.

In an article that studies civil conflict dyadically, Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) use a dataset on rebel fighting capacity compared to the state and use it to examine features of conflicts such duration. By only looking at groups engaged in rebellion, however, the

authors “sidestep the problem of classifying potential rebels ex ante.” While this research is useful for understanding many variables during the process of conflict, it does not allow for any variation on the variable of conflict onset. This makes it impossible to study the dyadic interaction that causes some groups that have a grievance against the government to rebel violently, while others do not.

Other research projects that have taken on the problem of identifying potential rebel groups ex ante by looking at ethnic groups within countries. Two prominent datasets on this are the Minorities at Risk dataset and Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Minorities at Risk Dataset: 2009, Cederman et al: 2009). These datasets have told us much about why some ethnic groups rebel while others do not. For example Cederman, Wimer, and Min (2010) find that ethnic groups are more likely to rebel if they are larger as a proportion of the country’s population, or if they are excluded from the political system.

When researchers look just at ethnopolitical groups, however, they assume that rebellion is mobilized along ethnic lines. This is certainly true in some cases. If one were studying the outbreak of violence in Rwanda in the 1990s, for example, it would be important to understand the Hutus and Tutsis as the relevant groups. But many rebel groups do not mobilize along ethnic lines. The Marxist rebel group Shining Path in Peru, for example, mobilized more along ideological lines rather than ethnic lines. Cases like this would be excluded if one were to just look to ethnic lines to understand civil conflict. Because of these concerns, the best way to study civil conflict dyadically would be to identify those groups that have a major grievance against the government and are mobilized the address this grievance.

At one extreme, one could include dyads consisting of all organized groups within society. This data, in addition to being an unwieldy empirical undertaking, would require

including groups such as the Rotary Club, who are not particularly relevant as a potential rebel group. In order to address this problem, I look only at groups engaged in either violent rebellion or major nonviolent resistance against the state. These are identified in the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset (Chenoweth & Stephan: 2011). This dataset contains 324 groups from 1900 to 2006 that are mobilized with the goal of replacing their government, expelling a foreign occupier, or seceding a piece of territory in order to form a new state.

Since the groups in the NAVCO dataset are selected on the basis of their goals, there is variation on the tactics that they used. Some mobilized primarily with violence, defined as a campaign involving force to harm or threaten an opponent. These campaigns are coded based on Gleditsch's update to the Correlates of War dataset, Clodfelter's encyclopedia of armed conflict, Sepp's list of counter-insurgency operations after 2002, and insurgencies collected by Lyall and Wilson (Clodfelter: 2002, Gleditsch: 2004, Sepp: 2005, Lyall & Wilson: 2009).

Other groups in the NAVCO dataset mobilized nonviolently, despite having similar goals to the violent groups. In this dataset, nonviolence is defined by tactics such as protests, sit-ins, boycotts, strikes, and other types of civil disobedience. It was coded through a review of literature on nonviolence, based especially on "Karatnacky and Ackerman (2005), Carter, Clark and Randle (2007, and Schock (2005)" (Chenoweth & Stephan: 2011).

These groups represent the best available source for the universe of cases of potential rebel groups. They are all the groups with major grievance against the government and the ability to mobilize to address it. Their variation on the use of violence allows for the study group features that impact civil conflict onset, something not possible in previous literature that only looks at groups actively engaged in rebellion.

It is important to acknowledge the downsides of using groups identified in the NAVCO dataset as the universe of potential rebel groups. In order to be observed in the dataset, the groups must actually be mobilized against the government. This means that it is necessary to assume that all relevant potential rebel groups have a sufficient level of ability to mobilize enough of the population that they are observed. Very small groups with extremely low potential strength, such as the Michigan Militia, are not included in the NAVCO dataset.

If the violent campaigns differ systematically from nonviolent campaigns in this minimum level of mobilization capacity required to be observed, then this could bias the findings of this study. Put differently, it is possible that the dataset only picks up on the successful cases of mobilization, and that violent and nonviolent campaigns differ in the factors that allow them to successfully mobilize. While this is a concern, it is impossible to test if violent and nonviolent campaigns differ systematically on their ability to mobilize, since the cases where mobilization does not occur are not observed.

In addition, my theory deals with the government response to threat that these potential rebel groups pose. In cases where mobilization capacity is extremely low, there is a good chance that the groups are never on the government's radar enough to get any sort of response. As such, my theory and tests should be interpreted as one of the interaction between states and potential rebel groups that have reached this minimum level of mobilization capacity.

There is also the risk of excluding groups that have enough mobilization capacity to be observed, but do not make the types of maximalist demands required to be included in the NAVCO dataset. This could be a problem as this may be a function of potential fighting capacity. A group with a grievance that anticipates that it will be weak relative to the state during conflict may demand only territorial autonomy rather than secession, expecting that the state is more

likely to make this modest concession and that is better than no concession at all. Inuit communities in northern Canada, for example, never tried to outright separate from the country, but instead pushed for self-rule in the territory of Nunavut (Krauss: 2006).

While this creates a risk of censoring relevant cases, it also has benefits for this research design. Because potential rebel groups are selected on the basis of their demands, this controls for the level of demands that potential rebels make. This means that the statistical tests presented in this dissertation should be interpreted as the likelihood of violence, conflict duration, and conflict intensity when rebel demands are held constant.

While the problems with using NAVCO campaigns to identify relevant potential rebel groups do create concerns, the dataset nonetheless represents an exciting new frontier for studying civil war onset as an interaction. In the remainder of this chapter, I outline the measures used to proxy for the observable potential fighting capability of each group. In order to do this, it is first necessary to identify the mechanisms by which different variables may impact the potential fighting capacity of a campaign.

Mechanisms

In this section, I outline four ways that variables could impact a group's number of potential supporters, their ability to mobilize supporters, the effectiveness of the membership on the battlefield, and the visibility of their potential fighting capacity.

Number of Potential Supporters

Some variables impact potential fighting capacity by increasing or decreasing the number of people that could potentially support a rebellion. This does not mean that all potential

supporters will actually join a rebellion, but rather there is reason to believe that they would be sympathetic to the rebel group's cause should rebellion occur. Under the right conditions, they might be influenced to join or at least give their tacit support.

There is significant variance in this, as some rebellions only appeal to a small number of people while others will likely benefit a broad cross-section of society. A military coup against a popularly elected leader, for example, might only receive the support of the military officers who stand to gain political control. This is a relatively small group. Jacobo Arbenz was elected to lead Guatemala in 1951, but then ousted in a coup by a small group of officers. Similarly, some rebellions explicitly represent minority groups and can only anticipate the support of a small portion of the country. When the Rwandan Patriotic Front rebelled, for example, they identified as a Tutsi group. This meant that they could not anticipate support from any portion of the Hutu majority, and their size was therefore capped by the size of the Tutsi population.

The leaders of other potential rebel groups have reason to believe that a large portion of the population could potentially support them. Sometimes this happens because they draw from an ethnic majority group, as in the aforementioned Free Syrian Army example. In this case, there was reason to believe that a large portion of the population in the potential support base due to the fact that most Syrians are Sunnis. Some groups do not organize along ethnic lines, but rather have an ideological message designed to appeal to a large portion of the population. In an oppressive dictatorship, for example, a group that espouses democratic ideals could potentially appeal to a broad cross-section of society. The pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe in the 1980s mobilized large groups of people, drawn from many sectors of society. As these cases illustrate, there are variables that states and rebel groups can look to as indicators of the number of people that a potential rebel group may be able to mobilize.

Determining the size of a potential rebel group's potential support base presents a significant information problem in some cases, especially for groups that mobilize along ethnic lines. Ideological beliefs are, many times, privately held and impossible for others to observe. There can be major consequences to publically displaying support for the cause of group mobilized against the state, even if people privately sympathize with them (Kuran: 1989).

This means that groups that mobilize along ideological lines, such as Marxist groups and pro-democracy movements, may have a small support base or a large one, but information problems make it difficult to proxy for this and factor it into their decisions regarding violence and nonviolence. Because of this, there is variation on both the size of the potential support base of a group, and the ability of relevant actors to proxy for this size.

Intuitively, one would expect that larger groups would have an advantage. After all, they have more people that they can put to work on anti-state activities, which can make rebellion costly for the state. Research on collective action, however, gives reason to believe that groups with smaller support bases might have an advantage (Olson: 1965). These groups may be better able to mobilize supporters (mobilization is discussed in greater detail below), and could have an easier time monitoring and controlling the membership to present a unified front.

Evidence suggests, however, that the advantages of larger groups outweigh the advantages of smaller groups. In their study of violent and nonviolent resistance, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that larger groups are more likely to be successful. In addition, size can bestow legitimacy on a group, which can help attract even greater support, internally and externally (Cederman et al: 2009). Based on these factors, I assume that groups that have a larger potential support base, when this is observable through proxy variables, have a greater potential fighting capability and therefore an advantage when they bargain with the state.

Ability to Mobilize Supporters

In order to understand political violence, it is also necessary to look at why individuals choose to participate in collective rebellion (Sambanis: 2004). Having a large potential support base can be an advantage, but there can also be variation in the ability of groups to mobilize their supporters. This can be extremely difficult in the case of violent rebellion, but can also be difficult in cases of nonviolent resistance.

Both types of movement have significant costs associated with participation. First, participants literally risk their lives due to the strong possibility that the government will put these movements down with force. In addition, participants commonly risk arrest or social sanctions if they do make it out alive. There is also an opportunity cost associated with participation, because the labor devoted to participation could be devoted to other activities. Furthermore, rebellion and nonviolent resistance both require financial support, the costs of which are commonly (though not always) paid by the membership.

While individual participants generally pay the bulk of the costs of violent rebellion and nonviolent resistance, the benefits from government concessions and policy changes are generally available to everyone in the potential support base, regardless of their individual participation. In South Africa, for example, members of the African National Congress protested against the apartheid system, and some paid very heavy costs for their participation. When the apartheid system was repealed, however, all previously excluded groups benefitted, not just those who had chosen to participate in the anti-apartheid movement.

Because the political benefits are non-excludible and non-rival, rebellion and nonviolent resistance resemble a public good (Lichbach: 1998). This gives individuals incentives against participation, even if they support the cause. Because of these incentives, a cause that is popular

with a large segment of the population may not gain widespread participation without mechanisms to mobilize active supporters. This creates a classic collective action problem, where everyone following his or her individual incentive to not contribute make it so that mobilization never takes place.

Of course, the collective action problem outlined above is not insurmountable. If it were, then violent rebellion and nonviolent resistance would not exist. Clearly they do, meaning that there are ways to overcome the collective action problem described above. There is variation, however, in the tools that the leaders of groups that may engage in rebellion have available to overcome the collective action problem described above.

First, some groups can offer private benefits to individuals that participate (Lichbach: 1998). Money is the most common private benefit, but there are others such as the ability to loot, the sense of comradeship that people get from participation (Weinstein: 2007). This can help overcome the collective action problem by giving people a reason to contribute to the public good. Members of the opposition in Syria, for example, receive money from neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia. This gives them an individual benefit in addition to the public benefit that they would get if the Assad regime does fall.

Some groups can overcome the collective action problem by identifying and sanctioning those who do not participate. This can cause members to participate for fear of being ostracized by their peers. The groups that are best able to do this are the ones that have close social networks and ties, which can monitor behavior most effectively. The Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, originally grew through ties with the Pashtun community (Abbas: 2014). Since this was a close-knit community grouped together geographically, it made it much easier to identify which members participated.

Finally, groups can increase the benefits from the collective good being achieved. If members see successful collective action as being of a greater benefit, they have incentives to contribute in spite of the possibility that others will free ride on their behavior. Peruvian Maoist rebel group Sendero Luminoso, for example, spent significant resources to set up schools and teach the Marxist ideology to children (Koc-Menard: 2007). If the children grow up fully committed to the ideas of Sendero Luminoso, then this increases the benefits of successful rebellion and the incentives to participate. As groups increase in their ability to mobilize membership through the mechanisms described above, they can become a greater threat to the state because they can offer larger numbers of people mobilized against them.

Effectiveness of Membership

While large numbers of people can be useful for rebellion, not all membership bases are equal in terms of their ability to impose costs on the state. Some rebel groups have been able to use their membership effectively on the battlefield, and performed better than one would expect based on their numbers. Hezbollah, for example, is relatively modest in size with only a few thousand members. They have nonetheless have seen some success against the Israeli Defense Force through innovative tactics. As a result, they have been able to earn greater concessions than other armed groups, both state and non-state, that have fought against Israel. Other groups, however, have been less effective on the battlefield than one might expect given their numbers. The Biafran independence movement, for example, mobilized over 50,000 members but was defeated by the Nigerian army.

It makes sense that there would be variation in effectiveness. There is variance in how well equipped members of a rebellion are. At the low end, some rebel groups are barely able to

arm themselves. This is a limiting factor for rebel groups because states generally have access to the international market for sophisticated weaponry. Poor access to weapons limits the types of operations that rebel groups can conduct, and can force them to rely on asymmetric warfare strategies while avoiding conventional warfare.

Some rebel groups, however, have access to modern weaponry and have a diverse range of arms at their disposal. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, for example, had a small navy and an air force to augment their rebellion. While well-armed rebel groups usually do not have the level of weaponry that the state has, they may be close enough that they can take on the state in many different types of warfare, and have many more strategies available in their toolkit.

Armed rebellion also requires a very specific set of skills, on the part of both the leadership and the rank and file membership. Leaders must be able to plan effective military strategies while maintaining the support of the member base, evading capture themselves, and bargaining with other political actors in order to advance their goals. One of the best examples of an effective, though brutal, rebel leader was Augusto Pinochet. Backed by the United States, he staged a coup against President Salvador Allende. Pinochet's military leadership allowed him to quickly overthrow Allende and establish himself as dictator (Remmer: 1989). Following the coup, Pinochet ruled the country for almost two decades and maintained a place in the government until his death in 2006.

Rank and file members also must be able to effectively carry out the plans and understand when and how to make tactical adjustments. The United States has understood this in its war against insurgents in Iraq, whose strategies adapted and evolved throughout the war. Initially, insurgents would attempt to ambush convoys, leaving them vulnerable to fire. To adapt to this, they developed roadside IEDs, which do not leave them as vulnerable. As the war

progressed, so did the sophistication of these IEDs. While they were initially wired, they eventually became wireless and harder to detect (Higginbotham: 2010).

Adjustments like this require significant technical skills because insurgents must build and program the IEDs. They also require innovation to come up with new tactics that address the problems with old ones. Not all rebel groups have access to membership with these types of skill, but still do their best to make do with what they have. These groups have fewer strategies at their disposal, even when they recruit large numbers of people. Because of this, they are not expected to be as effective on the battlefield.

The above discussion illustrates that there are several dimensions of potential rebel strength. As such, there are several different proxies that political actors can look to when they try to gauge how strong a rebel group could become during conflict. It is important to recognize that these are just proxies that are useful for making a prediction, not deterministic indicators of how successful a group could be during conflict. A rebel group may draw from a very small base, with few resources to mobilize and little skill on the battlefield, and nonetheless be successful due to luck, state incompetence, or factors that are hard to observe.

The Kosovo Liberation Army, for example surprised observers and its own membership with how effective it was in its fight against Serbia. In these cases, however, they have difficulty signaling this without demonstrating their capabilities on the battlefield. Groups that have observable proxies that show their high potential strength, based on the mechanisms outlined above, do not need to rely on battlefield signals to as great an extent. In the next section, I describe some of these proxies, which can be used to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2.

Indicators of Potential Rebel Strength

Some rebel groups and nonviolent resistance movements explicitly appeal to a specific ethnic group or subset of ethnic groups within a country. In Djibouti, for example, the Front for Restoration of Unity and Democracy drew support from the Afar ethnic group (Bollee: 2003). Some groups have organized along ethnic lines, but recruited from several different ethnic groups. The South African Defiance Campaign, which fought against the Apartheid system, had heavy participation from all of the non-white groups excluded from the political system at the time.

While ethnicity is one common line of mobilization for a rebel group, it is not the only one. Pro-democracy movements, for example, recruit from those excluded from the current political system. This exclusion is sometimes ethnic in nature, as it was in South Africa, but not always. Many autocratic states exclude people based on their economic class, birth position, or lack of participation in the military. In these cases, pro-democracy movements commonly recruit people from many different ethnic groups, and do not have an explicitly ethnic component in their goals or their message. The People Power Movement in the Philippines, for example, mobilized a large cross-section of society (Schock: 1999). Marxist movements, similarly, commonly recruit from marginalized ethnic classes. In Nepal in the 1990s and 2000s, for example, Maoist rebels recruited largely from a peasant support base (Joshi & Mason: 2008).

Ethnic vs. non-ethnic mobilization is an important distinction for understanding the degree of the information problem that a potential rebel group presents. Ethnicity refers to identities defined by “an arbitrary subset of categories which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership (Chandra & Wilkinson: 2008).” Ethnic characteristics, unlike non-ethnic characteristics such as political ideology, are ascribed at birth.

It is true ethnic identity is more fluid than sometimes presented, and certain physical characteristics take on political salience while others do not. In Rwanda, for example, the distinction between the Hutus and the Tutsis was largely a product of colonial rule, where German and Belgian colonizers identified the Tutsi minority and placed them in charge in order to maintain indirect control over the country (Stearns: 2012). Despite this fluidity in ethnic identity, these birth characteristics can solidify over time to manifest themselves in important ways. In the Rwanda example, these divisions created out of convenience for European colonizers eventually led to a genocide that killed almost a million people. In addition, the hyper-nationalist nature of wartime has a tendency to harden ethnic identities (Kaufman: 1996).

The ascribed nature of ethnicity gives states and potential rebel groups an important tool to identify the size of a campaign's potential support base. They can observe who is a member of their ethnic group, and target these members of society for recruitment. Not every member of an ethnic group will support a campaign organized along ethnic lines. The ETA in Spain, for example, was only able to find limited support within the Basque community (Douglass & Zulaika: 1990). In general, however, ethnically mobilized movements can expect that members of their ethnic group are more likely to be supporters than citizens who are not members of their ethnic group.

Campaigns that organize along non-ethnic lines face greater difficulty in identifying the size of their potential support base. Unlike ethnic characteristics, which are ascribed at birth, non-ethnic characteristics such as political ideology cannot be directly observed. This is especially important because people have strong incentives to misrepresent their true political beliefs when expressing these beliefs brings the risk of government repression, jail, and possibly death. These incentives to keep their beliefs private only change when a campaign gets large

enough that their risk of individual punishment falls below the benefits of successful collective action (Kuran: 1989). This means that it is comparatively more difficult for groups organized along non-ethnic lines to identify the size of their potential support base *ex ante*.

This difference in the ability of ethnically organized campaigns to identify their potential support base means that these groups present fewer information problems than non-ethnically organized groups. The state can observe the size of their group, and use this as a rough proxy for the potential that the group has to grow in size and fighting ability. They have a disadvantage, however, in the fact that they have a cap on their potential size.

While it is harder for non-ethnic groups to identify their support base, it is also difficult for the state to know their true level of support. The potential exists for a large portion of the population to actively support a campaign during the process of conflict. In ethnic campaigns, on the other hand, there is generally a cap on the size of their potential support base because those who are not members of the ethnic group are very unlikely to support the campaign.

Because of these differences, ethnically mobilized campaigns create fewer information problems but also have a smaller cap on the size of their potential support base. This cap varies based on the size of the ethnic group that the campaign represents. In Syria, for example the Muslim Brotherhood drew from the Sunni majority. Since Sunnis made up almost three quarters of the population, this gave them a large potential support base. As a result, they had 30,000 active members at their peak. The Sikh insurgency in India, on the other hand, represented a group that made up much smaller portion of the whole population. At its peak, it was able to mobilize around 3,000 members (Chenoweth & Stephan: 2011).

This leads to the prediction that groups organized along ethnic lines have a larger number of people it could potentially mobilize as their group gets larger. This means that groups that

represent large groups, relative to their country's population as a whole, have a greater potential fighting capacity.

Proposition 1: When campaigns are organized along ethnic lines, their potential strength increases as the size of their ethnic group increases relative to the country's population as a whole.

The number of participants in a campaign is an important indicator of its potential strength, but it is not the only criterion that matters. Not all members of a rebel groups are equal in their ability to effectively use their membership on the battlefield. Some groups have managed to recruit large numbers of people, but have nonetheless struggled militarily. Conversely, some groups have been effective despite being relatively small in size.

This difference in effectiveness has several sources. First, some rebel groups have access to better equipment than others. This plays a big role in determining the strength of a group, as those with access to technology can make conflict much more costly than those who do not have access to technology. Additionally, groups have variance in the sophistication and diversity of their tactics. Some have been able to use innovative military tactics and evolve effectively, while others have struggled in this regard. Here, I focus on the features of the membership as a whole that impact the ability of groups to arm themselves well and make use of strategic and technological innovation. In particular, I look at the economic resources and level of human capital of the group membership, which I argue have a significant impact on the ability of a group to be effective on the battlefield.

Access to money is a key factor that in a group's success for several reasons. First, it can be used to pay fighters who join the rebellion. This can help overcome Lichbach's "rebel's dilemma" by giving private benefits to those who do join (Lichbach: 1998). In addition, it can be

used to equip fighters and give them training so that they are more effective on the battlefield. Finally, money can also be used to market rebellion, and to spread messages that will appeal to the population.

Before the start of conflict, a key source of money for revenue is financial support from the membership. At this stage, groups are unlikely to have access to natural resources or third party support, so they must rely on themselves to fund rebellion. Groups that draw from a wealthy support base, such as the military officers who carried out the coup to put Pinochet in power, have an advantage in this.

Not all groups enjoy this access to money early on, though. Many potential rebel groups draw their support from marginalized a population, which significantly reduces the financial resources at their disposal. The CPN-M in Nepal, for example, drew its support from landless peasants. As a result, they had to rely mostly on looting from police to get weapons (Marsh: 2007). This variation in financial resources leads to the prediction that the potential fighting capacity of a rebel group is will increase with the wealth of the group's support base.

Proposition 2: The potential strength of a group will increase as the income level of its membership, relative to the population as a whole, increases.

Income is an important determinant of how effective a rebel group with become on the battlefield, but it does not tell the entire story. Some groups have been effective due to strategic innovation. The skills to engage in strategic and technical innovation take significant knowledge and training. Rebel groups with an educated support base have an advantage in this, as they are the ones more likely to have members with the necessary skills. They are better able to use and train others to use advanced weaponry, have advantages in strategic planning, and have the

critical thinking skills necessary to adapt to battlefield conditions on the fly. Because of this, it is predicted that groups with an educated support base will have higher potential rebel strength.

Proposition 3: The potential strength of a group will increase as the education level of its membership, relative to the population as a whole, increases.

The rank and file members play an important part in rebellion, but the leaders at the top are generally the ones responsible for setting the strategic vision and play an important role in the success of rebellion. Just as education matters for the rank and file members, it also is important for leaders. When a leader is educated, they are more likely to be familiar with important strategic and technical innovations. In addition, they have an advantage in being able to use historic nationalist or ideological narratives to recruit members. They also can have an advantage in their ability to indoctrinate members to the group's ideology. Because of this, the potential strength of a group is greater if its leader has a higher level of education.

Proposition 4: The potential strength of a group will increase as the education level of its leader increases.

Leaders who have formal military training are also advantaged. These leaders are especially likely to know what strategies will be successful on the battlefield, and be able to devise plans to inflict maximum damage on their opponents. While this is predicted to increase a group's potential strength, there is a worry that it might also create competing influences for the use of violence relative to nonviolence. Research on the backgrounds of state leaders shows that those with a military background may be more risk acceptant and willing to use force (Horowitz & Stam: 2014). In addition, there may be a self-selection effect. Leaders who are predisposed to military options may choose to join the military, and may also push for their group to use

violence. Because of this, it is expected that the military background of a leader will be more relevant for testing hypotheses 2 and 3 than hypothesis 1.

Proposition 5: The potential strength of a group will increase when its leader has formal military training.

Potential rebel strength can also change during the process of conflict. When a rebel group gains control of a piece of territory, this has a positive impact on potential rebel strength for several reasons. First, it can provide a safe-haven for group to mount attacks. Rebel groups can also tax the population within a territorial area, giving them additional revenue. Finally, the people living in the territory give rebels a base for recruitment. This points to rebel groups that have access to territory having an advantage in conflict.

Proposition 6: The potential strength of a rebel group will increase when it gains control of territory.

Among rebel groups that gain access to territory, groups that gain access to territory with a loutable natural resource, which can be accessed during conflict, are especially advantaged (Lujala et al: 2005). The Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, for example, financed itself with revenues from diamonds found in mines in territory that it controlled. In Iraq, ISIS is currently using revenues from oil fields under its control for funding. Rebel groups with access to a resource can use this money to recruit and arm fighters. They also have fewer incentives to settle because continued conflict will keep the revenue stream for a resource (Ross: 2004). This can make their threat to hold out for a better bargain in the future more credible. Because of this, rebel groups that gain access to a natural resource have more potential strength than those who do not.

Proposition 7: The potential fighting strength of a rebel group will increase when it gains access to a lootable natural resource.

Some rebel groups also receive funding through third party support from another government. There are several reasons that a third party may give financing to a rebel group. Sometimes, a third party will support a rebel group due to ethnic, religious, or cultural ties. Armenia supported rebels in the Nagorno Karabakh region of Azerbaijan for this reason. Sometimes, this support is simply due to agreement with the group's goals or ideology. Hamas has received funding from other Turkey for this reason (Levs: 2014). Countries also will commonly support a rebel group due to their relationship with the regime that they target.

In other cases, a third party will support a rebel group for broader political reasons. This was well known during the Cold War, when the United States and Soviet Union were known to support different rebel groups in their struggle against each other. When the United States supported the Contras in Nicaragua, for example, this was driven heavily by the desire to oppose Communism in the developing world (Carothers: 1991). Similarly, the Soviet Union supported the FRELIMO rebel group in Mozambique in the 1970s and 1980s for international political reasons (Simpson: 1993).

This support can enhance a rebel group's potential strength in several ways. Third parties with the ability to become involved in civil wars generally have more financial resources, which can be used to support recruitment. They also can provide advisors and military trainers to enhance the effectiveness of the fighters. In addition, they may provide weapons that would be otherwise difficult to obtain in a conflict-affected country.

Proposition 8: The potential strength of a rebel group will increase when it receives third party support.

Measurement of Variables

Proposition 1, which predicts that the size of an ethnic group will have a positive impact on potential rebel strength, requires measurement of two variables. First, it is necessary to identify which groups are organized along ethnic lines, and which are organized along non-ethnic lines. For this, I rely on original coding based on the case descriptions provided in the NAVCO codebook (Chenoweth & Stephan: 2011).

I create dummy variable to identify all campaigns that explicitly identify themselves as representing a certain ethnic or religious group. Examples of this type of group include the Armenian separatists in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, the Taureg rebellion in Mali, and Darul Islam movement in Indonesia. I also include campaigns that explicitly represent multiple groups, but not every significant group in the country, such as the South African campaign against Apartheid.

After identifying these campaigns, I match them up with groups in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman et al: 2009). This dataset includes a measure of the proportion of the population that belongs to each politically relevant ethnic group. In cases where the campaign explicitly represented multiple ethnic groups, I add the proportion of each ethnic group together.

Proposition 2 deals with the income of the membership of a group as a whole. I code original data on this based on my research of each NAVCO campaign, classifying campaigns as economically “high”, “medium”, or “low” relative to the country as a whole. I code this based on several sources, including scholarly databases such as Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Minorities at Risk, and Global Nonviolent Action Database (Asal et al: 2008, Lakey: 2011, Uppsala Conflict Data Program).

When the information is not available from these sources, I use sources such as academic book and journal articles, newspaper sources, and reputable websites such as Encyclopedia Britannica. I look for indications of how members of the group compared to the rest of their country, and which populations the group targeted for recruitment. For ethnically organized groups, I also code their standing based on the group that they represented in cases where information on the specific group members was not available.

I consider campaigns to be “high” when sources indicate that the membership was drawn primarily from elite groups. I consider campaigns to be “medium” when sources indicate that they drew from the middle class, working class, or a broad cross-section of society. I consider campaigns to be “low” when sources indicate that they drew primarily from groups that were economically marginalized or part of a peasant class.

This is a difficult variable to measure for several reasons. First, it requires aggregating an entire group to a numerical value when individuals may differ greatly in their economic standing. In addition, the economic makeup of a group can sometimes change over time as the support base of a campaign changes. Finally, the lack of a single source for this information on each campaign means that there is uneven information for each campaign. Some campaigns, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, have received significant scholarly attention and therefore there is much information available. Others, such as the NFDLM in Kenya, did not receive as much attention and therefore there is less information available. This is the reason that I use a relatively crude three point ordinal measure rather than one that is more specific. Due to the data problems, a more specific measure would likely contain an unacceptable amount of measurement error and missing data.

The difference between this measure and other previously available measures such as the one available in the Minorities at Risk dataset is that it specifically looks at the active participants in the campaign rather than the group as a whole. In addition, it includes only groups that are actively involved in an anti-state campaign, rather than all groups that are politically organized. Finally, it allows for the measurement of the economic level of groups that are not organized along ethnic lines, which are absent from the Minorities at Risk dataset.

Proposition 3 deals with the level of education of the group membership. I use a similar approach to code this variable as I do to the “income of membership” variable. I code a campaign as “high” when sources indicate that the group drew primarily from intellectuals, people with some college education, or people who represented the more educated part of the population. I code campaigns as “medium” when sources indicate that campaigns drew primarily from people with normal levels of education, or broadly from the population as a whole. Finally, I code campaigns as “low” if sources indicate that they drew from people who had little access to education, or from children.

In addition to coding original data on group characteristics, I code original data on biographical information of the leaders. To do this, I first identify the leader of each campaign. In some cases, this is clear-cut. In Liberia, for example, Charles Taylor was the explicit leader of the NPFL (Harris: 1999). In other cases, however, it is less clear-cut who the leader is. This can come for multiple reasons. First, some leaders deny their involvement in a rebel movement. Gerry Adams, for example, has continually denied his involvement with the Provisional IRA. This is despite the fact that he is generally accepted as the most important leader. In other cases, movements did not have a clear-cut leader. The opposition to the Sukarno regime in Indonesia,

for example, did not have a single person that could be clearly identified as the leader and drew from both the far right and far left.

In these cases where the leader is not clear-cut, I select the leader judged to be most important, either because they are more commonly referred to as the leader or the one that was in charge during the main phase of the campaign. In some cases, the leader died in the middle of the campaign. In these cases, I generally choose the leader from the beginning of the campaign since that is the period most relevant for judging potential rebel strength.

I code the level of education and military training. This information comes from biographies of each leader. For education, leaders are coded as having “no education”, “primary education”, “secondary education”, and “post-secondary education”. For military training, I refer only to formal military training, rather than informal training that might result from participation in a previous rebellion. This is coded as a simple dummy variable that indicates if they have training.

Propositions 6, 7, and 8 deal with factors that are observed during conflict, rather than ex-ante. Therefore, they are not expected to impact Hypothesis 1, which deals with the impact of potential rebel strength on conflict onset. They are expected to have an impact on Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, which deal with conflict duration and intensity.

Proposition 6 considers the impact of territorial control. This is coded through matching cases in the NAVCO dataset up with cases in Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan’s dataset on rebel strength, which includes a dichotomous indicator for whether a group has territorial control (Cunningham et al: 2009). Data on control of natural resources, used to test Proposition 7, comes from matching up all of the NAVCO cases that are in the UCDP dataset with Lujala’s data on natural resources conflicts (Lujala: 2010). I code whether diamonds, gemstones, or drugs were

cultivated in the conflict zone. This assumes that rebels who fight in a conflict zone with lootable resources have at least some access to these resources. Finally, Proposition 8 deals with support from a third party. This data is included in the NAVCO dataset, which includes a variable for whether a campaign received overt third party support. This information comes from encyclopedias, scholarly work, and expert opinion.

Table 3.1: Key Independent Variables and Their Measurements

Variable	Measurement Source
Ethnic Group Size	Ethnic Power Relations
Income of Membership	Original Coding
Education of Membership	Original Coding
Education of Leader	Original Coding
Leader Military Training	Original Coding
Control of Territory	Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009)
Access to Natural Resource	Lujala (2010)
Third Party Support	NAVCO dataset

Country-Level Control Variables

While the key variables in this study deal with group-level features, it is also necessary to control for country-level features that previous research has established impact conflict-related variables. First, I control for the level of democracy within a country. This is necessary because countries that are more democratic are expected to have more means available to affect political change without violence. In addition, nonviolence may mean very different things in democratic countries than it does in autocratic countries. In democracies, nonviolence may just be seen as politics as usual. The expected levels of repression may therefore be lower than in autocratic countries, where nonviolence could be seen as a greater threat to the system. In order to account for this, I include the countries level of democracy in the year of the beginning of the campaign. Data on this comes from the Polity IV project (Marshall & Gurr: 2014).

Second, I control for the level of economic development. It has long been established that less developed countries are significantly more likely to experience civil war. There are several proposed reasons for this. First, economic development may be a proxy for state capacity. Less developed countries tend to have weaker governments, which are generally worse at putting down rebellion. This leads to greater opportunity for rebellion to be successful (Fearon & Laitin: 2003). In addition, a low level of economic development may be a sign that government is ineffective, which could fuel grievances for citizens and incentives to take up arms (Collier and Hoeffler: 2004). To control for this, I include the gross domestic product per capita of each country in all models. This data comes from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al: 2012).

I also control for the state's military capabilities. Countries with strong militaries have an easier time putting down rebellion. Since my theory deals with the strength of the rebel group when the strength of the state is held constant, it is necessary to hold control for state strength. To do this, I use the capabilities score from the Correlates of War Project. This offers a rough proxy for military strength based on energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditure, military personnel, total population, and urban population (Sarkees & Wayman: 2010).

In addition, it is necessary to control for population. Previous studies have established that countries with higher populations are more likely to experience civil war, especially if this population is concentrated in urban areas (Goldstone: 2002, Fearon & Laitin: 2003). Data on each country's urban population comes from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al: 2012). Due to the impact of outliers, I use the natural log of the urban population for the control variable.

I also control for each country's experience with conflict. First, civil war could beget more civil war. It weakens the state, making armed rebellion more tempting for other groups. In

Kosovo, for example, the KLA mobilized at a time when the Serbian state was weakened and its standing hurt internationally due to the war in Bosnia (Judah: 2000).

Interstate war may also increase the risk of a violent campaign. This can distract from a state's resources, making rebellion an attractive option. When Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, for example, Chechen rebels seized the opportunity to renew their fight for independence from Russia (Seely: 2001). To control for this, I include the number of wars that the country experienced in the year before the beginning of the campaign. Information on whether the state is experiencing an interstate war comes from the Correlates of War dataset.

Endogeneity Concerns

The research design outlined above brings in two possible concerns about endogeneity. First, there could be a selection effect regarding which cases are included in the dataset and which are not. Second, it is possible that conflict could erode the economic standing of group's membership, leading to problems with reverse causality. In this section, I address each of these concerns and discuss the reasons why this research design, while it does not completely alleviate these concerns, nonetheless represents a useful test for my theory.

Concerns about a selection effect come from the fact that campaigns must have certain features in order to be observed in the NAVCO dataset. They must have over 1,000 participants, and be mobilized around the goal of overthrowing their government, expelling a foreign occupier, or seceding a piece of territory. Violent and nonviolent campaigns could systematically differ in their likelihood to reach this minimum threshold, which could bias the results. Unfortunately, there is not a good way to measure the negative cases: Those groups of people who have a grievance with the government but do not rally a sufficient number of people to be observed or

do not make sufficient demands to be observed. Readers should keep in mind this concern throughout the analysis, and consider the possibility

In addition, there are endogeneity concerns due to the effect of armed rebellion on those who participate. It is possible that conflict may erode the economic standing of rebels, leading to a case of reverse causality. It is well documented that civil wars have a negative economic impact on the economy of the countries in which they take place due to capital flight and destruction of the infrastructure (Collier: 1999).

While this is a concern, there is reason to believe that it is not driving the results in this research design. While civil war is economically harmful in the aggregate, that does not mean that it is harmful for individual participants. Many, in fact, get rich from their participation in civil war. Collier (2000), for example, has argued that rebellion is a form of organized crime that allows rebels to extract rents and defend them from the government.

In addition, the economic damage done by civil war mostly happens by slowing growth compared to countries that did not experience civil war, not reversing it. Most countries that experience civil war, in fact, continue to improve economically while war is taking place. In a study of Somalia, for example, Leeson (2007) found that the economy improved under statelessness, with the country doing better on 18 key indicators in the 2000-2005 period than it was before the government collapse in 1991. This is due to the fact that the countries that experience civil war tend to be poorly governed, and the destruction of government control that comes with civil war can actually reduce predation. These two factors mean that, while I do not economically address the issue of endogeneity, it is unlikely that results would be driven by the erosion of the economic standing of the membership of violent movements.

Descriptive Statistics

The NAVCO dataset contains 234 campaigns that began between 1950 and 2006. In this section, I discuss the results from the coding of each variable.

Table 3.2: Frequencies for Economic Standing and Education Levels of Campaigns

	Economic Standing Frequency	Education Level Frequency
Low	103	52
Medium	75	43
High	32	89
Total	210	184

The frequencies for the original coding of economic standing and education levels of the group membership appear in the table above. The frequencies for the economic standing of the group membership show that nearly half of the groups where information was available came from the part of the population that was below average (103 of 210). This is not surprising, as poverty is a common grievance among people rallied against their government (Collier & Hoeffler: 2004). Additionally, those with a lower economic standing face a lower opportunity cost for participation in a campaign (Lichbach: 1998). They may also, in cases where they are unemployed, have more free time that can be devoted to participation in a campaign.

The frequencies for education level are more surprising. Participants in anti-state campaigns are commonly portrayed as uneducated in the media. This is particularly true for violent campaigns. Even participants in nonviolent campaigns, however, are portrayed this way. The modal category for education level, however, is above average. This suggests that participants in campaigns are generally more educated than commonly portrayed in the media. This falls in line with previous research on individuals who committed terror attacks in Palestine, which finds that they tend to be among the more educated in the population (Berrebi: 2003).

There are several possible reasons that participants in campaigns would be more educated than average. First, education citizens, in countries with high unemployment rates, may feel especially aggrieved due to the perceived difference economic opportunities. In addition, more educated individuals may be more attractive recruits for a group mobilized against their government, for reasons outlined in Chapter 2. Additionally, more educated citizens may be more familiar with the group's ideology, which can be a major incentive to join a movement (Lichbach: 1998).

There is some correlation between the level of education and economic standing of the group membership (0.54). This is to be expected, as income and education level tend to be highly correlated in most countries. This correlation suggests that statistical models including both variables may run the risk of multicollinearity. The fact that they are not more correlated, however, suggests that they do measure fundamentally different things. We see this most noticeably in Marxist movements, which commonly recruit members from student bodies, where many people have high education levels but low income.

Table 3.3: Education Level of Campaign Leaders

No formal education	0
Primary education	4
Secondary education	18
Post-secondary education	137
Total	159

The frequencies for the leader education variable are surprising for their lack of variation. All but 22 of the leaders included in this dataset had post-secondary education. Many even had education beyond this, through law degrees, medical degrees, and PhDs. All leaders, however, had at least some education. The leaders among the least educated, Lords Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony, Tamil Tigers leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, FARC leader Manuel Marulanda, and

Revolutionary United Front leader Foday Sankoh, all attended primary school but dropped out when they reached secondary school. All four of these leaders led violent campaigns.

Additionally, the only one that is not labeled as a failure by the NAVCO dataset, the Revolutionary United Front, is labeled as a partial success. This would lend support to the idea that groups with less educated leaders are less successful on the battlefield.

Table 3.4: Formal Military Training Among Campaign Leaders

No military training	102
Military Training	54
Total	156

Conclusion

In this chapter, I present propositions about eight variables that are expected to have an impact on potential rebel strength. The first five of these are observable in all campaigns, which means that they can be used to predict rebel strength should the campaign turn violent. The last three are only observable during violent rebellion, but can be used to predict rebel strength in future periods. In the next chapter, I use these variables to test hypotheses 1-3 (outlined in Chapter 2), which predict that groups with more potential strength will be more likely to use nonviolence, fight shorter conflicts, and fight less intense conflicts.

Chapter 4:

The Use of Violence and Nonviolence

In Chapter 2, I developed three main hypotheses about the impact of potential rebel strength. In these hypotheses, I predicted that rebel groups with higher potential fighting capability are more likely to use nonviolence relative to violence, and when they do use violence will fight shorter and less intense conflicts. In Chapter 3, I developed measures for several different aspects of potential rebel strength. In this chapter, I test Hypothesis 1, which deals with nonviolence and violence.

To test the hypothesis, I use a multi-level logit model with fixed effects. This is well suited for regressions that include both country-level and group-level variables. I show that economic standing and education level negatively impact the probability that a group will violence, meaning that campaigns that draw from a more educated base or a base with more economic resources is more likely to use nonviolence. This provides additional support for the idea, supported by previous research, that education and increased economic opportunity at the individual level can decrease conflict (Bueno de Mesquita: 2005, Oyefusi: 2008, Bartusevicius: 2014). It also provides a counter-point to the research showing that individuals who participate in terrorist attacks tend to be more educated than average (Kavanagh: 2011). While this may be the case, more educated citizens are less likely to belong to groups committed to political violence.

With some caveats, ethnic group size negatively impacts the probability that campaigns organized along ethnic lines will use violence, meaning that bigger groups are more likely to use nonviolence. There are some cases, however, where extenuating political circumstances will cause exceptionally large groups to use violence. The Shia rebellion in Iraq following Operation

Desert Storm is an example of this, where the presence of a major invading coalition led by the United States triggered a rebellion. When these cases are excluded, ethnic group size does show a statistically significant, negative effect on the likelihood of violence.

The leader's education level did not emerge as a robust predictor of violent conflict. An unexpected result from gathering data for this project was that leaders of all campaigns tend to be significantly better educated than initially anticipated, and there is little variance on this variable. This lack of variance, however, points to possibilities for future research into individual characteristics of leaders, which are addressed in the concluding chapter. Military training did predict the use of violence in the bivariate case, but this result was not robust to added controls. It is surprising that this relationship is not stronger. One might expect those with military training to be the most likely to rise to the top of violent organizations, but have no reason to rise to the top of nonviolent organizations. The evidence suggests that this happens to an extent, but not a great extent.

Nonviolence or Violence

Hypothesis 1: As the potential rebel strength of a group mobilized against the state increases, the likelihood that they will use violence rather than nonviolence decreases

Dependent Variable

In Hypothesis 1, the dependent variable is the use of violence relative to nonviolence. The measurement this variable comes from the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth & Stephan: 2011), which includes both nonviolent and violent campaigns mobilized to replace their government,

expel a foreign occupier, or secede a piece of territory. The models presented in this chapter include all cases that began between 1950 and 2006.

The dependent variable is coded with cases of nonviolence receiving a value of 0 and cases of violence receiving a 1. This means that high values should be interpreted as the use of violence relative to nonviolence, and positive coefficients should be interpreted as saying that the independent variable increases the chances of the use of violence, while negative coefficients should be interpreted as saying that the variable decreases the chances of violence.

Table 4.1: New Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns by Decade

Decade	Nonviolent Frequency	Nonviolent Percent	Violent Frequency	Violent Percent	Total Campaigns
1950-1959	9	27%	24	73%	33
1960-1969	8	24%	26	76%	34
1970-1979	11	26%	32	74%	43
1980-1989	40	68%	19	32%	59
1990-1999	12	29%	30	71%	42
2000-2006	17	77%	5	23%	22
Total	97	42%	136	58%	233

The frequencies of new nonviolent and violent campaigns over time are shown in Table 4.1. They indicate that, from 1940 to 2006, violence was the more popular means to affect major political change. In total, 58% of the cases used violence while 42% used nonviolence. Violence was the more popular form of contention early on. Many of these violent conflicts targeted colonial rulers, such as the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya and the Shifta insurgency in Eritrea. It is well documented that violence spiked in the 1990s, and this the most popular decade for new violent campaigns in this dataset (Fearon & Laitin: 2003). Many of these conflicts happened in the wake of the Cold War ending. There were violent rebellions in areas attempting to establish independence from former Soviet states such as Russia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

Following the spike, however, violence drastically declined. The 2000-2006 period saw the smallest number of new violent campaigns (even accounting for the shorter time period). Of the violent conflicts that did break out, many, such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, were related to the United State's war on terror. It should be noted, however, that the time period following the end of this dataset and lasting until present (2015) has seen a slight uptick in the number of violent conflicts, driven largely by radical Islamic groups in the Middle East and Africa (Pinker & Mack: 2014). It remains to be seen if this is a temporary increase or the beginning of a general trend.

Nonviolent resistance, on the other hand, was relatively infrequent early in this time period but spiked in the mid 1980s. This was driven largely by the anti-communist campaigns in the former Soviet Union, which accounted for 14 of the 40 cases in the 1980s. These campaigns brought down governments in areas such as Germany, Poland, and Russia. Since that spike, nonviolence has been on the rise and accounted for the vast majority (77%) of campaigns in the 2000-2006 era. In this more recent era, "Color Revolutions" brought down governments in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, in countries such as Serbia, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia.

Independent Variables

The key independent variables in to test Hypothesis 1 are campaign-level features that act as proxies for their potential fighting capacity should rebellion occur, which are described in detail in Chapter 3. Since this hypothesis deals with the onset of violent conflict, I test it only with the variables that can be observed in both types of campaign: economic standing of the membership, education of the membership, education of leader, leader military training, and ethnic group size for campaigns organized along ethnic lines.

In addition to these group-level features, I control for several country-level features that previous scholarship suggests impact the probability that a country will experience violent conflict. These include gross domestic product per capita, urban population, level of democracy, and having an ongoing violent conflict. I also control for the beginning year due to the fact that there is an upward trend in the use of nonviolence over time.

Statistical Model

The data above is hierarchical, with campaigns nested in states. This means that each campaign takes place within a state, and there are times when multiple campaigns took place in the same state at the same time. India, for example, had several ongoing campaigns in the year 1985, including the Naxalite rebellion, the Mizo revolt, and the Sikh insurgency. While this may be expected in a large country such as India, smaller countries have also seen multiple campaigns at the same time. In the early 2000s, for example, Sudan experienced multiple distinct campaigns, including the SLA, JEM, and SPLA. The variables in the dataset include variables unique to each campaign, as well as state-level variables that are similar for every campaign that took place in the same state at the same time.

The hierarchical nature of the data creates problems for standard statistical models, which assume that observations are independent. Countries may vary in their general tendency to see violent conflicts or nonviolent resistance movements due to unobserved characteristics not included in the control variables. This can result in clustering of the errors. For example, it is possible that the Philippines, for cultural, political, or other reasons, differs systematically from Indonesia in its overall tendency to experience one type of movement over the other. If the

campaigns in NAVCO were included in a normal statistical regression that does not take this clustering into account, there is a risk of making incorrect inferences.

To address these problems, I use a multi-level model. This type of model lets the residual component vary at each level. In this case, that means that there will be a separate residual component for group features and state features. Multi-level models also have added benefits over other means to address this issue, such as fixed effects and clustered standard errors. These later methods treat clustering as a statistical problem that must be dealt with. Multi-level models, on the other hand, give an opportunity to explore this as an interesting source of variation. With a multi-level model, it is possible to partition the variance between the different levels, to see the relative importance of state-level features and group-level features. Put differently, a multi-level will tell us if some groups use nonviolence instead of violence because of who they are, or because of the situation that they find themselves in (Steenbergen & Jones: 2002).

Such variance is interesting not only from an intellectual perspective, it also has policy implications. If members of the international community are interested in promoting nonviolence as an alternative to violent rebellion, it is important to know whether state-level or group-level features better explain the variance between the two tactics. With limited resources, this can be vital, for example, in assessing the relative effectiveness of initiatives designed to strengthen the state vs. initiatives designed to better educate repressed groups. These policy implications are discussed in greater detail in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.

Results

Before estimating the individual impact of each key independent variable, I partition the variance to determine how much is explained by campaign-level (level 1) features, and how

much is explained by country-level (level 2) features. The results from this partition are shown in Table 4.2 below. They indicate that country-level features account for 42% of the variance, while campaign-level features account for the remaining 58% of the variance.

This means that both sources of variance are important for explaining the use of violence, but campaign-level explain a slightly higher percentage of the variance. This is interesting in light of the fact that most statistical research on violent conflict has been based on country-level features. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), for example, use features aggregated to the state level to predict the likelihood that a state will experience a violent civil war.

These results suggest that, while country-level features remains an important source of variation, campaign-level features deserve more attention than they have received. They show that the push made by Cunningham et al (2009) to focus on rebel group features is a fruitful direction for future research, and that researchers should take on the issue of finding ways to identify potential rebel groups ex ante.

Table 4.2: Random Effects Parameters for the Use of Violence Relative to Nonviolence

Parameter	Estimate
Location (constant)	0.29 (0.04)
Residual	0.40 (0.03)

Group Economic Standing and Education Level

First, I test the impact of group-level education and economic standing on the likelihood of violent conflict. The results from the tests for economic standing and education level are shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: The Use of Violence Over Nonviolence as a Function of Group Member Economic Standing and Education

Variable	Model 4.1	Model 4.2	Model 4.3	Model 4.4
Economic Standing	-1.16* (0.22)	-1.63* (0.48)		
Education Level			-0.77* (0.19)	-0.66* (0.31)
Real GDP Per Capita		0.00* (0.00)		0.00* (0.00)
Location Polity Score		0.14* (0.06)		0.11* (0.05)
CINC score		-8.08 (14.92)		-11.75 (15.16)
Population (logged)		-0.23 (0.21)		-0.15 (0.20)
Beginning Year		-0.04 (0.03)		0.05 (0.03)
Constant	2.34	78.10	1.86	106.71
N	210	124	184	109
Chi ²	32.38	15.52	17.77	14.03

*Significant at the 95% level of confidence


Models 4.1 and 4.2 show the impact of the economic standing of group membership. Model 4.1 shows the results from a bivariate logistic regression, and Model 4.2 shows the full multi-level model with controls. The negative coefficient indicates that the economic standing of a group's membership significantly decreases the probability that they will mobilize with violence as opposed to nonviolence. This relationship remains robust even after controlling for the country's real GDP per capita, which suggests that the result is not merely a product of economic development making them less likely to experience a civil war.

This relationship is shown graphically Figure 1 below. Here, the probability of violence is shown at the three levels of economic standing (low, medium, high) when all other variables are held at their mean (based on Model 4.2). 95% confidence intervals are also shown. This indicates that the relationship, in addition to being statistically significant, is also substantively significant. Groups of low economic standing, when held average at all other variables, have a

probability of using violence of .78. When they are move to medium in their economic standing, this probability drops to .51. Finally, groups, with high economic standing have a probability of .24 that they will use violence. This helps explain the case of the Philippines. The violent New People's Army and Moro Islamic Liberation Front both draw from groups with a low economic standing, while the two People Power movements drew from groups with a high economic standing.

For comparison, groups in the 90th percentile of GDP per capita (with a value of 4980.4) have a probability of using violence of .42. Groups in the 10th percentile (with a value of 213.59), on the other hand, have a probability of using violence .71. This account for a swing of .29 in the probability of using violence, compared to the .54 swing that group-level economic standing accounts for. This suggests that a country's aggregate economic standing, a robust predictor of violence, may not have as big a substantive impact on the likelihood of violence as the economic standing of the group that is mobilized. This could help explain cases where relatively developed countries experienced violent conflicts, such as the one that Russia experienced in the economically marginalized region of Chechnya. Since the region of Chechnya was less economically developed than the rest of the country, the Chechens had reason to anticipate that nonviolence would not be an effective way to advance their cause.

Figure 4.1: The Probability of Violence as a Function of Group Economic Standing




The impact of education is shown in Model 4.3 and Model 4.4. Like economic standing, education level holds a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of violence. Once again, this is consistent with hypothesis 1. The effect size, however, is not as large as the impact of economic standing. This is shown graphically in figure 4.2 below which, like Figure 4.1, shows the likelihood of violence at the three education levels (low, medium, high) when all control variables are held at their means (based on Model 4.4).

As with economic standing, education level is both statistically and substantively significant. When all other variables are held at their averages, groups with low education levels have a .71 probability of using violence. That probability drops to .59 when the group has a medium education level. Groups with a high education levels have a probability of .45 of using violence. This may explain why Albanians in Kosovo rebelled against the Serbian government with violence, while student protesters used nonviolence to bring down the Serbian government shortly after.

According to this model, groups in countries in the 10th percentile of GDP per capita have a probability of using violence of .67. In the 90th percentile, however, that probability drops to .35. This means that a move from the 10th to the 90th percentile of GDP per capita accounts for a swing of .32 in the probability of using violence. This is slightly higher than the .26 probability that education level accounts for, suggesting that education is an important predictor of the use of violence, but not as important as economic variables.

One possible explanation for the weaker impact of education is the influence of Marxism. Many of the groups in the NAVCO expressed Marxist goals, and these campaigns tended to be violent. These groups tended to draw from populations that were educated enough to have knowledge of Marxist ideology, but had a low economic standing. The FNLM in El Salvador, for example, drew from populations that were educated but had a low economic standing. Marxist groups may have a greater tendency for violence, either for ideological reasons or because they have difficulty gauging and signaling their potential strength due to incentives for citizens to publically misrepresent Marxist sympathies (Cyr: 2013). Because of this, it is possible that these groups, with a low economic standing but a high education level, may bring down the impact of education level on the use of violence.

Figure 4.2: The Probability of Violence as a Function of Group Education Level*Group Leader Characteristics***Table 4.4: Multi-level Model of the Use of Violence Over Nonviolence as a Function of Group Leader Education and Military Training**

Variable	Model 4.5	Model 4.6	Model 4.7	Model 4.8
Leader	-0.28	-0.36		
Education Level	(0.40)	(0.85)		
Leader Military Training			0.95*	0.74
			(0.38)	(0.73)
Real GDP Per Capita		0.00		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Location Polity Score		0.24*		0.25*
		(0.10)		(0.10)
CINC score		-15.61		-21.68
		(18.62)		(18.61)
Population (logged)		-0.29		-0.18
		(0.26)		(0.25)
Beginning Year		-0.14*		-0.13*
		(0.07)		(0.06)
Constant	1.57	286.65	0.20	255.91
N	158	84	156	88
Chi ²	0.52	7.07	6.88	7.75

*Significant at the 95% level of confidence

Table 4 shows the impact of leader features on the likelihood of violent rebellion. Unlike group membership features, these variables did not emerge as robust predictors of the use of violence. Models 4.4 and 4.5 show that the impact of leader education is not statistically significant. This is to be expected given the lack of variance in leader education, something that emerged as surprising during the data collection process. This points to an interesting puzzle. Why do the leaders of campaigns, regardless of the education level of their membership, almost always have a college education?

In addition, this points to other sources of variation that might be relevant for future research. Perhaps the type of education that leaders have matters. Some leaders, such as South African Defiance leader Nelson Mandela, were educated in law. Others, such as Hezbollah leader Subhi al-Tufayli, were educated in religion. In addition, there is variance in where leaders were educated. Some, such as the Dalai Lama, were educated domestically, while others, such as Kosovo Liberation Army leader Hashim Thaci, went abroad. These all point to directions for future research. At present, however, the education of the leader of the campaign does not appear to be an important predictor of the use of violence.

Models 4.7 and 4.8 show the impact of leader military training. In the bivariate case (Model 4.7), this does show up as a statistically significant predictor of the use of violence. Campaigns led by individuals with military training are more likely to use violence than nonviolence. Campaigns led by people with no military training have a probability of using violence of .55, while campaigns led by people with military training have a probability of using violence of .76. This result, however, is not significant once control variables are added, and it appears that military training is not a robust predictor of the use of violence. It is interesting that the relationship is not stronger. One might expect leaders with military training to naturally rise

to the top of violent campaigns, but not necessarily to the top of nonviolent campaigns. These results suggest that this happens to an extent, but not a great extent, and that campaigns led by individuals without formal military training still have a good chance of being violent.

Campaigns Organized Along Ethnic Lines

72 of the NAVCO campaigns that took place since 1945 were explicitly organized along ethnic lines. My theory predicts that groups that are larger relative to their country's population are more likely to choose nonviolence over violence. The analysis, presented below, lends to support to this idea, but with some major caveats. The small number of observations in the sample, especially when control variables are introduced, means that a few cases can drive findings. In particular, there are four cases of campaigns drawn from groups that make up more than 50% of the population that have a major impact on the regressions.

The four cases of campaigns drawn from large groups were the Hutu rebellion in Burundi, the Shiite rebellion in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, and the Defiance Campaigns in South Africa. The former three campaigns were violent, while the Defiance campaigns were nonviolent. In Burundi and Iraq, there is strong reason to believe that the use of violence was driven by external circumstances. Burundi happened in the context of a larger trend of Hutu and Tutsi violence in the region. The Shiite rebellion in Iraq happened in the wake of Operation Desert Storm, a conflict which created a unique political situation. Due to the concern that these two cases could be outliers that may hide the true results, they are excluded from the analysis.

Syria and South Africa are still included in the analysis because there is not as strong a reason to believe that they were driven by extenuating to the extent that Iraq and Burundi were. In South Africa, nonviolence was used by a coalition that made up over half of the population, in

line with Hypothesis 1. In Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood represented the majority Sunni Muslims and used violence. While this runs counter to Hypothesis 1, it appears to be a case that Hypothesis 1 predicts poorly rather than a special case necessary to drop.

Due to the small number of cases organized along ethnic lines, including control variables can quickly reduce the number of observations to a fraction of the original number. Because of this, I include only a limited number of control variables. I control for the total proportion of the population that is excluded from the political system. Data on this comes from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman et al: 2009). I also control for the government capabilities score, which is based on the states share of the worlds population, GDP per capita, GDP per unit of energy, military power, and military expenditures. This comes from Correlates of War dataset, and is included in the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth & Stephan: 2011).


Table 4.5: Multi-Level Model of The Use of Violence as a Function of Ethnic Group Size

Variable	Coefficient
Ethnic Group Proportion of the Population	-10.39* (4.78)
Total Excluded Population	-15.71 (8.81)
Location Government Capabilities	-35.02 (19.27)
Location Polity Score	0.06 (0.08)
Simultaneous Violent Movement	2.27* (1.15)
Beginning Year	-0.09* (0.04)
Constant	190.58
N	47
Chi ²	6.72

*Significant at the 95% level of confidence

The results in Table 4.5 suggest that, with the above caveats in mind, there is evidence that larger ethnic groups are more likely to use nonviolence when they mobilize against their state. This relationship is shown graphically in Figure 4.3 below, which displays the predicted probability that a group will use violence at different levels of ethnic group size, when all other variables are held at their means. A group with the minimum proportion of the population in this dataset (.001), when all other variables are held at their means, has a .90 probability of using violence. For comparison, a group with the largest proportion of the population in this dataset (.62), has a probability of using violence of .17.

This stands somewhat in contrast to the findings of the Ethnic Power Relations project, which (Wimmer et al: 2009). Here, the authors find that larger ethnic groups are more likely to rebel. The difference can be attributed to the sample. The Ethnic Power Relations dataset includes all politically relevant ethnic groups, while this one only considers those that are mobilized with major objectives. This suggests that larger groups may be more likely to organize and make demands to the level where they would be recorded in the NAVCO dataset, but when they do are less likely to use violence as their size increases.

Figure 4.3: The Use of Violence as a Function of Ethnic Group Size*Conclusion*

In this chapter, I provided support for Hypothesis 1, but also showed that not all proxies for potential rebel strength are clean predictors of violent conflict. Group economic standing and education level are robust predictors of the use of violence. Leader education level is not a good predictor of the use of violence for reasons that were unanticipated in the research design. As expected, leaders with military training are more likely to use violence, though this variable was not a robust predictor of the use of violence. In the next chapter, I move to testing Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, which both deal with the subset of campaigns that did use violence.

Chapter 5

Violent Conflict Duration and Intensity

In Chapter 4, I showed that groups that have a higher potential fighting capacity are more likely to use nonviolence rather than violence. I argued that this supports my theory that groups with potential to grow in strength and capabilities are better able to extract concessions from the government, which explains why the Russian government made concessions to the pro-democracy movement in the late 1980s, but has continually refused to give concessions to Chechen rebels. In this chapter, I extend this logic to violent conflicts, and argue that conflicts will be less intense and have a shorter duration when there is reason to believe that the group has a high potential strength.

Hypothesis 2 deals with the duration of violent conflict. I test this using a negative binomial regression on a subsample of the cases that did use violence. As predicted, groups with higher economic standing and education levels fight shorter conflicts. Ethnic group size is a negative predictor of conflict duration, also in line with Hypothesis 2.

The small number of ethnically organized violent rebellions, however, means that the results should be treated as suggestive rather than definitive. Control of territory, the presence of natural resources, and third party support, however, do not show up as significant predictors of conflict duration. This runs contrary to Hypothesis 2, and I discuss some of the possible reasons for this.

Hypothesis 3 deals with conflict intensity, as defined by the number of battle deaths. This is also tested using a negative binomial model. These results provide some support Hypothesis 3, though not all variables show up as significant, negative predictors of conflict intensity. I find

that groups of higher economic standing tend to fight less intense conflicts. For education level, there is some qualified support for the negative relationship with conflict intensity. The results from the bivariate regression show a statistically significant relationship, but this relationship is not robust to controls. This suggests that the relationship between education level and conflict intensity is more complex than modeled here and merits future research.

I also find that control of territory is negatively associated with battle deaths, though the robustness of this finding depends on which estimate of the number of battle deaths is used. Similarly, the presence of resources in the conflict zone shows up as a negative predictor of conflict intensity in some models, though the significance of this once again depends on the estimate of battle deaths used. The effect of third party support, however, runs contrary to Hypothesis 3. The results show that, if anything, rebel groups that have third party support are expected to fight more intense conflicts. Among groups organized along ethnic lines there is less support for Hypothesis 3, and I find that there is not a significant relationship with conflict intensity.

Duration of Violent Campaigns

Hypothesis 2: Among groups that mobilize using violence, the duration of the conflict will decrease as the group's potential rebel strength increases.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for Hypothesis 2 is the duration of violent conflict. In total, there are 137 violent campaigns since 1950 in the dataset. The duration is defined as the distance between the beginning year and the end year of all violent campaigns, as identified in the

NAVCO dataset. This method of coding does create one important caveat. Many campaigns began and ended in the same year. This method of coding leads to them receiving a value of “0”, even though their duration was not truly zero years. As such, a value of “0” should be interpreted as meaning “<1”. This will become important below, when I discuss the statistical model used. The average number of years for a conflict is 7.99 years, with a standard deviation of 9.33 years and a variance of 87.10 years. The frequencies for violent campaigns are shown in Figure 5.1 below.

Figure 5.1: The Duration of Violent Campaigns Since 1950




Figure 5.1 above indicates that most violent campaigns are relatively short in duration, with the most common category being less than zero years. There is significant variation on this,

however, with some lasting several decades. At the low end are coups and coup attempts in places such as Venezuela, Chile, Thailand, which happened in a matter of days. At the high end, the URNG in Guatemala, the FARC in Colombia, and the ETA in Spain all fought conflicts that lasted for several decades.

Table 5.1: Average Conflict Duration by Beginning Decade

Beginning year	Average Duration in Years
1950-1959	4.17
1960-1969	12.62
1970-1979	9.14
1980-1989	8.06
1990-1999	2.31
2000-2006	1.50

Table 5.1 above shows the average duration of conflicts based on the decade in which they began, with ongoing conflicts excluded. The results show that conflict duration spiked in the 1960s, and have gradually become shorter in the time period since.

Independent Variables

I include the key independent variables used in the models for Hypothesis 1, economic standing, education level, and leader characteristics. I also include several new variables, including control of territory, access to natural resources, and third party support. These variables had a conflicting impact on the duration of conflict for reasons not anticipated in the initial research design. I also include all of the controls from Hypothesis 1.

Model

The dependent variable deals with duration, and studies of conflict duration normally use a hazard model. Hazard models, however, are meant for time-series data that receive a treatment at some point during the period under observation. This data is not time-series, as the units of analysis are campaigns. In addition, the key independent variables are not measured at the detail where it is known when in the campaign the treatment was acquired. As such, a count model will be used to answer questions about conflict duration.

The dependent variable is overdispersed, meaning that its variance is significantly greater than its mean. Because of this, negative binomial regression is used. On the surface, it might appear that a zero-inflated negative binomial model would be well suited for this variable because “0” is the modal value for conflict duration. This model, however, is meant for situations when zeros result from a separate causal process than other values (Long & Freese: 2001). This is not the case with this data. As mentioned above, campaigns that receive a “0” should be interpreted as lasting less than one year, rather than lasting no time. Because of this, it seems unlikely that they result from a separate causal process than campaigns that last longer. Put differently, a campaign that lasted 10 months is unlikely to be fundamentally different from a campaign that lasted 13 months to the point where a special statistical model is required. Because of this, I do not use zero-inflated negative binomial regression.

Results

Table 5.2: Violent Conflict Duration as a Function of the Economic Standing and Education Level of the Group Membership

Variable	Model 5.1	Model 5.2	Model 5.3	Model 5.4
Economic Standing	-0.73* (0.16)	-0.81* (0.21)		
Education Level			-0.40* (0.13)	-0.41* (0.15)
Real GDP Per Capita		0.00* (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)
Location Polity Score		-0.02 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.02)
CINC score		-5.61 (6.88)		-15.65 (11.14)
Population (logged)		0.03 (0.08)		0.17 (0.11)
Beginning Year		-0.03* (0.01)		-0.04* (0.02)
Constant	3.07	67.58	86.01	2.87
N	124	75	99	60
Chi ²	17.17	25.05	8.69	14.41


*Significant at the 95% level of confidence

The results for the group membership level variables of economic standing and education are shown in Table 5.2 above. They indicate that both variables have a statistically significant, negative impact on conflict duration. As the economic standing of the group membership increases, the expected duration of violent conflict decreases. This is in line with Hypothesis 2, as groups with greater economic resources are expected to perform better on the battlefield. When all control variables are held at their means (based on Model 5.2), campaigns that draw from groups of low economic standing are expected to last 7.95 years. When they draw from people of medium economic standing, the expected duration drops to 3.52 years. At a high economic standing, violent conflicts are only expected to last 1.56 years. This represents a change of 6.39 years over the range of economic standing.

This provides additional support for the finding by Cunningham et al (2009) that strong rebel groups tend to fight shorter conflicts. It is also, to an extent, in line with research from Hultquist, who argues that rebel groups are more likely to achieve a settlement with the state as they approach parity in power (Hultquist: 2013). Since groups with greater economic standing are more likely to be powerful relative to the state, they are better able to gain concessions in negotiated settlements.

A surprising result from this regression is the positive coefficient for GDP per capita. A group in a country from the 10th percentile of GDP per capita (with a value of 213.49) is expected to see conflicts last 5.03 years, while a group from a country in the 90th percentile (with a value of 4980.40) is expected to see their conflict last 14.1 years. This result falls in line with previous work on conflict duration, which also shows a positive relationship between GDP per capita and conflict duration (Cunningham et al: 2009). Perhaps this is a result of GDP per capita being a proxy for state strength, and strong states are less likely to either be militarily defeated or hurt to the point that they need to offer concessions to a rebel group to avoid continued conflict. This was the case in Spain, where the ETA never became a significant threat to the relatively strong Spanish state and as a result never achieved significant concessions over several decades of conflict.

Figure 5.2: The Expected Duration of Violent Conflict as a Function of Group Economic Standing



Education has a similarly negative impact on violent campaign duration. This also provides support for Hypothesis 2. When controls are held at their means (based on Model 5.4), the level of education swings the expected duration of violent conflict by 5.71 years. Violent campaigns by groups with low education levels are expected to last 10.21 years. Groups with medium education levels, however, are predicted to have campaigns that last 6.78 years. When campaigns draw from groups with a high education level, the expected duration of the campaign is 4.5 years. This impact is shown in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: The Expected Duration of Violent Conflict as a Function of Group Education Level




Table 5.3: Conflict Duration as a Function of Ethnic Group Size

Variable	Model 5.5	Model 5.6
Ethnic group size	-2.16 (1.38)	-2.76* (1.26)
Excluded Population Size		1.22 (0.66)
Real GDP Per Capita		0.00* (0.00)
Location Polity Score		-0.03 (0.03)
CINC score		-0.28 (15.92)
Population (logged)		0.11 (0.13)
Beginning Year		-0.08* (0.02)
Constant	2.48	153.10
N	50	28
Chi ²	2.22	25.12

*Significant at the 95% level of confidence

Table 5.3 shows the impact of ethnic group size on the use of violence. The small number of observations means that the model is sensitive to the controls included. As such, the results should be interpreted as suggestive rather than definitive. Nonetheless, they do provide some support for Hypothesis 2. In the bivariate regression, the coefficient is negative, though insignificant. In the multivariate regression, the coefficient becomes significant, though the number of observations is reduced. According to Model 5.6, a group that makes up 10% of the population is expected to fight a conflict that lasts 8.2 years, while one that makes up 60% of the population is expected to fight a conflict that lasts 7.1 years. This suggests that larger ethnic groups do tend to fight shorter conflicts when they mobilize using violence, but the evidence is not conclusive and the effect size is not especially large.

Table 5.4: Conflict Duration as a Function of Control of Territory, Presence of Lootable Resources, and Third Part Support

Variable	Model 5.7	Model 5.8	Model 5.9
Control of Territory	-0.17 (0.27)		
Presence of Lootable Resources		-0.26 (0.25)	
Third Party Support			0.29 (0.25)
Real GDP Per Capita	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Location Polity Score	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
CINC score	-7.16 (13.51)	-5.19 (7.26)	-3.91 (7.34)
Population (logged)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.08)
Beginning Year	-0.05* (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)	-0.04 (0.01)
Constant	101.90	79.31	77.01
N	60	79	79
Chi ²	15.39	14.00	14.28

*Significant at the 95% level of confidence

Table 5.4 shows the impact of control of territory, the presence of lootable resources in the conflict zone, and third party support on conflict duration. The results do not show that any of these variables having a significant impact conflict duration in the way initially predicted. This runs contrary to Hypothesis 2.

There are several reasons that this may be the case. First, lootable resources may provide funding for rebel groups to continue conflict when they otherwise would be quickly defeated by the state. Rebel groups with access to natural resources may also have incentives to drag on conflicts that they do not anticipate winning in order to continue to get revenue from these resources (Ross: 2001). The FARC in Colombia, for example, was able to use its access to drugs to fund sustained rebellion that has continued long after its prospects of victory have dimmed.

Control of territory, especially territory in the periphery or mountains, may allow rebel groups that are not otherwise powerful to hide and mount continued rebellions. Fuhrmann and Tir (2009) argue that territorial conflicts give rebels a tactical advantage, making them better able to survive state offenses. The FARC in Colombia, for example, periodically used the mountains to regroup during their four decade long conflict with the Colombian government. In these cases, the state may tolerate a level of continued conflict rather than making concessions. This is the case in Chechnya, where the state has refused to make significant concessions, but the Chechen rebels have periodically been able to gain control of territory and mount sustained rebellion. These factors may offset the impact, causing the variables to not have a significant effect on conflict duration.

The Intensity of Violent Campaigns

Hypothesis 3: Among groups that mobilize using violence, the intensity of the conflict will decrease as the group's potential rebel strength increases

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this study is conflict intensity, defined by the number of battle deaths in the conflict. This data was coded by matching violent cases on the NAVCO dataset with PRIO battle-deaths data, which includes low, high, and best estimates for each conflict. In some cases, years in the PRIO dataset do not match perfectly with years in the NAVCO dataset. In these cases, I only use battle death data from the years in the NAVCO dataset. During years when a best estimate is not available, I use the mean of the low and high estimate to construct a best estimate. This method induces some measurement error into the best estimates, but it is unlikely that it causes best estimates to be either systematically overestimated or systematically underestimated.

Independent Variables

The key independent variables in this study are the same ones used in the tests of Hypothesis 2: the economic standing of the group membership the education level of the group membership, ethnic group size, rebel control of territory, the presence of lootable natural resources in the conflict zone, and third party support.

The model also uses several controls. The first control used is the duration of the conflict, in logged days. Conflicts that last longer are expected to, on average, have more battle deaths.

Since the key independent variables have a statistically significant impact on conflict duration, as established in the tests of Hypothesis 2, it is necessary to control for this.

Testing Hypothesis 3 calls for a separate set of control variables that Hypotheses 1 and 2. My theory on conflict intensity depends heavily on the decisions of the target state in how much repressive force to use. The previous regressions used control variables based on the location of the campaign. Conflict intensity, according to my theory, is a function of the level of violence that the regime uses. As such, it makes more sense to control for features of the target regime, rather than the location. In addition, battle death data has more missing data than the other dependent variables, limiting the number of controls that can be used.

I control for the capabilities of the target. States with more capabilities have a greater ability to inflict damage on a rebel group, which can sometimes lead to more intense conflicts. Ideally, a test would separate out different types of capabilities, such as military capability and economic capability. Given the small N of this study, however, doing so quickly induces missing data problems that can cause half of the observations to be deleted in the full regression. The capability score used in this regression is a composite based on the government's share of world's population, GDP per capita, GDP per unity of energy, military manpower, and military expenditures. It comes from the Correlates of War dataset, compiled by Chenoweth and Stephan in the NAVCO dataset (Sarkees & Wayman: 2010; Chenoweth & Stephan: 2011).

I also control for the polity score of the target. There are several reasons to expect that democracy would have a negative relationship with conflict intensity. First, democratic states may hold back in their level of violence, due to either normative concerns or institutional constraints (Lacina: 2006). In Northern Ireland, for example, the British government was restrained in the level of force that it used against the IRA (Woodwell: 2005). Second,

democracies typically have more channels for those dissatisfied with the government to voice their frustrations (Przeworski: 1991). This may dissuade some from turning to violence, which can hurt the recruiting of a rebel group. Additionally, I control for the duration of conflict, since longer conflicts are expected to have higher levels of battle deaths, and the beginning year.

Results

Table 5.5: Conflict Intensity as a Function of the Economic Standing and Education Level of Group Membership


Variable	Model 5.10	Model 5.11	Model 5.12	Model 5.13
Economic Standing	-0.98*	-0.40*		
	(0.20)	(0.09)		
Education Level			-0.84*	-0.20
			(0.18)	(0.24)
Duration in Days (Logged)		0.69*		0.83*
		(0.09)		(0.11)
Target Polity Score		-0.09*		-0.05
		(0.03)		(0.03)
Target Capabilities		16.91*		11.16*
		(5.28)		(4.82)
Beginning Year		-0.03*		-0.04*
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Constant	12.28	63.78	12.60	92.51
N	103	76	83	60
Chi ²	13.43	63.96	17.56	56.06

*Significant at the 95% level of confidence

Table 5.5 shows the impact that a group's economic standing and education level has on the expected intensity of violent conflict. The results suggest that economic standing does have a significant impact on conflict intensity, and this relationship is robust, even when controlling for duration, the target regime's polity score, the target capabilities, and the beginning year. As the economic standing of a group's membership increases, the expected intensity of violent conflicts that it fights decreases. When all variables are held at their means, groups with a low economic standing are expected to fight in conflicts that see 75,465 battle deaths. When a campaign is

drawn from groups with a medium economic standing, this expected number of battle deaths drops to 50,612. At the high end, the expected number of battle deaths is 33,944. For comparison, a campaign that targets an autocracy with a Polity IV score of -10 is expected to see 157,298 battle deaths, while one that targets a democracy with a Polity IV score of 10 is expected to see 26,623 battle deaths. This finding is in line with Besancon's study showing a positive relationship between inequality and conflict intensity, as they show that groups that are economically marginalized tend to fight more intense conflicts (Besancon: 2005).

Figure 5.4: Expected Number of Battle Deaths as a Function of Group Economic Standing



Education level does not receive the same level of support as economic standing in these tests, but still receives some support. The variable is significant in the bivariate regression (Model 3), it loses its significance once it is subjected to control variables. This suggests that education levels are not as strong a predictor of conflict intensity than economic standing. This may be a function of missing data. When controls are included, 23 observations are lost, leaving a

sample size of 60. Nonetheless, it suggests that economic standing is a more robust predictor of conflict intensity than education.

Table 5.6: Expected Battle Deaths as a Function of Territorial Control

Variable	Model 5.14 (Best Estimate)	Model 5.15 (Low Estimate)	Model 5.16 (High Estimate)
Control of Territory	-0.79* (0.37)	-0.68 (0.39)	-0.77* (0.37)
Duration in Days (Logged)	0.76* (0.12)	0.91* (0.15)	0.66* (0.12)
Target Polity Score	-0.10* (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.09* (0.03)
Target Capabilities	5.76 (5.74)	-6.07 (6.26)	3.48 (5.65)
Beginning Year	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Constant	65.11	97.64	104.74
N	66	66	66
Chi ²	49.03	49.94	54.41

*Significant at the 95% level of confidence

The impact of territorial control on conflict intensity is shown in table 5.6. This table has regressions run with the low, high, and best estimates for battle deaths. The results show that territorial control most likely is a significant predictor of battle deaths, and the relationship is negative. This relationship is significant for both the best and high estimate, though it does lose significance in the model with the low estimate. The results, according to the model with the best estimate, show that groups that control territory are expected to fight conflicts with 65,134 battle deaths when all other variables are held at their means. Those that do not control territory, however, are expected to fight conflicts with 29,427 battle deaths.

Table 5.7: Expected Battle Deaths as a Function of Lootable Resources

Variable	Model 5.17 (Best Estimate)	Model 5.18 (Low Estimate)	Model 5.19 (High Estimate)
Presence of Lootable Resources	-0.58 (0.33)	-1.43* (0.39)	-0.83* (0.34)
Duration in Days (Logged)	0.73* (0.09)	0.80* (0.10)	0.62* (0.08)
Target Polity Score	-0.08* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)
Target Capabilities	16.78* (5.02)	8.99 (5.47)	15.84* (4.98)
Beginning Year	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.05* (0.01)	-0.05* (0.01)
Constant	64.53	110.46	108.97
N	82	82	82
Chi ²	68.71	71.63	73.83

*Significant at the 95% level of confidence

The impact of the presence of lootable resources in the conflict zone is shown in Table 5.7. The results provide some evidence that access to resources decreases the intensity of conflict, though this evidence is not conclusive. The presence of lootable resources in the conflict zone shows a statistically significant negative relationship in the models with the low estimate and high estimate, but not the model with the best estimate. When there are no resources present, conflicts are expected to see 39,882 battle deaths according to low estimate, and 171,254 battle deaths according to the high estimate (I do not interpret the best estimate because the coefficient is not significant). When there are lootable resources in the conflict zone, however, this estimate drops to 9,553 at the low end, and 74,900 at the high end. This provides support for Ross's (2004) argument that resources can decrease the intensity of conflict. I suggest an alternative, though not necessarily competing, mechanism. Ross focuses on the idea that conflict parties can cooperate to plunder the resources, while I argue that resources augment rebellion giving the state incentives to hold back.

Table 5.8: Expected Battle Deaths as a Function of Third Party Support

Variable	Model 5.20 (Best Estimate)	Model 5.21 (Low Estimate)	Model 5.22 (High Estimate)
Third Party Support	0.88* (0.34)	0.22 (0.41)	0.81* (0.36)
Duration in Days (Logged)	0.67* (0.09)	0.77* (.010)	0.56* (0.08)
Target Polity Score	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)
Target Capabilities	13.94 (5.14)	12.25* (6.11)	14.18 (5.25)
Beginning Year	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.05* (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)
Constant	49.77	95.64	94.87
N	82	82	82
Chi ²	72.15	72.44	60.42

*Significant at the 95% level of confidence

The impact of third party support for the rebels on conflict intensity is shown in Table 5.8. These results suggest that my expectations about third party support were likely incorrect. Third party support does not show a negative relationship with battle deaths in any of the models, and shows a statistically significant, positive relationship in the models with both the best estimate and high estimate. According to the model with the best estimate, groups with third party support are likely to, when average on all other variables, see 29,264 battle deaths in their conflict, while groups that do not will see 72,443 battle deaths.

One possible explanation for this unexpected finding is that third parties that support rebel groups are commonly stronger than the states that these groups target. This may cause the state to become increasingly desperate in their repression strategies. Assad, for example, increased his level of repression as the Free Syrian Army gained foreign support. Another possibility is that third parties sometimes cause a great amount of destruction when they become involved in a civil conflict, such as when the United States bombed Belgrade for 78 days in

support of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Finally, there may be a selection effect, with conflicts that are more intense attracting more international attention.

While these findings go against the prediction of my model, they are in line with previous research on third party conducted by Regan and Aydin, which find that third party interventions commonly extend conflict (Regan: 2002, Regan & Aydin: 2012). All of this suggests that third party intervention is fundamentally different from other factors that impact how strong a rebel group could potentially be.

Table 5.9: Expected Battle Deaths as a Function of Ethnic Group Size

Variable	Model (Best Estimate)	Model (Low Estimate)	Model (High Estimate)
Ethnic Group Size	0.61 (2.17)	0.02 (3.00)	1.16 (1.76)
Excluded Population Size	1.55 (1.10)	1.34 (1.49)	1.66 (0.06)
Duration in Days (Logged)	0.55* (0.22)	0.71* (0.33)	0.63* (0.18)
Target Polity Score	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.08* (0.03)
Target Capabilities	-0.33 (13.94)	-52.01* (19.12)	-9.95 (12.88)
Beginning Year	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Constant	12.74	47.06	6.32
N	31	31	31
Chi ²	21.88	21.13	28.98

*Significant at the 95% level of confidence

The impact of ethnic group size on conflict intensity is shown in Table 5.9. This table indicates that larger ethnic groups do not fight conflicts with significantly higher levels of battle deaths than smaller ethnic groups. This shows that, while ethnic group size does likely impact conflict onset and duration, it does not impact conflict intensity.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I looked at the impact of proxies of potential rebel strength on conflict duration and intensity. Some of the variables, most notably economic standing, provided support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. Others, particularly third party support, did not support expectations. This suggests that the logic behind Hypotheses 2 and 3 may be correct, but require more nuanced analysis than initially anticipated in my theory.

Chapter 6:

Case Studies of Violent Conflict and Nonviolent Resistance

In this chapter, I use a qualitative research design to more closely examine the mechanism behind my hypotheses. Chapters 5 and 6 show that my predictions, with some caveats, generalize to campaigns between 1950 and 2006. This does not necessarily mean that the underlying mechanism behind the hypotheses is correct. By looking at the cases in more detail, I demonstrate that key decision-makers, with both the state and potential rebel groups, do consider potential rebel strength when making decisions regarding the use of violence and the decision to offer concessions.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first, I look at two cases with a most similar systems research design: the Kosovo Liberation Army and the campaign to overthrow Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic. In the second section, I look at four cases in the Arab Spring, which are more recent than the NAVCO dataset and allow me to test my predictions with out of sample cases.

Serbia and Kosovo

I examine two cases in this section. The first is the violent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which targeted Serbia in the late 1990s in an effort to gain independence for its autonomous region. With the help of air support from NATO, the KLA was able to achieve its goal of independence. According to journalist Tim Judah,

“The Kosovo Liberation Army Must Rank as one of the most successful guerrilla movements in modern history. In the nineteen months following its first appearance, the KLA... had all but fulfilled its aims- managing to subcontract the

world's most powerful military alliance to do most of its fighting for it (Judah: 2000).”

The second case is the nonviolent Serbian October protest movement that brought down Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic's regime in late 2000. These protests came in the wake of Milosevic's apparent loss in the presidential election to opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica on September 24, 2000. The rallies drew hundreds of thousands of people, and Milosevic eventually lost the support of his security forces. He stepped down on October 5, 2000, ending his political career. Six months later, Milosevic was indicted for war crimes (Rupnik: 2001).

These two movements, both of which were ultimately successful, broke out at roughly similar time periods, but varied in both their use of violence and the ease at which they were able to extract concessions from the Milosevic regime. Because of this, they offer a useful comparison for the strategic logic that potential rebel groups employ when choosing nonviolence or violence, and the strategic logic that leaders employ when making decisions about concessions to make to a campaign.

Case Selection

The cases were selected using the “on the line” strategy, outlined by Leiberhan (2005). This involves selecting cases that appear to support a hypothesis to see if their underlying mechanism proposed in Chapter 2. The cases also represent most similar systems. Both took place in a similar geographic location during a similar time period, and targeted the same regime, with President Slobodan Milosevic in power in both cases. They differ, however, on the use of violence. In addition, Milosevic ultimately made concessions to both movements, which gives a

chance to study the discussions that he had and criteria that he factored in when deciding which concessions to make.

Key Questions

For each case, I ask several key questions that give insight into the causal mechanism.

For the KLA, I ask:

- Why did the KLA choose to use violence rather than nonviolence?
- Why did the Milosevic regime initially choose not to make concessions to the KLA?
- Why did the Milosevic regime eventually choose to make concession to the KLA?

For the movement to overthrow Milosevic, I ask:

- Why did the protesters use nonviolence rather than violence?
- Why did Milosevic choose to make concessions within a relatively short time period?

Kosovo Liberation Army

In the mid 1990s, Kosovo was an autonomous territory within the Republic of Serbia in Yugoslavia. The population was ethnically distinct from the rest of Serbia, being 90% Albanian. The territory, however, had historical significance to Serbia that dated back to the Battle of Kosovo in 1389.

“The vast majority of Serbs had a strong attachment to Kosovo, which they consider the cradle of Serbia’s identity and the mainspring of its ancient culture. The province holds numerous shrines of the Serbian Orthodox church and artifacts of the former Serb medieval kingdom and is the site of the famous Field of Blackbirds, where the Turks vanquished the Serbs in 1389. Kosovo had

assumed a 'mystical importance' for many Serbs, generating memories of vanished glories that have been kept alive in legends and folk songs on which every Serb child- including Milosevic- has been reared for the past six centuries (Hosmer: 2001).”

Milosevic used this significance as a nationalist rallying-point during his rise to power. In 1987, when Serbian protesters were beaten by police in Kosovo, Milosevic famously warned, “no one should dare beat you” (Hosmer: 2001). On the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milosevic made his famous Gazimenstan speech. In this speech, Milosevic played up a brand of Serbian nationalism that proved to be important for his rise to power (Snyder: 2000).

Tension between Kosovo and Serbia began to escalate following Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito’s death in 1980. Student demonstrations took place in 1981, which the Yugoslavian state put down with force. As Yugoslavia’s economy worsened, popular support for independence within Kosovo grew. By 1991, the Democratic League of Kosovo had 700,000 members (Rogel: 2003).

When Yugoslavia broke up and Serbia fought wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Kosovo originally stayed quiet. Pacifist Ibrahim Rugova, who advocated nonviolence, led the separatist movement. Rugova argued that Kosovars were poor and had no weapons, and therefore violence would not be effective. He also argued that violence would cause a backlash on the part of Serbs (Rogel: 2003).

As Serbia’s conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia wound down, Kosovo Albanians became increasingly disillusioned with nonviolence. In the 1995 Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War, Kosovo was treated as an internal matter for Serbia. “The lesson the Kosovars

gained from the Dayton Treaty was that pacifism led nowhere. The way was thus open those elements that favored a more militant approach (Rogel: 2003).”

The KLA was the main beneficiary of this frustration with nonviolence. Headed by Hashim Thaci, this group was initially formed in 1993, and was generally considered fringe organization at the time (Judah: 2000). In 1997, the KLA launched its guerrilla campaign. The collapse of the state in neighboring Albania gave them access to cheap weapons, allowing them to arm themselves (Judah: 2000)/ They quickly gained the support of Kosovo’s Albanian population. In 1997, the funerals for three KLA men who were killed attracted up to 20,000 attendees (Rogel: 2003). The conflict initially went well for the KLA. They quickly gained territory, meeting very little Serb resistance (Judah: 2000?). By 1998, the KLA had over 10,000 members and had established control over 40% of Kosovo (Heath: 1999). Milosevic then cracked down harshly on the KLA, using air strikes and artillery, and killing civilians in the process (Perritt: 2010).

This conflict attracted the attention of the Western powers. NATO hosted a peace conference at the Chateau Rambouillet in France. Rugova, Thaci, and Kosovo politician and journalist Veton Surroi headed Kosovo’s delegation. Serbs who attended the conference, however, did not take it seriously, and stayed out late drinking heavily (Rogel: 2003). The conference happened in the shadow of threatened NATO intervention if an agreement was not reached. The proposed agreement that came from this conference involved a referendum for Kosovo’s independence within three years and a NATO peacekeeping force, but also created a smaller force than Kosovo wanted and called for demilitarization of the KLA (Judah: 2000).

Kosovo’s delegation signed the agreement on March 18, despite their reservations. The signing was a calculated risk. The agreement did not give them everything that they wanted, but

they expected to receive US support if Serbia (Judah: 2000). Serbia, on the other hand, refused to sign the Rambouillet agreement. US Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke described his exchange with Milosevic on March 22.

“I said to him, ‘You understand what will happen when I leave here today if you don’t change your position, if you don’t agree to negotiate and accept Rambouillet as the basis of the negotiation?’” And he said: ‘Yes, you will bomb us.’ And there was dead silence in the room (Kostovicova: 1999 in Judah: 2000).”

NATO began bombing Serbia on March 24, 1999, and the subsequent events did not go as any side expected. The Western powers believed that the bombings would be short, and that Serbia would quickly capitulate (Judah: 2000). Milosevic, for his part, also expected the war to be short. He thought that the NATO coalition would dissolve, and that Russia would support him (Rogel: 2003). The bombing took its toll on both Serbia and Kosovo, however. Serbia reacted to the bombing by pushing Albanians out of Kosovo, hoping to change the demographics in the area and create a humanitarian crisis to draw away support for the bombing (Hosmer: 2001). After 78 days of bombing, Milosevic came to an agreement with NATO to end the air strikes and the air strikes ended on June 10, 1999. With the weather for bombing improving and the coming winter promising to increase the economic hardships, Milsevic felt that it was in his best interest to give in to NATO’s terms (Hosmer: 2001).

Why the Kosovo Liberation Army Used Violence

At the onset of conflict, Kosovo had many factors that my theory suggests favor violence as opposed to nonviolence. First, Kosovo was economically marginalized. Its GDP per capita was \$700, which is among the poorest in Yugoslavia (Ozerdem: 2010). In addition, members of

the KLA tended to be less educated. In a vocational training program set up for former combatants after the conflict, 26% of applicants had less than a high school education while only 6% had graduated from university (Ozerdem).

The KLA drew almost exclusively from the Albanian population. While they were a majority in the Kosovo enclave, they were a minority in Serbia in Serbia as a whole, making up only 17% of the population (Wimmer et al: 2009). KLA leader Hashim Thaci, like most rebel leaders, did have a college education, with a degree in Philosophy and History from University of Pristina and graduate work in International Relations from the University of Zurich. He did not, however, have formal military training (Andrejevich: 2015). At the onset of conflict, third party support from the United States did not appear likely. At the time, the United States only favored a restoration of Kosovo's autonomy status that it previously had under Yugoslav rule (New York Times: 1997).

These factors would all suggest that, *ex ante*, the KLA appeared to have little potential rebel strength. They drew from a small minority group that was economically marginalized and did not expect the third party support that it eventually received. It is therefore not surprising that the Serbian state did not make any concessions to them when they rallied using nonviolence in the 1980s and early 1990s, a point that is addressed below.

The evidence is that citizens of Kosovo largely chose violence instrumentally rather than based on ideology, as they did not expect nonviolence to be effective. Supporters of KLA put this logic succinctly. Shaiquer Maloku described the use of violence, "None of us want war. We have been given no choice. It is the only way we will be free (Hedges: 1998)." Another KLA supporter, Adem Demeci, said "I will not condemn the tactics of the Kosovo Liberation Army because the path of nonviolence has gotten us nowhere. People who live under this kind of

repression have the right to resist. The Kosovo Liberation Army is fighting for our freedom (New York Times: 1998).” Both of these quotes suggest an instrumental view of violence. The support for violence is not based on an ideological preference for violence, but rather a belief that nonviolence will not be effective.

Why Milosevic Did Not Initially Make Concessions

Early on, Serbia underestimated how powerful the KLA would eventually grow. Veljko Odolovic, Serbia’s administrator in Kosovo, stated in early 1998, “We have wiped out one terrorist group, maybe the biggest and most important one, but there are dozens of others. The armed resistance is strong. It is probable that we will see renewed terrorist attacks in the days ahead. There are other terrorist gangs now preparing their members... We cannot speak of an end to the operation until these terrorist cells are liquidated. This may take a little more time (Hedges: 1998).” While this is an acknowledgement that the KLA was a significant group, it suggests that the Serbian state did not believe that it would grow into a group that would significantly challenge Serbia’s control of Kosovo. It shows that the Milosevic regime saw the KLA as a nuisance that must be wiped out, and that they felt that this could be done in a matter of days.

Milosevic’s regime was hardly alone in the belief that that Kosovo was too weak to extract significant concessions from Serbia. In early 1998, a New York Times editorial referred to the KLA as a “doomed struggle against a much stronger Serbia (New York Times: 1998).” Because of this skepticism of how much the KLA would grow, Milosevic had few incentives to make concessions.

When Milosevic refused to accept the Rambouillet agreement, he underestimated how much the NATO bombing would augment the KLA's strength, and did not think the downsides of the agreements were worth the tradeoff. Even when the bombing began, Milosevic did not believe that this would strengthen the KLA enough to threaten Serbia's hold over Kosovo. He defiantly stated, "You are not willing to sacrifice lives to achieve our surrender. We are willing to die to defend our rights as an independent sovereign nation (Harden: 1999).

All of this suggests that Milosevic employed a logic similar to that outlined in Chapter 2 when he initially dealt with the KLA. He believed that it had a small potential strength, and as a result he did not feel the need to make any concessions to them, and was not afraid to use harsh methods to crack down on them.

Why Milosevic Eventually Made Concessions

Milosevic's decision to eventually make concessions underscores many of the information problems that exist during the process of civil conflict. He incorrectly estimated the strength of the KLA, the West's reaction to the crisis, the ability of the NATO coalition to hold together, and Russia's actions. Instead, Western countries reacted with horror at the refugee crisis, further cementing Milosevic's status as an international pariah (Whitney: 1999). In addition, his hoped for Russian support never materialized. This meant that, despite the bombing lasting longer than the NATO nations expected, the coalition never fell apart.

As the bombing wore on, its costs to Serbia increased significantly more than Milosevic expected. 5,000 Serb troops died, and approximately 10,000 were wounded (Harden: 1999). The bombings also damaged the Serbian economy because they targeted Serbia's infrastructure and industrial facilities (Hosmer: 2001). This eroded Milosevic's public support base. Anti-war

protests began to spring up in Serbia. These protests included reservists, who were afraid to return to Kosovo due to the bombing (Hosmer: 2001).

Milosevic anticipated that the bombing would become more costly as the weather improved, and the Serbian winter would magnify the economic problems caused by the bombing. The agreement to end the bombing also gave Milosevic the ability to make the case to the Serbian people that he had improved the terms over the Rambouillet Agreement. The new agreement allowed him to stay in power, and allowed the United Nations, rather than a referendum, to determine the status of Kosovo (Hosmer: 2001).

Serbian October

In the year 2000, two years after the Kosovo War, protesters in Serbia brought an end to Milosevic's presidency through mass nonviolent resistance. This came following an election was widely seen as stolen by Milosevic over opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica. The Serbian October was not the first time that there was mass nonviolent resistance to Milosevic's rule. In 1996 and 1997, protests drew up to 500,000 participants. The Serbian October, however, was different. The previously fractionalized opposition had become united by the campaign before the election, and the stolen elections served as a focal point to rally citizens (Thompson & Kuntz: 2004).

By the late 1990s, Serbia had become a "competitive authoritarian" system. Elections happened, and the results of such elections were uncertain. Milosevic's regime, however, rigged votes and used their control over the media to give themselves an advantage at the ballot box (Stevanovic: 2004). In 1998, citing term limits, Milosevic said that he would not run. In 2000,

however, he reversed course and hastily amended the constitution to remove his term limit (Bujosevic & Radovanovic: 2003)

Elections had originally been scheduled for July of 2001, but Milosevic called for early elections to be held in September of 2000. Milosevic did this because he overestimated his remaining popularity in Serbian society. This decision demonstrates the information problem that Milosevic faced in ex-ante determining how strong a potential rebel group could grow. He thought that his opposition was weak despite the fact that Kostunica was leading in the polls, and that holding elections in 2000 gave him a better chance than waiting (Thompson & Kantz: 2004).

The election was widely regarded as rigged. Nikola Dinic, a district court magistrate, resigned during the vote counting, saying, “When we began recording packages of votes from penal and correctional institutions, security guards prohibited us from seeing the ballot papers, saying they were acting on orders from the president of the commission (Bujosevic & Radovanovic: 2003).”

When the votes were tabulated, Milosevic received 38.62 of the votes, while Kostunica received 48.96 of the votes (Thompson & Kuntz: 2004). Milosevic declared that, since neither candidate received a majority, there would be a runoff election. Kostunica refused this, saying, “we are talking about political fraud and blatant stealing of votes... This is an offer which must be rejected (BBC: 2000).”

Following the election that was widely seen as stolen, citizens of Serbia rallied against Milosevic. The opposition used predominantly nonviolent tactics involving civil disobedience. They held mass rallies, distributed pamphlets, purchased advertising times, blocked roads, and refused to work.

Why The Opposition Used Nonviolence

The size and level of organization of the opposition to Milosevic surprised most outsiders (D'Anieri: 2006). Prior to 2000, the opposition had been fractured and unable to unite. In this case, however, the opposition remained united and on message. At its peak, rallies drew up to 700,000 people (Thompson & Kantz: 2004). The opposition drew from a broad cross-section of society. Many of the participants were college students affiliated with the Opor movement (Nikoloyenko: 2013). Other participants, however, came from such diverse backgrounds as business owners, municipal employees, and coal miners (Bujosevic & Radovanovic: 2003). In addition, many members of the military supported the protests, a dynamic that is discussed below.

The organization used nonviolence instrumentally, believing that it would be more effective as a weapon against the state's brute force and would help with recruitment (Nikolayenko: 2013). Human and financial capital also played a role in the effectiveness of the Serbian opposition. They received money from the membership and international donors, and used this to fund an effective marketing and branding campaign. 40% of Opor's revenue was used to maintain the unity of the opposition, which helped these protests be more effective than earlier rounds (Nikolayenko: 2013).

Why Milosevic Made Concessions

Milosevic's decision to back down appears to be guided chiefly by two factors, the size of his opposition, and the disintegration of his own support base. By October of 2000, "it seemed that Milosevic had passed the tipping point that all despots fear: when the regime fears the people more than the people fear the regime (Schulte: 2013)."

The opposition was successful in winning the support of Milosevic's security forces by treating them as victims of the regime rather than enemies (Nikoloyenko: 2013). "There can be no doubt that the police and army defied the orders given by Slobodan Milosevic himself, and that a kind of 'non-aggression' agreement existed between the (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) and sections of the police even before October 5 (Bujosevic & Radovanovic: 2003)."

Very quickly, Milosevic realized the extent of his opposition. "Lacking the support of the security forces, and facing massive popular protests, Milosevic had no option but to surrender (Thompson & Kuntz: 2004). This is consistent with the theory developed in Chapter 2. Milosevic showed a willingness to make concessions, but only when faced with a broad coalition of society that he felt was a threat to his rule.

Conclusion

The cases of the KLA and the anti-Milosevic protests in Serbia both provide evidence that violence and nonviolence are both used instrumentally, and that key decision-makers consider how powerful a group has the potential to grow when they make decisions on whether to offer concessions. In the next section, I look at my theory's ability to predict cases outside of the NAVCO dataset with the Arab Spring.

Arab Spring

In December of 2010, Tunisian citizens began to nonviolently rally against the regime of long-serving President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Within a month, Ben Ali's regime had fallen. This turnover triggered protests and rebellions against governments throughout the Arab World. Within a year, Hosni Mubarak's regime in Egypt had fallen to a primarily nonviolent resistance

movement, and civil wars had broken out in Libya and Syria. The war in Libya resulted in leader Muammar al-Gadaffi losing power and his life within eight months in a conflict that left, by some estimates, under ten thousand people dead (Black: 2013). At the time of writing, however, rebels in Syria have not successfully ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The war has lasted for at least four years, and left over two hundred thousand people dead (Reuters: 2015).

Case Selection

These four cases represent good case studies for several reasons. First, they represent similar systems in the sense that they happened in the same region of the world in similar time periods, though the caveat that they happened in four different countries with different economic circumstances should be noted. They feature variation in the use of nonviolence vs. violence, and the two violent cases feature variation in the duration and intensity of the fighting. In addition, they happened after the time period in the data used in Chapters 3 and 4 (1950 to 2006), giving a chance to see how well my models predict cases outside of the sample.

Key Questions

For each case, I ask several questions. For the nonviolent cases, I ask:

- Why did protesters in Egypt and Tunisia use nonviolence
- Why did the Egyptian and Tunisian states make concessions to the protesters

For the violent cases, I ask:

- Why did rebels in Libya and Syria use violence?
- Why has the war in Syria been longer and more intense than Libya?

Tunisia

On December 17, 2010, a Tunisian vegetable vender named Muhamed Bouazizi stood in front of his provincial headquarters in Sidi Bouzid. Earlier that day, a policewoman had confiscated his cart when he refused to pay a bribe. Humiliated, he lit himself on fire as a protest of the treatment that he had received from the Tunisian government. Bouazizi's act of self-immolation became a rallying point for Tunisian citizens who were frustrated with President Ben Ali's regime.

Ben Ali had been in power since 1987. In that time, he used his political control to build a vast patronage system for his family and allies (Anderson: 2011). He also put significant restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of the press. By 2011, food inflation and unemployment had taken their toll on Tunisia's economy (Lotan et al: 2011). Following Bouazizi, tens of thousands of Tunisian citizens began to protest against their government, and call for the ouster of Ben Ali's regime. These protests continued until January 14, when Ben Ali fled the country and accepted exile in Saudi Arabia.

Why the Tunisian Protesters Used Nonviolence

Tunisia had several factors that would predict nonviolence over violence. The movement drew from a broad cross-section of the population, including lawyers, students, journalists, and police officers (Lahey: 2011). Tunisia had a large, well-educated middle class, and protests drew from this population. One are of success is that the Ben Ali regime had managed to create the best education system in the Arab world (Anderson: 2011). Surveys conducted after the protests showed that protesters were, "disproportionately male, professionals, government employees, private sector employees, and managers (Beissinger et al: 2012)."

Why the Tunisian State Made Concessions

The Tunisian government initially tried to buy off the protesters so that Ben Ali's regime could maintain its power. On December 20, Development Minister Mohamed Al Nouri Al Juwayni announced \$10 million in new government spending on employment. In his speech, Al Juwayni stated that, "the issue of unemployment is of concern to all parties in Tunisia. What is not unacceptable (sic) is for those parties to resort to violence, which is not in anyone's interest (Rendaree: 2010)." These efforts, however, failed to calm protesters. On January 14, Ben Ali fled the country and turned over power to his prime minister.

Egypt

Following the successful ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Egyptian citizens began to turn their eyes to Hosni Mubarak, their president. Mubarak had ruled Egypt since 1981. For this entire period, he had declared a "state of emergency" to restrict freedom, and carefully used the military to (Lahey: 2011). Under this system, the military controlled up to 40% of the military (Erickson: 2011).

On January 25, 2011, protesters used the National Police Day as a focal point to begin their protests at Tahrir Square in the Egyptian capital of Cairo. These protests were arranged through social media, and over 100,000 people signed up in advance (Kirkpatrick & Sanger: 2011). Mubarak used his police force to crack down on the protests, so the next day protesters came prepared:

"This time, they brought lemons, onions and vinegar to sniff for relief from the tear gas, and soda or milk to pour into their eyes. Some had fashioned cardboard

or plastic bottles into makeshift armor worn under their clothes to protect against riot police bullets. They brought spray paint to cover the windshields of police cars, and they were ready to stuff the exhaust pipes and jam the wheels to render them useless. By the early afternoon, a few thousand protesters faced off against well over a thousand heavily armed riot police officers on the four-lane Kasr al-Nile Bridge in perhaps the most pivotal battle of the revolution. ‘We pulled out all the tricks of the game — the Pepsi, the onion, the vinegar,’ said Mr. Maher, who wore cardboard and plastic bottles under his sweater, a bike helmet on his head and a barrel-top shield on his arm. ‘The strategy was the people who were injured would go to the back and other people would replace them,’ he said. ‘We just kept rotating.’ After more than five hours of battle, they had finally won — and burned down the empty headquarters of the ruling party on their way to occupy Tahrir Square. (Kirkpatrick & Sanger: 2011).”

Why the Egyptian Protesters Used Nonviolence

Anti-Mubarak protesters had a history of using nonviolence prior to the 2011 protests. In 2008, youth activists received training from Serbia’s Opor! student group that helped lead the anti-Milosevic demonstrations. As Mohammed Adel, one of the leaders of the April 6 Youth Movement, said, “If someone is beating you, don’t attack him. Don’t use any violence against them. Just take photos and put them on the internet (Kristof: 2011).”

The demonstrators that rallied in 2011 came from all economic sectors of society, including the upper and middle classes (Gause: 2011). Just like in Tunisia, protesters tended to be male, professional, government and private sector employees, and managers (Beissinger:

2012). Sharm el Sheik, a spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood, one group prominently involved in the protests, described the protests by saying “we participated with everyone else and did not lead this or rise Islamic slogans so that it can be the revolution of everyone. This is a revolution for all Egyptians; there is no room for a single group’s slogans, not the Brotherhood’s or anyone else (Kirkpatrick: 2011).” This widespread involvement may be rooted in Egypt’s social capital. As one academic in Egypt described it:

“Egypt has a culture of deep communal bonds and trust, which manifested itself in the demonstrators’ incredible discipline: their sustained nonviolence, their refusal to be provoked by thugs and saboteurs, their capacity to police themselves and coordinate their demands, and their ability to organize without any centralized leadership. Perhaps the finest example of this egalitarian spirit was the appearance in communities rich and poor, of spontaneous citizen mobilizations to maintain order once the police had disengaged (Anderson: 2011).”

Why the Egyptian State Made Concessions

While the Mubarak regime used its police force to suppress the protesters, Mubarak was unable to gain the support of the military. This was an especially big issue in Egypt because the military was relatively powerful compared to other countries in the Arab world. With the military not supporting his regime, this significantly lowered Mubarak’s ability to put down the rebellion.

In addition, Mubarak lost the support of an important foreign ally in the United States. When Mubarak pledged not to run for reelection after his current term ended, US President Barack Obama publically stated that Egypt’s transition could not be delayed and must begin

immediately (CNN: 2011). This was a big blow to Mubarak because Egypt had traditionally been one of the biggest recipients of US aid. Faced with a potentially powerful rebel group and the desertion of his allies, Mubarak was forced to flee the country.

Libya

In February of 2011, the Arab Spring spread to Libya. Protesters sought the ouster of Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi, whose official title was the “Brotherly leader and Guide to the First of September Great Revolution of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.” Gaddafi had been Libya’s de facto leader since 1969, and ruled the country autocratically. While the other countries in the region all tolerated some sort of political opposition, Gaddafi’s regime was personalist and tolerated no dissent (International Crisis Group: 2011)

Gaddafi cracked down on the protests with violence, promising a “bloodbath” in the areas where the protests took place (Kuperman: 2013). The protests quickly turned violent, and within a week, rebels were in control of the eastern part of the country around Benghazi (Adler-Nissen Pouliot: 2014). Within a month, the conflict had attracted third party intervention from the NATO countries, which began airstrikes against Libyan forces on March 19. In addition, the United Nations Security Council put in place sanctions, an arms embargo, and froze Libyan assets (Daalder & Stavridis: 2012).

Why the Libyan Rebels Used Violence

While the rebellion in Libya started with nonviolence, many participants admitted at the time that the use of nonviolence was mainly a function of the fact that they did not have weapons at the initial stage. Leaders, even when they came from peaceful religious sects, still advocated

the use of violence at an early stage (Kirkpatrick: 2011). The rebels in Libya had an economic standing and education level that my model predicts predisposed them towards the use of violence. An observer at the time noted that, “Libya’s decades of internal isolation have left the generation in its 30s and 40s- the one likely to assume leadership in a new Libya- poorly educated and ill equipped to manage the country (Anderson: 2011).”

Why the Libyan State Did Not Make Concessions

Gadaffi’s biggest concern was his own political survival, and he had an “utter disregard for how his action (were) perceived by the outside world (International Crisis Group: 2011).” Because his regime was so personalist, he saw his hold on the country as an indivisible issue. He also believed that he had built a system where no institutions within his government were strong enough to challenge him, and that his security forces were stronger than the military. In addition, he was successful in discouraging major defections within his own regime. (International Crisis Group: 2011). Because of this, the evidence suggests that Gadaffi did not believe that the rebels would be able to topple his regime.

Why the Libyan Conflict Was Short Lived and Less Intense

While the Libyan opposition did have economic problems, there were not as marginalized as other groups that have used violence. Many of the active participants in the opposition were in middle class. The major reason that the Libyan conflict was short was that the rebels were relatively successful on the battlefield, and their strength was augmented with NATO airstrikes. Within eight months, they had successfully ousted Gadaffi’s government and killed the leader. In this case, the conflict was shorter and less intense than Syria, though the

mechanism was slightly different than the one outlined in Chapter 2. Rather than Gadaffi making concessions based on the size and strength of the Libyan opposition, he was killed. Due to the highly personalist nature of his regime, this left the rebels as the victors in the conflict.

Syria

While protests and rebellions broke out in other parts of the Arab world, many, including the Syrian government, believed that Syria was different and would not be hit with the Arab Spring. President Bashar al-Assad had led the country since 2000, taking over for his father who took power in 1970.

Despite these autocratic tendencies and clampdowns on personal liberties, it was widely believed that Assad was more popular than other regimes in the Arab. “Assad was young, not old; his regime had more legitimacy because it had confronted Israel rather than collaborated with it (Ajamio: 2012).” In 2007, Syria had a referendum on Assad’s rule, which resulted in Assad receiving 97% of the vote. While the election was clearly not free and fair, Assad saw the 75% voter turnout rate as a sign that his regime was popular (Lesch: 2012).

This apparent popularity, however, masked several problems with Assad’s regime. First, Assad came from a minority Shiite sect in a majority Sunni country. Throughout Assad’s tenure, he worked to privatize Syria’s patronage system. This created problems for a population where many personally benefitted from public spending. These economic problems were compounded by its high birthrate, creating a generation of youths with few opportunities (Ajamio: 2012).

In March of 2011, protests broke out in the small southern town of Daraa. At this time, the protests were over the imprisonment of students who had been charged with creating anti-government graffiti. The government responded to these protests with harsh crackdowns, causing

several deaths. This triggered a backlash among the Syrian population, with the protests quickly growing in both size and level of violence. By the end of the year, over 100,000 Syrians were involved in a full-scale rebellion against the Assad regime (Balci: 2012). Despite predictions of the Assad regime's imminent demise, the government has proven resilient and lasted far longer than many expected. At the time of writing, the war is still going on and has left over two hundred thousand people dead (Amman: 2007).

Why the Syrian Rebels Used Violence

While the rebellion began as nonviolent, rebels in Syria embraced violence. As one participant described it, "even if the army assaults you, you can still rise up again. We've already won. We're victorious now. I lived a life of terror, fear, and killing, and now I'm free (Shadid: 2011)." Syria's economic problems hit the Sunni majority hard. The Alawites had some insulation from this due to key members being placed in important positions within the regime. Because of this, they remained loyal to the regime throughout the rebellion (Erickson: 2011).

One factor from Syria that runs counter to my theory is the size of the Sunni ethnic group. The quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 4 showed that, with some caveats, large ethnic groups are more likely to use nonviolence rather than violence when they rebel. Since the Sunnis make up a majority of Syria's population, this would lead to the prediction that they would be likely to gain concessions through nonviolence. Despite this, the Syrian opposition turned felt it necessary to turn to violence. This is not the first time that Syria's Sunni majority turned to violence against the Assad regime. In the 1970s, Sunnis rebelled against Assad's father. This rebellion was put down harshly in 1982, when Assad leveled the Sunni stronghold

city of Hama (Uppsala Conflict Data Program: 2015). This history may have had an impact on the decision of the Sunni opposition to use violence.

Why the Syrian State Did Not Make Concessions

While there was reason to believe that the anti-Assad rebellion would grow due to the minoritarian nature of the regime, the evidence is that Assad did not take this threat seriously because he overestimated the popularity of his regime. This shows that, while this case does not entirely conform to the proxies for potential rebel strength outlined in Chapter 3, the state did follow the strategic logic outlined in Chapter 2. Assad did not make significant concessions early on because he did not believe that the rebellion would grow strong enough to topple his regime.

Why the Syrian Conflict Was Long Lived and Intense

While the Syrian conflict has attracted some third party intervention on behalf of the rebels, it has not attracted the type of attention that the Libyan conflict did. As a result, members of the Free Syrian Army have not received the type of air support that augmented the strength of Libyan rebels and allowed them to quickly achieve their goals. Instead, the conflict has evolved into a stalemate of sorts, where the rebels have not been able to achieve their goals but the Assad regime has not been able to defeat them. At present, opinions differ on whether Assad will survive this conflict (Fisk: 2015). As a result, the Assad regime has not seen reason to make concessions but the rebels have not seen reason to lay down their arms. This all helps account for the length and intensity of the Syrian conflict in comparison to the conflict in Libya.

Conclusion

In this section, I presented case studies of four countries that experienced campaigns during the Arab Spring. The Tunisian and Egyptian protests drew from a broad cross-section of society, and successfully encouraged the defections of key regime and military figures. This ultimately forced the leaders of these two countries to abdicate their leadership and flee the country, conceding to the demands of the protesters. In Syria and Libya, rebels had a lower economic standing and education level, which predisposed them to use violence (though the size of Syria's Sunni ethnic group should have predisposed them to nonviolence). Rebels in Libya, however, had their potential strength augmented by NATO intervention, leading to a shorter and less intense conflict.

Chapter 7:

Conclusion

In the previous chapter, I laid out a theory of the impact that potential rebel strength has on three aspects of conflict: the use of violence relative to nonviolence, the duration of violent conflict, and the intensity of violent conflict. I united these three dependent variables with a common theoretical framework based on the state's expectations about each group's potential rebel strength when they engage in either violent rebellion or nonviolent resistance. I predicted that groups are more likely to use nonviolence as their potential strength increases, and when they do use violence are expected to fight shorter and less intense conflicts.

Main Findings

In the statistical tests presented, I looked at both violent and nonviolent groups that sought major political change within their countries, based on the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth & Stephan: 2011). These groups represent the universe of cases of potential rebel groups, allowing for the study of violent conflict dyadically in ways that were not possible with previous data.

The Use of Violence vs. Nonviolence

I argued that the groups that are most likely to be successful on the battlefield are more likely to use nonviolence than violence. These groups represent the biggest threat to the government, and the government is able to observe this without the groups actually using violence. As a result, they are able to extract concessions without actually using violence.

The statistical tests lend support to this hypothesis, though the level of support varies based on which variable is used to measure potential rebel strength. The variables of the group membership as a whole, economic standing and education level, received significant support as predictors of the use of violence. Groups that pull from an educated support base, as well as those that pull from populations with a high economic standing, are significantly less likely to use violence.

With some caveats, groups that pull from an ethnic group are more likely to use nonviolence as the size of the population that they pull from increases. This general tendency towards nonviolence by large ethnic groups, however, can be overcome when there are extenuating external political circumstances. This happened in cases such as the Shia rebellion in Iraq after the United States completed Operation Desert Storm, and the Hutu Rebellion in Burundi.

The Duration of Violent Conflicts

I argue that campaigns that do use violence will fight shorter conflicts when their potential strength is higher. These groups give states the biggest incentives to settle early to avoid seeing the rebel group grow to its full potential. Since the state is expected to make higher offers, the rebel group is more likely to see settlement as preferable to continued fighting, creating shorter conflicts.

The two original variables coded in this dissertation, education level and economic standing, once again receive robust support. Conflicts have a significantly shorter duration when they draw from groups with higher levels of education and economic resources. The other

proxies for potential rebel strength, territorial control, access to natural resources, and third party support, do not show a significant relationship with conflict duration.

The Intensity of Violent Conflicts

I argue that conflicts will be less intense, with fewer battle deaths, when the potential strength of the rebel group is higher. The economic standing of the rebel group shows to be a significant, negative predictor of battle deaths. Group education level is a less robust predictor, showing up as significant in some models but not others. Control of territory and the presence of natural resources are also significant in some models but not in others. Third party support, however, had an impact contrary to my predictions. If anything, conflicts that attract third support for the rebels are more intense.

Unanticipated Findings

This dissertation also revealed some facts that were not anticipated at the beginning of the project. First, the leaders of the campaigns, both violent and nonviolent, were more educated than originally anticipated. The vast majority of leaders had a college education, the highest level possible under the coding rules. This was true even for groups that drew their membership primarily from people with little or no formal education. The Tupamaros, a Marxist rebel group that fought in Uruguay in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, drew its membership primarily from groups with a lower economic standing and level of education, but were led by Raul Sendic, a lawyer with a university education.

While there was little variation in the level of education of leaders according to the coding rules for this project, there was variation in the education of leaders that may be

important. Some leaders had a college education, but nothing more. Some leaders have considerably more than just a college education. In addition, there was considerable variation in the fields that leaders were educated in. Some were educated in law. Others were educated in philosophy, such as Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of Kosovo's nonviolent resistance movement. Still others were educated in a diverse variety of fields not traditionally associated with politics. Pakistani protest leader Altaf Hussain, for example, had a degree in pharmacy.

There was also variation in the types of institutions that leaders went to for education. Many went to standard universities. Some went to seminaries or other religious schools, such as Jaime Sin, who led the second People Power movement in the Philippines. Others, such as Thai coup leader Sonthi Boonyaratglin, went to service academies for a military education.

Finally, there was important variation in where leaders were educated. Many, such as Thai pro-democracy leader Chamlong Srimuang, received their education in their home countries. Others, such as Hashim Thaci, went abroad. This all suggests that the education of a rebel group leader may be an important source of variation among nonviolent and violent campaigns, but not in the way initially laid out in this project design.

Another unexpected finding from this dissertation was the influence of Marxism. Many of the potential rebel groups explicitly expressed Marxist goals, such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru, or the CPN-M in Nepal. A common characteristic of many of these groups is that they drew from a population that was economically marginalized, but also had a college education and training in Marxist ideology. These groups present an interesting subset of cases, as they almost exclusively mobilized with violence. This is to be expected given their economic standing, but not their education level. In my previous research, I have argued that Marxist groups are likely to use violence because they face an information problem in identifying their potential

supporters (Cyr: 2013). Because of this, Marxist groups may behave differently in regards to key variables than other groups, and the impact of their education level may be outweighed by this factor.

A final unexpected finding is that third party support does not impact conflict intensity in the same way that other proxies for potential rebel strength do. The evidence is that, if anything, third party support for a rebel group will cause conflicts to become more intense. It is possible that third party support has a more substantial impact on rebel strength than the other proxies mentioned due to the fact that third parties interveners are generally more powerful than states. It is also possible that more intense conflicts tend to attract more international attention, and thus these rebel groups are more likely to receive third party support.

Policy Implications

Countries have long promoted nonviolence over violence as a policy goal. Prior to Nigeria's 2015 presidential election, for example, United States Secretary of State John Kerry said that the United States would "emphasize to both of the candidates the importance of non-violence in this election... in particular, that the loser accepts the results and discourages supporters from responding in any violent fashion" (Reuters: 2015). Kerry went as far as to say that the United States would deny visas to anyone that committed or promoted violence following the election (Reuters: 2015). As this suggests, the United States has an interest in promoting nonviolence.

There are several reasons that states see promotion of nonviolence as a useful policy. First, there are normative reasons. Put simply, nonviolence is less destructive than violence. If groups with a grievance against their government choose nonviolence rather than violence, this

can reduce conflict around the world. When Irish nationalists chose to switch from violence to nonviolence in Northern Ireland, for example, this drastically reduced conflict in the region.

In addition to a normative interest, states also can have a practical interest in promoting nonviolence over violence. Recent research strongly suggests that nonviolence is more effective than violence. In their 2011 book, Chenoweth and Stephan show that nonviolence is significantly more effective than violence, and groups that use nonviolence are more likely to succeed in their policy goals (Chenoweth & Stephan: 2011).

This means that states can promote nonviolence as a policy tool by supporting groups whose policy goals they agree with when they use nonviolence. The results presented in this dissertation suggest that states can promote nonviolence internationally through promoting economic development. Scholars have realized this long before this dissertation, and economic development aid has long been used as a tool of conflict prevention. Peacekeeping missions commonly have an economic component for this reason. The findings in this dissertation suggests that not all economic development policies are equal in the impact that they will have on conflict reduction.

Rather than economic aid targeted towards a country as a whole, the focus should be on aid targeted towards specific groups within a country. Campaign-level features explain a greater portion of the variance than state-level features, meaning that policies targeted at those likely to mobilize against the state could have a significant impact. Aid targeted at particularly economically disadvantaged groups is expected to be most effective. These groups likely have a grievance against the government, and the results here suggest that these are the groups most likely to use violence when they do rally against their government. The results here also suggest

that education is an important way to prevent violent conflict. This means that economic aid could particularly be directed towards schools and other institutions that build human capital.

Understanding this can provide innovative policy options. Powerful countries sometimes seek regime change through military means as a way to replace regimes that they have unfriendly relationships with. The United States notably did this to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003. These regime changes are costly, however. In the case of Iraq, the United States lost over four thousand troops, spent two trillion dollars, and suffered international condemnation as a result of the invasion (Trotta: 2013). While the war initially received popular support from people in the United States, some voices called for the United States to push for nonviolent removal rather than violent confrontation (Mack: 2002). Such a policy may have avoided the costs of war and, while it may not have ousted Hussein as quickly as the military option did, it may have provided a more favorable outcome overall. This dissertation sheds light on how the United States can promote such policies in the future through support of groups most likely to engage in nonviolent resistance.

This dissertation also sheds light on perverse policy incentives for leaders that anticipate that a portion of the population will mobilize against them, due to autocratic practices, economic mismanagement, repression of specific regions or groups, or other common rallying points. These leaders may have strong incentives to promote violence over nonviolence. This may seem strange on its face, but the higher success rate for nonviolent campaigns means that leaders would prefer to see a campaign use violence as opposed to nonviolence, so as to avoid making major concessions that may include leaving office. Milosevic, for example, weathered several violent rebellions but was ultimately taken down by nonviolence.

The results here suggest that leaders can encourage violence by keeping marginalized groups marginalized. If they do not provide them with economic opportunities or education, then these groups are less likely to engage in mass nonviolent resistance. Even though these groups are among the most likely to rebel violently, many leaders would prefer this risk. Countries in the developed world should keep this in mind when delivering economic aid to rulers who may be at risk of experiencing a major resistance campaign. Aid givers should be carefully monitor who is receiving the aid to ensure that they are not using it to insulate themselves from mass nonviolent resistance by excluding the groups that they feel are likely to oppose them.

Future Research

New Proxies for Potential Rebel Strength

This dissertation points to several possibilities for future research. First, it represents a step in studying civil war by looking at the features of potential rebel groups, rather than just the state. Evidence here strongly supports the argument that variables that suggest that a group would be effective on the battlefield are negatively related to the use of violence relative to nonviolence, but the proxy variables here represent just some of the possible variables that researchers can look at. Researchers can build on the work in this dissertation by finding new group features, either those that can be observed ex ante or those observed during conflict, that also act as proxies for potential rebel strength.

One possible avenue for research would be to look at how religious features impact the ability of groups to recruit members and how those members fight when rebellion does occur. Religious ideologies may influence the preferences that groups have regarding violence vs. nonviolence. Religion may offer a social structure from which to recruit, and religions beliefs

may influence the cost tolerance that members of a rebellion have. This dissertation has not focused on these features, but they may influence the dynamics of violent conflict and nonviolent resistance.

Rebel Strength as a Dynamic Variable

Previous scholars have sought to model violent conflict as a process, where parties credibly reveal their capabilities on the battlefield to solve information problems and reach an agreement that all parties prefer to continued fighting (Wagner: 2007). These theories, however, treat each party's capability as static throughout the process of fighting. This dissertation draws attention to the fact that these capabilities can change, and presents a first attempt to theorize about how this can impact conflict dynamics.

Future research can build on this in several ways. First, models of rebellion could look at rebel strength year by year, so to see more directly how changes in rebel strength that happen during conflict impact variables of interest. In addition, this concept of changing power could be applied to interstate conflict. During World War II, the United States developed the atomic bomb towards the end of fighting with Japan. This development greatly enhanced the strength and bargaining position of the United States. Within weeks, the war ended with Japan agreeing to an almost unconditional surrender to the United States. Future models of interstate conflict could look at how rapid changes in the strength of one actor impact conflict, and how the possibility of these rapid changes influences crisis bargaining.

Education and Conflict

This dissertation represents a first step into looking at the impact of human capital on conflict, and there are several research projects that can come from this. One possible project that could come from this would look why some rebel groups are successfully able to harness technology and adapt their strategies in response to changing conflict dynamics. In Iraq, for example, insurgent groups have created increasingly sophisticated roadside bombs and evolved in where they place them in response to changing tactics on the part of United States forces. Other groups, however, have not been as successful in harnessing technology. This is implied in the mechanism behind my hypotheses about group education level, but future research could more explicitly analyze this phenomenon.

It would also be possible to look at why some rebel groups build schools and provide education for their support base while others do not. Many groups, such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru, spend significant resources on education. This is puzzling on its surface, since rebel groups typically have limited resources and money spent on education cannot be spent on weapons. It is possible that education is a recruitment mechanism, that groups do it when they need to gain a tactical advantage on the battlefield, or that it is based on normative concerns of service provision.

In addition, future research could look at the variation in leader education mentioned above. Recent research on interstate conflict suggests the backgrounds of government leaders are important for decisions that they make on issues regarding war and peace (Horowitz & Stam: 2014). It stands to reason that this also matters for the leaders of violent and nonviolent campaigns, and future research could explore the impact of different educational backgrounds,

such as where they attended college, what they majored in, and what education beyond undergraduate they have.

Another possible project would apply this study of human capital to interstate war. Some countries perform poorly militarily, even though their militaries are well funded and well equipped. Future research could examine if human capital plays a role in this, and if well-equipped militaries perform poorly when they do not know how to use their technological resources correctly or engage in poor strategic planning.

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