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The Theory of Recognition and the Integration of Immigrants

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THE THEORY OF RECOGNITION AND THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS

by

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has been approved for the Department of Political Science.

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Date____________

The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we
Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards
Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.
Immigration is a global trend, which increases the ethnic, racial and religious diversity in the immigrant-receiving countries. This diversity that immigrants bring is usually perceived as a threat to national security and social cohesion. In the face of these perceived threats, the term “integration” referring to commonality within diversity has come to the forefront as an ideal goal in the public debates on immigration. However, this dominant perspective on the issues of immigration orients us to understand the goal of integration from the receiving country’s perspective, approaching the integration of immigrants as a necessity for social cohesion and security of the host country rather than as a democratic justice problem. This dissertation provides a distinctive perspective on the issue of immigrant integration. As an interdisciplinary research project, it strives to accomplish this task by employing Axel Honneth’s recognition theory as an analytical tool to understand and criticize existing institutional and societal structures of integration in the host societies. In Part One, my basic argument is that immigrants cannot integrate to the overall society unless the recognition order of the host society provides normative conditions such as equal respect and esteem for its immigrants’ healthy self-realization. As opposed to the dominant approach, I propose to understand the ideal of integration as a concrete process, which is strongly related to the immigrants’ feelings of misrecognition and denigration. After articulating the advantages of employing Honneth’s recognition theory for the issue of the integration of immigrants; in Part Two, I consider the application of the theory to the specific experiences of Canadian immigrants. I present how economic integration mechanisms for immigrants in Canada may systematically devalue immigrant labor, transform their self-esteem, and as a result inhibit their integration into the host society. Specifically, I investigate several economic barriers specific to Canadian immigrants such as the non-recognition of foreign credentials, the lack of “Canadian experience,” limited English skills as the reasons for the higher rates of poverty and unemployment that many immigrants experience compared to their Canadian counterparts. Finally, through an application of Honneth’s recognition theory, I contend that in addition to improving state institutions to provide fair terms of integration to immigrants, we need to examine the economic and social barriers that immigrants are subject to in their search for meaningful, fair employment and social networks.
For My Beautiful and Brilliant Mother Zeynep Göksel,
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Introduction

This dissertation, entitled “The Theory of Recognition and the Integration of Immigrants,” can be identified as an interdisciplinary research project, which employs Axel Honneth’s recognition theory as an analytical tool to analyze and criticize existing institutional and societal structures to provide a different perspective on the issue of immigrant integration. Recognition theories take the mutual recognition of esteem and equal respect as basic human desires and our moral responsibilities to our fellows. It also understands demands for recognition as justice demands through a critique of oppression and domination. This dissertation applies recognition theory to the recent Canadian experience to reconsider the socio-economic barriers to the integration of immigrants and the recognition of immigrant identity.

In this dissertation, I argue that the dominant perspective in political science literature orients us to view the issue of integration from the receiving country’s perspective, approaching the integration of immigrants as a necessity for social cohesion and security of the host country. This one-sided orientation does not provide us with a robust analytical framework for addressing the injustices faced by immigrants, which I believe hinder immigrant integration in the first place. Unlike the dominant perspective, I propose to understand the ideal of integration from the perspective of the immigrant. In order to make this important perspectival shift, we need to understand conditions of the existing institutional order that immigrants are being asked to integrate into. With this regard, employing Honneth’s recognition theory allows me to make inferences about the integration of immigrants and the transformation of the host society by criticizing the interpretation of normative principles of justice that is manifested in the existing institutional order in modern capitalistic societies. In this dissertation, my analysis suggests that in addition to improving state institutions for the fair treatment of immigrants, we need to
examine the economic and social obstacles or barriers that immigrants are subject to in their search for meaningful, fair employment and social networks. I believe that my approach explains better than the dominant perspective the social and political problems that immigrants face during their adaptation process.

The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part One consists of three chapters. It sets the scene by introducing the integration of immigrants as a democratic justice problem. As this dissertation aims to provide an immanent critique of the existing institutional order that immigrants are asked to integrate into, I start with an analysis of the notion of integration on a contextual basis. In the first chapter, “What is Integration?”, I examine the historical and theoretical evolution of the notion of immigrant integration to critique the dominant approach to it. I conclude the First Chapter by introducing a new definition of just integration that eliminates the shortcomings of the dominant perspective. In the Second Chapter, “Theories of Justice, Minority Rights, and Recognition Theory”, I examine and criticize political theory literature on minority rights to argue that Honneth’s recognition theory is the most illuminating of all justice theories in studying immigrant integration. In Chapter 3, “An Outline and The Case”, after articulating the advantages of employing Honneth’s recognition theory for the issue of the integration of immigrants, I consider the application of the theory by introducing the method of immanent critique. I also provide the reasons behind my choice of Canada as my specific case for the application of recognition theory. Lastly, I discuss the complexity of this endeavor by examining the conditions of being an immigrant.

Part Two is the application of Honneth’s recognition research program to the specific experiences of Canadian immigrants. It proposes to introduce novel ways that the theories of recognition provide to restructure a more just recognition order for the integration of immigrants.
Part Two consists of three chapters. My main aim in these chapters is to investigate how economic integration mechanisms for immigrants in Canada may systematically devalue immigrant labor, lower their self-esteem, and as a result inhibit their integration into the host society.

In Chapter 4, “Canadian Pre-immigration Policies, Social Pathologies and the Sphere of Respect”, I introduce the basic contradiction that Canadian immigrants face after their settlement. Canadian immigrant admission policy, namely the point system, favors highly skilled and educated foreigners by giving priority to their education and work experiences for their admission. Thus, the skills and qualifications of immigrants are basically determined by the pre-immigration policy. However, statistical data shows that these highly qualified immigrants do not fare well in the Canadian job market. The higher rates of poverty and unemployment that immigrants experience compared to their Canadian counterparts is the core problem that I would like to investigate through an application of recognition theory. I reveal this pathology by first introducing pre-immigration policies, and second, analyzing them in terms of the unrealistic expectations that they may create for immigrants before even coming to Canada. Next, I examine the determining factors behind the high poverty rates among Canadian immigrants. Lastly, I categorize the barriers to the economic integration of immigrants under two headings as the ones emanating from innate characteristics, and the ones emanating from skills and qualification of immigrants.

I conclude Chapter 4 with an analysis of Honneth’s second sphere of recognition, respect. First, I investigate the economic barriers emanating from innate characteristics of immigrants, briefly introducing the specific ways in which immigrants are being discriminated against because of their innate characteristics in the Canadian job market. Next, I analyze the current
multicultural institutions of integration, which try to eliminate the misrecognition of immigrants. I argue, along with Honneth, that the recognition of respect is essential but insufficient for the healthy self-realization of immigrants. Therefore, the societal recognition of their esteem is at most necessary.

In Chapter 5, “The Sphere of Esteem and the Economic Integration of Immigrants”, I analyze Honneth’s third sphere of recognition, esteem, in depth. I briefly describe the concept and examine the debate between Honneth and Fraser on recognition and redistribution. Next, I analyze the achievement principle as the normative element of the economic sphere through which we get esteem from our fellow citizens. In relation to this value horizon, I discuss the specific economic pathologies that immigrants suffer from in the capitalistic system and analyze how the achievement principle creates injustices and barriers for their integration process. Thus, this chapter provides an immanent critique of the values of the Canadian job market and aims at an explanation of how changing the rules of the achievement principle is essential for immigrant integration.

Finally, in Chapter 6, “Ethnic Enclaves and the Spheres of Respect and Esteem”, I start with a discussion of Honneth’s understanding of group membership for the healthy self-realization of individuals. I argue that for the application of recognition theory to the issue of integration, we need to approach ethnic groups as social mechanisms which provide individual immigrants opportunities for mutual recognition not only of their esteem but also of their cultural identity. After, I give an account of Honneth’s analysis of cultural demands under the sphere of respect. I criticize his analysis because of his lack of emphasis on the value of culture for the self-realization of immigrants and on the effect of hierarchical and oppressive structure of some ethnic groups on personal autonomy of immigrants. I introduce Tully’s idea of “multilogues” for
the revision of Honneth’s sphere of respect and a fourth recognition sphere of cultural esteem as possible improvements to increase the explanatory power of Honneth’s recognition theoretical model.

In the second section of this chapter, I change my analysis of ethnic enclaves as cultural mechanisms of recognition to examine the effects of ethnic groups for immigrant esteem in the Canadian context. I argue that there are counterproductive effects of ethnic enclaves for the recognition of immigrant esteem both on individual and communal level. In addition to the equal treatment of cultural demands of these groups, we should advocate for a reinterpretation of the current achievement principle to eliminate structural economic limitations that immigrants suffer from in their ethnic enclaves. Finally, I contend that just integration of immigrants can only be possible if immigrants have democratic exit options for their membership of these ethnic groups.
Part One: The Theory of Recognition
Chapter One: What is Integration?

1. Introduction

As discussed in the main introduction, my principal objective in this dissertation is to challenge existing institutions for the socio-economic integration of immigrants within Canadian context. Thus, I believe that it is crucial to start with a clear understanding of how integration has been interpreted in the immigrant-receiving countries and whether this temporarily settled interpretation impairs immigrants ability to integrate to their host society. I begin this chapter with a brief introduction of the topic of immigration as a global trend and continue with a historical outline of integrationist policies in Western countries. Accordingly, I will argue that even though the term “integration” has been used rhetorically in a variety —often contradictory— ways, the discursive shifts in the interpretation of the meaning of immigrant integration generally takes place within a assimilationist-multicultural axis as the degree of anxiety over social stability and national security changes in the face of real or perceived threats from a specific immigrant group at a certain time. In this sense, we encounter a dominant approach which attempts to nullify the perceived threats to national security and social cohesion of the host society in the face of the ethnic, racial and religious diversity.

Next, I introduce how this dominant approach generates fictitious problems and diverts our attention from the structural problems of inequality, discrimination, and political exclusion of immigrants. My criticism will be that while being too occupied with the task of recovering a lost order that is based on invalid presuppositions of the abstract concepts like social cohesion and common national identity, the dominant approach neglects to question the socio-economic and...
political barriers to the immigrant integration which may ideologically be reproduced to dominate and exclude immigrants in the recognition order of the host society.

Finally, questioning the validity of a specific interpretation necessitates a certain kind of value horizon that provides a framework to analyze and criticize the existing societal order that immigrants are asked to integrate into. I will reconfigure our understanding of the issue of integration as a democratic justice problem so that the value horizon towards more inclusion and individualization can guide my following analysis of socio-economic barriers to integration that Canadian immigrants suffer from. In line with Honneth and Tully, I will argue that only free persons who have equal footing in democratic deliberations and negotiations can legitimately be asked to integrate into the society. I believe that immigrant integration should also be understood with regard to this normative standard. Hence, my main argument is that the success of immigrant integration depends on host society to create stable structures of social recognition.

2. Immigration as a Global Trend

For the last two decades, the trends of globalization—namely, economic liberalization, the demand for cheap labor, and the advancements in communication and transportation—have improved human mobility remarkably. Today, “the total number of international migrants has increased over the last 10 years from an estimated 150 million in 2000 to 214 million persons” (United Nations' Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision). As a matter of fact, one of every thirty-five persons in the world is a migrant; about 192 million people are living outside their place of birth.

The growing number of immigrants in Western countries will continue in the future because the aforementioned economic and socio-political trends of globalization are not likely to change anytime soon. Low fertility rates in Western countries together with stable economic
growth and constant changes in demand for labor continue to increase the economic necessity of immigrants. In this sense, many Western countries have begun to perceive the immigrant population as an asset for their economy. “This view, combined with the recognition that migration flows cannot be stopped, has helped to fuel the perception that a more pragmatic approach to managing (as opposed to controlling) migration is required” (Lacroix 2010, 4). Thus the market-oriented approach to immigration policies will likely welcome more immigrants in the future.

In addition to bringing tangible economic benefits, international migration has also increased ethnic and racial diversity. The liberalization of pre-immigration laws has reduced the legal obstacles to South-to-North and East-to-West migration. Moreover, the greater ease of transportation in addition to the increased awareness about the opportunities abroad and political conflicts in some areas of the world have led the way to the increased levels of international migration flow (Reitz et al. 2009, 4). Hence the composition of immigrant populations has changed dramatically in the last two decades. For example, in 2006, approximately 83.9% of recent immigrants to Canada were born in regions other than Europe, up from 68.5% in 1981 (Census Canada, 2006). The majority of the immigrant population in Western countries can be identified as ethnically and racially different from host country nationals.

For some, this ethnic and racial diversity has raised serious concerns about the national security, identity, and social cohesion of the host societies. In the 2008 Austrian and United States elections and the 2012 French presidential election, “the challenge of integrating immigrants loom[ed] high in national public debates and the issue of social cohesion caused headaches for many politicians and policy makers” (Lacroix 2010, 2). In a sense, today
“immigration is to modern politics what violent crime was in the 1980s: an apparently marginal issue that can swiftly overwhelm a campaign” (economist.com 2008).

Ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism have been perceived as threats in some policy and academic circles for several reasons. First, the majority of immigrants do not look, speak, or in general live like nationals in the host society. There is an unwavering belief among some nationals that many immigrant cultural values are irreconcilable with the liberal values that Western societies identify with. This common opinion crystallizes when it comes to the issue of integration of Muslim immigrants in Western European countries.

The Salman Rushdie affair and the Danish cartoon affair are exemplary in terms of how Muslim cultural values can clash with liberal rights such as freedom of expression. These events hardened some Westerners’ belief that particular immigrant cultures threaten to eventually preclude Western value structures. The perception is that these immigrant groups, because of their different culture, will never integrate into the host societies, instead constituting a marginalized and perhaps violent minority that could breed hatred for Western liberal values. According to some, the different value systems of immigrant groups do not only pose a challenge to Western values but turn the very existence of immigrant groups into a threat to national security. This discourse of national security has been at the forefront, especially after 9/11 and the 2005 London metro bombings.

In addition to concerns for national security, debates over immigration have also revolved around the issue of the future of national identity in the face of cultural and ethnic diversity. While host countries expect their immigrants to adapt to the host culture in time, they have also come to recognize that adaptation is not a one-way street, but requires the host society to change as well. As the numbers and concentration (and hence the visibility) of ethnic immigrants
increases, the perceived threat to national identity and social cohesion of the host society also increases. The connection between national identity and social cohesion can be explained in terms of the Western interpretation of citizenship based on national identity and commonality as the foundation of democracy.

These concerns are the foundation of the dominant discourse towards immigrants in the host countries. Universally valued liberal rights are in danger. The binding force of the nation is diminishing. The enemies of national security live within our society. Statements like these are embedded in the dominant discourse and lead Western societies to be extremely alarmed by the very existence of their immigrant populations. The term “integration” has come to the forefront as a prominent answer to these concerns. In this sense, the integration of immigrants from different ethnic and religious backgrounds has become a central issue for both policy makers and academics in Western democracies.

3. Integration as a Solution

Integration is a very hard concept to define. For example, Banton (2001) refers to integration as a “treacherous concept” that offers no sensible criteria for operation and measurement (151-152). Nonetheless, the term “integration” maintains its popularity among academics and policy makers, perhaps due to its highly abstract meaning, which makes the term suitable for variety of policy projects (Hamberger 2009, 2). As a result, integration has become a widely used term to describe the aim of post-immigration policies throughout Western Europe and Canada (Favell 2003, 14).

When we look at the discourse of these post-immigration policies, we can conclude that even though the term integration has been used in different ways, it still connotes social cohesion, the unification of a diverse population through the construction of a common identity,
and “structuring a ‘common ground’ of institutions and services for civic engagement of diverse communities” (Qadeer 2003, 29; Reitz et al. 2009; Favell 2003, 14). The main question is how the host state can manage the diversity that the immigrant population brings for the protection of social cohesion and the preservation of liberal values.

The social and political integration of immigrants into their host country is taken as a “collective goal” for policy makers and academics. However, there is no common agreement about how to accomplish this collective goal. Historically, policy strategies for the social and political integration of immigrants have congregated around the debate between two opposing poles, namely assimilation and multiculturalism. The pendulum swings between these two extremes in the social policy debate have occurred as the historical conjectures concerning the relationship between immigrant groups and their host societies have been changed by contemporary socio-economic and political events (Chun et al. 2011, 28).

On the one hand, assimilationists have argued that immigrants can only integrate into the host society and become full members if they leave their ethno-cultural identities behind and identify as nationals of the host country. On the other hand, multiculturalists assume that the integration of immigrants can solely be possible through respecting and tolerating the ethno-cultural identities of immigrants. Only in this way can immigrants embrace a common identity with the nationals and become full members of the host society. The assimilation and multiculturalism debate is an ongoing one within literature and policy circles. Below, I will give a brief historical background to circumscribe the flux that the notion of integration has undergone between these two opposite strategies. This analysis will reveal how the term “integration” has been rhetorically employed to respond to the public concerns over stability and security.
4. Historical Background

Historically, in host countries, both state institutions and some sections of society had perceived immigrants as undesirable, but also as an economic necessity. Until the 1960s, the policy of “Anglo-conformity” was the model for immigration in the United States, Canada, and Australia. These countries simply demanded that their immigrants assimilate into the host culture (Kymlicka 1995, 14). The expectation was that, after residing in the country for a long period of time, immigrants would automatically internalize the host society’s culture and values. In this sense, integration was understood as assimilation.

To illustrate, Castles and Davidson (2000) argues that “integration policies are often simply a weaker form of assimilation, based on the idea that adaptation is a gradual process in which group cohesion and interaction play an important part. Nonetheless, the final goal is complete absorption into the dominant culture” 298). Moreover, Ålund and Schierup (1986) point out that in the European immigration literature, integration has been treated as identical with assimilation, since the end result of the integration of an immigrant is expected to be an agent who behaves and speaks in exactly the same way as the host country nationals. The most vivid example of this would be the French official discourse on immigration up to the 1970s, which referred to the “unilateral adaptation of the immigrant to the laws and the customs of France and of the French, the superiority of French culture and national identity” (Weil and Crowley 1994, 103).

Nevertheless, during the 1970s, “under pressure from immigrant groups, all three countries [the United States, Canada and Australia] rejected assimilationist models and adapted a more tolerant and pluralistic policy which allows and indeed encourages immigrants to maintain various aspects of their ethnic heritage” (Kymlicka 1995,14). Moreover, in 1964, the British
government accepted the notion of integration. Roy Jenkins, then Home Secretary, defined the term “integration” as “not a flattening process of uniformity but cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Weil and Crowley 1994, 112).

This kind of understanding of the term “integration” is associated with multiculturalism. In general, multiculturalism suggests that the recognition of cultural diversity will provide a better environment for the integration of immigrants. In this context, multicultural policies came out as a well-grounded solution to the possible problems that emanate from cultural pluralism. Many immigrant-receiving countries in the West have embraced multicultural policies in the hope of building pathways to integrate immigrant groups with the larger community. Canada is exemplary among immigrant receiving countries in embracing multicultural policies as an integration strategy.

Historically, Canada has responded to the separatist movement in Québec and the demands of its ethnic minorities by embracing multiculturalism. “In 1971, Prime Minister Trudeau proclaimed Canada a bilingual and multicultural nation, where multiculturalism means the acceptance and recognition of ethno-cultural minorities. To promote acceptance of differences, the government aimed at supporting ethnic organizations, making use of ethnic press as a standard part of government communication and at encouraging institutions and organizations to explore areas of common concerns such as rights and racism” (Heisler 1992, 633-634).

Multiculturalism in Canada presents itself in three different ways, as theory, policy, and discourse. Although the term “multiculturalism” generally refers to all relevant theories, policies, and political discourses with regard to recognition of cultural differences on institutional and societal level, the differentiation between these areas is essential to understand the nuances of
multiculturalism in Canada. To begin with, multicultural theories are concerned with being fair to immigrants with regard to the official and social expectations of immigrants’ adaptation and the conditions of their integration. In order for this integration process to be fair, Kymlicka argues that political institutions should act in a culturally conscious way with regard to the differences and necessities of immigrant groups. These multicultural theories aim in the long run to “connect minority groups to the whole, through contribution, participation, interchange, and language acquisition” (Reitz et al. 2009, 19). Application of this general theoretical framework to the policy responses is called multicultural policies.

Multicultural policies usually refer to those state programs and regulations which are clearly framed to recognize a particular demand of cultural recognition from an ethnic or cultural group. Multicultural policies are abundant in Canada and sometimes the subject of numerous public debates. To illustrate, today in Canada, Sikh men are permitted to wear their turbans on the Mountie duty. This is a multiculturalist policy because the regulation of the Mountie uniform is reframed to allow Sikhs to wear their traditional dress code. This policy helps Sikh men to be integrated into the general society while preserving their cultural and religious differences. Therefore, the recognition of cultural differences is in the forefront of multicultural policy making. However, not every recognition demand for cultural difference can make it to the policy level in Canada. For example, the legal appeal of Muslim immigrants in Canada for the establishment of Sharia tribunals to regulate familial affairs of their group members was immediately dismissed as the scope of this demand exceeds the limits of cultural tolerance that can be provided in a liberal democratic state.

The tradition of multicultural policies reflects the general discourse around issues of immigration, and the way politicians and Canadian society in general justify and legitimize the
degree and the scope of tolerance for the cultural differences. The degree and the scope of tolerance are discursively determined by the dominant interpretation on the nature and similarity of minority cultures in comparison to Canadian culture. Through an analysis of policy reports and scholarly articles, Lee (2003) argues that the degree to which immigrants converge to the average performance of native-born Canadians and their normative and behavioral standards has become a typical measure of immigrant integration in Canada.

Thus to the extent that immigrants earn as much as native-born Canadians, they are deemed to be economically well integrated. Similarly, successful social integration implies immigrants’ adopting the English or French language, moving away from ethnically concentrated immigrant enclaves, and participating in social and political activities of mainstream society, in short, discarding differences deemed to fall outside mainstream society. What constitutes desirable integration of immigrants is taken for granted in the immigration discourse. Accordingly, there is a strong expectation that immigrants should accept Canada's prevailing practice and standard and become similar to the resident population. The discourse nominally endorses cultural diversity, but specific cultural differences, especially those deemed to be far removed from the Canadian standard, are viewed as obstacles to integration. The discourse recognizes the value of diversity, but at the same time questions it on the premise that growing racial diversity and cultural difference weaken Canada's normative consensus and social cohesion (Lee 2003, 316).

With regard to Lee’s discourse analysis, the possibility of immigrant integration is seen as less likely when immigrants are too different. Unlike multicultural policies, multicultural discourse understands immigrant integration in more of an assimilationist way. This contradictory emphasis of multicultural discourse on similarity of immigrants works to the advantage of some of the Canadian policy makers. On the one hand, they can represent Canada as tolerant of ethnic and cultural diversity through couple of examples of multicultural policies to attract immigrants. On the other hand, policy makers are able to inform Canadians through a multicultural discourse on integration that their anxiety over cultural pluralization is misplaced because the limit and the scope of tolerance to diversity is very limited and utilized to direct immigrants to assimilate into Canadian culture\textsuperscript{1}. In this sense, even in a country where
multiculturalism is officially embraced, the term “integration” can sometimes be interpreted with assimilationist undertones as the public attitude towards diversity is negatively affected by specific events.

Especially after 9/11, theory of multiculturalism as a strategy to achieve immigrant integration has lost its popularity as the national security issues come to the forefront. In the countries where multiculturalism was once celebrated, many have started to reconsider these policies and the theory behind them due to the significant inter-ethnic tension (Reitz et al. 2009, 1). In Britain, New Labor social policy has shifted from defending tolerance for cultural differences to demanding social cohesion and commonality between the host society and immigrant groups. In 2011, at a security conference in Munich, David Cameron declared that multiculturalism had failed. He continued:

We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values… Building a stronger sense of national and local identity holds the key to achieving true cohesion by allowing people to say, “I am a Muslim, I am a Hindu, I am a Christian, but I am a Londoner, too” (BBC, 5 February 2011).

Many policy makers have argued that tolerating cultural differences leads to the marginalization and radicalization of immigrants, and that it is better to demand that immigrants assimilate into a liberal framework for the sake of national security. To illustrate, Australia has revised its multicultural and immigration policies as a result of national security concerns which emerged after the 9/11 and Bali bombings (Chiro 2009, 12). In Canada, “a parallel controversy arose following the arrest of 17 alleged members of a purported Islamic terrorist cell in June 2006” (The Economist 2006a cited by Reitz et al. 2009, 9). A 2006 Toronto Community Foundation survey shows that approximately two-thirds of Canadians have reported an increased anxiety over the cultural integration of newcomers (Vitalsignscanada.ca 2006). Accordingly,
Michael Adams concludes that “Canadians more often think that something about multiculturalism is broken and that immigrants are not adequately adapting to life in Canada” (Reitz et al. 2009, 9). The international concerns over national security have started to frame migration in terms of unemployment and religious fundamentalism. As a result, “migration is increasingly interpreted as a security problem” which needs to be solved by ensuring social cohesion through assimilation. Thus, as the security concerns are on the rise, the pendulum that defines integration of immigrants swings from multiculturalism to assimilation.

So far, I have tried to give a brief introduction of historical interpretations of the term “integration”. Above discussion reveals that the interpretation of the term “integration” has been reconstructed historically based on temporarily settled public concerns with regard to the effects of immigrant diversity on social cohesion and security and employed in opposing ways—assimilation and multicultural axis—by policy makers and immigration scholars. Next, I will explain the consequences of taking the host society’s understanding of integration at face value in our studies of immigrant integration. I will try to answer the question: Are the public concerns over stability, security, and social cohesion ideologically used to justify the dominance of the host society’s interests?

5. Problems with the Dominant Approach

As can be seen from this brief historical construction of the term “integration,” the assimilation-multiculturalism axis approaches the problem of integration of immigrants out of a concern for the social cohesion, national identity, and security of the host country. I believe that this perspective understands the issue of integration of immigrants based on false presuppositions about these abstract terms. This generates fictitious problems and diverts our attention from the structural problems of inequality, discrimination, and political exclusion. Overall, it does not
provide us a robust analytical framework for addressing issues of justice in the study of immigrant integration. Below, I will try to reveal these problems by reconfiguring our perspective on the relationship between national identity and social cohesion.

To begin with, the dominant approach takes the necessity of common national identity for democratic survival and social stability and cohesion for granted. However, this causal relationship between the national identity and social cohesion is mainly understood on the false premises on highly abstract concepts. To illustrate, the ideal of universal citizenship has always been actualized within the context of the nation state and national identity. In practice, the ideal of universal citizenship is in disagreement with the reality of nation state, because a citizen is always also a member of a nation. Thus, citizenship as an ideal is meant to be universal above particular identities, but “it exists only in the context of a nation-state, which is based on cultural society—on the belief in being different from other nations” (Castles and Davidson 2000, 12).

This paradox emanates from the common understanding that “the idea of democracy requires some structures of integration, some cultural capacity for internal communication and some social solidarity of the people” (Calhoun 2007, 154). After the establishment of the Westphalia order, national identity has been employed to satisfy this alleged necessity. From this perspective, sharing common primordial ethnic identity is the binding force between citizens. This national homogenization was believed to generate a common value structure that is necessary for building trust between citizens who share equal rights and obligations within the confines of a nation state.

However, with the struggles for the emancipation of minorities and the increase of immigrant populations for the last three decades, the binding force of “nation” has started to disappear. What is the alternative for national identity? This question has been adamantly asked
by many political theorists because it does not only point out the paradoxical nature of the universal assumptions about equal citizenship, but also reveals the injustices that have been done to the groups that do not belong to the majority’s national identity in a society. Many political theorists (Calhoun 2007, Vertovec 1999, Young 2000) argue that the emphasis on national homogeneity has caused discrimination and segregation of immigrants in Western societies.

I believe that if the emphasis on the necessity of national identity for social cohesion continues for the issue of integration, it may not only perpetuate the unjust treatment of minorities, specifically immigrants, but it may also continue to generate conflict between ethnically different groups. As long as nationality is understood as the sole civic tie between citizens, immigrants would be perceived as highly threatening potential invaders. In 1992, to warn Americans against the dangers of these supposedly violent and irrational people living next door, Jack Miles cried out: “when the barbarians sacked Rome in 410, the Romans thought it was the end of the civilization. You smile—but what followed was the dark ages” (Bach 1993, 156).

This barbarian vision displays ingrained stereotypical understanding of outsiders from whom nationals need absolute protection (Alexander et al. 2005, 782).

Moreover, the argument that ethnic diversity of immigrants will damage the social cohesion of the host country depends on an underlying assumption about the existence of the unity of nationals in the host country. This directs not only politicians but also political theory research to an impossible ambition: to recover a lost order that actually never was: social cohesion. Vertovec (1999) rightly argues that “social cohesion is only invoked by its absence: that is, while we are rarely presented with views of what a high degree of social cohesion might look like, we are bombarded with descriptions of the lack of social cohesion in contemporary society” (xii).
The lack of social cohesion is an abstract term which is employed to refer to the socio-economic problems that society faces such as “high incidence of crime, joblessness and homelessness, growing mistrust of neighbors and of government, worsening quality of social services, new manifestations of racism and xenophobia, an entrenchment of political apathy, and more” (Vertovec 1999, xi). The socio-economic problems that the majority population faces have sometimes been blamed on the very existence of immigrants. The immigrant population instantaneously becomes the scapegoat since it is perceived as the reason why society lacks cohesion and suffers these socio-economic problems. Thus, the abstract notion of social cohesion is also historically constructed and deconstructed as tensions between new identity groups occur and are resolved through recognition and negotiation or disagreement and ethnic tension. I believe that the dependency on national ties for social cohesion may eventually propagate the segregation of ethnically different groups. Nationalistic movements, which are trying to restore national solidarity, inflame ethnic conflict. In many ways the immigrant threat to national security is being fabricated through the false presumption about the status of national solidarity in the face of ethnic diversity.

Moreover, the connection between culture and individual identity has been approached based on a rigid understanding of cultural differences via national identity. Ethnic identities of immigrants have been treated as something either to be assimilated or to be encouraged to flourish. Thus, the demand for recognition by immigrant groups has been approached from a rigid group identity perspective. The basic question to be answered has become the degree and the scope of toleration that the liberal states can show to the rigid and frequently oppositional identities of their immigrants. The main focus has usually been on the compatibility between the liberal values attached to the national identity of Western countries and the ethno-cultural
identities of immigrant groups. As a result, this approach to integration has diverted our attention from the social pathologies that immigrants suffer in the host country.

For reasons like these, in this dissertation, I argue that the issue of social and political integration of immigrants should be understood beyond the national identity, and social cohesion perspective. So far, first I tried to show how the problem of integration of immigrants has been approached from an assimilation and multiculturalism axis. Then, I offered a critical analysis of this approach to redirect our attention to a different way of looking at the immigration problem. In this dissertation, I argue that integration of immigrants should be approached from a democratic justice perspective. The normative problem that political theory faces today is the course that the transformation of the political institutions and societal values of the host country will take in the face of cultural pluralism for the sake of justice, inclusion, and equality. Next, I will examine what just integration may entail through a discussion of Parekh, Tully, and Honneth.

6. Just Integration

6.1. Parekh’s arguments on integration of immigrants. Like many other scholars of multiculturalism, for Bikhu Parekh, the term “integration” should first be outlined by how it is associated with the collective goal of immigrant receiving liberal societies in the face of cultural and ethnic diversity. Parekh is also careful about how the ideal of integration can be instrumentalized by the dominant approach as assimilationist. “Prima facie, integration appears to be a perfectly sensible goal, as immigrants should be encouraged to become an integral part of the society, and should have the same rights, opportunities and obligations as the rest, but probed deeper, integration involves a particular way of incorporating outsiders in to the prevailing social
structure, and is sometimes either indistinguishable or only marginally different from assimilation” (Parekh 2008, 85).

Parekh also argues that there is a tendency to apply different standards of integration to different racial and ethnic groups. Moreover, Parekh claims that some integrationists see partial integration as a sign of separateness and a refusal to integrate (Parekh, 2008, 86). Taking these shortcomings of the dominant discourse on immigrant integration into consideration, Parekh points out that integration is most of the time is seen as a one-way process but it is in fact a two-way process, involving both immigrants and the host society to adapt to each other. He also contends that social solidarity can be advanced by the recognition of the different identities of groups. “Politics of identity does not militate against social cohesion or redistribution; rather respecting the legitimate claims of groups involved is an important step towards integrating them into an expanded basis of solidarity” (Parekh 2008, 47).

In line with Parekh, I contend that the acknowledgement of integration as a two-way adjustment process should be the starting point in any discussion of just integration from a democratic justice perspective. Parekh offers us certain normative standards that host societies need to comply with to accomplish an open-ended and two way process of immigrant integration. Accordingly, there are three main normative standards. First, if liberal democratic states identify with the values of fairness and equality, it is reasonable to expect them to make accommodations to provide fair terms of integration to their immigrants. Second, host societies should also be open to the diversity that immigrants bring. Third, the degree of integration should be taken into account in studies of different immigrant groups to defy the stereotypical compartmentalization of expectations from visible immigrants.
I believe that employing this kind of an open-ended approach to the issue of integration is novel in the way that it allows context specific differences to be included in our analysis. Parekh’s approach dispels the myths of social solidarity and unity for the cause of integration and invites us to criticize the way the term integration is being used to refer assimilation. However, it does not tell us how and why these myths are created, what kind of purposes they are serving, and how they can be changed. Hence, the normative standards to analyze and criticize the relations of oppression and domination and their structural and institutional effects are missing in Parekh’s discussion. Next, I will complement Parekh’s understanding of integration with Tully’s understanding of integration. I will argue that this move is necessary because of Tully’s emphasis on discursive possibilities for the fairer norms of integration in his studies of struggles for recognition and integration.

6.2. Tully’s idea of democratic integration. Tully questions the legitimacy and the effectiveness of current norms of integration in Western countries in terms of their origination processes. According to Tully, the justification for the system that immigrants are being asked to integrate into should emanate from the scope of discursive possibilities that immigrants are able to practice in the public sphere. These discursive possibilities can come in many different forms. To illustrate, while immigrants can interpret and follow the norms of integration differently in practice without challenging the norms directly, they can also question, challenge, agree and disagree with the existing norms. In addition, immigrants can implement or experiment with “a modified regime of integration norms, acting in accordance with it and testing it in turn” (Tully 2008b, 227). Even though all these practices can be counted as democratic, Tully claims that three very distinctive approaches to integration follow from them.
Tully argues that the first approach to integration encompasses the most current practices in Western countries. Today, in immigrant-receiving countries, the integration norms are being imposed on immigrants without their participation in the decision making process. In this sense, even though the norms of integration are being imposed by a democratic state, the practice of integration itself is anti-democratic; “complex modern systems integrate members ‘behind their backs’, that the situation is too volatile and dissonant for democratic procedures, that immigrants are subjects but not yet citizens so they do not have a say, that the demos comes after integration” (Tully 2008b, 227).

Tully’s diagnosis is in line with my arguments against the dominant approach to immigrant integration. When it is presented from a democratic practice perspective, it is difficult to justify this kind of direct imposition of integration norms on immigrants. However, the undemocratic imposition of integration norms is a prominent practice today. As Tully (2008b) states “the propaganda around terrorism, security, and the clash of civilizations strengthens this anti-democratic approach and the reactions its policies cause are then used to justify its extension” (227).

After signifying the problem as an anti-democratic imposition of integration norms on immigrants, Tully differentiates two forms of democracy, namely a “low-intensity” or “restricted” democratic approach and an “open-ended” or “non-restricted” democratic approach. Through a comparison of these two with regard to “four aspects of democratic negotiation of integration regimes”, Tully argues that

the restricted approach is “restricted” in that it places limits on all four aspects of democratic negotiation: 1. The democratic negotiation of norms of integration takes place only in what we might call the official institutions of the public sphere. Furthermore, official representatives of the people subject to the norm in question usually partake in the negotiations. 2. Democratic negotiation takes place within a set of pre-established procedures, and having a say within them usually consists in saying YES or NO to a
proposed norm developed elsewhere (as, for example, in the vote on the constitution). 3. The general outline of what a norm of integration must look like at the end of the negotiations is given at the beginning. It is usually given as beyond question by some grand narrative of global processes of modernization, good governance, democratization, human rights or civilization. 4. The discursive practices of norm negotiation are seen as a discrete step in a larger process of norm generation that comes to an end (Tully 2008b, 228).

While “restricted” approach ensures the inclusion of immigrants in the negotiations for the normative principles of integration, it also places these four limits where agonistic tensions are not likely to occur in diverse societies. Tully contends that there is a more democratic option at hand. The “open-ended” approach accepts the fact that there will always be differences and disagreements on the prevailing norms and institutions in democracies. If the regime provides open and free democratic negotiations and experimentations to all its members including its immigrants, the norms of integration will be configured in a most democratic way.

Tully refers to “citizen identity” as the bonding factor among individuals living in open-ended democratic societies. In addition to having equal rights, in order to exercise autonomy, citizens should participate in public life. The form of participation that is necessary for the constitution of citizen identity should be intersubjective and dialogical involving “having a say” or being “in on” the public dialogues and negotiations over how and by whom political power is exercised (Tully 2008a, 147). Being able to freely participate in public life and exercising personal autonomy without shame brings persons a certain kind of self-awareness, self-formation, and self-consciousness hence a citizen identity that they all share with each other.

Thus, democratic integration is only possible when members of society have a sense of citizen identity. Tully contends that in a society where some members cannot freely participate in democratic negotiations, they are subjects not citizens. While this society is not legitimate, it also misses the essential bond for the integration of its members. Thus it is disintegrating.
struggles against being a subject are called “identity politics” and “struggles for recognition” (Tully 2008b, 165-166).

There are two crucial points to learn from Tully’s democratic approach to integration. First, integration of the political association can only be possible by having equal and free citizens as the members of the society. As such, only persons who have the possibility to develop “citizen identity” can be asked to integrate into the system in a just manner. Second, struggles of recognition and identity politics are byproducts of a political system which imposes the rules of the democratic game without giving its members the possibility to negotiate them.

Tully provides us a framework to get a sense of what a just and legitimate integration regime would look like for immigrants. His emphasis on democratic participation as the prerequisite of the legitimacy of a political order and individual autonomy introduces how essential it is for immigrants to have equal rights to participate in public negotiations on an equal footing. Moreover, Tully argues that the existence of minority rights is not enough to ensure that open-ended democratic discursive practices will take place.

For the specific case of immigrant integration, Tully believes that immigrants are subject to a “minimal and non-negotiable regime of minority rights”. He provides the example of the Danish cartoon affair and explains how instead of debating and negotiating the terms of integration in a situation like this, immigrants who were protesting were polarized and apoliticized. “But, it is precisely these democratic activities that create a sense of attachment to the larger community even when members do not get all their demands” (Tully 2008b, 231-232). I agree with Tully that the turn of events during the Danish cartoon affair has illustrated that immigrants cannot identify as citizens and negotiate the terms of the integration with the natives of their host country.
Therefore, Tully’s democratic ideal of integration provides us with a certain norm with which to judge the legitimacy of particular institutions and public debates through an inclusive political participation standard. Even though Tully provides us with analytical tools to criticize the current participation levels of immigrants and the structure that participation takes place, he falls short of explaining the socio-economic integration of immigrants and the relationship between recognition of the free persons as citizens and recognition of esteemed persons as contributing members of society.

In the *Struggle for Recognition*, Axel Honneth (1996) introduces a critical theory of recognition in order to locate emancipatory movements in the justice claims of misrecognized groups and their efforts for reconstructing a more equal integrated society. While agreeing with Tully on the necessity of free and equal political association, Honneth also provides a multi-leveled recognition theory to reveal the function of the capitalistic order in the integration of society. Next, I will discuss Honneth’s idea of integration based on recognition.

### 6.3. Honneth’s idea of integration through mutual recognition.

From the discussion above, it is clear that integration into a society is a two-way process. In this sense, integration is not only essential for individual autonomy but also for the legitimacy of a society. If integration were only possible in a legitimate society of free and equal individuals, what would be the conditions for personal autonomy? Honneth defines mutual recognition as the pre-condition for personal autonomy and societal legitimacy.

I currently see the connection between philosophical anthropology and social theory as lying in the normative conditions for social integration: individuals can become members of society only by developing, via the experience of mutual recognition, an awareness of how rights and duties are reciprocally distributed in the context of particular tasks. In this way, the use of the concept of recognition allows the normative implications that are necessarily inherent in every social theory to emerge from both directions: from one direction, individual opportunities for a positive relation-to-self depend on conditions that are social in character, since they comprise
normatively regulated forms of mutual recognition; from the other direction, a given society’s chance of meeting with the uncoerced support of its members depends on its ability to organize the relations of recognition in a way that enables the individual development of those positive forms of relation-to-self (Honneth 2002, 501).

While Tully sees recognition claims as “ineliminable, agonic democratic games to be played with a minimum domination” (Tully 2000, 469), Honneth understands recognition as a basic human desire. Honneth claims that the development of a practical relation to the self requires mutual recognition, which can only be constituted through three distinguished forms of social integration, namely love, rights, and solidarity. These three patterns of relationship between the individual and its other are different in terms of their medium of recognition, form of relation-to-self made possible, and potential for moral development (Honneth 1996, 95).

However, Honneth does not suggest an ideal just recognition order to be discovered through his theoretical arguments. Instead, he offers an immanent criticism of the recognition order of modern capitalistic society. In this sense, he puts emphasis on current recognition relationships between individuals, states, and corporations. According to Honneth, the recognition of individual skills and qualifications in the capitalistic market is a pre-condition for social solidarity in a society where there are no religious and traditional values to bind people together (Honneth 2012b, 68). This is the reason why Honneth takes the capitalistic market as the place where societal integration happens.

In this sense, Honneth, together with equal and free political participation under the sphere of respect, maintains that symmetrical and authentic social participation is a pre-condition for the integration of society. Honneth claims that Dewey in Public and its Problems envisions a democratic society in terms of cooperation and problem solving. “Dewey’s theory of democracy contains an answer that opens a third avenue between the false options of an over-ethicized republicanism and an empty proceduralism; namely, to grasp democratic ethical life as the
outcome of the experience that all members of society could have if they related to one another cooperatively through a just organization of the division of labor” (Honneth 1998, 780).

According to Honneth, Dewey’s emphasis on the community in which free and equal citizens come together to solve common problems of society through democratic division of labor is an appropriate articulation of the public sphere and the explanation of role of politics in individuals’ lives. Relevant social labor defines the individual’s place in the society and is strongly connected with individual self-esteem. A consciousness of social co-operation that is instantiated through a just division of labor gives motivation to people to engage in the public sphere as full members of their society.

In modern societies, social integration occurs not through hierarchical values and norms, but through value representations contesting for their recognition as valid ways of achieving the general societal goals (Deranty 2009, 284). Because of the open and non-hierarchical mechanism of social integration, conflict appears as an eminent possibility in modern society. Accordingly, struggles of recognition break out when misrecognized minorities do not agree with the justification of dominant societal values.

Honneth’s recognition theoretic model presupposes a certain direction of universal progress within the ethical order towards “a process of individualization, i.e., the increase of opportunities to legitimately articulate parts of one’s personality, [and] social inclusion, i.e., the expanding inclusion of subjects into the circle of full members of society” (Honneth 2001, 185). Inclusion and individualization is possible through the recognition struggles which challenge the difference between the current interpretations of normative principles of equality and achievement by the dominant party and the normative potential of these principles. In this sense, Honneth compliments Tully’s emphasis on equal and free political participation for the ideal of
inclusion with the ideal of individualization which is contextualized within the realm of individual relationships with non-state corporations and socio-economic institutions.

Below, I will recount the general implications of what a just integration would look like to set the value horizon for my analysis of socio-economic barriers to immigrant integration in Canada. This move will not only help me to justify my choice of Honneth’s theory of recognition over other approaches to the term “integration” but also to make the structure of my dissertation more explicit to my readers.

1. Integration is a two-way adjustment process which positively transforms both the dominant group’s and minority groups’ practices of recognition, forms of self-relation and identities. This kind of understanding of integration is embedded in many multicultural theories (Parekh 2008, Kymlicka 2010, 39) together with relational and intersubjective theories of recognition (Tully 2000, Honneth 1995). Above discussion of Parekh, Tully and Honneth’s understandings of just integration was geared towards reorienting the dominant approach to the integration by putting the transformative characteristic of integration into consideration. This transformative understanding poses challenges to the assimilationist integration premises which presuppose integration as a one-way adaptation of immigrants to their host societal culture. The transformative quality of just integration also eliminates the rigid understanding of cultural identity, hence the compartmentalization of cultural and ethnic groups within the public sphere. It opens up possibilities for open-ended democratic negotiations, as the process is not concerned with the preservation of temporarily settled interpretations of societal values but the democratic deconstruction of these values. It annotates special value to the agnostic disagreements and the struggles of recognition because through these activities, it contends that solidarity and social integration can partially be accomplished.
Thus, this perspective on recognition struggles is helpful to orient our perspective away from the aforementioned dominant approach because it shifts our focus away from the concerns for stability and elimination of conflict in society to the intrinsic value of the emancipation struggles for social integrity. More importantly, while this transformative process does not give us procedural prescriptions on how to achieve the ideal of integration, it provides us normative standards as pre-conditions for just integration to analyze and criticize the existing structures and the current norms of integration. It states that the modern capitalistic systems have well-defined normative standards and certain kinds of integrative institutions already in place.

2. In Western liberal countries, these evaluative normative standards are founded on the claim that integration to the political community can only be possible by having equal and free citizens as the members of the society. Only then, individuals can develop a sense of belonging as members of society. This general claim for freedom, equality and the inclusive political participation standard constitutes the foundation of democratic justice. Liberal and democratic standard dictates that like every member of society, legally settled immigrants should also be asked to adapt to the norms of integration that are democratically negotiated and experimented in a free and equal public setting.

3. Even though, democratic inclusion and equality standards indicate a value horizon, they lack a concrete content in modern capitalistic societies, which is less hierarchical and more open to different values. This openness makes these values vulnerable to second order interpretations which are shaped by a certain kind of recognition relations. Honneth argues that there are three kinds of relations of recognition which determine the forms that inclusion practices take in the public sphere. First, rational recognition is the precondition for the ideal of equal and free inclusion. Rational recognition is an effortless mutual acknowledgement of certain aspects of
other’s personality within a context of personal and institutional relationships. Second, misrecognition is the opposite of rational recognition which directly excludes persons from the negotiations of the norms of integration. Finally, ideological recognition, unlike misrecognition, integrates its subjects into the existing recognition order by creating voluntary subordination. Thus, even though individuals may seem like they are included in the process, they may not rationally be recognized as free and equal subjects at all.

These types of pathologies of recognition indicate contradictions within the institutions and structures of integration processes and inhibit democratic inclusion thus societal integration. Therefore, an analysis of the interpretation of the democratic inclusion standard by society and state institutions and the current pathological recognition—misrecognition or ideological recognition—relations should be at the epicenter of our studies of just integration because what needs to be challenged is the relations of recognition and institutions of integration to achieve new, broader, more inclusive, and more emancipatory norms of integration. In last sections of Chapter 2, through an in depth analysis of Honneth’s recognition theory, I will explain the general tenets of these arguments. In Chapter 3, I will thoroughly recount the recognition theory’s several core assumptions on the relationship between individuals and society and the recognition order of modern capitalistic societies. In Part 2, I will employ these assumptions to analyze and criticize the socio-economic barriers that Canadian immigrants are suffering from and the current integrative institutions in Canada.

4. Thus, just integration is a transformative process which alters not only the current recognition relations between groups and forms of self-relation but also the second order interpretations of normative standards of democratic inclusiveness. This standard as the prerequisite of the legitimacy of a political order and individual autonomy introduces how essential it is for
immigrants to have equal rights to participate in public negotiations on an equal footing. What do these rights entail? I open Chapter 2 with a historical overview of political theoretical debates on minority rights with a focus on multicultural theory. Multicultural theories are mostly concerned with the scope and degree of special group rights in order to offer fair terms of inclusion to the minority groups in society. In Chapter 2, I specifically choose to discuss Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism for two reasons. Kymlicka is an important figure in Canadian politics, who supports provision of multicultural rights not only to national minorities but also to immigrant groups. He presents multiculturalism as an issue of “citizenization” and sets out to compel the myth of multiculturalism as the celebration of static cultural differences. In line with Tully and Honneth, Kymlicka argues that multicultural recognition is a transformative process. Second, Kymlicka’s theory is a good representative of how even transformative multicultural rights can pose a threat to the socio-economic integration of immigrants. To illustrate, Kymlicka takes policies, such as affirmative action policies for the disadvantaged immigrant groups, allowing dual citizenship, funding of ethnic group organization to support their cultural activities, as multicultural endeavors that serve to change the current norms of integration so that immigrants are included as free and equal members. Although I agree that such programs are helpful to increase immigrant inclusion, I argue that multicultural policies are usually remedies for the barriers to inclusion emanating from misrecognition not ideological recognition and manifest themselves in the form of state led redistribution of wealth.

In Chapters 2 and 4, I will employ Kymlicka’s analysis of Canadian multicultural policies and argue that the multicultural focus on state-funded distribution to correct or eliminate discriminatory practices can underemphasize immigrants’ demand for esteem in the sphere of social division of labor. In Chapters 2 and 5, through an examination of relations of work and the
sphere of esteem, I will argue that the normative criteria of integration is also concerned with the nature of relationship between non-state corporations and individuals in a co-operating community.

5. Therefore, individualization together with inclusion should constitute the value horizon with which we can analyze and criticize the existing norms of integration. In line with Dewey, Honneth’s sphere of esteem expands the confines of the norms of just integration to the pre-political conditions of symmetrical and authentic social co-operation between free and equal members of society. While legal inclusion assigns reciprocal obligation of equal treatment, individualization demands special consideration to individual qualifications and skills for the accomplishment of societal goals.

As immigrants’ immediate problems are generally identified in terms of employment, I believe that an analysis of current socio-economic norms that regulate the economic opportunities of the immigrants is essential for the configuration of the transformative direction that non-state institutions would take for more inclusive integration of immigrants. My main aim is not to suggest a new form of economic order but to reorient our view on economic obstacles as recognition problems that immigrants are suffering from. Even if it looks like immigrants are at the mercy of invisible workings of free market, I would like to argue that these economic conditions can also be based on societally interpreted norms of achievement. In addition to redistribution and recognition of cultural identities, we need to understand how recognition of esteem is essential for immigrant integration. I argue that even everyone in modern capitalistic societies suffer more or less from such economic problems, economic obstacles to immigrants are specific to the immigrant population which can be identified neither as a definitive group nor class. The last section of Chapter 3 is dedicated to make these differences apparent. Moreover, I
find Honneth’s understanding of work especially helpful because it is founded on a theory of human socialization rather than a theory of political economy. Even though, there are a variety of political theories which refers the social role of work and individual self-relation to it (Muirhead 2004, and Weeks 2011), the uniqueness of Honneth's emphasis on the value of work comes from the fact that he speaks to a tradition that focuses on identity and group politics in a cultural setting. I will try to make these claims more apparent in Chapter 5. I will also dwell into the issue of ethnic groups as co-operative members of the host society to further investigate the relationship between ethnic enclaves and immigrant self-realization in Chapter 6. This chapter will also reconsider the shortcomings of Honneth’s tripartite recognition theory.

7. To summarize, I approach the ideal of just integration not as for the sake of security or the preservation of liberal values which may be achieved through implementation of specific immigration policies, but as a concrete and transformative process through which collective individuals change societal values as equal members of society in the face of misrecognition or ideological recognition. Specifically, I take integration neither as assimilation nor as adaptation but as a process of recognition whereby immigrants’ self-formation results in self-respect and self-esteem.

7. Conclusion

In this chapter, first, I have introduced immigration as a global trend, which increases the ethnic, racial and religious diversity in the immigrant-receiving countries. In the host countries, cultural and ethnic diversity that immigrants bring is usually perceived as a threat to national security and social cohesion. The term “integration” is generally used to refer to the ideal commonality within diversity in the face of these perceived threats.
After establishing the contradictory usages of the term “integration” within the multiculturalism and assimilation axis, I have presented an historical account of integrationist policies in Western countries. I claim that this dominant perspective to the issues of immigrant integration does not provide us with a robust analytical framework for addressing the issues of justice in the study of immigrant integration. Proponents of the dominant position argue that the integration of immigrants is a necessity for social cohesion, stability, and security of the host country. I contend, however, that this perspective is based on false presuppositions about these abstract terms. This generates fictitious problems such as scapegoating immigrants as stealing jobs of citizens of the host country and diverts our gaze from the structural problems of inequality, discrimination, and political exclusion of immigrants.

As opposed to the dominant approach, I have proposed to understand the ideal of integration as a concrete process, through which individuals change societal values as equal members of society. In this sense, the problem of the social integration of immigrants is strongly related to the feelings of misrecognition, and “the success of the normative integration of societies depends on their potential to create stable structures of social recognition” (Honneth 2002, 271).

Endnotes:
1 To illustrate, Joppke and Morawska (2003) argue that the popularity of multiculturalism is exaggerated in its public and academic reception. They claim that even countries like France, which is accused of having assimilationist post-immigration policies, have de facto multiculturalism on a local level invented out of “the sheer need to find ethnic interlocutors and sounding boards for their policies”(7). If one disregards the misleading national model talk, one can “rediscover rather thin and uniform ‘integration’ requisites of liberal states [acquisition of official language and respect for the liberal constitution] plus a plethora of context-specific ad hoc policies, utterly devoid of an underlying philosophy of integration” (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 8). Thus, as soon as an immigrant sets foot in the host country, she has already integrated into the main institutions of the society. Therefore, there is a turn away from multiculturalism toward assimilation. Moreover, Joppke and Morawska (2003) claim that the world leader of multiculturalism, Canada, spends so much less money on distinctively multicultural policies that it is nearly impossible to differentiate it from other countries.
“It may be unrealistic to expect a major social impact for such a small program [multiculturalism], the annual budget for which has been on the order of $21 million per year, or about 0.01% of total government expenditures” (Canada, Department of Canadian Heritages 2005, p. 91 cited by Reitz 2009, 14). Also, with the decline of the popularity of multicultural policies, the funding of multicultural programs is being eroded slowly. “Figures from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration suggest at least $5 million a year hasn't been disbursed since 2007, and the department's marquee funding program has seen nearly 40 per cent of available funds go unused” (CBCnews, 2013).

2 Another example comes from recent policy changes in Britain. According to Chun et al. (2007), “immigration is increasingly interpreted as a security problem and the practice of prejudice and suspicion in relation to new immigrants has been exacerbated by new policies and practices. For example, the immigration approach expressed in the British government’s White Paper, Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity (Home Office, 2002), reinforces various exclusionary practices and policies towards certain groups of new immigrants and refugees. More recent legislature, including the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 and the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill introduced in June 2005 (and passed as an Act on March 2006), implements further controls on immigrants via an integrated pre-entry and in-country security ‘E-borders’ and Border Management Programme” (41).
Chapter Two: Theories of Justice, Minority Rights, and Recognition Theory

1. Introduction

Immigrant integration has been an ongoing issue for advanced capitalistic societies in Western Europe and North America. The basic concern is how dangerous a threat to national security and social cohesion is the increased level of cultural, religious, and ethnic plurality that immigrants bring. After the 9/11 attacks and the 2005 London metro bombings, it appeared that these concerns were not unwarranted, and immigrant-receiving countries have taken the issue of immigrant integration as one of their top priorities. Enormous time, energy, and money have been dedicated to create policies to ease the integration of immigrants so that they, while remaining economically active, will not pose a challenge to the unity and security of their host society.

In the first chapter of my dissertation, I argue that social and political integration of immigrants into their host country is taken as a “collective goal” for policy makers and academics. However, there is no common agreement on how to accomplish the integration of immigrants. The academics and policy makers use the term “integration” in various different and sometimes opposing ways. I believe that instead of questioning the capacity for individual autonomy of immigrants that come from illiberal and traditional societies, we need to ask whether the ethical and symbolic order of the host society provides the conditions for immigrants to exercise their autonomy. If by immigrant integration we mean immigrants becoming full members of their host society, we need to deconstruct historical practices that create barriers to the full integration of immigrants into the social, economic, and political spheres of the host country. The deconstruction of these barriers can only be done with reference to normative
principles of justice acquired either historically or procedurally. Thus, the problem of immigrant integration should be approached as a democratic justice problem. In the first chapter, I advocated an understanding of integration from the perspective of Honneth’s recognition theory. In this chapter, I will focus on the political theories offering normative principles of justice with regard to minority rights and will try to justify recognition theory as my choice of analysis of immigrant integration.

I believe that the best way to accomplish this objective is to start with the existing debate around immigration and justice within political theory literature. When it comes to the question of the integration of immigrants, the social and political theory literature is very rich, diverse, and fragmented. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this issue has generally been approached from an assimilation and multiculturalism axis, with a focus mainly on the legal rights of minorities within a liberal framework. In this chapter, I will trace back the history of debates about minority rights in order to position my dissertation topic within the political theory literature.

First, I will introduce the debate about minority rights within liberal political theory to understand the normative foundations of multiculturalism both as a social and political theory. In this context, the liberal justifications of multicultural theory will be explained with regard to Kymlicka’s *Multicultural Citizenship*. I will argue that even though the focus on group rights has helped to elevate certain injustices suffered by immigrants on an institutional level, it has also caused these theorists to overlook the socio-economic pathologies that immigrants face in their working life and affairs with their Canadian counterparts and cultural groups. By keeping the problem within the confines of public sphere and with reference to the democratic demands of
rigidly identified immigrant groups, the task of realizing justice within the multiculturalist framework is basically left to the state.

Next, I will propose a relational and pluralistic understanding of individual autonomy with reference to recognition theories. My main focus will be on Honneth’s recognition theoretical model, which I believe is the most analytically suitable one to analyze the socio-economic barriers to immigrant integration. I will give a brief outline of his theory to show how approaching the issue of immigrant integration from a recognition theoretical perspective can unravel in a more comprehensive manner the economic and social pathologies that create barriers to immigrant integration. I will put special emphasis on the importance of the recognition of esteem of immigrants within the capitalistic structure.

2. Liberal Justification of Minority Rights

According to Kymlicka, the history of debates on minority rights can be categorized into three consecutive phases. The first debate about minority rights occurred before 1989—the collapse of Soviet Union—and was about picking a side between two opposing approaches to the understanding of individual autonomy. On the one hand, the classical liberal approach opposes culturally particularistic policies because it supposes that multicultural policies will override the neutrality and impartiality of political institutions. Liberals prioritize individual basic rights over particular definitions of the good. In this sense, liberalism constructs its understanding of freedom and equality on the basis of the unencumbered and atomistic individual. On the other hand, the communitarians believe that as individuals we are completely attached to our community and culture and have separate obligations to our community. To illustrate, Sandel argues that we have constitutive attachments to our culture and community that we cannot get rid of without deconstructing our identity (Sandel 1984, 90).
In the first debate, cherishing minority rights was seen as possible only through a communitarian defense of the value of community. However, this apparent duality between communitarian understanding of the “embedded individual” and the liberal principle of neutrality for the actualization of negative freedom of individuals was questioned within liberal circles with the emergence of the national minority question after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, the second debate was focused on the possibility of minority rights within a liberal framework. In this debate, political theorists approached the issue from the liberal point of view and tried to answer the question of “what is the possible scope of minority rights within liberal theory?” (Kymlicka 2007, 30). The foundation of this debate was grounded on the empirical reality that minorities in Western liberal countries demand “at least some forms of public recognition and support for their language, practices, and identities”, and these countries have already been accommodating specific minority rights within a liberal framework (Kymlicka 2007, 30). In the second debate, in which Kymlicka was an influential contributor, liberal political theorists tried to lay out normative reasons about why autonomous individuals who embrace liberal values may need special minority rights. Thus, the explanation of the importance of cultural membership came to the forefront of the literature.

In *Multicultural Citizenship*, Kymlicka proposes a liberal justification for legal recognition of cultural group rights by putting emphasis on the cultural conditions of individual autonomy. Kymlicka argues that culture is a defining feature of individual identity. In order for individuals to develop autonomous personalities, they need to grow up in a culture where they can freely find symbolic expressions for their decisions and opinions. Hence, the liberal justification of the state’s support for the development and the protection of cultural groups has
its foundation in the redefinition of negative freedom based on the identification of the self with regard to culture.

Kymlicka (1995) sets out to show that “many forms of group differentiated citizenship are consistent with liberal principles of freedom and equality” (34). The point is to differentiate the forms of minority rights so that the ones which do not undermine individual autonomy can be defended from a liberal perspective. In order to do that, Kymlicka distinguishes internal restriction and external protection claims. It is also important to keep in mind that he is against the differentiation between individual and collective rights since the category of collective rights can include rights of associations and trade unions. Instead of collective rights, Kymlicka uses the term group differentiated rights.

According to Kymlicka (1995), “liberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices” (37). In this context, Kymlicka makes another distinction and says that societal cultures which involve not only shared memories or narratives but also common practices and institutions should be protected for their survival.

Moreover, Habermas (1998) claims that liberal states are not blind to cultural differences and these differences can be incorporated into the state through communicative action. For this, one needs to “recognize that the bearers of individual rights [have been ascribed] an identity that is conceived intersubjectively…A correctly understood theory of rights requires a politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the life context in which his or her identity is formed” (Habermas, 1998, 208). Nevertheless, Habermas prioritizes personal
autonomy and rejects collective rights for the reproduction of specific cultures. He believes that each and every individual should have a right to say yes or no to her group’s value judgments.

The critics of minority rights within the liberal framework have opposed this line of argument from two major fronts. On the one hand, some claim that it is better to keep neutrality in liberal political institutions because of the existence of essentially opposing cultural values. For example, Brian Barry suggests that the importance given to the public affirmation of individual membership in cultural groups by cultural liberalists is logically unattainable especially when many cultures disagree in their substantive claims (Moore 2003, 159). On the other hand, some claim that individual membership in cultural groups is a completely private matter. Michael Walzer (1994) claims that there is a strict division between the liberal state and ethnicity just like the separation between religion and politics (100-110). Accordingly, what matters for the liberal state is its citizens’ alliance to the civic values of the constitution, not their private feelings of belonging to specific ethnic communities.

In general, critics of multiculturalism argue that the policies that protect cultural groups promote radical cultural relativism, which undermines the liberal values of free speech and equality of opportunity (Barry 2002; Huntington 2004). They claim that too much tolerance for cultural differences is bad for social cohesion because it creates and/or protects rigid ethnocultural groups, which may in turn breed radicalization and marginalization of ethnic groups. Thus, multiculturalism defeats its purpose, which is integration, and should be either abandoned or limited in scope to a considerable extent.

Although the liberal justification for the cultural rights of minority groups has been under attack by different fronts within liberal theory, theories of multiculturalism did translate into a legitimate explanation of the immigration and minority policies implemented by many Western
Multicultural theory suggests that “it is better to recognize and value [cultural] diversity, and not seek to downplay diversity, or to cast all groups within one single cultural mould” (Reitz et al. 2009, 1). To illustrate, Parekh (2000) in *Rethinking Multiculturalism* introduces multiculturalism as an ideal considering the inevitability of the cultural embeddedness of human beings and cultural diversity within the nation state and the desirability of inter-cultural dialogue for the disagreements that may emanate from this empirical reality.

Thus, multiculturalism demands the accommodation of cultural differences and cultural groups. However, multicultural social theory not only is concerned with liberal justifications of group rights for cultural minorities, but also relies on a “particular understanding of the basic social dynamics of inter-ethnic relations” (Reitz et al. 2009, 1). In this sense, multicultural theory demands cultural justice for ethnic minorities within a country. And, for Kymlicka, the question surrounding the injustices to minorities caused by a dominant majoritarian culture and identity constitutes the third debate around minority rights.

Kymlicka contends that multicultural theory can reveal the injustices committed against minorities within the liberal state. In line with my discussion in Chapter 1, Kymlicka points out an inherent problem within the classical understanding of the liberal state and universal citizenship (Kymlicka 2007, 36). The liberal state’s engagement with “the nation-building” practice reveals not only the paradoxical nature of universal assumptions about equal citizenship, but also the injustices that have been done to the groups that do not belong to the majority’s national identity in a community.

The question of whether multiculturalism’s understanding of group relations and its demand for respecting cultural diversity can provide a sufficient ground for the elimination of the cultural injustices that minorities suffer constitutes the ongoing debate about minority rights in
the identity politics literature. The attention given to the proponents of cultural injustice has alarmed many political theorists, prominently feminists and post-structuralists, who interpreted this shift as a pernicious diversion from the inequalities emanating from economic structures, race, and gender. While some (Okin 1999; Phillips 2007) argue that the framework of the protection of minority cultures can undermine the status of women in closed ethno-cultural groups, others (Young 1990, 1997; Fraser 2003) claim that cultural politics is too far removed from the economic realm to explain struggles over equality and redistribution in the face of structural injustices. Next, I will analyze Kymlicka’s approach to the issue of integration of immigrants to understand the limit and the scope of multicultural theory from a justice perspective.

2.1. Multiculturalism and the integration of immigrants. There are two main reasons why I chose to focus on Kymlicka as a representative of multicultural theory for the issue of integration of immigrants. First, as discussed in Chapter 1, multicultural theory and discourse appear to be significantly different in their approach to ethnic diversity. As one of the most influential scholars of liberal minority rights, Kymlicka’s understanding of multiculturalism goes beyond multicultural celebration of rigid cultural practices. Kymlicka contends that multiculturalism refers to a transformative process. Even though his approach to just integration carries family resemblances to my account, his main emphasis on minimal demand for recognition from immigrants within liberal state, I believe, falls short on expanding the discussion of integration beyond state funded multicultural policies. Second, Kymlicka links multicultural theory to the current multicultural policies to defend it against its critics. Thus, his theory provides a fertile ground for a further discussion of current institutional arrangements of immigrant integration in Canada.
To begin with, in *Multicultural Citizenship*, Kymlicka focuses on two broad patterns of cultural diversity, namely national minorities and ethnic groups. National minorities are culturally diverse groups that arise from the “incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially cultures into a larger state” (Kymlicka 1995, 10). In this sense, national minorities have their own societal culture that “provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private sphere” (76). The national minorities generally demand self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies (10). Because national minority groups have their own societal culture preexisting with the dominant political culture, they have the right to demand the preservation of their distinctiveness through political institutions.

Unlike national minorities, ethnic groups arise from individual and familial immigration. Kymlicka argues that immigrants do not have institutionally complete societal cultures in the sense that they do not have a distinct societal culture within the settled community. In this sense, even though immigrants cannot recreate their own societal culture, they should be able to “contribute new options and perspectives to a lager Anglophone culture, making it richer and more diverse” (Kymlicka 1995, 95-96). Thus, Kymlicka claims that immigrants can change the political institutions within the societal culture but cannot demand their own societal culture within the general society.

In addition to identifying immigrants as not having distinct societal cultures, Kymlicka makes two crucial assumptions about the condition of immigrants in their host society. First, he claims that at least by the third generation, immigrant families are integrated into the societal culture of the state either by desire or necessity (Kymlicka 1995, 76-78). He suggests four
criteria for the integration of immigrants into Canadian society: “adopting a Canadian identity, participating in Canadian institutions, learning an official language, and having inter-ethnic friendships” (Reitz et al. 2009, 14). Hence, if an immigrant feels socially and politically invested in Canadian society, it means she is an integrated immigrant.

Moreover, Kymlicka (2007) supports policies that would ease the integration of immigrants to the host country with regard to the fairness principle. He argues that state policies that pressure immigrants to integrate should be fair in the sense that political institutions should provide the same amount of respect and recognition to the immigrant groups as they do for the national majority (40). In order to provide fair conditions for the integration of immigrants, Kymlicka argues, the liberal state should consider its policies on a contextual basis.

For Kymlicka, if the state provides fair and sufficient conditions for immigrants to meet the above-mentioned criteria, then the integration of immigrants can be accomplished. However, when we look at these criteria in depth, we notice that the fulfillment of some is impossible if we only focus on granting immigrants multicultural rights. For example, friendship and identities are not goods to be distributed by the state in a fair manner. I do not believe that either equality or fairness can be used as a normative principle to encourage nationals to be friends with immigrants.

Additionally, the political participation of immigrants cannot be guaranteed by their naturalization. To illustrate, although immigrant naturalization rates in Canada are relatively higher than those in the United States, “the voting rates for visible minorities are below expectation based on that citizenship” (Reitz et al. 2009, 23). Furthermore, “it is well known that homeland-centered politics has always been a major component of Canadian participation,
occurring mostly in the context of pressure aimed at influencing political developments in the homeland” (Black 2011, 1172)3.

These empirical facts reveal the gap between the reality of political activity and the expectations of guaranteeing immigrants equality in the legal sphere. In order to understand the reasons behind the low political participation of immigrants, we need to question whether there are pre-conditions for the political integration of immigrants other than having equal political rights. Unfortunately, the state-centric approach to justice does not allow us to investigate societal and familial dynamics that may affect the individual autonomy. In Chapter 4, I will discuss the effects of multiculturalists’ focus on state funded programs for the integration of immigrants in detail. Through an analysis of Honneth’s theory of recognition, I will claim that in order to accomplish mutual recognition, human beings also need recognition of their esteem. Redistribution of goods through state procedures is not a sufficient condition for the integration of immigrants.

Kymlicka’s second assumption about the condition of immigrants in their host society is that immigrant groups generally want to integrate with the major culture in order to be accepted as full members. Young criticizes Kymlicka’s distinction between ethnic and national groups. She claims that most ethnic minorities “demand inclusion in economic and political life at the same time that they reject the expectation that they should become socially and culturally integrated” (Young 1997, 52).

Thus, Kymlicka disregards the fact that ethnic minorities, including immigrant groups, may want to be excluded from the national culture. However, Kymlicka argues that as far as the immigrants are concerned, liberal society is right “to compel respect” for liberal principles: “I do not think it is wrong for liberal states to insist that immigration entails accepting the legitimacy
of state enforcement of liberal principles, so long as immigrants know this in advance, and nonetheless voluntarily choose to come” (Kymlicka, 1995, 170).

Carens agrees with Kymlicka that democracy and pluralism are pre-conditions to maintaining “a morally legitimate political order” in most of the immigrant receiving countries. “To repudiate these values, at least with respect to the public culture, is to advocate injustice… Hence it would not be possible for immigrants to reject pluralism and democracy without rejecting the very principles they need to employ in order to claim moral standing in the first place” (Carens 2000, 120).

Both Kymlicka and Carens take respect for liberal values as a legitimate expectation of the host society from its immigrants. First, because the very activity of becoming an immigrant in a liberal society shows consent, and second, because respecting liberal values is the only way to claim membership in a liberal community. These arguments may sound reasonable if these immigrant-receiving societies perfectly embrace and respect liberal values as they claim. The treatment of a particular liberal ethical order as universally valid when it comes to the question of inclusion of immigrant groups is a common practice in political theory literature.

There are two basic reasons why I am concerned about this liberal/illiberal dichotomy in the discussion of immigrant integration. First of all, this dichotomy puts immigrants in a position in which they have to prove that they are indeed liberals. Because of the tendency to conflate difference with illiberalism, immigrants have to “put their identities on display, to demonstrate their ‘civilized behaviors’” (Kernerman 2005, 11).

Second, the representation of liberal values in this perfectionist manner gives the illusion that every national regardless of her cultural, religious, and ethnic background is equal and free within the public communicative space as long as she respects the individual autonomy of others.
According to this view, if an immigrant fails to integrate, it does not mean that the state or the host society has failed to recognize the immigrant in her difference, but that she has failed to respect the liberal values of her host country. This kind of understanding puts the burden on immigrants to prove that they are liberal according to the dominant interpretation of it by the host society. However, even if immigrants manage to be recognized by the host society as liberals, this can do nothing but perpetuate the ideological domination and political exclusion of immigrants rather than integrating them.

In this sense, the re-evaluation of liberal norms is essential for the moral progress of ethical orders in the face of cultural pluralism. I argue that Honneth and Tully’s understandings of the term “integration” do not dichotomize the cultures into opposite categories of liberal and illiberal. Recognition theory in particular advocates for a criticism of the interpretation of normative values such as equality, freedom, and fairness. Under the following heading, I will discuss this idea further.

To summarize, Kymlicka prioritizes the social integration of immigrants into their host country. Immigration is perceived as a free individual choice and this free choice binds immigrants in a way that does not bind national minorities within the host country. By integration, he means the adoption of liberal values and the acquisition of an official language by the immigrant population. In order for this integration process to be fair, Kymlicka suggests that political institutions act in a culturally conscious way in relation to the differences and necessities of immigrant groups. I agree with Kymlicka’s effort to adjust liberal political institutions for the recognition of the diverse identities of immigrants. The equal recognition of immigrant identities in the legal sphere will surely provide a more just environment, which will ease the process of immigrant self-realization.
However, the multicultural focus given to the transformation of political institutions for the recognition of immigrant identities has a tendency to disregard the socio-economic barriers for the integration of immigrants and to empower states and groups for the identification of immigrants. Honneth argues that “in today’s politics of social movements and multiculturalism, a purely universalist moral order is not enough. It is not enough in terms of justice and it is no longer an adequate basis for solidarity. What is needed is a principle of solidarity based on recognition as much as on redistribution (respect, dignity). Recognition, too, must be incorporated into the changing moral order of society” (Lash and Featherstone 2011, 6).

Hence, I argue that a reciprocal understanding of recognition should be at the center of creating a space for individual agents to develop a positive relation to their self-understanding. Next, I will introduce and examine the dialectical understanding of recognition as a solution to the problems that the above-mentioned theories face. First, I will proceed with an introduction of the similarities and differences between Hegel’s, Taylor’s, and Honneth’s utilization of the concept of recognition.

3. The Theory of Recognition

In the theory of recognition literature, the concept of recognition has been taken as the foundation for normative claims about equality, freedom, and the concept of a good life. Hegel’s attempt to reconcile particularities of culture and universal laws of reason under the concept of mutual recognition has attracted social and political theorists who study the relationship between individual freedom and cultural belonging. Thus, Hegel’s conceptualization of the term has been utilized and reinterpreted by the recognition theorists who want to study cultural justice.

To begin with, for Hegel, the separation of subjective particularities and universal ideals is one of the major defects of the Kantian concept of freedom⁴. He claims that Kant’s ethics
“divides man against himself, locks reason into eternal conflict with desire and denies the natural side of man any right to satisfaction” (Singer 1983, 33). In this sense, Hegel asserts that freedom is the reconciliation between objective and subjective will through mutual recognition.

The main argument is that we can only know ourselves through other people in a contextually bounded environment. Our identity depends on our culture, traditions, reason, and mutual recognition of one another’s self-consciousness. Therefore, “freedom is neither a faculty given by nature, nor a capacity of the self, but a structure of interaction between individuals wherein the self-determination of each is constitutively related to that of others through mutual recognition” (Ritter 1982, 5).

Hegel argues that the state is the highest order for the institutionalization of freedom because it grants certain rights and duties to its citizens. Rights and duties provide a rational way of life to the citizens who willingly acknowledge them. In this sense, institutionalization means construction and protection of the condition in which an agent is able to reconcile her subjective will to any universally willed action as really being a result of her own will. Accordingly, the institutionalization of freedom through the mutual recognition of rights and duties assigned by the state means the actualization of freedom.

This Hegelian analysis has become an important starting point for a communitarian critique of the liberal understanding of the ideal self, which is free from the bonds of culture and traditions. To illustrate, Taylor does not only emphasize how our identities are constructed by our culture, but also how recognition of our identity by other people has intrinsic value for our dignity as human beings. Moreover, Honneth also utilizes the bidirectional character of the Hegelian concept of mutual recognition for his study of political struggles. Even though Taylor and Honneth agree with Hegel on the dialectical meaning of the notion of recognition, they have
contested and reinterpreted the Hegelian conclusion about the actualization of mutual recognition through state institutions.

3.1. Taylor: the politics of recognition. In 1992, Charles Taylor published an influential article on normative justifications of minority group rights based on a theory of recognition. Taylor’s proposition was that the recognition of identities is a necessary condition for our understanding of the struggles because most political struggles can be understood as struggles for recognition of the particular identities of cultural groups.

According to Taylor, the politics of recognition has two different meanings. On the one hand, it includes a politics of universalism, which is based on the equal dignity of all individuals. On the other hand, it emphasizes a politics of difference, which is based on the universal necessity of individuals to be recognized for their unique identities (Taylor 1992, 38). In this respect, “the demand for recognition animated by the ideal of human dignity points in at least two dimensions, both to the protection of basic rights of individuals as human beings and to the acknowledgement of the particular needs of individuals as members of specific cultural groups” (Taylor 1992, 8).

Taylor argues that “our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition by the others, and so a person or a group can suffer a deep damage, if the society or the people around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning picture of themselves” (Taylor 1992, 25-26). In this sense, due recognition is a vital human need. “We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things that our significant others want to see in us” (33). Taylor advocates for the equal right to recognition. For him, political institutions and society in general should give recognition to identities that are not universally shared (39).
As a result, for Taylor, cultural politics is about the recognition of the distinctness of each cultural group. Cultural injustice is committed against these groups when societal and political institutions fail to perceive and respect people for who they already are. The concept of recognition is understood from a perspective in which the already existing authentic identities of groups are re-cognized. Even though Taylor approaches the concept of recognition from a dialectical point of view in which an individual identity is constructed through mutual recognition, his application of this idea to multicultural policies turns out to be a highly familiar understanding of individual identity, which is defined in terms of rigid cultural belonging.

Most critics of Taylor’s theory of recognition have an issue with his strong emphasis on the distinctness of group identities (Phillips 2004, 20). To illustrate, Markell (2003) argues that “Taylor’s critique of the liberal model of agency as sheer autonomy rightly charged that model with aspiring to an attractive but impossible sort of sovereignty, yet Taylor’s own view of agency as the expression of one’s own authentic identity merely reproduces the aspiration to sovereignty not in choice but in the knowledge of one’s position in a larger totality” (59). Thus, Taylor’s conceptualization of recognition for the justification of multicultural policies cannot solve the problem of identification of immigrants in terms of rigid cultural groups. This approach gives extraordinary power to the groups and the state, which are the agents of recognition. Accordingly, “multiculturalism then appears not as a cultural liberator but as a cultural straitjacket, forcing those described as members of a minority cultural group into a regime of authenticity, denying them the chance to cross cultural borders, borrow cultural influences, define and redefine themselves” (Phillips 2004, 15).

These fundamental criticisms of Taylor, I believe, can be answered by Honneth’s critical theory of recognition. Even though Taylor and Honneth agree on the definition of mutual
recognition as the basic human need, the main motivations at the heart of their model are different (Deranty 2009, 432). To illustrate, while Taylor is concerned about the embeddedness of the individual in a specific cultural tradition, Honneth puts emphasis on the essential vulnerability of the subject as a result of intersubjective dependence (Deranty 2009, 384-392). Thus, unlike communitarians, recognition theory does not take group or individual identities immune to criticism; none are “self-authenticating sources of valid claims” (Zurn et al. 2010, 7).

In this sense, Honneth approaches struggles for recognition from an individualistic point of view. This approach allows him to understand recognition from a self-formation perspective. This perspective tries to understand the necessary process for the individual to develop a healthy relation to the self. Then, the concept of mutual recognition is understood not as a reaffirmation of already existing identities, but as the attribution of necessary and sufficient conditions for personal autonomy. Thus, for Honneth, “recognition is no longer a good that is due to an already existing instance with normatively justified claims, it is the condition of normative life itself. Integrity through recognition is not a good at all, but the condition for any conception of good life” (Deranty 2009, 435).

Next, I will introduce Honneth’s understanding of recognition based on a “response” model. Then, I will explain Honneth reconstruction of the Hegelian understanding of recognition and ethical order and how his views on recognition are helpful to broaden our understanding of the social integration of immigrants. Finally, I will explain Honneth’s three empirical axes of self-formation with a special emphasis on the sphere of esteem.

4. Honneth’s Recognition-based Critical Theory: An Overview

4.1. Honneth’s understanding of recognition. As discussed above, mutual recognition has been understood as a prerequisite for healthy self-formation and individual autonomy. The
term “recognition” introduces these processes as intersubjective and historical. But what is it exactly that we recognize? Does the act of recognition result in a process where the other subject acquires a new and positive attribution? Or does it result in a new perception of an attribute that a person had already independently possessed?

In his article titled *The Potential and the Actual: Mead, Honneth and the “I”*, Markell (2007) questions Honneth’s understanding of recognition and offers the term “acknowledgment of differences” instead. Markell claims that injustice is the failure to acknowledge—“to see and respond to the conditions of one’s own action—rather than a failure to recognize the qualities of others” (Markell 2007, 132). Markell argues that recognition as a term has two meanings, namely the potential (recognition understood as a creative act) and the actual (recognition as a response to something pre-existing), that have been used interchangeably.

Markell argues that the failure to separate these two meanings causes inaccurate assumptions about the relationship between an individual’s creative self-formation and her pre-existing membership in certain groups that shape her identity. “Efforts to secure recognition of the supposedly pre-existing identity of some group will inevitably turn out to have been consequential interventions into the ongoing recognitive activity through which identities are made and transformed” (Markell 2000, 500).

In response to Markell, Honneth (2007) defends a response model when it comes to the generic use of the concept of recognition. Even though I agree with Markell’s criticism of the usage of the term recognition to label ethic groups from a dominant perspective, I think his criticisms are not valid for Honneth’s response model of recognition. Honneth sees recognition as a process whereby existing potentialities turn into actualities for the self-formation of the individual. In this sense, “the trouble is that such a vision of recognition as recognition of
identity is quite far from Honneth’s own model. In Honneth, recognition is not recognition of an already formed identity, but rather a dynamic condition of identity” (Deranty 2009, 431).

To summarize, Honneth differentiates the possible ends of recognition into two categories namely the “attribution” and “response” model. Mutual recognition can either cause the other subject to acquire a new, positive property or “an already-present property of a person is, as a secondary matter, merely strengthened or publicly manifested. In the affected subject with something she had not had before; in the second case, by contrast, it would be a matter of a certain kind of perception of an already independently existing status” (Honneth 2007, 508).

Honneth advocates for the “response” model to put emphasis on the constitutive role of recognition in the healthy self-formation of the subject. Honneth rejects the “attribution” model because we cannot reasonably find any evaluative standards for the recognition of a completely new potential in the other subject. While the “response” model where already-present property of a person is reinterpreted and acknowledged by public encompasses a particular and culturally specific value horizon. The recognition process in “response” model involves negotiating and reinterpreting the value or the worth of the persons’ potentials. Thus, only with the “response” model, we can understand the relations of recognition as linked to revisable value or worth of other persons (Honneth 2007, 508).

There are two important implications of this kind of understanding of recognition. First, recognition owes its legitimacy to the normative quality of the process. This process should be seen as resulting not in emergence of new properties of the subject but in a positive public manifestation of the properties that the subject already possesses. Second, the constitutive character of recognition relations appears historical and depends on society’s cultural understanding. In modern capitalistic societies, “individuality and social inclusion jointly
indicate progress in social acts of recognition” (Honneth 2007, 511). Next, I will introduce how Honneth challenges the understanding of common good of society and human nature from a self-preservation perspective by employing Hegel’s Jenna writings.

4.2. Honneth’s reconstruction of Hegel’s notion of recognition. In the Struggles for Recognition, Honneth (1996) criticizes the turn that early political philosophy took with Machiavelli and Hobbes.7 Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’ socio-ontological premise about self-preservation as a basic human need stages the state as the sole agent to protect society from civil conflict and instability (Honneth 1996, 10). Honneth claims that practical concern about stability is caused by the major theoretical dependence on the universal identification of human nature in terms of self-preservation. The immanent consequence of this kind of understanding of human nature is the identification of individuals as atomistic, self-interested, and competitive beings. Such a perception not only increases the role of the state in the lives of the individuals as the sole protector of individual rights from societies’ pressure to conform, but also makes it impossible to theorize the common good of the society as other than societal stability.

Moreover, this perception has irreversible effects on our understanding of equality and freedom. If a social political theory has its foundation in such an understanding of human nature, its definition of freedom would also be limited by negative freedom from societal and political interference.8 Honneth must reject this kind of understanding of negative freedom and define a type of positive freedom to be able to explain psychological feelings of injustices that are neither visible nor comprehensible in the legal institutional sphere, especially under liberal states, which provide protection of extensive individual rights.

He takes the empirical emancipatory motivation of misrecognized groups as the basis for his justice, equality, and freedom claims. This move constitutes a basic departure from the early
Frankfurt school. Honneth believes that the proletariat “suffer[ing] from an exclusive focus on material production” has disappeared as an emancipatory force from history (Honneth 1996, xi.). Today, “emancipation cannot be attributed to a group that only shares socio-economic circumstances” (Honneth 2007, 69). Accordingly, the feelings of disrespect for individual identity have been laid out as an alternative to injustices emanating from material forces. In this sense, Honneth’s theory represents a transformation from “rationality-centered social critique” to “moral and identity formation theory”. In order to set up normative claims for identity formation, Honneth reconstructs Hegel’s Jenna writings (Honneth 1996, 1).

Honneth points out the fact that Hegel in his Jenna writings rejects the basic suppositions of early political philosophy about self-preservation and social stability. Instead of defining human nature in terms of self-preservation, Hegel defines human nature or basic human need in terms of self-realization through mutual recognition. “Recognition means an effortless mutual acknowledgement of certain aspects of other’s personality connected to the prevailing mode of social interaction” (Honneth 2010, 50). According to Hegel, individual self-consciousness can only know itself through another’s self-consciousness. In this sense, every subject seeks intersubjective acknowledgment of its self-understanding. Every subject needs “undistorted self-relation in which subjective and objective affirmations are brought into coincidence” (Yar 2003, 116).

Moreover, “we can see that the process of intersubjective agreement entailed in recognition is generative of mediating structures, shared cultural and institutional forms which reconcile subjects in common normative and practical orientations of a sittlichkind. As such, the theory of recognition offers an invaluable resource for rethinking the vexed problem of ‘community’, namely the challenge of establishing substantive forms of solidarity in the context
of late-modern, highly differentiated and pluralistic societies” (Yar 2001, 72-73). Honneth claims that from anthropological point of view, as individuals depend on society’s recognition for their self-formation, the societal integration depends on the self-realization of individuals.

I believe that Honneth’s reconstruction of the Hegelian notion of recognition is a suitable starting point for the study of immigrant integration because of its normative claims about the intersubjectivity of individual autonomy, mutual recognition as a basic human desire, and the interdependence of individual self-realization and the political and social order. Next, I will recount the normative foundations of Honneth’s recognition-based critical theory.

4.3. Normative foundations of recognition. First, the dialectical processes of self-formation help Honneth identify the major concerns of early political philosophy, which were stability and the elimination of conflict in society, from a different perspective. Since the process of mutual recognition in the face of disrespect motivates social struggles, “[they] could become a structuring force in the moral development of society” (Honneth 1996, 93). After each struggle, society will be more free and just for individual self-realization (Honneth 1996, 129). Because misrecognition is strongly related with feelings of injustice, what self-realization demands is a just society where individuals reciprocally recognize each other’s similarities and differences.

Thus, social resistance becomes something not to be avoided but embraced for the common good of the society. After establishing the common good, which can be shared by all the individuals in the society, Honneth explains that emancipatory movements can be empirically situated in justice claims for misrecognized groups. In this sense, the inability to satisfy the demands of individual or group recognition claims is defined in terms of injustice. This reinterpretation of emancipatory conflicts as progressive forces of history takes our focus away from the concerns for stability and elimination of conflict in society. For the issue of immigrant
integration, it provides the necessary tools to dispel concerns for national security and social cohesion. It helps us to analyze immigrants’ demands for recognition as symptoms of justice claims.

Second, Honneth’s critical theory, unlike that of the early Frankfurt school, presupposes a certain understanding of human nature: that human beings’ basic desire is not self-preservation but self-realization through mutual recognition. When human nature is defined in that way, we are dealing with individuals who can desire to de-center themselves and their self-interest for their own self-realization. This is a moral claim that requires “social agents to have an attitude that goes beyond an immediate concern with their self-interest in being responsive to the needs of the other” (Brink and Owen 2007, 6). This enables Honneth’s theory to connect individual needs with societal needs and create a subjectively desirable community.

Third, Honneth argues, “without anticipating a conception of the good life, it is impossible to adequately criticize any of the contemporary injustices” (Honneth 2003, 114). Honneth’s recognition theoretic model presupposes a certain direction of universal progress within the ethical order towards a process of individualization and social inclusion (Honneth 2001, 185). Honneth argues that for recognition to be intentional between equal subjects, we need to act with regard to pre-evaluative reasons, which constitute the value horizon of three spheres of recognition.

What count as a rational and legitimate demand emerges from the possibility of understanding the consequences of implementing it as a gain in individuality or inclusion...But, in order to pick out morally justified particularities from the multitude of those typically asserted in social struggles for recognition, it is first necessary to apply a criterion of progress, however implicit. For only demands that potentially contribute to the expansion of social form of recognition can be considered normatively grounded, since they point in the direction of a rise in the moral level of social integration (Honneth 2001, 187).
This mild value realism does not only allow Honneth to differentiate between real and abstract (ideological) recognition but also to avoid disturbing forms of value pluralism (i.e. those advocated by the Ku Klux Klan or neo-Nazis). Moreover, “these trans-historical and transcultural standards allow Honneth to claim that the struggles of recognition are not dependent upon a contingent commitment to the self-realization that just happens to belong to Western liberal democracies, but rather express a virtually anthropological force that produces a progressive dynamic, orienting our history towards the self-realization of all” (Bankosky 2012, 187).

These points are extremely important for my discussion of immigrant integration for two reasons. First, if recognition is a basic human desire, we can conclude that recognition of immigrant identities, skills, and abilities is essential for the self-realization and integration of immigrants. Hence, doing justice to the immigrant population becomes a priority for integration. Second, if the capacity for relational individual autonomy is transcultural, then the fear that illiberal immigrant groups would never integrate into the host societies should generally be invalid.

Hence, I agree with Yar (2001) that “the ability of a recognition-theoretic perspective simultaneously to entertain the need for solidarity, the exercise of individual autonomy, a sensitivity to difference, the critique of power and the struggle for social justice, establishes its indisputable relevance for mapping the future of progressive politics” (73). Next, I would like to briefly introduce how recognition theory also examines the psychological harms emanating from misrecognition or lack of recognition through object-relations theory.

4.4. Honneth’s reconstruction of Mead’s identity theory. Honneth’s reconstruction of Hegelian ethical order ends with a criticism. Honneth claims that Hegel’s philosophy of
consciousness is problematic for critical explanation of injustices emanating from misrecognition because Hegel over institutionalizes the ethical life in the *Philosophy of Right*. At the end, Hegel defines the state as the actualization of the ethical order where individuals willingly and effortlessly follow their political duties for the sake of the common good of the society.

The state is understood as the embodiment of self-realization through mutual recognition. This conceptualization turns the interactive relationship between individual and society into a cognitive development process of singular intelligences (Honneth 1996, 65). What concerns Honneth is the “reestablishment of an access to an emancipatory sphere of action” and to make an empirically justifying critique of injustices in the society (Honneth 2007, 68). To do that, Honneth employs Mead’s social psychology, which basically transforms “Hegel’s recognition-theoretic account of anthropogenesis into the framework of an empirically-oriented social scientific naturalism” (Yar 2003, 119).

According to Mead’s social psychology, individual self-identification depends on the perception of the self by others. In identity formation, an individual “me” knows herself through her identification by the society. Mead calls society the generalized other. In early childhood, with the help of “play and game”, the person constitutes an awareness of the self via others’ objective expectations and evaluations of her actions. In this context, “I can become aware of what my gesture signifies for the other only by producing the other’s reply in myself” (Honneth 1996, 73).

While the “me” represents mediated relation to the self through the generalized other, the “I” represents “the instance of human personhood that is responsible for the creative response to the action problems” (Honneth 1996, 74). According to Mead, the tension between the “I” (claims of individuation) and “me” (internalized collective will) causes moral conflict between
the individual and its generalized other - namely society (Honneth 1996, 82). Honneth claims that an analysis of the development of identity in early childhood naturalizes the idealistic speculations of Hegel.

Honneth turns to social scientific research to give normative recognition claims a sense of empirical applicability. In this context, Mead’s theory about how self-formation is constructed by the generalized other’s objective evaluation of the self in early childhood development is reconstructed (Honneth 1995, Ch.4). The analysis of the relationship between the self and society may explain the cases where misrecognized individuals are native-born citizens. However, I think that the self-formation processes of immigrants are much more complicated than those of natural citizens who have been misrecognized or ideologically recognized by the state and society. I will explore this argument further in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Next, I will lay out three forms of social integration that need to be in place for healthy individual self-realization with reference to Honneth’s theory.

4.5. Love, Rights and Solidarity: The forms of social integration for mutual recognition. Honneth claims that the development of a practical relation to the self requires mutual recognition, which can only be constituted through three different spheres of social integration, namely love, rights, and solidarity. These three patterns of relationship between the individual and its other are different in terms of “(a) the medium of recognition, (b) the form of relation-to-self made possible, and (c) the potential for moral development” (Honneth 1996, 95).

Love and friendship constitute one of the three axes of self-formation. By using psychological theories about early childhood, Honneth claims that love and friendship are the primary relationships that enable the moral subject to have self-confidence. In cases of disrespectful treatment of individuals, like abuse and rape, the individual’s physical integrity is
threatened. Every self-formation necessitates emotional support from its other in the shape of love and friendship. “It is only because the assurance of care gives the person who is loved the strength to open up to himself or herself in a relaxed relation-to-self that he or she can become an independent subject with whom oneness can be experienced as mutual dissolution of boundaries” (Honneth 1996, 105).

The second axis of self-formation is the provision of legal rights to every subject on an equal basis. “For the individual member of society, to live without rights means to have no chance of developing self-respect” (Honneth 1996, 119). Self-respect is important for individual self-formation because it signals that an individual is an “end in itself” and his existence is socially relevant. Legal status is strongly associated with universal equality. Rights empower “the bearer to engage action that can be perceived by interaction partners” (Honneth 1996, 120). The social integrity of the individual as a morally responsible subject is threatened by exclusion and the denial of rights.

Solidarity and self-esteem constitute the third integrative relationship that is necessary for a healthy self-formation. Self-esteem can only be construed by the recognition of “particular qualities that characterize people in their personal differences” (Honneth 1996, 122). Self-esteem is strongly related with the value system of the society. The mutual recognition of the subjects’ different traits and abilities in a society depends on “the degree of pluralization of the socially defined value horizons” and sharing commonality through individualization and equalization (Honneth 1996, 122).

Therefore, “in modern societies social relations of symmetrical esteem between individualized (and autonomous) subjects represent a prerequisite for solidarity. In this sense, to esteem one another symmetrically means to view one another in the light of values that allow the
abilities and traits of the other to appear significant for the praxis” (Honneth 1996, 129). Feelings of injustice can emanate from the denigration of one group because of its place in the division of valuable social labor in the society.

Moreover, each recognition sphere creates its own individual obligations, which make it possible to speak of a “morality” of recognition. “The moral rights and duties that correspond to each of the circumscribed forms of recognition follow from the specific structure of the relation-to-self which is, as it were, first to be created or strengthened by these forms” (Honneth 1997, 31).

From this point one can now appreciate more fully the obligations representing the moral side of the individual relation of recognition. Where it is that form of recognition through which the value of individual needs is affirmed, there are duties to care emotionally, ones that apply in a symmetrical or an asymmetrical manner to all partners in such a primary relationship; the typical case of an asymmetrical obligation here is the relationship of parents to their children; the typical case of a reciprocal obligation is represented by the relationship in a friendship. If it is, on the other hand, that form of recognition through which the moral autonomy of the individual is strengthened, then there exist reciprocal obligations of universal equal treatment; all subjects mutually have the duty to respect and treat each other as persons to whom the same moral accountability is attributed. And where, finally, it is that form of recognition through which the value of individual capabilities is strengthened, there are reciprocal duties to demonstrate solidarity, ones that apply to all members of the corresponding value community; here one may think of that kind of special consideration we owe to each other insofar as we participate jointly in the realization of a project (Honneth 1997, 32).

The absence of any of these integrative relationships causes moral shame and injury to an individual’s self-formation. “Subjects who, as a result of having their ego-claims disregarded, are incapable of simply going ahead with an action” (Honneth 1996, 138). These emotional experiences make one realize how much her self-identifying actions are dependent on others and this realization may motivate struggles for recognition.

Honneth’s three axes of self-formation illuminate the role of family, state, and society on individual identity formation. They suggest the importance of an ethical order for the self-
realization of individuality. This dimension of Honneth’s theory allows us to criticize the existing ethical order with regard to the normative principles of love, respect, and esteem.

For each of the three recognition spheres is distinguished by the normative principles which provide their own internal standards of what counts as “just” or “unjust”…, each principle of recognition has a specific **surplus of validity** whose normative significance is expressed by the constant struggle over its appropriate application and interpretation. Within each sphere it is always possible to set a moral dialectic of the general and the particular in motion: claims are made for a particular perspective (need, life-situation, contribution) that has not yet found appropriate consideration by appeal to a general recognition principle (love, law, achievement). In order to be up to the task of critique, the theory of justice outlined here can wield the recognition principles’ surplus validity against the facticity of their social interpretation (Honneth 2001, 186).

In the case of moral conflict between these three spheres of recognition order, “the claims of all subjects to equal respect for their individual autonomy enjoy absolute first priority”(Honneth 2007, 141). In this sense, the sphere of right triumphs over the spheres of love and esteem.

Finally, the third axis of self-formation, namely community as the medium of the feelings of esteem, shows us that the equal recognition of political rights is not enough for immigrants to become free and equal members of the host country. The sphere of esteem directs us to look one step further than multicultural policies and examine the necessary socio-economic transformation which host community and immigrants have to go through to create a just moral order. The economic pathologies can be understood simply as obstacles or barriers that immigrants are subject to in terms of finding a meaningful and fair employment. Next, I will investigate the sphere of esteem in a more detailed manner.

**4.6. The sphere of esteem.** As in the other spheres of recognition, mutual recognition of esteem depends on a common value horizon where members of a society “share an orientation to those values and goals that indicate to each other the significance or contribution of their
qualities for the life of the other” (Honneth 1996, 121). Unlike legal recognition, recognition of esteem is particular and historically shaped by the “cultural self-understanding of a society”.

Thus, the social worth of particular human qualities and skills is determined with regard to these culturally defined values and societal goals. The scope and the measure of dominant ethical conceptions of societal goals “depend on the degree of pluralization of socially defined value horizon…the more conceptions of ethical goals are open to different values and the more their hierarchical arrangements gives way to horizontal competition, the more clearly social esteem would be able to take on an individualizing character and generate symmetrical relations” (Honneth 1996, 122).

According to Honneth, the best way to analyze the historical development of the relation of social esteem would be to analyze the transition from the concept of “honor” to the categories of social “standing” or “prestige” (Honneth 1996, 123). Honneth argues that in traditionally organized corporative societies, a person’s status was pre-determined with regard to a certain hierarchical recognition order. Even though the person had symmetrical relations of esteem within his estate, his honor status was asymmetrical with regard to other estates within the society. His skills and qualities did not emanate from his authentic identification but from the societally determined value that his estate represented for the realization of the societal goals.

In a hierarchical recognition order of this sort, a person could only get mutual recognition of his esteem and be honorable if he could manage to demonstrate the skills that had been pre-determined for him. Even these hierarchical structures represented a particular evaluative system among many; they were not questioned until the transcendental basis of their self-evidence was stripped away by the conflict-ridden development of Enlightenment challenging the traditional understanding of morality and equality.
In this sense, the abandonment of the certainty of given societal hierarchies corresponds to the development of the recognition of “ethical obligations as inner-worldly decisions” after the enlightenment (Honneth 1996, 124). “For the first time, it came to be open to dispute whether a person’s social standing is to be measured in terms of pre-determined traits that are attributed, as types, to entire groups. It is only from this point on that the subject entered the contested field of social esteem as an entity individuated in terms of a particular life-story” (Honneth 1996, 125).

Thus, unlike traditional societies, modern societies are open to different values and champion individuality instead of class divisions. The individualization of the esteem sphere in modern societies necessitates that interpretations of societal worth be open to the plurality of values emanating from a variety of different modes of self-realization. In modern societies, esteem becomes a crucial recognition sphere for persons to feel themselves to be “valuable” for their society as individual members since they are being recognized for their particular skills that they do not share with anyone else (Honneth 1996, 125).

As a result of the bourgeoisie’s struggle against the pressure “to conduct oneself in a manner suitable to one’s ‘estate’, social esteem begins to be oriented not towards collective traits but towards the capacities developed by the individual in the course of his or her lifetime” (Honneth 1996, 125). In modern capitalistic societies, the value horizon, which measures the worth of individual contributions to societal goals, is a form of value pluralism—albeit one defined in class and gender-specific terms.

The normative principle for esteem is the achievement principle in modern societies. The achievement principle should be abstract so as to embrace ever-changing and different ways of individual self-realization. However, it should also be concrete so as to serve as an evaluative tool to decide on the degree of esteem that particular persons will get in a given time. The
individualized system of recognition relations is permanently subject to interpretative conflicts in modern societies.

Thus, “the abstract guiding ideas of modern societies provide so little in the way of a universally valid system of reference with which to measure the social worth of particular traits and abilities that they must always be made concrete through supplemental cultural interpretations before they can be applied in the sphere of recognition” (Honneth 1996, 126). So, the dominant interpretations of societal goals are open to cultural conflicts between groups which would like to make their contributions to societal goals specifically more valuable. The struggles over income distribution are representative of such a conflict. Consequently, in a recognition sphere, there is a constant reinterpretation of the social worth of skills.

However, these conflicts help to improve the dominant understanding of achievement principle to be more symmetrical. In a just recognition order, “subjects mutually sympathize with their various different ways of life because, amongst themselves, they esteem each other symmetrically” (Honneth 1996, 128). Symmetrical recognition of individuals’ skills and qualification as valuable for actualization of societal goals creates solidarity among members of the society because they encourage not just passive tolerance but “felt concern” for what is particular about the other person (Honneth 1996, 129). “Without social bonds that extend beyond the familial sphere, and which have greater binding power than those generated by the mutual recognition of persons under law, the social cohesion of highly individuated, modern societies is at risk. Social esteem through mutual recognition could in principle provide such cohesion, thus helping to secure the integrity of the society and individual identities in one stroke” (Smith 2009, 56).
In this dissertation, I argue that studying economic structures that operate within a certain value structure is essential for our understanding of immigrant integration not only in economic terms but also social and political terms as well. The basic argument that connects the economic barriers to the issue of immigrant integration is that the capitalistic market is a function of social integration with regard to gaining esteem. This statement is important for us to understand the gap between the official expectation from immigrants to integrate and the possibility of that very expectation being fulfilled by immigrants. Thus, I believe putting emphasis on the structure of the capitalistic market and the place of immigrants in this structure should be studied to make inferences about the causes of problems that inhibit immigrant integration in their host countries. In Chapter 5, I will discuss the sphere of esteem in detail. I will introduce the basic relationship between the value of work for the healthy self-formation, the integrative function of capitalism, and its neoliberal norms. This preliminary introduction to Honneth’s recognition theory, specifically the sphere of esteem, aims to explain why it provides us the best tools for our understanding of the issue of societal integration in general.

5. Conclusion

To summarize, in this chapter, I have introduced the debate about minority rights within liberal political theory to understand the normative foundations of multiculturalism. In this context, I have argued that even though the focus on group rights has helped to elevate certain injustices suffered by immigrants on an institutional level, it has also caused the multicultural theorists to overlook the socio-economic pathologies that immigrants face in their working life and affairs with other nationals and their own cultural groups. By keeping the problem within the confines of public sphere and with reference to the democratic demands of rigidly identified immigrant groups, the task of realizing justice is basically left to the state.
Finally, I have proposed a relational and pluralistic understanding of individual autonomy with reference to recognition theories. I have presented a brief outline of Honneth’s theory to show how approaching the issue of immigrant integration from a recognition theoretical perspective can unravel in a more comprehensive manner the economic and social pathologies that create barriers to immigrant integration. I have also put special emphasis on the importance of the recognition of esteem of immigrants within the capitalistic structure.

Endnotes


3 Other case studies that suggest a positive linkage include “Sarah Wayland’s (2007) analysis of the Tamil diaspora’s strong support of the liberation movement against the Sri Lankan government; it was built on networks that served information exchange and fund-raising purposes and as well reached out to the Canadian mainstream and the state, most often through public demonstrations and lobbying. Of course, the massive and energetic rallies by the Tamils in the spring of 2009 to urge action by the Canadian state to help stave off the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers provided powerful visuals of the connection between Canadian and homeland politics” (Black 2011, 1172).

4 According to Zurn (2010), “recognition rejects the pure proceduralism of Kantian strategies for underwriting the universally of its normative claims, however, preferring to see them as grounded in the anthropologically universal structural interconnection between forms of inter-subjective life and individual development and self-realization...With Neo-Kantianism, the philosophy of recognition endorses the way in which modern legal systems and structures of constitutional democracy safeguard individual autonomy through individual civil liberties and equal opportunities for political participation” (5).

5 According to Honneth, the classical concept of individual autonomy has been challenged by two fronts. First, in line with Freud’s psychological findings, scholars questioned the possibility of complete self-determination by pointing out the unconscious drives and motives of the individual action. Second, in line with the investigations of later Wittgenstein, “the possibility of individual constitution of the meaning has been challenged by referring the dependence of individual speech on pre-given system of linguistic meanings” (Honneth 2007, 181). In this sense, these psychological and linguistic critiques destroy the conscious theoretic understanding of individual autonomy. However, Honneth claims that individual autonomy is still possible if we reconstruct the individual subject “so as to include those subject-transcending powers as constitutive conditions for the individualization of the subject” (Honneth 2007a, 183). Honneth claims that “only the person who is in a position to disclose needs creatively, to present her life in an ethically reflected way and to apply universal norms in a context sensitive manner, can be regarded as an autonomous person under conditions in which the psyche in principle not wholly under our control” (Honneth 2007a, 191).

Constant criticism of self-preservation as a fundamental element of human nature can also be observed in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. The basic claim here is that self-preservation causes an instrumental approach towards our understanding of nature and creates social pathologies of domination between human and nature and between man and man. Honneth diverges from Adorno and Horkheimer with his replacement of self-preservation with mutual recognition. This emphasis enables Honneth to make universal claims about the relationship between society and individuals, which are basically missing in the *Dialectics of Enlightenment*. In his lecture on *Reification*, Honneth (2005) claims that cognition of an object comes after the recognition of that object. In this sense, reification is the process of forgetting our dependence on recognition on both objects and subjects. Still, his Hegelian roots which certainly asserts that mutual recognition can only happen between two subjects do not enable him to go a step further to analyze our relationship with nature. Elsewhere, Honneth was criticized for not taking the relationship between nature and human beings into account for the recognition process. See; J. P. Deranty. 2005. The Lost of Nature in Axel Honneth’s Social Philosophy, *Political Horizons*, 6:1.

Berlin in his *Two Concepts of Liberty* distinguishes negative liberty from positive liberty. Negative liberty means liberty from interference. Are there any constraints to my actions? How many alternatives do I have? Can I make a free choice between these alternatives? Answers to those questions determine the degree of negative liberty a person has. In this sense, negative liberty is an individualistic concept. On the other hand, positive liberty means self-mastery, autonomy and the capacity of self-determination. From Rousseau to Hegel, many philosophers argue that in order to be truly free, citizens need to exercise their political freedom. Thus, citizens should actively and directly participate in political decision-making processes. In public sphere, citizens should serve for the common good rather than their self-interest. In order to achieve this, citizens need to transcend themselves to a higher being. This is the reason why the concept of political liberty has been paradoxically used to support totalitarian, nationalistic endeavors. On the other hand, in term of understanding of emancipatory movements in society, I believe that liberal thinkers such as Locke, Berlin and Mill who advocated for the negative liberty and dismissed any claims for changing the structure of society and state with regard to an understanding of common good of the society have the same problem.

Honneth (2007) criticizes Habermas’ concept of the lifeworld because it always “unfolds behind the backs of the subjects involved” (70). But when we think about his analysis of Winnicott’s early childhood self-formation theories, we can make the same criticism to Honneth (Honneth 1995, 98). If the first axis of mutual recognition, namely love, depends on our experiences with our early childhood environment especially our relationship with our mother, this means that the recognition also always “unfolds behind the backs of the subjects involved”. In this sense, the emphasis on emotions and psychology rather than democratic theory makes Honneth’s theory harder to apply to different empirical cases. In his later writings, Honneth tries to close this gap by employing Dewey’s democratic theory.
Chapter Three: An Outline and the Case

1. Introduction

So far, I believe that I have accomplished to take three steps towards justifying a critical study of the issue of immigrant integration in the framework of recognition theory. First, I analyzed the historical deconstruction of the term “integration”. I showed that the term “integration” has been interpreted with regard to the interests of the dominant party in the host societies. The dominant perspective is one-sided and often ideological. It hinders our understanding of the feelings of suffering that immigrants experience in the process of integration.

Second, I suggested that the issue of integration should be approached as a democratic justice problem. By employing an analysis of Tully and Honneth’s idea of integration, I reconstructed the term within the context of democracy and justice theories. Consequently, I identify the term “integration” as a process whereby individual members of society are recognized equally, with respect; and authentically, for their unique skills and qualifications, with esteem. In this sense, integration is not a duty, or something that needs to be imposed, but a process which necessitates just social conditions and political and socio-economic institutions.

Third, through an analysis of Kymlicka’s liberal group rights theory, I argued that Honneth’s recognition theory gives us necessary tools to deliberate on the socio-economic conditions of recognition in addition to the political ones. In the previous chapter, I introduced an extensive account of Honneth’s recognition theory within a justice framework. From that densely theoretical analysis, it has become apparent that the focus of Honneth’s recognition theory on the historical processes of the recognition of individual respect and esteem offers a new perspective.
for our understanding of the issue of immigrant integration. This also makes the core assumptions of recognition theory attractive to employ in our analysis of current oppressive, discriminatory and exclusionary relations of recognition that many immigrants may be subject to in their host societies.

In the second part of my dissertation, I will apply recognition theory to the economic experiences of highly skilled immigrants in Canada. In this sense, this chapter aims to provide the necessary background information for this endeavor. In order to do that, I will, first, present Honneth’s recognition theory as a research programme and argue that his theory provides helpful analytical tools to examine social and economic problems that may hinder immigrant integration. After, I will recount the core assumptions of the theory to lay out the basic foundation behind my application of it to the particular socio-economic problems that Canadian immigrants are suffering in the following chapters. Next, I will present several explanations to justify my choice of the Canadian case. Finally, I will specify the category of immigrants that I will focus on throughout the application of Honneth’s recognition theory in Part 2 and explain the reasons behind that choice.

2. Recognition-Theoretical Research Programme

The second part of the dissertation aims to contribute to “the original ambition of recognition theory by understanding it as a productive research programme” (Honneth 2012a, vii). Application of an already existing research program to a specific issue necessitates keeping the core assumptions of recognition theory intact (Honneth 2012a, viii). I acknowledge the risk of taking core assumptions at face value for an analysis of a particular event. However, I believe that recognition theory’s reconstructive and relational approach to the particularity and universal values gives flexibility to the researcher not only for testing auxiliary hypotheses of recognition
theory when it comes to the particular issues but also for diagnosing less visible social pathologies. Before starting a critical and many-leveled investigation of the issue of immigrant integration in the next part of the dissertation, I want to examine the term “social pathology” and introduce the core hypotheses of Honneth’s recognition theory.

2.1. Social pathology and the core hypotheses of recognition theory. According to Honneth (2012a), a social pathology signals a “danger of social misdevelopments” (25). Social pathologies are products of one-sided or narrow interpretations of normative values such as legal equality, freedom, and achievement. They are the crystallization of conflicting institutional rationalities. Thus, social pathologies can be identified as offenses to practical reason. In other words, they are the signposts indicating the absence of certain integrative relationships, which are the requirements for healthy and “practical relations to self”. To illustrate, racial discrimination against visible minorities even in a legally equal democratic society is an example of narrow understanding of the rationality of equal legal recognition of individuals. This narrow understanding creates conflicting rationalities between legal institutions and socio-economic practices.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the lack of love, respect, or esteem may cause moral shame and injury to an individual’s self-formation. In turn, these forms of disrespect may sometimes restrict an individual’s potential for autonomy. Because of social pathologies, some subjects cannot fully participate in socio-economic and political life (Honneth 2012b, 25). Individuals who experience indeterminacy of this sort may either lose confidence in their capacity to be autonomous and become politically inactive or retreat to their groups in order to experience the mutual recognition of their esteem for the particular characteristics that is misrecognized by the general society and may find the motivation to initiate a struggle against their misrecognition.
Social pathologies might have a negative effect on the societal integration of individuals because while membership of any particular group may help individuals to develop a healthy self-relation through esteem *qua* membership of that group and, “thus, to facilitate a realization of a particular aspect of oneself, it is only in a democratic community, as a free relation of cooperating groups, that one can realize the plurality of aspects of oneself *in a way which is mutually enriching*” (Owen 2007, 291). However, we need to keep in mind that social pathologies can also be the motor of social struggles for recognition. The dialectical relationship between social pathologies and the struggles for recognition can challenge the established recognition order and initiate a positive change for the relations of recognition.

In the second part of my dissertation, I will identify particular economic barriers to immigrant integration in terms of social pathologies. This move presupposes recognition theory’s several core assumptions on the relationship between individuals and society and the recognition order of modern capitalistic societies. Below, I introduce these assumptions that I will keep intact in my analysis of particular social pathologies that Canadian immigrants suffer.

1. Mutual recognition is understood as the normative requirement for individual autonomy and the basis of the legitimacy of societal relations and practices (Honneth 2002, 501). In this sense, individuals depend on society’s recognition for their self-formation and societal integration depends on the self-realization of individuals. Historically, there has always been a certain form of recognition order that connects societal needs to individual needs. Modern capitalistic society’s recognition order is less hierarchical and more open to different values. However, openness makes recognition order vulnerable to second order interpretations of normative standards.
2. In modern capitalistic society, relations of love, respect, and esteem constitute the differentiated forms of recognition for the healthy self-realization of individual autonomy. This “tripartite recognition order brought by modern capitalistic society” gives particular expressions to the conditions, modes, and forms of recognition (Honneth and Fraser 2003, 186). Honneth’s inclusion of love and esteem in addition to equality and rights as determining factors of individual autonomy shows us that equal recognition of political rights is not enough for the actualization of individual autonomy. Moreover, capitalism and relations of work under the sphere of esteem are identified as integrative functions for solidarity.

3. These modes of recognition have their own regulative ideals and particular interpretations. This dimension of Honneth’s theory allows us to criticize the existing recognition order with regard to the normative principles of love, respect, and esteem. In the case of moral conflict between these three spheres of recognition order, “the claims of all subjects to equal respect for their individual autonomy enjoy absolute first priority” (Honneth 2007b, 141). In this sense, the sphere of right has an absolute priority over the spheres of love and esteem. However, it is not always easy to set boundaries between these recognitional spheres. Thus, “a recognition-theoretical model can take up the task of critique not only where what is at stake is a defense of moral progress within the respective spheres of recognition. Rather, we must always reflexively examine the boundaries that have been established between the domains of different recognition principles, since we can never rule out the suspicion that the existing division of labor between the moral spheres impairs opportunities for individual identity formation” (Honneth and Fraser 2003, 189). An examination of how ethnic enclaves may blur the boundaries between esteem and respect and impair immigrants’ integration will be discussed in Chapter 6 in detail.
4. Even though the three spheres of recognition have their own evaluative standards, they are vulnerable to secondary interpretative practices. To illustrate, “in modern societies, relations of social esteem are subject to a permanent struggle, in which different groups attempt, by means of symbolic force and with reference to general goals, to raise the value of the abilities associated with their way of life” (Honneth 1996, 127). Not only the power but also the climate of public attention decides the temporarily stable outcome of cultural group struggles with regard to the secondary interpretive practice. This is the reason why the three spheres of recognition share a common value horizon. Honneth argues that for recognition to be intentional between equal subjects, we need to act with regard to pre-evaluative reasons, which constitute the value horizon of the three spheres of recognition. Honneth claims that the value horizon of modern capitalistic societies consists of individualization and inclusion.

What counts as a rational and legitimate demand emerges from the possibility of understanding the consequences of implementing it as a gain in individuality or inclusion...But, in order to pick out morally justified particularities from the multitude of those typically asserted in social struggles or recognition, it is first necessary to apply a criterion of progress, however implicit. For only demands that potentially contribute to the expansion of social form of recognition can be considered normatively grounded, since they point in the direction of a rise in the moral level of social integration (Honneth 2001a, 187).

5. Since recognition relations are mutual, historical, and relational, social pathologies find expression within societal and institutional practices as well. In this sense, mutual recognition is not only a phenomenon that can occur between individuals but also one that institutions can grant (Honneth 2007b, 334). As mentioned above, institutions can signify a certain recognition order, which may create expectations of recognition, or conflicting institutions may create feelings of disrespect. “The recognition order of modern societies is institutionalized in many ways. The interpersonal love relationships that occur between embodied individuals are institutionalized in a framework that designates childhood as a special phase of life requiring
particular forms of care, and interprets marriage as a love relationship between mutually needy beings. Respect is institutionalized in the structure of modern legislation that allows us, in principle, to have legal equality. Social esteem is institutionalized within the ‘structure of the industrially organized division of labor’” (Cox 2012, 195).

When it comes to the relationship between agents and institution, we need to ask the question of how to understand a pathology. Is a pathology already embedded in institutions? Or is a pathology incorporated by agents into the already existing institutions? Honneth(2004b) argues that “one should understand agents as operating within a certain institutionalized rationality of society against another. So what one has to show is exactly that there are conflicting institutionalized rationalities” (386).

6. There are two kinds of recognition, namely rational and ideological. Rational recognition is identified as receptive or reproductive instead of attributive or productive. Thus, recognition of an act motivated by practical reason does not ascribe new qualities to its addressee but perceives “qualities that a person already possesses” (Honneth 2012b, 81). In the literature, there is a tendency to represent recognition practices, attitudes, and institutions as “the opposite of practices of domination or subjection” (Honneth 2007b, 325). To illustrate, racial discrimination is a practice of domination and the opposite of recognition.

However, the practices of recognition can function to subjugate and dominate its addressees. Honneth calls these type of practices and relations of recognition ideological.

When certain social conditions block the formation and exercise of actors’ reflective capacities or, in other words, when relations of recognition are asymmetric, ideological, or pathological, we appear to face a case which can be called ‘second-order pathology’ that takes the form of a ‘structural reflexivity deficit’ on the part of actors. In such a situation, the first-order social conditions which appear to be normatively problematic—relations of injustice, exploitation, misrecognition etc.—are not, in the relevant sense, accessible to those affected, be it because they are not
experienced and recognized as such or they are intuitively grasped but misinterpreted and consequently accepted as either legitimate or natural (Honneth 2007b, 346).

In this sense, ideological recognition, unlike misrecognition, does not directly exclude its addressees, but integrates them into the existing recognition order by creating voluntary subordination. It offers abstract recognition where there is an evaluative change in the perception of the capacities of persons but no prospect for material change within the recognition order. Unlike misrecognition, ideological recognition promises its addressees credible, positive, and contrastive change in the interpretation of their value for societal goals.

To illustrate, “the emotional appeals to the ‘good’ mother and housewife made by churches, parliaments, or the mass media over the centuries caused women to remain trapped within a self-image that most effectively accommodated the gender-specific division of labor. The public esteem enjoyed by heroic soldiers continuously engendered a sufficiently large class of men who willingly went to war in pursuit of glory and adventure” (Honneth 2007b, 325-326). Honneth claims that the only way to differentiate between rational and ideological recognition relationships is to measure legitimacy “according to the normative quality of the way it comes about” (Honneth 2007b, 332). Unfortunately, as can be understood from the above examples, it is always easier to recognize ideological relations in retrospect. In Part 2, I will use the differentiation between ideological recognition and misrecognition to argue that institutional responses to the socio-economic barriers that Canadian immigrants face may serve as ideological recognition.

In conclusion, my analysis will treat specific examples with regard to above stated core assumptions about the structure of the modern capitalistic society and the relations of recognition between agents, institutions and general society. Next, I will introduce the structure of my
application of recognition theory and present an outline of the flow of my analysis in the second part of the dissertation.

3. An Outline

For my dissertation project, I ask the general question of why integration of immigrants is a major problem. However, the integration of immigrants should be particularized so that it can be studied through an application of the core assumptions of the recognition theory. In order not to idealize or phenomenologically discover certain principles of justice, Honneth suggests that one should start with an analysis of the existing practices and mechanism which cause the social pathology/unreasonableness in society. I have decided to study the economic pathologies that immigrants are going through in Part 2 because I am interested in analyzing current norms and institutions of socio-economic integration which may cause misrecognition and even ideological recognition. My main objective is to reveal how some institutions, while presented as providing fairer conditions of integration, can impair the immigrants’ possibility to realize their plural aspects of self-formation in the Canadian job market. I will present these pathologies in detail in the following chapters. Now, I would like to introduce the structure of the analysis of those particular pathologies.

In the following section of the dissertation, I will first identify the socio-economic sufferings of immigrants connected to social pathologies in detail. Lack of recognition and the conflicting rationalities of recognition spheres may sometimes cause psychological harm in the form of feelings of denigration, disrespect, and shame. These feelings may go unnoticed for a while, but they usually manifest themselves through a variety of problems such as mental health, dysfunctional marriages, feeling that one’s actions lack meaning, etc. Next, I will diagnose these sufferings to situate the pathology in a particular recognition sphere in the societal order. This
diagnosis will uncover whether the social pathologies in question are caused by misrecognition or ideological recognition of the esteem of immigrants in the Canadian job market and division of social labor. It is important to differentiate these two in order to analyze the causes of the social pathology and the developmental potential for the recognition struggles against it.

After the diagnoses of these pathologies, I will investigate how immigrants are struggling against the sufferings emanating from pathologies and how the Canadian government responds to these struggles. Focusing on existing integrative institutions is essential because, as Honneth argues, the web of particular relations of recognition between the individual, state, and society in modern capitalistic systems has well-defined normative standards and certain kinds of integrative institutions in place.

A well-grounded critical approach to the analysis of concrete pathologies should take these normative standards as valid for the value horizon of the particular life-world. Honneth calls this kind of criticism immanent critique. Honneth acknowledges that the “state is already, in fact, producing a special kind of Sittlichkeit. So we have to become aware of these measures and, in the interest of new, broader, more inclusive, more emancipatory forms of Sittlichkeit, we have to change these measures. But it would be untrue to say that we have to invent these measures because they are already there. It is a question of changing the measures, not a question of establishing some measures” (Honneth 2004a, 387). Thus, my discussion of social pathologies should be complemented by an analysis of the integration measures that the Canadian state imposes on immigrants. In this sense, my aim is not to prescribe completely different economic integration mechanisms or a different economic system in Canada but to diagnose the deficiencies within the existing system to improve upon it.
Finally, in order to provide descriptive information and particular examples, I also draw upon quantitative and qualitative studies from Canadian immigration literature. I do not claim that this kind of empirical information provides strong enough statistical evidence to make my arguments absolute. I simply use the findings of empirical studies to make my diagnosis on economic barriers for immigrants stronger and my arguments more persuasive. Before starting my analysis, lastly, I want to justify my choice of case study and explain the specific type of immigrant I am investigating in my dissertation.

4. Why Canada?

In my discussion of the socio-economic, psychological, and political challenges that immigrants are facing, I will focus on the Canadian case. Although this case is unique because of the composition of immigrant groups and immigrant policies in Canada, I believe that it is one of the most suitable cases for the discussion of economic barriers to the immigrants’ entrance to the Canadian job market from a recognition theoretical perspective.

To begin with, immigration has been an essential source of population growth for Canada. “Over the period of 1901 to 1996, the total immigration of some 12 million persons and the estimated emigration of some 6 million produced a net population gain of 6 million” (Nakamura et al. 2003, 1). In 2011, Canada had a foreign-born population of about 6,775,800 people who represent 20.6% of the total population (statcan.gc.ca, 2011). The composition of immigrants in Canada changed after the 1967 Immigration Act. Before the policy change, more than 80 percent of immigrants to Canada came from European countries. After the implementation of the point system and the removal of preference based on country of origin, the composition of immigrant population has changed considerably.
By 2011, the proportion of immigrants identified themselves as a member of minority groups had increased to 19.1 percent. While immigration from Asia accounted for less than 10 percent of all immigrants in 1966, it is now by far the largest category, with more than 61.3 percent of all newcomers coming from the region. Thus, majority of immigrants are visible minorities (Papillion 2002, 9-10, statcan.gc.ca, 2011). Therefore, the majority of immigrants in Canada are stereotypically put into the immigrant category because of their racial markers. That is the reason why the Canadian case is a good representative of the type of immigrant experience based of misrecognition of respect I want to focus on in Chapter 4.

Although most immigrants in Canada belongs to visible minorities, the concentration of immigrant groups in three of the major Canadian cities, namely Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal, is not as dense as that of their counterparts in Western European countries. To illustrate, “in Europe, non-European migrants tend to come from a small number of origins in the Middle East and North Africa. In Canada’s most populous city Toronto, by contrast, although immigrants are quite numerous overall (45% of the population is foreign-born), and although there are also large groups that predominate – the Chinese, South Asian and blacks are comparable in relative size to the three largest groups in Amsterdam, each of the groups is characterized by considerable internal diversity” (Reitz et al. 2009, 16). This means that the some problems that Canadian immigrants face may directly emanate from their condition of being an immigrant rather than their identity of belonging to a specific religious or ethnic group. This type of experience based on ideological recognition of immigrants’ esteem will be explored in detail in Chapter 5.

Secondly, Canada is a hard case to crack because of the way it champions itself as the only legally identified multicultural country in the world. The Canadian government is generally
very responsive to the recognition demands of immigrants and employs multicultural policies to satisfy these demands. There are hundreds of programs at the federal/national level funded by the Canadian ministry of multiculturalism. Canadian society also comes across in the public polls as pro-immigrant. This kind of overwhelmingly positive discourse on multiculturalism, I believe, clouds our vision when it comes to the hidden injuries that immigrants suffer in Canada because it is harder to see the layers of discrimination and exclusion under these circumstances. Since the social pathologies regarding immigrant integration in Canada are not specifically visible and usually go unnoticed, an application of Honneth’s theory can provide the necessary leverage to reveal their role as barriers to integration.

Finally, Canadian immigration policy is based on a point system which favors highly skilled foreigners by assigning points for education and work experience and accepting those who earn high scores. According to the point system, “the applicants must attain a specified minimum number of points to gain entry. The point system gives a concrete form to immigration policy goals and as such is a potentially powerful tool for steering the composition of the inflow towards those occupations and skills believed to be in high demand in Canada” (Green et al. 1995, 1008). This means that, excluding family class applicants, the primary applicants for immigration are being chosen on the basis of their merit as defined by Canadian institutions.

Canadian immigration policy is framed primarily in response to Canada’s need to maintain an economic advantage in the global market in order to increase its international competitiveness. Skilled immigration is considered a ‘cheap’ solution for increasing Canada’s economic growth because it increases the level of human capital in the labor force and Canada does not bear the cost of educating these workers. As a result, Canadian immigration policy has been heavily tied to the needs of the Canadian labor market. Skilled workers are preferred to family-class immigrants and refugees due to their high human capital (i.e., high levels of education and work experience and good command of English and/or French) and the economic independence expected of them in the Canadian labor market (Buzdigan and Halli 2009, 366-367).
One can make two important inferences with regard to the Canadian immigration system. First, immigrants are necessary for the well-being of the Canadian economy and desired by both Canadian society and the state because of their economic value. Second, this system creates a legitimate expectation about the economic opportunities that Canadian immigrants will take advantage of. It is absolutely understandable why immigrants have high expectations for their socio-economic well-being even before settling in Canada. Although the composition of the immigrant population, immigration policies based on merit, and multicultural/integration post-immigration policies are designed to reduce the challenges to immigrants in terms of economic and social integration into Canada, economic exploitation, racial discrimination, and political exclusion still continue to haunt recent immigrants to Canada. I will examine this particular pathology in Chapter 4. To reiterate my basic argument in Chapter 1, this mismatch between the pre-immigration policy and post-immigration realities will also reveal the importance of focusing on non-state socialization practices in the economic sphere for our understanding of just integration.

In conclusion, Part 2 of this dissertation discusses general themes of recognition theory within the context of Canadian pre-immigration policies, economic barriers that Canadian immigrants are suffering from after their settlement and the rationality of Canadian institutions of integration that aim to elevate these conditions. Following content specific analysis of immigrant admission policies and its conclusions are particular for the Canadian case as these policies are different in comparison to the US and other immigrant-receiving Western countries. While the core assumptions of recognition theory and the structure of my analysis are applicable to any specific context in any of these countries, I accept that the particular discussion of specific social pathologies will vary from one country to another. However, my analysis of Canada does
not aim to simply reveal institutional flaws that are specific to Canada. My analysis takes individualization and inclusion as the value horizons of modern liberal societies and analyzes common practices of liberal institutions in Canada by generalizing the issue of immigrant integration as an issue of democratic community. Thus my emphasis on the particular interpretation of already existing integration norms is concerned about the structural injustices. Finally, I contend that as the economic societal values are structured and interpreted globally in neo-liberal age, my examination of Canadian immigrants’ suffering in the job market as a democratic justice problem can be generalized to many of the socio-economic realities of other immigrant-receiving counties. Next I will explain whom I generally refer to as immigrants in my analysis of integration in Canada.

5. The Categories of Immigrants

In this section, I would like to discuss several important specifications of my study of immigrant integration. The immigrant category which I will be employing for this study is that of (1) legal immigrants admitted through the skilled worker program. This “ideal type” is based on human capital theory’s assumptions, as it portrays a “highly-skilled, well-educated, English- or French-speaking, upper class male or female” (Buzdigan and Halli 2009, 366-367). As I mentioned above, I will focus on economic barriers to the immigrants’ entrance to the Canadian job market. My basic argument is that even though a major proportion of immigrants to Canada are admitted based on their skills and qualifications, once they arrive, they are either stuck in survival jobs or unemployed. This is the reason why I narrow down my definition of “immigrant” in this manner.

There are also differences between newcomers, longtime residents, and second-generation immigrants. The economic pathologies investigated in this project mostly affect (2)
newcomers; however, longtime residents and even second-generation immigrants in Canada are not generally free from unemployment and poverty. Moreover, I will generally be talking about (3) individual immigrants rather than immigrant groups. While my main emphasis will be on (4) immigrants coming from anywhere except US and UK, my arguments has a stronger stance for (5) immigrants who belong to racial minorities and women immigrants of any nationality.

Another reason to narrow down the immigrant category that I analyze is that the term “immigrant” is a very complicated concept to tackle with from a single theoretical perspective. Generally, there is a misguided meshing of immigrant identity with ethnic identity in the current political theory literature. However, I believe that newcomer immigrants’ status as foreigners differentiates them from other excluded groups and calls for special attention to the meaning of being an immigrant.

1. Being an immigrant is not an identity but a condition. Evidently, “immigrant” is an umbrella term. Not all immigrant experiences are the same. One needs to qualify the half empty signifier “immigrant” with country of origin, ethnicity, race, etc. Indeed, in the literature, immigrants are usually treated in terms of their ethnicity or race, for example, as African or Turkish immigrants. This categorization of immigrants may change with regard to the context in which we analyze the problems of one particular immigrant group. The form that misrecognition takes for the specific individual or group of immigrants and the consequences of it may vary. For example, while visible minorities may complain more about discrimination because of their race, an invisible minority may feel excluded because of their educational background. However, the conditions of being a foreigner³ and having an accent can be counted as the common ground/characteristics of all immigrants around the world. The basic claim in this dissertation is that many individuals in the virtue of having the condition of being an immigrant in common
suffer from explicit structural injustices emanating from misrecognition of their respect and ideological recognition of their esteem.

In the political theory literature, even though there are extensive studies on the ethics of immigration (Bauböck 1994, Carens 1995, Bader 1997, Benhabib 2004), the problem of conditions of the immigrant is understudied. One of the main reasons for this negligence is the general, but ill-founded, perception of the condition of the newcomer immigrant as a “potential citizen to be” (Von Vacano 2010, 9). This expectation may lead many not to question whether immigrants face misrecognition different from that of underrepresented native citizens. I argue that even everyone in modern capitalistic societies suffer more or less from such economic problems, economic obstacles to immigrants are specific to the immigrant population which can be identified neither as a definitive group nor class.

2. Unlike other minority groups, immigrants go through a strange transformation. As Honig (2007) points out, newcomer immigrants generally go through a stage of mourning for the ones they have left behind. In addition to the feelings of grief, loss, and separation, newcomer immigrants may also suffer from indeterminacy, because of the lengthy process of adaptation to the new socio-economic and political environment of the host country. These psychological feelings may affect immigrant self-formation and ability to integrate into the host society.

To be forced to cross the Atlantic as a slave in chains, to cross the Mediterranean or the Rio Grande illegally, heading hopefully North, or even to sweat in slow queues before officialdom, clutching passports and work permits, is to acquire the habit of living in between worlds, caught in a frontier that runs through your tongue, religion, music, dress, appearance and life. To come from elsewhere, from “there” and not “here”, and hence to be simultaneously inside and outside the situation at hand, is to live at the intersection of histories and memories… this drama, rarely freely chosen, is also the drama of the stranger (Chambers 1994, 6).

Who is the immigrant? She is a foreigner, indeed, a stranger. She brings her foreign lifeworld with herself. However, she acknowledges the desirability of the other’s lifeworld. She
wants to be an autonomous individual but also has strong attachments with her ethnic group in the host country for economic and also psychological reasons. Moreover, “the person finds herself with a new life-project on the one hand, and the ties and pulls of the old country at the same time, particularly in the form of family obligations” (Von Vacano, 2010, 14).

Immigrants in general, and newcomer immigrants in particular, are in a unique position in society. On the one hand, the newcomer immigrant has the opportunity to recreate herself and her family from scratch in a new country where possibilities in theory seem endless. On the other hand, immigrants face many difficulties in this self-making project. Unlike other misrecognized groups within the host society, immigrants voluntarily put themselves in a position in which they need to create a new understanding of themselves.

However, unlike other underrepresented groups, the state does not recognize immigrants as it recognizes native citizens in general because of the legal regulation of immigration. “The criteria for selection of new immigrants that are allowed to enter the nation are not grounded on norms that apply equally to all applicants. Nor are the applicants treated as individuals: they are seen as members of given groups or nationalities. Secondly, it means that the state acts towards immigrants in a relationship of subordination akin to the subject-object dialectic. The immigrant is dependent on the choices of state actors, particularly in the bureaucracy, who themselves must follow the guidelines and procedures of state policy” (Von Vacano 2010, 19).

These are the reason why immigrants’ relation with the host country and culture is slightly different from that of other underrepresented groups. Immigrants are always aware of the fact that they are not equal with other citizens and this condition of inequality was not imposed by the state or society but through the free choice of the immigrant.
3. I claim that immigrants’ transformation, adaptation and demands for recognition can be best understood considering these recognition orders, namely “the imaginary recognition order” and “the invented recognition order”, in addition to “real recognition order” of the host society. Imaginary order refers to the immigrants’ memory and nostalgia to their origin country’s societal culture, environment and lifeworlds. When it comes to most of the immigrants, we have to accept the fact that they were previously subject to a completely different recognition order in their origin country. Their experience of indeterminacy emanating from the conflicting rationalities inherent in the real recognition order is mostly shaped by their previous experiences. Cognitively, when faced with irrationality of economic hardships, immigrants take refuge to their “imagined recognition order” to find the type of recognition they intuitively need. Unlike other underrepresented groups, the immigrants’ rejection of their current situation takes place in their old ethical order.

Furthermore, an additional reaction to the feelings of misrecognition happens within the groups of immigrants coming from the same country. Immigrants invent a unique culture and treat it as their real generalized other. The invented culture emerges “in reaction to the situations, views, and discrimination they faced on arrival” (Portes 1996, 95). “While the public sphere is both constraining and daunting to a new immigrant, the private sphere of cultural activity becomes a solace for the immigrant experience” (Von Vacano 2010, 9-10). That is what I call “invented recognition order” which misses the mark of full implications of an ethical order. Ethnic enclaves can be best understood in terms of this kind of recognition order. “Invented recognition order” is a healthy reaction on the part of immigrants and also supported by multicultural theories. However, it can inhibit the integration of immigrants in two ways. First, if the immigrant group is hierarchical, it may cause disrespect to some specific group of
immigrants. Second, if this recognition order cannot find a real expression within the host society’s order, it means that the full integration of immigrants into their host society will be impossible.

Therefore, deprived of the environment where they exercise mutual recognition, immigrants invent a culture, which broadens the gap between immigrants and host community further by marginalizing immigrant identity. This process should be understood as interactive. It is not the product of immigrant actions per se, but rather, the product of the conditions created by the official language and general perception of immigrants. This condition is unique with regard to the socio-economic conditions that other underrepresented groups suffer. Even though I do not have space to discuss these recognition orders further, I believe that a realization of these interconnections gives us valuable lessons for easing integration of immigrant.

6. Conclusion

To summarize, I believe that recognition theory’s reconstructive and relational approach to the particularity and universal values gives flexibility of interpretation to the researcher not only for testing auxiliary hypotheses of recognition theory when it comes to the particular issues but also for diagnosing less visible social pathologies. In this chapter, I have provided background information to set the scene for my application of recognition theory to the specific economic barriers to immigrants’ entrance to the Canadian job market. I have introduced the core assumptions of Honneth’s recognition theory that I will keep intact in the application and tried to justify my case of choice. Lastly, I have examined conditions and recognition orders specific to immigrants and narrowed down my unit of analysis. In the second part of the dissertation, my focus will be on newcomer immigrants admitted to Canada from the high skilled labor category.
Endnotes:

1 As Carens (2001) argues, “most contemporary political debates about immigration are not primarily concerned with what justice requires, permits, or prohibits, but with conflicting conceptions of what is good for the political community. People disagree about the social, economic, political, cultural, demographic, and environmental consequences of immigration and about whether any given consequences will be bad or good for the political community. What both sides in these debates share is the view that the policy should be determined, for the most part, by what is good for the existing community (or some segment of it) and not by what is good for the immigrants” (28).

2 Federal Skilled Worker Program: “The Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP) is responsible for 81 percent of all economic immigrant admissions and 46 percent of total admissions. Skilled workers must have at least one year of work experience in professional, managerial, or skilled trade/technical occupations in order to qualify for the program, and are evaluated based on other points-system criteria — education, age, proficiency in English or French, and adaptability” (migrationpolicy.org, 2011).

3 See Honnig. 2001. Democracy and the Foreigner. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. Honig explores how immigrant identity as a foreigner legitimizes host country’s political system. She looks at the “symbolic politics of foreignness” (p. 6) and its applications for democratic theory. Honig rightly points out the fact that immigrants’ foreignness both supplements and threatens the unity of host country. Honig explores the transitional character of the immigrant with a psychoanalytic study of the Book of Ruth. She claims that for democratic expansions to be successful, both receiving population and immigrants should mutually engage “their home-yearning”. I agree with Bonig about the necessity to acknowledge the transitional character of immigrants and their psychological feelings of loss and mourning.

4 To my knowledge, there is only one forthcoming article on immigrant identity in political theory literature. Von Vacano employs a Nietzschean perspective to point out the ressentiment problem for the formation of immigrant identity. The theory of ressentiment tries to explain the direction and the processes of immigrant identity formation within the host society. I have several problems with Von Vacano’s approach. First of all, Von Vacano does not explain what he means by “identity” in general. Second, I agree with Von Vacano’s diagnosis about the conditions specific to the immigrants, which limit the positive relation to self. Immigrants need to reconstruct their understanding of the self when they settle down in their new country. Von Vacano calls this dualistic position where immigrants are in between neither a full-fledged citizen of the host country nor they completely unattached their idea of the self from their origin country. Unlike Von Vacano, I claim that immigrants are in a more complicated position that one can call dualistic. Third, Von Vacano presents the cultural activities of ethno-cultural groups within the host country as the actualization of this kind of dualistic immigrant identity. In that sense, ethno-cultural groups appear as the dialectical knot of this dualistic situation of immigrant condition, a place where an immigrant achieves the self-identification. However, if immigrants do this willingly or unwillingly is out of context of Von Vacano’s analysis.

Part Two: Application of the Theory of Recognition to the Canadian Case
Chapter Four: Pre-Immigration Policies, Social Pathologies and the Sphere of Respect

1. Introduction

My main aim in the second part of this dissertation is to investigate how economic integration mechanisms for immigrants in Canada might systematically devalue immigrant labor, transform their self-esteem, and as a result inhibit their integration into the host society. Through statistical evidence and ethnographical life narratives of immigrants, I first aim to understand the determining factors behind the high poverty rates among immigrants in Canada. Second, I will employ Honneth’s tri-partite recognition model to analyze these factors with regard to the spheres of right, and esteem. Third, I will investigate the current institutional relations and practices for integration of immigrants in Canada and criticize these practices with reference to the normative criteria of each recognition sphere. This move is necessary to show not only the pathological realities but also the future prospects for change to accomplish more justice and inclusiveness in modern capitalistic societies.

In Chapter 4, specifically, I will introduce the details on the basic contradiction that Canadian immigrants face. Canadian immigrant admission policy, namely the point system, favors highly skilled and educated foreigners by giving priority to the education and work experiences of immigrants for their immigration admission. The skills and qualifications of immigrants are basically determined by this pre-immigration policy. However, statistical data shows that these highly qualified immigrants do not fare well in the Canadian job market. To illustrate, “census data examined show that among university graduates, immigrants are many times more likely to be working in several occupations requiring only a high school education; in the case of ‘taxi and limousine drivers’, the figure is ten times more likely” (Boyd 2013, 167).
The higher rates of poverty and unemployment that immigrants experience compared to their Canadian counterparts is the core problem that I would like to investigate through an application of recognition theory. I will reveal this pathology by first introducing pre-immigration policies, and second, analyzing them in terms of the unrealistic expectations that they might create for immigrants before even coming to Canada. Moreover, I will examine the determining factors behind the high poverty rates among Canadian immigrants. To do that, I will categorize the barriers to the economic integration of immigrants under two headings as the ones emanating from innate characteristics (in direct contrast with liberal institutional and capitalistic rationality) and the ones emanating from the skills and qualification of immigrants (in line with the rationality of capitalistic markets but in contrast with the institutional rationality of immigrant admission).

Finally, I will introduce the economic barriers emanating from innate characteristics of immigrants as misrecognition of immigrants’ self-respect and will investigate the immigrant strategies and institutional arrangements to struggle against this type of misrecognition. However, before dwelling into these theoretical and empirical accounts of Canadian institutions of integration, I would like to start the Part 2 of my dissertation with a story of mine. This is a story about my own struggle to find a meaningful job in line with my qualifications in Canada. I believe that it will help me to situate the issue of immigrant integration in a more concrete setting since it is a real account of suffering that I try to analyze throughout the dissertation.

2. A Story of an Immigrant Doctor in Canada

I remember myself being nervous but confident standing in front of the building of the marketing company. I was there for an interview for a promising starter job. I was nervous because it would be my first Canadian job interview and I was not entirely sure if my English
speaking ability would undermine my potential to answer the generic job interview questions. However, I was still self-confident because at least five similar companies had contacted me for an interview, which gave me the message that I was a desired candidate in the Canadian job market. Besides, I had a Canadian masters degree, which—I believed at the time—should be more than enough for starter marketing jobs.

It was a promising job at first glance. I had been told that monthly earnings for a job like this were in the range of two thousand to five thousand Canadian dollars. There were big opportunities for career advancement in this sector, the interviewer insisted, giving herself as an upright example. After hearing what she had to say about the job, I was relieved because I was uncertain whether I could find a good paying job this soon after graduation.

I went back to the company the next day for a training session with a colleague. The point of the session was for me to understand what exactly they were doing in the company. I wore something professional-looking—a skirt and high heeled boots—and was overcome with feelings of excitement and pride. After all, it was a whole new experience for me. I was starting a career and would finally be making much-needed money.

After learning the schedule for the day from my trainer—a 45-year-old Nigerian newcomer immigrant—I remember how disappointing the rest of the day turned out for me. First, we went to the Etibioke—a suburban area, an hour and a half away from Toronto—by public transit. Then, we took another bus to a commercial area in a Chinese neighborhood and started visiting small shops one by one. We visited at least 25 stores that day, walking at least three miles in the frigid cold weather of Toronto.

My trainer entered each shop with a strong and authoritarian posture demanding respect and obedience. After all, he was posing as an official representative of the one and only electric
company in Toronto. Without showing any identification, he asked the shop owners—usually Chinese immigrants— to show their electricity bill to him. He intentionally put fear into these people’s hearts by insinuating that they may have been doing something wrong for all these years and might be punished. After investigating each electricity bill, he told the immigrant shop owners how they were being unlawful by not enrolling in a certain service that the electricity company provided and tried to encourage them to enroll in that service for a certain fee. Most of them out of fear enrolled in this new service; only couple of them realized that it was a scam and started to yell at my trainer to get his sorry being out of their shop.

I had an opportunity to talk to my trainer on our way back home. He told me that he was a doctor in Nigeria. It had been a year and a half since he immigrated to Canada and this marketing scam was the only job he could find. He was eager to bring his wife and children from Nigeria to Canada and that was the reason why he was using these deceitful methods to get people buy the service they actually did not need. Since the job I had been so excited about was commission based, he could not make any money— the travel expenses were all on him— if he did not fool people into thinking that they had to pay for that service. And, much to my dismay, this is exactly what I was being asked to do.

At the time, I tried to picture myself walking hours in the cold weather, posing as someone else and lying to clueless people. I imagined myself doing this hundreds of times a month to earn good enough money to survive. I told myself that my English was much better than my Nigerian trainer’s and I had a Canadian diploma. He may have had to do this for some time until he had enough credentials in Canada, just like me. I was better off than him and this could not be the fate of all immigrants. Maybe he has a character flaw, I thought. I was certain that I would not have to take these marketing jobs till I realized— after months of training in
employment agencies and applying to thousands of job ads— that only these marketing companies got back to me for an interview.

I was a 25-year-old Turkish immigrant woman back then. I was full of self-confidence and very hopeful about my future career. During the two-year job search in Canada, I had to let go of my self-image that I brought from Turkey together with my name, even my history of education. I ended up working at a Starbucks where customers took their frustration out on immigrant baristas. The customers would get angry at the immigrant baristas because of their inability to make a simple “extra foamy non-fat dry cappuccino.” We, highly educated immigrants, lowered our self-esteem enough to accept a part-time job that had nothing to do with our credentials. To add insult to injury, we were humiliated because there was a general assumption among our Canadian customers that we were not even qualified enough to be their baristas.

As an immigrant, when I look back and remember the initial hopes and self-esteem that I brought to Canada, I realize how naive I was. After long hours of friendly chats with my immigrant friends and informal interviews with newcomer immigrants that frequented employment agencies, immigration offices, and neighborhood houses in Toronto and Vancouver, I realize I am not the only one. Now that I have experienced the Canadian job market for myself, I see my Nigerian trainer from a different perspective. Reflecting upon it, I do not believe that he had a character flaw or that he was simply an immoral person. After all, he was a doctor healing people in Nigeria. What I have realized instead is that the Canadian economic market and societal values attached to immigrants, rather than immigrants themselves, have major flaws.

Even though the legal admission of immigrants based on certain skill sets has often been perceived as an economic win-win policy strategy for both the host society and immigrants, we
observe that this is not usually the case. There are, of course, success stories about how immigrants excel in their careers in the host country. For example, every year, twenty-five immigrants are recognized by Canadian Immigrant Magazine as the top Canadian immigrants. These successful immigrants who managed to contribute to the well-being of Canadian society are introduced as role models for newcomer immigrants. “Ranging from artists to philanthropists to entrepreneurs from a variety of ethnicities across the country,” (canadianimmigrant.ca 2013) they are supposed to be inspirations for immigrants in general.

However, these few exceptions do not change the general observation of the low economic success of first and even second-generation immigrants. Immigrants struggle with poverty more than anyone else in their host country. For example, according to statistical studies, the average poverty rate especially among recent immigrants is significantly higher than the average poverty rates of the Canadian population (ammsa.ca 2013). How and why do immigrants suffer from poverty in the economic system of the host country? Why does this seemingly contradictory situation occur in the first place? How do economic market and institutions affect immigrants’ feelings of self-esteem and in turn their integration? More specifically, how can a formerly dignified physician from Nigeria in turn become a scam artist after his immigration to Canada? These are the questions that drive the second part of the dissertation. Next I will introduce the basic contradiction between the pre-immigration policies and the post-immigration realities in Canada.

3. Pre-immigration Policy and the Contradiction

In Canadian discourse, it is said that admission to Canada is a privilege and not a right. According to the Canadian point based system (PBS),

points are awarded to applicants based on personal characteristics assumed to be associated with short and long-run adaptation to the Canadian economy. Thus, points
are given for general characteristic such as education, age, and language proficiency, as well as specifically targeted characteristics such as whether the applicant already has a job arranged and whether he or she is in an occupation in high demand in Canada. Applicants must obtain 70 out of a possible 100 points to be admissible, and assisted relatives, if they cannot pass this threshold, are awarded 15 bonus points. In this system, as in earlier versions, occupation-related characteristics play a central role. Points for occupational skill, experience, and demand plus special points for designated occupations make up 43 out of the 100 possible points. Applicants who exceed the threshold are admitted on a first-come-first-served basis. The total number of immigrants to be admitted to Canada in a year is set by the government in advance after consultations with interested parties such as the provinces. Within that total, applicants are processed according to a specified set of priorities. Top priority goes to family and refugee class immigrants. Family class immigrants are given high priority because their entry into Canada is based on the right of Canadian residents to reunify their close relatives (Green et al. 1995, 1009)

It is estimated that Canada will welcome between 240,000 and 265,000 new permanent residents in 2011. Sixty percent of these immigrants will come through economic streams. Thus, approximately 155,000 highly skilled immigrants earned the privilege to be admitted to Canada in 2011 (Government of Canada.ca 2010). Moreover, Canada is very ambitious to increase its global share of highly skilled immigrants. Former Minister of Citizenship Jason Kenney has recently announced that the recruitment of highly skilled immigrants will be proactive: the Canadian government is encouraging Canadian employers to attend job fairs to recruit immigrants to Canada (Canadianimmigrant.ca 2012). Actually, according to Gera and Songsakul (2007), Canada is recruiting twice its fair share of highly skilled and educated immigrants. From the pre-immigration perspective, these endeavors look like fair game. Canada as a nation state has borders and can choose whomever it wants to admit to the country as an immigrant.

In this sense, the skills and qualifications of immigrants are basically determined by the pre-immigration policy. Considering this fact, one can make two important inferences with regard to the Canadian immigration system for the integration of immigrants. First, immigrants are necessary or in demand for the well-being of the Canadian economy and desired by both
Canadian society and state because of their economic and demographic value. They provide
economic and demographic security to Canada. Second, immigrants can infer certain facts about
the economic opportunities in Canada's job market from its immigration system. Even though
Canadian government does not give any promises in terms of employment or wages during the
admission process, immigrants may mistakenly assume that the approval of their skills and
qualifications as Canadian immigrants signals extensive opportunities to find meaningful
employment in Canada. Since legal immigration to a country is always a voluntary and
intentional choice, this kind of optimistic expectations may play a considerable role in
immigrants’ decision to immigrate.

However, when we look at the post-immigration realities rather unpleasant circumstances
such as high poverty and unemployment confront Canadian immigrants coming from outside of
the USA and UK. As discussed multiple times before, this contradiction is the starting point of
my analysis of the social pathologies that immigrants suffer in Canada. The apparent gap
between the expectations that pre-immigration policies may create and the economic realities of
immigrant employment after the settlement is uncalled for. The fantasy recognition order that
immigrants are being admitted to dissolves soon after their settlement. I argue that pre-
immigration policies in Canada may express a certain kind of recognition order for the
immigrants’ psyche that is non-existent in real life. I contend that this fantasy recognition order
can be understood as an ideological tool to attract highly skilled immigrants who, in theory, can
integrate into Canadian society more easily than low-skilled ones.

In a recent article, Ruth Cox (2012) applies the theory of recognition to Australian pre-
immigration policies. She also argues that pre-immigration policies and institutions refer to a
recognition order that is said to be in place in the host country (Cox 2012, 193). However, Cox
analyzes Australian immigration policies from an opposing perspective. She argues that the positive historical changes in Australian pre-immigration policies show us that there is a progress in the recognition given to immigrants in terms of their respect and esteem. For example, the fact that Australia left its White-Australia policy behind and has started recruiting immigrants in terms of their skills shows that immigrants are socially included in Australian society with regard to their skills instead of their innate qualities like race, ethnicity etc. Moreover, Cox in her dissertation on the same topic spends quite some time on refugee policies and how these policies have been improved to give recognition to humanity of foreigners in the sphere of respect.

I believe that Cox is making several implicit assumptions about immigration and recognition theories to be able to approach pre-immigration policies the way she does. Her basic assumption is that immigration policies are somehow effective mechanisms for giving due recognition to immigrants. By looking at pre-immigration policies, Cox proposes that we can arrive at definitive conclusions about the three spheres of recognition without even analyzing the recognition order that immigrants are subject to after their settlement. For example, she takes family reunification policy as being directly related to how the immigrant receiving society values love relationships for their immigrants. Moreover, the skilled worker program shows that society values the esteem of immigrants. I believe that this approach is problematic first because pre-immigration policies can be ideological. Hence, they can promise a change in value without enabling a real change in the material world. Second, government policies can never be enough for the recognition of immigrants' esteem and respect. Immigrants need to feel that they are worthy and valuable for their skills and qualification as cooperating members of their host society. Thus, by confining the possibilities of immigrant inclusion and recognition within
institutionalized immigration policies, I believe that Cox fails to recognize the social aspects of misrecognition and economic barriers to social inclusion.

Moreover, by making core assumptions about host societies’ recognition order and justice system with an analysis of pre-immigration policies (how countries accept legal immigrants and refugees), Cox neglects to question post-immigration policies and the social pathologies that immigrants suffer after their settlement. Thus, she employs critical theoretical understanding of recognition but fails to criticize host countries. Because her theory is built around immigration policies and how they affect due recognition, any type of inclusive change in those policies directs us towards a kind of a progress and celebration of that progress. However, one can simply argue that the admission of the skilled worker class of immigrants should not be counted as a progress towards improving the autonomy of immigrants but a simple cooperation of firms and state to improve the prosperity of the host country at the expense of the respect and esteem of its nationals who are unemployed. Therefore, the improvement of recognition in immigration policies can be purely ideological and may not provide material changes to the life of its immigrants or to the native citizens.

In conclusion, Cox understands immigrants’ position as rather advantageous. She treats skilled immigrants as people who have already improved their esteem and respect by coming to Australia. This may be true but it creates an illusion that these people would not demand more recognition after their settlement. Cox simply takes the term “social inclusion” as actualized through the official admission of applicants as immigrants into Australian society. This kind of understanding of social inclusion (legal, unidirectional and automatic) is unsubstantiated, as my earlier arguments have shown. Therefore, I believe that the contradiction that is created by pre-
immigration policies and immigrants’ place in Canadian economy should be studied from a recognition theory perspective.

4. Immigrants’ Place in the Job Market

Recent research indicates that the newcomer immigrants to Canada have had lower earnings outcomes compared to their Canadian counterparts (Nakamura et al. 2003, 1). On an urban level, the poverty rate of immigrants is 52% in comparison to 24.5% percent for all residents in Toronto (Lee 2000, 82). “Data from the 2006 Census shows that while 9.7% of Canadian born persons fell below the poverty line, a notable 34.1% of recent immigrants (2 years or less) lived in poverty. In fact, 10 years after arriving in Canada, immigrants face poverty rates twice as high as Canadian born persons. It takes 20 years for the poverty rates of immigrants to equalize with the poverty rates of persons born in Canada” (Ammsa.org 2013)

The reason why the poverty rate is significantly high among newcomer immigrants is that they are either unemployed or stuck with low paid or “survival jobs”. “Recent immigrants’ unemployment rates in Canada compared to similarly-aged non-immigrants are almost twice as high, and median wages of recent immigrant workers are also about 49% lower compared to native-born workers” (Canadian Census 2006). According to Chun and Cheong’s research on immigrants’ economic status, many immigrants are stuck in low paying jobs —such as cashiering, house-keeping, and janitorial work (Chun et al. 2011, 4).

This apparent wage gap between immigrants and their Canadian born counterparts has been theoretically explained in two different ways. The lower average wages for some groups of immigrants can either indicate their lower average productive value for the national economy or the fact that they suffer from labor market discrimination. From the productivity perspective, “some Canadians fear that the lower earnings of more recent immigrants mean that they are less
desirable to employers because their skills or work habits are less well suited for Canada. There are fears that these newer immigrants will pull down the productivity of the nation” (Nakamura et al. 2003, 1). However, statistical research shows that immigrants’ qualifications and skills are higher than their Canadian counterparts; thus their potential productivity is in reality considered higher (Nakamura et al. 2003, 1). This shows us that Canadians’ initial worry about immigrants being a burden on Canadian economy due to their low productivity might be incorrect. However, the statistical invalidation of these worries does not make them go away. The anxiety over immigrants being a burden to the host society’s economy has also been expressed through public accusations that immigrants are a drain on welfare services and that they take jobs from native-born Canadians (Vertovec 1999).

Even though these worries are usually imagined, the public debate over the economic integration of immigrants has mainly been geared towards easing this kind of public anxiety towards immigrants. In the first chapter, I discussed the reasons behind this particular form of debate. I argue that these kinds of concerns about immigrant integration have diverted our gaze from real injustices that immigrants are suffering from. The dominant focus has been on false presuppositions of highly abstract concepts like social cohesion, stability, and security of the host country. In this sense, Chapter One aims at revealing an alternative perspective to understand the problem of immigrant integration. This alternative analysis advises us to leave our deeply ingrained anxieties and prejudices towards immigrants behind and change our perspective from the imagined interests of the receiving country to the real sufferings of immigrants from injustices in their host country.

In the spirit of the first chapter, this chapter aims at uncovering social pathologies emanating from the conflicting institutional rationalities. If the education and skill sets of
immigrants are not the determining factors of their high poverty and unemployment levels, how can we explain the clear wage gap between immigrants and their national counterparts? I will argue that many high skilled immigrants in Canada suffer from misrecognition and ideological recognition of their skills and qualifications and this can be the reason why they are either stuck in survival jobs or unemployed.

Before concluding that the social pathologies of recognition orders are the main cause of high levels of poverty and unemployment among immigrants, I want to consider the fact that settling in a place will always require some time. The conventional wisdom dictates that many of the hardships that immigrants face in the job market are natural and will disappear over time, just like their foreignness. In fact, Joseph Carens (2010) argues that after residing for some time, immigrants should be acknowledged as citizens of the host country. Spending enough time in a place plays a significant role in immigrants’ ability to claim rights and duties from their host country. Here, Carens uses the time card to make an argument for the political equality claims of immigrants. However, the “adaptation takes time” argument is overwhelmingly employed to justify the economic challenges that immigrants face in the host market. This view normalizes the fact that many highly educated immigrants are unemployed or can only get survival jobs. After all, this is normal because it takes time for immigrants to learn the mechanisms of the Canadian job market, culture, institutions, and English language. From this perspective, the ideal situation for the host country in the case of economic integration would be something like the following: immigrants should acknowledge their lower status, be patient, and continue with their hard-working and law-abiding ways while working at whichever survival job they can find.

I partially agree with the “adaptation takes time” argument. However, taking it as the sole determining factor has prevented us from investigating the systematic discrimination against
immigrants in the capitalistic system in depth. I believe that a recognition theoretical analysis of established integration mechanisms in Canada will provide the necessary leverage for our understanding of the reasons why immigrants are either stuck in survival jobs or unemployed for long period of time even though they have valuable skills and qualifications. Before starting a critical and many-leveled investigation of the issue of immigrant integration, first, I will introduce the barriers to immigrant employment as social pathologies.

5. Economic Barriers as Social Pathologies

In the previous section, I introduced the higher rates of poverty and unemployment that immigrants experience compared to their Canadian counterparts as the core problem that I would like to investigate through an application of recognition theory. Through a brief analysis of statistical literature, I arrived at the conclusion that the basic reasons behind the problem are societal and economic practices of exclusion and discrimination. But what does this statement tell us about the issue of immigrant integration? Is this a problem of cultural misrecognition and discrimination? Or is it a problem of misrecognition of immigrant skills in the job market? If the problem emanates from the capitalistic market itself, should we understand it as a systemic problem or as a problem emanating from an ideological evaluation of certain societal values such as esteem and achievement?

In the immigration literature, scholars argue that there are several barriers for immigrants to find jobs in line with their qualifications, such as the non-recognition of foreign credentials, the lack of “Canadian experience,” limited English skills (1134), easier access to specific occupational niches and training opportunities, and discriminatory practices of the job market based on origin and immigration status (Reitz 2001; Ng 1990-2 Chun et al. 2006; Kazemipur and Halli, 2001). Employment discrimination based on origin is a visible discriminatory practice,
which can be rejected easily with regard to liberal democratic values of neutrality and equality. However, other barriers—foreign credentials and experience, limited English skills, etc.—are not that easy to tackle because they refer to qualifications and skills rather than innate characteristics of immigrants. In this sense, these barriers cannot be identified as directly discriminatory. Employers’ demand for these qualifications is seemingly justifiable when we consider the logic of the free market. After all, are not the maximization of efficiency and profit and lowering the costs of training the basic interests of the employers?

Therefore, I categorize the barriers to the economic integration of immigrants under two headings as the ones emanating from innate characteristics (in direct contrast with liberal institutional and capitalistic rationality) and the ones emanating from the skills and qualification of immigrants (in line with the rationality of capitalistic markets but in contrast with the expectations that institutional rationality of immigrant admission). I categorize discriminatory practices in terms of the “being” and the “doing” of the immigrant worker, because “next to the recognition of the social status linked to the profession, work can also afford a form of recognition based on the doing, not the being, of the worker, that is, a recognition based on the quality of the relationship that the worker has maintained with the ‘real’” (Dejours and Deranty 2010, 172). “Doing” relates to not only the job that immigrants are doing but also how they get to do it. However this division between economic barriers should not be approached as two absolutely separate mechanisms of discrimination, as I will show in Chapter 6, they are quite interconnected.

Finally, I take these barriers as indicative of social pathologies that immigrants experience during their economic integration process. The existence of these barriers may instantiate a certain recognition order, which disadvantages immigrants (though visible
minorities among native-born citizens can also experience similar disadvantages) in the Canadian job market.

So far, I have discussed the apparent gap between the expectations that pre-immigration policies create and the economic realities of immigrant employment after the settlement. In the following section, I will focus on the economic barriers emanating from immigrants’ innate characteristics, such as ethnicity, race, gender, and accent. These characteristics can be defined as the “being” of immigrants. The universal equality principle dictates that no one should be treated differently with regard to her innate characteristics. Thus this kind of economic barriers to immigrants’ entrance to the Canadian job market can be identified as a social pathology caused by the misrecognition of the legal equality of immigrants in the sphere of respect of the modern capitalist societies. This kind of social pathology is genealogically different from the social pathologies emanating from the devaluation of immigrants’ skills in the capitalistic job market.

For the following section, my aim is to investigate, first, the direct discriminatory barriers that immigrants may face, and second, the mechanisms that the Canadian state provides to compensate immigrants for the disadvantages emanating from these economic discriminatory practices. Then, I will claim that even though the anti-discriminatory programs that multiculturalist policies produce are helpful for the integration of immigrants, they are not sufficient to provide conditions for the mutual recognition of immigrants. In Chapters 5 and 6, I will argue that these policies can even be employed in an ideological manner to keep immigrants’ lower status intact in the economic job market. Before beginning my discussion, I would like to start with a brief introduction to Honneth’s understanding of the sphere of respect.
6. The Sphere of Respect

As mentioned in the literature review, there are three spheres of recognition designating three types of normative interactions. According to Honneth, love, respect, and esteem are necessary conditions for individuals to develop full autonomy. These three normative conditions provide, first, a secure environment in which one’s needs, values and beliefs are taken care of (love through familial care and friendship); second, a perception of the self as equal to all (respect through legal equality); and, third, a symmetrical validation of one’s contribution to societal life (esteem through the achievement principle). The spheres of recognition provide “minimal conditions that enable a subject to develop a minimal sense of his or her value; a self-value that is the most basic requirement for any action with a minimal amount of autonomy” (Deranty 2009, 276).

The first sphere of recognition, namely love, provides conditions for individuals to form a sufficient degree of confidence required to engage with others socially. In the literature review section, I have already mentioned how Honneth, through an object-relations theoretical perspective, argues that human beings desire mutual recognition and the first place they experience this kind of interaction is with their caregiver when they are babies. Individuals’ social abilities are largely shaped by these interactions. However, being able to appear in public without shame for one’s authentic values, beliefs, and needs requires two other recognition spheres with regard to agents’ relationships with state, non-state corporations and overall society.

The second sphere, the sphere of respect, is concerned with our relationship to the state and other fellow citizens. The normative criterion that arranges the mutual interactions of self-respect between citizens and the state is the provision of legal rights to every subject on an equal basis. Honneth argues that the principle of universal equality is the most important achievement
of modern capitalistic societies, and many current struggles of recognition are for equal status (Deranty 2009, 294).

Honneth investigates the achievements in the sphere of respect by an analysis of Marshall’s famous article titled *Citizenship and Social Class*. In this sense, “Marshall’s historical delineation of the widening of the sphere of rights offers Honneth a synthetic presentation of the development of modern law as the gradual expansion of subjective rights that is linked directly to the demise of rigid class organization” (Deranty 2009, 299). In his discussion of Marshall’s categorization of rights into civil, political, and social rights, Honneth introduces the dialectical progression of individual rights from the civil to the political and from the political to the social sphere. The basic claim is that the legalization of abstract rights by itself is not enough to actualize the equal treatment principle of the sphere of respect. Recognition theory’s task is to put forward the necessary conditions for individuals to experience themselves as political equals. The history of the expansion of rights into the social sphere illustrates the necessity of the formulation of abstract rights into concrete spheres of human life (Honneth 1996, 115-118).

In this sense, the sphere of respect in modern societies ties recognition, law, and rational morality together because legal equality is not only a necessary condition for individuals to have self-respect but also presents itself as a right which justifies the current political and social order. Therefore, with a Neo-Kantian perspective, Honneth argues that the legitimacy of the political system completely depends on the approval of all of its members. For this approval to be normatively valid, we need to suppose that legal subjects can make reasonable, autonomous decisions regarding moral questions (Honneth 1996, 114).
Self-respect is important for an individual’s self-formation because it identifies the individual as an “end in itself” and her existence as socially relevant. “For the individual member of society, to live without rights means to have no chance of developing self-respect” (Honneth 1996, 119). Rights empower the possessor to act with her interaction partners on an equal footing (120). Thus, they are pre-conditions for any type of autonomous action. Accordingly, the social integrity of the individual as a morally responsible subject is threatened by exclusion and denial of their rights.

The integration of immigrants is only possible through relations of legal equal recognition by the host state and fellow citizens. In the previous chapter, I have argued that some of the economic barriers that immigrants are facing are directly related to the immigrants’ innate characteristics. Next, I will introduce these together with specific examples and evaluate these kinds of discriminatory practices from the recognition perspective.

7. Employment Discrimination and Respect

Many scholars in the immigration literature argue that immigrants’ economic success level is determined by employment discrimination (Reitz 2001, 2006; Li 2001, 2003; Kazzemipur and Halli 2001). Employment discrimination is described “as negative employment decisions based on statuses such as birthplace or origins, rather than based solely on credentials and qualifications directly related to the potential productivity of the employee” (Reitz 2001, 353).

Employment discrimination can happen in the form of either skill undervaluation or pay inequity. These two forms of labor market discrimination are slightly different from each other in terms of immigrants’ access to jobs. Pay inequity means that immigrants have full access to jobs but they are being paid less than native-born citizens for the same or similar work. In contrast,
skill undervaluation or devaluation of immigrants can be defined as “any employment of immigrants in work below a level of skill at which they could function as effectively as native-born Canadians” (Reitz 2001, 350).

As previously mentioned, the composition of immigrants in Canada has changed after the 1967 Immigration Act. Before the policy change, more than 80 percent of immigrants to Canada came from European countries. After the implementation of the point system and the removal of preference based on country of origin, the composition of the immigrant population has changed considerably. Among the immigrants arrived in Canada between 2006 and 2011, the proportion of immigrants of European origin had fallen to 13.7 percent. The vast majority of immigrants are thus, according to Canadian discourse, visible minorities (Papillion 2002, 9-10; statcan.gc.ca 2011).

Like many other visible minorities, immigrants are facing discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, etc. However, two specific examples of employment discrimination that immigrants—rather than native-born visible minorities— specifically experience are discriminatory practices based on foreign accent and names. As mentioned before, limited English skills appear as one of the most valid reasons why immigrants are not able to find jobs in their caliber. It is realistic in an English-speaking country to expect employees to have a good command of the national language. However, one must accept the fact that most of the immigrants are not native English speakers and they will never be able to speak English without an accent.

In the job market, most highly skilled, long-term immigrants come to the realization that it is not their English-language ability but their native accent that is the source of disadvantage that prevents them from finding decent paying jobs (Chun et al. 2011, 10). Generally, immigrants
report that they face discrimination in phone interviews for employment or other activities such as finding housing. According to Creese and Kambere (2003)’s study, employers in Vancouver discriminate against language accents and re-assess the employment competency of African immigrant women during job interviews. They argue that “English accent marks the speaker as either local or extra-local, and thus Canadian or immigrant. In the Canadian imaginary, these are constituted as mutually exclusive entities” (10). In this sense, extra-local accents are perceived as markers of immigrant status and cause barriers for immigrants to finding decent jobs and integrating into the Canadian job market.

Moreover, the majority of participants in Chung et al. (2011)’s study claim that reference to a lack of “Canadian experience” is being used by employers to cover discriminatory hiring practices (7). This discriminatory practice has been revealed by the recent study of Oerapolus et al. (2011), which found that “Canadian-born individuals with English-sounding names are significantly more likely to receive a callback for a job interview after sending their resumes, compared to internationally-born individuals, even among those with international degrees from highly ranked schools or among those with the same listed job experience” (43). Thus, their study shows that discrimination is based on the names of the job applicants. In order to eliminate this discriminatory practice, many immigrants, especially from Asian countries, have been using nicknames in their job applications. In this sense, immigrants are put in a position in which they have to disidentify themselves in a literal sense.

Discriminatory practices such as these can be identified as misrecognition of immigrants for their innate characteristics. This kind of direct discrimination should be studied under the second sphere of the recognition order, namely respect. The sphere of respect’s normative standard is the provision of legal rights to every subject on an equal basis. The social integrity of
the individual as a morally responsible subject is threatened by exclusion and the denial of rights. Moreover, “the principle of mutual respect among autonomous persons” has the normative priority over other principles of love and achievement. The legalization of equal status is the absolute guarantee of the moral progress of norms of integration.

Accordingly, if the market mechanism itself creates unfavorable employment options for immigrants, the liberal democratic state’s duty is to regulate the market as much as possible to provide fairer terms of integration to immigrants. So what are the existing integrative institutions in Canada to discourage and eliminate this kind of discriminatory practices? As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, the Canadian state has endorsed multiculturalism as an official post-immigration policy. Within this framework, Canadian institutions implement a variety of multicultural policies. The cluster of determinants of employment discrimination of immigrants tells policy makers that immigrants are facing specific barriers in integrating into the Canadian job market. Since most of these obstacles emanate from innate qualities that immigrants cannot change or disown, it is the host society’s duty to provide programs that would help to alleviate these barriers.

Kymlicka (1998), in Finding Our Way, defends multicultural policies against their skeptics by giving reference to multicultural programs that aim to eliminate employment discrimination. He rightly claims that “multiculturalism is best understood as a response by ethno-cultural groups to the demands that the state imposes on them in its efforts to promote integration” (24). Thus, multiculturalism in practice should not only be understood as culturally specific demands that immigrants make upon the state but as a rational policy options to create fairer terms of integration of immigrants into their host country (Kymlicka 1998, 25). For this end, Kymlicka contends that Canada is promoting and implementing multicultural policies and
programs. To illustrate, “commission for regulatory guidelines regarding the ethnic stereotypes in the broadcast of media, affirmative action policies that seek to increase representation of visible minorities and cultural diversity training for employers” are a few examples of integration institutions in place for immigrants in Canada (Kymlicka 1998, 42).

These anti-discriminatory programs are all set in motion to make the integration process fairer for immigrants in Canada. Canadian institutional efforts to act in a culturally conscious way in relation to the differences and necessities of immigrant groups are exemplary. The equal recognition of immigrant identities in the legal sphere will surely provide a more just environment, which will ease the process of immigrant self-realization. However, even though these programs are attempts to improve the recognition order, many of the economic barriers emanating from immigrants’ qualification cannot be addressed by them. Next, I will investigate the limitations of multicultural integration and anti-discrimination policies when it comes to the economic success of immigrants.

8. Recognition vs. Redistribution

As discussed above under multicultural theory and policies, anti-discrimination and affirmative action programs come to the forefront for elevating the economic hardships that immigrants are suffering. These programs appear as a positive dialectical change in our understanding of the social rights given to immigrants. Although I agree that such programs are helpful, I follow in Honneth’s footsteps and argue that the legalization of political, economic and social rights does not provide sufficient conditions for full autonomy. Individuals also need to be recognized with regard to their esteem. The multicultural focus on state-funded distribution to correct or eliminate discriminatory practices can underemphasize these needs. They may even turn into ideological tools to further indirect discriminatory practices.
Honneth criticizes the liberal justice approach for neglecting to understand individuals’ vulnerability and desire for mutual interaction. As discussed in Chapter 2, the foundation of multicultural theory is based on liberal justice theories. In this sense, multiculturalism investigates the limit and scope of legal group rights within the context of the liberal state. These theories argue that liberal justice can include legal group rights as long as they do not interfere with individual rights. In these theories, the individual agent is defined not as atomistic but with regard to her cultural belonging. Through this kind of identification, multicultural theory dismisses the neutrality claims of the liberal state and offers a medium wherein individual and group rights can coexist.

Even though the multicultural theory creates leeway for the relational understanding of individuals with regard to their culture, the application of the theory via multicultural policies faces the necessity of defining cultural groups in rigid terms in order to apply the fairness principle. In addition, it treats the conditions for autonomy as something that can be distributed more equally. To illustrate, many affirmative action programs may give visible minorities more opportunities to find a job that matches their qualifications, but they cannot help these people to be acknowledged by their co-workers and employers. Thus, state-sponsored distribution programs and provision of equal civil and social rights are not sufficient for the full integration and autonomy of immigrants. This can be best presented through a discussion of Honneth and Anderson’s (2004) arguments for and against liberal justice theories.

In their paper, *Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice*, Honneth and Anderson (2004) argue that traditional rights language is so individualistic that it understands rights-guaranteeing relations as an issue of distribution as if these relations were individual possessions (139). They do acknowledge the importance of legal rights and distribution to ensure equal
opportunity but question their ability as the sole medium for securing the other conditions that are necessary for the development of individual autonomy such as self-esteem and self-trust.

The agentic competencies that comprise autonomy require that one be able to sustain certain attitudes toward oneself (in particular, self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem) and that these affectively laden self-conceptions – or, to use the Hegelian language, “practical relations-to-self” – are dependent, in turn, on the sustaining attitudes of others. One’s relationship to oneself, then, is not a matter of a solitary ego reflecting on itself, but is the result of an ongoing intersubjective process, in which one’s attitude toward oneself emerges in one’s encounter with an other’s attitude toward oneself (Honneth and Anderson 2004, 131).

In this sense, the recognition theory asserts that “the supportive recognitional infrastructure” is a condition for the possibility of autonomy. Honneth criticizes the material forms of social justice solely based on distribution of goods with regard to its understanding of individual autonomy, which strives to give agents as much independence as possible of their partners in interaction (Honneth 2012b, 37). Honneth argues that the most important consequence of this kind of one-sided understanding of individual autonomy is a theoretical emphasis on “distribution”. In this sense, justice is equated with a just distribution of goods. Even though distribution principles may be determined through a consensual deliberative process, the agency delegated to implement principles of distribution in society is the democratic state. This is problematic for two reasons.

First, autonomy is understood fully in terms of the fair enjoyment of certain goods. The relational aspect of it is abandoned. Honneth argues that distribution of goods can articulate but not acquire the self-respect necessary for individual autonomy. Thus, “guaranteeing rights [through redistribution] does not ensure autonomy directly (in the negative sense of blocking interference) but rather supports autonomy via the support for self-respect” (Honneth 2012b, 133).
Second, individual autonomy is seen something to be developed through legal relations. However, together with the democratic legal community, in which we are obligated to respect each other as free and equal citizens, we are engaged in family and work relations in a variety of ways (Honneth 2012b, 43). This kind of understanding gives too much power to the state and cannot provide the necessary environment for relational individual autonomy whose prerequisite is mutual recognition in three spheres of love, respect and esteem. In line with Honneth, I advocate a pluralistic theory of justice in which individuals can also relate to the corporations and non-state organizations in addition to the democratic state. In this sense, that “the conditions for equal and justified recognition depend not only on a high degree of equality in the distribution of resources, but on a more equal division of labor in which people can contribute a range of work of different skills and qualities, thereby allowing everyone the possibility to develop their capacities” (Sayer 2011, 88).

9. Conclusion

To summarize, in this chapter, I have discussed the apparent gap between the expectations that pre-immigration policies create and the economic realities of immigrant employment after the settlement. I have introduced this problem as creating a fantasy recognition order. I claim that Canadian pre-immigration regime might rather be used as an ideological tool to attract highly skilled immigrants. After, I have introduced immigrant’s lower status in the Canadian job market and discussed two possible determinants of it namely, lower productive value of immigrants and labor discrimination. Next, I have examined the economic barriers specific to immigrants in Canada. I have categorized these barriers in two headings, namely the ones emanating from innate characteristics of immigrants and the ones emanating from immigrants’ skills and qualifications.
Finally, I have investigated some of the economic barriers, briefly introducing the ways in which immigrants are being discriminated against because of their innate characteristics in the Canadian job market. I have also analyzed the current multicultural institutions of integration, which try to eliminate the misrecognition of immigrants. I argue, along with Honneth, that the recognition of respect is essential but insufficient for the healthy self-realization of immigrants.

Endnotes:

1 “Survival employment’ is, jobs that support basic livelihood needs for oneself and one’s family rather than jobs that utilize one’s educational and skill level” (Chun et al. 2011, 4).

2 For the further investigation of the differences between “being” and “doing”, Smith and Deranty continues as follows: “If I have done something which I consider to be worthwhile, or which others have benefited from, I typically expect that achievement or contribution to be recognized as such by others. But unlike recognition of what one is, recognition of what one does is not dependent on some pre-given fact about me. It is not in virtue of being an entity of a particular kind—say, one with needs, with autonomy, or a distinctive set of beliefs—that the agent of a recognition-worthy act, an act that represents a genuine achievement or a substantive contribution to the social good, expects recognition. Rather it is as the source of the act itself. Even if there are facts about me which I might consider relevant for an assessment of my personal achievement in doing something, the recognition-worthiness of what I do is not limited to what it says about me: it extends beyond that to the quality of the action as measured against the standards of achievement and contribution that prevail in the community at large” (Smith and Deranty 2012, 54).

3 They find that “ applicants with English names about 45 percent more likely to receive a callback from an application than resumes with Chinese or Indian names” (Oerapolus et al. 2011, 7-43).
Chapter Five: The Sphere of Esteem and the Economic Integration of Immigrants

1. Introduction

In the last sections of Chapter 4, I distinguished the barriers to the economic integration of immigrants with respect to their causes—in terms of the “being” and the “doing” of the immigrant worker. Under the sphere of respect section, I analyze those barriers emanating from immigrants’ innate characteristics through situating them in direct contrast with liberal institutional and capitalistic rationality. I have argued that even though economic discrimination against immigrants due to their “being”, such as ethnic background, skin color, and accent, can be addressed through anti-discriminatory multicultural programs, these remedies are not sufficient to economically integrate immigrants into Canadian society, because immigrants in Canada are also subject to discrimination due to their specific skills and qualifications, namely their “doing”. Thus, the misrecognition or the ideological recognition of immigrant esteem cannot be completely alleviated through state-sponsored multi-cultural policies targeting the problem of equal treatment of immigrants. Indeed, eliminating economic barriers concerning skills and qualification of immigrants requires equal legal treatment of immigrants as a prerequisite, but these barriers can only be addressed through a criticism of the current division of labor in modern capitalistic society.

In this chapter, I will introduce the economic barriers that immigrants face due to their qualifications in the job market. I will identify deskilling, the lack of Canadian experience, and the misrecognition of foreign credentials as the main barriers to the economic integration of immigrants. After the diagnoses of these pathologies, I will investigate how immigrants are
struggling against these pathologies and how the Canadian government responds to the demands of these struggles. This analysis, as in the previous chapter, will reveal the double bind that immigrants face in the process of economic integration. I will claim that unlike the misrecognition that immigrants are suffering in the sphere of respect, the devaluation and deskilling of immigrants’ work emanate from the practices of ideological recognition. Before the analysis, however, I would like to introduce Honneth’s arguments on esteem and work as normative criteria of justice, and how his recognition stance for the criticism of human socialization in the capitalistic relations is connected to the healthy self-realization and integration of immigrants.

2. The Sphere of Esteem

2.1. “Work”. As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the unique contributions of Honneth to recognition theory is his insistence on approaching the problem of exclusion and domination from a socio-economic perspective. Honneth contends that the normative significance of “work” has been largely abandoned in the current research on recognition struggles. Instead, the main discussion revolves around the cultural transformation of modern societies in the face of value pluralism.

Honneth establishes that the external criticism of capitalism based on organic self-production from a socialist perspective can be the reason behind this lack of emphasis. The gap between social reality of capitalism and utopian expectations of socialism forced social theories to acknowledge the current futility of theoretical endeavors of external criticism of capitalism (Honneth 2012b, 57). Honneth (2012b) argues that even though the desire for a job that “provides not only livelihood, but also personal satisfaction, has in no way disappeared”; this longing ceased to concern the general public discourse (57). However, the disappearance of a
criticism of the division of labor and a critique of the capitalistic system from public discourse has caused many discriminatory practices to go unnoticed and even appear legitimate.

Instead, Honneth represents “work” as something having not only instrumental value in terms of our survival but also cognitional value for our self-understanding. Accordingly, “work” constitutes the sphere where individuals get recognition for their individual skills and qualifications. It is through “work” that we relate to non-state organizations, corporations, and our co-workers. Even though Honneth does not put much emphasis on “work” and the current “division of labor” in his most popular book, *The Struggles for Recognition*, his initial work is mainly concerned with a robust criticism of the division of labor in capitalist society (Smith 2009, 46).

Smith (2009) argues that in Honneth’s previous studies, “work is always socially structured activity: it is only through social relationships, and the norms that govern what is acceptable by way of human interaction, that objects get produced. It is obvious that the forms of human interaction that characterize work can instantiate relationships of recognition in more or less satisfactory ways…Social relations that systematically prevent a worker from showing any initiative, or that render her or his initiatives invisible, as counting for nothing in the process of production, hardly affirm or ‘recognize’ the worker’s subjectivity” (Smith 2009, 52-3). In this sense, what we do to make money determines the conditions that may or may not make mutual recognition possible.

I agree with Honneth that the instrumental approach to the meaning of “work” is ill-founded. A study of just integration should consider the value of “work” to realize how the socio-economic conditions of immigrants affect their integration to their host society. Even though the normative significance of “work” for the integration of societies has been studied by
economic justice theories, I believe that situating the relations of work within a recognition perspective complements the major emphasis on redistributive policies with a criticism of our socialization with non-state actors in the modern capitalistic society. Next, I will explain how the seemingly deregulated capitalistic system can be criticized with regard to the ideal of mutual recognition as a social problem.

2.2. An immanent critique of capitalism. In chapter 3, I discussed the method of immanent critique as a tool to analyze current social relationships within the capitalistic market without proposing a utopian ideal outside of the system. Honneth argues that injustices emanating from capitalistic structures can be explained through social-cultural value systems. For this reason, he has been accused of reducing distributive injustices to cultural injustices. In his discussion with Nancy Fraser, Honneth explicates this point in detail. In their famous debate, Fraser differentiates between struggles for cultural recognition and struggles for economic redistribution. She observes that the demands for recognition of difference, namely identity politics, have come to the forefront of the public sphere for the last 150 years, while the demands for equality have been neglected. Fraser advocates for a “two dimensional conception of justice”. This conception considers distribution and recognition as distinct perspectives on and dimensions of justice (Fraser 2003, 35). Recognition and redistribution constitute two conditions for the actualization of the notion of “parity of participation”. Through this notion, Fraser introduces “social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact as peers as the requirements of justice” (Fraser 2003, 36).

Fraser claims that even though redistribution and recognition demands are generally interwoven, there is a conceptual utility to treating these conditions of justice separately. She argues that this dual treatment of justice is necessary to analyze and remedy injustices that
emanate from purely systematic economic motives such as profit or global economic trends. She gives an example of how a white American male can become unemployed because of a corporate merger. This, Fraser contends, has nothing to do with relations of cultural misrecognition. This kind of injustice is driven by the causes shaped by the structure of capitalism. Within this context, Fraser (2003) accuses Honneth’s recognition theory of being guided by cultural monism. For Fraser, “Honneth seems to ignore the basic fact that explanation of phenomena specific to the economic order ought to be in categories of instrumental, not communicative or normative, rationality, in causal, not moral terms” (Deranty 2009, 412).

In his answer to Fraser’s accusations, Honneth maintains that his theory is not culturally but morally monistic. He argues that recognition does encompass redistribution because the injustices emanating from economic inequalities should be understood as emanating from disrespect, namely misrecognition of the equal value of individuals as human beings and their authentic achievements. However, while making such an argument, Honneth accepts that market mechanisms and complex economic functions exist. He does not claim that recognition theory provides a holistic theory for the specificity of economic action, however it is exceptionally helpful to analyze the experience of economic injustice, qua social experience (Deranty 2009, 413).

It is clear that, on its own, a theory of recognition is incapable of producing a theory of capitalism, but it never intended to do that anyway. However, by relying on theories elaborated by the sociology of work and the economic sciences, it can nevertheless engage in the analysis of the effects of recognition produced by the institutions of salaried work and the capitalistic market (Renault 2004, 212 cited by Deranty 2009, 413).

Thus, Honneth’s recognition theory offers a sufficient analytical tool to understand the experiences of economic injustices via social experience in the sphere of esteem. The theory of recognition accepts the complexity of economic relations but denies that social action is
powerless to eliminate the unintended consequences of complex economic relations (Deranty 2009, 421).

Therefore, the sphere of esteem is a fruitful analytical tool to investigate the experiences of economic injustices that immigrants suffer. Recognition theory achieves this not by proposing a utopian ideal of self-sufficient work but by improving the normative criteria of individualism and autonomy inherent to the capitalistic system. Next, I will explain the normative principle of achievement.

2.3. The normative principle of achievement. As mentioned in the last chapter, Honneth recognizes the value of redistributive and proceduralist justice principles in the compensation of shortcomings of the capitalistic system in terms of enhancing individual autonomy, but he advocates for a more comprehensive understanding of justice as recognition. In line with Honneth, Sayer (2011) argues that “the conditions for equal and justified recognition depend not only on a high degree of equality in the distribution of resources, but on a more equal division of labor in which people can contribute a range of work of different skills and qualities, thereby allowing everyone the possibility to develop their capacities” (88). Honneth insists that the esteem sphere where economic actors and non-state organizations together with state institutions interact should be included in our studies of justice.

Honneth argues that the capitalistic system should be seen as a function for the integration of modern societies. The normative principles such as achievement and individualism that capitalism operates with should be the epicenter of any justice theory. Honneth and Hartmann (2006) explains that the capitalistic system has succeeded in integrating society “because the following principles were simultaneously institutionalized: (1) ‘individualism’ as a leading personal idea; (2) an egalitarian conception of justice as a legal form of government; and
(3) the idea of achievement as the basis for assigning status…In modern society the normative surplus of such institutionalized norms of justice possesses a transformative potential above all because they make the given reality appear as a moral situation of discrimination that cannot be legitimized” (Honneth and Hartmann 2006, 42-43). In a society where discrimination and exclusion cannot be legitimized, the solidarity needed to integrate members of society emanates from economic realities. Thus, the application of Honneth’s recognition theory to the economic problems that immigrants suffer due to their skills should start with the current definition of the achievement principle.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the recognition of esteem is essential not only for individuals to have healthy relations to themselves but also for the integration of individuals into their societies. The achievement principle is the core normative regulative concept in modern capitalistic societies to interpret and evaluate an individual’s degree of contribution to societal goals. Since modern societies prioritize universal equality and individual difference at the same time, the achievement principle represents itself paradoxically. On the one hand, the achievement should be abstract enough to be inclusive in the face of value pluralism. On the other hand, it needs to be rigidly defined under particular circumstances so as to be able to differentiate the value of the specific contributions of particular persons to societal goals. In this sense, the achievement principle is always subject to second-order interpretations which encompass the interests of the dominant group in the society. The dialectical reconstruction of the content of the achievement principle throughout history emanates from this dual nature of the concept. The principle itself contains elements for both domination and emancipation. That is the reason why many recognition struggles take place in the sphere of esteem over the interpretation of achievement principle.
2.4. The Neo-Liberal turn and paradoxes of capitalism. Honneth contends that the meaning of economic relations and the achievement principle in modern capitalistic societies is currently determined by the neo-liberal revolution, especially after the 1980s. The term “neo-liberal revolution” refers to “(1) weakened (welfare-) state steering activities, growing power of global firms, the internationalization of financial flows, and the fading of class-cultural ties; (2) a spread of shareholder-oriented management, where the influence of shareholders on firms grows to precisely the extent that that of other groups with a stake in the firm dwindles” (Honneth and Hartmann 2006, 46).

Before the neo-liberal revolution, the norms of capitalism were set by large companies by offering their employees “long-term career opportunities and under some circumstances even a protected social environment by means of worker apartments, holiday centers, and training structures” (Honneth and Hartmann 2006, 46). However, after the 1960s, the economic conditions and the expectations from employees changed tremendously. This new capitalism has no longer been defined workers for their capacity to satisfy hierarchically determined factors within a large enterprise but for their availability to self-responsibly bring their skills and emotional resources to the advantage of ever changing market norms of achievement. In this shareholder or “flexible” capitalism, workers find themselves fully responsible for their career successes or failures. Workers today are supposed to turn themselves into entrepreneurs and be flexible enough to initiate new ventures or careers whenever necessary.

With the neo-liberal revolution, the achievement principle is interpreted solely with regard to the market. Thus, achievements that cannot be converted into profits started to go unnoticed. Capitalistic markets are mostly interested in the results not the means they come about (Honneth and Hartmann 2006, 54). Moreover, the unregulated market mechanism does not
only affect lower-class people; everyone is subject to the uncertainty of their future achievement, including top businessmen like Wall Street financiers. This new capitalism maintains its justification by depoliticizing the sphere of achievement and turning it into an individual responsibility.

Honneth and Hartmann (2006) argue that this new model of capitalism creates paradoxes for the principles of individualism and personal autonomy, because while it appears to intend to realize these principles in the economic sphere, it reduces that very possibility (176). To illustrate, the fact that workers in the new capitalistic system perceive their jobs “as revisable steps in their experimental self-realization” but not as their duties appears to be progress according to the criteria of individualization and personal autonomy. However, this fact also justifies “dismantling the privilege of membership in a firm, dissolving legal status guarantees and expecting increased flexibility” without providing the necessary conditions to the responsible individuals to flourish as an independent from market forces (179). Moreover, this situation has spillover effects into the other spheres of recognition, such as friendships and love relationships. For example, we observe today that more and more friendships are built around instrumental objectives.

The paradoxes of the new capitalism create feelings of suffering and experiences of injustice in modern individuals. But because of the assumptions of the unregulated market, we understand them as unintended consequences of our free choice. Honneth explains that they are not. They are indeed the result of a specific interpretation of the achievement principle by the dominant interest group. While no one is spared from experiencing injustices in the sphere of esteem after the neo-liberal turn, I believe that immigrants have an especially hard time finding a place for themselves in this paradoxically individualistic capitalistic system due to their specific
conditions of being immigrant discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, the Canadian point based system (PBS) in the admission of immigrants can be understood as a neo-liberal capitalistic project as well.

Current neo-liberal immigration policies in general and PBS in particular recast immigrants as economic agents rather than social and political ones. During the mid-1980s, Canada, like many other advanced capitalistic nations, suffered a serious economic crisis due to several developments including new space-shrinking technologies, globally integrated production networks, and niche-based just-in-time production. This post-Fordist global phase of capitalism necessitated “flexible accumulation”. As such, this new phase reflected the structure of Canadian immigration policies. In order to stay competitive in a knowledge-based and service-oriented world economy, Canada’s emphasis on the qualifications of immigrants has changed.

The Canadian state, responding to this capitalist transformation, particularly the deterritorialization of finance and the flexibility of accumulation, jettisoned its emphasis on specific occupations in the point system in favor of credentials demonstrating transferable skills. Most Canadian immigrants are being picked with regard to the neo-liberal values of flexibility, risk taking, and individual responsibility. In line with Honneth’s discussion of neo-liberalism, “points-based policies provide techniques of responsibilization in which selection is oriented to picking ‘active’, self-reliant and entrepreneurial subjects likely to stimulate economic growth without significant state intervention or expenditure” (Walsh 2011, 866).

By turning the immigrant admission process into technical and standardized calculations, Canadian policy makers proudly present PBS as non-discriminatory and objective. Furthermore, the operational guidelines that PBS employs appear as “the first major step to limit the
discretionary powers of immigration officers” (Green and Green 1999, 431). However, as discussed above, neo-liberal ideals and realities are riddled with contradictions. The high unemployment level among highly skilled immigrants in Canada is a perfect representation of this type of contradiction. The neo-liberal value given to immigrants’ pre-immigration skills cannot be driven by strategic calculation of market needs. It is motly a fantasy because it does not directly reflect the reality of Canadian job market. The chosen group of ideal neo-liberal immigrants is either stuck in survival jobs or unemployed.

In this chapter, I aim to uncover this contradiction as a paradox through an examination of the economic problems that immigrants are going through and the ways immigrants struggle against them. This will show how many immigrants are in a vicious circle of never-ending demands for flexibility and self-improvement.

3. Deskilling and Employment and Career Services

Some scholars argue that a lack of knowledge of the workings of the Canadian job market may be the reason why immigrants are struggling to find jobs in their profession (Chun et al. 2011, Reitz 2006). Adaptation to a new place, culture, and practices takes time and requires a learning curve. As discussed in Chapter 4, I agree with this argument and do not see immigrants’ lack of knowledge as a permanent economic barrier. Under this heading, I would like to discuss the way in which Canadian career service providers direct immigrants to deskill or underemphasize their foreign credentials and experience. Even though there are not many studies on the discourse of the career service providers, I believe that it is a good place to start for the analysis of misrecognition or ideological recognition of immigrant esteem.

During the time of their settlement, immigrants may employ several strategies to familiarize themselves with the Canadian job market. One of the official channels for career and
employment help during settlement is provided by provincial state-funded settlement organizations. These settlement organizations offer free career services ranging from club membership to two-week long workshops on finding employment. They inform and prepare recent immigrants with their job search or self-employment endeavors\textsuperscript{3}. They help job-seeking immigrants in a variety of ways, from their resume writing to preparation for Canadian job interviews. These services are generally well received by the immigrants, but there have also been complaints about the way service providers present information about the immigrants’ prospects in the Canadian job market.

There is a general observation that career service providers encourage immigrants not to mention their foreign credentials in their resumes so that they will not appear overqualified for low-skilled jobs (Chun et al., 2011). This practice is indicative of the reality of the Canadian job market. From my experience with one career services agent in Vancouver, I could clearly tell that she was presenting the current job market in such a way as to indicate that the job experiences I had in Turkey and in the United States would be of no value in finding a Canadian job in my profession.

The career agent recommended that I look for low-skilled part-time jobs instead of wasting my time looking for high-paying professional jobs. Her point was that any newcomer immigrant to Canada regardless of their credentials and previous work experience should start with survival jobs to gain Canadian experience. The necessity of starting from the beginning was the clear message. Her advice for me to succeed in getting a shelving job was to delete all degrees except my BA and all job experience unrelated to the shelving job from my resume. I followed her advice. While editing my resume, I realized that I was looking at a resume of a
twenty-year-old person who is just starting her career. All the years of hard work to earn degrees were erased.

Eventually, I took the shelving job and started working eight-hour shifts for three days a week. My duty was to shelve the merchandise from scratch because the store was not opened yet. There were fifteen of us doing the same job. This group consisted of a computer scientist immigrant from China who had recently acquired an MBA from Douglas College in Vancouver, four immigrants from the Philippines who had their bachelor degrees in medical assistance, two accountant immigrants from India, and six native-born Canadians who were part-time undergraduate students working on their degrees.

My initial feeling that I was out of place with my Ph.D. studies vanished into thin air as soon as I realized that I was among a very highly educated crowd of immigrants. The depressing revelation was that it was exactly where I belonged as an immigrant who lacked Canadian experience. All the qualifications and skills we as immigrants had acquired throughout our adult years had disappeared with our settlement to Canada. There we were, standing side-by-side with twenty-year-olds who had not earned their undergraduate degrees yet. It was apparent that in the eyes of our employer, thirty-something immigrants were not any different from these young people.

Immigrating to a new country and starting everything from scratch may sound appealing and may even be a vitalizing option for some. But when the condition of being an immigrant puts one in a place where the qualities and skills she identified herself by are erased forcefully, it means there is denigration of her self-esteem. Thus, deskilling the qualifications of immigrants is a basic example of the misrecognition of immigrants’ self-esteem.
When it comes to the esteem of immigrants, the dominant party that is determining the interpretation of the achievement principle is native-born Canadians. As in the other spheres of recognition, mutual recognition of esteem depends on a common value-horizon where members of a society “share an orientation to those values and goals that indicate to each other the significance or contribution of their qualities for the life of the other” (Honneth 1995, 121). Unlike legal recognition, the recognition of esteem is particularly and historically shaped by the “cultural self-understanding of a society” (Honneth 1995, 122). Thus, the social worth of particular human qualities and skills are determined by the degree to which they can help to realize culturally defined values. The reluctance of Canadian employers and society to value immigrants’ skills and education earned in a foreign country equally to the ones earned in Canada is exemplary of the Canadian self-understanding as being superior to the countries that immigrants are coming from. The perception of the superiority of Canadian education and experience pushes immigrants into a segregated job market where they are disattached from the qualities and skills that they used to get their esteem in their country of origin and during the process of application to immigration to Canada.

Next, I will examine the “the lack of Canadian experience” as an economic barrier to the integration of immigrants. My main argument for the following two sections is that the struggle strategies that immigrants are employing and the ones the Canadian state is providing may create a double bind, or rather a vicious circle, in which the real solution to the lack of economic integration of immigrants cannot be accomplished.

4. Lack of Canadian Experience

Can immigrants transfer the value of their foreign experience to the jobs they take in Canada? The dominant understanding is that the foreign experience that immigrants bring with
them has little value in the Canadian job market. This is a claim that needs to be investigated in detail to understand the reasons behind the preference/priority given to Canadian experience. In the immigration literature, there are not many statistical analyses of the effect of foreign work experience on the chances of finding work in an immigrants’ profession.

Reitz (2006) contends that foreign work experience, as an independent variable, is difficult to measure due to the nature of calculation of potential foreign experience. While we do not have much statistical evidence to prove that there is a negative relationship between foreign work experience and unemployment rates of immigrants, there are a variety of ethnographic studies on the devaluation of immigrants’ foreign work experience in Canada.

To illustrate, the majority of participants in Chun et al.’s (2011) study claim that reference to a lack of “Canadian experience” is being used by employers to cover discriminatory hiring practices and to “create unnecessary obstacles to finding even the lowest-paid jobs” (7).

As one of the interviewees explains the situation:

I know some people have very high educational levels in their home countries but whenever you apply for a job, sometimes the job requires two to three years of local experience. When I look at ads, I don’t even dare to apply for it (Chun et al. 2011, 19).

Another interviewee explains how employment agencies advise immigrants to exclude their foreign experience from their resume:

So basically, they are asking you to down tone your qualifications so that you can get the job, but even if you down tone your qualifications, since you don’t have a Canadian experience you don’t even get the job. So it’s a chicken and egg thing (Chun et al. 2011, 20).

The practice of devaluation of foreign work experience puts immigrants into a vicious circle. Newcomer immigrants naturally do not have Canadian experience but the fact that they cannot find work due to their lack of Canadian experience means they will never have it. How
do immigrants struggle against this kind of problem? In what ways do they try to get themselves out of the vicious circle that the lack of Canadian job experience creates?

One easy way is to lie on one’s resume. One of the interviewees in Chun et al.’s study explains this pretty well:

They always ask me, ‘do you have experience here?’ [I respond], ‘No.’ Even just for jobs that pay you $10 or $8 at the most, it’s like you need to be well-connected. My friends who live here would always say to me, ‘Well, lie. Lie. Tell them that you’ve taken care of children, that you’ve cleaned houses, that you’ve worked as a babysitter, that you’ve done translations, etc. Lie, lie, lie (Chun et al. 2011, 21).

But immigrants can only lie so much. Lying can be a method to jump over the Canadian job experience barrier only if immigrants are applying for jobs in the service or personal care sector. After all, people can lie about the things that they do at home without having to prove it. It has been suggested that a more sensible way to get out of the vicious circle that has been created by the requirement of Canadian job experience from immigrants who just settled in Canada is to take advantage of volunteering opportunities in the different sectors in Canada. The basic assumption is that immigrant volunteering will enhance immigrants’ social and human capital. Next, I will examine the effectiveness of volunteering as a societally sponsored mechanism to solve immigrants’ lack of Canadian experience.

4.1. A Struggle mechanism: Volunteering. Volunteering is a Canadian cultural practice (Daya and De Long 2004). It is a way for Canadians to give back to their community and to network while improving their social skills and economic qualifications. When it comes to the integration of immigrants, volunteering may seem like an ideal practice, because—as the webpage of Immigration Alberta indicates— “volunteering offers newcomer immigrants a great opportunity to gain Canadian work experience, practice language skills and to get to know people in their community” (Province of Alberta 2013).
Indeed, volunteering by immigrants can be seen as a signal of productivity, may provide very much needed Canadian references, and can help to improve the language skills of immigrants. Moreover, “for employers, volunteering may be regarded as a productive activity similar to work experience and an indicator of human capital. For immigrants, volunteering garners such work experience, helps with improving language skills, and can result in better jobs or higher wages” (Handy and Greenspan 2008, 959). It has also been argued that newcomer immigrants who are struggling to find employment may feel more like an active member of Canadian society if they volunteer and make a contribution to societal goals (Barbulak 2003).

4.1.1. Problems with immigrant volunteerism. There are two main problems that immigrants encounter when they are given the option of volunteering to eliminate the economic disadvantage of their lack of Canadian experience. The first and the most apparent one is that immigrants have neither the means nor the time to volunteer. As extensively explained in Chapter 4, many newcomer immigrants and long-time residents in Canada suffer from poverty and unemployment. Most of them have to take two or three part-time jobs to make ends meet. Thus, “economic disadvantage works to isolate new immigrants, the group which would arguably benefit most from connections to a social network and community-based service providers” (Scott et al. 2006, 17).

Even if immigrants dedicated some of their time to volunteering, it is questionable whether their volunteering experience would help them get out of the above-mentioned vicious circle. In Chun et al.’s study (2011), “volunteering was not seen as a viable strategy [by the interviewed immigrants] for obtaining employment in one’s desired field or occupation. Rather, volunteering was seen as a pathway for obtaining jobs in completely different fields such as child care or elder care, or work in immigrant service agencies or community centers” (21).
In this sense, there is an apprehension that through the structured and limited opportunities of volunteering, immigrants, and specifically immigrant women, are directed into low-paid and unpaid work in the service sector. To illustrate, Dossa (2004) interviewed Canadian immigrant women from Iran in her book titled *Politics and Poetics of Immigration*. One of them, Nuri, who had volunteering experience, stated:

“I am a clinical psychologist, a dental hygienist as well as a computer typist.” She then explained that she had updated her language skills in Canada and “yet, I am not getting a job. I tried everywhere and there is no place for me”.

Responding to a question on the possible value of volunteer work in hospitals and schools for learning English, she said: “No. I have no opportunity to learn English. I work with senile elderly people or very small children.” Nuri then recalled how one service provider had suggested that she should volunteer at a day care center. The service provider told her, “Don’t worry you think your English is not good. You can hold babies” (Dossa 2004, 49).

In Nuri’s story, we meet with a young immigrant woman from Iran with many qualifications and a tremendous drive to make it in Canada. Clearly, her volunteering job was not helpful for her to improve her English skill or get the Canadian experience necessary to find a job as a clinical psychologist. Taking care of elderly people or very small children for free is a great service for the overall well-being of the society, and immigrants who volunteer may well be recognized for their esteem by the society or by the specific organization for which they volunteer. But I think this type of recognition is problematic.

To begin with, the esteem gained through volunteering does not provide any material changes in the life of the volunteer immigrant. The immigrant is still stuck in part-time service-sector jobs. The opportunities for volunteering are limited and structured in such a way that they
shape immigrants’ prospects in the Canadian job market. Thus, this type of recognition is abstract and ideological. As discussed in Chapter 3, ideological recognition, unlike misrecognition, does not directly exclude its addressees but integrates them into the existing recognition order by creating voluntary subordination. Ideological recognition can be observed where there is an evaluative change in the perception of the capacities of persons but no prospect for material change within the recognition order (Honneth 2007, 325-326).

Therefore, volunteerism can turn into an ideological tool which creates paradoxical results for the economic integration of immigrants. It is paradoxical because, on the one hand, it poses as an efficient tool for immigrants in search of work in their profession. On the other hand, it constrains and shapes the preferences of immigrants in the prospective job market. During the process, immigrants usually lose the time and motivation to find work in their profession. Instead they give up their initial hope and incline towards low-skilled, part-time jobs because their volunteer experiences increase their chances for employment in those areas. In this sense, this shift in the career of immigrants is not a purely autonomous choice on their part.

However, the institution of volunteering makes it look like immigrants have options. This practice enables “the dominant culture to continue to shape mainstream institutions with minimum disruption thereby reasserting the hegemony of the dominant groups; and allowing the state to provide the conditions necessary for global capital competitiveness through the availability of skilled low cost labor while simultaneously ensuring that immigrant integration is achieved in structural selective ways without overburdening the neo-liberal state” (Lee 1999, 102-103, Bauder 2003).

In this context, immigrants become especially vulnerable to the forces of neo-liberalism and ideological state institutions because of the host society’s dominant assumptions about the
cultural and ethnic differences that they bring. Thus, their struggle for recognition gets harder since the causes behind their experiences of economic injustices become more invisible. The same line of logic is true for my second example of an economic barrier, namely the misrecognition of foreign credentials.

5. The Misrecognition of Foreign Credentials

Like the lack of Canadian experience, the misrecognition of foreign credentials has been identified as one of the main determinants of the economic well-being of immigrants. To illustrate, “among those employed in 2006, 62 percent of the Canadian-born were working in the regulated profession for which they trained compared to only 24 percent of foreign-educated immigrants” (Statistics Canada, 2010). However, the Canadian market does not devalue all foreign credentials. “Esses et al.’s study (2006) on the role of prejudice in the discounting of immigrant skills found that only when the job applicant is an immigrant from a non-Western country is skill and credential discounting evident” (Shan 2009, 360). The assumption is that employers do not prefer immigrants as employees because they cannot evaluate the value of immigrants’ foreign credentials.

This comparison of immigrants to their Canadian counterparts is just another incidence of immigrants’ excessive experience of lack of esteem in Canada. After all, the misrecognition of foreign credentials might cause devaluation and deskilling of immigrant labor. While unable to find a suitable job matching their credentials, highly skilled immigrants have to downgrade their work experience to appear less “skilled” to find a “survival job” (Chung et al. 2011, 7). Thus, the misrecognition of foreign credentials can pose as a serious injustice.
Canadian state institutions started to take action against the problem of misrecognition of foreign credentials. Till the mid-1980s, Canada required its immigrants to sign under the above statement:

I fully understand that the issuance of an immigrant visa to me in no way assures eventual acceptance into the practice of my [profession or occupation] in Canada. I realize that such acceptance is the sole discretion of the licensing authority in the province in which I wish to work or practice. I further understand that acceptance by the licensing authority in any province or provinces in Canada is not an assurance of acceptance in other provinces (McDade 1988, 55).

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Canadian government started to respond to demands for the recognition of foreign credentials by establishing provincial task forces and generating overview documents. Today, in Canada, there is no centralized office responsible for the evaluation of foreign credentials. Depending on the nature of the evaluation, immigrants may need to approach one or all of the following organizations: “(1) provincial and territorial credential assessment service, (2) regulatory or professional bodies, (3) educational institutions, and (4) employers. While professional and regulatory bodies determine the professional standing of the qualification, the assessment of foreign credentials for the purpose of academic study resides in the hands of education providers such as universities and colleges” (Guo 2009, 42).

Moreover, the recertification process changes for each profession. Different occupational groups face different difficulties depending on the degree of control by Canadian professions. “Generally, the protected occupations require professional certification in addition to a bachelor or higher degree, including architectural designers, engineers, doctors, and teachers, just to name a few. To practice in the protected professions, however, immigrants must also pass Canadian courses and examinations and acquire a stint of supervised employment in Canada. For example, the medical profession requires foreign-trained professionals to take a certification examination in combination with language testing, and/or to undertake a period of internship or practicum in
Canada. With multiple barriers in the protected professions, former professionals in these areas have the most trouble getting back to their original professions… Moreover, employment is not guaranteed, in spite of acute current shortages in the labor force, for each professional immigrant needs to find a willing employer—not an easy task” (Guo 2009, 42).

Today, “across Canada, there are about 50 regulated professions and more than 100 apprenticeable trades. Together, the regulated occupations account for about 20% of the Canadian workforce” (Shan 2009, 362). As can be seen from the above information, getting foreign credentials recognized by Canadian institutions for these regulated occupations is a long, complicated, and demoralizing process. The conditions were worse before the end of the 1980s, but the discriminatory attitude has been reflected in the accreditation and recertification institutions. The fact that there are not any agreed upon national standards or national coordination to create these standards reveals that immigrants coming from all around the world are vulnerable to local stereotypes and discrimination. Moreover, there is a clear discrimination against any kind of foreign education in this process. To illustrate, “before professional certification was given; for example in engineering, foreign-trained engineers were required to complete a longer period of satisfactory practice experience in addition to fulfilling all examination requirements” (Li 1996).

Therefore, we observe that occupational interest groups put extraordinary barriers to immigrants’ accreditation processes. On the one hand, PBS is designed to answer the needs of the job market by admitting immigrants’ whose profession is on demand. On the other hand, many of these immigrants cannot perform their profession due to the accreditation problems. While this can pose as a justice problem, it is also to the disadvantage of Canadian economy. To illustrate, “it has been estimated that the discounting of foreign human capital contributes to a
total loss in annual immigrant earnings of between Canadian $2.4 billion and Canadian $3.2 billion” (Banerjee and Verma 2012, 79). Then, the question appears: Is the problem of misrecognition of immigrant credentials an institutional failure on Canadian government’s part which evidently cannot regulate the pre-immigration admission policies with regard to the demands of occupational interest groups? Does this flaw occur because of the lack of official information on the labor demands of Canadian job market or because of Canadian government’s inability to deal with special interest groups to provide fair terms during the accreditation process?

Either way, the apparent picture is that the purpose of admitting professional immigrants to Canada misses its justification under these circumstances. Canadian government admits immigrants who are medical doctors because there are labor shortages in the Canadian medical field. However, these immigrants cannot get accreditation and those positions cannot be filled. Then, would the solution for the misrecognition of foreign credentials be to stop admitting professional immigrants? I think this can be a valid solution. From this perspective, we can understand the problem of accreditation not as a justice problem but as a system flaw in our consideration of improving Canadian pre-immigration policy to offer fair terms of integration to immigrants. As a result we can rightly demand Canadian government to be more responsive to the market needs and to organize occupational interests so that they would not undermine the whole purpose of the admissions of professional immigrants.

However, I believe that the mismatch between admission practices and the market forces are created not only by the unintentional results of power plays between interest groups and Canadian government but also by the intentional Canadian policy that aims to sustain high levels of education among Canadian population. In this sense, Canadian government’s insistence on
admitting highly educated immigrants is not only the result of market forces but also the consequence of the Canadian project to increase education levels in the society for the future. I think that Canadian immigration policy juggles between these two opposing projects and is not ready to leave either of them. This is the reason why I believe that in our analysis of the already settled immigrants’ experiences, we should still understand the problem of misrecognition of foreign credentials as the problem with the norms of integration and the recognition order of the host society. Next, I will analyze post-migration education as an immigrant strategy to struggle against the economic injustices emanating from the misrecognition of foreign credentials.

5.1. Post-Migration Education (PME). In the face of these realities, the current immigrants with high education have three options. First, they can acknowledge their place in the Canadian job market, deskill themselves, and apply for low-skilled jobs. Second, they can show great vigor and get their accreditation or recertification. These processes truly disadvantage immigrants in comparison to their Canadian counterparts. Also, they empower many Canadian agencies as the recognizer. While getting foreign credentials recognized is not impossible, it may not help to improve the chances of immigrants for finding jobs in their profession. As mentioned before, these time-consuming processes work to immigrants’ disadvantage. The vicious circle that emanates from the lack of Canadian experience can occur even after getting accredited. The last option for immigrants would be to get Canadian education on top of their foreign education and restart their career with Canadian credentials.

Before the discussion of PME, I would like to restate that immigrants who choose to get a Canadian education are already highly educated. “According to Statistics Canada research, very recent immigrants aged 25 to 54 with a university degree are nearly three times more likely than Canadian-born individuals to be enrolled in school or training programs (19.0% vs. 6.7%,
respectively), even when their previous degree was obtained in Canada. Among those very recent immigrant students, almost half (47.2%) attended university, 25.9% attended college or CEGEP\textsuperscript{6}, and 23.8% attended other education such as language training, accreditation or professional upgrade programs” (Gilmore and Le Petit, 2008). In this sense, PME is a highly preferred option for immigrants, especially among already young and highly educated ones.

Recognizing immigrants’ preference for PME, Canadian governments both on the federal and the provincial level invest in immigrant training and education. The federal government has long provided English training and labor market orientation for immigrants. “In the province of Ontario, the Ministry of Citizenship and Education is funding ‘bridging programs’ to provide newcomers with education and skill assessment, skills training, workplace experience, assistance in license or certification examination, language training and individual learning plans” (Shan 2010, 170).

As mentioned above in my discussion of career service providers, the Canadian government provides a variety of settlement services in Canada, mostly through settlement agencies. In 2007, the Ministry of Citizenship and Education in Ontario issued an additional $29 million investment to expand programs province-wide for skilled newcomers (Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2007). In addition to these, provincial student loan agencies provide financial help for immigrant students who are enrolled in a university program full-time or part-time. Moreover, the mandate of the Immigrant Access Fund (IAF), created in 2005, to relieve poverty by providing micro-loans to skilled immigrants in order to assist them in obtaining Canadian accreditation, upgrading, or training that will allow them to return to employment in their pre-immigration professional and trade fields. From its establishment in 2005 to 2010, IAF has distributed 544 loans worth approximately $2.7 million (cic.gc.ca, 2011).
At first sight, the fact that the Canadian government invests in immigrants’ training and provides opportunities for immigrants is commendable. However, we also need to ask: Does PME help immigrants to find a job in their desired areas? “In what kinds of training is the government investing, or which jobs are immigrants expected to learn? Are they jobs where immigrants can make use of their previous training, or jobs where Canada has a demand for immigrant and female labor?” (Shan 2009, 263).

To begin with, according to the Toronto Immigrant Employment Data Initiative’s study (TIEDI), there is no clear pattern between school enrollment levels and labor force participation rates, the unemployment rate, or the full-time employment rate. However, “in the case of immigrants returning to school, the longer interruption in their work career, coupled with the fact that immigrants who have not returned to school had already had the opportunity to repair their human capital can result in lower income, higher unemployment rates, and lesser likelihood of holding full-time employment, at least in the first years following their arrival” (3). Thus, the time spent to get PME may put immigrants at a disadvantage in finding jobs due to the lack of Canadian experience and the adjustment process needed to get back into the labor market. The time and money dedicated to get PMEs also reflects long periods of economic hardship for the immigrants’ families.

Moreover, we should also question how immigrants decide what kind of path of education or certification they will pursue. As in all settlement processes, immigrants are exposed to a lot of informal information on the expectations of the Canadian job market. In particular, their relatives or acquaintances who have already settled down are telling them what their weaknesses and strengths are in finding a job in Canada. In their ethnographic study on Chinese immigrant women’s career decisions, Shan and Ng (2010) found that many immigrant
women decide to get an education in Canada to increase their chances to find a job. Their first intuition is to earn certificates in their profession to prove the value of the qualifications they earned in their country of origin. However, the ones who have degrees in regulated occupations in Canada shy away from getting accreditations due to lack of time and money. Even after accreditation, because of their language skills and immigration status, immigrants do not feel confident about getting a job in a regulated profession due to high competition with Canadian natives.

Thus, most of the women in Shan and Ng’s study (2010) decided to drop their qualifications and skills behind and pursue a new career path. Their decisions were “informed by the discourse around ‘jobs for the Chinese’, which in turn is shaped by gender, race and class as interwoven social relations in Canadian society” (179). One of the interviewees wanted to pursue her marketing job in China but “decided that it was not realistic to try to gain entry into marketing, which was dominated by white people. The sectors where other Chinese immigrants were employed became the scope of her exploration. Inspired by a Chinese Canadian employment counselor, she felt she should focus on the settlement services sector, which employs a good percentage of women and racialized minorities—a decision that departed from her work experience in China” (179).

In conclusion, we observe that PME is used as a social mechanism to manage the increasingly diverse immigrants’ labor. As with the volunteering opportunities, PME opportunities are limited and highly structured to direct immigrants into specific career paths where they cannot pose a challenge to their Canadian counterparts. Since reeducation decisions are being made with regard to the opportunities that immigrants have and these opportunities are
shaped by discriminatory practices, PME can improve immigrants’ chance of getting a job but does not solve the problem of misrecognition of immigrant esteem.

In the beginning of this chapter, I identified economic barriers that immigrants suffer due to their “doing”, such as their individual qualifications and skill, as social pathologies belonging to the recognition sphere of esteem. I argue that these kinds of economic barriers belong to the sphere of esteem because immigrants’ qualifications are misrecognized fully by employers due to their foreign nature. The foreign credentials and work experience are not recognized by the risk-averse employers. This creates a serious mismatch between the expectations that Canadian point based system creates for many immigrants, which favors highly educated candidates for immigration, and the realities of the Canadian job market. Through an analysis of economic barriers such as the lack of Canadian experience and misrecognition of foreign credentials, I show that volunteering and PME are opportunities created for the immigrants to struggle against these barriers. However, these opportunities are provided in such a way that immigrants’ qualifications are ideologically directed into certain economic sectors, the so-called “survival jobs”. This leaves immigrants without job security, career advancement opportunities, and good wages. Below, I will discuss dual market theories and argue that when it comes to the sphere of esteem, immigrants are subject to a different recognition order than their Canadian counterparts.

6. Dual Market Economy

The above discussion has shown that immigrants are actively being excluded from the upper divisions of the Canadian job market. Canadian employers can discriminate against immigrants’ qualifications and prefer Canadian natives, and Canadian state institutions, which provide training and career services for immigrants, may systematically exclude immigrants
from the most desired jobs (Bauder 2003, 699). The dual market theory helps us explain the structure of the Canadian market.

This theory hypothesizes that there are two relatively separate segments in the market. The primary labor market is characterized by jobs that are relatively well paid, with benefits, nice working conditions, employment security, clearly defined grievance procedures and work discipline regulations. In contrast, the secondary labor market is characterized by jobs that are part-time, short term, unstable, with low pay, poor working conditions and arbitrary work discipline. In other words, the division between “good” and “bad” jobs reproduces these two separate sectors. Certain groups such as women, visible minorities, immigrants usually populate the secondary labor market. “The focus of dual labor market theories is on the barriers that limit access for many qualified individuals into the primary labor market, and the ability of participants from the advantaged segment to maintain their position” (Buzdugan and Halli 2009, 369).

The above analysis shows that the possibilities for immigrants’ upward mobility into the primary job market are riddled with contradictions. Even if upward mobility is not impossible, it happens very rarely. Many immigrants are stuck in the secondary job market although they have high skills and qualifications. This fact cannot be solely explained by discrimination based on ascriptive characteristics. Harrison and Sum (1979) argue that dual labor market theory is not a theory of discrimination per se. “Inequality and hierarchy are inherent in the job structure. Certainly, ascriptive traits such as age, race, and sex easily assign workers to different segments. But the discrimination itself does not create the segmentation, although it does help reproduce its concrete manifestations” (699). Even if racism is completely eliminated from employers’
preferences, the job market will still have a segment in which workers suffer from poverty and underemployment.

According to the theory of recognition, the achievement principle of modern societies is the regulative norm to recognize individual esteem. In the case of immigrants, we observe that immigrants are subject to two different recognition orders at the level of esteem. On the one hand, immigrants are being recognized for their qualifications and skills through the Canadian point based immigration regime. Immigrants’ worth for their contribution to Canadian societal goals, namely economic growth, is being directly recognized by the Canadian government through their admission. As I discussed in Chapter 4, the Canadian immigration regime offers a non-discriminatory, technical, and standardized system to admit immigrants with regard to market needs.

At first, this system may look like progress towards recognition of the esteem of immigrants, but as we look deeper, we encounter systematic contradictions. On the one hand, the Canadian point system favors highly educated immigrants because it assumes that these people would be able to adapt faster and meet the neoliberal need for flexibility by offering a variety of skills. On the other hand, after a further investigation of the economic barriers to immigrant integration, we observe that the flexibility that immigrants bring is only necessary so that they can be placed in a lower segment of the Canadian job market.

In this sense, after settlement, most highly skilled immigrants experience a reversal in their feelings of esteem due to the misrecognition of their skills by employers. The process of adaptation and integration to the job market does not usually improve the recognition that immigrants get for their skills. Instead, immigrants are forced to change their skill sets with regard to the achievement principle that is only applicable for them. Their preferences for PME
and volunteering are not built around their authentic individuality but for the sole purpose of making enough money to survive.

The most interesting part of this story is the fact that immigrants are usually blamed for stealing jobs from native Canadians. This statement that immigrants are an economic threat may be true not for all Canadians but for the ones who were also excluded from the primary job market and stuck in the secondary market due to their race, age, sex, etc.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the achievement principle is always temporarily interpreted by the dominant party’s interest. The above discussion clearly shows how getting immigrants to work in low-paying jobs could be in the economic interest of all Canadians. However, the neoliberal immigration regime, which takes immigrants as solely economic assets and places them in lower segments in spite of their qualifications, inhibits immigrants’ ability to be recognized for their esteem and in turn to integrate into their host society as full members. As discussed in Chapter 1, the integration of immigrants is identified as a common interest of the host society, but misrecognition and ideological recognition practices do not give immigrants enough self-esteem and self-respect so that they can be confident enough to value their capacities, needs, and beliefs.

This institutionalized recognition order renders immigrants unable to exercise their autonomy and participate in society. They just stop trying to struggle for their esteem. Nadia’s story is exemplary in that regard:

When I first came to Canada, I was full of hopes and dreams. I had worked hard in Iran and I was planning to do that here too. Now I have just stopped dreaming. I have stopped trying (Dossa 2004, 96).

Nadia, during her job search in Canada, has experienced many of the economic barriers discussed above. From being humiliated by her coworkers to having to hide her master’s degree
from the United States, denigration has become a simple fact of life for her for many years now. Even though Nadia was struggling to accept the fact that her host country does not value her skills enough to offer her a job in her profession, she did not give up easily. She took ESL classes to improve her English and had managed to get her degree from Iran accredited in Canada. But nothing worked. Now, Nadia is silent. She resents her situation but refuses to acknowledge that she is a victim. She is suffering because she cannot practice the profession that she loves. She feels like she is not allowed to. She has been told, maybe hundreds of times, that she is not good enough. After trying too hard to eliminate the barriers to her job search, she is tired, frustrated, and disillusioned. She has stopped trying (Dossa 2004, 96).

If immigrants cannot find the esteem they need from the Canadian job market to have healthy self-relation to themselves, where do they get it? How does this reflect the integration process of immigrants? In the next chapter, I will discuss ethnic enclave formation as another struggle strategy against the misrecognition of immigrant esteem. Ethnic enclaves present a challenge and a unique approach for the application of the theory of recognition because groups formed around ethnic lines blur the boundaries between the spheres of universal respect and particular esteem. It also introduces a cultural identity dimension to the issue of the integration of immigrants.

7. Conclusion

To summarize, in this chapter, I have focused on two economic barriers namely foreign credentials and work experience of immigrants and I have argued that these barriers belong to the sphere of esteem because immigrants’ qualifications are misrecognized by employers because of their foreign nature. I have also pointed out that volunteering and PME are opportunities created for the immigrants to struggle against these barriers. However, these
opportunities are provided in such a way that immigrants’ qualifications are ideologically directed into certain economic sectors, the so-called “survival jobs”. This leaves immigrants without job security, career advancement opportunities, and good wages. Finally, I have presented dual market theories and argued that when it comes to the sphere of esteem, immigrants are subject to a different recognition order than their Canadian counterparts.

Endnotes:

1 Honneth is not alone in pointing out the lack of emphasis on relations of work and its social and psychological effect on individual autonomy. In the same vein, Weeks (2011) in her seminal work titled *The Problem with Work* argues that work is not only an economic necessity but also social convention and disciplinary apparatus that demands individuals to either work or to live with someone who works. Individuals who are excluded and discriminated can reinterpret the norms of social convention of work. Moreover, Muirhead (2004) agrees with Honneth that the value of work for the healthy self-relation for the individuals. In his book titled *Just Work*, he sets out to investigate the account of meaningful work and analyzes the term “social fit” as the foundation of just work.

2 There are also some programs that help immigrants to prepare for the Canadian job market before their settlement. “Community Colleges (ACCC), and a network of partners across Canada (CIIP) prepare prospective immigrants for the job market in their origin country. Since 2007, there are only 9,000 prospective immigrants have graduated from the program. CIIP consists of three steps. The first CIIP component is a one-day orientation workshop where participants are informed about job prospects, job readiness - potential challenges and how prospective immigrants can minimize risks by preparing prior to arrival in Canada, job search - job search strategies, tools, and the different types of jobs in Canada, job retention - understanding the Canadian workplace and its culture. The second CIIP component involves personalized planning focused on key job and integration decisions, as well as actions to be taken before and after arrival in Canada. The third CIIP component provides online advice, tools, and other resources from Canadian partner organizations and direct contact with Canadian employers. In this way, CIIP also acts as an integration platform for employers and other partners to reach out to prospective immigrants before they land in Canada” (http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/partner/bpss/ciip.asp last accessed on 11/21/2013).

3 For further information on career services:

4 “The measurement of work experience often is an estimate based on a calculation of the number of years since an individual completed his/her formal education: age minus years of education minus 5 (the number of years before the onset of education). The number produced by such a calculation is sometimes called ‘potential experience.’ In census data, tapping the distinction between foreign and domestic Canadian experience requires an additional estimate, based on the year of immigration. (The public-use samples include imprecise categories, which introduce further error.) Further complicating the analysis is the fact that for persons with a given level of education and total work experience, years of foreign experience is a proxy for higher age at immigration, and higher age at immigration may lead to slower immigrant adjustment and labor market progress. Shaafsma and Sweetman’s (2001) analysis of the importance of age at immigration takes account of these interrelations, and concludes it definitely matters” (Reitz 2006, 12-13).
“More specifically, five provincial and territorial credential assessment agencies provide foreign credential assessment services to immigrants. These agencies are International Qualifications Assessment Service (Alberta), International Credential Evaluation Service (BC), Academic Credentials Assessment Service (Manitoba), World Education Services (Ontario), and Education Credential Evaluation (Quebec). The five agencies formed the Alliance of Credential Evaluation Services of Canada (ACESC), which facilitates the dissemination and exchange of information regarding international education” (Guo 2009, 42).

CEGEP means General and Vocational College.

Chapter 6: Ethnic Enclaves and the Spheres of Respect and Esteem

1. Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1, the basic concern about the integration of immigrants is usually caused by the concentration and isolation of ethnic immigrant communities in the host countries. The emphasis on national security and social cohesion of the host country is exacerbated whenever immigrant communities are seen as too different to be able to assimilate into the main values of the host society. Against this dominant perspective, I suggested approaching immigrant integration from a recognitional justice perspective. Throughout the second part of the dissertation, I have focused on the economic barriers to the integration of immigrants. Hopefully, I have managed to present these barriers as mechanisms for the misrecognition or ideological recognition of immigrants’ skills and qualifications. Moreover, I have argued that many government policies and immigrant strategies to alleviate these barriers may further the misrecognition and create a vicious circle of survival jobs, unemployment, and poverty for many highly skilled immigrants in Canada. In this chapter, I want to close the circle and analyze the role of ethnic enclaves, and ethnic groups more generally, for the integration of immigrants. In this sense, I will try to answer the question of how recognition theory understands the effect of ethnic groups on the integration of immigrants.

I think that this endeavor is crucial as well as fruitful for my analysis of immigrant integration for several reasons. To begin with, so far, I have approached the problem of immigrant integration from an individualistic perspective. My main ambition in this dissertation project is to apply Honneth’s recognition theory to the socio-economic barriers that immigrants individually suffer. I have chosen this path because I believe that the socio-economic dimension
of recognition theory has been neglected in immigration studies. Immigrants’ demands for recognition have usually been understood from an identity politics perspective. In those studies, the unit of analysis has mostly been at the level of the ethnic group, not the individual immigrant. Even though I do not dismiss the importance of these studies and the cultural recognition demands of immigrants—I discussed these under the sphere of respect in connection with employment discrimination—I claim that we need to adjust our cultural focus so that we can clearly understand the socio-economic dimensions of immigrant suffering and its effects on their self-esteem and immigrant integration.

In this chapter, first, I will start with a discussion of Honneth’s understanding of group membership for the healthy self-realization of individuals. I will argue that for the application of recognition theory to the issue of integration, we need to approach ethnic groups as mechanisms where individual immigrants can find mutual recognition not only for their esteem but also for their cultural identity. This will orient my focus away from the socio-economic dimensions to the cultural dimensions of immigrant integration. Next, I will examine the cultural socialization aspect of ethnic groups for the healthy self-realization of immigrants. In line with Honneth, I will claim that in the face of misrecognition of cultural identities, ethnic groups may provide immigrants countercultures of respect and an outlet to struggle against cultural domination and exclusion.

After, I will give an account of Honneth’s analysis of cultural demands under the sphere of respect. I will criticize his analysis on two fronts. First, I will consider the possibility of a fourth recognition sphere so that we can capture the value of culture for the self-realization of immigrants. Second, I will argue that Honneth’s simplistic treatment of ethnic groups in his discussion of cultural recognition demands disregards the hierarchical and oppressive structure
of some ethnic groups. I will introduce the “minorities within minorities” debate and argue that Honneth’s analysis should be complimented with Tully’s emphasis on the inclusiveness of discursive processes during recognition struggles. I will conclude this section by suggesting that just integration requires equal treatment of immigrant cultures, acknowledgement of the value of culture for the self-realization of immigrants and a revision of the sphere of respect so as to include regulatory discursive practices during the identification and acknowledgment of cultural demands.

In the second section of this chapter, I will refocus my analysis of the effects of ethnic groups from culture to socio-economical dimensions to examine the immigrant esteem within their ethnic enclave. First, I will analyze the role of ethnic enclaves for the socio-economic wellbeing of immigrants. I will argue that there are counterproductive effects of ethnic enclaves for the recognition of immigrant esteem both on individual and communal level. I will suggest that we encounter an analytical contradiction on the value of ethnic groups for the recognition and the integration of immigrants. This contradiction can only be eliminated by understanding ethnic groups both as cultural groups and groups for esteem. In addition to the equal treatment of cultural demands of these groups, we should advocate for a reinterpretation of the current achievement principle to eliminate structural economic limitations that immigrants suffer from in their ethnic enclaves. I will also argue that just integration of immigrants can only be possible if immigrants have democratic exit options for their membership of these ethnic groups.

2. Group Formation and Recognition

As mentioned in Chapter 2 in detail, Honneth understands recognition as a basic human desire. Through an analysis of object-relations theory, he argues that all human beings share the desire to be united with the “other” through mutual recognition. “The group allows adults to re-
experience the direct recognitional behavior—still communicated by gestures and words— they once experienced during childhood in the affirmative reactions of their caretakers—at least in fortunate cases” (Honneth 2012b, 206). With this regard, individuals as adults try to satisfy the desire to be united with the “other” through membership in certain groups. Group membership creates a sense of commonality where one experiences the affirmation of her beliefs and needs by other members of the group. Since citizenship is too abstract a form of group membership to satisfy this desire, groups gathered around more concrete causes have become necessary for individuals to develop healthy relations to self in modern capitalistic societies.

Although Honneth presents group formation as necessary for individuals to get or struggle for due recognition, he is also aware of the contradictory effects of group membership with regard to personal autonomy. He states that even though there is a tendency in social theories to emphasize either the regressive features of groups or those features that promote autonomy, both elements are rooted in the same group mechanism (Honneth 2012b, 201). Honneth argues that the only way to eliminate the blind spots of these one-sided approaches is to understand “group” from a neutral point of view.

The “I” seeks the “We” of shared group experience, because even after maturity, we are dependent on forms of social recognition imbued with direct encouragement and affirmation. Neither self-respect nor self-esteem can be maintained without the supportive experience of practicing shared values in the group. Therefore, far from constituting a threat to personal identity, groups are, to take a phrase from Adorno, a ‘primary source of humanity’. The pathologizations that we repeatedly observe in the life of the group are, conversely, caused by the infiltration of individual personality disorders. Therefore, social groups are always as good or as bad as the prevailing conditions for socialization (Honneth 2012b, 214).

On the one hand, groups can be a social mechanism that serves the interests or needs of their members by helping them to achieve personal goals and development. On the other hand, groups can function to inhibit personal autonomy of its members due to their hierarchical and
oppressive structures (Honneth 2012b, 203). Thus the badness or goodness is defined by the pathological treatment of some members or outsiders by some other members. In line with Honneth, I identify ethnic groups as social mechanisms— if situated in a democratic recognition order—that can provide both cultural and esteem recognition to immigrants. For the following discussion of the effects of ethnic enclaves on the immigrant integration, I will approach ethnic groups, as neutral and will examine the goodness or the badness of ethnic groups for the self-realization of immigrants with regard to the nature and the scope of their effects on immigrant self-formation on a contextual basis. My primary example will be the cultural and socio-economic experiences of immigrants in their ethnic enclaves. For this analysis, I categorize the effects of ethnic enclaves as cultural, communal and individual. Next, I will briefly introduce the term “ethnic enclave” and continue with an account of how ethnic groups, specifically ethnic enclaves can be a social mechanism that provide necessary conditions for immigrants to create countercultures of respect in the face of misrecognition of their cultural identity.

3. Ethnic Enclaves and Ethnic Groups as Countercultures of Respect

The term “ethnic enclave” usually refers to a kind of community where formal and informal institutions and symbols are created to bring members of a specific ethnicity together. “Formally, a residential enclave is an area where a particular ethnic group numerically dominates, and has spawned corresponding religious, cultural, commercial and linguistic services and institutions. An enclave is a culturally and economically distinct area” (Qadeer and Kumar 2006, 1). Moreover, living and working in ethnic enclaves should not be understood as a symbol of forced racial segregation or ghettoization but as a voluntary choice made by immigrants.
According to Qadeer and Kumar’s (2006) research, there are more than 260 ethnic enclaves in Canada. For example, four in every five people living in Richmond, BC are ethnically Chinese. As one reporter describes, “Richmond’s roads are replete with white delivery vans emblazoned with Chinese characters and massive 150-store Asian-friendly malls seemingly plucked right from downtown Shanghai” (National Post 2012). Although Richmond, BC is an extreme example, as it is home to second largest Asian community in North America, ethnic enclaves are very common in Canadian cities such as Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal.

Many immigrants choose to live and work in ethnic enclaves for a variety of reasons. Ethnic enclaves do not create only employment and housing opportunities but also an environment in which immigrants can express and share their cultural values in their newly adapted country. As discussed in Chapter 3, immigrants are in a different condition than other minority groups. Even though, not all immigrant experiences and ethnic groups are the same, unlike other minority groups, many immigrants go through a cultural transformation and adaptation process in addition to their feelings of grief, loss, and separation. Ethnic enclaves in the host society can provide help and comfort to immigrants in this process.

It has also been argued (Reitz 2003, Dion 2009, Zhou 1997, Rumbaut 1994) that belonging to an ethnic group helps immigrants to develop healthy relations to their ethnic identity in their host country, which may ease the overall integration of immigrants. In general, ethnic groups help immigrants to develop a positive sense of well-being, higher sense of community and social connectedness (Crocker et al. 1994; Lee and Davis 2000; Lee 2003). Moreover, Social Identity Theory argues that “ethnic group identification may buffer the negative effects of discriminatory treatment since the more an individual identifies with a chosen socio-demographic group, the more committed he/she is to emphasizing the positive attributes of
that group. So, individuals with high ethnic group identification are more likely to feel positive about their group membership even in the face of discrimination. Individuals with low levels of ethnic group identification or belonging, on the other hand, may not have the psychological resources to appropriately deal with discriminatory treatment” (Breton et al. 2009, 86). In addition, Honneth contends that group formation is usually necessary for immigrants to experience and struggle for mutual recognition. To illustrate, for the struggles for equal treatment, immigrants usually establish their demands for the recognition of their cultural identity within their particular ethnic groups.

There are always opportunities for people to create counter-cultures of respect in a disintegrating society. It gives more and more people the chance to find a certain kind of social esteem in groups, which are somewhat de-coupled from those overarching processes of normative integration. So, this is something that has no dangerous signs, but is a sign of cultural pluralization³ (Honneth 2002, 271).

However, ethnic groups as a medium for recognition of immigrant self-respect can also create unfair terms for the self-realization of some immigrants. Some ethnic groups within host societies are hierarchical and patriarchal. This situation has been discussed in a wider “minorities within minorities” literature. This literature criticizes multiculturalist policies and “draws attention to the way groups can oppress their own internal minorities— which might be women, but could also be children, homosexuals, or the poor—and the risk that policies of multiculturalism will reinforce the inequities of power” (Phillips 2004, 12).

The popular debate about the oppressive practices of Muslim communities towards women in Western countries is a good example of this contradictory aspect of cultural group formation⁴. While debating the right to wear headscarves in public institutions, “we may find ourselves facing the demands that young girls be allowed to wear veil, since it is important part of their belonging to the Muslim community; that Muslim girls be protected from their potential...
subordination within their own communities; that Muslim girls be protected from their devaluation within the wider non-Muslim community” (Bankosky 2012, 199).

As in this case, the idea of recognition itself may produce contradictions. How should we answer the demands for recognition of Muslim girls? Within this framework, the problem of situating demands for recognition of cultural identities into a specific recognition sphere comes to the forefront. Are the struggles over cultural and ethnic identity over self-esteem or self-respect? Below, I will present Honneth’s answer to this question.

3.1. Honneth’s answer. According to Honneth, there are three kinds of recognition relations in modern capitalistic societies. The sphere of love constitutes normative principles of care and friendship. However, appearing in front of the public without shame while being true to one’s authentic values, beliefs, and needs requires two other recognition spheres within the context of agents’ relationships with state and society. The second sphere, the sphere of respect, is concerned with our relationship with the state and other fellow citizens. The normative criterion that arranges the mutual interactions of self-respect between citizens and the state is the provision of legal rights to every subject on an equal basis. Unlike legal recognition, recognition of esteem is particular and historically shaped by the “cultural self-understanding of a society” (Honneth 1995, 122). Thus, the social worth of particular human qualities and skills is determined by “the degree to which they can help to realize culturally defined values” (122). In this sense, while the sphere of respect is about the universal recognition of human beings as equal, the sphere of esteem is about the recognition of particular skills of individuals with regard to their contribution to specific societal goals.

In Chapters 4 and 5, I have already introduced the differences between the spheres of respect and esteem. After categorizing the socio-economic barriers to immigrant integration into
“being” and “doing”, I discussed the strategies that immigrants employ to struggle against them. Accordingly, I distinguished the immigrant strategies that aim to eliminate obstacles to equal treatment from the ones that aim to improve individual chances to be recognized as valuable for the accomplishment of societal goals. For Honneth, the distinction between “being” and “doing” is important because he does not “want the concept of achievement to include some of the sources of esteem that depend on the identity that we have (our “being”) as opposed to the things that we achieve (our “doing”)” (Cox 2010, 131). Honneth argues that “what makes esteeming different from recognizing him or her as a person is primarily the fact that it involves not the empirical application of general, intuitively known norms but rather the graduated appraisal of concrete traits and abilities” (Honneth 1996, 113). Recognition of esteem always presumes an evaluative frame of reference that signifies the value of the personality traits on a scale of better or worse.

Honneth does not deny the conflictual and interchangeable relationship between the spheres of respect and esteem, and between culture and economy. Honneth maintains that the relationship between the spheres of recognition may not always be a two-step process where equal respect is a pre-condition for adequate esteem. Esteem may generate, or at least enhance, the opportunity for equal respect” (Cox 2010, 138). For example, people who are extremely successful in their profession and recognized for their esteem by the overall society can help to alleviate relations of misrecognition that concerns equal respect for their racial or ethnic identity. However, according to Honneth, the cultural demands for recognition of certain identities—identity politics—are clearly encompassed by the sphere of respect as issues concerning universal and group rights.
Honneth claims that many cultural groups’ struggles aim at improving either the situation of the group’s individual members or the common life of the group. The cultural demands that aim to change the misrecognition of equality towards the members of the group are concerned with the universality of political rights. Most of the time, “the appeal to such recognition only serves the aim of eliminating social discrimination that prevents the group’s members, as members of their specific group, from making use of universal basic rights” (Honneth 2003, 163). In this sense, Honneth argues that these kinds of struggles should be approached within the normative framework of demands for equal legal treatment.

In addition to these kinds of individualistic demands, Honneth claims that cultural group struggles revolve around the need to accomplish two main communal objectives. The first type of objective is about attaining safeguard from external encroachments that could negatively influence the groups’ cultural reproduction. The second type of objective is about obtaining resources or preventative measures from state institutions to promote and develop the unity within the ethnic community (Honneth 2003, 164). Honneth contends that these demands are also appeals for equal treatment by state institutions. The first demand requires the state to provide the freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly that it has already provided to the majority culture. The second demand requires state elimination of disadvantages that ethnic communities face and that the majority group does not suffer. Thus, these two communal objectives are a plea for equal treatment.

If we go back to our initial question on Muslim girls, Honneth’s answer would be that universal equality as a normative principle of the sphere of respect informs us to recognize the individual choices of young Muslim girls. In order to appear the way they are in front of public without shame, these girls should definitely be allowed to wear whatever they think their
religious identity requires them to wear. Moreover, the fact that the current recognition order does not treat religious differences equally, since dominant members of the society who are mostly Christian are allowed to wear their religious symbols in public puts the demands of Muslim girls into the sphere of respect.

For my own discussion of immigrant integration in Canada, I have also taken social pathologies that may initiate struggles that demand equal recognition of immigrants’ ascriptive characteristics in the job market as subject to the regulative principle of equality in the sphere of respect. I argue that beside its negative effects on immigrants’ self-formation, ethnic groups can provide recent immigrants the necessary environment that would ease their adaptation to the host country. Just integration is not possible if immigrant ethnic groups do not suffer from disadvantages proportionally and are deprived of equal treatment.

However, I believe that young Muslim girls in immigrant receiving countries pose a real challenge to Honneth’s recognition approach to the cultural demands of ethnic groups. As discussed above, this case is problematic because of the oppressive structure of the religious group. Muslim girls feel obligated to wear headscarves not only for religious reasons but also to become members of their cultural community. It is mainly assumed by the host society that answering Muslim girls’ demand for recognition of their cultural difference would perpetuate their subordination in Muslim communities. A Bankovsky (2012) argues, no matter what we do—allowing or prohibiting the wearing of headscarves in public—, we cannot stop the psychic harm that Muslim girls will be suffering either within their community or in relation to larger society. Thus, there is a dialectical back and forth when it comes to the struggles of recognition of “minorities within minorities” in the identity politics.
As discussed previously, for recognition theory, normative progress towards more inclusion and individualization is possible through the recognition struggles which challenge the difference between the current interpretations of normative principles of equality and achievement by the dominant party and the normative potential of these principles. However, there are cases like the headscarf affair in which the interpretation of achievement and equality can be in opposition to each other for the demands of recognition. This can produce the social denigration of the struggling subjects even if they struggle for recognition of their cultural difference. I believe that there are two basic reasons behind the diminishing explanatory power of Honneth’s recognition theoretical approach to the effects of ethnic groups on personal autonomy. Below, I will examine the problems of Honneth’s theory of recognition and introduce possible improvements to it so that it can be more responsive to the complicated relationship between ethnic groups and immigrants’ self realization.

3.1.1. The Fourth recognition order. To begin with, the dominant criticism of Honneth’s approach to cultural identity demands as appeals for equal treatment of cultural groups in the society is concerned with the importance of a culture for its members. While Honneth takes the legal recognition that the dominant group enjoys as a measure to identify the scope of cultural demands within the sphere of respect, he dismisses the demands for recognition of cultural esteem. Honneth argues that cultural demands for recognition cannot be situated in the sphere of esteem simply because the normative evaluation of the value of a culture is impossible. Honneth believes that dominant cultures do not have neutral standards to judge the value of other cultures. Thus, it is not rational to demand the recognition of equal esteem of a culture because of the impossibility of a final judgment on cultural values.
Honneth (2003) contends that “we cannot meaningfully speak of a ‘demand’ for social esteem for one’s culture…there can be no legitimate claim to this sort of esteem, since it can only be a result of process of judgment that escapes our control just as affection or sympathy does” (168). In this sense, public judgment of the value of a culture would be patronizing, ethnocentric and homogenizing. It may say “we shall exercise our power to esteem you since you need esteem, whether or not you actually deserve it” (Thompson 2006, 72). The recognition of esteem should be about the “individual’s accomplishments and abilities, rather than their identity per se, which are the grounds for esteem. Individuals should not be esteemed just for being a Muslim, speaking Spanish, or being Ulster-Scots” (Thompson 2006, 94).

Many scholars criticize Honneth’s stance on identity-politics and demands for cultural esteem as being insufficient in the face of recent struggles for recognition in modern nation states (Leeuwen 2007, Thompson 2010, Moyaert 2011, Heins 2012). These scholars consider the necessity of the fourth recognition sphere which would regulate our obligation to recognize one another as members of cultural communities. Especially Leeuwen (2007) and Heins (2012) claim that by keeping the cultural demands of minority groups in the sphere of respect, Honneth dismisses the value of culture for the development of individual identity. In this context, “minority groups are caught up in a struggle for recognition not because they want to secure a familiar medium by which they are capable of clarifying their own options, but because they derive meaning and a sense of belonging from a unique set of traditions or a particular cultural group” (Leeuwen 2007, 186).

While these critics agree with Honneth in the sense that overall society cannot give esteem to specific cultural practices, they argue that it can still recognize the value of these cultural practices for its members. These theorists advocate for a fourth principle of recognition,
which may tie demands for respect to cultural differences. Leeuwen (2007) calls this “difference-respect” principle. He claims that individuals need to be recognized as members of their cultural group not because “cultural embeddedness makes individual freedom possible or that cultures might have an intrinsic value, but because in both cases what is being ignored is the actual motivation of members of social groups to protect and experience their culture” (Leeuwen 2007, 195). In addition to having universal equal treatment and esteem for their skills, individuals need to be positively at ease with their particular identities for their personal autonomy. To illustrate, Leeuwen would argue that we can consider Sikh men’s demand to be allowed to wear their turbans in the offices of the Canadian Mountie police force as a difference-respect demand. The ability for Sikh men to be able to identify with their religious beliefs while contributing to Canadian society as a Mountie is a sign of inclusion and individualization.

I agree with the advocates of fourth recognition order and argue that this kind of recognition of the importance of cultural belonging is essential for progress in the modern recognition order. Because cultural “belonging is generally determined by criteria that are not the result of choice. People do not decide to belong to an encompassing group. They belong because of what they are”(Margalit 1996, 140). A fourth sphere of cultural esteem where members of society acknowledge the effects of their culture in shaping their personal autonomy would improve Honneth’s recognition theory in such a way that the those Muslim girls would not be seen as victims who are silently waiting to be saved by the larger community. However, the fourth recognition sphere does not completely eliminate the sufferings of “minorities within minorities” in hierarchical and oppressive ethnic group formations. Below, I will discuss Tully’s idea of “multilogues” as the possible inclusion to Honneth’s idea of sphere of respect so that we
can assure justice during the discursive processes that shape the very demands made for cultural recognition.

3.1.2. Tully’s “multilogues” for the “minority within minority” problem. By defining cultural recognition demands under the sphere of respect, Honneth focuses on the relationship between the larger society and the specific underrepresented minority groups. This inhibits Honneth’s ability to analyze the inner mechanisms of the ethnic group in relation to its members. Cultural demands of ethnic groups are usually taken as it is without any further examination of the condition of its members within the group. Tully (2000) offers a set of requirements to solve this problem. He argues that the legitimacy of a demand of cultural recognition should be examined with regard to the following requirements. First, for a demand to be legitimate, the spokespeople or representatives of the group who make demands in the name of overall members of their ethnic group should have the acceptance of the proposed identity by their members. “This requires democratic negotiation and agreement which ensures that minorities within the group have the opportunity to have a say in the formulation of the demand so it accommodates the other aspects of their identity that matter to them and also can be defended by appeals to shared principles, values, and goods (for example, linguistic and religious minorities within a region seeking recognition as a nation within a larger multinational association)” (Tully 2000, 475).

Second, to claim legitimacy and initiate a democratic response by the state and larger community, the cultural demand must consider the reasonable counter-proposals of other members of the society. “This requires the complex reciprocal elucidation of democratic negotiations among the group demanding the change and the other members of society or their representatives” (Tully 2000, 476). Tully calls these discursive practices “multilogues”. These
are necessary for activation of a democratic duty among the members of overall society. In line with Tully, I believe that a revision of the regulative principles of Honneth’s second spheres of recognition so that these requirements to measure the legitimacy of cultural recognition demands are included is essential to create conditions for just integration of the immigrants. However, although we have these discursive practices in place, we need to acknowledge that even the most legitimate demands will be constantly revised and resubmitted in the democratic reinterpretations of norms of integration.

While Honneth understands the struggles of recognition as positive and as having emancipatory powers for excluded groups and individuals, he also accepts the negative and destructive side of these struggles—in the cases where we need to make a choice between esteem and respect. In this context, Honneth refers to the “agonism of struggles,” by which he means that some of “the struggles of recognition cannot eliminate conflict or negative forms of domination, such that there is, necessarily, something permanent about struggle itself” (Bankosky 2012, 196). In line with Honneth, Tully (2000) argues that recognition in theory and practice should not be understood as an end state, but “as a partial, provisional, mutual, and human-all-too-human part of continuous processes of democratic activity in which citizens struggle to change their rules of mutual recognition as they change themselves”(477). Tully contends that even though mutual recognition may not be achieved, some groups after struggles of recognition may feel of either disclosure or a kind of acknowledgement of the suffering the way they experience. Thus, even in the face of failed attempts, recognition struggles create bonds and solidarity among the members of society.

4. Ethnic Groups as Groups for Esteem
So far, I have examined the ethnic groups as social mechanisms for immigrants so that they can freely identify with their cultures and struggle for the equal treatment of their cultural identities by the larger society. I have argued that Honneth’s theory falls short in its examination of ethnic groups. I propose, in line with many scholars, a fourth recognition sphere and a revision of the sphere of respect with regard to Tully’s “multilogues” to eliminate the weaknesses of Honneth recognition theoretic model for the analysis of “minorities within minorities” problem. Now, I would like to criticize Honneth’s theory for understanding ethnic groups mainly in terms of culture. I argue that ethnic groups, specifically ethnic enclaves, are also places where many immigrants can find their self-esteem in the face of economic barriers that are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

There are many economic and social benefits of ethnic enclaves for immigrants. To illustrate, recent studies (Qadeer and Kumar, 2006; Wu et al. 2011) show that ethnic enclaves provide immigrants, especially newcomers, easier access to the housing and job market in Canada. However, ethnic enclaves may pose threats to the integration of immigrants in a variety of ways. The studies on the subject of “ethnic networking”— businesses operated and maintained primarily by members of immigrant and/or minority groups — and its effects on the well-being of immigrants have shown polarized results in the literature. While one side of the debate puts emphasis on the advantages of ethnic enclaves to group members, the other side of the debate points out the potential traps, or structural limitations of ethnic enclaves on immigrants (Walton-Roberts and Hiebert 1997, 120). Next, I will count the counterproductive effects of ethnic enclaves on the recognition of individual immigrants’ self-esteem in the Canadian job market and the identification of ethnic groups in general. I categorize these effects under two headings, namely individualistic and communal, to reveal the contradictory results of
the existence of ethnic enclaves for the individual self-realization of the immigrant within the recognition order of the host country and for the overall recognition of ethnic group identities by the host society and its institutions.

4.1. Individualistic effects of ethnic enclaves. If we look at the reality of ethnic enclaves from a recognition theoretical point of view, we see immigrants as agents stuck in a double bind. As discussed in previous chapters, even though many immigrants have high qualifications to satisfy neoliberal criteria, host societies do not usually offer a recognition order of esteem so that they can find jobs that fit their qualifications. In the face of misrecognition of their skills and qualifications by employers, immigrants often take refuge in ethnic enclaves. Most of the immigrants lack networks to find an appropriate job for their skills and education, so they seek help from ethnic groups. From this view, ethnic enclaves may appear beneficial for the economic integration of immigrants. However, working and living in ethnic enclaves can place structural limitations on the self-realization of immigrants’ esteem within the host society.

One structural limitation that immigrants face is the fact that ethnic networks are usually embedded in a specific economic sector. For example, in Toronto, ON, convenience stores are usually owned by Koreans and construction jobs are populated by Ghanaians. Since working in ethnic enclaves as a strategy does not provide a diversity of options for immigrant job seekers, immigrants looking for jobs in an already segregated job market can be stuck in these ethnically specific economic sectors.

Moreover, “poor pay rates and exploitative working conditions [and] low returns to human capital” are typical in ethnic enterprises (Lee 1995, Min 1996). In order to obtain market niches and competitive advantage in a specific economic sector, ethnic business owners exploit their co-ethnic labor power. According to Walton-Roberts and Hiebert’s (1997) ethnographic
study, Indo-Canadian entrepreneurs in Vancouver are competitive in the job market because of the flexible and cheap labor power that is available to them through their ethnic communities. A construction business owner, Ajit, states that:

Nobody can beat our prices because we got our own product [roofing shingles] ... plus our labor is cheaper than other people. Like when I tell my guys, “hey listen the market is slow; we’re going to pay you only $8 an hour”, they say “no problem” (Walton-Roberts and Hiebert 1997, 134).

From the perspective of ethnic entrepreneurs, while self-employed immigrants report higher levels of satisfaction (Reitz 2006, 16), they also suffer from insecurity within the wider Canadian market. To illustrate, Castles argue that the changes emanating from the neoliberal economy push immigrants to be self-employed and provide service for low prices without any job security.

On the one hand a small number of high-tech big firms became centers of financial and legal expertise, design, know-how, and project conception and monitoring. On the other hand, all manual production work and associated employment costs and social security were subcontracted to small firms, which had to bear the risk of market fluctuation. This led to a polarized job setting, marked by requalification and favorable job ladders and wages in the dominant firms and dequalification, low pay and insecurity in the small firms…Often subcontracting took place through a long chain, with last link consisting of small firms owned mainly by immigrants, employing other immigrants by temporary basis without any contract, often in hazardous working environment. The fragmentation was further exacerbated by the proliferation of fake “self-employment” in which manual workers were forced to become independent subcontractors, bearing all risk of unemployment, accident or illness themselves (Castles and Miller 2009, 242).

Therefore, ethnic enclaves appear to be a counterproductive strategy for the recognition of immigrants’ self-esteem. Ethnic businesses are usually positioned in the lower segments of the Canadian economy and exploit co-ethnic human capital in order to gain a competitive advantage over native Canadian businesses within the same sector. In this regard, the success of the business completely depends on the high degree of flexibility and low cost of immigrant labor. These businesses do not usually offer job security or equitable wages to their employees. Thus,
rather than offering a solution to economic barriers to immigrants’ entrance into the Canadian job market in line with their skills and qualifications, most ethnic businesses and self-employment ventures may perpetuate the ideological recognition of immigrants’ esteem.

The fact that many immigrants have a chance to prosper only in their ethnic communities reveals another contradiction, because living and working in ethnic enclaves mediates the ways through which the host society and institutions recognize immigrant ethnic groups. Below, I will discuss the communal effects of ethnic enclaves on the recognition of ethnic identities and the recognition demands of immigrant ethnic groups.

4.2. The Communal effects of ethnic enclaves. As mentioned above, ethnic businesses are in competition with native Canadian businesses. This competition occurs within the lower segments of the job market and causes low returns in wages. This is the reason why immigrant workers may seem like they are stealing “native” jobs from the perspective of the host society. According to realistic group competition theory, the resentment that is felt towards immigrants by the host society usually emanates from perceived inter-group competition and ethnic threat. Exclusionary behaviors towards minority groups are caused by the perceived necessity of competition for scarce resources in the community. In this sense, ethnic groups in a society are seen as posing a threat to the social position and to the privileges enjoyed by the majority of individuals whenever there is a conflict in the interests between the two groups. According to the ethnic competition hypothesis, “the stronger the actual competition between ethnic groups and/or the stronger the perceived ethnic threat, the more the mechanisms of social identification will be reinforced inducing exclusionary reaction” (Scheepers et al. 2004, 18).

While Honneth celebrates individual competition for the progress of the achievement principle, he does not refer to competition as in the group competition theories. The competition
that the achievement principle requires should not be understood in terms of group competition for economic resources. Instead, “the competition should be thought of as fostering a process of reciprocal understanding in which individuals learn to understand themselves as subjects possessing abilities and talents that are valuable for society” (Honneth 2003, 142). Honneth claims that individual competition in the pursuit of esteem is the normative ground of the achievement principle in modern capitalistic societies. The sphere of esteem should constitute individuals’ specific attempts to be recognized as cooperative members of society, not as members of their ethnic group (Mendonca 2011, 943). In this sense, while these sociological studies may explain the reasons behind the perceived ethnic threat and exclusionary reactions towards immigrants through a group competition thesis for scarce resources, Honneth’s recognition theory can explain why the competition is structured in such a way.

Through an analysis of the sphere of esteem and the dominant interpretation of the achievement principle, we can observe that ethnic enclaves and immigrants’ entrance to the job market are structured so that immigrant labor can be directed to the lower segments where cheap and flexible labor can be taken advantage of. Thus, “perceptions of inter-group competition and out-group threat may only partly reflect the actual inter-group competition” (Scheepers et al. 2004, 17). This kind of competition between ethnic groups creates false comparisons and stereotypical identification of ethnic identities and groups by some in the host society.

Accordingly, the existence of ethnic enclaves provides a challenge because they create an environment not only for the economic integration for immigrants—with the aforementioned structural limitations—but also the cultural isolation of immigrant communities. To illustrate, the Canadian government perceives the existence of ethnic enclaves for the immigrant integration in a contradictory manner.
Ethnic enclaves can play a positive role in easing the shock of adjustment to a new culture ... To the degree that ethnic enclaves restrict their members and shield them from alternative norms, values and behaviors, they can discourage immigrants from full participation in society and perpetuate segregation ... Ideally, in an integrated society, immigrants move through the ethnic enclave, using its resources in order to enter the mainstream society. In this view, ethnic enclaves consist of individuals linked by common interests in removing barriers against their participation in the broader community. Ethnic groups may continue to exist, but individuals might fall away as they adjust to the host society (Employment and Immigration Canada, 1993, 4-5 cited by Li 2003, 321).

From the above statement, one can infer that Canadian multicultural discourse perceives ethnic enclaves as advantageous in the short term and disadvantageous in the long run for the integration of immigrants. The positive function of ethnic enclaves for immigrants to find a job is acknowledged and celebrated, but long-term immigrant participation in them is seen as a threat. Canadian policy makers are cautious of the function of ethnic enclaves as a “cultural shield” (Li 2003, 321). Moreover, these ethnic groups mediate the ways through which the host country recognizes immigrants in terms of their ethnic identity. Their existence creates a rigid understanding of ethnic cultures; thus, the struggles of immigrants are immediately understood in terms of identity politics. This point was discussed previously with regard to multicultural policies in Chapter 2.

Above discussion of the effects of ethnic enclaves on the recognition of esteem of immigrants illustrates how ethnic groups have counterproductive mechanisms for the recognition of immigrants’ particular skills and qualifications. We observe that even though ethnic enclaves provide economic benefits, they limit immigrants’ opportunities for getting due recognition for their esteem. It also appears that usually immigrant do not have a realistic exit option out of these ethnic enclaves.

5. Conclusion
In addition to the equal treatment of cultural demands of these groups under the principles of a fourth recognition sphere and “multilogues”, I believe that just integration advocates for a reinterpretation of the current achievement principle so as to eliminate structural economic limitations that immigrants suffer from in their ethnic claves. The major culprit for the creation of ethnic niche markets where immigrant labor may be exploited is the dual market economy. The segregation of immigrants in lower segments of the job market creates barriers to just integration of immigrants in Canada. In Chapters 4 and 5, I have also argued that the contradictory situation of highly skilled immigrants in the Canadian economic system emanates from the fact that immigrants are subject to a different recognition order than their Canadian counterparts within the host society. Double standards are so invisible that they usually go unnoticed and strengthen the dependence of immigrants on their ethnic groups. The first analysis reveals that immigrants suffer economically because of the double standard that the host country provides them. Thus, if we simply apply Honneth’s theory to the issue of immigrant integration, we can say that double standards should be removed. Immigrants should be treated equally. The only way to do that is to change the achievement principle and the value that we put on immigrant labor.

I believe that the achievement principle should be reinterpreted through democratic discursive principles with regard to several issues. First, the value of having degrees or job experiences from outside of Canada should be reevaluated as the current interpretation does not let many immigrants to perform their profession. The dominant interpretation is riddled with power plays between Canadian government, specific economic sectors and occupational interest groups. It fails to contribute to the Canadian societal goals of increasing the value of labor power and education of growing population. It also causes immigrants to take refuge in their ethnic
enclaves without having realistic exit options. Second, achievement principle should be
reinterpreted so that the segregated economic market would not grossly affect the healthy self-
formation of immigrants.

How these practices of reinterpretation of societal value will take place cannot be
anticipated by the recognition theory. What recognition theory can do is to analyze the existing
interpretations of norms and reveal their surplus validity to guide struggles of recognition to
achieve progress towards more inclusion and individualization. I believe that as long as
immigrants are provided an equal platform in democratic discussions and realistic exit options
both from the segregated job market and their ethnic enclaves, they can achieve to be a
cooperative member of their host society through democratically participating to solve common
societal problems.

Endnotes:

1 From this point on, I will use the terms “ethnic groups” and “ethnic communities” interchangeably with the term
“ethnic enclaves”. These terms essentially refer to the immigrants’ membership to their ethnic communities or
groups, which is enabled through living and working in their ethnic enclaves.

2 Moreover, ethnic groups can be utilized to struggle for the recognition of esteem of individuals—for example,
Chinese engineers lobbying to ease their accreditation process in Canada.

4 Recently “the Parti Québécois government is leading Quebec into a wrenching debate over faith and the future
place of minorities in the province by unveiling a charter of values that would ban Muslim headscarves, Sikh
turbans, Jewish kippas and other “overt” religious symbols from the public service.” In
values/article14214307/ (28/11/2013).

5 On the other hand, McBride argues that the competitive nature of the sphere of esteem is problematic in the sense
that “at the collective level it risks pitching us into a morally unacceptable and politically destabilizing politics of
competition and hierarchy” (McBride 2009, 107).
Conclusion

My dissertation can be identified as an interdisciplinary project. On the one hand, it speaks to a variety of political theory literatures revolving around the issues of immigration, minority rights, economic discrimination and justice. On the other hand, it attempts to apply Honneth’s recognition theory to diverse and fragmented empirical findings on the economic and social pathologies that high skilled immigrants in Canada are suffering from. I believe that my approach to the issue of immigrant integration has accomplished to make several contributions to the immigration literature in general.

First, throughout my multilayered empirical and theoretical analysis, I have tried to focus on the general theme of the integration of immigrants. In Chapter 1, my historical and discursive analysis of the perception of the term “integration” in the immigrant-receiving societies has revealed an unhealthy obsession to restore the previous order of the host society in the face of cultural and ethnic pluralization that diverse population of immigrants has brought. I have showed that isolation even the existence of immigrants may be blamed for social and economic problems that host societies’ are experiencing. This kind perception of immigrants inhibits host society’s ability to recognize its immigrants as individuals who have authentic skills, qualifications and identities in addition to their ethnic, cultural and religious attachments. Moreover, I have presented that this practice is also prevalent even in the multiculturalism discourses. When it comes to the question of doing justice to immigrants, they are usually perceived as parts of their ethnic group rather than individuals as having authentic demands.

Through a criticism of this dominant approach to immigrants, I have argued that advocating integration so that the impact of immigrants can be erased and preservation of social cohesion can be secured is problematic. This diverts our attention from the real problems that
real people are experiencing. My basic argument was that no matter how much we try to measure the scope and the degree of tolerance to the diversity for the inclusion of immigrants, immigrants cannot integrate to the overall society unless recognition order provides normative conditions for immigrants’ healthy self-realization.

Thus, I have reconceptualized the term “integration”— in line with Honneth’s recognition theory—by identifying it with the ability of the actual recognition order of host societies to include immigrants as full members of society who can participate in public with self-esteem and self-respect. In this sense, I have turned the debate on the integration of immigrants upside down by approaching it with a criticism of host society rather than of ethnic group formation of immigrants. I believe that this approach may be more fruitful in comparison to dominant one because it provides a guideline for the direction of progress that host societies and its institutions have to go through to integrate their immigrant members.

Second, I claim that my unique approach to the integration of immigrants from a recognition perspective contributes to the debate on multiculturalism and identity-politics. Through a constructive criticism of multicultural theories for the recognition of cultural differences, I have put forward the importance of the economic barriers to the immigrants’ entrance to the job market. My aim was to investigate, first, the direct discriminatory barriers that immigrants face, and second, the mechanisms that the Canadian state provides to compensate immigrants for the disadvantages emanating from the economic discriminatory practices. My analysis of ethnic enclaves in Chapter 6 does not only reveal the insufficiency of state funded multicultural policies and programs for the recognition of immigrants’ self-esteem but also revealed the counterproductive results of many state attempts done to ease immigrants’ integration.
Third, my emphasis on economic problems that high skilled immigrants face and how these are structured by the demands of neoliberal capitalistic order adds a new dimension to the multicultural studies. Recognition theory understands the economic sphere as societally defined thus not immune to structural changes to achieve more inclusion of immigrants. This attitude brings a mostly forgotten factor against the integration of immigrant in the forefront of the immigration studies. I believe that this kind of reminder on the role of economic problems play for the process of integration was a long due in the multicultural literature. In modern capitalistic societies, legal recognition can never be enough for individuals including immigrants to develop their self-esteem.

Moreover, my analysis of the interaction between pre-immigration policies and post-immigration realities has revealed the importance of providing fair terms to immigrants not only after but also before their settlement. I have argued that Canadian immigration admission policies may create positive expectations for the immigrants’ career opportunities. The fantasy recognition order that immigrants are being admitted to dissolves soon after settlement. This is unjust and poses a serious threat to the integration of immigrants. Thus, my analysis informs policy makers to consider the negative effects of admitting high skilled immigrants without being able to provide jobs in line with their qualifications.

Recognition theory has also helped me to contribute to the social psychological studies on immigrant identity. Through the discussion of condition of being an immigrant, I have encountered the different recognition orders that immigrants cognitively think that they are subject to. These are fantasy, imaginary and invented recognition orders. Even though I identified them, I did not have space to study them in detail. I believe that a study like that would improve our understanding of immigrant identity construction. Thus I have argued that in
addition to anti-discriminatory policies and reinterpretation of achievement principle so as to incorporate immigrants’ qualifications into Canadian job market, the special conditions that immigrants share should be considered.

Furthermore, the study of ethnic enclaves in the last chapter has revealed the weaknesses of Honneth’s recognition theory in case of contradictory normative claims that may emanate from the sphere of esteem and respect. I have eventually argued that for my specific case, these weaknesses pose a serious challenge in our understanding of the role of ethnic groups on immigrants’ autonomy. I suggested that Tully’s “multilogues” and a fourth recognition order can eliminate these weaknesses and solve the problem of “minority with minorities” in the recognition literature. However this endeavor has also revealed the necessity to approach each recognition demand on a contextual basis. The initial realization of this necessity has actually inspired me to understand recognition theory as a research program. This is the reason why the second part of dissertation is dedicated to a study of concrete economic problems of high skilled immigrants in Canada.

In the second part of the dissertation, I have investigated the higher rates of poverty and unemployment that many immigrants experience compared to their Canadian counterparts. I have identified several economic barriers specific to Canadian immigrants and determined the ways they create structural domination and exclusion of immigrants in the Canadian job market. To accomplish this task, I wrestle with a huge amount of empirical evidence on a variety of economic barriers to the entrance of high skilled immigrants in Canadian job market. I believe that my project accomplishes to gather scattered empirical and ethnographical studies on the economic pathologies that Canadian immigrants suffer from within a theoretical framework.
Finally, the dialectical turns that immigrants’ struggles for recognition take throughout my analysis have reminded us that a complete mutual recognition cannot be actualized in the real world. The process of recognition is always fractured and incomplete. However, recognition order can be changed to improve inclusion and individualization of members of the society. For the issue of immigrant integration, we must continue to find novel ways to offer more recognition for the universal equality and particular achievements of the immigrants. Discriminatory practices, ideologically structured economic mechanisms and misrecognition of skills of immigrants are unjust and it is our duty to fight against these unjust practices. I strongly believe that if we accomplish to walk on this path, we can seriously improve the economic conditions of immigrants and ease their integration.
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