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The presentation of the concepts of Person and Behavior has been accomplished by means of various related conceptual-notational devices. Among these are the following.

1. The parametric analysis of behavior, and the general formula for behavior.
2. The calculational system for generating forms of behavior description.
3. The Judgment Diagram for reconstructing, analyzing, and criticizing Deliberate Actions.
4. The Emotion Formulas for reconstructing, analyzing, and criticizing emotional behaviors.
5. The definition of Person.
6. The parametric analysis of persons.
7. The Developmental Schema for historical explanation of personal change.
8. The Relationship Formula and Relationship Change formulas for explaining behavior.
In addition, familiarity with the calculational system, parametric analyses, and descriptive formats dealing with reality concepts in "What Actually Happens" was largely presupposed.

The present section provides a different sort of access to the Person Concept, with emphasis on the concepts of Person and Behavior, particularly in relation to the reality concepts and specifically excluding reference to verbal behavior. This access is given by a set of related mottoes, or maxims. These maxims are, effectively, a set of rules or principles for distinguishing formally and methodologically adequate formulations of actual (historical) persons and their behavior. Thus, they reflect a shift from the more expository presentation of a set of distinctions and conceptual structures to a more tutorial instruction in how to use them appropriately.

As in the case of the rules of a game, these rules all apply simultaneously. At first blush, it may seem impractical to apply approximately one hundred rules simultaneously. In fact, however, once a general sort of mastery has been attained, the issues, perplexities, and uncertainties which arise are likely to involve relatively specific points, and it is therefore helpful to be able to refer to relatively specific and discrete rules. Unlike the case with the rules of a game, there is no way
of generating a set of rules here which is either finite and exhaustive or uniquely definitive. This is because each 'rule' is simply another 'view' of the same conceptual structure, the Person Concept, and there is no end to such views and also no privileged set.

Historically, the practice of constructing formulations which are in accordance with the maxims and using them in accordance with the maxims has been called "Status Dynamics." The maxims are, accordingly, designated as Status-Dynamic maxims.

Heuristically, the maxims have been organized below into nine groups. These groups are designated as follows.

A. Person and World
B. Behavioral Choice
C. Value and Behavioral Choice
D. Stability and Change
E. Person and Community
F. Persons and Other Persons
G. Person and Self
H. Limits, Constraints, and Limitations
I. Norms, Baselines, and Burdens of Proof

The various maxims under these headings are presented directly below without elaboration in order to facilitate summary reference. Following that, they are
presented again, this time with sufficient explication and elaboration to provide some practical guidelines for use. Rules, of course, have to be interpreted and applied, hence the maxims should not be taken to have the same kind and degree of inflexibility as mere truths.

The distinction between maxims and truths in this respect is important on two counts. The first is that rules or maxims are primarily something to act on, in contrast to truths, which are primarily something to be judged and learned, and therefore the use of maxims is a reminder that the Person Concept formulation, no less than the Person Concept, is primarily something to be acted on rather than something to be learned or believed. The second is that most of the maxims could be taken straightforwardly as tautologies or sentential formulas in a theory of behavior, and therefore the temptation to deal with them in terms of a truth evaluation is, for many, an overwhelming temptation.
A Collection of Status-Dynamics Maxims

A. Person and World

A1. A person requires a world in order to have the possibility of engaging in any behavior at all.

A2. A person requires that the world be one way rather than another in order for him to behave in one way rather than another.

A3. A person's circumstances provide reasons and opportunities to engage in one behavior rather than another.

A4. For a given person, the real world is the one which includes him as a person, actor, observer-describer, and critic (appraiser, evaluator).

A5. What a person takes to be the case (takes to be real) is what he is prepared to act on.

A6. A person acquires knowledge of the world (states of affairs to act on) by observation and thought.

A7. For a given person, the real world is the one he has to find out about by observation.

A8. A person takes it that things are as they seem unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

A9. A person takes the world to be as he has found it to be.
B. Behavioral Choice

B1. Because a person's circumstances are what they are, the person has the reasons and opportunities that he has to engage in one behavior rather than another.

B2. If a person wants to do something he has a reason to do it.

B3. If a person recognizes an opportunity to do something he wants to do, he has a reason to do it.

B4. If a person wants to do something, he has a reason to create or look for an opportunity to do it.

B5. If a person has a reason to do something, he will do it unless
   a. he has a stronger reason to do something else
   b. he doesn't recognize that he has that reason
   c. he is unable to do so
   d. he mistakenly takes it that he is doing it, or
   e. he miscalculates or his behavior miscarries.

B6. If a person has two reasons for doing X, he has a stronger reason for doing X than if he had only one of those reasons.

B7. If a person's circumstances call for him to do something he can't do (by virtue of lacking the requisite motivation, competence, or knowledge, including knowledge of opportunities) he will do something he can do (if he does anything at all).
B8. If a person wants to engage in a given behavior he will thereby also want to engage in other behaviors to the extent that they are relevantly similar to the behavior in question.

B9. If A has the relation R to C the behaviors of A with respect to C will be an expression of R, unless:
(a) A is acting on a different relationship which takes precedence
(b) A doesn't recognize the relationship for what it is
(c) A is unable to do so
(d) A mistakenly believes that A is doing so, or
(e) A miscalculates or A's behavior miscarries.

C. Value and Behavioral Choice

Cl. A person values some states of affairs over others and acts accordingly.

Cla. If a person's relationship to something is such that he is in a bad situation, or circumstances, he has a reason to try to improve it.

Clb. If a person's relationship to something is such that he is in a good situation, or circumstances, he has a reason to act to maintain it.

Clc. If a person is in a good situation and has an opportunity to improve it he has a reason to try to do so.
C1d. If a person is in any situation and it may be expected to become worse, he has a reason to act to prevent that.

C2. A person will not choose to actualize less behavior potential rather than more.

C3. If a person values a specific something, e.g., an object, a circumstance, a behavior, or, more generally, a state of affairs, he will thereby also value other specific things of the same kind to the extent that they are relevantly similar to the original.

C3a. If a person values a general something he will thereby also value a specific something to the extent that it is a paradigmatic instance or realization of the more general value.

C4. If a person values something general he will be sensitive to (will tend to evaluate) the relevance of his circumstances to that something and act accordingly.

C4a. Negative-emotional behavior (fear, guilt, anger, shame, etc. behavior) is an attempt to improve a bad situation.

C4b. Positive-emotional behavior (joy, triumph, glee, etc. behavior) is an attempt to preserve, enhance, or celebrate a good situation.
D. Stability and Change

D1. A historical individual acquires a given individual characteristic by virtue of having the prior capacity and the relevant intervening history.

D1a. A person acquires a given person characteristic by virtue of having the prior capacity and the relevant intervening history.

D2. A historical individual having a finite history has some non-acquired characteristics during some part of that history.

D3. If a person acquires a given person characteristic he acquires it in one of the ways in which it can be acquired.

D3a. If a person acquires a given relationship to something he acquires it in one of the ways in which it can be acquired.

D4. A person acquires concepts and skills (know how), archetypally, by practice and experience in one or more of the social practices which call for the use of (and offer opportunities for the use of) that concept or skill.

D5. What a person takes to be the case about the world is the outcome of his observation, thought, and action.
D6. If a person has a given person characteristic he continues to have it until it changes.

D7. If a person has a given relationship to something he continues to have it until it changes.

D8. If a person, C, has a relationship, R, to Z, and if C's behavior with respect to Z is such that it violates R and expresses RR, then R will change in the direction of RR.

D9. If a person knows something he continues to know it until he forgets it or changes his mind.

D10. (A9) A person takes the world to be as he has found it to be.

D11. The world is subject to reformulation by persons.

E. Person and Community

E1. A person requires a community in order for it to be possible for him to engage in human behavior at all.

E2. A person requires that the community be one way rather than another in order for him to behave in one way rather than another.

E3. A community is characterized by a common world, a language, a structure of social practices, ways of living, and individual members.

E4. A person's place in the community provides reasons and opportunities to engage in one behavior rather than another.
E5. To engage in a deliberate action is to participate in a social practice of the community.

E6. If a person participates in a social practice he must do it in one of the ways it can be done.

E7. When a person is in a pathological state there is a significant restriction in his ability to participate in the social practices of the community.

E8. If a person makes non-normative changes in his participation in the social practices of the community, that calls for an explanation.

E9. A person may act as a representative of the community or as merely a member.

E10. A person takes it that a member of the community has the personal characteristics required for normal participation in the social practices of the community unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

E11. Reasons for behavior (deliberate action) are states of affairs which are Contingencies (as defined the Basic Process Unit) within the structure of the social practice of which the behavior is an optional component.

F. Interactions of Persons

F1. The behavior of one person with respect to another is a participation in [at least] one of the social practices of his community.
F2. (B9) If A has the relation R to C the behaviors of A with respect to C will be an expression of R, unless:
(a) A is acting on a different relationship which takes precedence
(b) A doesn't recognize the relationship for what it is
(c) A is unable to do so
(d) A mistakenly believes that A is doing so, or
(e) A miscalculates or A's behavior miscarries.

F3. If C and Z participate in a social practice, the fact that Z participates in one way rather than another (or chooses that social practice rather than another) gives C a reason to participate correspondingly in one way rather than another.

F3a. C's behavior with respect to Z may be a case of participating in two or more social practices simultaneously.

F3b. If C and Z participate in a social practice C may anticipate to some extent Z's choices among behavioral options on the basis of Z's personal characteristics, and relationships to C and others.

F3c. Z may participate in one way rather than another (choose certain options rather than others) as a way of letting C know what kind of person Z is.
F4. If C has a given relationship to Z, C's behavior potential is different from what it otherwise would have been.

F4a. If Z has a greater behavior potential than P, it is likely that C would gain more behavior potential from a positive relationship with Z than with P.

F5. If C makes the first move in a social practice, that invites Z to continue the enactment of the practice by making the second move. (Move 1 invites Move 2.)

F6. If C makes the second move in a social practice, that makes it difficult for Z not to have already made the first move. (Move 2 preempts Move 1.)

F7. Z's positive or negative evaluation of C's behavior provides reasons for C to continue, discontinue, modify, or elaborate (etc.) such behavior.

F7a. If C chooses his behavior under the description "Bl" and Z redescribes it as "B2" and C accepts the redescription and C appraises B2 differently from Bl, then C will have an additional reason to engage in Bl or not to engage in Bl, depending on the nature of the appraisal.

G. Person and Self

G1. A person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of deliberate action.

G2. A person has a status in the real world.
G3. A person has a status in the world as an Actor, as an Observer/Describer, and as an Appraiser, or Critic.

G4. A person has a status in the world as a possible-Actor, as a possible-Observer/Describer, and as a possible-Appraiser/Critic.

G5. A person's statuses as Actor, Observer, and Appraiser each correspond to distinctive sorts of relationship to the world and/or parts of the world either simply or in their aspects.

G5a. A person acts as himself.

G5b. A person knows about himself.

G5c. A person knows about his relation to the world and his place in it.

G5d. A person evaluates his worth.

H. Limits, Constraints, and Limitations

H1. A person's personal characteristics correspond to reality constraints on the behaviors he can engage in.

H1a. (B7) If the situation calls for a person to do something he can't do, he will do something he can do, if he does anything at all.
H1b. If the situation calls for a person to enact a behavior for which he lacks the requisite knowledge, he will enact some other behavior for which he has the requisite knowledge, if he does anything at all.

H1c. If the situation calls for a person to enact a behavior for which he lacks the requisite motivational priorities, he will enact some other behavior for which he has the requisite motivational priorities if he does anything at all.

H2. A person's personal characteristics correspond to reality constraints on the ways in which he can acquire personal characteristics and relationships.

H2a. A person's personal characteristics correspond to reality constraints on which personal characteristics and relationships he can acquire.

H3. A person's world is made up of possibilities and non-possibilities for behaving.

H4. A person's self concept is a summary, and primarily intuitive (unreflective) formulation of his behavior potential.

H5. All the world's a stage.

H5a. Status takes precedence over fact.

H5b. Reality takes precedence over truth.

H6. (C2) A person will not choose to actualize less behavior potential rather than more.
H7. Behavior goes right, if it doesn't go wrong in one of the ways it can go wrong.

H8. A person always acts under conditions of uncertainty.

H9. A person always has enough information to act on.

I. Norms, Baselines, and Burdens of Proof

I1. A person takes it that things are as they seem, unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

I2. (A9, D10) A person takes the world to be as he has found it to be.

I3. If a person has a given person characteristic and his behavior is an expression of it, that calls for no explanation, whereas if his behavior violates that person characteristic, that does call for an explanation.

I4. If a person has a given relationship and his behavior is an expression of it, that calls for no explanation, whereas if his behavior violates that relationship that does call for an explanation.

I5. If a person's relationships or personal characteristics change, that calls for an explanation.

I6. A person's behavior goes right, if it doesn't go wrong in one of the ways in which it can go wrong.
I7. A person takes it that a person who is a member of a group, class, or set of persons is a typical member until and unless he discovers differences.

I8. (E8) If a person makes non-normative choices, that calls for an explanation.

I9. If a person engages in an intrinsic social practice, that calls for no further explanation.
A. Person and World

A1. A person requires a world in order to have the possibility of engaging in any behavior at all.

A2. A person requires that the world be one way rather than another in order for him to behave in one way rather than another.

A3. A person's circumstances provide reasons and opportunities to engage in one behavior rather than another.

A4. For a given person, the real world is the one which includes him as a person, actor, observer-describer, and critic (appraiser, evaluator).

A5. What a person takes to be the case (takes to be real) is what he is prepared to act on.

A6. A person acquires knowledge of the world (states of affairs to act on) by observation and thought.

A7. For a given person, the real world is the one he has to find out about by observation.

A8. A person takes it that things are as they seem unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

A9. A person takes the world to be as he has found it to be.
A1. **A person requires a world in order to have the possibility of engaging in any behavior at all.**

Clearly, without a world, behavior as we know it would be impossible. A person behaves as part of a world of objects, processes, events, states of affairs, and relationships. In one way or another, a behavior is a person's way of changing his relationship to the world that includes him, either by changing some part of that world or by changing his relationship to some part(s) of it.

A2. **A person requires that the world be one way rather than another in order for him to behave in one way rather than another.**

A person engages in one behavior rather than another because the world, which comprises his circumstances, is one way rather than another. The person's relationship to the world and to various parts or aspects of it reflect its being the way it is rather than some other way, and it is these relationships which in turn are reflected in his behavior, which, as noted above, is a way of changing such relationships.
It is because of the correspondence between the specificity of the world and the availability and value of possible behaviors that the person makes decisions concerning the world at some (any) degree of generality or specificity. Some of these decisions may qualify as "finding out about the world" or "getting information about the world."

A3. A person's circumstances provide reasons and opportunities to engage in one behavior rather than another.

A person's circumstances are those states of affairs which are relevant to his behavioral options and choices, i.e., those states of affairs which provide opportunities, limitations and motivations for engaging in this behavior rather than that.

A4. For a given person, the real world is the one which includes him as actor, observer-describer, and critic (appraiser, evaluator).

We have noted that engaging in a behavior is a way of trying to change certain relationships. It is also a way of bringing about (creating) certain states of affairs. Thus, the person is an actor, or agent, in his world.
We have noted that it is because the world is the way it is that the person has the choices he has and engages in the behavior he does. Certain cases of distinguishing the world (or parts or aspects) as being this way rather than that way qualify as finding out about the world or getting information about the world. Thus, a person is an observer in the real world. However, since the relevant information on which behavior is generated is [information concerning] states of affairs and these in turn are essentially codified in verbal behavior, we may say that a person has an essential status not merely as an observer, but as an observer-describer of (and in) the world.

We have noted that behavior is a way of changing states of affairs and relationships and that the choice of behavior is responsive to the states of affairs which obtain. The connecting link is appraisal, or evaluation. The person appraises his circumstances and relationships and optional behaviors in regard to their standing or value with respect to valued prospective states of affairs. More colloquially, a person evaluates his circumstances and relationships as to their desirability both as such and in relation to alternatives; he also evaluates alternatives as to their attainability and evaluates behavioral options both in regard to their desirability as such and in
regard to their instrumental value with respect to desired outcomes. Thus, a person has an essential status in the world as an appraiser and evaluator.

A5. What a person takes to be the case (takes to be real) is what he is prepared to act on.

The real world is the world of persons and their behavior. The distinction between "real" and any of its alternatives (imaginary, delusional, illusory, fictitious, misconception, unreal, et cetera) is a critic's distinction and it corresponds conceptually to the distinction between what it makes sense to act on and what it doesn't. For example, if I appraise the cup before me as a hallucination, I will not be prepared to drink from it; if I appraise his account of there being a bear outside as fictitious, I will not be prepared to hide from it or to go shoot it; if it was only in a dream that I killed him, I will not feel guilty about killing him, though I may feel guilty about actually dreaming that. And so on.

Because appraisals of a given something are not uncommonly made sequentially and because the contribution of the most recent appraisal may be decisive with respect to the series, we may say that what a person takes to be the case (and therefore is prepared to act on) is given by the last member in such a series.
The last member is designated as a "final order appraisal," and we may say then that a person's world is codified in his final order appraisals. (This concept is used by Plotkin and Schwartz (197) in an extensive analysis of the concept of hypnosis and altered states of consciousness.)

A6. A person acquires knowledge of the world (states of affairs to act on) by observation and thought.

The acquisition of knowledge about the world follows from several of the foregoing considerations.

The acquisition of knowledge as a result of thinking is possible because (a) knowledge is knowledge about the world and (b) the concept of the real world is the concept of a structure of related objects, processes, events, and (above all) states of affairs, and (c) the relationships among certain states of affairs (e.g., deductive, inductive, part-whole, part-part, and instantiatory relations) make it possible to establish some states of affairs on the basis of other states of affairs rather than by direct observation.

In the vernacular, we use "the real world" in an equivocal way. On the one hand, the concept of the real world is a totality concept rather than a compendium of details. Here, "the real world" is a
holistic, or "placeholder" description; the fact that one can fill in details is part of the concept, but the details themselves are not, for the details could be different from what they are without changing our concept. In What Actually Happens, this concept is generated as a limiting case in the State of Affairs System: the real world is the states of affairs which includes all other states of affairs as constituents. (This is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's "The world is everything that is the case. . . . The world divides into facts, not things," but it is only reminiscent, not a development of that line of thought.)

On the other hand, when we say "the real world is this way, not that way" we often are using the phrase to refer to the real world in all its (largely undiscovered) detail. Likewise, when we are lamenting or boasting of our degree of knowledge of "the real world" we are not uncommonly using the phrase to refer to the completely determinate territory of which we have only our defective Korzybskian maps.

In the present formulation "the real world" is used in the first of these two ways. It is in this sense that we say above that we find out about the real world by observation and thought. Note that we need the concept of something which transcends all of our particular observations and thoughts in order
to be able to think of our observations as observations of that something.

A7. For a given person the real world is the one he has to find out about by observation.

Here, the relevant contrast is between the real world, on the one hand, and either all possible worlds or merely possible worlds on the other hand. What we know about all possible worlds we establish by thought, not observation. Likewise, what qualifies as a possible world is something we establish by thought, not observation. In contrast, the real world is distinguished from merely possible worlds by the fact that we observe it and by the states of affairs which we establish by observation, augmented by what we establish by thought and what we know without observation (recall the discussion of one's knowledge of one's own behavior).

Given the preceding principles, the present one follows. However, it is of some interest to have it explicitly formulated, since it provides the pre-empirical basis for empiricism which makes empiricism a rational enterprise (see What Actually Happens, section II, III). The requirement for observation to find out about the real world is tautological, but it is neither absolute nor universal. Because it is
not, fanatic empiricism, which has characterized academic psychology from its inception, is irrational, not rational. (It is also tautologous that the real world is the one that a given person acts in, is part of, and has exchanges with; it is also the one which a given person appraises and evaluates differentially.)

A8. A person takes it that things are as they seem unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

"P takes it that X" is an evaluatively non-committal form of locution. It is applicable in cases where we ordinarily say "P knows that X" or "P believes that X" or "P has a gut-level feeling that X" or "P has the mistaken conviction that X" or "P perceives that X" or "P supposes that X," and so on very nearly ad infinitum. All of these normal ways of talking reflect an appraisal of P's assigning X the status of being the case. In contrast, "P takes it that X" reflects no such appraisal. Specifically, nothing about the basis of legitimacy of the status assignment is implied.

Methodologically, one of the major consequences of this principle is that neither the intractable foundation problems which beset dolce academica nor the corresponding problems of skepticism are generated within Descriptive Psychology. Formulating this
principle represents a refusal to deny, as philosophical and psychological theories often do, that knowledge is possible for persons and that the acquisition, testing, integration, and use of information by persons is a finite task which, paradigmatically, can be accomplished by persons. It does not, of course, offer any assurance that any given thing that we take to be the case actually is the case.

Psychologically, a major implication is that the boundary condition (not foundation) for knowledge is competence, not some peculiar knowledge such as the indubitable deliverances of Experience or of Revelation or Intuition. How things seem to me will be an expression of my competence, and this will be the case whether it is the original matter at hand, some test or evidence, or a final review that is in question. At all points, what I take to be the case is governed by competence. And, of course, what qualifies as reason enough to reject or question an initial repression will be a matter of competence and other personal characteristics.

A9. A person takes the world to be as he has found it to be.

The concept of the world includes as a central feature the enduring character of the world. A person
is part of the world not as an object among objects, but as a life history within a world history. It is not possible for a person to find out what persons do and must find out about the world in a moment or in a single glance. Rather, persons find things out piecemeal over the course of their lives. In order for this to be possible, knowledge of the world must be stable, portable, and cumulative. Knowledge acquired at some place yesterday is still knowledge at some other place today.

Note that this principle provides no warrant for simple inductivism, nor should it suggest that persons typically perseverate. For example, if Gil observes Wil jogging this morning or notes that there is a football game going on this afternoon, he will not at midnight or tomorrow morning take it that Wil is still jogging or that the football game is still going on. For what he found out then was that Wil was jogging then, and it is the knowledge which persists, not the jogging.

On the other hand, Gil might conclude today that Wil is a friendly fellow or that Wil has a disdainful attitude toward football. Tomorrow he will take it that Wil is a friendly fellow and not merely that he was yesterday. This is because the concept of a trait, in this case being a friendly fellow, is the concept
of an enduring characteristic, not of an episode at a given point in time.

Or again, if I have found it to be the case that none of my efforts succeed in making my adverse circumstances desirable or more advantageous, I may well make no effort to improve my current adverse circumstances or even think of doing so, even though there is in fact an opportunity at hand to do so because I have found that such efforts do not succeed, and not merely that they did not succeed. An observer operating within dolce academica might well regard this phenomenon with perplexity as being irrational or counterintuitive and give it a name and a learned explanation supported by experimental data. Such an observer will also be taking the world to be as he has found it to be, namely one which approves of such efforts and rewards them.

The only way I can observe the world is to observe some parts or aspects of it. (Compare: The only way I can touch a building is to touch some part of it.) It follows that all observation in this sense is fragmentary. Further, if my observation is to tell me anything about the world, I must regard what I observe as being a portion of the history of the world. To give a description of what I observe with the understanding or stipulation that it is a part of the history
of the world is to give a Chronological Description
(What Actually Happens, Chapter III). To give the
same description with a different understanding or
stipulation, e.g., that it is an instantiation of a
repeatable pattern, is to give some other form of
description, e.g., an Object Description or a Process
Description or an Event Description or a State of Affairs
Description (WAH, Chapter III).
B. Behavioral Choice

B1. Because a person's circumstances are what they are, the person has the reasons and opportunities that he has to engage in one behavior rather than another.

B2. If a person wants to do something he has a reason to do it.

B3. If a person recognizes an opportunity to do something he wants to do, he has a reason to do it.

B4. If a person wants to do something, he has a reason to create or look for an opportunity to do it.

B5. If a person has a reason to do something, he will do it unless
   a. he has a stronger reason to do something else
   b. he doesn't recognize that he has that reason
   c. he is unable to do so
   d. he mistakenly takes it that he is doing it, or
   e. he miscalculates or his behavior miscarries.

B6. If a person has two reasons for doing X, he has a stronger reason for doing X than if he had only one of those reasons.

B7. If a person's circumstances call for him to do something he can't do (by virtue of lacking the requisite motivation, competence, or knowledge, including knowledge of opportunities) he will do something he can do (if he does anything at all).
B8. If a person wants to engage in a given behavior he will thereby also want to engage in other behaviors to the extent that they are relevantly similar to the behavior in question.

B9. If A has the relation R to C the behaviors of A with respect to C will be an expression of R, unless:
   (a) A is acting on a different relationship which takes precedence
   (b) A doesn't recognize the relationship for what it is
   (c) A is unable to do so
   (d) A mistakenly believes that A is doing so, or
   (e) A miscalculates or A's behavior miscarries.
B1. Because a person's circumstances are what they are, the person has the reasons and opportunities that he has to engage in one behavior rather than another.

As noted in A3, a person's circumstances are those states of affairs which are relevant to his behavioral options (opportunities, limitations) and choices. Those states of affairs are constituents of the real world. Thus, if we omit reference to personal characteristics, this principle is equivalent to the principle that a person's behavior potential reflects his status (his position in the world) at a given time.

There are at least two ways in which a person's reasons depend on his circumstances. In the first case, the circumstances are what the person acts so as to change (see below). In the second case the circumstances provide the contextual features which determine what the significance of a given behavior is. Which is to say, the circumstances determine, in certain ways, what other behavior a given behavior is (for example, that "jumping out the window" is also "getting away from the lion," which, in turn, is also "escaping the danger"). If the person has a reason to engage in any of these other behaviors, e.g., to escape the
danger, he will thereby have a reason to engage in the behavior in question.

A person's circumstances provide opportunities for behaving because they encompass the relationships which the behavior is designed to change. For example, if there is a door in front of me, I have the opportunity to walk through it, whereas if it had not been there, I would have no such opportunity. Likewise, if there is an orange on the table over there, I have the opportunity to go over and eat it. And if I am in a position of public trust, I have an opportunity to betray that trust, whereas if I were not in that position I would not have that opportunity. Finally, if there is a game of chess that is played (by us), I have an opportunity to play chess, whereas if there were no such game I would not have that opportunity.

A person's circumstances are not the same as his environment or the "stimuli" for his behavior, although the things that a given observer would describe as "stimuli" would also appear in his description of "circumstances" and much or all of what he would describe as "environment" would also appear in his description of "circumstances." However, the fact that there is no elephant in this room, the fact that if A > B and B > C then A > C, the fact that in this community we do not speak an unknown language, the
fact that he attacked me ten years ago so that my prospective action constitutes revenge, and the fact that I am currently starving and intoxicated all would be included among my circumstances though they would not be included in descriptions of my environment or of the "stimuli" for my behavior.

Among the most important stable states of affairs which comprise my circumstances is that there are the social patterns of behavior that there are in my community. As with chess, so with our repertoire of social practices, i.e., were there no such things to be done I would not have the opportunity to do any of those things.

B2. If a person wants to do something he has a reason to do it.

Among the circumstances which can give a person a reason to do something is the simple fact that he wants to do it. Thus, this principle is a special case of B1, above. To be sure, there will be some explanation of why the person wants to do that, but no appeal to such an explanation needs to be made in order for the person to have a reason to do what he wants to do.
B3. If a person recognizes an opportunity to do something he wants to do he has a reason to do it.

As used here, "do something he wants to do" includes both "get (achieve) something he wants to get" and "try to do it." Further, P has an opportunity to do X if, in those circumstances, he can accomplish X by doing things he knows how to do; in effect "opportunity" equates to "practical possibility," not "logical possibility."

This principle encompasses both the case where the person already wants to do something and the case where he only now wants to do something. If I am hungry, I already want to eat something, and the orange being on the table provides me with an opportunity which, when I recognize it, I have a reason to take advantage of. On the other hand, it is only when the lion walks in the room that I want to escape the danger, and the window being close by provides me with the opportunity to do so which, if I recognize that, gives me a reason to take advantage of the opportunity.

B4: If a person wants to do something he has a reason to create or look for an opportunity to do it.

This principle makes explicit a feature of B2, above. That is that "doing X" covers not merely the case of simply doing X, but also the case of first
getting in a position to do X and then doing it. For example, if I am hungry and I want to eat something I may look for an opportunity to eat something by going to the refrigerator and opening the door, and if the orange is there, then I have found an opportunity. Likewise if pace Roberts (1979), I am a psychological Romeo, when I go to the party I may screen the female guests carefully, and if I come across one who is interested and is a psychological Juliet, then I have found an opportunity to act as Romeo. A clinical application of this principle is the use of the notion of a "scenario" in case formulations (Clinical Topics, 1977).

On the other hand, if what I want is to eat some glazed orange, then even when I find an orange in the refrigerator, I still have to perform the culinary art in order to have that opportunity. In this case we would say that I had created the opportunity. Note that looking for and finding an opportunity will generally be a limiting case of creating an opportunity. One could say, for example, that I had created an opportunity to eat something by going to the refrigerator and looking.
B5. If a person has a reason to do something he will do it unless

a. he has a stronger reason to do something else, or
b. he doesn't recognize that he has that reason, or
c. he is unable to do it, or
d. he mistakenly takes it that he is doing it, or
e. he miscalculates or his behavior miscarries.

If a person has a reason to do something and does not do it, that calls for an explanation, and the explanation must have the form, or at least the force, of one or more of the five "unless" clauses above.

Let us designate as $B_1$ the behavior which the person has a reason to engage in and $B_2$ the behavior which he does engage in. The five "unless" clauses can then be seen as specifying formally the relevant ways in which $B_2$ could fail to be $B_1$. These ways reflect the $W$, $K$, $KH$, $P$, and $A$ parameters in the parametric analysis of behavior. The other three parameters, $I$, $PC$, and $S$, are not mentioned because (a) the identity of the person is here taken as given, so that no issues arise here, (b) issues with respect to personal characteristics would arise only via the "unless" clauses noted above, and (c) the principle will apply directly to any behavior which is the value of the Significance parameter.
If we consider the main clause together with the first "unless" clause, we have a classic principle concerning relative strength of motivation. In a situation where a person can do either X or Y but not both, his choice of X is prima facie evidence that his motivation to do X was greater than his motivation to do Y. Here, action speaks louder than words.

Although the principle calls for no qualification as such, issues arise in empirical contexts because the description under which the person chooses to do X rather than Y may not be "X" and "Y." That is, an observer's description of the alternatives may not correctly identify the alternatives which the actor distinguished and chose between, hence the choice provides only prima facie evidence for an observer.

B6. If a person has two reasons for doing X he has a stronger reason for doing X than if he had only one of those reasons.

The most obvious sort of example of this principle is that if I both enjoy the flavor of coffee and need a stimulant I will have these two reasons for drinking coffee and by virtue of that I will have a stronger reason for drinking coffee than I would have if it were merely the case that I enjoyed the flavor or if it were merely the case that I needed a stimulant.
Note that the principle does not say that any two reasons are greater than any one reason. It says, rather, that a combination of reasons is greater than any member of the combination. Note, too, that if in a given case we decided that the combination of reasons A and B provided no more reason for doing X than did reason A alone, we would conclude either that B wasn't a reason after all or that B was not a separate or additional reason relative to A. For example, my reason for jumping out the window is that it will get me away from the lion and also that it will get me out of danger. However, these are not two separate reasons, since the only reason for getting away from the lion is to get out of danger.

Two more interesting and far-reaching instances of the principle have to do with combinations of behaviors, or "compound" behaviors:

If:

- B1 is a behavior for which I have reason R1 having a strength or weight of N1
- B2 is a behavior for which I have reason R2 having a strength or weight of N2
- R1 and R2 are not completely overlapping.

And if:

- B3 = B1 and B2 simultaneously
then:

I will have reason $R_3$ with strength $N_3$ for doing $B_3$

and

$N_3 > N_2$

$N_3 > N_1$

Consequently, given alternatives $B_1$, $B_2$, and $B_3$, I will choose $B_3$.

Or if:

$B_3 = [\text{First } B_1 \text{ then } B_2]$

similar consequences follow.

Note that the conclusions concerning $B_3$ in the two cases require an "other things being equal" clause. That is, we assume that $B_1$, $B_2$, and $B_3$ really are the alternatives and that no [decisive] additional hidden costs (reasons) are involved with $B_3$ in contrast to $B_1$ and $B_2$ singly.

Further, the possibility of $B_3$ depends on the recognition of the opportunity to do $B_3$. For example, I may have a reason to save money and a reason to get revenge on him but unless I recognize the opportunity to do both simultaneously by refusing him a loan I will have no motivation corresponding to $R_3$, and $B_3$ will not be one of my options.
The examples of behavioral compounding are of interest because they provide a way of understanding some of the salient facts of the transition from infancy to adulthood. Our view of the infant is (roughly) that of an individual who exemplifies principle B5 in its most obvious form, i.e., he simply acts on whatever single motivation is most prominent at a given time. In contrast, our view of the normal adult is, roughly, of an individual who acts in the light of a total set of circumstances and his total set of [usually conflicting] motivations and acts in a humanly appropriate way and is not, in principle, at the mercy of any single motivation, not even his strongest. The present principle shows how, in conjunction with the cognitive development necessary for the recognition of opportunities for relevant cases of B3, principle B5 remains operative through the transition from the impulse-ridden infant through various stages of socialization, motivational integration, and impulse control. (It also shows why cognitive development alone is not enough--the component motivations must be present also.)

B7. If a person's circumstances call for him to do something he can't do (by virtue of lacking the requisite motivation, competence, or knowledge, including
knowledge of opportunities), he will do something he can do (if he does anything at all).

The primary thrust of this principle is a reminder that behavioral explanation is sometimes a matter of explaining why a person didn't engage in a certain behavior. Issues of this sort arise when there is some presumption that the person will engage in that behavior, i.e., when his circumstances give him what the observer who is in need of the explanation would have taken to be reason enough, and yet he does not. Most of the cases of this sort can be grouped into two categories.

The first is where the behavior chosen is justifiable, intelligible, reasonable, appropriate, etc., but unexpected, and the usual upshot is that the observer was wrong in his estimate of the personal characteristics of the actor, and the explanation specifies in what respect.

The second and more usual case is where the behavior is inappropriate, unrealistic, or exhibits poor judgment, and the actor rejects the observer's description of the behavior. These cases are central to our current notions of psychopathology irrespective of whether we describe them theoretically as maladaptive behaviors, expressions of ego defense mechanisms, misconceptions, distortions of reality, incongruence,
defective information processing, or whatever. A more
detailed explication of such phenomena and forms of
explanation is given in Clinical Topics (1977) and
in the present volume.

Incidentally, the fact that psychopathology is
so conceptually tied to distortion of reality is one
of the most obvious reasons why clinicians, and
psychologists generally, have an intellectual stake
in an intelligible and practical systematization of
reality concepts.

B8. If a person wants to engage in a given behavior
he will thereby also want to engage in other behaviors
to the extent that they are relevantly similar to the
behavior in question.

This principle is a special case of principle C3
below, and is an elaboration of principles B4 and B5,
above. It merits explicit formulation because it has
direct application to two very important concepts in
traditional psychologies, i.e., the concept of "general-
ization" and the related concepts of "displacement"
and "symbolic behavior" (see Meaning and Symbolism,
1977, for a discussion of the latter and Clinical Topics
for a discussion of the former).

First, let us note a limitation which may not
be obvious, though it is implied by the wording of
the principle. It is not that the actor is motivated to engage in other behavior, BB, only to the extent that BB is similar to B, the behavior in question. Rather, this is the motivational value which we may attribute to BB by virtue of the similarity to B. The actual motivation for BB in a given case may be anything whatever if we take account of other motivating circumstances in addition.

Implicit in this principle is the simple fact that any given behavior may be correctly described in a number of different ways, and this will be the case even if we restrict ourselves to descriptions that have psychological reality for the actor (and are not merely observers' inventions), i.e., descriptions under which the behavior was, or would have been, chosen. Also involved are some of the more complex facts involving relations among these descriptions.

Among the facts of the latter kind is that, in general and in principle, the value of a given behavior to the actor is not given either exhaustively or exclusively by a given description of that behavior.

For example, in the heuristic example of fear behavior, the value of "jumping out the window" was that in those circumstances to do that was also a case of "getting away from the lion." From the value of the former, we may conclude that any behavior BB which
was relevantly similar would also be valued. In the example, the most relevant similarity would be that BB was also a case of "getting away from the lion." (And recall that the primary value of the latter was that in those circumstances it was a case of "escaping the danger.")

If two behaviors, B and BB, are similar, then there is some description, Q, which applies to both equally, and under that description B and BB are just two instances of exactly the same behavior, i.e., Q. In the example above, there need be no reduction in motivation between B and BB if we stipulate that B is entirely instrumental and Q is a statement of the instrumental value of B. This conclusion would not hold in the case where B is "playing golf," BB is "hiking" and Q is "getting moderate outdoor exercise," for here B is not merely instrumental and [therefore] Q is not an exhaustive description of its value.

Evidently it is the concept of value, rather than that of similarity, which is fundamental here. It is because the value realized by a given behavior distributes across descriptions and behaviors that we can draw conclusions from (a) the value to the actor of behavior under one description to (b) the value to the actor of behavior under another description. In the present context, BB is relevantly similar to
B to the extent that it realizes the same values as B, and it is those values, not the similarity as such, which account for the motivation for BB. I would expect that the traditional formulation of "generalization" in terms of similarity reflects the traditional implicit stipulation that there is only one 'real' description of behavior and that is [what qualifies as] a Performance Description. Under these conditions similarity is one of the very few plausible relations between behaviors, but even so, similarity requires a mystical hypothetical unconscious mechanism or process called "generalization" in order to explain how similarity is effective in the 'production of the phenomenon.' Insofar as "generalization" is not taken to be the name of such a process, it has only familiarity value but no explanatory value. Note that the value explanation above is explanatory and that no process is involved.

B9. If A has the relation R to C the behaviors of A with respect to C will be an expression of R unless:

(a) A is acting on a different relationship which takes precedence or
(b) A doesn't recognize the relationship for what it is or
(c) A is unable to do so or
(d) A mistakenly believes that A is doing so or
(e) A miscalculates or the behavior miscarries.

This principle is the Relationship Formula which has already been discussed at length and therefore requires no further discussion here. We may note that A having the relation R to C is one of the states of affairs which comprises A's circumstances and it is a circumstance which gives A a reason to behave accordingly, i.e., in a way which is an expression of R. Given that, we may, by principle 5, above, conclude that A will do so, unless . . . .
C. Value and Behavioral Choice

Cl. A person values some states of affairs over others and acts accordingly.

Cla. If a person's relationship to something is such that he is in a bad situation, or circumstances, he has a reason to try to improve it.

Clb. If a person's relationship to something is such that he is in a good situation, or circumstances, he has a reason to act to maintain it.

Clc. If a person is in a good situation and has an opportunity to improve it he has a reason to try to do so.

Clc. If a person is in any situation and it may be expected to become worse, he has a reason to act to prevent that.

C2. A person will not choose to actualize less behavior potential rather than more.

C3. If a person values a specific something, e.g., an object, a circumstance, a behavior, or, more generally, a state of affairs, he will thereby also value other specific things of the same kind to the extent that they are relevantly similar to the original.

C3a. If a person values a general something he will thereby also value a specific something to the
extent that it is a paradigmatic instance or realization of the more general value.

C4. If a person values something general he will be sensitive to (will tend to evaluate) the relevance of his circumstances to that something and act accordingly.

C4a. Negative-emotional behavior (fear, guilt, anger, shame, etc. behavior) is an attempt to improve a bad situation.

C4b. Positive-emotional behavior (joy, triumph, glee, etc. behavior) is an attempt to preserve, enhance, or celebrate a good situation.
C1. A person values some states of affairs over others and acts accordingly.

This is a fundamental principle with a variety of conceptual connections and exemplifications.

For example, it elaborates the principle which says that the world must be of one sort rather than another in order for the person to behave in one way rather than another.

A. Given that a person values some states of affairs over others, the importance of the existing state of affairs is that this is what the person acts to improve, and, of course, what qualifies as an improvement and what will bring it about both depend on what the person's circumstances are. (Note that what is required is merely some differentiation, not the hypothetical completely detailed description of the world, though it will be the case that the greater the differentiation, or specification of detail, the greater will be the differential behavioral possibilities.)

B. To try to bring about a state of affairs which contrasts with the person's current circumstances requires that the person have a concept of the world and a holistic one at that. He must have the concept
of the to-be-achieved state(s) of affairs in order to be disposed to bring it about. (Recall the discussion of the relation between values of the K and W parameters of behavior.) He must also have the concept of "the real world" as one which both is this way and could be this other way. For the Observer-describer it is enough that the world is what it is. For the Actor (and the Critic), however, the primary fact is what the world could be, though both actuality and possibility are essential. For an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of deliberate action, the world is formulated essentially in light of the behavioral possibilities it offers and the individual is formulated primarily in terms of the behavioral possibilities he has, hence the conceptual correspondence between person and world.

The concept of improving the current state of affairs is not a simple matter of before and after. That would imply, for example, that in all cases of successful behavior a less valued state of affairs is succeeded by a more valued state of affairs, and of course, this is not the case. In escaping from the lion, for example, I am merely recovering my previous position of safety (perhaps only temporarily), not improving on it. And if I linger over the memory of that symphony or of that tennis match, it is not
that I value the memory over the actuality but rather that I value the actuality plus reminiscence over the actuality without reminiscence. In short, the concept of what the world could be needs to be elaborated to include the concept of what it would be if I did or didn't take this or that action.

It is because deliberate action is in this way a case of choosing among possible futures that possibility is primary over actuality, even though arriving at a given possible future requires that I get there from here. Correspondingly, as noted in Meaning and Symbolism, the most general and fundamental form of description of a situation is not an Observer's description of what, normatively, it is, but rather a Critic's assessment of what it calls for by way of action.

The following principles are by way of elaboration.

Cta. If a person's relationship to something is such that he is in a bad situation, or circumstances, he has a reason to try to improve it.

The specific element introduced by this principle is the normative concept of being in a "bad" situation. A situation is a bad situation if at face value it provides the person reason enough to try to change it. For example, the lion entering the room creates what is at face value a bad situation for me, and if
I did not try to escape the danger, that would call for an explanation. On the other hand, the sun going behind the clouds does not at face value put me in a bad situation, though in fact I may be prompted thereby to turn up the heat. If I do that, more will be required by way of explanation than "The sun went behind the clouds." Normative knowledge of this sort provides guidelines even in the absence of specific knowledge of the individual in question.

C1b. If a person's relationship to something is such that he is in a good situation, or circumstances, he has a reason to act to maintain it.

This is the mirror image of the preceding principle. The normative element appears in what qualifies as a "good" situation, and in the presumption that it is the kind of situation that is likely to change for the worse if that is not prevented. Social preeminence is among the most familiar sort of example here. So is having a large amount of liquid capital. To a lesser extent, being in good health qualifies. Being in a pleasurable state is also a paradigmatic example.

C1c. If a person is in a good situation and has an opportunity to improve it, he has a reason to try to do so.

This principle refers to another of the possible
combinations generated by introducing norms for good and bad situations.

C1d. If a person is in any situation and it may be expected to become worse, he has a reason to act to prevent that.

Again, this principle refers to one of the possibilities generated by introducing norms for good and bad situations. Like the preceding principle, this one serves as a reminder that in actual cases there will be issues of completeness. Principles which deal with just having a reason do not deal explicitly with the multiplicity of reasons which a person's circumstances provide and they do not deal with the even more specific feature of reasons not to do something as well as reasons to do something.

Thus, to improve my situation only in some respect or other will not be decisive for my behavior if my situation becomes worse in other respects. Likewise, having a reason to act in one way will not be decisive if I also have a stronger reason not to. It is the Judgment Diagram, not these individual principles which codifies the multiplicity and pro-con character of circumstances and reasons.
C2. A person will not choose to actualize less behavior potential rather than more.

To review: A person's status is his place within a domain of related elements which include him. To refer to a person's status without relativizing it implicitly or explicitly to a given domain is to refer to his place in the real world. Having a given place carries with it having a certain set of relationships to the other elements or subdomains within the domain. Such relationships provide both reasons and opportunities for behaving (Principle B1). Thus, a person's behavior potential (his possibilities for behaving) corresponds to his status and is what it is because his status is what it is.

Thus, any behavior will be a case of actualizing behavior potential. There are two major components of actualizing behavior potential. The first consists of bringing about categorical states of affairs. For example, having climbed out the window I am now outside, I am still alive, I am now out of danger, I am now in the company of Wil and Gil next to this automobile. The second consists of bringing about modal states of affairs. For example, having climbed out, it is now possible for me to climb back in, whereas so long as I was in the room it was not possible for me directly to climb back in, and if I had never been in the room
before it would be possible to climb in directly, but not to climb back in. And so on.

We may speak elliptically about such matters by saying that engaging in a behavior both brings about certain actualities and certain possibilities (or necessities, opportunities, or impossibilities) the most important of which are the possibilities or opportunities for further behavior. This division is a classical one and one for which there is certainly a point even though it being possible for me to directly climb back into the room is just as much a present state of affairs as my now standing beside the automobile. One of the points of distinguishing categorical and modal states of affairs is that it is then possible for us to compare and contrast the values they have for a given individual at a given time.

In general, the value of preserving or creating some possibilities for further behavior takes decisive priority over the value of achieving any particular actualities. In the vernacular this phenomenon is usually referred to as "the survival instinct" or "the instinct of self preservation," and there is some reason to believe that the philosophical theory of egoism is an illegitimate offshoot of those commonplace notions. These notions are indeed to the point, since
the condition of having no further possibilities for behaving is just the condition of being dead.

However, the priority of life preserving states of affairs over actualities is only a very general one, not a universal one. We must also be able to account for both suicides and heroic risk of death. Formally, the distinction in question provides the logical form of the explanation: the actuality was valued over other actualities plus their further life possibilities. In practice, the task is to achieve an illuminating description of the actuality and possibilities in question and to assemble the evidence to make these descriptions compelling. An example of this sort is found in the analysis of the case of Shirley in "Clinical Topics."

A different case which is of interest is where the actuality has no value except that which is associated with the corresponding possibilities or opportunities. For example, a purely instrumental behavior which is part of a sequential means-ends series will be of this sort. For example, per hypothesis, the only value of walking to the refrigerator when I am hungry is that it is then possible to open the door and look inside, etc. (In contrast, climbing out the window had no value except as a way of getting out of danger, but here the relation is between two
actualities which are brought about simultaneously, rather than between an actuality and a set of later possibilities.)

To say that a person actualizes "more" or "less" behavior potential introduces a quantitative element into the picture. As used here, this quantitative element corresponds conceptually to the value of the state of affairs, including both actualities and possibilities, achieved by the behavior. To actualize more behavior potential is to achieve a more valued state of affairs. Thus, the present principle is an illuminating version of "If a person has a reason to do something he will do it, unless he has a stronger reason to do something else instead."

The negative wording of the principle is essential in order to avoid the misleading suggestion of a universal motive which operates mechanically at all times in human behavior. It is not that a person is always, willy-nilly, trying to maximize the value of the states of affairs he achieves. Even less is it a Panglossian affirmation that whatever a person in fact achieves is the best possible state of affairs as he sees it. Rather, the emphasis is on the choosing, not on the achievement. If a person's alternatives are formulated in such a way that one represents the achievement of a more valued state of affairs as against the other,
the latter will not be chosen over the former. Note that even when the alternatives are explicitly formulated in this way, the person may be mistaken about it and thereby choose what he or others will later regard as being of less value. When I act in error that is not because I have chosen to make a mistake.

Not to put too fine a point on it, any preemptive universal motive in human behavior would make human behavior irrational in principle unless the statement of that motive were a tautology with respect to persons and an infallible means for its accomplishment were provided. For with respect to any universal motive to do X it is logically possible for my circumstances to be such that I have reason enough not to do X, so that if I do X I am then acting irrationally, because the motivation to do X lies outside of the conceptual constraints on what it makes sense for me to do. Introducing an operative universal motive to achieve pleasure, or to actualize all one's potential, to self-actualize, to grow, to maximize one's behavioral options, or think well of oneself, into the domain of human behavior is comparable to introducing the motive to put down at least one "9" into the domain of doing arithmetic. It is not that there is something wrong with putting down a "9." It is that the situation doesn't always call for that if one is doing arithmetic, and doing arithmetic would become an immediate shambles if a
"wild card," or magic, motivation of this sort were operative.

Consider also the following dialogue.

Wil: I can prove to you that all your behavior is motivated by the desire to avoid exotic diseases.

Gil: How's that?

Wil: Well, look, you haven't in fact contracted any exotic diseases lately, have you?

Gil: No, not if you don't count colds.

Wil: So your behavior has succeeded, and regularly succeeds, in avoiding your contracting exotic diseases.

Gil: Well, yes.

Wil: And furthermore, if you thought that any of your behavioral options would lead to contracting an exotic disease, you would refuse that option, wouldn't you?

Gil: Yes.

Wil: Well, there you are! You've done what you've done in order to avoid contracting an exotic disease!

Gil: Oh, my! There's something wrong with that.

Wil: What?

Gil: Well, even without examining the actual argument, it's clear that you could substitute "overwhelming anxiety" in place of "exotic disease" and 'prove'
that all my behavior is motivated by the avoidance of anxiety. And the same holds for excruciating pain, loss of self esteem, death, stultification, inauthenticity, or anything else that I would normally be quite sure to try to avoid. That's a reductio ad absurdum, isn't it. It's one thing to say that I don't and wouldn't do what leads to these things. It's quite another to say that I do what I do do in order to avoid those things, or to accomplish their absence.

C3. If a person values a specific something, e.g., an object, a circumstance, a behavior, or, more generally, a state of affairs, he will thereby also value other specific things of the same kind to the extent that they are relevantly similar to the original.

This is the more general version of principle B8 which is stated specifically in terms of behaviors. Values distribute over state of affairs descriptions and not merely over behavior descriptions. In general, we do not value specific objects, behaviors, places, or states of affairs as such, though if we are "attached to" a given person, place, or object nothing else will entirely substitute for it. Insofar as I value someone's friendship because she is entertaining or intelligent or dedicated, I will be capable of valuing the friendship of someone else who is entertaining
or intelligent or dedicated. Insofar as I enjoy tennis because it is an active sport and not merely because it is tennis, I will be capable of enjoying other active sports. And so on.

It is these general characterizations of what I value about, or in, the specific things I value which appear in our efforts to describe systematically what a given person's "values" are or to categorize for people generally what it is they value. Pyramiding descriptions to others of greater and greater generality and finally to ultimate descriptions, e.g. "happiness," is one way to arrive at 'universal motives,' if one misconceives the enterprise, as noted above.

C3a. If a person values a general something he will thereby also value a specific something to the extent that it is a paradigmatic instance or realization of the more general value.

This principle is the relevant inverse of C3. Since values are not found in the abstract but only insofar as they are associated with specific states of affairs a person will value specific things as realizations or instantiations of his general values. Since some particulars will be better realizations of a given value than will other particulars, the "transfer" of value, i.e., the value distribution across particulars will be relative to this degree.
Non-systematic efforts to give general descriptions of people's values are likely to be more general categorizations of the particular things valued rather than general descriptions of what it is about those particulars that is valued. Thus, we may speak of a person as having a high value on "Art," a moderate value on "Politics," a low value on "Service," and so on.

Being told that Gil values painting because he values art tells us more about what else Gil values (music, poetry, sculpture, etc.) than about why he values painting. In contrast, being told that he values painting because it gives him freedom to express how he sees things does give us an explanation. Having "freedom of expression," i.e., fewer limitations on one's behavior relative to some norm, is recognizable as being at face value in a "good situation." To value that over the usual alternatives is conceptually intelligible (principles C1b and C1c), and it is this intelligibility that provides the explanatory value. Given this explanation, we could also understand why Gil might not value music, poetry, et al., i.e., because we can understand why he might not find freedom of expression in these, since that calls for some minimum level of appreciation and competence, which he might not have.
C4. If a person values something general he will be sensitive to (will tend to evaluate) the relevance of his circumstances to that something and act accordingly.

It is because I greatly value a general state of affairs, i.e., being fundamentally safe, that I am sensitive to the circumstances of the lion walking into the room. I recognize the circumstance of being in the same room with the lion not merely as "being in a bad situation" but specifically as violating the condition of "being fundamentally safe," and it is the latter state of affairs which I have reason to restore. If I placed no value on my safety or anyone else's, I would have no use for the concept of "danger" and so I would be incapable of fear or fear behavior (though I might still be eaten up by the lion and recognize that I might).

Likewise, it is because I value a general state of affairs, i.e., not wronging people, that I am sensitive to the circumstance of having failed to write a promised recommendation on time. I recognize the circumstance of not doing that as being incompatible with the condition of "not wronging people" and so I act to prevent that. Or, if I have already failed to do that, I cannot restore the state of affairs of "not having wronged anyone" but I can achieve a new
state of affairs of "not wronging people" and thereby restore the state of affairs of "being someone who does not wrong people." If I placed no value on anyone doing wrong or not doing wrong I would have no use for the concept of "doing wrong" and I would be incapable of guilt or penance (though I might still fail to write the recommendation).

Two subsidiary principles follow.

C4a. **Negative-emotional behavior (fear, guilt, anger, shame, etc. behavior)** is an attempt to improve a bad situation.

In each case, the reality basis of the negative-emotional behavior is the violation of a valued general state of affairs and the emotional behavior, which is the rational response to that reality basis, is behavior which is designed to restore the valued state of affairs. Thus, we could also say that negative-emotional behavior is an attempt to recover, preserve, or enhance behavior potential (and status) in the face of actual, presumptive, or expected loss of behavior potential (and status).

C4b. **Positive-emotional behavior (joy, triumph, glee, etc. behavior)** is an attempt to preserve, enhance, or celebrate a good situation.

In these cases the reality basis for the emotional
behavior is the achievement or occurrence of a valued state of affairs and the behavior (as contrasted with symptomatology such as flushing or fainting) which is the rational response to that reality basis is a celebration. Celebrations range from spontaneous and informal to ceremonious and formal. In either case, they may be regarded as special cases of accreditation ceremonies. In the informal cases the accreditation is accomplished by enacting the part of one who has that good fortune (that increase in status and behavior potential). Thus one chortles with glee, sings or shouts or jumps with joy, strikes a victorious posture, and so on. A common feature of these celebrations is that, in contrast to negative-emotional behavior, the behavior is non-instrumental—it is not designed to accomplish some further goal. That is because with good fortune there is not something that needs to be changed or accomplished whereas with bad fortune there is. Doing something which is in a vulgar sense useless, such as singing or jumping, is already an expression of the fact that one is in a position of not having something that has to be done now. Formal cases, such as the Romans' official Triumphs, need be no less genuine for being conventional and in that sense, contrived. Even these are generally not merely conventional, for without some relation to the reality basis they would
lose their force. Thus, for example, one parades the conquered foe or re-enacts the victory, or ceremoniously restores the loser to parity. Or one gives public thanks to the author of the good fortune or praises the virtues which account for the good fortune, or engages in non-instrumental behavior, and so forth.

Thus, knowledge and valuation are the fundamentals of which emotional phenomena are special cases. Not all of the cases have to do with emotion. For example, I might place a high value on "telling the truth" or on "being accurate" and thereby be sensitive to the circumstance of Wil saying "There's a cup on the table" when in fact it is a small pitcher that is there. I could restore the state of affairs of "being accurate" by correcting him, and that need not be from being dismayed, indignant, angry, or any other "emotional" reaction.

It is this general status-restoring aspect of human behavior, abetted by physiological models, which gives "homeostatic" models of human behavior the plausibility they have. But again, values are not mechanisms, and they do not operate mechanically. In the main, such general values serve to limit our choices, not to make them for us, i.e., they rule out
certain of our behavioral options, but they do not thereby select the options we do choose (recall the "Exotic Diseases" argument). In the special case of being violated by current states of affairs, they do become "operative" and those are the times when we have a reason to act so as to restore the valued state of affairs.

If we focus on valued states of affairs which are generally more or less violated, the same basic considerations will lead to a picture of constantly striving toward an unattainable ideal (of self actualization, authenticity, pleasure, nirvana, freedom from anxiety, etc.).
D. Stability and Change

D1. A historical individual acquires a given individual characteristic by virtue of having the prior capacity and the relevant intervening history.

D1a. A person acquires a given person characteristic by virtue of having the prior capacity and the relevant intervening history.

D2. A historical individual having a finite history has some non-acquired characteristics during some part of that history.

D3. If a person acquires a given person characteristic he acquires it in one of the ways in which it can be acquired.

D3a. If a person acquires a given relationship to something he acquires it in one of the ways in which it can be acquired.

D4. A person acquires concepts and skills (know how), archetypally, by practice and experience in one or more of the social practices which call for the use of (and offer opportunities for the use of) that concept or skill.

D5. What a person takes to be the case about the world is the outcome of his observation, thought, and action.
D6. If a person has a given person characteristic he continues to have it until it changes.

D7. If a person has a given relationship to something he continues to have it until it changes.

D8. If a person, C, has a relationship, R, to Z, and if C's behavior with respect to Z is such that it violates R and expresses RR, then R will change in the direction of RR.

D9. If a person knows something he continues to know it until he forgets it or changes his mind.

D10. (A9) A person takes the world to be as he has found it to be.

D11. The world is subject to reformulation by persons.
In this section, and in subsequent sections, certain principles already given above are presented again with little or no additional elaboration. Those which are presented here for a second time are relevant here because they do deal with considerations of stability and change.

D1. A historical individual acquires a given individual characteristic by virtue of having the prior capacity and the relevant intervening history.

Individuals do change, and such changes are routinely codified as changes in their individual characteristics. For example, I take an irregularly shaped branch, turn it on a lathe, and it emerges with a new shape (individual characteristic), i.e., it is now cylindrical. When I paint it, it emerges with a new color (individual characteristic). After it has weathered for several years it has changed color again and it has become light and brittle. And so on.

Principle D1 gives the canonical form, or the "logical form," for explanations of such changes. It is the counterpart to the tautology that whatever has become the case with an individual now, it must already have had the possibility, or potential, for
undergoing that change (otherwise the change could not have happened), but also, some intervening occurrence was necessary in order to bring about the change from potential to actual.

Principle D1 applies to persons as a special case:

**D1a. A person acquires a given person characteristic by virtue of having the prior capacity and the relevant intervening history.**

We have seen how this formula is elaborated into the "developmental schema," which provides a systematic framework for giving accounts of personal change over the life history, including changes from infancy to adulthood, whence the designation "developmental schema."

We also noted five restrictions on the developmental schema the result of which is the logical form of traditional "stage" theories of development (e.g., Piaget, Freud).

We have commented on the consequences of behavior as including both actualities and potentials for subsequent behaviors. To this we may now add that the actualities include acquired personal characteristics and that the potentialities include the potentials for acquiring various personal characteristics, for the "intervening history" which is of greatest interest is the history of behavior.
It should also be noted that capacity is relative to the intervening history. When we speak of the capacity to acquire a given personal characteristic, e.g., the ability to play the piano, we often use it in a noncommittal way. That is, we mean the capacity to acquire that ability in some way or other. There is a point in talking that way. On the other hand, I may have the capacity to acquire that ability through supervised rote practice but not through self practice plus insight-inducing explanation, whereas for someone else it might be the reverse. Similarly, when we say that someone doesn't have the capacity to learn to give mathematical proofs, we normally mean "not by any of the ways we know of." There can be no empirical justification for saying in an absolute sense "he just can't learn that, period!" Both Special Education and the "unlimited human potential" movement are based on this consideration.

D2. **A historical individual having a finite history has some non-acquired characteristics during some part of that history.**

Few, if any, of the historical individuals which we distinguish are individuals which we take to have histories which extend endlessly into the past. Rather, we generally take it that the particulars we distinguish
had a beginning, a time at which they came into existence. Principle D2 reflects the fact that any characteristics which an individual has when it comes into existence will be characteristics which that individual has not acquired. In this connection it will make no difference if the origin of the individual is subject to dispute. If two critics date the origin of a given individual differently, all that follows is that they may also differ in what they take the individual's non-acquired characteristics to be.

Under the conventional standards for dating the beginnings of individual human histories, the non-acquired personal characteristics which human beings have include some embodiment characteristics and some capacities to acquire personal characteristics other than those embodiments and capacities.

D3. If a person acquires a given person characteristic he acquires it in one of the ways in which it can be acquired.

This principle is a reminder that although one can specify the logical form of explanations for personal change, there is an essential empirical element in actual explanations. There is more than one reason for this.
First, any person characteristic the acquisition of which is to be explained is one which is distinguished by observers within some community. The existence of that community and the fact of their making that distinction are both historical accidents; neither they nor any of their consequences could be purely a conceptual matter.

More importantly, the existence of the particular ways in which the personal characteristics can be exercised or acquired is also a historical accident. For example, I can imagine exercising, and therefore also acquiring (see D4, below), personal characteristics such as competitiveness, forethought, and restraint by participating in the social practice of playing chess. That chess is one of our social practices is a historical accident. But if chess were not played there are other ways in which those characteristics are and could be acquired. And even if all of these other ways were in fact nonexistent, there would be other ways, currently unknown to us, whereby one could acquire and exercise the characteristics of forethought, competitiveness, and restraint. Either that or we would have no distinctions of those sorts and, correspondingly, no problem of explaining how one acquires those characteristics. As P. F. Strawson comments in a similar connection (1957), "It is only
because there is a solution that the problem can be stated."

Similar considerations apply to relationships.

D3a. If a person acquires a given relationship to something he acquires it in one of the ways in which it can be acquired.

Neither D3 nor D3a is limited to acquisitions which come about by virtue of the person's behavior. With respect to relationships, it is clear that acquisitions, changes, and losses can come about by virtue of changes at either end or in the relevant circumstances. With respect to personal characteristic changes which come about in some way other than as the result of the person's behavioral history (surgery and accidents are the main things that come to mind here), most of the changes are losses of abilities. It is principle D4, below, which deals with changes resulting from behavior.

D4. A person acquires concepts and skills (know how), archetypally, by practice and experience in one or more of the social practices which call for the use of (and offer opportunities for the use of) that concept or skill.

This principle codifies a set of considerations
which is not as simply formal-conceptual as D1 and D2 but is not merely empirical either, and the reference to archetypal is a suitable disclaimer.

We have noted above that there is more than merely an empirical connection between the expression of a personal characteristic and the participation in the social practices in which the personal characteristics can be expressed. In a given historical context there is an empirical identity between using concepts or skills and participating in the social practices of the community.

Further, the use of a concept or skill on a particular occasion is responsive to the historical particularities of the situation. For example, if I sit in a chair on a given occasion, what I distinguish is not merely an abstract instance of "chair," but rather this particular sort of chair, and this actual chair. Likewise, the skill which I exercise is not merely an abstract exercise in "sitting," but rather sitting in this sort of chair and this particular chair (which is vastly different from sitting in a canoe or a saddle).

Because every exercise of a concept or skill is of this sort and because to have a concept or skill is to have the power to use it with non-accidental success, it is difficult to see how one could acquire this power without any exposure to the occasions and
particularities of its use. One would have to suppose some kind of pre-established harmony which guarantees that what the person is able to do just happens to match what happens to be there or what the situation calls for, no matter what is there or how it changes. And then we should have to explain why a person lacks some concepts or skills.

Several sorts of issues lie on the fringes of these considerations.

(1) "Innate Ideas"

If we postulate that the practice and experience mentioned above is not essential to acquiring concepts and skills but that some other sort is essential, so that after that history the person has the concept or skill without ever having practiced its use, then the condition of the person with respect to the concept or skill is formally the same as in the classic notion of "innate ideas," and it presents the same problems. For example, we could imagine a world in which it was routinely the case that we got persons to acquire the skill of solving differential equations by giving them three meals at eight-hour intervals consisting of kidney pie baked at 400 degrees for approximately 70 minutes. Then if someone should invent a new method of solving differential equations, would our kidney
pie eaters automatically know it? And would it also be the case that if our differential equation solvers got better with practice we would find it mysterious that this could happen in the absence of kidney pie? Clearly there is something absurd about this notion of innate ideas.

There are two sorts of "nativistic" theses which we encounter currently. The first concerns language learning. It is said that most children do not hear enough of the grammatically relevant sentences of their native language to learn that language merely by observation, inductively, hence it must be the case that either (a) they already know part of the grammar and merely complete that knowledge on the basis of observation or (b) they have a special, "wired in," readiness for language learning and at most learn from experience which language they are to speak. The former is clearly not a viable stance unless we postulate that children partly know the grammar of every language. The second appears to rest on a confusion between skill acquisition on the one hand and fact learning or information gathering on the other. There is no reason whatever to expect that the kind of history from which a child with linguistic capacity would learn how to speak English is the same as the history from which he could learn what the grammar of English is. In
point of fact, most children do not know what the grammar of English is. (If linguists do not, why should children?) This is not peculiar to language learning. It is equally true that children who learn to paint, ride bicycles, or herd reindeer do not thereby acquire theoretically satisfactory descriptions of what it is they do. With respect to skill learning we have no non-empirical basis for specifying the kind and amount of practice which children should have in order to learn "honestly." Therefore we also have no basis for saying that if children routinely require less than the stipulated amount in order to learn then they must have some special grace such as a "wired in" capacity. "Wired in" and other ideological commentary adds nothing to our understanding here.

The second case is another version of "wired in." Observation of infants leads to the generalization that an infant will usually cry if dropped and that an infant will usually not crawl out into apparently empty air. This leads to such statements as "Fear is an innate emotion" and "People have a primitive, 'wired-in,' capacity for fear." But fear has nothing to do with such reflex sensitivity to external or internal circumstances. As we have seen, fear behavior is paradigmatically a rational symbolic behavior and a participation in an intrinsic social practice. The most that such phenomena could contribute to fear
behavior is (a) that patterns of movement requiring little new learning would be available for the Performance of fear behavior when the person was in danger, or (b) that the person would be unlikely to ignore those circumstances, including cases when those circumstances amounted to or were part of his being in danger, or (c) given the preceding, these behavioral patterns might appear, in whole or in part, among the symptoms of being in a state of fear. Any reflex pattern, including the two in question here, could just as easily interfere with learning and enacting fear behavior as facilitate it—it all depends on the empirical circumstances.

D5. What a person takes to be the case about the world is the outcome of his observation, thought, and action. This is essentially principle A6. Here we will focus on the knowledge of one's own actions. We noted previously that one's knowledge of one's own actions is the knowledge one has as their author, not the knowledge one has as their observer. To be sure, we may be mistaken in this respect, but then, we may be mistaken about anything we observe or think up, too. Observation serves as a check on the self-knowledge we have without observation. When we are mistaken about the latter we often, perhaps usually, find out
if at all, by observation. When we are not mistaken, we already know what observation confirms.

Also, with respect to acquiring facts by observation we may say here that to acquire a given fact by observation requires that the observer have the concepts in terms of which that fact is stated. For without the availability of the requisite distinctions, facts which are open to observation will not be acquired. For example, if I have not the concept of a chair I can look into the classroom full of chairs and see there only a number of strangely shaped objects; if I have not the concept of a carburetor and some acquaintance with examples of carburetors I can look at one directly and see there only a peculiar assembly of curiously wrought pieces.

D6. If a person has a given person characteristic he continues to have it until it changes.

D7. If a person has a given relationship to something he continues to have it until it changes.

Principles D1-D5 have dealt with the acquisition of personal characteristics and relationships. Accordingly, principle D6 begins the corresponding focus on the retention and loss of personal characteristics and relationships. The primary principle is simple
and fundamental, i.e., person characteristics and relationships are retained until and unless they change.

There is no general qualification on these principles in terms of duration. An original capacity or a filial or neighborly relation may last a lifetime. A state of confusion or a relation of being under attack by someone may pass in moments. Attitudes, concerns, preferences, interest, knowledge, friendships, fears, and admirations may be acquired in childhood and last for the remainder of a lifetime.

D8. If a person, C, has a relationship, R, to Z, and if C's behavior with respect to Z is such that it violates R and expresses RR, then R will change in the direction of RR.

This is the Relationship Change Formula, which has been discussed at some length previously. It is a special case of D7. We noted above that in deliberate action future possibilities are primary, although present actuality is an essential consideration. (The latter appears in the K parameter; the former appears in the W, K, and S parameters.) This consideration is a central one with respect to a person's relationships to historical particulars, including persons, including oneself. That is, the other person is related not merely as an actual friend, teacher, debtor,
danger, et cetera, but also as a possible friend, possible teacher, et cetera. Possible friend is a relation now, which can be acted on now, and one who is now a possible friend is different from one who merely may be a friend in the future. It is by virtue of the fact that C has various relationships to Z that C, in acting on some, can act in a way which violates others.

It is worth noting here, too, that the behavior referred to in D8 is behavior which has psychological reality for the actor. That is to say, the description under which it is identified by an observer in the application of this principle is a description under which it was chosen by the actor. For example, if C unintentionally insults his friend Z, then his behavior does not violate C's relation to Z and does not change it. However, if Z takes it as an insult, Z's relation to C may be violated and change as a result.

It is also worth noting that a person's relationship to another may change not merely as a result of his own behavior (as in the case of C in D8) or the other person's behavior (as in the case of Z in D8) but also by virtue of changes in the relation of either one to some other elements in the social domain within which they have a place. For example, if Wil falls
in love with Gil's girl friend he becomes a rival; if he marries Gil's sister he becomes a brother-in-law; if he inherits a large sum of money he becomes the object of envy; and so on.

D9. If a person knows something, he continues to know it until he forgets or changes his mind.

This principle is a special case of D6, for a person's knowledge is one of his personal characteristics. The principle refers to the two general ways in which we lose knowledge.

D10. A person takes the world to be as he has found it to be.

This is principle A9, and it is a special case of D9. In the discussion of A9, the focus was on the requirements for accumulating knowledge of the world. Here, the focus is on the inertia of personal characteristics, i.e., nothing is required in principle to maintain personal characteristics whereas something is required in order to change them. (In a practical sense something may be required in order to maintain personal characteristics, e.g., under circumstances which normally would account for change.)

In the case where I acquire knowledge that replaces earlier 'knowledge,' my latest version of the facts
is what I have currently found the world to be. On the other hand, when I merely acquire more current information, the way I have found the world to be is that it was first one way then the other.

In short, the requirements for accumulating knowledge about the world include not only that the world be stable enough for knowledge not here-now acquired to retain its validity, but also that knowledge as an aspect of persons be stable enough for knowledge not here-now acquired to be still available for use.

D11. The world is subject to reformulation by persons.

This principle is applicable in more than one way. Least problematical is that the accumulation of information about the world is, in a sense, a reformulation.

But the growth of a person's knowledge of the world is not primarily a matter of the magpie accumulation of specific facts or even of specific facts plus general principles. To reach the level of even ordinary understanding is to a large extent a matter of head-stretching, i.e., the acquisition of concepts, patterns, frames of reference, appreciations, integrations, doubts, qualms, standards, and the like, any of which may constitute a major reformulation in the sense of adding dimensions which increase the complexity of everything
we 'knew' previously or of changing the relation of large portions of our world to other portions or to ourselves. Serious failures to reformulate the world in these respects produce a lack of knowledge and an overly restricted life pattern. The heuristic image of The Demon Businessman, devised for use in Descriptive psychotherapy, may be illuminating here.

"The Demon Businessman" is a well known American folk hero. Picture a man in his mid-thirties who is exceptionally successful in business. He's exceptionally successful because when he's on the job he's always thinking, talking, and acting Business. And when he's out to lunch he's thinking, talking, and acting Business. And when he's home with his family, or when he's on a picnic or at a football game, or sitting in church, or visiting friends, or whatever, he's always thinking, talking, and acting Business. So it's not too surprising that he's successful in business.

"Now, there's something wrong with living that way, and everyone but him can see that. His life is much too narrow. But if someone suggests to him that there's something wrong with the way he's living, his first reaction is 'You mean I should lose money instead of making it?' Which just reflects the fact that he's always thinking, talking, and acting Business.
"Now, these days, there aren't too many Demon
Businessmen left, but there are other things that people
are fanatic about, for example, being morally right
or being factually correct. Now in your case, . . ."

Typically, for example, the reaction of experiment
technicians to the suggestion that there's something
wrong with the picture of science as the search for
Truth is "You mean we should be wrong instead of right?"
And, typically, the reaction of a 'determinist' to
the suggestion that there's something wrong with that
way of thinking is "You mean there's an indeterministic
flaw in the machinery?" (Cf. Chapter VI in "What
Actually Happens.")

Thirdly, there is the aspect of creating new forms
of behavior which in turn create new realities and
change the world to that extent, hence call for a
changed understanding of it. This is the alternative
view of the essential character of science (see
Explanation, Falsifiability and Rulefollowing (1967)
and Meaning and Symbolism (1978)). Inventing games,
creating new art forms, devising conceptual-notational
devices or heuristic images all exemplify this phenome-
on. Inventions of this sort may also call for far-
reaching restructuring of our formulations of the world
or parts or aspects of it.
Finally, reformulation often occurs in regard to our global views about the whole world (and what it calls for on our parts). Religious conversions and the adoption of metaphysical theories of "philosophies of life" are of this kind.

From a different perspective, problem solving efforts of any kind are likely to take the form (in some sense, must take the form) of reformulating the world as a whole or in some of its parts or aspects. Realistic problem solving, brainstorming, fantasy, daydreaming, and dreaming all provide vehicles for and instances of such reformulating.

One might summarize here by saying that persons are inherently world-constructors, since they inherently conceive of possibilities of behaving, and that what a person constructs he can, in principle reconstruct, since he might have constructed it differently to begin with. Which is not to say that a person could construct just any old world and get away with it (see Chapters II and III in What Actually Happens).
E. Person and Community

E1. A person requires a community in order for it to be possible for him to engage in human behavior at all.

E2. A person requires that the community be one way rather than another in order for him to behave in one way rather than another.

E3. A community is characterized by a common world, a language, a structure of social practices, ways of living, and individual members.

E4. A person's place in the community provides reasons and opportunities to engage in one behavior rather than another.

E5. To engage in a deliberate action is to participate in a social practice of the community.

E6. If a person participates in a social practice he must do it in one of the ways it can be done.

E7. When a person is in a pathological state there is a significant restriction in his ability to participate in the social practices of the community.

E8. If a person makes non-normative changes in his participation in the social practices of the community, that calls for an explanation.

E9. A person may act as a representative of the community or as merely a member.
El0. A person takes it that a member of the community has the personal characteristics required for normal participation in the social practices of the community unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

El1. Reasons for behavior (deliberate action) are states of affairs which are Contingencies (as defined the Basic Process Unit) within the structure of the social practice of which the behavior is an optional component.
E1. A person requires a community in order for it to be possible for him to engage in human behavior at all.

E2. A person requires that the community be one way rather than another in order for him to behave in one way rather than another.

These principles have been stated in a form parallel to A1 and A2 to emphasize that the real world is essentially the world of people and their behavior. All the world's a stage and the non-person portions of it are props which are called for by the drama. (Any genuine alternative will either (a) raise the Kantian problem of unknowable things-in-themselves or (b) create the "None of us is really one of us" absurdity or (c) create the problem of the Ghost outside the Machine (What Actually Happens, Chapter VI). By "the real world" here I mean the state of affairs which includes all other states of affairs as constituents.

E3. A community is characterized by a common world, a language, a structure of social practices, ways of living, and individual members.

The reference in E2 to the community being one
way rather than another is elaborated here. E3 refers
to the more or less distinctive, stable, basic
characteristics of a community; the principle may be
regarded as an informal parametric analysis of
communities. (See also A. O. Putman, 1981, on this
matter.)

E4. A person's place in the community provides reasons
and opportunities to engage in one behavior rather
than another.

This principle is parallel to A3 for reasons noted
above. It is the complement of E3 in that it refers
to the particular circumstances of particular behaviors
rather than to stable features of the community.

Part of what is involved in the notion of "oppor­
tunity" here is the notion of "eligibility." A person
is eligible to do something if (a) he is entitled to
do it, has the right to do it, etc., which amounts
to (b) if he does it properly it will be counted as
having been done, whereas without the eligibility
nothing that he might do would be counted as having
done it at all. (Recall the classic example of the
minister who is entitled to perform marriages vs a
taxi driver who, out of the clear blue, tells his two
passengers "I now pronounce you man and wife."
Members of a community are eligible to participate jointly in the social practices of the community. Their choices of which partners, which practices, and which options in those practices reflect their more particular relationships to these partners.

E5. To engage in a deliberate action is to participate in a social practice of the community.

This point was made previously in a technical way by pointing out that the set of possible behaviors among which a person chooses in deliberate action is just the set of behavioral options in a given stage of a social practice.

Here we may emphasize that social practices (teachable, learnable, do-able public forms of behavior, usually involving more than one participant) are what there is to "do." If one wants to play a game, one has to select from the games that there are or else invent one and get it accepted. Likewise, if one wants to do anything one selects from the things that are done, or else one invents a new form of behavior and gets it accepted.

Intrinsic social practices are those which can be understood as being engaged in without ulterior motive and without a further end in view. (Note that this does not imply that the same social practices
will be intrinsic for everyone in a given community, but a community would probably not be viable if there were not a great deal of general agreement in this regard.) Further, not merely is it the case that engaging in a deliberate action is a case of participating in a social practice, but also, participating in either a non-intrinsic social practice or a course of action (recall the forms of behavior description) is a case of participating in an intrinsic social practice (the latter is what one is doing by doing the former).

Because intrinsic social practices are coherent and intelligible as being engaged in without reference to anything beyond themselves, they provide an embodiment of the basic rationality of human behavior. (Note that patterns of emotional behavior are included among the intrinsic social practices.)

Reference to intrinsic social practices also makes the complete description of what behavior was engaged in formally a finite and do-able enterprise, something which is formally impossible under existing theories of behavior, which represent behavior as non-rational.

As noted in What Actually Happens (Ch. VI), description and explanation are not mutually exclusive. Rather, explanation is a situationally determined special case of description. Thus, the formal possibility of giving a complete description of a behavior
is also the formal possibility of achieving complete understanding of the behavior (which is different from having exhaustive information about all aspects of the behavior). For example, it is a conceptual tautology that if a person recognizes that something is a danger to him he has a reason to try to escape the danger, and further that if he has that reason he will act on it unless. . . . Likewise if a person eats because he is hungry or if he engages in a game of chess or if he laughs at a joke, these behaviors need nothing beyond themselves to be fully intelligible. (Of course, on a given occasion they may be instrumental or ulteriorly motivated.

E6. **If a person participates in a social practice he must do it in one of the ways it can be done.**

This is the inverse of E5. The structure of social practices is such that there are various [behavioral] options at each stage. In order for the social practice to be enacted on a given occasion one of the options at each stage must be selected for enactment. It is this feature of social practices which necessitates deliberate action, for the choice of a given behavior over some set of alternatives in deliberate action is the choice of a behavioral option in the social practice being enacted.
E7. When a person is in a pathological state there is a significant restriction in his ability to participate in the social practices of his community.

Members of a community are eligible to participate jointly in the social practices of the community, and there are additional eligibility restrictions on certain of those social practices. Because the consequences of failure to participate appropriately or successfully are often quite serious, sometimes to the point of being a matter of life or death, each member of the community has a legitimate interest in the competence of each member to participate in those social practices.

Because of this interest we have the concept of illness, i.e., of being in a pathological state. The conceptual criterion for being in a pathological state (this includes psychopathology) is given by E7.

E8. If a person makes non-normative choices in his participation in the social practices of the community, that calls for an explanation.

As noted above, members of a community have an interest in the way other members participate in the social practices for which both are eligible. When a person behaves in ways which are merely what one might expect from a member in good standing, given the circumstances and the social practice(s) being
engaged in, his behavior is unremarkable. However if his choices of behavioral options are not what is expected or what is required, and particularly if this is a consistent happening, other members have an interest in that and codify it by giving a personal characteristic description which marks that idiosyncracy. Among such explanations is one which attributes those choices to his being in a pathological state. (To be sure, the observer-describer might instead revise his estimate of the circumstances or of the practices being engaged in.)

E9. A person may act as a representative of the community or as merely a member.

A person acts as a representative of the community when he acts or judges in ways that are normative for the community because they are normative for the community. He acts explicitly as a representative of the community when he represents himself (presents himself, describes himself) as that. In doing so he acts impersonally and "objectively." (To be sure, he may be mistaken about what is normative.)

Note that a person may well act or judge in normative ways without acting "objectively," for the latter requires that he act that way because it is normative and not, for example, because he, personally,
takes it that that is how things are or that that is what the situation calls for.

It has been the fashion to contrast 'objective' judgment with bias or 'subjective' judgment and to identify 'objective' judgments with by-definition true judgments of what is really the case. In this fashion, the task of trying to achieve 'objective' judgments has been formulated as the task of trying to rid ourselves of our personal biases so as to achieve that epistemologically superior way of knowing. Not surprisingly, it has been recognized that this is an impossible task, if for no other reason than that we would never know if we had succeeded (but we have no way to proceed, either). The conclusion is that objective judgment is impossible to attain but should be striven for anyhow, and consensus has been often suggested either as a way to proceed or as a criterion for objectivity. But the general conclusion, i.e., that we never really know anything, is a reductio ad absurdum.

In the present formulation there is a meaningful but non-invidious distinction between personal judgment and objective judgment. Personal judgments are not per se biased, and objective judgments are not per se correct or true. Objectivity is not a superior way of knowing, and achieving it calls for an ordinary
kind and level of competence, not a complete depersonal-
ization.

The importance of normativeness in judgments is
primarily social, not epistemological. What the members
of a community are committed to by virtue of (and often,
as a condition of) being members is the major basis
for one member having claims (and making claims) upon
other members. Appeals to truth are merely one of
a variety. There are also claims to justice, fairness,
consideration, appropriateness, assistance, and the
like.

E10. A person takes it that a member of the community
has the personal characteristics required for normal
participation in the social practices of the community
unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

This principle codifies the "basic trust" among
members of a community. A member takes it that other
members have the capability to participate as members.

We noted that cases of significant incapability
in this respect are codified in the concept of a
pathological state. However, this does not exhaust
the interest of community members. There is also an
interest in cases where a member participates in ways
which are acceptable but are more idiosyncratic than
merely behaving normatively would be. As we noted in
connection with E8, it is consistencies of various sorts in this respect which are marked by giving personal characteristic descriptions (person descriptions). The reason that one member of the community, C, has an interest in such characteristics of another member, Z, is that in general, C's own participation with Z will be different by virtue of Z's actual or anticipated non-standard choices. C's willingness to participate with Z at all in various practices will often depend upon such knowledge or anticipation, for in general C will also have preferences in this respect. (Recall B4: If a person wants to do something he has a reason to create or look for an opportunity to do so.)

E11. Reasons for behavior (deliberate action) are states of affairs which are Contingencies (as defined in the Basic Process Unit) within the structure of the social practice of which the behavior is an optional component.

This principle relates two ways of talking and two conceptual-notational schemes. The first is the idiom of individual behavioral choice, of which it can be said that it is in principle rational and social. This way of thinking and talking is codified in the Judgment Diagram. The second is the idiom of social
participation which is expressed in the concepts of community, institutions, and social practices and codified in the process representation of social patterns of behavior (Social Practice Description).

The relation in question involves a simple identity. In the individual behavior idiom we identify certain states of affairs which are relevant to behavior and designate these as "reasons." Our classification of these (Hedonic, Prudential, Ethical, and Aesthetic) is a classification of what bearing such states of affairs can have on behavior. Reification is to be avoided here. In saying that a given state of affairs is a reason for C to do Q, we are not referring to an arcane, mentalistic something called a "reason." (Similarly, in saying that A causes B, we are not referring to an arcane, physicalistic something called a "cause.") Rather, we are making a status assignment. We are saying that that state of affairs plays that part in C's life history. Even that is putting it elliptically. For the non-elliptical form we look to principles B1 and P4. It is because the world is the way it in fact is, i.e., because C's circumstances are as they are rather than some other way that Q rather than some other behavior is the [humanly called for] behavior for C to engage in (because doing Q qualifies as improving C's current circumstances as
discussed above in connection with the "Value and Behavioral Choice" principles).

In the social participation idiom we begin with the concept of social patterns of behavior (social practices) which are historically repeatable. That is, they can have multiple instances. Because such patterns generally involve more than one person, we generally speak of them as something which a person participates in rather than what he simply does or engages in. Social practices are not simple linear sequences of specific behaviors. Rather, they have in general a complex hierarchical structure of stages, options, and contingencies, as described in "What Actually Happens" (The Basic Process Unit), which allow for (often almost unlimited) flexibility and adaptability to individual participation. Attributional Contingencies are those which specify that a certain behavioral option is open only to an Individual having certain personal characteristics, including, as a special case, having certain knowledge (of states of affairs).

We have already noted a fundamental correspondence in individual and social descriptions of human behavior in that the choice of behavior in Deliberate Action is the same thing as the choice of an option in a given stage of a social practice. The present principle extends that correspondence. Deliberate Action involves
not merely a choice of one behavior from a set of alternatives, but also, the choice of that behavior on the basis of reasons. And social practice participation involves not merely the selection of one behavioral option from a set of options at a given stage, but also some set of contingencies limiting the options available in a historically particular enactment, including contingencies dealing with states of affairs known to the participant. The further correspondence consists in the fact that the state of affairs which gives the person (as such) a reason for selecting a given behavior (as such) is the same thing as the state of affairs on the knowledge of which the selection of that same behavior (as an option in the social practice) by that person (as a participant in the social practice) is contingent.
F. Interactions of Persons

F1. The behavior of one person with respect to another is a participation in [at least] one of the social practices of his community.

F2. (B9) If A has the relation R to C the behaviors of A with respect to C will be an expression of R, unless:
   (a) A is acting on a different relationship which takes precedence
   (b) A doesn't recognize the relationship for what it is
   (c) A is unable to do so
   (d) A mistakenly believes that A is doing so, or
   (e) A miscalculates or A's behavior miscarries.

F3. If C and Z participate in a social practice, the fact that Z participates in one way rather than another (or chooses that social practice rather than another) gives C a reason to participate correspondingly in one way rather than another.

F3a. C's behavior with respect to Z may be a case of participating in two or more social practices simultaneously.

F3b. If C and Z participate in a social practice C may anticipate to some extent Z's choices among
behavioral options on the basis of Z's personal characteristics, and relationships to C and others.

F3c. Z may participate in one way rather than another (choose certain options rather than others) as a way of letting C know what kind of person Z is.

F4. If C has a given relationship to Z, C's behavior potential is different from what it otherwise would have been.

F4a. If Z has a greater behavior potential than P, it is likely that C would gain more behavior potential from a positive relationship with Z than with P.

F5. If C makes the first move in a social practice, that invites Z to continue the enactment of the practice by making the second move. (Move 1 invites Move 2.)

F6. If C makes the second move in a social practice, that makes it difficult for Z not to have already made the first move. (Move 2 preempts Move 1.)

F7. Z's positive or negative evaluation of C's behavior provides reasons for C to continue, discontinue, modify, or elaborate (etc.) such behavior.

F7a. If C chooses his behavior under the description "Bl" and Z redescribes it as "B2" and C accepts the rede- scription and C appraises B2 differently from B1, then C will have an additional reason to engage in B1 or not to engage in B1, depending on the nature of the appraisal.
F. Persons and Other Persons

F1. **The behavior of one person with respect to another is a participation in [at least] one of the social practices of his community.**

This principle is, in effect, an extension of E10 and E5. What there is for one person, A, to do with respect to another person, B, is for A to participate jointly with B in the practices which A's community has available for enactment. Paradigmatically, A and B are members of the same community and have generally the same understanding of the social practices in which they both take part.

F2. If C has the relationship R to Z, the behavior of C with respect to Z will be an expression of that relationship, unless

(a) C does not recognize the relationship for what it is
(b) C is acting on another relationship which takes priority
(c) C is unable to act in this way
(d) C mistakenly believes his behavior is an expression of R
(e) C miscalculates or his behavior miscarries.
This is principle B9 and it is the Relationship Formula discussed previously. Here, we may focus on the fact that any two persons for whom interaction is a possibility are likely to have relationships that are more than merely nominal, i.e., more than merely whatever is implied by both being members of the same community. If so, then those relationships provide not merely reasons, but also opportunities to engage in certain practices and/or to engage in particular ways ("options") in particular practices.

Recall that among these relationships are what we would normally call "possible relationships" (e.g., "possiblefriend"). Such relationships are selectively exploited by persons in their behaviors with respect to others. As a result, much of C's behavior with respect to Z reflects the present possibility of there being certain other relationships between C and Z in the future. (Think, for example, of flirting, making friends, being guarded, playing chess, teaching.)

Given that a person's status is, roughly, the set of his relationships within a domain, the preceding consideration may be regarded as a more detailed articulation of the earlier notion a person actualizes both actual behavior potential and possible behavior potential. Possible behavior potential reflects possible
relationships as well as possible circumstances and possible personal characteristics.

F3. If C and Z participate in a social practice, the fact that Z participates in one way rather than another (or chooses that social practice rather than another) gives C a reason to participate correspondingly in one way rather than another.

This principle is a special case of A2 and A3 and is an extension of the preceding principles. The successful joint participation in a social practice is not merely a matter of two individuals and a social pattern of behavior. Rather, it is a joint accomplishment, like building a sand castle together or playing a game of tennis. What is required for a normal interaction is not merely for C and Z to stay within the range of options provided by the social practice. Rather, C needs to be responsive to Z's selection of options and to take some initiative in his own selection of options (and likewise for Z). This may sound difficult, but it is a routine accomplishment.

The result is that, for a given person, particular others will frequently offer and evoke behavioral and personal potential which others do not. (Think, for example, of particular family members, lovers, coaches, salesmen, ministers, drinking companions,
psychotherapists, special friends, instinctive enemies, and so on. These are standard examples.)

A person's selection of an option within a social practice cannot be understood merely on the basis of the fact that he is engaging in that social practice. Since the latter would be compatible with the choice of any of the options, it will not explain why the particular option was chosen. Typically, the choice will reflect either (a) the person's personal characteristics (traits, abilities, etc.), or (b) the person's relationship to the other participant(s), or (c) a second social practice which is being engaged in simultaneously with the first, or (d) all of the above.

F3a. C's behavior with respect to Z may be a case of participating in two or more social practices simultaneously.

As may be expected, when C is engaging in two or more social practices simultaneously, the choice of options in each of the social practices is highly likely to be highly restricted because it will not be generally the case that behavior which satisfies the requirements of (is one of the options in) one of those social practices also satisfies the requirements of the other(s). Thus, the selection of options in a given practice is indicative of the additional social practice(s) being
engaged in simultaneously (and/or, as noted above, indicative or personal characteristics or relationships). A heuristic example is "Dinner at 8:30," which goes as follows.

"Suppose that I told you that last night I got home from work at 6:30 and we had dinner at 8:30 and it was sirloin steak, well done. . . . You would probably shrug and say something like 'So what else is new? Half the people in town might say the same thing.' And that's true. That doesn't particularly distinguish me from anybody else. In a sense, all I've told you is that I did in fact the very sort of thing that we do. . . . But now, suppose I add that (a) yesterday morning I had a big argument with my wife and we didn't get anything resolved, (b) I usually do get home at 6:30 but we usually have dinner at 7:30, not 8:30, and (c) I like sirloin, but I like it rare, and I hate it well done. Of course, you smile knowingly, because now it's clear that there was something else going on, namely, that she was giving me the business. It was a hostile behavior on her part, and one of the points to reflect upon is how obvious it is that that's what she was doing."

The human penchant for killing two or three birds with one stone is probably universally recognized. It is not accidental, but rather reflects the fact that a person's circumstances normally provide him with a
multiplicity of reasons pro and con any given behavior, and the ideal behavioral choice would be one which satisfied all of those reasons simultaneously. (Recall the Judgment Diagram.) This is essentially never possible, since there are always reasons pro and reasons con and it is not possible to satisfy both sets. Since it commonly takes a combination of various reasons pro to outweigh the various reasons con for the behavior chosen, behaviors which are engaged in commonly are responsive to several reasons simultaneously. Typically, responding to different reasons is also a case of engaging in different social practices. The net result is that behaviors which are engaged in are commonly cases of engaging in more than one social practice simultaneously.

Quite often, and perhaps as a rule, when we engage in several social practices simultaneously, there is only one of them which we "overtly" engage in and the others are accomplished by virtue of our choosing certain options in that practice. The basis for saying that one of those practices is the one engaged in "overtly" is that the Performance aspects of the behaviors in question are those which are recognizably associated with that practice. For example, in the "Dinner at 8:30" heuristic, the practice overtly engaged in is that of having dinner. From the description it may be presumed that had an observer been present at the time he could have told
by inspection that we were having well done steak for
dinner at 8:30. The second practice, i.e., Provocation
elicits Hostility, was engaged in merely by making
suitable choices among the options of "Having dinner" and
required no distinctive Performance aspects. (Note that
what was required to make the hostility obvious was not
some additional details about Performance aspects, e.g.,
tone of voice or facial expression, but rather the
background facts which were relevant to the hostility and
generate the relevant redescriptions. Moving from "We
had steak well done for dinner at 8:30" to "she served
something she knows I hate and did it an hour late" is a
redescription which brings out the hostility aspects.)

There is a whole set of customary, conventional
social practices which are of the same general sort as
having dinner at 8:30 and which are the sort which a
sociologist or anthropologist would take a professional
interest in. ("So what else is new? Half the people in
town might say the same thing. . . .") Commonly these
include those practices for which conventional social
settings and props are culturally provided and which
therefore generate visible uniformities in peoples'
behavior. (We eat dinner at home or at a restaurant, buy
stamps or mail letters at the post office, buy groceries
at the grocery store, and so on.) It is useful to think
of this body of social practices as the medium within
which more personal, idiosyncratic, revealing, meaningful participations in other social practices are engaged in merely by making the suitable choices within the medium. In contrast, if one picks only the most conventional, performative, and mundane descriptions of behavior, one can easily make it appear that behavior is overwhelmingly determined by the environment and hardly at all determined by personal characteristics. For example, an experimental finding that 95% of people who go into a store buy something could be interpreted in this way.

Yet part of the force of "Dinner at 8:30" is that it is obviously a case of hostility, given those additional facts which would not be visible to an observer on the spot. (That it is obvious is not the same as it being indubitable.) Thus, this principle is the central one for observational assessment both in clinical practice and in everyday life. It is by virtue of our understanding the full range of our social practices and their exemplifications, and not merely the vulgarly conventional ones, that we can recognize the significance of a person's having done it (the conventionally recognizable practice) in the way he did and thereby recognize the expressions and enactments of ulterior motives, unconscious motives, scenarios, concerns, values, strategies, and other personal characteristics. The point of recognizing these things is that we then treat the person
accordingly. It is an important fact that there is such a thing as treating them accordingly.

F3b. If C and Z participate in a social practice C may anticipate to some extent Z's choices among the behavioral options on the basis of Z's personal characteristics and Z's relationships to C and/or relevant others.

This principle is a practical consequence of the preceding two. Since Z's personal characteristics and relationships correspond to some likelihood of selectivity in the choice of options within a given social practice, C's knowledge of such characteristics and relationships will lead C to expect such selectivity.

The anticipation will, in the nature of the case, almost never (essentially, never), take the form of a simple, flat, explicit prediction, "Z will do Q." Rather, C will have some largely inexplicit expectations, which are normally reflected in how surprised C is at what Z observably does. Nor is it merely a question of whether Z in fact does what is expected of him. The anticipation is also reflected in that Z is regarded as already a possible doer of Q (he is the kind of person who would do Q, or might well do Q, in those circumstances).

Recall that "the kind of person who would do X" is a form of description which identifies a personal
characteristic, usually one for which we have no explicit name. Since any case of "doing X" is a case of choosing some option in some social practice, it follows that in general every social practice provides some number of distinctive ways to distinguish between one kind of person and another. This is the converse of the fact that a primary use of personal characteristic descriptions is to anticipate or explain behavioral differences, i.e., differences in choices of options within social practices or in the choice of one social practice over another.

F3c. Z may participate in one way rather than another (choose certain options rather than others) as a way of letting C know what kind of person Z is.

This principle refers to the phenomenon of "self presentation." Whenever Z's reason for his choices is that that will get C to think of him as a certain kind of person it is appropriate to speak of Z doing some self presentation or making a self presentation.

The point of a self presentation is that it provides an immediate basis for relationship and interaction independently of any prior history. Z's self presentation as being an X type of person amounts to a promise to behave accordingly if C will treat him as an X type person.

Given the prior development of "state" as a personal characteristic we may note that the contractual aspect
holds here as well. "Telling you my feelings is like making you a promise." Likewise for telling you my thoughts, concerns, and mental states. If C tells Z "I'm angry at you" or "I feel nauseous," that amounts to a promise to behave accordingly and that an appropriate "unless" clause explanation will be available if C does not do so. Correspondingly, if C tells Z "I was angry at you last week," this may be a disguised way of letting Z know "I'm still angry with you now," which would be the case if the reality basis for angry behavior was still present, but it has other possible interpersonal functions. It may, for example, be a way for C to clarify the behavior which he did engage in, which presumably was not obviously angry behavior or there would be little need for clarification. By identifying angry behavior as one of the options which was turned down in favor of the option which C did select, C clarifies what behavior C did engage in. That information also communicates something about C's values or priorities and about C's relationship with Z.

This formulation of self reports of feelings and other states of mind may be regarded as an addition to the classic account of such behaviors as internal observation reports, but it may also be regarded as an alternative or replacement. As has been noted by many others, if "I'm angry at you" is assimilated to "I have an itch
in my left palm" or "that filing cabinet is black" it becomes entirely mysterious why we should attach as much importance to such feelings as we do.

Because it bypasses the traditional long term process of getting to know another person, self presentation is an effective interpersonal device, and perhaps one that is indispensible for a society of highly mobile individuals. However, it also facilitates interpersonal exploitation (since promises can be made, benefited from, and then not kept) or certain forms of pathology which involve enacting being a certain kind of person without actually ever being that kind of person or which involve initiating certain kinds of relationship without ever following through and having that relationship.

F4. If C has a given relationship to Z, C's behavior potential is different from what it would otherwise have been. Paradigmatically, it is increased.

If C has the relationship R with someone, P, then C gains the possibility of engaging with P in behaviors and interactions which are expressions of that relationship. However, in accordance with the preceding principles, C's options are selectively restricted in accordance with P's choice of options, which in part reflect P's personal characteristics. Since in general, P's personal characteristics are different from Z's, the restrictions
associated with cRp will be different from those associated with cRz. Thus, even if C already has the relationship with P, having it with Z carries different behavioral possibilities. As noted previously, different others evoke different potential from a person.

The difference in behavior potential is not restricted to possibilities for direct interaction. If C and Z form a two-person community then each can call on the resources of both. If C has substantially less behavior potential than Z, then acquiring the relationship with Z is likely to constitute a significant increase in C's behavior potential, and gaining it will have that value for C.

Although paradigmatically a new relationship increases C's behavior potential, in particular cases it may not. For example if Z becomes C's enemy or disqualifies C it may well happen that C's behavior potential is decreased. If so, it will be a net loss, not a pure loss, since having an enemy provides some increase as well as some decrease in behavior potential.

We may designate as "positive" any relationship which at face value increases C's behavior potential if C acquires that relation to P. Correspondingly, we would designate as "negative" any relationship with the opposite implication.
F4a. If Z has greater behavior potential than P it is likely that C would gain more behavior potential from a positive relationship with Z than with P.

Under these conditions, C has a greater reason to form a positive relationship with Z and will do so, unless... The appraisal of the possibilities offered by Z as a possible friend, possible lover, possible protector, etc. is often experienced as "being attracted to Z," "being drawn to Z," and so forth. One might hypothesize that, conversely, whenever C is attracted to Z, it is by virtue of having made such an appraisal. The experiential aspect is not primary, however. Under the conditions described, if C attempts to form a relationship it will be because C will not choose to actualize less behavior potential as against more, or, one might say, because C is attracted to Z (as contrasted to merely feeling attracted to Z).

It is only "likely" that C would gain more from Z than P. This limitation reflects the gap between the quantitative and qualitative assessment of behavior potential. The issue depends in fact on which behavior potential Z has and not merely how much (and on which personal characteristics and which behavior potential C has).
F5. If C makes the first move in a social practice, that invites Z to continue the practice by making the second move. ("Move 1 invites Move 2")

Commonly, in personal interactions, the initiation of participation in a given practice comes about by virtue of one of the participants directly beginning the joint enterprise, with the second person then joining in. Only in matters of special importance, for example, or in cases where certain personal characteristics or relationships are involved is agreement typically reached ahead of time as to which social practices C and Z will engage in at a given time. Arriving at an explicit agreement itself requires some special social practice, e.g., negotiation, bargaining, or invitation elicits acceptance/rejection. And typically, these practices are merely initiated, not agreed to in advance.

The logical constraint is that it cannot be the case that for C and Z to engage in a social practice on a given occasion, they must have already engaged in another social practice on that occasion, since that would constitute an intractable infinite regress problem.

Making Move 1 in a social practice is thus one of the primary vehicles for one person to influence the behavior of another as a direct result of his own behavior. The reason for the general effectiveness of this procedure is not that we are creatures of habit and that
chains of behavior, once initiated, can be expected to run off smoothly. Rather, the simple fact of C's initiating the practice creates a situation which (a) provides a ready opportunity to continue the observance of the practice and (b) is likely to generate any or all of several motivations on Z's part. Among the latter are (a) reluctance to go against the existing flow of events, (b) reluctance to reject C's invitation, (c) reluctance to jeopardize the relation with C, and (d) the appreciation of whatever positive values are embodied in the practice.

F6. **If C makes the second move in a social practice, that makes it difficult for Z not to have already made the first move. (Move 2 preempts Move 1 ex post facto)**

If, instead of initiating a practice by making the first move, C initiates the practice by making the second move, thereby treating Z as having made the first move, the psychological gravity well effect is even more pronounced. The influence of making move one may be avoided, by being insensitive to it, or overcome, by bringing to bear stronger countermotivation. In contrast the influence of making move two can only be countered, not avoided, and in general, it must be countered overtly. The reason is that as soon as C treats Z as having done X, that gives Z's behavior the public reality
of having been a case of doing X. Given that, that will remain the public reality unless Z makes a successful overt attempt to secure a different public reality for that behavior. To make matters worse, the fact that C's behavior is a case of employing the Move Two strategy is often easily concealed, which makes it even more difficult for Z to counter it effectively.

A standard heuristic example is the following. Suppose that C and Z are in a freely mobile conversational setting such as a cocktail party. Z taps C on the shoulder and makes a comment which could about as readily be taken as a friendly joke or a sarcastic putdown. If C treats it as a friendly joke, then a friendly joke is what it now was, unless Z makes successful affirmative efforts to establish it as a friendly joke.

F7. Z's positive or negative evaluation of C's behavior provides reasons for C to continue, discontinue, modify, or elaborate (etc.) such behavior.

This principle exemplifies many of the principles in Section C, but especially, Cl, Cla-Cld, and C2. C may react to the fact of Z's making the evaluation and/or to the states of affairs to which Z's evaluation calls attention. In connection with the latter, two corollaries which are of technical interest may be stated.
F7a. If C chooses his behavior under the description "B1" and Z redescribes it as "B2" and C accepts the redecription and C appraises B2 differently from B1, then C will have an additional reason to engage in B1 or not to engage in B1, depending on the nature of the appraisal.

This principle provides one of the major ways for Z to influence C's behavior by means of a verbal interaction. It is employed routinely by parents, teachers, lovers, friends, enemies, managers, salespeople, and psychotherapists. In the context of psychotherapy, redescriptions of this kind include those which are commonly called "interpretations," and the acceptance of "B2" by C is commonly called "insight." The effectiveness of the insight for generating new behavior stems from the appraisal of B2 as contrasted with a mere description.

In the context of Descriptive-Psychology psychotherapy, such redescriptions are designated as "Poisoning the well" or "salting the mine," depending on whether the appraisal of B2 is negative or positive. In traditional social contexts, "Praise" and "Blame" or verbal "Reward" and "Punishment" will routinely exemplify F7 or F7a.
G. Person and Self

G1. A person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of deliberate action.

G2. A person has a status in the real world.

G3. A person has a status in the world as an Actor, as an Observer/Describer, and as an Appraiser, or Critic.

G4. A person has a status in the world as a possible-Actor, as a possible-Observer/Describer, and as a possible-Appraiser/Critic.

G5. A person's statuses as Actor, Observer, and Appraiser each correspond to distinctive sorts of relationship to the world and/or parts of the world either simply or in their aspects.

G5a. A person acts as himself.

G5b. A person knows about himself.

G5c. A person knows about his relation to the world and his place in it.

G5d. A person evaluates his worth.
G. Person and Self

G1. A person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of deliberate action.

This principle qualifies as a definition of "person," and was so presented earlier, in the conceptual development of personal characteristics (Dispositions, Powers, etc.). In fact, the archetypal person is one who (a) engages in deliberate action, (b) participates in social practices, and (c) acts symbolically. This follows from the definition and the conceptual structure of the Person Concept, since (1) to engage in deliberate action is to participate in a social practice and (2) for a given deliberate action, B, the social practice which I participate in by doing B is one of the values of the Significance parameter of B, hence B is always a case of symbolic behavior as well as Deliberate Action.

G2. A person has a status in the real world.

This principle is essentially the inverse paraphrase of G1, particularly in the light of G1. G1 states that for a given person the real world is the one which includes him as an Actor, Observer, and Critic.
G3. A person has a status in the world as an Actor, as an Observer/Describer, and as an Appraiser, or Critic. This is the inverse paraphrase of principle A4. It is also implied by G1, since Deliberate Action implies the archetypal self-regulating feedback loop involving these three statuses. A review of these, which are also categorical ways-of-being in the world may be helpful.

(a) For the Actor, the world is essentially an arena for action, and he treats it accordingly by incorporating it into his actions. Acting as Actor has several distinctive features.

1. His behavior is spontaneous; he does what comes naturally. (What he does is an expression of his character and is not directly problematic.)

2. His behavior is creative rather than reflective. His behavior and its products are a significant expression of himself and not merely a common or conventional response to a situation, though it may be that, too.

3. His behavior is value-giving rather than value-finding. Creating the behavior involves creating a framework of interrelated statuses (and their corresponding values) of which mundane particulars are substantiations (embodiments).
(4) His behavior is a before-the-fact phenomenon, since he creates it (he is not finding out what behavior he is engaged in—he is doing it).

(b) For the Observer/Describer, the world is something to be recognized as being this way rather than some other way (Recall A2, A7, A8). Archetypally, the Observer/Describer acts as "one of us," since recognizing the world as X rather than Y paraphrases into "That's what we call 'X'."

(c) For the Appraiser, or Critic, the world is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory in a given respect. If it is satisfactory it is satisfying. If it is unsatisfactory, it warrants a diagnostic recognition of its being unsatisfactory in this way rather than that way and a prescription for trying to improve matters by acting in this way rather than that.

Both Observer and Appraiser behavior is reflective rather than merely spontaneous and creative. They are after the fact, rather than before the fact, since behaviors have to be engaged in before they can be observed and they must be at least imagined in order to be appraised. Similarly, situations have to be observed or be described (directly or indirectly) by someone else in order to be recognized as being of this kind rather than
that or as calling for this kind of behavior rather than that.

Both Observer and Appraiser behavior are value-finding rather than value-giving, since (archetypally) values must be present in the relationship of Actor to circumstance before they can be recognized (third person description) or appraised (first-person report).

(d) As forms of behavior, there are logical relations and not merely functional relations among Actor, Observer/Describer, and Critic/Appraiser. Specifically, to give a description of what one observes or recognizes is a special case of Actor (the latter being the general case for behavior); and to give an appraisal is a special case of giving a description (a special form of description vs "mere description") of what one recognizes or observes. Insofar as spontaneity and creativity are found in Observer and Critic behavior, that is a consequence of their being (special forms of) Actor behavior.

G4. A person has a status in the world as a possible-Actor, as a possible-Observer/Describer, and as a possible-Appraiser/Critic.

This principle reflects the various explications, e.g., of relationships, developmental history, and behavioral choice, and other aspects of the Person Concept.
where "future possibilities" are portrayed as present states of affairs of a distinctive kind. For example, in the case of C having a given relationship to Z, C responds to Z not merely in terms of what would ordinarily be described as C's actual relationship to Z, but also in terms of C's possible future relationships to Z. In the explication, both of these fall under the category of C's actual relationship to Z, and it is that relationship to Z that C's behavior with respect to Z is an expression of. That is because it is now the case that those relationships are possible sometime in the future, and that is something which now provides reasons for behaving in this way rather than that way.

Thus, G3 refers to the vulgarly "actual" and G4 refers to the actually possible. If either of the two is to be designated as the more fundamental, it is G4. One basis for this decision would be that, as we noted earlier, it is extremely rare for a person to sacrifice all future possibilities in favor of any present actuality. To be sure, one might argue that a person often sacrifices some future possibilities in favor of a present actuality.

The game of chess provides a heuristic example in regard to actuality and possibility. I may describe the "actuality" as the board position at a given time. I may also describe, as best I can, the possibilities for
future moves. And then, on reflection, I may say, "The
description of the board position is the codification of
the possibilities for future moves. Even though it is
not a description of those possibilities or of those
moves, one could, from the board position, together with
the rules, work out what those future possible moves
are."

Place is indifferent to history, whereas objects
bear its marks. If I, with my present characteristics,
am located there in the domain of persons, my possibili-
ties are given by (a) my characteristics, (b) my loca-
tion, and (c) the logical structure and empirical charac-
ter of the domain (including my characteristics). What
my possibilities do not depend on in addition is the
history of how I acquired those characteristics or
arrived at that place. The same holds if we restrict
ourselves to the ordinary three-dimensional visual space.
If I am sitting at my desk, my possibilities of, e.g.,
reaching for the coffee cup and drinking from it, or
getting up and walking out, or opening the drawer, et
ce tera, are given by (a) my personal characteristics,
including my embodiment, (b) the fact that I am sitting
at the desk, and (c) the distribution of the various
things in the room, the building, etc. And the same
holds for the chess example. The possibilities for this
knight here are a function of (a) its being a knight,
(b) its being at square KB3, and (c) the rules of chess and the locations of the other pieces on the board.

Rather than declaring one to be more fundamental than the other, we may simply emphasize the importance of actual possibilities because they are more likely to be overlooked than are vulgar actualities. Are we nevertheless in danger of giving up solid reality in favor of an airy network of possibilities? For example, what about the immutable past? Is that to drop out of the picture entirely? And if so, how does that square with the definition of a person as being essentially a history?

However, recall that the values of the Know and Significance parameters of behavior are not restricted in their temporal range. If all my future behavior is a continuation of my life history, not someone else's, and if certain possible behaviors are continuations of enterprises already begun and currently in progress whereas others are not, then those states of affairs will be incorporated in the present and future empirical character of the domain (the real world), in the significance of my behaviors in the future (hence in which behaviors those are, and therefore in what my future possibilities are), in the distinctions I make when I act, and so on.

Perhaps the best summary is the reminder that neither human behavior nor human history is a species of progress, though each has process aspects (recall the
discussion of the Embodiment parameter and see also "Embodiment" (1982)).

G5. A person's statuses as Actor, Observer, and Appraiser each correspond to distinctive sorts of relationship to the world and/or parts of the world either simply or in their aspects.

The general character of these relationships was summarized in G3. What is of special interest here is a person's relationship to himself as Actor, or to himself as Observer/Describer, or as Appraiser/Critic. More specifically, we are interested in the case where it is the person as Actor, or as Observer/Describer, or as Appraiser/Critic who has these relationships. More generally, we may also consider each pair, i.e., Actor and Observer, Appraiser and Actor, and Observer and Appraiser, at either place in the relationship. For example, as an Actor-Observer a person has a relationship to himself as an Appraiser-Actor or as an Actor, or as an Actor having a relationship to himself as Observer-Critic, et cetera. Which is to say that these relationships are recursive as well as reflexive. As in the case of the recursive structure of English grammar, we seldom in fact make use of much of the complexity which the conceptual system really has. And finally, what we have said of Actor, Observer/Describer, and Appraiser/Critic
applies to the special case of possible-Actor, possible-Observer, and possible-Critic.

Of course, the formulation of these states of affairs as relationships makes everything sound too discrete and self-conscious, but that is merely an unfortunate consequence of the modularization which characterizes the English vernacular (and contributes to its effectiveness). For example, it is not that there is first a Critic and a world and then what goes on between them is that the one evaluates the other (that is a spectator (Observer) formulation). Rather, my understanding the world in evaluative and imperative terms is my being the Critic. (This latter formulation is a Critic-Actor formulation, as is the following.) Note that in this presentation "the world" is used as a holistic, or "placeholder" description, not as a way of referring to a logically preexisting 'referent' labelled "the world." A useful reminder here is to say that these relationships are functional relationships which are expressed in behavior rather than logical relations which are expressed in descriptions of them. There is a point in saying that, and to ask "But is it true?" would be to miss the point by responding too narrowly as Critic and not enough as Actor. (Statements are for Observer-Critics; maxims are for Critic-Actors.)
Presumably, this complex conceptual structure and its empirical instantiations, along with the complexity of motivation codified by the Judgment Diagram, is the principal basis for the commonplace Balkanization of the human psyche into "The part of me which ______ (feels this way, believes that, experiences this, wants that, objects to this, is like a parent, and so on)" and for talk about a person's relations to himself.

The present formulation is an articulation of the earlier presentation ("What Actually Happens") of the self concept as a person's summary formulation of his status, and correspondingly, his behavior potential. Because a person has multiple statuses which are functionally related and recursively generative, the domain of possible relationships of a person to himself (and, correspondingly of his possible formulations of his own status) is rich and complex and has an unlimited logical depth. (Note that both Actor and Appraiser/Critic are themselves complex, which further enriches the mix.)

Thus, it is not surprising that a person is both transparent to himself and in some ways a mystery to himself and a potentially unending source of novelty for himself and others. The following subsidiary principles provide some articulation of a few of the possibilities.
G5a. A person acts as himself.

Recall that the status of Actor, as expressed in behavior, carries with it the following.

(1) The person acts spontaneously and does what comes naturally; he assimilates the world to his behavior.

(2) The person is creative in that the behavior or its products are significantly an expression of himself and not merely conventional responses.

(3) The behavior is value-giving since it creates a framework of statuses and corresponding values within which mundane particulars can embody those values.

(4) The behavior is created, not discovered, hence is known before the fact without observation, not after the fact by means of observation.

When we introduce reflexivity and recursiveness into the structure we get a variety of possibilities. Here, we focus on one such possibility, namely, the case of a person as Actor in relationship to himself as Actor. As Actor, the person creates a scenario for enactment which involves a structure of statuses not merely for the material staging and props and other persons, but also for himself as Actor. Thus, he creates a value framework which includes a place and value for himself as Actor. The latter is assimilated to his own behavior as Actor in just the same sense as the other persons and material
props are. In this way, the person acts as himself. Insofar as he is not thereby miscast (see below), he acts authentically.

Phenomenologically, the reflexivity appears in the Actor's self awareness, which is not primarily based on observation, and in the ease with which the ideas and inclinations for action are experienced as coming from "somewhere" (hence the classic psychoanalytic notion of the "It") and flowing through him rather than issuing directly from himself.

It is Actor and Person combinations which provide versions of a person acting as himself. In the example above, it was Actor-Actor. Actor-Person, Person-Actor, and Person-Person provide the other examples.

Recall principle A5. It is primarily as Actor and secondarily as Appraiser that a person knows himself (is real for himself). It is as Observer/Describer that he knows about himself.

G5b. A person knows about himself.

As an Observer/Describer, a person recognizes himself to be one way rather than another. Although it is not primary, a person does have observational knowledge about his behavior and himself as Actor, Observer and Appraiser. By virtue of this, he can act as "one of us"
and describe himself objectively in terms of the personal characteristics he has.

G5c. A person knows about his relation to the world and his place in it.

As an Observer/Describer a person's knowledge about himself is essentially an external, or "third person" type of knowledge. In this genre, he has knowledge about his place in the world and his relations to its various parts and their aspects. Such knowledge includes knowledge about the value (as a possible-other or possible-member, as well as an actual friend, current employer, and so on) he offers to the world and especially to other persons (both if they recognize it and if they do not). Because such knowledge of his personal value is generally not very detailed or specific we often say that a person "has a sense of" his own worth. But we also say that in connection with the following case.

G5d. A person evaluates his worth.

If a person can know about the value he offers to the world, including himself and others, he can certainly appraise it. In G5a we noted that as Actor the person creates for himself a scenario (a status/value framework) which has a place for himself as well as for others. As Appraiser-Actor he appraises the value he offers to the world and acts accordingly by creating scenarios which
have a place for someone who has that personal value. In enacting these scenarios he acts as someone who has that personal value.

If we nominalize the person's appraisal of his personal value we may then, as in the vernacular, refer to his self esteem, or his sense of self worth. Because the value which he offers to others depends in such large measure on the statuses to which they assign him it is not surprising that the development and evolution of self esteem has often seemed to be a simple matter of 'incorporating' other persons' evaluations, or, conversely, of simply recognizing his own achievements and relationships as compared to those of others. However, as various cases of psychopathology help to make quite clear, the situation is substantially more complex than that.
H. Limits, Constraints, and Limitations

H1. A person's personal characteristics correspond to reality constraints on the behaviors he can engage in.

H1a. (B7) If the situation calls for a person to do something he can't do, he will do something he can do, if he does anything at all.

H1b. If the situation calls for a person to enact a behavior for which he lacks the requisite knowledge, he will enact some other behavior for which he has the requisite knowledge, if he does anything at all.

H1c. If the situation calls for a person to enact a behavior for which he lacks the requisite motivational priorities, he will enact some other behavior for which he has the requisite motivational priorities if he does anything at all.

H2. A person's personal characteristics correspond to reality constraints on the ways in which he can acquire personal characteristics and relationships.

H2a. A person's personal characteristics correspond to reality constraints on which personal characteristics and relationships he can acquire.

H3. A person's world is made up of possibilities and non-possibilities for behaving.
H4. A person's self concept is a summary, and primarily intuitive (unreflective) formulation of his behavior potential.

H5. All the world's a stage.

H5a. Status takes precedence over fact.

H5b. Reality takes precedence over truth.

H6. (C2) A person will not choose to actualize less behavior potential rather than more.

H7. Behavior goes right, if it doesn't go wrong in one of the ways it can go wrong.

H8. A person always acts under conditions of uncertainty.

H9. A person always has enough information to act on.
H. Limits, Constraints, and Limitations

Hl. A person's personal characteristics correspond to reality constraints on the behaviors he can engage in.

(Cf. principle B7) One way of expressing limitations on a person's possible behaviors is by specifying or implying limitations in the possible parametric values of his behavior. That limitations of this kind are codified in a specification of his personal characteristics is perhaps most clear with respect to powers, i.e., Knowledge, Values, and Abilities. For example, it is clear that if a given behavior requires a given piece of knowledge, then if the person does not have the requisite knowledge he cannot engage in that behavior. Similarly for motivations, or motivational priorities, and abilities. Thus,

Hla. If the situation calls for a person to do something he can't do, he will do something he can do, if he does anything at all.

Principle Hla reminds us that the problems of understanding persons and their behavior include the problem of explaining why a person doesn't do what he might have been expected to do. It provides a conceptual schema for certain explanations of this kind, i.e., "He didn't
because he couldn't because he lacked the necessary knowledge, motivation, motivational priorities, or ability." In the vernacular, we discriminate more finely between "He didn't because he couldn't," "He didn't because he didn't want to (enough)," and "He didn't because he didn't know enough to." But since we cannot choose what motivations or knowledge to have on a given occasion there is a clear sense in which "didn't know enough" or "didn't want to" are cases of "couldn't" (though not of "didn't know how"). However, we may also say the following explicitly.

Hlb. If the situation calls for a person to enact a behavior for which he lacks the requisite knowledge, he will enact some other behavior for which he has the requisite knowledge, if he does anything at all.

Hlc. If the situation calls for a person to enact a behavior for which he lacks the requisite motivational priorities, he will enact some other behavior for which he has the requisite motivational priorities, if he does anything at all.

To return to principle Hl, personal characteristics also correspond to constraints on possible values of the Performance, Personal Characteristic, and Significance parameters. With respect to the Personal Characteristic parameter, the correspondence is conceptually guaranteed
and needs no further comment. With respect to the Performance parameter, possible values will obviously have a strong conceptual dependence on the person's Embodiment characteristics. Finally, values of the Significance parameter will be constrained in the same way that individual behaviors are constrained (indeed, many of the values of the Significance parameter will be individual behaviors), since the person's capability for engaging in behavior patterns will delimit the significances which his individual behaviors could have. For example, if a person is unable to engage in behavior of doing X, then the significance of his doing Y cannot be that it is his way of doing X on that occasion. Thus, knowledge, values, and abilities are once more relevant.

H2. A person's personal characteristics correspond to reality constraints on the ways in which he can acquire personal characteristics and relationships.

Perhaps the readiest way to elaborate this maxim is by reference to H1. As noted earlier, the acquisition which is of primary interest is the acquisition of relationships or personal characteristics as a result of the person's behavior. For a given person, different behavioral histories would result in the acquisition of different relationships and/or personal characteristics. ("If a person has a given personal characteristic he
acquired it in one of the ways it can be acquired.

Since these acquisitions depend on which behaviors are engaged in and these in turn are limited in ways which correspond to personal characteristics, the acquisition of relationships or personal characteristics is correspondingly limited.

The Personal Characteristic concept of Capacity was introduced to provide a direct and explicit way of dealing with the possibilities of personal change. "A person acquires a given person characteristic by virtue of having the prior capacity and the appropriate intervening history." Just as an ability is conceptually defined by reference to a form of achievement which the ability is the ability to accomplish, capacity, in the sense in which it is used as a person characteristic, is conceptually defined by reference to a person characteristic which it is the capacity to acquire.

We may, however, ask "How come the person had that capacity?" To this the answer is "In part, by virtue of having the person characteristics he had at that time." Thus, person characteristics at the earlier time make a difference not merely in the behavioral history which, given the required capacity, results in the acquisition of the target personal characteristics, but also in the capacity itself.
To be sure, it may be that certain person characteristics are relevant to the behavioral history and other person characteristics are relevant to the capacity which is involved. However, such segregation need not occur, and it is perhaps the exception rather than the rule. For example, if I already know how to add and subtract, the exercise of those abilities is not unlikely to be involved in the behavioral history whereby I learn to multiply, but also, my having those abilities is a good part of why I have the capacity to learn to multiply by virtue of having that behavioral history.

H2a. A person's personal characteristics correspond to reality constraints on which personal characteristics and relationships he can acquire.

Since person characteristics correspond to reality constraints on how person characteristics and relationships are acquired, they also, in a practical sense, correspond to limits on which person characteristics can be acquired at all. In a practical sense, there may be no way to get there from here.

In principle, of course, no such statement can be justified. There is no way a priori or on a merely conceptual or methodological basis, to set definitive limits to the characteristics a person might acquire. The limitations lie in our knowledge concerning the histories
which, for a given set of capacities, will result in the acquisition of the person characteristic. They also lie in our capabilities for bringing about such histories.

All of the foregoing apply directly to the acquisition of relationships.

H3. A person's world is made up of possibilities and non-possibilities for behaving.

Persons are neither omniscient nor omnipotent. They do not, for example, leap over tall buildings, move faster than a speeding bullet, or walk through walls. A person takes the world to be as he has found it to be, and one of the things that a person discovers is that certain logical possibilities, such as those noted above, are simply out of the question. Correspondingly, he discovers that other logical possibilities offer genuine behavioral possibilities which in turn provide the occasions and the content for choices. The former are conventionally designated as "givens" and the latter are designated as "options." Thus, for a given person, the world is divided into the two domains of the "givens" and the "options," each having a range or content which is characteristic for that person.

A person's survey and reflection upon choices and courses of action open to him encompasses the domain of the "options." This is because whatever choice is made
or whatever course of action is taken, the issue to be decided is which of the options is to be selected or enacted. There is no option of choosing among "givens," hence any such logical possibility is in general unthinkable in the sense that the person cannot treat it as a real option or as really possible.

Thus, a person's understanding of the limits of his actually possible behaviors (as contrasted to his logically possible behaviors) corresponds to his formulation of "givens" and "options." In this connection, his formulation of his "options" is his formulation of his behavior potential and therefore corresponds to his "self concept."

H4. A person's self concept is a summary and primarily intuitive (unreflective) formulation of his behavior potential.

A person is an individual whose history consists essentially of choosing particular behaviors from among the behavioral options available. That is, it consists essentially of deliberate action.

Some care is in order in regard to our specifications of the options available and the behavior chosen.

Just as we do not fully understand which behavior a given behavior was if we do not know which personal characteristics it was the expression of or which significant
patterns it was the implementation of, so also we do not understand fully which behavior it was if we do not know what the set of alternatives was over which it was chosen (or the set from which it was chosen). For example, to disappoint a friend reluctantly and regretfully as the lesser of two evils is quite different from disappointing her blithely and unconcernedly as a matter of personal convenience.

Very often our consideration of the nature of the behavior in light of the alternatives is carried implicitly by our characterizations of the kind of choice that was made or in our characterizations of the Significance aspects of the behavior. It is also carried implicitly in our reconstructions in accordance with the Judgment Schema, where the alternatives are collapsed onto the "reasons to do otherwise."

More directly, the alternatives are represented explicitly, though schematically, in the diamond notation for Deliberate Action. Further, the alternatives are represented both cognitively and motivationally (as values of both the Know and Want parameters). And, finally, this representation of the alternatives is part of the representation of the behavior itself.

When we define a person as an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action, the conceptual emphasis is on the behaviors which
are chosen rather than on the sets of alternatives from which they are chosen, though, as we have seen, these are highly overlapping notions.

Cognitively and experientially, the emphasis is the other way. With respect to the past, a person tends to regard himself as the person who did what he did. But with respect to the present and future a person tends to regard himself as the person who could do various things. And even with respect to the past, he affirms, "I could have done otherwise." Such an affirmation is the affirmation of a mundane history of deliberate action, not the affirmation of a transcendental freedom of the will nor the denial of an equally transcendental and incoherent 'determinism.'

H5. All the world's a stage.

We noted in G3 and elsewhere that the status of Actor was value-giving, as contrasted with the value-finding character of Observer and Appraiser statuses. As Actor, the person creates scenarios for enactment, and his behavior is the enactment. (The degree of structure involved in the dramatic plot ranges from cases of detailed ritual to cases of extended improvisation.)

A scenario, or dramatic plot, involves a structure of related statuses. Paradigm examples of such structures include (a) Mother, Father, Baby; (b) Trusted
Friend, Cohort, Self, and Enemies; and (c) Pitcher, Catcher, First Baseman, Second Baseman, etc. The statuses correspond to the dramatis personae, including the inanimate as well as animate characters. Each status logically carries with it the behavior potential for contributing (or failing to contribute) to the enactment in a variety of ways. Thus, the status corresponds to the potential value which may be realized by an individual embodying that status. Correspondingly, it carries the standards by which the individual embodying the status is to be judged (and treated accordingly).

In the earlier references we were concerned primarily with the structure and dynamics of the self. Here the emphasis is on the application to the world at large and to the mundane particulars which are its constituents. It is this kind of status/value framework which provides the holistic structure of a person's world, and it is into this framework that mundane particulars of the sort publicly identified and described are fitted. A person's world consists primarily of a structure of statuses which define what things are, not in the sense of a taxonomy, but as dramatis personae which have a bearing on the person's behavior and possibilities ultimately or indirectly if not immediately and directly. Only secondarily does it consist of the historical particulars he encounters.
The formal considerations involved here are codified in the State of Affairs System, and specifically in the descriptive formats of Process Description, Object Description, and State of Affairs Description. (See Chapter 2 of "What Actually Happens.")

Consider, for example, the Basic Process Unit (BPU). The BPU is primarily a parametric analysis of the domain of processes. It is structured in terms of the following parameters: (1) Stages, (2) Options, (3) Elements, (4) Individuals, (5) Eligibilities, and (6) Contingencies (Cooccurrence and Attributional). These divide naturally into three groups. (a) Stages and Options provide the gross structure of the process; (b) Elements, individuals, and Eligibilities provide the "recipe" structure of the process, i.e., what things have a part in it and how they are related; and (c) Contingencies provide the internal fine structure of the process. It is the second group which is of interest here.

Elements were characterized as being the formal ingredients of the process in question. In the present context we can say straightforwardly that specifying the various Elements of the process is the same thing as specifying the various statuses involved in the process (e.g., Catcher, Pitcher, Ball, etc.), and in this sense Elements are statuses.
The formal individuals and their Eligibilities come into the picture because a given individual may serve in more than one status. (The individual who at one point is the Batter is the Center Fielder at another point.) Formal individuals are connected to Elements in one-one, one-many, many-one, or many-many relationships, and these are given by Eligibility specifications.

The concept of a given process is the concept of all of its possible occurrences (each of which is designated as a Version). For a historical occurrence (an actual occurrence) of the process to take place each formal individual must be embodied, or substantiated, by a historical individual, i.e., an individual eligible to be referred to in a Chronological Description. Historical individuals embody formal individuals and Elements on particular historical occasions; on other occasions the same Elements and Individuals are substantiated by other historical individuals.

It is important to recognize that the relation of the Element to the historical individual who embodies it is one of empirical identity, not instantiation or exemplification. Blue is (always and necessarily) an instance of color; and a cat is (always and necessarily) an example of a mammal. In contrast, it is only tonight and tomorrow that John Barrymore plays Hamlet. When he does that, he is not an instance of Hamlet; he is Hamlet.
These distinctions and relationships are familiar in the world of theater and in the world of athletics. Elements and historical individuals are familiar to audiences everywhere. ("John Barrymore plays Hamlet tonight!" "Fernando Valenzuela pitches tonight!") Eligibilities and formal individuals are better known to producers, directors, and managers. (Actor 1 plays Hamlet in scene A and the third spearbearer in scene B; Actor 2 plays Polonius in scene C and the second spearbearer in scene B, etc.; Prop 1 plays (is) the skull; Prop 2 plays (is) one of the spears in scene B, etc.)

Thus, the dramaturgical model has a great deal of heuristic value. However, most social practices, and a fortiori most processes, do not have a play-like structure. Since they have various Options at each stage, they would have to be compared to a play in which the characters are drawn and a schematic plot or a set of requirements or restrictions is given but the actual lines and actions have to be improvised. That specification, however, resembles the specification of a game (except that the rules are implicit), and because of this, the Game model has also been helpful for understanding the logic of social practices and processes.
H5a. **Status takes precedence over fact.**

Statuses are substantiated by historical particulars on given historical occasions. Since the particulars are judged by the standards which are implicitly and essentially carried by the statuses, the particulars do not in general make a difference to the statuses, but the statuses make a difference in the judgments made of the particulars. Consider the following classic example.

Gil: I feel inferior.

Wil: Impossible! What do you mean, "inferior"?

Gil: I just don't feel I'm worth all that much.

Wil: But you can't possibly! Here you are a self-made millionaire and a Nobel prize winner. You were All-American ten years ago and you've been the country's most famous movie star for the last five years! How can you possibly . . . !

Gil: Well, that just goes to show what some inferior persons can do.

And consider the following classic from The Compleat Therapist:

Gil: It's foolish to be terrified of elevators. You know they're not dangerous.

Wil: Yes, I know it isn't so, but that's the way I feel.
Examples of the first kind provide paradoxes for those Self theorists who would like to believe that a person's self concept is merely a summary of the information he has about himself, or that people are essentially biased in their own favor. Both kinds of example provide ammunition for persons who would provide us with evidence that people are basically irrational and who would take our failure to be convinced as a confirmation of this conclusion.

In this connection, it is well to remember that whatever Barrymore does on the stage is counted as how Hamlet was played, and whatever Valenzuela does on the mound is counted as what the pitcher does. The details of what they do do not lead us to count them in some other way. Likewise, we have seen that when a person evaluates his worth he also generates corresponding scenarios which have a part (status) for just such a person. Whatever he does then is counted as what was done by that person and the details do not affect this logic. Thus, indeed, "That just goes to show what some inferior persons can do." Likewise, factual specifications about the dangerous elevator are merely that; they will not change a dangerous elevator into a non-dangerous one. Thus, indeed, "I know it isn't so, but that's the way I feel."
This principle may be regarded as an informal corollary of principles A4, A5, and the preceding. What a person takes to be the case (takes to be real) is what he is prepared to act on. And what he takes to be real is what has a place (a status) in the world that has a place for him as a Person, an Actor, an Observer, and an Appraiser. As noted above, the world is primarily a structure of statuses and only subsidiarily a set of facts. And the structure of statuses is generated by Actor-Appraiser functioning whereas facts and truths are generated by Observer-Appraiser functioning.

Confusion often arises between status assignments and descriptions (recall the Degradation Ceremony analysis of 'determinism' in "What Actually Happens"). A major reason for such confusion is that we often assign a status to a historical particular on the basis of the same characteristics which provide the grounds for classifying or describing it. For example, we may assign the status of "Object" to what is there ("what is there" being a holistic description, not a referential one). And we may say of an object, "That's a typewriter." To do so is, ordinarily, both to assign it the status of Typewriter and to classify or describe the object in regard to what kind it is, i.e., a typewriter. In dramatic terms, we cast that object in the role
(character) of Typewriter in our scenarios which incorporate it. And we will, correspondingly, judge it by how well it plays that part in our real world, and we will treat it accordingly.

With material objects and observable processes and events such as typewriters, rocks, trees, bodies of water, floods, conversations, touchdowns, contracts, and the like, the confusion is understandable because there is something close to a one-to-one relation between the status assignment and the categorization. Unlike John Barrymore, that object does not play the part of Typewriter merely tonight and tomorrow; roughly speaking, once a Typewriter, always a Typewriter. At most we run into occasional awkward moments when the one-to-one relation is violated, but at those times we can give "functional descriptions." For example, though we do not say "It is playing Doorstop today," we do say "I'm using the typewriter as a doorstop." We could paraphrase this as "In my scenario, this historical individual, which conventionally would have the status of Typewriter, has the status of Doorstop." It is only because there is such a background convention that we are not usually inclined merely to refer to "the doorstop." For some persons such examples raise the question of which it really is, and usually the conclusion is that it isn't really anything
and therefore classification is in a hopeless muddle (see, e.g., Kent, 1978).

In contrast, persons act as all kinds of things, usually some number of them simultaneously at any given time. For example, when Wil talks to Jil about the doings of their son at school, he may be acting as (a) Father, (b) Husband, (c) Taxpayer, (d) Disciplinarian, and (e) Possible-Angry-Person. Thus, it is persons who bring out most clearly the way in which our mastery of status creation, status assignment, and empirical identities are essential and fundamental for living as Persons.

Still, what about the element of conflict involved in the "safe" Dangerous Elevator or the Typewriter with no printing element? Here we may turn to another parameter of processes, i.e., Contingencies, and specifically, Attributional Contingencies. Cases of Attributional Contingencies are cases where certain Options are ruled out (logically or probabilistically) unless (or if) the Individual (hence also the historical individual) who is a given Element on a given occasion has certain attributes (e.g., abilities or knowledge). Given that such Contingencies are included in the structure of the process, the number and qualitative range of possible Versions of the process may be substantially restricted if the historical individual embodying a given Element has
or lacks certain characteristics. In general, in that case, the possibilities of realizing the values inherent in the scenario or social practice will be correspondingly limited. (Little satisfaction is to be expected if John Doe plays Hamlet or pitches tonight or if the printless typewriter is used to type a letter.) Such limitations may well render it pointless to enact the scenario or social practice at all. Given principles B4, B5, C1, and C2, among others, it is unlikely that under these conditions the scenario-creator would simply go ahead with an enactment. One alternative is simply to move to a different scenario.

However, one of the things which we commonly do in such situations is to decide that our culprit has been miscast and is more suitable (in terms of attributional contingencies) for a different part. Thus, we wind up with John Doe, Spearbearer, or with a new doorstop. In a similar vein, we may decide that a billiard ball model is miscast as The Explanation of Chemical Processes, or that Ptolemaic theory is miscast as The Explanation of How Planets Move. As noted elsewhere (1967, 1978), in none of these cases do we do so because the facts require it.
H7. Behavior goes right if it doesn't go wrong in one of the ways it can go wrong.

From one point of view, this principle is a corollary of principle B9 and the earlier discussion of the Relationship Formula, with specific reference to the fifth "unless" clause, i.e., "unless C miscalculates or his behavior miscarries." The specific issue here is the success of a deliberate action that is engaged in, i.e., an action that would be represented in specific form except that the Achievement parameter would be unspecified, i.e.,

\[ <I, W, K, KH, P, \theta, PC, S> \]

If we try to give a general account of the possibility that a person fails to accomplish what he is doing, i.e., fails to bring about the wanted state of affairs which is the value of the \( W \) parameter, we will focus on the \( K, KH, \) and \( P \) parameters. (\( W \) escapes examination because it is presupposed already by the possibility of failing at all--\( W \) specifies what there is to fail at.)

The behavior may fail because it was based on misinformation, or a distortion of reality. For example, if Wil wants to avenge a murder, he may kill Sam, thinking that Sam is the murderer. If it turns out that Sam is not the murderer, then Wil has failed to accomplish what he wanted, which was to avenge the murder. However,
there is a clear sense in which Gil does accomplish what he wants, namely, he succeeds in killing Sam. The two are easily distinguished if we diagram Wil's action as symbolic behavior. In terms of the diagram in Figure ,

![Diagram of symbolic behavior](image)

we can say simply that although B3 fails, B2 (and B1) succeeds. We can also make allowances for B3 by saying "In terms of what he takes to be the case at the time of the behavior, Wil's behavior is successful." In contrast, the symmetric possibility with respect to competence is not open.

For example, if Gil shoves Wil's arm just as Wil is pressing the trigger, Wil not only does not succeed in killing Sam, but he also does not succeed in shooting Sam
Figure. Behavior goes right if . . .

wrongful injury
K3

Sam = murderer
K2

Sam, gun, locations
K1

P
Point gun
Pull trigger
A
Death of Sam?
Vengeance?

W3
W2
W1

Kl

KH1

Vengeance

death of Sam

KH2

KH3

B1 = Shoot Sam

B2 = Kill Sam

B3 = Avenge the wrong
or anything else that he was trying to accomplish. In this case, we would say that Wil's behavior miscarried.

One of the issues for which such considerations are relevant is the issue of how one accounts in general and in principle for the success of human behavior (successes in finding out about things, in accomplishing things, in avoiding or preventing things, etc.). The implication of H7 is that if we are talking about human behavior as human behavior, nothing is needed for this purpose. The general explanation for the success of behavior that is engaged in is that it is an expression of the person's competence, and reference to that competence is already contained in the specification of what behavior it is. In this sense, human behavior is sui generis in needing no external guarantor of success, a conceptual theme which is found in the classic notion of "agency."

In particular, it is not the case that Wil's behavior goes right because he has analyzed every way it could go wrong and has taken precautions against every such possibility. For one thing, only a successful precaution would have the effect of reducing some possibility of error. But since the precaution could itself fail, Wil would have to take all possible precautions against that eventuality. But then he would be caught in a hopeless infinite regress on the very first of an unlimited number of precautions. Clearly, the only way to ensure that
nothing goes wrong is to do it right, and doing it right is ultimately and primarily an expression of competence, whether it is the original enterprise or some practical precaution. (This is the direct message of the heuristic image of Choosing Your Movements (1976)).

This conclusion holds in the special case where the precautions take the form of experiments.

Note that where the relevant competence is not assumed, we give Course of Action descriptions, and, in the vernacular, we often say "He's trying to do X" or use an equivalent locution. For example, we say "He's giving a lot of speeches in an attempt to get himself elected." What we do not say is "He's getting himself elected--but of course, he may fail."

Independently of the foregoing, we could also argue in a way that is parallel to the classic argument concerning perceptual illusions. Illusions are possible, but they must be the exception rather than the rule, for if most of our perceptions were illusional we would have no way of establishing that any perception was either illusional or veridical. In that case, our practical distinction between veridical and illusional perceptions would have been lost, though we might entertain some corresponding transcendental notions of unknowable Truths.
Indeed, the issue concerning perceptual illusions is merely a special case of the question of people's success in finding out things, i.e., it concerns people's success in finding out things by observation.

Again, consider the problem of giving someone instructions in regard to doing something:

Gil: Do X.
Wil: How do you do that?
Gil: Do A and then B.
Wil: How do you do A?
Gil: Do C, D, and E.
Wil: How do you do C?
Gil: Oh, my. Let's forget it.

Here, "X" may refer to any Deliberate Action. The infinite regress problem is avoided only if Gil can describe the task of doing X as a case of doing one or more things which Wil knows how to do without further instruction. But there is a limit to Gil's ability to redescribe the task, hence at some finite depth in the task analysis, he gives it up as hopeless.

The same issue arises when it is a case of Gil himself doing X. If Gil has the competence to do X, then, in a practical sense, he can see to it that doing X succeeds, or goes right. However, there is not thereby any presumption that he can also see to it that A and B
go right or that C, D, and E go right. Clearly, there is
a limit to the range of descriptions of actions of which
it is the case that, as so described, he can see to it
that they go right. In particular there will be a lower
bound on the series of members of Task Analysis decompo-
sitions of doing X for which this is the case (i.e., he
can see to it that they go right).

It follows that there are such things as basic
actions, i.e., actions which are not accomplished by
engaging in other actions. If we do not add unrealistic
requirements for uniformity, universality, recognition
criteria, identity criteria, and so on, it will not be a
problematic notion, though it will introduce the possi-
bility of certain technical or practical problems.

All of the foregoing may be regarded as merely an
elaboration of the decision to formulate behavior as
having a Know How parameter. In giving a particular
description (e.g., doing X, doing A, doing C) as a Delib-
erate Action description we are implying that that was
what the person saw to. (In contrast, describing a
behavior as merely intentional action implies only that
the performance reflects a competence which reflects a
learning history; since the behavior in question is not
discriminated, there is no question of its being seen to,
either.)
Some of the technical issues may be formulated by reference to the notation for Symbolic Behavior, which has the (optionally recursive) structure of "Doing B2 by doing B1." In the case where B2 is "getting revenge" and B1 is "shooting Sam" we would normally be prepared to say that Wil knew how to shoot a target and that in the present case the target was Sam, with the expectable result. In contrast, we probably would not say that Wil knew how to get revenge and that in the present case it happened to be on Sam, though we might say that Wil was capable of getting revenge and did so on this occasion.

There are two reason for the latter reservation. First, the range of (contextually determined) possibilities associated with the general concept of "getting revenge" is so diverse and uncertain that we would hesitate to say that anyone knew how to do that. Second, with respect to getting revenge on that occasion, there was nothing that Wil had to know how to do over and above what was required for shooting Sam, thus, there is little reason to strain to identify some second competence comparable to knowing how to shoot a target. The extra thing that was required falls in the middle ground between knowing and knowing how. That is, it is a matter of sensitivity and judgment. Wil had to recognize the opportunity to get revenge by shooting Sam.
Wil's success, not merely in shooting Sam, but in getting revenge, is not accidental. That being the case, we say straightforwardly that getting revenge is something he did. At the same time, since there is no distinctive Know How and performance associated with that result, we would recognize the validity of the question "By doing what?" (and not merely "How did he do it?"). The answer is "By shooting Sam." Thus, "Shooting Sam" is a candidate for being the smallest, or innermost, diamond when Wil's behavior is diagrammed. Having said, "By shooting Sam," we are under no obligation to continue to, e.g., "By pointing the gun and pulling the trigger" as a specification of Wil's Deliberate Action, though we would almost certainly accept it as a specification of his Performance. To be sure, if we took it that pointing the gun and pulling the trigger did represent Deliberate Actions on Wil's part, we would have the option of putting in one more inner diamond in the representation. However, the same considerations would then apply with respect to the option of continuing. The option would disappear beyond the level at which there was only the performance of a basic action.

In sum, competence is a conceptual requirement for behavior, not merely an empirical one. Thus, none of the foregoing should be taken to imply that persons have some transcendental power to guarantee the success of their
behaviors. Rather, persons do acquire competence by practice and experience and they also learn by experience what it is they can expect to succeed at (Persons take the world to be as they have found it to be) and they formulate corresponding "givens," "options," self concepts, and Actor scenarios and act accordingly.

HB. A person acts under conditions of uncertainty.

We know of nothing that could guarantee a person (a) that what he takes to be the case is the case, (b) that he knows all the states of affairs (reason) which are relevant to what he does, (c) that his choices are correct, (d) that he is proceeding correctly, (e) that his efforts will succeed, (f) that he would recognize it if his efforts did or did not succeed, or (g) that he would recognize the relevant consequences of his behavior.

From the recognition of such states of affairs as these, an Existentialist might draw the conclusion that life is fundamentally absurd or that human behavior is ultimately irrational. What is irrational, however, is to suppose that any such missing certainties are in any way essential for human behavior or human rationality. An Actor needs creativity and opportunity, not certainty. An Observer needs judgment and sensitivity, not certainty. A Critic needs competence and creativity, not
certainty. We are not missing anything if we are without those certainties or guarantees.

In the field of psychopathology and treatment there is a heuristic Image which is relevant, i.e., The Two Oughts. When someone says "People (or I, he, they, etc.) ought to (should) do X" he often takes it for granted that this is an elliptic version of "People ought to do X, and so they are blameworthy, reprehensible, and at fault if they don't." This is an Ethical "ought." In fact, however, it is often the case that this implicit 'full' reading is inappropriate. Instead, the non-elliptic version is "People ought to do X, and so it's unfortunate if they don't (or can't)." This is an Aesthetic or pragmatic "ought." For example, "A husband and wife should confide in each other." Sometimes the proper conclusion is "And so he (she) is at fault because we can't." More often the appropriate conclusion is "And so it's unfortunate that we don't (and what if anything can I (we) do to improve matters)."

In a similar vein, we might say "A person ought to know. A person ought to be (legitimately) sure" of those things instead of being uncertain. This is an Aesthetic or pragmatic "ought," and the appropriate conclusion is "and so it may be unfortunate that he wasn't."

In Actor-Observer-Critic terms, the philosophical laments and accusations which are accomplished by
reference to such "uncertainties" may be diagnosed as a case of elevating possible Diagnoses into universal Prescriptions. For example, it is possible that what a person took to be a case of X was actually a case of Y and the way his behavior goes wrong is that he treats a case of Y as though it were a case of X. From the ideological trauma of that recognition, one might generate the prescription "(You should) Always be (legitimately) certain of your facts before you act, and there's something fundamentally deficient about you and your behavior if you aren't." To be sure, if one could have guaranteed knowledge one would also have a measure of certainty that that particular criticism (Diagnosis) would not apply. But of course, this is just another variation on the idea of making behavior go right by seeing to it that it doesn't go wrong. If we cannot see to it that we are not wrong and if we cannot see to it that we find out whether or not we are (were) wrong, then neither can we have it merely be that we cannot be wrong.

H9. A person has enough information to act on.

This principle may be regarded as a corollary of maxims A2, A3, H6, and H8, and it says little, but may on occasion be an important reminder. Since all that a person needs is for the world to be one way rather than another in order to have a reason to do one thing rather
than another, a person is not incapacitated nor is his behavior brought to a halt by virtue of his not having information. To be sure, we are often lacking some particular information that we would like to have, but no matter what information we have, there is always some behavior or course of action which it makes sense to engage in. In those cases where behavior does come to a halt the explanation involves some kind of state, e.g., sleep, exhaustion, panic, toxicity, not the lack of information.
I. Norms, Baselines, and Burdens of Proof

I. A person takes it that things are as they seem, unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

II. (A9, D10) A person takes the world to be as he has found it to be.

III. If a person has a given person characteristic and his behavior is an expression of it, that calls for no explanation, whereas if his behavior violates that person characteristic, that does call for an explanation.

IV. If a person has a given relationship and his behavior is an expression of it, that calls for no explanation, whereas if his behavior violates that relationship that does call for an explanation.

V. If a person's relationships or personal characteristics change, that calls for an explanation.

VI. A person's behavior goes right, if it doesn't go wrong in one of the ways in which it can go wrong.

VII. A person takes it that a person who is a member of a group, class, or set of persons is a typical member until and unless he discovers differences.

VIII. (E8) If a person makes non-normative choices, that calls for an explanation.

IX. If a person engages in an intrinsic social practice, that calls for no further explanation.
I. Norms, Baselines, and Burdens of Proof

II. A person takes it that things are as they seem, unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

This maxim is the cognitive version of H7, which is the behavioral version. If we try the skeptical alternative, i.e., "A person doesn't take it that things are as they seem unless it can be shown that they are" we find ourselves immediately in the position of trying to make things go right by preventing every possible way of going wrong. The infinite regress becomes obvious as soon as we notice that any attempt to "show that it is as it seems" suffers from the same problem as the original. If we are going to be skeptical, we shall have to say at the very first step, "Well, it does seem that we've produced some evidence to indicate that it is as it seems, but of course, it only seems that we've done that, and that must now be shown." And so on and on, with no outcome and no end.

In fact, the primary evidence that things are as they seem is that we successfully treat them as being what they seem to be. How things seem to us will, of course, depend on what we have the competence, judgment, and sensitivity to recognize, as well as there being
something of the sort to be recognized. To the Tic Tac Toe player the world consists of noughts and crosses, their presence and absence.

I2. A person takes the world to be as he has found it to be.

This maxim is the same as A9 and D10. As noted earlier, the world which is the stage for our behavior is sufficiently stable so that we can find out about it a little at a time and accumulate knowledge about it. Among the things we find out are how stable various things are, and if we discover that certain things, e.g., the weather, or Wil's temper, are unstable, we take it that that continues to be the case until and unless we change our minds or discover that it is now different with Wil or with the weather. Thus, we do not need evidence to conclude that things are as we have found them to be. We do need evidence in order to conclude that things are no longer as we had found them to be.

I3. If a person has a given person characteristic and his behavior is an expression of it, that calls for no explanation, whereas if his behavior violates it, that does call for an explanation.

In connection with the Relationship Formula it was noted that our ability to use it depends on our ability
to recognize which behaviors would be expressions of a given relationship, which would violate the relationship, and which would be neutral. Similar considerations hold for person characteristics. Our ability to recognize expressions and violations is not accidental, since the person characteristics which fall in the categories of Powers and Dispositions are in large part defined in terms of the type(s) of behavior which would be expressions of them.

If a person has a given person we have reason to expect that his behavior will express it or at least, not violate it. Therefore, if his behavior does violate it, there is some reason why it does and we will require that reason in order to understand it. The reasons will generally involve unusual circumstances or other person characteristics which predominate.

I4. If a person has a given relationship and his behavior is an expression of it, that calls for no explanation, whereas if his behavior violates that relationship that does call for an explanation.

The considerations here are entirely parallel to those of I3, above. We have already encountered the notion of a behavior which violates an existing relation. This was in connection with the "unless" clauses in the Relation Formula and in connection with the Relationship
Change Formula. In both cases the major explanation involved acting on another relationship which took precedence.

I5. If a person's relationships or personal characteristics change, that calls for an explanation.

This principle is the complement to D6: if a person has a given person characteristic he continues to have it until something happens so that it changes. Thus, if such a change does occur, there is some event which accounts for why it occurred when it did and some state of affairs which accounts for why it occurred at all. Except as an expression of ignorance or lack of interest, we will not accept that "It just did happen."

I6. A person's behavior goes right, if it doesn't go wrong in one of the ways it can go wrong.

This maxim is the same as H7. In the present context we may regard it as restricted form of I3. If a person has the requisite person characteristics for the behavior he is engaging in, and particular the requisite knowledge, motivational priorities, and competence, then no explanation is required if the behavior is successful. On the other hand, if the behavior is not successful, then an explanation is called for to account for why, in spite of having the requisite characteristic the person
failed in his behavior. Mostly such explanations will be provided by reference to atypical states or to chance or accidental circumstances. And in most cases such explanations amount to saying that he didn't after all have the requisite characteristics on that occasion. Compare: If a marble on a flat level surface doesn't roll when it's pushed, that calls for an explanation.

I7. A person takes it that someone who is a member of a group, class, or set of persons is a typical member until and unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

From one point of view this is a restricted variant (restricted to persons, for convenience, though the restriction is not necessary) of I1 and a parallel to I6. Since a person's possessing the requisite characteristics for his behavior, we have reason to believe that the behavior will be as expected, i.e., successful, and because of that, we require that there be an explanation if it isn't. (Note that we only require that there be an explanation; we often do not demand that someone actually has or gives the explanation.) Similarly, this being a case of a person who is X gives us some reason to expect that he will have whatever characteristics and exhibit whatever behaviors one would expect from a person who is X. What we would expect from a person who is X simply corresponds to how we have found such persons to be (I2).
For example, if we have found X persons to be noticeably irascible on the whole, we will expect this X person to be irascible. If we have found X persons to be unpredictable, we will so regard this X person. If we have found that X persons run the gamut from A to B, we will expect that this person will be somewhere in the A-B range. If we have no findings or expectations concerning X persons we will ignore his being X and simply expect what we expect from persons generally, unless, for example, we have found that newly distinguished types of persons are generally atypical with respect to the general run of persons, in which case we will probably be more noncommittal than usual. And so on. Making use of what we know in no way resembles blind induction.

Initial expectations may not be borne out. We do not, except in some bizarre or highly atypical cases, engage in endless preliminary investigations to see if they will be borne out. As noted above, our primary recourse is to treat an apparent case of X as a case of X and see (a) whether we can do so successfully, and (b) what atypical findings emerge along the way. There are two complementary developments from this point.

The first is that the entire domain of personal characteristic concepts reflects the extent to which we mark differences and similarities not merely between one person and another (the parametric analysis approach) but
also between persons and a relevant norm (the paradigm case formulation approach) such as the fictitious "standard normal person." But note that, having marked a person's deviations from the relevant norms in the form of personal characteristic descriptions, we now expect him to act accordingly (I3).

The second is that some form of treating a case of X as a case of X appears to be the only way that persons can make direct use of the knowledge they have. Characteristically, a person has to act on the knowledge he has and does not have the realistic option of conducting investigations to augment his knowledge first (H8).

Note, too, that treating a case of X as a case of X may involve following policies or strategies, since treating something as a case of X may be just to treat it or him (them, her) in a certain way which is specified by the policy or strategy. One of the features of policies is to provide a rationale for acting which does not require extensive inquiry, interpretation or judgment in individual cases. Familiar forms of policy are "Always do Q," "Never do Q," "Do Q if Y," "Do Q unless Y," and "If Y, do Q unless Z." Thus, policies are formally suited for acting under uncertainty (H8), and some policies may refer directly to uncertainty (for example "If you don't know whether it's X or Y, don't do anything that depends on whether it's X or Y" or "If you don't know whether
it's X or Y, make your best guess and act on it").

However, many social scientists follow the policy of interpreting all cases where a person fails to make a complete investigation of the facts as cases of egocentricity, bias, or irrationality.

Policies and strategies lie half way, one might say, between merely doing what the situation calls for and assimilating the situation to our more idiosyncratic projects and scenarios.

18. If a person makes non-normative choices, that calls for an explanation.

This is a special case of 17, since such a person violates the expectation that he will behave in ways that are typical of the group in which he operates. Explanations are, typically, not hard to come by, since they may consist merely of noting some atypical circumstances or relations, or of assigning a personal characteristic.

19. If a person engages in an intrinsic social practice that calls for no further explanation.

We noted earlier that an intrinsic social practice is one which has the kind of internal conceptual coherence such that a person could be understood to be engaging in that social practice without any ulterior motive and without a further end in view. For example, when a
person paints a picture in his spare time, or when he makes restitution to someone he has harmed, or when he tries to get out of the danger he recognizes himself to be in we are not normally inclined to suspect an ulterior motive or look for a further end in view. Similarly for the cases where a hungry man eats food, a thirsty man drinks water, and so on.

The reason we are not inclined to look further or suspect something ulterior is that nothing of the sort is in principle needed. Accounts of behavior in terms of the intrinsic social practices which give them a tautological completeness are formally capable of being complete behavioral accounts for the behavior in question as such.

If we could not understand any social practices as intrinsic then we would be unable to understand human behaviors as anything other than essentially arbitrary and ultimately meaningless. This would be the case even if we invented transcendental goals such as pleasure, self interest, or salvation or transcendental principles such as self-actualization, reinforcement, cause-effect, instinctual qualification, homeostasis, and so on. Of course, for a person who could only see behavior as arbitrary or meaningless, only such explanatory options would be open (Hla).
Thus, when an Observer-Describer gives an ordinary description of a human behavior, such as a deliberate action description or a non-intrinsic social practice description, or an activity description, such a description will be necessarily incomplete. One may move toward completeness by raising the significance question, i.e., "What is he doing by doing that?" Once an intrinsic social practice description emerges (and it may be there at the outset), behavioral explanation stops unless there is specific evidence for some ulterior motive or instrumental value. But with respect to such evidence that the person was doing more than just engaging in that intrinsic social practice, one would have to ask "What else was he doing?", "What was he doing by doing that?", et cetera until a new intrinsic social practice description emerged.