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GRIM COMMERCE:
SCALPS, BOUNTIES, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF TROPHY-TAKING
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN NORTHEAST, 1450-1770

by

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in the Early American Northeast, 1450-1770
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The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we
Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards
Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.
ABSTRACT

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Thesis directed by Professor Fred W. Anderson

Although most historians have evaded its study, postmortem mutilation had an extensive history on both sides of the Atlantic. Corporeal trophies communicated a variety of meanings to the people of Early America: mutilating a corpse conveyed affective power, marked physical and cultural boundaries between groups, and conferred spiritual authority. When European and Indian cultures met, these trophies formed an important aspect of their (mis)communication. Certain body parts acquired greater social and economic significance, developing into an exchange of human scalps for monetary rewards with dire implications for intercultural relations in North America. Colonial scalp bounties fused the “logic of elimination” with targeted violence. The rewards simultaneously produced racialized enemies and constructed whiteness as the unifying principle for people of the British (and later American) empire who emerged from the Seven Years War as “the white people.” Nineteenth-century “image-makers” extended these semiotics into the language of a new American empire: an empire that defined its boundaries through racialized violence.


4 Billington, *Land of Savagery*, used the phrase “image-makers” to refer to novelists, illustrators, journalists and others who helped construct the image of the West in American culture during the nineteenth century.
To Daron and Auben;

yes, Mommy’s done now.
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

As mediator and locus of our individual experience in the world, the body provides a potent vehicle for communicating cultural meanings. Its very ubiquity complicates the message, multiplying and enriching those meanings. For European and indigenous peoples in early America, the human body provided “the ultimate site of cultural identity and intercultural contention” that shaped their understandings of themselves and each other. Although most historians have evaded its study, postmortem mutilation had an extensive history on both sides of the Atlantic and appears in a startling number of sources. Corporeal trophies communicated a variety of meanings to the people of Early America: mutilating a corpse conveyed affective power, marked physical and cultural boundaries between groups, and conferred spiritual authority. When European and Indian cultures met, these trophies formed an important aspect of their (mis)communication. Certain body parts acquired greater social and economic significance, developing into an exchange of human scalps for monetary rewards with dire implications for intercultural relations in North America.

Europeans had mutilated their dead often as a sign of state power, epitomized by the practice of drawing and quartering an English traitor. On this side of the Atlantic, communities displayed and exchanged scalps, hands and other trophies as symbols of alliance. Many performed elaborate ceremonies intended to incorporate these items as surrogates for the slain,

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ritually reviled them as vengeance against the dead, or both. Colonial interactions transformed these expressions into a language expressing economic relationships, domination, and cultural resistance. This study traces that process among the major cultural groups of the northeast: Algonquians of the coastal and riverine valleys, Iroquoians from the Hudson River to the Great Lakes; French colonists along the St. Lawrence River and into the Pays d’en Haut, English settlers in New England, and (to a lesser extent) the Dutch – many of whom stayed after New Netherland became New York.

Each group brought biases to the encounter. French and English colonists would likely have agreed with the Amerindian expression one exasperated Jesuit reported to his superiors in France: “Aoti Chabayá, (they say) … ‘You can have your way and we will have ours: every one values his own wares.’” Indians, French, Dutch, and English inhabitants of North America shared the tendency to view their own culture’s aesthetics, values, and traditions as preferable, if not explicitly superior, to others’. Often, these preferences pertained to the human body: from its shape, to its hair (or lack thereof), and its adornment.

As exploration gave way to settlement those predilections combined with different social and environmental circumstances to alter relations among Amerindians and Europeans. Early alliances in New France, cemented in the ritual exchange of bodily trophies, drew colonists into Amerindian conflicts while simultaneously establishing body parts as an expression of mutual

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accord. Missionaries and *coureurs de bois* bred familiarity (if not content) between French and Native Americans – albeit by quite different means. Anglo-Indian relations, by contrast, were characterized more by segregation than interaction. Increasingly, “the cultural interface between natives and English in North America … involved war,” a situation that further fueled apartheid.

The violent conflict in New England, while reinforcing cultural exclusionism, did not end cultural interaction; instead it became the essential mechanism for that interaction. “Over time, mutual bloodshed and brutality evolved to constitute a shared language of praxis” that fused with nascent English racial idioms to fuel Indian-hating and the trophy-taking practices to epitomize anti-Indian violence. The bounty system, initiated by the Dutch and elaborated by New Englanders, made this connection “agonizingly concrete,” eventually drawing a sharp line between Europeans and Indians that shaped military doctrine and cultural relations for generations, giving rise to the view of scalping as the iconic mutilation practice of the nineteenth-century American West.

Early English explorers and settlers used non-racial terms to describe native inhabitants of the New World, explaining the bodily variations they perceived by drawing upon “a broad discourse on cosmology and climate” that attributed these differences to environmental rather than heritable conditions. Defining racism as “bias, based solely on biologic characteristics,” scholars of race usually link the development of racism to “a truly biological definition” of

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7 Chaplin, *Subject Matter*, 81; Anderson and Cayton, *Dominion*, 44.
8 Hal Langfur, “Moved by Terror: Frontier Violence as Cultural Exchange in Late-Colonial Brazil,” *Ethnohistory* 52, no. 2 (Spring 2005), 255, 259.
human phenotypes that emerged from late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century science.\textsuperscript{11} Historians who follow this approach argue that ascribing racism to early New Englanders constitutes that scholarly anathema: an anachronism.\textsuperscript{12} However, English “attitudes, goals, and behavior in every major area of interaction with Indians,” coupled with colonial “assessments of bodies as superior or inferior,” led New Englanders to construct a “corporeal identity for themselves” that “was eventually comprehensible as racism.”\textsuperscript{13}

Scalp bounties played a powerful role in this process. New Englanders began offering bounties for killing wolves and other predatory animals in the 1630s.\textsuperscript{14} The difference that settlers began to emphasize between English and Indian bodies echoed William Wood’s observation that American wolves, too, were “different from them in other countries,” not only in looks but in how “these ravenous rangers” frequented colonial settlements attacking livestock and tearing English dogs to pieces.\textsuperscript{15} Bounties intended to encourage colonists “to destroy the wolves which are such ravenous cruel creatures,” a description New Englanders found equally apt for neighboring Indians.\textsuperscript{16} By 1640, Massachusetts offered up to forty shillings for killing a wolf, roughly the equivalent of a month’s wage for laborer.\textsuperscript{17} Such hefty rewards indicated the severity of the wolf problem: wolves and other predators that destroyed livestock and mastiffs threatened to undermine the progress of the English colonial project. The animals threatened

\textsuperscript{11} Chaplin, \textit{Subject Matter}, 21-22.
\textsuperscript{14} See Appendix A in this volume for a list of bounties offered by Massachusetts Bay, the first to record such a reward, beginning in 1630.
\textsuperscript{17} Shurtleff, \textit{MA Records}, dated 1640, quoted in McIntyre, \textit{War on the Wolf}, 30; wage comparison: McIntyre, 29.
settlers’ ability to tame their new environment, imperiling notions of English physical suitability for the New World. In response, colonists advocated using “all means” available “for the destruction of wolves.”\(^{18}\)

Colonies that offered bounties in exchange for the “head or heads of wolves,” soon created similar rewards for Indian heads and scalps.\(^{19}\) Rewards for predatory animals overlapped those offered for Indian scalps well into the eighteenth century.\(^{20}\) Legislators made explicit the similarity they saw between these animal and human predators by using the same terms of evidence for a kill: the head or the scalp.\(^{21}\) Bounties constructed Indians as predatory animals whose terrifying attacks on outlying settlements reduced English families to prey. The parallel implication – that such attacks would undermine English colonization – suggested Indians should be treated like other New World predators.

By equating Indian scalps with animal skins, bounties also increased settlers’ distance from their native neighbors “by equating Indians’ bodies with objects” that could now be bought and sold on a macabre market.\(^{22}\) Reducing humans to commodities replicated the slave trade and many colonial bounty acts outlined rewards for prisoners as well as scalps. But unlike eighteenth century New France, where the deliberate effort to encourage a slave trade depended upon alliance with some Amerindian peoples at the expense of others (whom the French bought as slaves), New England’s bounties encouraged indiscriminant Indian hunting (and hating). As commodities, scalps represented the complete subjugation and dehumanization of the individual

\(^{20}\) Compare Appendix A: Bounties on Wolves and Other Predators and Appendix B: Scalp Bounties, Massachusetts.
\(^{21}\) [Massachusetts], \textit{Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay}, ed. Massachusetts General Court (Boston: Wright & Potter, 1870), 2:88, 587, 843.
\(^{22}\) Chaplin, \textit{Subject Matter}, 225.
whose very soul became the property of the scalper and then the colonial government. As bounty offers drew colonists into the hunt for Indian scalps, this dismemberment reduced native peoples to “mere matter,” assuring the English of their physical superiority to their victims.

Although early English colonists never developed a coherent theory articulating generational inheritance of physical traits, they did produce a “racial identity” that posited “dominance” of innately superior European (English) bodies over Indian ones. This “racial idiom,” became reciprocally related to the scalp bounty system. As colonists grew convinced of their bodily superiority to Native Americans as they watched diseases devastate Native American communities, the analogy between Indians and prowling predators encouraged the English to physically dominate Indians they could not domesticate by hunting and destroying them. Encouraging colonists to scalp Amerindians reinforced emergent English concepts on human difference just as racial constructs buttressed the practice.

Scalps symbolized violence between people. They could also unite them. While scalping formed an integral part of American irregular warfare practices by the mid-eighteenth century, and became emblematic of anti-Indian violence and Indian hating, scalps continued to represent alliances and cooperation. By the seventeenth century, Native Americans brought scalps to their French allies to demonstrate continued military alliance as well as to obtain gifts and rewards. Indians served as soldiers in New England’s provincial forces, receiving wages in addition to bounties for scalps they redeemed. At the same time, Amerindian warriors continued.

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to scalp their victims in accordance with the enduring cultural and spiritual needs of their
communities, individual desire for status, and as resistance to colonial commercialization of the
practice. By the Revolutionary War, scalping had become a dynamic language of its own: a grim
commerce in meanings and body parts that characterized American-Indian relations into the late
nineteenth century.
CHAPTER II
Pre-encounter Cultural Frameworks

On October 13, 1535, Donnacona, leader of the Saint Lawrence valley Iroquoian village Stadacona, escorted Jacques Cartier to see “skins of five men's heads stretched upon wood [hoops] like skins of parchment.” Donnacona informed Cartier that the head skins belonged to five Toudamans [Micmacs] who lived to the South. Donnacona explained his people were constantly at war with the Toudamans, who had attacked their village only two years before killing men, women, and children. The villagers remembered that attack “bitterly” and pledged “vengeance” against their enemies, according to Cartier’s understanding.

Following this encounter, Cartier and his men returned to their ships and continued to trade with other villages along the Saint Lawrence River. The scalps, although noteworthy enough to make it into his records, warranted no further commentary from Cartier. Perhaps because of Cartier’s nonchalance, the earliest ethnographic account of scalping in northeastern North America went unnoticed as controversy erupted around the origins of the practice several centuries later.

Four major linguistic groups came to inhabit northeastern North America in the following century, each with its own history and practices regarding corporeal mutilation. Iroquoians, Algonquians,

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27 Most scholars now accept that Cartier’s “Toudamans” refers to Micmac Indians of what is now southeastern Canada and northeastern Maine.
French, and English viewed one another through the lenses of their cultural knowledge and experience. Cartier’s casual mention of the scalps, even his understanding of their meaning, reflects more than the dispassionate observations of an anthropologically curious world traveler. The French were familiar with corporeal mementoes – from trophies taken on the battlefield to relics taken from the corpses of saints – as were the English who settled along the Atlantic coast in the next century. Native Americans drew their own conclusions from Europeans’ corporeal trophy preferences and practices. This chapter describes the cultural knowledge and interpretations each group held regarding the body, dismemberment, and corporeal trophies during the early encounters in northeastern North America from 1450 through the 1500s.30

Archaeological and ethnographic evidence indicates Native North Americans practiced postmortem mutilation and took corporeal trophies as early as the Middle Woodland period (2390—1425 Years Before Present (YBP)).31 These practices were not limited to scalping. Algonquian and Iroquoian Indians removed digits, ears, hands, limbs, and heads as well as scalps throughout the early encounter


period. Despite Cartier’s apparent nonchalance concerning the practice, many early European accounts paid particular attention to scalping. While later writers frequently cited this and other Native American warfare customs as evidence of Indian barbarity and cruelty, such editorial comment appears less frequently in the earliest descriptions, many of which represent the author’s attempt to accurately describe their surroundings to those who had not made the journey. Later Europeans, more often the targets of such violence, exhibited more cultural bias.

Amerindian scalping methods varied from “total” removal of the skin of the head (sometimes including the face, ears and neck) to “partial” removal of the circle of flesh on the crown of the head. Scholars have attributed these variances practice to regional differences among indigenous groups. However, the circumstances and timeframes of many descriptions vary enough to suggest that Amerindian practices varied according to factors such as available time, proximity of other enemies and whether the scalping occurred in the heat of battle or after fighting had ended. While regional differences in scalping practices were noted:


33 Champlain’s descriptions of Algonquian practices along the St. Lawrence in the early 1600s provides one example. See: Samuel de Champlain, "Discovery of the Coast of the Almouchiquois as far as the Forty-Second Degree of Latitude," in Sailors’ Narratives of Voyages along the New England Coast, 1524-1624, ed. George Parker Winship, Burt Franklin Research Source Works Series (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968 [1905, 1605], reprint, American Classics in History and Social Science #30), 67-178; Joseph-François Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages amériquians, comparées aux moeurs des premiers temps, vol. 2 (Paris: Saugrain l’aîné, 1724), 14-17; 24-25; 246; 273-275 Early descriptions by the Jesuits varied with regard to scalping and postmortem mutilation. Some descriptions were veiled by what might be interpreted as the correspondents’ modesty and so lack explicit descriptions of violence since they were writing to their superiors in France. Others provide more specific descriptions of various postmortem practices.

34 Discussions of regional differences appear in: Georg Friederici, "Skalpieren," 105-115; Anastasia M. Griffin, "Friederici Translation," 140-154 Most later discussions of regional variation draw their conclusions from these sources. See: Georg K. Neumann, "Evidence for Scalping," 287-289; James Axtell and William C. Sturdevant, "Unkindest Cut," 458-468 A description of the form Neumann describes appears a 1703 letter from a French soldier taken captive by the Iroquois. The extent of flesh removed in this “total” scalping would facilitate dividing the trophy into smaller pieces – as Bougainville recounts in later wars (see E. P. Hamilton, ed., Adventure in the Wilderness: The American Journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 1756-1760 (Norman, OK: 1964), 142. But it does not match some of the descriptions of trophies taken by Iroquois at other locations and in other situations. Dubosq, the 1703 correspondent describes the practice as follows:
differences were real, considerations of circumstance probably created at least as much variation in observed practices.

Like many European misinterpretations of Native American behavior Cartier’s inference of the motive behind scalping – vengeance – says more about Cartier’s cultural context than Donnacona’s. The Iroquois display demonstrates not only the antiquity of these practices in northeastern North America, but the role they played in both inter-group conflict and alliance. The ritual treatment of trophies offers some of the best evidence for the importance of these practices in the cultural world of the groups who practiced them. Many northeastern Indians scraped and treated scalps that were then stretched and suspended in a hoop. This careful handling and the display suggest that more than vengeance undergirded these rituals. These factors also evidence a long history for the practices. By 1450, Iroquois practices differed in some ways from Algonquian customs, but in many ways there were striking similarities by the time these groups encountered Europeans. In fact, Cartier might just as easily have encountered scalps at an Iroquoian settlement further inland, or at some Algonquian villages south and east of Donnacona’s settlement at Stadacona.

“ Ils coupent la peau de la teste jusqu’à l’os en commençant au milieu du front, en tournant la main par derrière l’oreille en suivant de mesme jusqu’à l’endroit où ils ont commence.” Cyprien Tanguay, A Travers les Registres: Notes Recueillies par L’Abbe Cyprien Tanguay (Montreal: Cadieux & Derome, 1886), 94


36 Less evidence exists of scalping among coastal Algonquians pre-encounter. This may be due to several factors, not the least of which is a dearth of archeological research about the practice in this region. In light of this evidentiary gap, Friederici asserts that Algonquians in the St. Lawrence Valley, northern Maine and in the Delaware and Chesapeake Bay regions took scalps those in the rest of New England took heads but not scalps. While entirely possible, it seems highly unlikely that peoples surrounded by and probably intermarried with groups who practiced scalping would only have taken head trophies and not scalps. However, the combination of depopulation due to disease, regional burial practices, and heavy settlement early in the colonial period makes physical evidence scarce. For examples of beheading see: William S. Simmons, Cautantowwit's House: an Indian burial ground on the island of Conanicut in Narragansett Bay (Providence: Brown University Press, 1970), 54, 102, 106; William Scranton Simmons, Spirit of the New England Tribes: Indian History and Folklore (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 1986), 42, 128, 130, 140. For burial practices see: Dean Snow, "Late Prehistory of the East Coast," in Northeast, ed. Bruce G. Trigger, Handbook of North American Indians (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 58-69; Dean Snow, "Eastern Abenaki," 137-147; Dean Snow, Archaeology of New England, ed. James Griffin, New World Archaeological Record Series (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 34, 291-298. The presence of similar cultural institutions (see below) makes scalping likely, though hard to confirm except among the Micmac and other groups who directly bordered on Iroquoian regions. According to Bruce Trigger, the Stadaconans were less dependent upon horticulture than were Iroquoians in the New York and Great Lakes region. To the degree that they were more mobile and more dependent on hunting and fishing than were these western and southern Iroquoian cousins, they resembled the northern Algonquians such as the Micmac (with whom Donnacona reports regular warfare). See Bruce G. Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660, 2 vols., vol. I
The scalps Cartier saw evidenced the longstanding enmity between the Laurentian Iroquoians and the Algonquian Micmacs. These groups shared many warfare practices, a convergence that emerged over time through intercultural contact and conflict in which “mutual bloodshed and brutality evolved to constitute a shared language and praxis, at once symbolic and concrete.”37 A similar situation existed in Europe, where French and English armies used similar tactics and developed parallel trophy-taking practices on the battlefield as well as similar corporeal and even capital punishment sentences for crimes such as theft and treason.

Both Iroquoians and Algonquians removed limbs, particularly arms, as a variety of ethnographic and archaeological sources document. Both groups removed heads as well. However, evidence of pre-encounter practices is more available for some regions and groups than for others. Archaeological material is particularly degraded in areas that became intensely settled in the colonial period and later, or that are exposed to extensive water damage.38 Although the ethnographic material to date has argued that the maritime Algonquians did not practice scalping, their northern and eastern linguistic cousins certainly did and it is difficult to know whether the scant evidence for scalping in this region before the late 1500s is due to poor archaeological evidence, incompletely informed investigation (many of the remains that would now provide evidence of scalping have been repatriated before modern techniques for deciphering the practice could be used), or an actual absence of the practice among these groups.39 In light of the cultural context of the practice among neighboring groups, the complete absence of the practice seems unlikely but not entirely impossible, as conflict in the region seems minor before the appearance of

(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), 179-181 Even with these different subsistence patterns, the Stadaconans seem to have retained many of the cultural traits of other Iroquoians regarding corporeal mutilation, so far as is ascertainable in current records.  
39 The systematic archaeological study of Iroquoian scalping practices by Ron Williamson has no parallel in the northeastern Algonquian region, in part because many of the remains were discovered in the nineteenth century and have since been repatriated. Few drawings and even fewer photographs remain of the artifacts that would permit such a study.
Europeans on the Atlantic shores. Palisaded villages, suggesting regular raiding or warfare patterns, appear in these areas only in the post-encounter period. 40

Many Native Americans, Iroquoians and Algonquians among them, practiced secondary burial, meaning that communities disinterred previously buried remains and placed them, often years later, in a new gravesite. Absent decisive evidence of ancestor worship, it is difficult to make an argument that these (often mass) reburials constituted trophies, or that they received extensive individual veneration beyond the secondary interment. Such burial practices certainly involved some corporeal disarticulation, but differ significantly from dismemberment for the sake of the importance of the parts (rather than the whole). Individuals who reburied their kin clearly intended to transport entire corpses to the new location without preference for individual body parts. Thus, the primary context for bodily trophies for both Algonquians and Iroquoians in pre-encounter northeastern America was warfare.41 As trophies, body parts acquired a ritual significance upon their removal. The cultural variation between Iroquoian and Algonquian peoples suggests that the nuanced understanding of the rituals differed somewhat, but held important parallel themes.

The presence of enemy scalps evidenced the accomplishment of a raid but its meaning went beyond simple tit-for-tat vengeance. It was rooted in notions of reciprocity that bound Iroquoian society together, in addition to offering both women and men within Iroquoian society an opportunity to demonstrate, or even improve, their status. Those warriors who took scalps or captives demonstrated their honorable enactment of the idealized male gender roles and in the context of mourning war fulfilled reciprocal obligations of their kin, clan, and gender by replacing lost members of the community either physically with captives or spiritually through scalps.42

41 By contrast, Ron Williamson argues that intact heads uncovered in refuse piles can be interpreted as trophy heads precisely because there is not history of ancestor worship existed in the region. See: Ron Williamson, "Otinontsiskiak ondaon," 201-202.
42 For the importance of scalps to individual status see: Anastasia M. Griffin, "Friederici Translation," 137-139; Georg Friederici, "Skalpieren," 102-105.
By the sixteenth century, both Iroquoians and Algonquians appear to have practiced what historians identify as mourning war. Warfare that predated the formation of the Iroquois League sometime between the mid- to late fifteenth century and the end of the sixteenth century has furnished some of the richest archaeological evidence of postmortem mutilation in the northeast. Entrances to palisaded villages were often adorned with the heads or scalps of enemies, evidence of warfare that is further supported by discarded human bones found randomly scattered throughout the compounds and suggesting prisoner torture, cannibalism, and corporeal trophies. Caches of bones that include human remains are found scattered around settlement sites. Cups, bowls and rattles carefully crafted from human crania are among the deposits. Some of these artifacts appear, in the earliest settlements, to have functioned as gorgets (medallions strung for wear around the neck, presumably of high-status individuals). Numerous human burials provide evidence of both dismemberment and scalping.

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45 Ron Williamson asserted that the pre-encounter, pre-League period represents the historic height of postmortem mutilation practices in greater Iroquoia. See Ron Williamson, "Otinontsiskiaj ondaon," 217. Because postmortem mutilation was most commonly practiced in its more aggressive forms – the removal of a limb, head or scalp rather than a digit or an ear – on victims of attack (either by individuals, small groups, or more organized war parties, as I will discuss below), the victims were only rarely interred. To receive burial, the victim would have to be retrieved by their own tribe, brought to the village or settlement and buried there – often in a location remote from the regular burial site or cemetery, since their death, like victims of drowning, was considered traumatic and therefore spiritually dangerous. Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791; the original French, Latin, and Italian texts, with English translations and notes 72 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows Brothers, 1896), i:241-291, (hereafter: JR). Therefore, only a small percentage of the victims of such practices would have been interred. Still fewer of these burials are likely to be found and properly excavated by trained archaeologists sensitive to the significance of such finds, see: Ron Williamson, "Otinontsiskiaj ondaon," 215-217; Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., JR, i: 241-291; Regina Flannery, An Analysis of Coastal Algonquian Culture, Catholic Univeristy of America, Anthropological Series, vol.
Both Algonquian and Iroquoian societies were structured by status, age, and gender. Individuals attained initial status within the society through mastery of gender roles. Warfare provided men the opportunity to acquire status.  

Society rested on a fundamental dualism between sexes but echoed throughout Iroquoian society in a series of social categories. The social categories – clans, moieties, and nations – held reciprocal obligations to one another within the confederacy. These duties centered on “ceremonial gift giving and mutual ritual duties – particularly involving mourning and funerals – analogous to those of families on opposite sides of a longhouse.”

Mourning war exercised the rule of reciprocity across the akatöĂ·ni, or male line. Loss of any individual demanded replacement, "which was the obligation, not of his house-hold ([female] lineage), but of the akatöĂ·ni, an obligation [of]… offspring who were … duty bound to their father's lodge to which otherwise they were strangers. The matron of a lodge could force these persons to go to war to make up the loss or she could keep them at home to prevent further losses." The matron operated as the senior woman of a hearth identified with the male lineage, not her matrilineal clan. "If the matron decided to "raise up the tree" (replace the lost individual) …she spoke through a wampum belt to a war leader related to her household as akatöĂ·ni asking him to form a war party. Accepting the belt was his


This form of warfare divided Iroquoian peoples in the centuries before encounters with Europeans, and it is just this widespread warfare that the Iroquois League was designed to curtail. The Condolence Ritual, a central part of the rituals that kept the League alive, combined with reciprocal gifts and the Requickening rituals created what Daniel Richter has termed a “mourning-peace” by addressing some of the same grief, reciprocity, and replacement needs within the societies that it joined. While the ultimate prizes in a mourning war raid were prisoners, a scalp could be received in their place.

Among Iroquoians, mourning war did not end with the Good News of Peace and Power that created the Iroquois League, or with the creation of the Huron Confederacy to the West. Instead the focus of the violence shifted beyond linguistic cousins and onto their neighbors. League members struck both Iroquoian and Algonquian groups but preferred the former as shared cultural and linguistic traditions made captive assimilation easier. League formation and the concomitant redirection of Iroquoian occurred on the eve of encounter with Europeans and by the time of regular interaction with settlers constituted a well established pattern.

Mourning war structured larger organized violence, but not all external aggression. While a raid conducted by ten to one hundred men might be typical of a mourning war tactic, individual or smaller-party attacks also occurred. “… [S]ome warrior bent on glory might initiate the action by circulating a [wampum] belt without revealing his purpose ... This kind of engagement was known in the literature as "private" or "little war," as opposed to "general" or "public war," which was sanctioned by the council and done in the name of the nation.” Small bands of men might engage in such an attack as a means of aggrandizing their status within the group, or for reasons of reciprocal obligation that did not meet the demands of the larger society. In both mourning and little wars, “[e]ither the Old Men or the

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50 William N. Fenton, "N. Iroquoian," 315, citing Lafitau, see: Joseph-François Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages amériquians, comparées aux moeurs des premiers temps, 164.
51 Daniel K. Richter, Ordeal, 39-40.
52 External aggression refers to aggression beyond the society of which the aggressor is a member, in this case, beyond the village or the local tribe. Here I am following Dean Snow, Iroquois, 32.
initiating matron could recall a war party, but this had to be done with deference to the pride of those engaged.\textsuperscript{54} Such a limit demonstrates the degree to which warfare was linked to personal and family status, and perhaps suggests the difficulty for village and tribal elders in controlling the actions of younger men – something that would become particularly troublesome to relations with the Europeans who would settle in North America in the later centuries.

Among the northernmost Algonquian groups, hunting and warfare also provided the templates for masculinity, and not surprisingly, the most well known Micmac legends surround Gluskap, the mighty warrior who disappeared after teaching the Micmac the arts of hunting and warfare and who also gave the “the beaver his tail and the frog his voice.”\textsuperscript{55} Algonquian social organization, though fluid, was also predominantly patriarchal and leadership was patrilineal, though many non-elites may not have traced their heredity through the father.\textsuperscript{56} Sachemship, rather than clan, was the most common political category. The sagamore was usually “the eldest son of some powerful family and consequently also its chief and leader.”\textsuperscript{57} Each sagamore controlled a portion of territory, and positive relations with other leaders were maintained through hospitality and gift exchange. Inter-sachem disputes were cause for diplomacy, and while minor conflicts might be decided by a wrestling match (even between sagamores), more serious offenses, such as murder, could result in an attack or even war launched by the nearest relatives.\textsuperscript{58} This pattern is recognizable as mourning war, but could be avoided by presenting adequate gifts. Among Micmac, in a manner that echoes what we know about Iroquoian initiations of war, elder women could demand an attack so that the young men could garner the “reward, honor and renown” that

\textsuperscript{54} William N. Fenton, "N. Iroquoian," 315.
\textsuperscript{57} Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., \textit{JR}, 3: 87.
\textsuperscript{58} Philip K. Bock, "Micmac," 116.
accompanied the acquisition of scalps. Then as with Iroquois, women both dismembered captives and adorned themselves with scalps upon their return.\textsuperscript{59}

The scalp’s importance built on the adaptability of hair to deploy status. It could denote mourning, as when a Western Abenaki mother cut her hair after the death of a child. Hair style also reflected marital status. Newly married women in southern New England cut off the long hair that had veiled her face before marriage and wore a head covering until it grew back.\textsuperscript{60} Young men were not permitted to wear their hair long until they had successfully completed their vision quest – an ordeal of initiation into manhood which required fasting, loss of sleep, solitude and ritual drinks which may have been hallucinogenic.\textsuperscript{61} Married Abenaki men wore hair in “coil or knot on the crown of the head held by a thong.”\textsuperscript{62} This would have approximated a scalp lock and having attained married status, this man would have already proved himself in hunting and warfare.

The scalp lock itself was a wide spread characteristic of northeastern tribes.\textsuperscript{63} Men in most, though not all, Algonquian groups wore the hair at the crown of their head in a special braid or coil, particularly in times of war. This scalp lock was often adorned with beads, feathers, and other articles of power that identified deeds and perhaps even visions of the Manitou, or spiritual force, that were particular to the individual wearer. Describing his encounter with the Indians of the Saco River, Samuel Champlain noted that they shaved much of their head “and wear what remains very long, which they comb and twist behind in various ways

\textsuperscript{62} Gordon Day, "Western Abenaki," 154.
very neatly, intertwined with feathers which they attach to the head.”  

Martin Pring noted that Indians around Plymouth Harbor “weare their haire brayded in foure parts, and trussed vp about their heads with a knot behind: in which haire of theirs they sticke many feathers and toyes for brauerie and pleasure.” The “feathers” and “toyes” represented the individual’s specific deeds, political affinities, or association with spiritual forces.

Among those who knew or had traded with an individual, the scalp lock would have been specific to its owner and upon removal would have named the precise identity of the victim. As a male hairstyle, this lock demonstrated not only the deeds but the bravery of the wearer. Rather than cut the hair on the crown of the head short, the warrior who donned the scalplock flouted his enemy. It was an embodiment of courage and daring in a region where many men sought to evidence their own bravery through the corporeal trophy, particularly one so laden with cultural and personal meaning, for not only did the scalp lock denote the status of its wearer, it could enhance the status of the young man who removed it. His status, in turn would be embodied in a change in his own hairstyle.

The cultural emphasis northeastern Native Americans placed on hair, particularly that at the crown of the head, presents a poignant intersection between biology and culture. Emphasis on growing a scalp lock to exhibit status and masculinity presupposes that indigenous men had hair that continued to grow throughout their lifetimes. In other words, the cultural conditioning assumed that most Amerindian men did not lose that hair as a result of what we now call “Male Pattern Baldness” (androgenic alopecia). Men who lost their hair as a result of such genetic condition would presumably have experienced a

64 Samuel de Champlain, “Discovery of the Coast of the Almouchiquois as far as the Forty-Second Degree of Latitude,” 75.
disadvantage in terms of status display. Current genetic research demonstrates that Native American men are actually less likely to go bald than men of European descent.67

Hairstyle was all the more important because of the head it rested upon. Most Algonquian groups for whom there is substantial ethnographic material express a belief in a dual soul. One soul, located in the heart, was “the animating force of every individual.”68 The second soul, in Micmac the skadegamutc, among the Narragansett the cowwéwonck, was the dream soul, and located in the head, giving increased significance to the scalp. The dream soul was said to wander about while the body slept. It was this soul that would pass to the southwest to live in a bliss described as “Elysium … a kinde of Paradise.”69 Only “good men” could enter this paradise. “Bad men” who might “knocke at [the] doore” were turned away and told to “Walke abroad … so that they wander in restles want and penury.”70 But bad men were not the only ones denied a blissful afterlife.

Different burial customs for those who experienced particular forms of death suggest that the manner of demise may in some way determine one’s admission to the southwestern paradise. Drowning victims often received different treatment. Among the Huron (Iroquoian) they received bundle burials,

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69 Wilson D. Wallis and Ruth Sawtell Wallis, *The Micmac Indians of Eastern Canada*, pp. 151-152; John Josselyn, *An Account of two voyages to New-England wherein you have the setting out of a ship, with the charges, the prices of all necessaries for furnishing a planter and his family at his first coming, a description of the country, natives, and creatures, with their merchantile and physical use, the government of the country as it is now possessed by the English, &c., a large chronological table of the most remarkable passages, from the first discovering of the continent of America, to the year 1673*, Reproduction of original in Huntington Library (London: Printed for Giles Widdows, 1674), 95-96, cited in Kathleen J. Bragdon, *Native People Southern NE*, 190-191, 204; Roger Williams, *Key into the Language*, 130. Quotation: William Wood, "New Englands Prospect: A true, lively, and experimentall description of that part of America, commonly called New England: discovering the state of that countrie, both as it stands to our new-come English planters; and to the old native inhabitants: Laying downe that which may both enrich the knowledge of the mind-travelling reader, or benefit the future voyager," in *Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership* (University of Michigan, 2005 [1634], accessed 3 November 2009), available from http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?type=simple;rgn=div2;c=eebo;cc=eebo;idno=A15685.0001.001, 94.
70 Edward Winslow, "Good nevves from New-England: or A true relation of things very remarkable at the plantation of Plimoth in Nevv-England. Shewing the wondrous providence and goodness of God, in their preservation and continuance, being delivered from many apparrant deaths and dangers. Together with a relation of such religious and civill lawes and customes, as are in practise amongst the Indians, adjoyning to them at this day. As also what commodities are there to be rayzed for the maintenance of that and other plantations in the said country," in *Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership* (University of Michigan, 2001 [1624], accessed 3 November 2009), available from http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A15591.0001.001, 53.
while the Micmac (Algonquian) custom included burning a portion of their body in sacrifice to powerful spiritual forces. Failure to perform proper burial in this and other instances could have calamitous effects on the entire community.\textsuperscript{71}

Breaking a taboo surrounding death propped open the door between life and death and prevented the soul from fully leaving this world. In the case of an enemy, dismemberment may have helped to prevent the soul from entirely leaving the mortal plane, preventing departure for the southwestern paradise.

Crows were often associated with the head, and head imagery appeared in a variety of art forms that survive from the pre-encounter periods.\textsuperscript{72} Effigy heads adorned pipes and necklaces throughout the region. Among the Narragansett Cautantow wit, a divinity often represented by the boundary-crossing crow who brought the beans and seeds “from the Creator’s garden” and with them the gentle rains and breezes of spring, had dominance over birth and death.\textsuperscript{73} In a world in which the body was the canvas for cultural expression through ritual, the head provided a particularly prominent location to illustrate status. This was sometimes done through the adornment of a coronet, as on sachem, but even among the non-elite, the head provided evidence of status – from position in the social hierarchy to marriage, to widowhood.\textsuperscript{74}

As prestigious trophies, the head and scalp received ritual treatment. Artisans transformed skulls into bowls, rattles, and gorgets or pendants.\textsuperscript{75} Scalps with their hair and insignia were stretched on hoops or attached to poles for display or participation in dance ceremonies. The scalps Cartier saw during his

\textsuperscript{71} For the Huron burials of drowning victims see Ron Williamson, "Otinontsiskiaj ondaon," 199. The Micmac account appears by Jouvency in Thwaites, JR I:267. A similar account, supposedly of Iroquois practices and attributed to VanderDuck appears in Francis Parkman, Notes on the Indians, 1845, Francis Parkman Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.


\textsuperscript{73} William S. Simmons, Cautantow wit's House, 62.

\textsuperscript{74} Dean Snow, "Eastern Abenaki," 140.

\textsuperscript{75} Ron Williamson, "Otinontsiskiaj ondaon," 201-203.
meeting with Donnacona evidenced both the long history of trophy taking among the Laurentian Iroquoians and the deep enmity between them and their Algonquian neighbors. The cultural depth of the practice appears in the ritualized treatment of the scalps. Donnacona and the Laurentian Iroquois of Stadacona had vanished by Cartier’s return to the region. The circumstances of their disappearance are still debated. Perhaps their Micmac neighbors drove them away through constant warfare. Perhaps European diseases, borne on fishing vessels or even Cartier’s own, eroded the settlements. Whatever the reasons, Iroquoian-Algonquian rivalry did not fade with them. Instead it became a dynamic force that would shape the relations among native and colonial powers into the following centuries, as the Iroquois League turned its war-making powers outward attacking both Algonquian rivals and other Iroquoian speakers. Europeans both shaped and were influenced by these practices during the centuries of encounter and colonization in North America.
Figure 1: Unknown Adena Artist, *Engraved Skull Gorget*, Early Woodland Period, courtesy of the Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, image number AL07351 (above).

European men and women who traveled to North America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought their own cultural templates for corporeal dismemberment. Body parts performed a variety of functions in Europe that influenced French and English interpretations of and participation in mutilation practices in North America. Perhaps due to the universality of the human form, and confusing cross-cultural communication even further, Europeans prized many of the same body parts, yet the meaning they extended to their removal differed in significant ways. Throughout the Middle Ages and into the early modern period, corporeal semiotics intertwined religious and secular hierarchies into a metaphor representing social structure.

The ecclesiastic model portrayed the Church as unified under Christ as its head. Likewise, the governing nobility ranked highest in the social world. The king, as head of government relied on elite representatives – judges or provincial governors – as his eyes, ears, and mouth. The analogy cast the hands, second in rank, as enacting the work directed by the head. As the clergy did Christ’s handiwork by conferring blessings and performing rites, so the officers and soldiers in the king’s service performed the will of the head of state. Lower body parts, such as the stomach or feet, aligned to the lower ranks of society.

This corporeal template guided judicial punishments by enacting the state’s power on the appropriate parts of criminals’ bodies. Serious crimes warranted disfigurement in manners and loci that reflected the individual’s loss of social standing -- as in the case of a lawyer convicted of seditious libel who lost his ears, or the adulterer who lost his nose. In these instances, the

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77 Susan Dwyer Amussen, "Punishment, Discipline, and Power: The Social Meanings of Violence in Early Modern England," *Journal of British Studies*, 34, no. 1 (1995), 7. Branding a living offender was common and Amussen links it to the humiliation punishments such as dunking. Occasionally the removed ears (and less commonly, hands) became significant in their own right: as when they were nailed to a tree in the market square. From the Customall (custom book) of the town of Lydd in Kent many historians have studied this passage:
punishment constructed the victim as his own spectacle; his crime permanently evidenced on his body.

For those sentenced to death, their social status determined the method. Because non-aristocrats lacked status they also lacked symbolic heads and therefore did not qualify for beheading. As a legal punishment beheading symbolically removed rank by removing the ability of a noble to wear a crown. Members of the lower classes never had this social right, and thus were hanged rather than subjected to “poena capitis . . . ‘punishment of the head’ -- capital punishment.”\(^78\) This made beheading “the preferred and most prestigious mode of execution.”\(^79\) Paradoxically, the very denial of social status actually confirmed the victim's (prior) nobility; an effect rendered all the more potent when the heads were displayed, as was often done in cases of executed traitors.\(^80\) Although intended as a preventative measure, the exhibition provided relatives of the deceased an opportunity to claim their own augmented social status. A physician from Basel, visiting London in the late sixteenth century, noted:

> At the top of one tower almost in the centre of the bridge, were stuck on tall stakes more than thirty skulls of noble men who had been executed and beheaded for treason and for other reasons. And their descendants are accustomed to boast of this, themselves even pointing out to one their ancestors' heads on this same bridge, believing that they will be esteemed the more because their antecedents were of such high descent that they could

> "... if ony be founde cuttyng purses or pikeyng purses or other smale thynes, lynnyn, wollen or other goodes, of lyttyle value, within the francheise, att the sute of the party, [he] be brought in to the high strete, and ther his ere naylyd to a post, or to a cart whele, and to him shalbe take a knyffe in hand. And he shall make fyne to the towne, and after forswere in the towne, never to come ayene. And he be found after, doyng in lyke wise, he thanme to lose his other ere. And he be found the thirde tyme, beryng tokynge of his ii eris lost, or els other signe by which he is knowene a theffe, at sute of party be he jugged [judged] to deth."


even covet the crown, but being too weak to attain it were executed for rebels; thus they make an honour for themselves of what was set up to be a disgrace and an example.\textsuperscript{81}

Executions might demonstrate state power but, as this example illustrates, the interpretation of that power could remain contested and imprecise.\textsuperscript{82}

By the late medieval and early modern period executions migrated into the public sphere. Once private occurrences, aristocratic beheadings became theatrical spectacles full of elaborate staging that interwove dramatic representations of punishment in the theater to the “real-life equivalent . . . at Tyburn or Tower Hill.”\textsuperscript{83} The increased stagecraft in executions shifted the emphasis from the nature of the crime – burning the entrails of someone labeled as an “incendiary,” for instance – to the power of the monarch: a move that seems to have occurred in concert with the dramatization of the execution rituals.\textsuperscript{84} Where earlier corporeal punishment marked the body of the criminal with the nature of his or her crime, by the late medieval, and certainly by the early modern period, the corporeal disfigurement marked the body with royal power, often in ways that still recognized the nature of the alleged offense. As demonstrations of power and victory over the treasonous intentions of the criminals, early modern executions replicated the slaying of enemies in combat, albeit in a more controlled atmosphere.

Heads had a long history as trophies on the European battlefield, where they were removed and “… frequently sent to the king or displayed in the city as a symbol of military


\textsuperscript{82}Susan Dwyer Amussen, "Punishment, discipline, and power," 2.

\textsuperscript{83}The clearest articulation of this argument appears in Margaret Owens, "Dismemberment and Decapitation," especially Chapter 3, and her book resulting from this study: Margaret Owens, \textit{Stages of Dismemberment}, 144-186. See also: Michel Foucault, \textit{Discipline and Punish}, trans., Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), especially Part I, 3-16.

victory.”85 By the end of the fifteenth century, this practice was familiar to inhabitants of the European world. In the semiotics of European warfare, “The display of the head serves as a striking, unmistakable icon signifying not only the defeat and demise of the victim but, more crucially, the loss or transfer of political power that is consolidated through this act of violence.”86 The political implication of this interpretation, in combination with the projection of certain forms of violence onto allegedly monstrous opponents, would especially impact the English understanding of similar violence in the North American context.

As the English monarchs attempted to gain greater presence and control over Ireland in the sixteenth century, grisly trophies of Irish heads became common battlefield items. The English rhetoric behind efforts to colonize Ireland in the sixteenth century employed two sets of ideas. Contending that such practices were Irish rather than English, “the savagery of the native Irish and, in particular, their predilection for severing heads, [was] repeatedly asserted, not only in the texts of conquest, but in representations of the ‘Wild Irish.’”87 Images of warring Irish holding heads of their enemies combined with theatre from the era to indicate essential Irish barbarity.88

Yet, in a contradiction comprehensible only within the logic of wartime demonization of the enemy, “far from being merely the aberrant practice of the barbarous Gaels, beheading — and a form of judicial headhunting — became a cornerstone of the conquerors' policy of martial law.”89 The attempt by the English to distance themselves from the alleged barbarity of the Irish, and thus to legitimate their conquest of the island, helped them hone the discourse of savagery versus civility that was underscored by the Renaissance humanist ideas that encouraged the

85 Katherine Royer, "Body in Parts," 324.
86 Katherine Royer, "Body in Parts," 119.
88 Margaret Owens, Stages of Dismemberment, 153-156.
89 Patricia Palmer, ""An headless ladie and Ahorses loade of heades": Writing the Beheading," 25.
perception of certain practices as degraded and savage. The escalation of violence in Ireland in the latter half of the sixteenth century and into the seventeenth coincided with increased English colonial efforts in the New World, and influenced settlers’ practices and their understanding of Indian modes of conflict once hostilities arose.

Religious differences emerging from the Reformation catalyzed the renewed English interest in Ireland and concurrently led to warfare on the continent. In France particularly, this violence was exacerbated by the blood feud for which it provided new legitimacy. The feud was a widespread social ritual in much of Europe, often associated with medieval aristocratic culture. New studies propose that this custom escalated in sixteenth century France as the weakness of the monarchy combined with the challenges to social order offered by the Renaissance and Protestantism. Under the guise of the Wars of Religion, “blood taking and revenge in old feuds [became] a legitimate activity.”90 Feuds, in turn, intensified religious animosity and violence. The feud was restricted to nobles because it fundamentally involved a dispute over customary entitlements, often property rights, but was linked rooted in honor and the preservation of reputation and status.91 Entwined, as it often was, with the customary right to wage war, the feud could often engulf the countryside in combat as each group mobilized its subordinates.92 Because the feud aimed to protect familial honor and entitlements, humiliation of the opponent played an important role. While feuds might look like many things -- murder, assassination, legal suits, and civil war, to name a few -- “humiliation and bodily mutilation [were] closely linked.”93 Slitting the throat and removing the eyes of a corpse were common manifestations of

91 Stuart Carroll, Blood and Violence, chapter 2.
feud violence. “Trophies could be posted as a warning to others. The lackeys of the Marquis d'Arcy dressed up and shaved their victim, dragged him to the door of the village church, tore off his royal insignia; then, like a scalp, they mounted his moustache at the gateway to their master's residence.” The rise of such ritualized violence, in which each killing “… create[d] a ‘debt’ paid off by retaliatory violence, only to place the other side in the position of debtors,” set up a enduring cycle of violence in which delayed retribution preserved the ‘debt’ thereby heightening the tension between the groups. This system linked one family’s honor with the destruction or humiliation of the other group. Only a settlement of the initial claim – righting the original wrong – could end the violence.

The system of the feud held enough in common with mourning war in North America to appear similar. In fact, the two systems were quite different. Mourning war, while it might take advantage of regional rivalries, like that between the Iroquois League and the Hurons, or between Iroquoians and Algonquians, did not necessarily single out another group as the sole or primary focus of violence. Who was attacked was less important than that it resulted in captives or trophies like scalps. The European feud focused on the reparation and maintenance of honor and with it social and economic status. Native American mourning war aimed at repairing a loss of a different kind, namely a family’s loss of an individual member and their spiritual position in both the family and the larger society. Control over property or other rights was not the aim. The honor or status operative in the mourning war did at times have an entrepreneurial aspect like some of the situations that created conflicts in the changing social world of renaissance Europe, and sometimes that entrepreneurship was individual, as in the case of younger men who

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sought to prove themselves in warfare. Both could mobilize larger segments of the population and engulf the countryside in warfare. Yet despite their apparent similarities, the mourning war and the feud had different aims linked to their different social contexts. The feud was necessarily cyclical and was aimed at advancing or sustaining one group’s claims and status within the larger social context. Mourning war was not necessarily cyclical in principle, was limited in its aims, and was not in itself aimed at advancing the social placement or power of one group relative to others. The feud could be reconciled through the remedy of the initial claim. Although this usually required the mediation of the Church, there was such an external institution that (at least until the Reformation) both parties could accept. In the North American context, while the Iroquois League and the Huron and Wabanaki confederations limited mourning war among their members, there was no external authority that might limit the mourning war itself. Furthermore, because the motivation for mourning war arose from untimely death of community members, there was no one factor that could end the practice as unfortunate fatalities occurred in every generation and society.

Feuds and formal warfare were not the only forms of violence that resulted in postmortem dismemberment in the name of religious animosity in early modern Europe. Corpse desecration and mutilation are more commonly associated with rites of popular violence during the Wars of Religion. Both Protestant and Catholic crowds, comprised primarily of common people but also including notables, lawyers, and clerics, launched attacks. Huguenot mobs, although they occasionally assaulted lay persons, tended to focus their violence on members of the Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy and objects they reviled as idols.97 Catholics, however,

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were the “champions” in bloodshed, due to their numerical superiority in the population and especially their theological position toward the body.98 Where Protestants sought to root out pollution evidenced in iconography or the person of the clergy, Catholic violence “drew on a set of legitimizing rites and rituals, drawn from popular festivities, liturgical practices, official executions, and folk justice, to purify the community of heresy.”99 Catholic “sense of the persons of heretics as sources of danger and defilement” meant that “injury and murder were a preferred method of purifying the body social.”100 Thorough decontamination did not stop at the victim’s death, however: the corpse faced further punishment. This too, was primarily a Catholic, rather than Protestant, practice and was linked to theological differences between the groups and the implications these had for the body after death.

While Protestants cruelly tortured their victims, especially priests, before death, they “paid little attention to them when they were dead.”101 Catholics, on the other hand, frequently mutilated Huguenot bodies. “Burning and drowning heretical corpses … was not enough.”102 In addition to throwing the bodies to dogs, or dragging them through the streets, “the genitalia and internal organs [were] cut away, which were then hawked through the city in a ghoulish commerce.”103 The mode of sale suggests they were purveyed for their oddity. “Five pence for a Huguenot liver!” was advertised at Villeneuve d’Avignon in 1561 in a manner resembling the sale of exotic goods.104

Protestant disinterest in their victims’ corpses reflected their theological “rejection of Purgatory” and their belief that immediately after death the soul experienced either “Christ’s
presence or the torments of the damned.”¹⁰⁵ This contrasted with Catholic rituals that centered on the body’s continued importance after death. In Catholic belief prayers for the dead, centered at the burial site, increased the soul’s prospects in the afterlife and ensured its speedy progress through Purgatory. Proper burial helped to guarantee this as well, but the propriety of burial sometimes lay in the eyes of the beholder.

Throughout the Middle Ages, European nobles requested the division of their corpse upon their death. The reasons behind these requests coupled concerns for their soul with an exercise of their worldly status. The widespread post-mortem bodily division among the aristocracy “allowed a patron to support a number of institutions by leaving parts of his or her body to be buried in each.”¹⁰⁶ Bequeathing one’s body parts to different institutions allowed the individual to demonstrate the extent of their social status before death.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, the specific locations within a church assigned for burial of an individual or their body part arranged the corpses in an even more specific geography of rank, with the “most sought-after spots nearest the altar. These were filled by members of the clergy and the upper echelons of local society. This was decided not just in terms of local standing, but ensured by the prohibitive cost of such sites.”¹⁰⁸

But due to the cultural perceptions regarding the body and its parts this support was rarely perceived as equal among the recipients. “[T]he hierarchical concept of the body resulted in sensitivities amongst the receiving institutions; few were happy to ‘receive those parts of the body which were lower in the physical hierarchy, and more closely associated with appetite, vice

¹⁰⁵ Natalie Zemon Davis, Society and Culture, 179.
¹⁰⁶ Pamela Graves, "Images, Punishment, Personhood," 43.
and disease.”109 While “the head remained the official site of the burial of the person,” the heart, understood as the “seat of piety” was often bequeathed to “institutions to which the donor felt particularly devoted.”110 These practices attained the height of their popularity throughout Europe between 1500 and 1800, this practice both emulated the longstanding veneration of saints’ remains even as the Reformation encouraged the rejection of pilgrimages and other practices associated with hagiolatry.111

Prior to the Reformation, the veneration of bodily relics in the cult of saints meant the dismemberment and dispersal of a saint’s body parts across Europe. Despite a papal bull issued by Pope Boniface VIII in 1299, these practices not only continued but expanded after the thirteenth century. These scattered relics provided destination sites for pilgrims and enriched these locations with sacred power. Shrines holding the head or hand of a particular saint were especially important.112 “In the veneration of Saints and relics, the body had a major part to play as a signifier, commodity, object of worship and source of magical power.”113 Through relics, deceased saints retained power in the world of the living. “Saints could effect conversion through their relics” in addition to curing the sick and enhancing fertility.114 Bodily division played an important role in medieval Christian worship, but the division between Catholic magic and Protestant religion that has previously been made is an artificial one.115

112 Pamela Graves, "Images, Punishment, Personhood," 43-44.
114 Margaret Owens, *Stages of Dismemberment*, 41.
115 In *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, Keith Thomas argues that by devaluing “the miracle-working aspect of religion and elevating the importance of the individual’s faith” Protestantism redefined “religion as a belief rather than a practice.” Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (New York: Scribner's 1971), 76. Subsequent scholarly work has emphasized the lived nature of religion, and tends to focus on practices rather than (contradictory
Despite their disparagement of the veneration of saints as magic and a theological position that denied Purgatory, Protestant rejection of the corpse’s power was not complete. While they trimmed the branches of divinity to emphasize a single God without attendant saints and angels, the lived practices of Protestantism reflected the deep cultural resonance in the power of the body even after death. While the practice of bodily division was particularly widespread in Catholic France, forms of the practice continued even in Protestant England. A “list of prominent Elizabethans whose hearts were extracted for separate interment” would include “Blanche Parry (d. 1589), Sir Martin Frobisher (d. 1594), Sir John Puckering (d. 1596), Elizabeth I (d. 1603), George Clifford, earl of Cumberland (d. 1605), and Thomas Sackville (d. 1608),” attesting to the cultural depth of the practice in spite of theological arguments against it.116

The complexity of European attitudes toward the body traversed the Atlantic with explorers and colonists. French explorers, fur traders and missionaries brought the cultural framework of hagiolatry and its practices of relic veneration and corporeal division to their encounter with Native Americans. English, especially the Puritans of the early colonial northeast, in their disdain for the veneration of saints, emphasized the relationship between corporeal mutilation and government power. Both understood the body and its division as a powerful symbol with a role in warfare and contests for power. The difference in emphasis, a temporal separation in the initial settlements, in addition to the different demographics of the settlers exaggerated the distance between their actions and interpretations throughout the period of encounter in North America.

116 Margaret Owens, "Dismemberment and Decapitation," 155.
CHAPTER III

“[T]heir great friend [will] make war on their enemies,”

Bodies in Contact, 1550-1650

Samuel Champlain interrupted a Montagnais victory celebration when he landed on St. Matthew’s point at the mouth of the Saguenay River in May of 1603. The French expedition returned two young Montagnais men who had survived a lengthy stay in France. Champlain hoped a positive report of their experience – not to mention their sheer survival – would encourage amicable relations with the village. To that end, one of the young returnees describing his travels to his kinsmen conveyed the good wishes of Henry IV, and the French king’s desire “to people their country, and to make peace with their [Iroquoian] enemies … or send forces to vanquish them.”

The Montagnais sagamore, Anadabijou, responded, “that in truth they ought to be glad to have His Majesty for their great friend … that he was well content that His said Majesty should people their country, and make war on their enemies … [underscoring] the advantage and profit they might receive from His said Majesty.” Anadabijou said nothing about making peace with their rivals. Instead, the Montagnais launched into a great feast that culminated with a scalp dance “celebrating … a victory they had won over the Iroquois, of whom they had slain about a hundred, whose scalps they cut off, and had with them for the ceremony.” The next day, Anadabijou and the Montagnais left for Tadoussac and another feast with their Algonquin Etechemin allies where scalps again played a central role in the festivities. Champlain described Besouat, the Algonquin sagamore “seated before … women and girls

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118 Champlain Works, 100.
119 Champlain Works, 100.
120 Champlain Works, 100-101.
121 Champlain Works, 103.
122 Etechemins, Algonquin speakers like the Montagnais, were also called the Malecites or Penobschts, and constituted groups within the Eastern Abenaki. Ives Goddard, “Eastern Algonquian Languages,” in Northeast, ed. Bruce G. Trigger, Handbook of North American Indians 15 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1978),
[who danced clothed only in their necklaces] between two poles, on which hung the scalps of their enemies. 123 Besouat enjoined his Montagnais and Etchemin allies to dance in triumph as he and his men distributed gifts to them.

Champlain’s first voyage to Canada immediately introduced him to the language of corporeal trophies among the indigenous peoples. Between 1550 and 1650 significant changes occurred in both the understanding and the practices of post mortem mutilation in the region. While each largely retained their own corporeal symbolism during the first half of this period, increasing encounters along the Atlantic coastline materialized in trade and disease, transforming the context of the practices for both Indians and Europeans. In New France, trade alliances and missionary Christianity provided the primary contexts for these changes. In New England, violence between settlers and native peoples produced very different results.

By 1650, mutual influence created observable differences in both Native American and European settler practices and understandings of postmortem mutilation. These changes were shaped by interactions between the earliest settlers and indigenous peoples as well as the different regional environments and settlement patterns of European colonies. By 1650, postmortem mutilation practices began to reflect this variation as Native Americans and Europeans incorporated fragments of each others’ practices, developing regionally distinct dialects of corporeal dismemberment that expressed this cultural negotiation.

In the latter half of the sixteenth century, the frequency of Amerindian-European encounters increased as the St. Lawrence River and surrounding waters became favored destinations for European fishermen, whalers, and traders. Native Americans along the Atlantic coastline responded to the newly acquired European trade goods and diseases in ways that made sense within their existing cultural frameworks. Likewise, Europeans used new goods and information about new lands and peoples in ways that fit their understandings of themselves and their world. Cultural and demographic changes that began hereafter cited as HNAI: Northeast, 70-77; Dean Snow, “Late Prehistory of the East Coast,” in HNAI: Northeast, 58-69; Dean Snow, “Eastern Abenaki,” in HNAI: Northeast, 137-147.

in this early encounter period had lasting and often devastating consequences in the decades that followed. Postmortem mutilation practices during this time, however, retained the meanings that had pre-dated encounter. The treatment of corpses during this period continued to reflect longstanding practices; novel materials or circumstances were incorporated like idiosyncratic words or phrases which were translated into a similar-sounding one in the speakers’ own languages. The meaning and use differed from the original intended, but created an innovative coherence in the new context.124

Increasing numbers of European ships explored the North Atlantic coast of America between 1550 and 1590, as fishermen extended their annual voyages to the coast of Newfoundland and the Gulf of the St. Lawrence River and discovered waters teeming with cod and right and bowhead whales. During the 1580s between 350 and 500 French vessels visited these fertile fishing grounds annually.125 Conservative estimates of crew sizes suggest between twenty-two and twenty-six men on each vessel; if so, 8,000 to 13,000 French mariners traversed the Atlantic to fill their nets each year.126 English and Basque sailors, as well as pirates of various origins, substantially increased the numbers of Europeans in American waters.127 “Far from … a fringe area worked only by a few fishermen, the northern part of the Americas was one of the great seafaring routes and one of the most profitable European business

124 Eggcorns are a relatively newly identified, though not newly created, linguistic phenomenon by which one word is mis-heard or misunderstood to represent a near homophone, sometimes across languages, and the mistake is then replicated in speech. The identification comes from the story of a subject who mistook the word “acorn” for “eggcorn.” Eggcorns usually make some sort of sense in their new linguistic context — an acorn is both an “egg” of sorts and a “corn” for an oak tree. Michael Erard, “Analyzing Eggcorns and Snowclones, and Challenging Strunk and White,” New York Times, 20 June 2006; Mark Liberman, "Egg Corns: Folk Etymology, Malapropism, Mondegreen, ???” 2003, [on-line blog archive], available from http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/000018.html; Internet; (accessed 24 Aug 2010). For a full discussion of the eggcorn phenomenon see: Mark Liberman and Geoffrey K. Pullum, Far from the Madding Gerund and other dispatches from the Language Log (Wilsonville, OR: William, James & Co., 2006).


destinations in the New World” as early as the late sixteenth century. Many of these mariners, particularly whalers who used on-shore ovens to render oil from their catch, spent portions of their time on land. Remains of these ovens evidence the early presence of Europeans on the shores of North America and suggest locations of early European-Amerindian encounters. In combination with environmental factors, these meetings brought changes for both Europeans and Native Americans, and in this early period each group responded to the novelty with all the creativity of their own cultural contexts.

European fishing activity in the region peaked in the 1580s, after which “a veritable collapse occurred” in the number of French vessels outfitted for the enterprise. European wars combined with “economic hardships … [and] numerous famines” to curtail French investment in fishing expeditions during the last decades of the sixteenth century. The intensification of cooling in the Little Ice Age increasingly pushed whales and cod offshore around the beginning of the seventeenth century, altering fishing practices by keeping fishermen out at sea rather than “inshore” as they had been only a few years before. These challenges prompted innovation by the remaining sailors.

Exploiting their knowledge of the seas and their previous experience on shore, European mariners who did not abandon their occupation were able “to diversify their … livelihood and shore up their income” by trading with the Amerindians along the coast. The fur trade emerged as a solution to the economic and environmental challenges facing European fishermen in the last decades of the sixteenth

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128 Turgeon, “Fishers, Traders, Amerindians,” 593.
130 Turgeon, “Fishers, Traders, Amerindians,” 593. See especially Table III, page 595.
131 Turgeon, “Fishers, Traders, Amerindians,” 593 (quote). Periodic warfare during the latter half of the sixteenth century included that between France and Spain and the religious wars of the second half of the century. Conflicts involving England and France in the late 1500s and early 1600s included: the Eighty Years’ War or Dutch Revolt (1568-1648); the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648); and the final Wars of Religion (I have listed some of the many conflicts that encompassed these conflict individually); the War of the Three Henrys (1585-1589, also called the Eighth French War of Religion); the Anglo-Spanish War (1585-1604, part of the Eighty Years’ War); the Nine Years’ War (1594-1603) involving England versus Irish clans (sometimes seen as one of the Wars of Religion); the Dutch-Portuguese War (1602-1661, England supported the Dutch Republic); the Anglo-Spanish War (1625-1630, part of the Thirty Years’ War) the Franco-Spanish War (1635-1659, part of the Thirty Years’ War). Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995; reprint, 2002); Jackson J. Spielvogel, Western Civilization 7th ed., 2 vols., vol. 2: From 1500 (Wadsworth Publishing, 1994; reprint, 2009), chapters 13, 14, 15.
133 Turgeon, “Fishers, Traders, Amerindians,” 595.
The success of this appropriation, by both Amerindians and Europeans, increased and expanded intercultural trade along the coast. The growth of the fur trade enhanced the vitality of each group, while also exacerbating tensions among Europeans and between Native American groups. Europeans angled for access to the best furs, and Amerindians sought control over the incoming goods they could trade at a premium to people living further inland. Each group appropriated trade goods into pre-existing cultural frameworks, creatively incorporating them to suit their priorities.

The rivalry that had pre-dated the fur trade on both sides of the Atlantic intensified as the trade expanded. Among Native Americans, decimation of populations from the early fur trade...
European diseases that accompanied trade increased warfare and led to the destruction and dispersal of the St. Lawrence Iroquoians, the very group Cartier had first encountered. Montagnais, Algonquins and Hurons competed to fill this power vacuum.  

The turmoil eventually produced changes in warfare practices in North America. While postmortem mutilation remained a salient feature of Amerindian warfare, the tactics changed. Champlain’s description of his Algonquian allies’ practices in 1609 differs substantially from later depictions of Native warfare. The “ritualized confrontation between large armies wearing wooden armor,” a form of combat that Europeans might well have recognized as similar to their own, fell victim to the increased use of metal-tipped weapons and firearms that could pierce the protection. Tactics of raid-and-retreat became increasingly common, leading some later commentators to assume this had long been the only form of Native American combat. But even amid the changed tactics, the practice of corporeal dismemberment and its form remained constant. Scalping represented one of the central acts that proved and could enhance a warrior’s status within the tribe because “success in battle increased the young man’s stature in his clan and village [including] his prospects for an advantageous marriage, his chances for recognition as a village leader, and his hopes for eventual selection to a sachemship.”


139 One of the earlier suggestions of this is found in Daniel Gookin, "Historical Collections of the Indians in New England," in Collections, 1st Ser. (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1792). But later historians, particularly those who pick up the story of Amerindian-European warfare in the seventeenth century have generally left unchallenged the notion that Native American combat was a “skulking way of war.” See Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics among the New England Indians, Published in Cooperation with Plimoth Plantation (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1991; reprint, 2000).

Body parts served a variety of functions in both European and Amerindian cultural contexts. Among Native Americans, hands seem to have enjoyed an afterlife in many Algonquian cultures, notably the Powhatans who sometimes wore the dried hands of their previous victims into battle, and digits were strung on necklaces in many Indian cultures. Limbs could provide provocative items for display in addition to the flesh for ritual cannibalism, especially among Iroquoians. But of all the body parts, the scalp appears to have received the most ubiquitous ritual treatment in Native America. Several reports of early encounters portray the ritual treatment and preservation of scalps among northeastern Indians.

After their 1609 attack on the Mohawk, Champlain’s Algonquian allies requested beads “to decorate the scalps of their enemies, which they carry in their festivities on returning home.” The ritual treatment these trophies received attests to a vital and enduring cultural symbolism. Beads and other adornment subordinated the scalps, and the souls they contained or protected, to the victor’s people enhancing aesthetic display of these trophies while simultaneously domesticating them. Decoration domesticated the enemies’ spirits held in the scalps, subduing them to aesthetic sensibilities of individual artists in new communities.

Embellished and displayed by a victor, a scalp simultaneously embodied the identity and trapped the soul of the victim. Hairstyle differed among various peoples, and often within those groups based on status or clan membership. Warriors in particular braided objects into their

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143 Champlain Works, 2:106.
hair that represented deeds, rites of passage, characteristics or intra-tribal group affiliations.

Such ornaments not only enhanced the individual’s power, but revealed his identity as surely as a name tag on a uniform. For rivals, particularly those who were sometime trading partners, the hair style in conjunction with the individual adornments on the scalp or scalp lock, would have been familiar enough to identify the slain individual by community, by rank, and sometimes by family or individual. The act of decoration was an act of appropriation; possession of the scalp reinforced the warrior’s possession of the victim’s spirit and confirmed the triumph.

Often, these trophies were stretched and displayed on hoops (as Cartier saw among the Laurentian Iroquoians), on sticks “in the bow of their canoes” (as Champlain described among the Algonquians), in or on dwellings, and even on dancers during ceremonies. Exhibition served as both a reminder and a perpetual declaration of victory. Ceremonies such as the scalp dances that Champlain observed at St. Matthews and Tadoussac, brought young warriors new status and celebrated their victories, but it also brought new souls into the community and prevented their reunion with their own kin.147

Scalps and other body parts also established and galvanized alliances. In the parlance of reciprocity, corporeal trophies created an alliance between people when they were given as gifts to a sachem. The gift implied a shared enemy and carried the obligation for future military aid. In the context of mourning war, in which men were called to avenge the loss of individual members of the family, the gift of a scalp, and its acceptance by the recipient, implied a bond

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146 Champlain Works, 2:106.

147 For the most thorough and oft-cited discussion of this symbolism in Algonquian cultures, see: William S. Simmons, Cautantowwit’s House: An Indian Burial Ground on the Island of Conanicut in Narragansett Bay (Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1970); Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, discusses similar beliefs among the Huron.
close to kinship. A victory or scalp dance, such as the one Champlain witnessed among the Montagnais and their Algonquin and Etechemin allies at Tadoussac in 1603, united its participants in opposition to their enemies and affirmed the success of their military partnership as well as their near- (or in cases of intermarriage, actual) kinship. It acknowledged the allies as “great friends,” indeed. Thus, Anadabijou’s willingness that the French “should people [his] country” is accompanied by the idea that these new, powerful allies would benefit his people by “mak[ing] war on their enemies.” The French presence at the scalp dances celebrating the Algonquian victory over their Iroquoian rivals confirmed and evidenced the alliance.

Champlain understood the necessity of military assistance to sustaining trading relations as few of his predecessors had, and this was in part responsible for his success in establishing French settlements where so many before him had failed. Acknowledging that French settlements would need Indian allies to ensure their survival, Champlain built upon his familiarity with European martial practices, “to show [his Indian allies]… the courage and readiness” he possessed. Champlain’s readiness to assist his Native American counterparts in their wars, distinguished him from English settlers in the northeast, whose leaders sought to limit their participation in intra-tribal conflict – except when it could be directed to serve their own objectives – and to prevent Indian acquisition of firearms. His acceptance of the military aspect of alliance earned him respect and trust, particularly of the Montagnais, where the hesitation of

151 *Champlain Works*, 2:98. For a concise discussion of the role of military alliance in Champlain’s efforts in the establish successful trade and a viable colony in Canada, see: Cayton and Anderson, *Dominion*, chapter 1.
others had proven that “they are only women, who wish to make war only upon our beavers.” Champlain’s actions affirmed both his masculinity and his sincerity.

On his return from the 1609 expedition against the Mohawk, Champlain once again observed the victorious reception of the scalps, and received recognition of his own feats. “Some days afterwards,” he recounts, “they made me a present of one of these scalps as if it had been some very valuable thing, and a pair of shields belonging to their enemies, for me to keep to show to the king. And to please them I promised to do so.” The scalp was indeed a very valuable thing, for it symbolized the partnership between the Montagnais and the French. The gift acknowledged Champlain as a warrior of merit, perhaps even a war chief in his own right, who represented a superior sagamore, the King of France. In Native American terms, that alliance may also have suggested that the French King held a subordinate role to Anadabijou, the Montagnais leader since there was no reason for the Algonquians to assume that the French were other than equals or perhaps slightly less than equals in the partnership.

French willingness to make war on more than beaver expanded with the fur trade as French traders continued their lucrative alliance by joining their Amerindian allies in battle to assure their continued loyalty in trade. As French settlement continued the human body and its parts continued to provide a touchpoint for communication. French missionaries employed its rich symbolism to further their message, demonstrate the progress of their missive and even to evidence their own martyrdom.

152 Champlain Works, 2:121; Cayton and Anderson, Dominion, 1-3.
153 Champlain Works, 2:106. The battle occurs in 1609.
Ecclesiastics who heeded the French King’s request for missionaries generally believed Amerindians could and would become good Christians and that “Christianization and Frenchification were synonymous.” Recollects, the first clerics in New France, eventually conceded that the process would be long and arduous and assimilation to French culture would have to precede Christianization. Jesuits, who continued the missionary efforts after expulsion of the Recollects, altered their approach. “[A]ware that much of Indian life was ceremonial and involved festivals and present-giving … [Jesuits] used these customs to gain entrance to native villages … [and endeavored] ‘to win the affections of the chief personages by means of feasts and presents.’”

Although attentive to Indian practice, appropriating the diplomatic and reciprocal language of Native American society in which gifts “could ‘wipe away the tears of sorrow" or "clear the dead from the battle ground’” distorted the missionary message. As they realized the distortion, Jesuits struggled to manipulate indigenous rituals for their own purposes. Attempting to distinguish gift-giving for Christian purposes, the clerics insisted “the gifts were to symbolize the hope that as all were happy on earth, so all would experience eternal bliss in heaven:” any alliance or comfort was spiritual in nature and “only the hope that we had of seeing them become Christians led us to desire their friendship.” These gifts did not come with the promise of future military alliance – at least not by most missionaries.

160 Several individual clerics did encourage and participate in warfare alongside Amerindian warriors, as the English accused Father Sebastian Râle of doing among the Abenaki during Queen Anne’s War.
In their conscious use of ritual to draw Indians to Christianity, Jesuits turned to familiar arenas in which they possessed unquestioned authority in catholic Europe. Death offered such an opportunity (and a poignant one given the diseases that accompanied European colonization), and missionaries often appropriated power over remains of the deceased to themselves. Jesuits attempted to ensure baptized Indians received a Christian burial, even if it meant disinterring the dead for re-burial in consecrated ground. Their attempts did not always go smoothly. Discovering a baptized man had died in their absence, missionaries convinced local leaders “to reveal the place of his burial and to permit his remains to be disinterred,” but had to stop the process “on account of the complaints of some women, who cried loudly that their dead were being stolen.”\textsuperscript{161} Acquiescing in the cultural authority of the women, Le Jeune lamented that, “One must at times humor their weakness.”\textsuperscript{162} The women were probably concerned about the location and wellbeing of the man’s soul which in Algonquian belief would have hovered for a time around the body before making its way to the southwestern paradise. Should the body be outside the control of his people the soul might become estranged from his kin.

Champlain’s description of Montagnais women who “stripped themselves quite naked, and jumped into the water, swimming to the canoes [of their returning warriors] to receive the scalps of their enemies” after the 1609 battle suggests a similarity in the role that women played in the ritual life of both scalps and captives.\textsuperscript{163} The important role of women in population reproduction and their role in instigating mourning wars – in the Iroquoian society, particularly, with its matrilineal focus – gave women an important role in the reincorporation of captives and scalps into society. The procreative connotation seems appropriate and parallel. This was equally true in the “requickenings” – the most

\textsuperscript{161} JR, 9:31.
\textsuperscript{162} JR, 9:31.
\textsuperscript{163} Champlain Works, 2:106.
elaborate adoption rituals. Because gender ideology differed among Native American groups, not all people who practiced scalping sanctioned the same roles for women. Among the Pawnee, women and uninitiated men were often forbidden – certainly in later centuries – from being in the presence of scalps because of their spiritual power.

Because of their spiritual power, scalps had to be handled in ritually prescribed ways to prevent them from causing harm to members of the victor’s group. Like captives, whose fate was often decided by women of the village, scalps’ incorporation needed to be mediated by the women of the village. “If not properly adopted … [the spiritual power invested in the scalp] would wreak havoc” on the community. Women who greeted returning war parties and danced victory celebrations helped to counteract the possible negative effects of such powerful items, in part because their role in mediating the boundaries between life and death through birth and the preparation of the dead positioned them in a culturally appropriate position.

In a more successful attempt by French Jesuits to claim the body of a Christianized Indian, “the mother yielded to [Jesuit] desire, and th[e] Captain urged the young men to go and get the body and place it in our hands. As the Father was urging them, one of them replied, ‘Do not be in such haste; perhaps his soul has not yet left his body, it may be still at the top of his

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165 I experienced this myself during a fellowship at an archive where a more traditional Pawnee curator would not allow me to see the scalps I was there to study because of my gender.


167 Ramon A Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). Gutierrez’s emphasis on the sexual acts described by an 18th century observer of Pueblo ritual is not necessarily equally applicable to the northeast. The early observers, particularly Champlain, make a point of noting the nudity of the women and men in certain portions of scalp dances and ritual reunions after war. Other peoples provide an even more expanded role for women, particularly the senior women, who play a primary role in the preservation, storing, and celebration of scalps. The longevity of the Kiowa scalp dance and the role of women in this society are a pertinent example – even today. William C. Meadows, *Kiowa, Apache, and Comanche Military Societies: Enduring Veterans, 1800 to the Present* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1999; paperback, 2002), 164-166.
head.’ And yet he had been dead for two days.”

Not only was the condition of the soul somewhat nebulous after death, but the individuals with the most authority over the dead were women. This further complicated the Native American perception of the Jesuits who did not fulfill the role of men – going into battle – and seemed concerned with areas usually associated with women’s authority among Algonquians and Iroquoians alike: the treatment of the dead. Jesuits, in their European viewpoint, went to the tribal leaders who, in these two cases, were male; yet the final approval or disapproval rested with the women of the group.

Even when Jesuits were able to convince the women to permit the reburial of their dead in the European manner, the cultural shift was not complete, suggesting the cultural negotiation that was taking place. “When they were lowering it into the grave, his relatives threw in, besides the robes with which he was covered, a Blanket, a Cloak, a bag containing his little belongings, and a roll of bark.” The young man in this case may well have been reburied in a Christian grave with a Christian burial, but he would leave for the afterlife with all the trappings of his Amerindian world. Women played a crucial role in end-of-life rituals, particularly in determining the proper burial site and method, their decisions blended Indian and European customs into new meanings expressed in new practices. The transition was gradual, but by the latter half of the seventeenth century prone burials, associated with European/Christian interment, became more plentiful in the archaeological record, contrasted with the flexed burials of the pre-encounter era.

Jesuit struggles reflected the mandate from the French crown to Christianize the Native American population. Religious directives combined with European ethnocentrism encouraged

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168 JR, 9:49.
169 JR, 9:51.
170 Brown, Stranger in Blood; Van Kirk, “Tender Ties.”
colonization and helped to convince Christian monarchs to sponsor exploration and settlement for the English as well as the French. Early supporters of English settlement in the New World notably the senior Richard Hakluyt, asserted the primary purpose of colonization ought to be “to plant the Christian religion.”\textsuperscript{172} This objective was reiterated in the English colonial charters.\textsuperscript{173} But English success was limited by comparison to their French counterparts. There were several reasons for this.

While Jesuits were concerned that Native Americans understand the doctrines of Christianity, and generally shied away from baptism of those who could not profess an understanding of the Christian faith (except in cases of children near death), they balanced this reticence with a desire to demonstrate the power of God’s grace and immanence. Thus, successful conversion of Indian souls was a primary focus of the Relations the fathers sent back to France every year. Tabulating numbers of Christianized souls measured French cultural progress New World. But in many ways, the French were successful in Christianization because they restrained their efforts at Indian cultural transformation. Jesuits spent years living among the Indians of the northeast, learning their language and culture and attempting to recast Christianity in terms of the native cultural context.\textsuperscript{174} This mirrored Champlain’s capacity for cultural collaboration on the military front, and had implications for the French attitudes toward postmortem dismemberment.

The French Jesuits were no less horrified by certain Native American practices than were their English neighbors in the New World, but their rejection of native practices of postmortem


mutilation was not burdened by an additional reaction against such practices in Europe, as were the Protestants’ views of corporeal dismemberment. Although Church doctrine technically condemned division of a corpse, little was done to limit its de facto practice. In fact, members of the upper echelons of European society often attempted to mandate not only that their body parts should be removed after death, but how and where they should be dispersed. The period of early settlement in the northeast coincided with “one of the last great periods of European (especially French) hagiography” and the attendant practice of veneration of relics, as well as the height of divided burial among the wealthy in France.175 The parallel was not lost on the Jesuit fathers at work in the New World, even if they saw it in culturally conditioned ways. The desire to relocate the bodies of baptized Indians evidences their concern for the placement, ownership and control over the dead.

Control over burial placement and certain parts of the corpse connoted control over the souls of the dead and thus the future of the people. For Native Americans, the soul could be barred from the afterlife if the body, its head or scalp were removed. The depth of the connection between the dead and the living and the connection of the soul and the body, meant removing an individual’s body – or the seat of one’s soul – permanently separated that person from his community and kin, creating a more enduring rupture than even death.

Catholic concern for the body after death focused on the afterlife as well. Proximity to the church, and the altar in particular, increased the status of the deceased in the afterlife, while

acknowledging the social standing of the individual during life.176 The focus on location (within consecrated graveyards) rather than corporeal integrity as defining Catholic burial permitted French clerics to negotiate two potential treacherous cultural zones. First, it enabled the coexistence of Catholic and traditional Amerindian treatments of the dead. Indian converts needed burial in consecrated graveyards to fulfill the Fathers’ notions of Catholic burial, but whether they were buried in the traditional flexed position or the objects interred with them proved less important than the location of the remains. When this led missionaries to disinter the dead Native American secondary burial practices may have helped to bridge the cultural gap, although little evidence speaks to this negotiation.

Second, although burial location emphasized geography more than mortuary practices, the extent of clerical geographic claims remained limited to the patch of ground consecrated for Catholic ceremony and cemeteries. Although the French crown claimed all of New France as a colony, Recollects and Jesuits who lived among Native American people rarely designated more than a small plot of a village’s land as holy ground. Cemeteries delineated the boundary between sacred and profane geography for Catholic clerics and their converts, but the invasion of traditional village territory proved limited.

The multiple symbolic contexts for the body in the early period of New France opened the door for multiple interpretations of postmortem dismemberment. The annual Relations written by Jesuits in Canada were “saturated in a hagiographic sensibility.”177 By conforming to the conventions of hagiographic literature, the Relations and similar contemporary writing by Catholics in the New World recounted French “missionary achievements.”178 The stories of

178 Greer, “Colonial Saints,” 323.
extraordinary lives in New France circulated in oral as well as written form “leading to the
development of a colonial cult of colonial saints, complete with pilgrimages, relics, and
miraculous cures.” Against the backdrop of hagiographic literature, the manner or
circumstance of death could reveal a deeper meaning for the individual’s life, one that would
also attest to the success of the New World in producing the necessary environment for the
revelation of saints. While, “strictly speaking, there were no saints in New France,” there were
several individuals whose lives became – either in text or in colonial popular culture – exemplary
of “holy Lives.” Some of these received postmortem treatment akin to the saints of Europe.

One of these was Jean de Brébeuf, a Jesuit captured by the Iroquois in March of 1649.
Brébeuf’s “illustrious post-mortem career” included using his corporeal relics to cure illness.
Father Henry Nouvel reported curing at least three individuals by dipping Brébeuf’s relics in
water which he then offered as a curative during his trip through Ottawa country in the 1670s.
The power of human remains to transform the living and their world was familiar to French
settlers as it was to their Indian hosts. Nouvel’s description of “marvels that God was pleased to
work upon our Savages by virtue of [Brébeuf’s] merits,” attested to the omnipotence of a
Catholic divinity, but the medium was not unfamiliar to his Amerindian observers. The father of
one patient converted upon the successful recovery of his child. And while many of the “saints”
memorialized in the colonial writings were French, the identification of Native American
“saints” proved the success of their mission to Christianize the inhabitants of the region.

Hagiography provided a powerful framework through which French settlers could interpret

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179 Greer, “Colonial Saints,” 327.
180 Greer, “Colonial Saints,” 326.
181 Greer, “Colonial Saints,” 333.
182 JR, 56:101-105. Nouvel does not specify which body part he seeped in water, identifying it only as “a Relic of
Father De Brébeuf’s,” 101.
183 Most notable of these, of course, was the Iroquois Catherine (Kateri) Tekakwitha, although her story was
practices they encountered in North America. They might express horror at the torture and scalping of captives, but French clerics also interpreted these practices in ways that furthered their missionary aims and rendered them useful to French Catholic and imperial aims.

English Protestants rejected hagiolatry and the veneration of saints’ relics as popish superstition. Separatists and Puritans who settled in New England interpreted the body through a plurality of secular and theological frameworks. While they shared many secular models with other Europeans, English settlers interpreted the body and dismemberment through the lens of Puritan theology. Combined with political analogies, corporeal and capital punishment, and English colonial efforts in Ireland, the Puritan theology of the body led these settlers to very different conclusions about corporeality and dismemberment in the New World.

John Robinson, minister to the English Separatists during their Dutch exile, articulated a Puritan theology of the body that interwove Calvin’s anthropology, Protestant iconoclasm, and Ramus’s epistemology with the Galenic model of humors. John Calvin expressed a “kaleidoscopic view” of the human body that saw corporeality as fundamentally a reflection of God and therefore good, but simultaneously condemned to frailty and mortality by original sin which “introduced a distinction between soul and body, placing the body in a subordinate position requiring direction by the soul.”

Though distinct from the soul, the physical body remained essentially different from the “flesh.” Unlike the body, flesh, “the soul’s lust for worldly things … was immoral and must be held in check.” While the latter might require subjugation and mortification, the former might evidence the individual soul’s rectitude and reflect the divine image.

186 Finch, Dissenting Bodies, 6.
Protestant emphasis on personal manifestation rather than external representation of divinity undergirded the iconoclastic impulse that led laypeople to destroy ritual objects and artwork across England in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Visible saints who embodied holiness replaced mediating icons expressed godliness in their daily comportment. These “living icons” supplanted “dead” statues as embodiments of the sacred.\(^{187}\)

Just as the body provided a medium through which visible saints manifested divine grace by expressing the soul’s purity, the body also mediated the external world’s effects on the soul. The five senses provided windows through which grace or sin could enter the soul. This adaptation of Petrus Ramus’s theories described the body as a permeable barrier between outside influences and internal conditions. Porous bodies could be altered through “one’s exchanges with the physical environment.”\(^ {188}\) Because “climate, weather, seasons, temperature, air, food, exercise, and social circumstances immediately and continuously altered a person’s physiology and psychology,” Puritan settlers in the New World saw their interaction with the American “wilderness” as an interactive struggle between disordered corruption that could blur the line between “human and vermin,” and the godliness that industry and well-ordered conduct could impart to the landscape.\(^ {189}\)


\(^{188}\) Finch, *Dissenting Bodies*, 14.

\(^{189}\) Finch, *Dissenting Bodies*, 7-10, 14, 48.
Figure 3. *Pillaging of Churches by Calvinists*, engraving, Frans Hogenberg, 1585, Musée National du Château de Pau, P55-35-28, available online at http://www.musee-chateau-pau.fr/
The permeability Puritans saw as a threat derived from ancient Galenic theory in which “everything in the physical world was constituted of the same elements and humors.”

Under this model, all matter derived from “four elements and their corresponding humors and properties—fire and choler, which were hot and dry; air and blood, which were warm and moist; water and phlegm, which were cold and moist; and earth and melancholy, which were cold and dry.”

Attributed to the physician and philosopher Galen of Pergamon of first-century Greece, these ideas “provided the standard scientific model for human physiology and anatomy, health and medicine, and interconnections between humans and other things in the material world.”

This popular understanding of the nature of the physical world experienced widespread acceptance throughout sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England and explained the threat posed by disorderly environments (both social and physical).

Visible saints “gathered out of the larger corrupt society” and bound themselves to one another and God, becoming “knit together as a body,” according to Protestant teaching. This echoed ancient conceptions of society that saw its successful function as analogous to the harmonious cooperation of the parts of an individual human body. Theologians had long used the Pauline metaphor describing the church as the body of Christ. In Catholic societies this metaphor became interwoven with the social analogy by placing the pope or divinely ordained king at the head with clergy as eyes. Robinson and other Protestant theologians revised this hierarchical model in favor of a more democratic one (at least among visible saints) in which Christ was the head and “the rest of the body’s parts were of equal standing and value in their

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190 Finch, Dissenting Bodies, 14.
191 Finch, Dissenting Bodies, 14.
192 Finch, Dissenting Bodies, 14.
194 Finch, Dissenting Bodies, 143-144.
activities and relationships to each other and to the head. For ‘this body mystical’ to thrive, all of its members … must work together and help each other.” In such a context, executions and murders removed a portion of the body. Caused by execution such a death purged the church body of wickedness where murder injured the whole and, like other capital crimes that threatened to corrupt the community, became “liable to death.”

English colonial efforts were also shaped by previous military endeavors and experience establishing plantations in Ireland during the previous century. English settlements in Ireland “were, quite literally, small transplantations of English society onto Irish soil, in enclaves created by driving out or destroying the native population.” The conquest of Ireland required military actions that spanned the reigns of several monarchs, and was contested throughout the seventeenth century until Oliver Cromwell’s vicious invasion enforced English control of the region in 1650. The Irish experience shaped both the intent and the method of English settlement in the New World. Puritans and Separatists created covenantal communities that they hoped would transplant their particular version of English culture to a less socially corrupt environment. However, not all initial settlers participated in church membership. Some, like Myles Standish, brought with them direct experience in English military endeavors.

The martial aspect of English colonial experience combined with the earliest settlers’ notions of a covenantal community to produce a distant, often oppositional stance toward their Native American neighbors. The church body, ever vulnerable to corruption by the surrounding

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197 Cayton and Anderson, *Dominion*, 43.
198 Cayton and Anderson, *Dominion*, 43.
environment’s wickedness and disorder, needed protection. That concern meant that even when their numbers were impossibly small by comparison to Indian counterparts, settlers shunned interaction with Indians whom they viewed as threats. Unlike the French whose interest in the region was largely economic and dependent on cooperative interaction with Amerindians, “English colonizers followed a path that led more toward apartheid than cultural engagement with native peoples.”

New England settlers established farms and a growing population dependent on arable soil with room for livestock. These settlement patterns created “an insatiable hunger for land [that] became the defining feature of English colonization” which drew them into repeated conflict with their Indian neighbors. Where French colonists exerted power through trade alliances and “deferred to [Native American] claims of recognition for personal and subject matter jurisdiction,” the English saw “territorial governance … [as] the road to dominion.”

Northeastern Algonquian and European concepts of power differed significantly. “For Algonquians, and perhaps most eastern Native Americans, control over land did not mean control over individuals” as it did in the European context. “The Algonquians had flexible ideas of territorial jurisdiction and almost no idea of land ownership in the European sense.” Since regional power was not linked to property ownership and settlements were fluid – even among Native Americans with more sedentary patterns such as the Huron and other Iroquoians who moved roughly every decade – for most Native Americans “personal and subject matter

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200 Cayton and Anderson, *Dominion*, 44.
jurisdiction overrode mere territorial jurisdiction, as the shifting nature of borders dictated.”

Power over persons was founded instead in the kinship network which helped to regulate individual behavior.

For English who sought territorial control, dismemberment of inhabitants whom the colonizers wished to remove from the land could prove that dominance on multiple levels of meaning. Although usually unlawful, some Puritans argued that killing individual “savage and brutish men” who threatened the church body might constitute a moral good in certain circumstances. These acts might equate to “slay[ing] the guilty justly.” Such rationale applied to unruly Englishmen as well as Indians. Indians whom settlers previously perceived as friends warranted treatment as a traitor. In the case of community conspiracies destruction of the entire village could be justified. The result was ironic: rather than rejecting postmortem mutilation all together, the English were willing to adopt it as a military practice by the latter half of the seventeenth century.

Plymouth residents were the first to assert English authority in the region through postmortem mutilation. In 1623, an alleged plot against the Wessagusset (Weymouth) settlement occasioned a mission by Plymouth settlers against the conspirators. Myles Standish, a veteran of English troops in the Netherlands, lured Massachusett sachems to a meeting that promised trade, the men killed them all and Standish paraded the head of one, Wituwamet, back to Plymouth where it was placed on the wall of the fort. Wituwamet was probably not only a sachem but a

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pniess, a warrior who had undergone initiation through a spiritual quest and trance state believed to render him impervious to bullets and arrows, since several Massachusetts Indians alleged that he could not be killed by gunfire.\footnote{209}

Placing his head on public display, the English symbolically identified Wituwamet as a traitor and, consequentially, as a potential social equal. Like the traitorous nobles whose heads lined the Tower Bridge in London, Wituwamet threatened the English because of his standing in the Indian community and the comparative English weakness in the region. The English assertion of their power over Wituwamet simultaneously acknowledged his authority in the region and attempted to undermine (or at least limit) that authority. While other Native Americas, such as the Wampanoag, acknowledged their equal status with English in the region through alliance (the Wampanoag treaty with the English was in 1621), the Massachusetts asserted their power over the unruly settlers at Wessagusset by challenging their presence in the region, and act that appeared, to English at Plymouth concerned they might face the same fate, to warrant the same treatment as the rebellious Irish: beheading.\footnote{210} As English competition for authority in the region increased, so did the significance of beheading.

Blinded by their own hierarchical culture and defensive fears, the English discounted Abordikis’s explanation for the violence, as “pretending” when the Massachusett sachem informed them “that he could not keep his men in order, and that it was against his will that evil

\footnote{209 Jenny Hale Pulsipher, \textit{Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England}, ed. Daniel K. Richter and Kathleen M. Brown, Early American Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). Pulsipher argues that compared to the Massachusetts Bay, the colonists at Plymouth saw themselves on more equal political terms with the surrounding Native Americans – both subjects to the King of England, although that subjectivity was ideally negotiated through the English settlers (something the Native Americans in the region challenged). Her study suggests this is true for the Native Americans with whom these settlers had treated. She deals primarily with the Wampanoag and Narragansett communities. Wituwamet was Massachusett.}

had been done to or designed against the English.”

But are reasons to take his declaration seriously. Captives and the corporeal trophies that often accompanied them offered enhanced status to men in Native American society. The plagues that ravaged the coastal people from 1617 onward upset the social balance in these societies. Historians’ focus on mourning war has tended to emphasize the role this social institution had in mobilizing large groups of people, even whole communities. But the status vacuum that accompanied the wholesale death of huge portions of the population resulted in both motivation and opportunity for younger men, or ambitious older ones, to undertake attacks that might further their own or their community’s standing in the region. It is also likely that the power of local sachems was affected as communities were diminished and dispersed by disease. Wituwamet and his cohorts may not have been acting with the knowledge or approval of other Massachusett leaders. They may have wished to rid themselves of the troublesome Wessagusset settlers independently and reap the benefits of status and security that would come with such a triumph. The English unwillingness to believe Abordikis reveals their own assumption that Native communities were organized as formally and hierarchically as their own, an assumption they and other Europeans made repeatedly in their trade and treaty interactions with people of the Americas. The evidence that this was not the case may well have contributed to the growing English perception of Native Americans as “savage” rather than “civilized” at a time when Puritan governance encouraged a strict ordering of society down to the household level.

The English may have believed Wituwamet’s beheading established proper hierarchy in the region, mirroring the bloody heads of rebellious Irish men propped outside the tents of English military commanders in Ireland, but the Massachusett reaction emphasized the settlers’

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ability to perforate the spiritual armor of a local *pniess*. The head’s location made the spiritual transgression all the more poignant: the fort where Plymouth residents placed Wituwamet’s head also served as “the meetinghouse in which the community of saints gathered to spend the Sabbath day in praying, singing, … preaching to the glory of God,” and inhaling the scent of rotting flesh from the grisly memento of their labor.\(^\text{212}\) Among their Indian neighbors it did not go unnoticed that the English wanted the heads of their enemies.

Eventually, the English even asked for them. From 1636 through the end of the Pequot War, the English demanded the heads of Indians alleged to have killed the trader John Stone and his companions.\(^\text{213}\) Fifteen years after Myles Standish impaled Wituwamet’s head on the Plymouth fort, a fleet of Englishmen called for the “heads of the of persons that had slaine Captaine Norton, and Captaine Stone, and the rest of their company, [because] it was not the custome of the English to suffer murderers to live, and therefore if they desired their own peace and welfare, they will … give us the heads of the murderers.”\(^\text{214}\) This ultimatum represented a significant shift from previous English relations with the Pequots.

Stone and his fellows were murdered in 1633. In the first years after their death, the English had only requested the surrender of the *assailants*, not their heads. The initial terms suggested that the English interpreted themselves as dealing with a political equal, if a rival, in

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\(^{212}\) Finch, *Dissenting Bodies*, 57.

\(^{213}\) The dates here are significant. Stone was killed in 1633, and in 1634 Pequot sachems appeared at Boston to treaty with the English, apologize for the killing which they said was revenge aimed at the Dutch for kidnapping and killing their sachem Tatobem, but mistakenly enacted against Stone. Alfred Cave notes that in 1634, the English did ask for the persons who had killed Stone, but generally accepted the explanation that most of the suspects had died of the plague. By 1636, following the death of trader John Oldham at the hands of Narragansetts and Nantics, the English no longer accepted the Pequot explanation and instead held the Pequots responsible for Oldham’s death as well, believing Miantonomo that Oldham’s killers had fled to the Pequots. Cave’s analysis suggests that English incursion into the Pequot region and the wampum trade facilitated this change of heart and the willingness to attribute Oldham’s death to Pequots rather than Narragansetts even when English in the Pequot region (Connecticut) feared the outcome. Alfred A. Cave, *The Pequot War*, Native Americans of the Northeast: Culture, History, and the Contemporary (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996, 51-62, 72-75, 104-108.

\(^{214}\) John Underhill, “John Underhill, ”Newes from America; or a New and Experimentall Discoverie of New England; Containing a true relation of their War-like proceedings thefe two years laft paft, with a Figure of the Indian Fort or Palizado” (London: Peter Cole, 1638), 10.
negotiating the punishment for a crime. But the escalation of the demand, announced by English captains from a fleet of ships, suggests that now the attackers were perceived as rebels against English authority in the region. Indeed, English presence in Pequot territory, Connecticut, had increased dramatically in the years between Stone’s death and the arrival of English ships under the command of Captains Endicott and Underhill in the Pequot harbor (at the mouth of the Pequot (Thames) River). The demand also came from a different group of English, Massachusetts Bay, who may have been as interested in demonstrating their regional hegemony to other English settlers as to Native residents.

Indians, by contrast, continued to want scalps. The Massachusetts scout who accompanied the English, “Cutshamakin … crept into a swamp and killed a Pequot, and having flayed off the skin of his head.” Cutshamakin used this scalp to advertise and raise allies for the war against the Pequots. “He sent it to Canonicus, who presently sent it to all the sachems about him, and returned many thanks to the English, and sent four fathom of wampom to Cutshamakin.” The wampum signified the sachem’s acceptance of the alliance and affirmed the military participation that the scalp initiated. It would also have conferred individual status on Cutshamakin, who, with the wampum, received acknowledgement of his ritual enactment of his role as a warrior. This scalp acted within a Native American vernacular in which body parts were disseminated throughout the networks of alliance to mobilize war parties. A response of trade goods affirmed the alliance and promised cooperation.

Interculturally, however, the communication was still in heads – and hands. Following the Pequot defeat, English Indians throughout the region sent “many Pequot heads and hands” to the colonial

216 See Cave, Pequot War, chapter 3.
217 Pulsipher, Subjects, 25.
219 Lipman, “‘Knitt them togeather,’” 17-18.
220 Lipman, “‘Knitt them togeather,’” 13-14.
government.221 The first of these trophies made sense to the English – albeit in their own terms. Narragansetts, Massachusetts, and Indians from Long Island aware of English demands for heads, and their ignorance about the value of scalps, sent the English signs of their alliance. The English had repeated their demand for Pequot heads in the Treaty of Hartford that ended the war, stipulating that the Indian parties to the treaty “shall as soon as they possibly can take off [the] heads” of surviving Pequots.222 At the urging of those who had some understanding of the reciprocal nature of Native American communication, the English responded with coats and cloth, though aware that these gifts connoted friendliness, they were clearly unaware of the equality of alliance this suggested among Indians.223 As to the hands, the English were entirely deaf to their meaning.

Hands were commonly removed not only in battle, but during torture of a prisoner in the rituals of mourning war.224 The longevity of hands as trophies is evidenced in burials but also in the persistence of this practice after the English voiced their objection to it. In August of 1637, “the Naragansetts [sic] sent [Massachusetts Bay] the hands of three Pequods, -- [allegedly including those belonging to] the chief of those who murdered Capt. Stone.”225 Rendering hands as well as heads to the English may well have attempted to further solidify the alliance. As indicators of torture, they symbolically gave the English a place at the ritual torment that was

223 Lipman, “‘Knitt them togeather,’” 23. Lipman rightly notes that the gifts from the English are not bounties at this time.
224 See evidence of this in Roger Williams, *The Complete Writings of Roger Williams*, ed. Edwin Gaustad, 7 vols. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963), 1:80, 140. Who notes Narragansett Indians “are much delighted after battell to hang up the hands and heads of their enemies: (Riches, long Life, and the Lives of enemies being objects of great delight to all men naturall; but Salomon begg’d Wifedom before thefe),” 1:140. Other authors, including Wood, noted hands hands and scalps before the Pequot War. William Wood, *Nevv Englands Prosepct: A true, lively, and experimentall description of that part of America, commonly called Nevv England : discovering the state of that countrie, both as it stands to our new-come English planters; and to the old native inhabitants : Laying doun the which may both enrich the knowledge of the mind-travelling reader, or benefit the future voyager* (London: Tho. Coates, 1634; reprint, Boston: Prince Society, 1865), 19, also available online at archive.org.
intrinsic to the capture of warriors in the mourning war complex. Initially, the English welcomed these items, but they soon made their corporeal preferences known.

By September of 1637, John Winthrop had communicated to Roger Williams his (and the Bay colony’s) distaste for hands as trophies. “I was fearefull that those dead hands were no pleasing sight” wrote Williams in response, “… yet I was willing to permit what I could not aproue… I have alwaies showne dislike to such dismembring the dead and now the more, (according to your desire) in your name.” Williams’s apprehension derived as much from the circumstances as from deep cultural traditions. Hands, unlike heads, though removed in England as punishments, did not operate regularly as trophies there. Concern over bodily integrity of the dead was not limited to Native Americans. English shared this aversion and their distaste made it easy for them to interpret such acts as savagery – reminiscent of Irish brutality and the inexplicable horror of murders sensationalized by the seventeenth century press in the form of murder pamphlets and not infrequent in the sermons of Puritan ministers like Cotton Mather. Williams permitted what he could not approve, no doubt because he also could not control it.

Clearly, for the English, heads provided the preferred mode of communicating victory over an enemy. They made sense in English social and legal language. Indians listened to the body language of the English, and while they continued to take hands, they appear less frequently in Indian-English exchanges. The hands that do appear in the record increasingly follow the meanings of English law – as when an Indian accused of murdering two Englishwomen was executed “after he had his right hand cut off.” The English terms of this

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226 Richter, “War and Culture,” and Richter, Ordeal, offer discussions of the mourning war complex.
punishment suggest that the murder was accompanied by theft. No mention of the hand appears after its amputation. With regard to corporeal trophies, two things are evident in the period between the Pequot War and King Philip’s war. First, both English and Indians retained their own cultural significance attached to the items. Second, both remained unable (or perhaps unwilling) to read the others’ meaning.

English colonists who incorporated bodily trophies into their cultural frameworks of bodies and territorial dominance moved further from their European counterparts in New France. Alliance with Amerindian peoples drew French colonists into regional disputes but, in this period at least, they viewed scalping and similar corporeal mutilation practices as Indian practices that while repugnant, offered some individuals a path to martyrdom. While the English attempted to maintain separation between Indians and colonists, their treatment of certain bodies actually wove the two cultures closer together in practice. The French, whose regular cultural exchange established a foundation for economic colonialism, did not include corporeal mutilation practices in this trade – at least not until the end of the seventeenth century. Among Iroquoians and Algonquians, corporeal mutilation and trophies continued to serve vital cultural roles that now incorporated the bodies of European colonists: allies, enemies, captives and adopted kin.

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Diaries (New York: AMS Press, 1857; reprint, 1982), 180. The editor notes that at the time many thieves in England were punished by having hands removed.
CHAPTER IV

The Seventeenth Century and the Beginning of Bounties

“The Maykans [Mahicans], going to war with the Maquaes [Mohawks], requested to be assisted by the commander of Fort Orange and six others. Commander Kriekebeeck went up with them; a league from the fort they met the Maquaes who fell so boldly upon them … that they were forced to fly, and many were killed.”\(^{230}\) Afterward, the Maquaes [Mohawks] “carried a leg and an arm home to be divided among their families, as a sign that they had conquered their enemies.”\(^{231}\)

Like these Dutch soldiers, many colonists found themselves caught in a web of inter-Indian disputes aggravated by increased European presence and trade. Decimating disease combined with struggles over both access to European goods and traditional settlement sites creating a social tinderbox. These factors produced shifts in Amerindian society that heightened cultural demands for young warriors to attack their neighbors, Indian and colonist alike.

\(^{230}\) J. Franklin Jameson, ed., *Narratives of New Netherland, 1609-1664*, Original Narratives of Early American History (New York: Scribner’s, 1909), hereafter cited as *NNN*, 84-85. The translation reads “Kriekebeeck,” although most authors spell the name “Kriekenbeeck,” see: Allen W. Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971), 46. By 1626 Daniel van Kriekenbeeck was commissary at Fort Orange, a position that combined the duties of commander, commercial agent, and diplomat (Trelease, *Colonial Affairs NY*, 46). The incident is also mentioned in Isaack de Rasière to Director of Amsterdam Chamber of Dutch West Indian Company, 23 Sep 1626, in *Documents Relating to New Netherland, 1624-1626*, in the *Henry E. Huntington Library*, ed. Arnold Johan Ferdinand van Laer (San Marino, CA: Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery, 1924), hereafter cited as *DRNN*, 172-251. In what appears to be an uncharacteristic oversight, Daniel K. Richter cites the date for the event as 1628, presumably because on page 89 of *Narratives of New Netherland* Jameson mentions a war broke out between the Mohawks and Mahicans in 1628. Yet earlier in that same passage Jameson states that Bastiaen Jansz Crol (Krol, in van Laer’s annotations, *DRNN*, 251) is vice-director in Fort Orange, and had been since 1626. The de Rasière letter explains Crol replaced Kriekenbeeck, among those killed in the attack of 1626 (*DRNN*, 172-3). Richter cites the Mohawk attack as an example of young warriors’ rapacity overwhelming the authority of their seniors who had concluded a peace. Peace Chiefs’ authority decayed throughout the seventeenth century due to disease, trade, and shifting diplomatic goals that interfered with the need for young men to prove themselves warriors through mourning war attacks – often instigated by female kin (usually an aunt) in an effort to requicken the spirits of lost loved ones. However, this instance does not provide the strongest evidence of that deterioration. If we trust the sources that Richter himself cites for this event, it appears that the dismemberment of the Dutch detachment occurred in 1626. If this is the case, then the warriors (apparently several of them by the Jameson account) who attacked the Dutch were not renegade young men looking to prove themselves in defiance (or ignorance) of a treaty concluded by their elders. They would have been acting in concert with the ongoing violence which had not yet been halted by treaty and quite possibly in proactive defense of their own village or fort as Trelease interprets (*Indian Affairs NY*, 46).

\(^{231}\) Trelease, *Indian Affairs NY*, 85.
These changes constituted one of two parallel processes which manifested through novel practices encompassing corporeal trophies during the seventeenth century. Among Native Americans, disease that decimated populations increased pressure on warriors to renew populations through captives and scalps. The fur trade brought new weapons and, as traders proved willing to exchange goods with individual Indians rather than supply large gifts to local leaders for distribution, offered access to anyone who brought them sufficient pelts. Young warriors, whose status depended in part on their ability to bring captives and trophies back from warfare, found greater pressure to undertake such violence at the same time that they had more access to weapons that increased their efficacy. By the end of the seventeenth century, Amerindian warriors brought scalps to their European allies in exchange for bounties. This exchange offered an alternative to trading pelts, particularly during wartime disruptions in hunting or trade. By the end of the century and into the 1700s Native American men joined provincial regiments, sometimes under Indian officers, for whom scalp bounties supplemented wages.

Native warriors collected bounties from colonial officials who attempted to augment their martial power by encouraging Indian men to attack settlers’ enemies. Dutch, English, and French colonies offered bounties more frequently throughout the seventeenth century. However, by the advent of the Imperial Wars practices in New England diverged from those in New France. While French governors-

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general continued offering rewards primarily to their Indian allies in amounts that changed very little throughout the period, New England legislators increasingly offered greater amounts in bounties intended to animate their own populations. By the eighteenth century the practice generated a new enterprise among colonial men, that of scalp-hunting.

Throughout the 1500s and into the early 1600s, Europeans traded most often with Algonquians. This was largely a circumstance of location. Native Americans living along the Atlantic coast primarily spoke Algonquian dialects. Iroquoian villages further inland placed the Five Nations beyond the first wave of European settlements. In the late sixteenth century Iroquois-Algonquian rivalries expanded for a variety of reasons – many linked to the increasing European presence along the Atlantic. These conflicts represented an ongoing struggle for regional power, a contest that often drew European allies into the fray, and in which body parts like those of the unfortunate Dutch soldiers, played a central role in the language of that dispute.

Several events in the late 1500s and early 1600s influenced Iroquois relations with their neighbors. First, the disappearance of Jacques Cartier’s Iroquoian allies along the St. Lawrence River meant that settlers of New France affiliated with the Algonquians who moved in to replace them. All of these Algonquian nations “were at war with at least some of the [Iroquois] Five Nations by the first decade of the seventeenth century” and blocked Iroquoian access to French trade goods. Second, the Susquehannocks, an Iroquoian group culturally distinct from the Five Nations Iroquois, moved into the Susquehanna River valley and gained access to European wares from the Chesapeake, hindering their

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233 The Hurons are an obvious and extremely important exception to this statement. As Iroquoians they demonstrate the complexity of inter- and intra-people relationships in Native North America. French-Huron relations developed in the 1630s. Prior to this, the Algonquian-Iroquoian enmity drove conflicts in the region and drew Europeans into war against Iroquoians. Richard White’s argument for including the Huron (and others such as the (Siouian) Winnebago) in the overarching “Algonquian” grouping for his study of the pays d’en haut provides a convincing extension of this dynamic. Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The Huron had more in common with the Algonquian peoples of the region than with their Iroquoian linguistic cousins. While placing the Huron under the Algonquian cultural umbrella is problematic, I believe it reveals more in this particular study than it obscures.

234 The Iroquoian villages along the St. Lawrence River that Cartier encountered in the early sixteenth century had disappeared entirely by Champlain's entrance into the region in the early 1600s.

235 White, *Middle Ground*, xi-xii.
transport to Iroquoia. Third, the flow of wampum – the purple and white beads fashioned from the whelk and quahog shells found predominantly along the coasts of Long Island Sound – had dried up significantly by the 1630s and what remained fell under Dutch control. Finally, Dutch presence along the Hudson River provided a new source for European trade and alliance.

Events of the 1620s suggest a stronger economic motivation for Iroquois attacks on the Mahicans than in the campaigns against their linguistic cousins, the Huron, following the epidemics of the 1630s. Hostility between the Mohawks and Mahicans had endured for at least a generation by the time Dutch settlers established Fort Orange (Albany) in 1624. Traders at Fort Orange continued to traffic primarily with (Algonquian) Mahican Indians in their immediate vicinity a precedent set by Dutch inhabitants of the earlier Fort Nassau (situated across the river at Castle Island), so that during the first quarter of the seventeenth century, “the Mahican tribe loomed larger on the Dutch horizon … than did the Mohawk.” This left the Mohawk at a disadvantage, with no direct access to European firearms or the wampum produced on Long Island, but it also insulated them from the first waves of European disease that coastal

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236 Richter, Ordeal, 53.
238 Jose Antonio Brandao offers convincing refutation to the economic Beaver Wars emphasis that has dominated historiography of Iroquois warfare and diplomacy following George Hunt. His argument that economic motives, as Europeans understood them, were ancilliary to Iroquois warfare objectives provides an important counterpoint to the trade-only argument prevalent in Hunt and many writers. He effectively re-centers the identification of Iroquois motives away from the myopic focus on trade goods and toward more complex objectives such as demographic renewal, territorial defense, individual and group status, and martial spirit that a fuller understanding of mourning war and Iroquois culture suggest. Necessarily, Brandao contrasts these motives with a purely economic one. This casts economics as a category that can somehow be extracted from cultural objectives and meanings, as if trade relations existed apart from cultural values that reflect status or power. While isolating economics in this way helps Brandao re-evaluate and re-direct historical study of the Iroquois, I understand economics as a broader category in which exchange of goods occurs along a spectrum and reflects, in part, a group’s needs or values. Brandao, Your Fyre, chapter 4. See, for instance, Lynn Ceci, “The Value of Wampum among the New York Iroquois: A Case Study in Artifact Analysis,” Journal of Anthropological Research 38 (1982); Lynn Ceci, “Native Wampum as a Peripheral Resource in the Seventeenth-Century World-System,” in The Pequots of Southern New England: The Fall and Rise of an American Indian Nation, eds. Laurence M. Hauptman and James D. Wherry, The Civilization of the American Indian (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 48-65.
239 Mahicans, like other Algonquians in this section, spoke an Eastern Algonquian dialect similar to the Munsee and Wappinger languages. Mahican homelands bordered the river valleys in what is now eastern New York and western New England. Mahican settlements ranged from southern Lake Champlain and the eastern side of Lake George, east of Schoharie Creek and south along the Hudson River valley. Trelease, Indian Affairs NY, 34.
Native Americans encountered. As trade developed at Fort Orange, the Mohawk focused their attacks on the Mahicans, who appealed to van Kriekenbeeck for help in confronting this increased hostility. 240

Mohawk attacks impeded Mahican hunting efforts and stalled trade at the fort in 1626. Responding to the Mahican request, Kriekenbeeke led his small party against a Mohawk village, but was ambushed on the way. While official Dutch policy dictated “strict neutrality in Indian disputes [unless] they were unavoidable or were assured of success,” Kriekenbeeke likely had confidence in the latter. 241 Following their rout of Kriekenbeeck’s party, Mohawks began subjugating the Mahicans, many of whom “abandoned all their lands on the west side of the Hudson River and concentrated their villages …[around] Fort Orange” in following years. 242 Thereafter, Mohawks began to appear regularly to trade at the fort, initiating a relationship that blossomed over subsequent decades.

241 Trelease, Indian Affairs NY, 47.  
242 Trelease, Indian Affairs NY, 47. Richter notes that when Dutchman Peter Barentsen travelled to the Mohawk region following the attack, Mohawk leaders did not promise an end to such acts, but performed Condolence ceremonies. Richter interprets this as demonstrating the decreasing control of sachems over young warriors. Instead, the timing of the event highlights some other factors. In 1626, the date of the battle involving Kriekenbeeck and his men, the Mohawk-Mahican war was far from over. Any Dutch request for assurances against attacks would have been premature since they were still allies of Mohawk enemies. Additionally, the notion of hierarchical control over young warriors by Iroquoian headmen belies the very structure of Iroquoian society described by Richter and other historians. Particularly if the leaders with whom Barentsen met were civil chiefs, they would have been in no position to control young warriors operating under the mourning war construct, as they would have been urged to action by powerful women, and was action outside the realm of the civil chiefs. Lastly, the argument for increasing independence of young Iroquoian men is most logically placed in the context of rapid demographic shifts resulting from population decimation by European disease and an increased reliance on the fur trade as a means to ensure economic livelihood. In the early seventeenth century, most Iroquois nations remained largely insulated (by the very Algonquians they hoped to remove) from the waves of European diseases that would hit in the ensuing decades (see below). Iroquois had indeed been involved in the fur trade for decades, but the opening of a route to Fort Orange provided the impetus for the mid-century Beaver Wars. This suggests that while economic shifts were well underway, the full force of these changes and the impact they would have for inter-generational conflict (perhaps built into Iroquoian society by the military imperative and the separation of civil and war chief duties) was yet to come. Richter, Ordeal, 56; Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 112-114. For a critique of the Beaver War thesis, see: William Vecsey and Christopher Engelbrecht, Iroquois: The Development of a Native World, The Iroquois and Their Neighbors (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005); Elisabeth Toooker and William N. Fenton, “Problems Arising from the Historic North-Eastern Position of the Iroquois,” in An Iroquois Source Book, The North American Indian (New York: Garland Publishing, 1940; reprint, 1940); William N. Fenton and Elisabeth Toooker, “Mohawk,” in HNAI 15, 466-480; Hunt, Wars of the Iroquois; Daniel K. Richter, “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser. 40, no. 4 (1983): 528-559; Dean Alan Kolata and Dean Snow, The Iroquois, The Peoples of America (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994); Elisabeth Toooker, “Women in Iroquois Society,” in Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroquoian Studies, eds. Jack Campisi, Michael Foster, and Marianne Mithun (Albany, NY: Center for the History of the American Indian of the Newberry Library, State University of New York Press, 1984), 109-124; Bruce G. Trigger and Elisabeth Toooker, “History of Research,” in HNAI 15, 4-15.
The violence of Mohawk-Mahican war conformed to customary tactics and rituals. Both Amerindian groups lived within a “fort … built against their enemies;” Mohawk warriors used arrows, reflecting their lack of firearms; Mohawks “devoured” one Dutch man “after having well roasted him. The rest they burnt.” Survivors described Mohawks dismembering a fellow soldier, shot while he tried to escape. Although more frequent in Iroquoia, garrisoned dwellings do appear in the archaeological record alongside evidence of dismemberment – including limb removal and indications of cannibalism. The limbs, “carried … home to be divided among their families, as a sign that [the Mohawk warriors] had conquered their enemies,” reflect customary rituals of community: resource division and martial success, while confirming the prowess of individual warriors.

Previous historians have labeled the Five Nation aggression of the mid-1600s “Beaver Wars” for the role they played in extending Iroquois reach into fur-rich areas as hunting depleted beaver stock in Iroquoia. But replenishing the declining Iroquois population was at least as important an imperative compelling the Five Nations into waves of conflict throughout the seventeenth century. By mid-century, “wars that mixed demographic and economic motives” attained a new “scale, duration, and persistence.”

In the early 1630s a northern route into Iroquoia brought French goods and epidemics of smallpox and measles into the region. Following the first documented smallpox epidemic among the Iroquois in 1634, the Seneca, Onondaga, Cayuga and Oneida attacked the Huron Confederacy. Again the violence conformed to traditional motives, providing captives whose linguistic and cultural parallels

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243 Steele, Warpaths, 114.
244 NNN, 84.
245 Brandao, Fyre, chapter 4.
246 Richter, Ordeal, 60. Such widespread warfare had historical precedents. Recent archaeological evidence suggests Iroquois warriors had visited similar attacks on their neighbors centuries earlier in the eras leading up to the creation of the Iroquois League. Burials and refuse piles from these attest to regular, heavy attacks that resulted in tremendous casualty numbers. Williamson, “Preliminary Report,” 120-122.
Iroquois' campaigns against the Hurons in the 1630s fit Iroquoian patterns for large-scale, organized expeditions. Typically undertaken against traditional foes, this form of warfare required council approval, coordination between civil and war chiefs from different villages, and the collective action of several captains and their groups of warriors. Regular trade with the French supplied the Hurons with a variety of European goods, and their location provided access to desirable northern furs, adding an economic incentive for the Iroquois warriors. Success would provide access to those resources.

Compared to this and similar large campaigns, raiding parties operated more liberty. Such expeditions did not require council deliberation and small numbers of warriors might launch them without their village leaders’ knowledge, although chiefs usually condoned such demonstrations of warrior skill.

Similar principles for both large and small war parties governed Algonquian warfighting. As devastating disease undercut community coherence and undermined village social structures, small raids offered young warriors opportunities for valor even when the community could not support large-scale expeditions. Raids continued to adhere to mourning war complex strategies that emphasized population revitalization through captives and scalps.

In the 1640s colonists introduced a new dynamic to North American violence: bounties. Colonial authorities initially offered trucking cloth or other items, as New Englanders had during the Pequot War, to persuade both Indian allies and their own settlers to attack their Native American and European

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248 Richter, Ordeal, 60.
249 Brandao, Dissertation, 95-100; Brandao, Your Fyre, 32-33.
250 Brandao, Fyre, 32-34.
enemies. Although they sometimes accepted them, rewards did not fundamentally change the motives of Indian warriors who remained firmly grounded in mourning war imperatives and continued to seek the physical and symbolic repopulation of their communities through captives and scalps. Europeans, ready to manipulate what they saw as internecine conflicts to their advantage, and eager to have their allies do their dirty work, encouraged attacks that served colonial purposes. By the mid-seventeenth century, colonial officials had moved beyond cloth and trinkets and instead offered payment in wampum and eventually currency for the corporeal trophies their allies brought from the battlefield setting the stage for what eventually became a market in body parts. Their language illuminates their intent. While New England officials had offered “rewards” or “gifts” to Indians who brought them Pequot body parts in the 1630s, colonists began using “bounty” to describe subsequent awards, a term applied to militia enlistment bonuses and compensation for reducing local wolf and wild cat populations.253

Bounty offers on wild animals required trappers produce the head or scalp of the beast in order to claim their reward. Many laws stipulated different amounts according to the age and sex of the animal. When they began offering rewards for Indian scalps, legislators conformed to these precedents revealing the similarity they saw between animals who attacked colonial livestock and the “wild . . . multitudes” of “savage barbarians” who seemed “readier to fill [the colonists’] sides with arrows than otherwise.”254

Like settlers’ complaints against wolves and wild cats, many early conflicts with neighboring Indians arose over colonial livestock. As European settlements expanded, so did their herds that roamed, unchecked through the northeastern underbrush. English and Dutch farmers fenced their crops, but rarely

253 The French did not commonly offer an enlistment bounty during this period, for reasons discussed below. Wolf bounties appear in the Massachusetts Colonial books as early as the 1630s. John Coleman has made much of the English relations with wolves, see: Brandao, Fyre, chapter 3; see Steele, Warpaths, 49 for the South African analogy. Rick McIntyre has significantly researched the topic of human-wolf relations. Rick McIntyre, ed., War Against the Wolf: America’s Campaign to Exterminate the Wolf (Stillwater, MN: Voyageur Press, 1995), and compare Jon T. Coleman, Vicious: Wolves and Men in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

their livestock. Unfenced Indian maize fields attracted wandering colonial hogs and cattle that were harassed by native dogs and sometimes killed by frustrated Amerindian farmers.255

When William Kieft took over the governorship of New Netherland in 1638, the colony’s population still numbered fewer than one thousand. That number doubled by 1643 and as Dutch settlement grew, so did conflict with neighboring Indians.256 The Governor and Council passed a series of laws attempting to rein in the colonists and their animals, with little effect.

In March of 1640 and again in May of the same year, to address the “daily” Indian complaints that “their Corn hills are trampled,” the council imposed fines on trespassing livestock.257 A later act warned that continued damage would destroy corn harvests and cause neighboring Indians “to entertain feelings of hatred against our Nation.”258 But the same day the council passed an ordinance “Providing for the Arming and mustering of the Militia,” suggesting the threshold had already been crossed.259

Dutch-Indian relations began a rapid decline in September 1639, when the Dutch council passed a “Resolution to exact tribute from the Indians in maize, fur or wampum” to offset the costs of “fortification and the maintenance of soldiers.”260 Insisting that West India Company Directors had issued “express orders to exact the contribution from the Indians,” Governor Kieft justified the tax on the grounds that local Indians had benefitted from Dutch protection.261 Whatever the origins, the ominous

256 Trelease argues that population increased in response to the expanding fur trade (despite the company’s 1638 attempt to control it) and allow all New Netherland residents to trade with Indians and ship goods to and from the. A new charter of Freedoms and Exemptions, published in 1640, confirmed these changes. Trelease, *Indian Affairs NY*, 60-61.
258 *LONN*, 21-22.
259 *LONN*, 22.
261 Trelease describes this rationale as “completely specious since that service was neither asked for nor rendered.” Trelease, *Indian Affairs NY*, 65; *DRCNY*, 8:6.
provision that “any tribe, who will not willingly consent to contribute” should expect colonists “to induce them … by the most suitable means,” indicated they anticipated resistance.\textsuperscript{262}

Less than a year later, Dutch colonists got what they expected. In the Spring of 1640, Raritan Indians “instead of sowing the customary friendship” threatened the Dutch commissary when he “arrived at the annual trading place.”\textsuperscript{263} Boarding the ship with their weapons, the Indians taunted the crew, offering to sell them squirrels (rather than beaver pelts) and “slapping” the captain in the face with them.\textsuperscript{264} When members of the same people allegedly killed some pigs on Staten Island, in July 1640 Kieft sent a company of seventy men under the colony’s Secretary, Cornelis van Thienhoven, to “attack them, to cut down their corn and to make as many prisoners as they can, unless they … make reparation.”\textsuperscript{265} The men “wished to kill and plunder” and despite van Thienhoven’s protests, “killed several of the savages, and brought the brother of the chief a prisoner,” whom they tortured as their sloop returned to Fort Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{266} In ordering the expedition, Kieft clearly did not understand the degree to which violence would beget retributive violence in North America.

Discontent spread as “the Company’s sloop” appeared at Native villages “for the purpose of levying a contribution.”\textsuperscript{267} When the ship arrived to collect from Indians along the Hudson River, they expressed their “surprise[e] that the Sachem[Kieft], who was now at the Fort, dare exact it; and he must be a very mean fellow to come to live in this country without being invited by them, and now wish to compel them to give him their corn for nothing.”\textsuperscript{268}

After an attack on Staten Island killed four tenants and burned a farm in June 1641, Governor Kieft urged other Indians in the region “to take up arms” against the Raritans, whom he blamed for the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{262} NNN, 322, 334; DRCNY, 1:332, 338.
\item \textsuperscript{263} DRCNY, 8:6, 22. Raritan Indians spoke a Munsee dialect, part of the Eastern Algonquian language group. They, like the Tappans, Haverstraws, Wiechquaeskecks, Hackensacks, Tankitekes, and others who lived in what is now northern New Jersey, New York Harbor, and the Hudson River outlet, became identified as Delawares after their later move from their seventeenth century homelands. Ives Goddard, “Easter Algonquian Languages,” in HNAI 15, 70-77; Ives Goddard, “Delaware,” HNAI 15, 213-239.
\item \textsuperscript{264} DRCNY, 8:6-7.
\item \textsuperscript{265} DRCNY, 8:6-7.
\item \textsuperscript{266} DRCNY, 8:7.
\item \textsuperscript{267} NNN, 209.
\item \textsuperscript{268} NNN, 209.
\end{itemize}
violence.\textsuperscript{269} Unable to prevent further attacks on “remote settlers” due to the density of the forest and small number of men,” the Governor and Council sought to “encourage the Indians, our allies hereabout … to cut off any stray parties” of Indians to prevent further attacks.\textsuperscript{270} Perhaps recognizing that what friends they did have might not be willing to attack other Indians simply because the Dutch asked them to, “[a]nd in order to incite them the more, [Kieft and the Council] promised them, Ten fathoms of Wampum for each head of the … Raritans, and 20 fathoms of Wampum for every head of the Indians who have most barbarously murdered our people on Staten Island.”\textsuperscript{271} Kieft had established the first clear bounty for corporeal trophies in North America, and simultaneously established a political calculus that equated Indian enemies with predatory animal populations.

The Dutch bounty differs from the gifts New Englanders provided in exchange for Pequot body parts in offering itemized payment rather than unspecified presents. Gifts of trucking cloth built upon the reciprocal, and quasi-military aspect of Native American trade alliances. But enumerating lengths of wampum established a monetary value for Raritan heads, transforming body parts into commodities. An earlier ordinance “regulating the Currency of Wampum” made explicit the Dutch understanding of wampum’s monetary function. Outlining different values, in terms of Dutch coin, for varying qualities of wampum, colonial authorities effectively established an exchange rate that privileges “good, polished Wampum, commonly called Manhattan Wampum,” over which they had a monopoly, and the “rough, unpolished stuff which is brought hither from other places.”\textsuperscript{272} Kieft’s offer of “payment” rather than reciprocal gifts shifted the framework for the exchange of corporeal trophies, at least in Dutch terms.

Yet, while the escalation of the practice in subsequent centuries confers an ominous significance to Kieft’s bounty offer, it was largely ineffectual in 1641. Far from initiating an immediate, dramatic shift in warfare practices, strings of wampum did not induce parties of Amerindians to war New Netherland’s

\textsuperscript{269} NNN, 209.
\textsuperscript{270} LONN, 28.
\textsuperscript{271} LONN, 28-29.
\textsuperscript{272} LONN, 26.
In fact, only one warrior appears to have brought a trophy to the Dutch that year. It wasn’t a head, and he didn’t bring it for the bounty.

In early November 1641, the Tankitekes leader, Pacham, arrived at Fort Amsterdam “in great triumph.” He brought a “dead hand hanging on a stick … saying it was the hand of the chief who had killed [the Dutch] … on Staten Island.” However, no documents record a bounty paid to Pacham or to anyone else in 1641. For his part, Pacham explained his motivation as friendship – certainly understood as alliance – rather than reward, informing the Dutch “he had taken revenge for [their] sake, because he loved the Swannekens (as they call the Dutch) who were his best friends.” Pacham situated his actions within the context of alliance among Algonquian sachems: as “a chief of the savages of Tankitekes,” who “was great with the governor of the fort” bringing the hand of a common enemy demonstrated that alliance and repaired the Dutch loss. Sachem to sachem, Pachem’s action demonstrated equality, not the power of economic encouragement.

That no record of a bounty payment remains is hardly remarkable from an historical perspective. Certainly, records of such a payment could easily have disappeared over time, or in the shipwreck which eventually cost Governor Kieft his life on his return to Holland. But Pacham likely received little or nothing. Such a breach of Native American protocol could prove disastrous to relationships between the Dutch and the Indians. Pacham likely expected gifts as reciprocal affirmation of the alliance his delivery of the trophy represented. Instead, over the next eighteen months Indian frustration with Kieft’s lack of appreciation for the rules of...
diplomacy escalated as a series of violent encounters between individual settlers and Indians drove the groups further apart. The attempt’s impotence, though belied by its infamy, suggests that the social value of a scalp within Native American society outweighed the price Kieft was willing to pay. Bounties did not translate into warrior status, nor did they effectively incite a war for which cultural cause was lacking in the Indian community.

In February of 1643, upwards of eighty warriors from up the Hudson River near Fort Orange, “each with a gun on his shoulder,” descended on the Wiechquaeskecks and Tappans, whose location gave them access to wampum from Long Island Sound, demanding tribute. While sources differ regarding the warriors’ origins, the victims’ response suggests the attackers intended the tribute for their own communities, not on the Dutch behalf. When violence began, hundreds of local Indians fled to Dutch settlements seeking protection.

Unwilling to intervene in a war with “the Indians from Fort Orange [Albany] who were also our friends,” settlers turned to the Governor for assistance. Kieft had something very different in mind. Persuaded by other settlers to use this opportunity to “wipe the mouths” of the Indians fleeing to New Amsterdam, some of them the same people who had allied with the Dutch against the Raritans less than eighteen months earlier.

Kieft visited ferocious violence on his former allies. Dutch colonists swept into Indian villages shooting the inhabitants and burning the towns. Looking across at nearby Pavonia from Fort Amsterdam,

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280 Haefeli, “Kieft’s War,” 20-22; NNN, 276.
283 NNN, 225-226. The authorization and the earlier permission to do so from the governing body of the Twelve Men appear on the same pages.
de Vries “saw nothing but firing and heard the shrieks of the savages murdered in their sleep.”

Following their return to the Fort, “the soldiers were rewarded for their services.” The assault at Pavonia was only the beginning.

When their former friend, “Pacham, a crafty man, ran through all the villages urging the Indians to a general massacre,” the Dutch expressed dismay. But trade and alliance interwove Amerindian groups in the region through relationships that long antedated Dutch settlement. When David de Vries travelled to one Long Island village amid the early violence, he encountered an Indian who lived “half a league from my farm-house in Vriessendael.” Asked why he and his family were so far from home, “[t]hey answered that they were out a hunting with these Indians, and had friends among them.” The nuances of Indian relationships and diplomacy evaded Kieft.

War failed to improve the Governor’s aptitude for Indian relations. As peace resumed, one chief observed that several younger men were “constantly wishing for a war,” because the Dutch gifts to compensate their losses seemed insufficient. When “commander Kieft told this savage that he was a chief of the Indians and must kill these young madcaps … and he would give him two hundred fathoms of zeewan [wampum]” as a reward, a Dutch party to the conversation, laughed at the Governor’s ignorance. “It is true that they do so towards each other, when they are at enmity with each other, but not at the will of foreigners,” he advised Kieft. Bounties failed direct Indian warfare to serve Dutch purposes. Even the Indians “from Fort Orange [who] wanted to levy a contribution upon the savages of Wick-quaogeck and Tapaen” in 1643 appear to have acted in their own interest rather than at European behest.

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284 NNN, 225-227, 276.
285 NNN, 228.
286 NNN, 227.
287 NNN, 278-279.
288 NNN, 278-279.
289 NNN, 230.
290 NNN, 230.
292 NNN, 225-226. Identified as “Mayekander” Indians in the text, a designation commonly translated as Mahicans, most historians have understood the attackers as Mohawks (see Trelease, *Indian Affairs NY*, 71, note 30). At least one scholar has interpreted these attackers as attempting to procure the tribute on behalf of the Dutch following
Despite the Dutch Governor’s attempts, Native American war fighting adhered to customary motives in which corporeal trophies fulfilled vital cultural roles, more valuable than the wampum Kieft offered.

Unlike the Dutch, New England colonists enjoyed a period of relative peace between 1638 and 1675. The price for this peace fell on their Algonquian neighbors who procured the respite through regular land sales to the encroaching Englishmen. The armistice “depended explicitly on these land transfers which … presumed the physical separation of indigenous and colonizing peoples.” 293 English appetite for land, fed by a population committed to farming and animal husbandry, “led more toward apartheid than cultural engagement with native peoples.” 294 While social distance brought a brief period of concord to New England, that peace grew increasingly tenuous as English-Indian relations proved more complex and their isolation less complete than early land purchases indicated.

Unsettled land dwindled along with Native patience as English settlements expanded until friction seemed to envelop nearly every social arena by the late 1660s. The execution of three Wampanoag men for the murder of John Sassamon, an Indian convert and intercultural diplomat, fanned the various sparks into a war that erupted in June, 1675. 295
During the war against King Philip’s Wampanoags, New Englanders struggled to raise a force large enough to combat their enemies. In response, colonial authorities established bounties similar to Governor Kieft’s, but these rewards differed from earlier presents for Pequot heads in two significant ways. First, the bounty acts offered colonial currency for corporeal trophies, rather than goods in kind. Second, specie appealed to a new audience: colonial settlers, not just ally Indians. Colonial governments instituted these changes in response to the dual exigency posed by novel enemy tactics and settlers’ opposition to military impressments. In the European discourse that condemned postmortem mutilation as a savage act – something entirely outside the capability of the “civilized” English – rewarding the practice sounded a new dissonance.

However, for local officials bounties solved pressing military problems. In the first place, conventional European military tactics proved largely ineffective against Native American warriors. The Massachusetts General Court noted in 1676 that “it is found by experience that troopers & pikemen are of little use in the present warr with the Indians.” In response, the government ordered these soldiers to carry different weapons (muskets) and prepare to fight as “musketeeres” or foot soldiers “any law, usage, or custome to the contrary notwithstanding.” The Court’s instructions recommended new methods but fielding men to deploy them posed additional challenges.

England customarily augmented her military force by impressing men into service, but in New England, “resistance to impressment became a problem immediately after the outbreak of the war and grew epidemically.” The observation that by February 1676 “the present warr with the Indians hath so farr exhausted the country tresury, that there is not a sufficiency to

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296 Cayton and Anderson, *Dominion*, 44.


prosecute the sajd warr to effect” almost certainly complicated matters. Most men, aware of
the strain on the treasury, likely questioned the possibility of pay in addition to resenting
impressments.

To “encourage” men to take up arms against the Wampanoags and their allies,
Massachusetts officials initiated a reward in February 1676 for “every person or persons that
shall surprize, slay, or bring in prisoner any such Indian on the [outskirts of settlement]…, he or
they shall be allowed three pounds per head, or the prisoners so taken, making it appeare to the
committee of militia of that towne to which they are brought.” The award built upon the
existing colonial practice of selling Indians convicted of capital crimes into slavery in lieu of
execution. The stated reward focused on heads, integrating European battlefield practices
(particularly in Ireland) and the measures for enumerating livestock and slaves – counting heads.
This shorthand fit, perhaps too easily, in the English corporeal lexicon in which an individual’s
political personhood could be reduced to this body part.

The English troops who approached Philip’s village of Mount Hope in 1676 discovered
their enemies communicated in the corporeal genre with equal fluency: “some heads, scalps, and
hands cut off from the bodies of some of the English, and stuck upon poles near the highway.”
These signs literally defined the boundaries of power by marking the geographic span of Philip’s
control. While the English described this as “barbarous and inhumane,” they belied their own
history. Less than a hundred years earlier Sir Humphrey Gilbert, an English officer serving in
the conquest of Ireland, had constructed a “lane of hedds” leading to his camp intended to terrify

300 Pulsipher, Subjects, 163.
301 A contemporary example is found earlier in the same volume of the MA Gov Records regarding “Indian Tom”
found guilty of rape and granted clemency by the Court in the commuting of his death sentence to a penalty of ten
years slavery to be served in the West Indies (undoubtedly a de facto death sentence itself). MA Gov Records, 5:47.
303 NNN, 282-283.
local residents who recognized “the heddes of their dedde fathers, brothers, children, kinsfolke, and freendes” into submission.\footnote{William Hubbard, \textit{A Narrative of the Indian Wars in New-England from the First Planting Thereof in the Year 1607, to the Year 1677: Containing a Relation of the Occasion, Rise and Progress of the War with the Indians, in the Southern, Western, Eastern and Northern Pars of Said Country} (Boston: John Boyle, 1775), 63.} Familiar with decapitation as a tool of both state power and terrorism, colonists interpreted Philip’s display as “bidding [them] Defiance.”\footnote{Thomas Churchyard, \textit{A Generall Rehearsall of Warres, Called Churchyarde Choise} (London: n. p., 1579).} But the form of Philip’s challenge formed part of a cultural patois. Algonquians’ display of corporeal trophies seems to have expanded to match English practices. Formerly restricted to ritual dances and the immediate buildings or walls of a fortress, the Indian corporeal displays literally moved out to meet the English at the intersections between the cultures.\footnote{Further evidence of this can be seen in the Indian mutilation of cattle and other English livestock at this time which were often stripped of a leg or a tongue or gruesomely disemboweled and left to wander until they collapsed or were found by the colonists. Hubbard, \textit{Narrative of the Indian Wars}, 63; Andrew Lipman, “‘A Meanes to Knitt Them Togeather’: The Exchange of Body Parts in the Pequot War,” \textit{The William and Mary Quarterly}, 3rd Ser. 65, no. 1 (2008), 8, note 8.} The symbolic richness of bodily mutilation in both cultures made corporeal trophies dynamic sites for intercultural communication.

Colonists unleashed a metaphorical and allegorical arsenal against Philip’s corpse. After shooting Philip ‘through his Venomous and Murderous Heart’ (the seat of his “bloody” passions, affections, and intentions),” Church ordered that “not one of his bones should be buried.”\footnote{Martha Finch, \textit{Dissenting Bodies: Corporealities in Early New England} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 57-58.} The soldiers beheaded and quartered the body (treatment for a traitor), hanging the limbs in the surrounding woods and provided head and hands to Church who initially gave the head and one or both of the hands to “Alderman, the Indian who shot him, to show to such gentlemen as would bestow gratuities upon him.”\footnote{Benjamin Church, \textit{Diary of King Philip’s War, 1675-76}, eds. Alan Simpson and Mary Simpson Chester, CT: Pequot Press, 1975), 156; Pulsipher, \textit{Subjects}, 184.} Alderman “got many a penny by it.”\footnote{Benjamin Church, \textit{The History of King Philip’s War}, Introduction and notes by Henry Martyn Dexter ed. (Boston: John Kimball Wiggin, 1857), 151-2.} Produced as evidence, the trophies verified Alderman as Metacom’s killer and initiated an informal reward system.
through which individual colonists could express their gratitude. Eventually both the head and at least one hand appear to have made their way to the central governments of the Massachusetts colonies. Despite the protests of an earlier generation of English leaders and little evidence of Indians bringing hands during the recent war, Philip’s hand, or hands, were delivered to Boston where they provided proof of the leader’s demise (and thus the colony’s deliverance) due to the marks on one of Philip’s hands, “being much scarred, occasioned by the splitting of a pistol in it formerly.”

Like a fingerprints, the marks authenticated the identity of the deceased.

Colonial authorities awarded Church and his small company the premium of thirty shillings per head for Philip and the others caught with him. Divided among them, it amounted to “Four Shillings and Six Pence a Man,” which Church bemoaned as “scanty reward and poor encouragement.”

Personal aggrandizement through corporeal trophies had expanded to include English colonists themselves. Though English still offered trade goods rather than specie in reward for the “head-skins” of enemy Indians during King Philip’s War, they provided exceptions for individual Indians in the case of extraordinary acts of valor, and it was coinage that worked to “encourage” the English.

Despite his complaints, through his own writing and the praise of colonial pastors and chroniclers, Church soon gained notoriety as new type of colonial hero.

Contemporaries lauded Church as “God[’s] … instrument of signal victories over the Indians,” and read divine Providence in the dismemberment of Philip’s corpse. “[T]aken and

310 Church, Diary, 156.
311 Church, Diary, 156.
destroyed,” Philip, like Ahab, “was hewed in pieces before the Lord.”

His body “cut into four quarters … hanged up as a monument of revenging Justice,” avenged the sufferings of English bodies. Plymouth residents “lined the main street of the village” to view “the head of that Leviathan” that leaders displayed on a pike where it remained, “a remarkable testimony of divine favor [to] the colony.” By the time Cotton Mather visited the colony years later, Plymouth residents had witnessed the skin fall from his rotting visage, leaving only a skull to grin at them. To “put an end to Philip’s blasphemy,” the Boston minister ripped “the Jaw from the exposed Skull” so as “to shut Philip up.” But in silencing Metacom New England authorities had fashioned practices that endured longer than either party could have imagined.

Despite anxiously regulating soldiers’ conduct by requiring prayer and prohibiting profanity in an effort conform them to a moral model worthy of divine beneficence, New Englanders expressed no moral qualms about encouraging acts they described as savage and barbarous. Even when debate over the treatment of the dead appeared, colonists did not question the incentives that rewarded the mutilation. Thus, while some “leaders wrote in distress of the ‘surreptitious, uncivil, if not inhumane deportment towards the living & dead’ by some of the soldiers in the Great Swamp Fight” in which English soldiers under Church slaughtered Wampanoags in a reprise of Pequot War tactics, they make no mention of monetary rewards that awaited those who returned with corporeal mementos of the attack.

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317 Church, *Diary*, 152-153.
The economic incentive offered colonial men a new route by which to advance themselves in society. Church’s own economic ascendance exemplified this. He gained substantially through investment in land, much of which lay on the edges of English settlement, animating his personal interest in expanding English prospects. His military service (not to mention his own publications about it) gained him notoriety and although dissatisfied with his portion reward for King Philip the complaint belied the many other premiums he collected during his career. His estate included two slaves, two servants, nine cows, a (silver) tankard, porringer, plate, pair of salt cellars, and set of spoons (weighing 42 ounces and valued at 25 pounds), in addition to “land at Tiverton” valued at over 180 pounds. No small accomplishment for a carpenter’s son, one of nine children.

When English colonists again sought to rally men for their protection, they returned to a practice that Church’s example seemed to validate. But continued use of such incentives contradicted English judgments regarding proper military conduct. Rewarding Indians for their participation in cooperative military endeavors reinforced the boundaries between savage and civilized practice by supporting Native customs when they aligned with colonial objectives. Such disbursements evoked exchanges based in trade and alliance. But paying English settlers for corporeal trophies blurred the moral categories. Unlike promises of plunder, enlistment bounties, or military wages, scalp bounties rewarded colonists who adopted Amerindian mutilation practices, transforming body parts into commodities woven into a market that drove anti-Indian violence and generated an entrepreneurial hero whose example influenced generations of New England men.
While officials in New France also rewarded Native American allies for their military practices and prowess, but did not extend similar compensation to their own settlers.\(^{318}\) They may not have needed to. By 1669, “the entire male population [of New France] between the ages of sixteen and sixty was, on orders of the King, organized into militia units.”\(^{319}\) While neither officers nor the men they were required to muster periodically were paid, “captains of the militia enjoyed an elevated social status; the men accepted militia service as a proper obligation” and, most significant, “the entire male population was armed, and could be swiftly mobilized.”\(^{320}\) While smaller in number than their English neighbors, this made French settlers more potent in war. After the Iroquois resumed attacks on New France, the Minister of the Marine sent more than “150 *Troupes de la Marine*” to augment the colonial forces, by 1685 these French forces numbered more than 1600 men.\(^{321}\) In part because the troops provided much-needed labor in more peaceful moments, they became well integrated into colonial society.\(^{322}\) Combined with Indian allies and Canadian militia (instituted in New France by order of the King in 1669), a portion of whom had served as members of earlier French regular troops and remained in Canada after their companies were recalled, these forces enabled the Governor-General, Jacques-René de

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\(^{318}\) To date, I have not discovered any document offering bounties or rewards for heads or scalps to French colonists in the seventeenth century. Documents exist in the eighteenth century that do not seem to explicitly state that bounty recipients were assumed to be Indian. A possible exception to this rule is suggested by the remaining *coureurs de bois* or French middlemen (for the fur trade) who often lived among ally Indians for extended periods of time and adopted their culture to various degrees. While most French documentation explicitly differentiates between these Frenchmen and the Indians with whom they lived, it is at least conceivable that in military affairs such a distinction would have been too technical.


\(^{322}\) Eccles, “Military Establishment,” 112.
Brisay, marquis de Denonville, to muster an “impressive . . . 2722 men” against the Seneca in 1687 (eight hundred and thirty-two of whom were *Troupes de la Marine*).\(^{323}\)

In the 1690s, these soldiers played an important role against English, not just Indian, foes in King William’s War. In this and subsequent Wars for Empire, colonial bounties helped to quantify, if not actually to encourage, allied Indian attacks against French enemies: Indian and English alike. An annual tabulation for 1692 noted that in addition to the forty-two scalps taken by Ottawas and Hurons, the Mission Iroquois had brought back “five blond scalps” from English settlements.\(^{324}\)

Some historians suggest this gives French colonists the dubious honor of offering the first bounties for European scalps, but this perspective overemphasizes the novelty of the event, at least in terms of colonial warfare.\(^{325}\) Colonists in New France simply turned an already familiar tactic against the most recent enemy in the region. That this opposing force was English as well as Indian, while significant in the imperial framework of European politics (of which the French Intendant was well aware), was far less significant from a tactical point of view than was the ability to demonstrate success both militarily and diplomatically to a ministry whose desire for detailed control of events was unmitigated by his distance from the region.

The bounties appear to have begun in 1692. On 11 November 1692, Intendant of New France, de Champigny, wrote to the French Minister:

> Nous sommes convenues M. le comte de Frontenac et moy de payer vingt écus blancs pour chaque prisonnier enemy qui luy serait amené, dix escus pour chaque prisonnière et pareille somme pour chaque enemy tué dont la chêvelure serait apportée, ce qui a donné lieu à une augmentation de dépense fort considerable.\(^{326}\)

\(^{323}\) Steele, *Warpaths*, 136 (“2722 men” and *troupes de la marine* numbers). Steele’s discussion (73-77) of military strength in New France omits the 1683-1685 troop assignments, but he draws much of his information from Eccles, “Military Establishment,” 110-114. Eccles includes these later companies that brought the regular troop numbers to 1600 in 1685. Eccles cites ANC, C11A, vol. 9, 105-107.

\(^{324}\) Eccles, “Military Establishment,” 112-113. See also Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 5 Oct 1692, Moreau de St. Méry, Archives Nationales de la France, 44-46.


\(^{326}\) Champigny au Ministre, October 1692, Collection Moreau de Méry, Archives Nationales de la France, 44.
We have agreed, the count Frontenac and myself, to pay twenty white (silver) Ecu[es] for each male enemy prisoner brought in, ten Ecu[es] for each female prisoner and the same sum for each killed enemy whose scalp is produced, this has increased our expenses considerably.\(^\text{327}\)

Louis XIV did not agree with the policy. But his opprobrium was based in financial, rather than moral scruples. In a memorandum to Frontenac and de Champigny, the French King (through his personal secretary) admonished Frontenac and his Intendant Jean Bochart de Champigny for the reward they were paying to allied Indians, rendered as “Sauvages chrestiens.”\(^\text{328}\)

\[\text{Sa Ma}^{\text{î}}\text{e veut qu’ils se conforment à l’ordre qu’elle leur a donné l’année dernière pour faire cesser le payement au Sauvages chrestiens de 10 escus blancs pour chaque home Sauvage tué; et de 20 escus pour chaque prisonnier et de moitié pour les femmes, ce qui fera encore une diminution sur led. Projet.}
\[\text{Cette despense ne se peut supporter …}\(^\text{329}\)

His Majesty desires that they conform themselves to the order he gave them last year, to cease paying the Christian Indians 10 silver ecus for every Indian killed, 20 ecus for each prisoner, and half these sums for women; this will be a further diminution of the estimate. This expense cannot be afforded …\(^\text{330}\)

Admonishing Frontenac and de Champigny for the high price they were paying for scalps and prisoners, the King urged the Governor and Intendant to “work harder to economize in their expenses,” believing that “two Ecus or more for each male prisoner and one for each female prisoner or individual killed” would be sufficient.\(^\text{331}\)

The King’s order to reduce the bounty on scalps formed part of attempts to control costs in the colony. France was fiscally strapped at the end of the seventeenth century, and regular warfare with her European neighbors had put the kingdom under additional economic pressure. Louis XIV wanted success

\[^{327}\text{Author’s translation. For monetary value, see Appendices. This concurs with “Memoire du Roi au Gouverneur de Frontenac et a l’Intendant Bochart Champigny,” (1693?) in Rapport de l’Archiviste de la Province de Quebec (1927-1928): hereafter cited as RAPQ, 125.}
\[^{328}\text{Lozier, “Lever des Chevelures,” 2.}
\[^{330}\text{RAPQ (1927-1928), 90. This is a translation of the above citation from RAPQ. O’Callaghan dates the letter 1694, but the first line of the letter notes that the previous year was 1692. Thus, the letter was probably penned in 1693, though it is possible that receipt of the correspondence was delayed until early 1694.}
\[^{331}\text{RAPQ (1927-1928), 139, 144 (author’s translation).} \]
in New France, but at a price he could afford. For the French Crown Frontenac’s reward for prisoners and scalps represented an excessive financial cost, not a moral conundrum. King Louis XIV actually offered his tacit approval of the practice in arguing over the amount rather than the bounty itself, and scalps continued to appear regularly in the correspondence between New France and Versailles.332

For Indian warriors, it is unlikely that bounties (whether for Indian or European scalps) provided a primary motive for their actions. Scalps they surrendered to colonial officials evidenced their continued alliance with France, a fact that colonial officials used in their correspondence with royal ministers. From the French perspective these trophies were emblematic of Indian participation in an attack. Further correspondence on the topic reveals that the amount was offered to ally Indians, not French soldiers or colonial militia.333 These bounties operated in a creative space of mis-communication between cultures that helps to explain both the rewards’ ability to encourage Indian warriors to help the French and their failure to do so when offered by the English.

Frontenac, Governor of New France during King William’s War, argued the bounties were “the most useful expenditure we could make, being the surest means of destroying the Iroquois Indians,” although he may not have understood why.334 The practice of paying mercenaries to fight on one’s behalf had a long history in Europe. Native warriors fulfilled a parallel need in New France and not unlike European mercenaries, Native warriors who joined French military campaigns accomplished a variety of aims, some communal, others individual. Yet some of these purposes differed substantially from European mercenaries’ motives. Native Americans joined one another in war, much as allies did in Europe, but in mourning war cultures this collaboration aimed to alleviate a community’s grief and loss a community by replacing deceased individuals. By returning from an attack with prisoners and scalps for

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332 DRCNY, 1:573.
torture or adoption, warriors repaired the social rift. On an individual basis, trophies conferred status on individual warriors.

Frontenac only had a vague understanding of the function of scalps in Native American warfare and culture. But unlike Kieft, Frontenac experienced relative success in encouraging Algonquians to fight for the interests of New France by offering rewards for enemy scalps. French bounties were effective for two primary reasons. First, and most important, by the seventeenth century the French had already demonstrated a history of alliance and cooperation with their Algonquian neighbors. The French had willingly assisted their allies in war against other Native Americans, notably the Iroquois. Second, Frontenac kept bounties at a level that avoided insult. When the King asked him to reduce the bounty to 2 ecus per male prisoner and 1 ecu for every female prisoner and scalp, Frontenac argued that the amount would be insufficient.335 Assuring the King that he would certainly follow orders and reduce the reward, he then launched into a pointed defense of the amount.

This also explains, in part, bounties’ failure to persuade Indian warriors to fight on behalf of the Dutch and English. The Dutch, at least under Kieft, were simply bad allies except insofar as they were good trading partners. Militarily, they failed to hold up their part of the alliance when it no longer suited them, but their willingness to provide muskets to the Mohawk – “as many as four hundred” – from 1643 to 1645 compensated for their deficiency as warriors. The English had already isolated themselves from most of the surrounding Native American communities. The very separation that had maintained the peace when land could be bought helped to create the desperation for troops when King Philip’s war hit. The English had long proved themselves to be poor allies: from the Pequot War and their voracious appetite for land the English had little to offer their neighboring Indians and found themselves unable to entice Indian warriors to join them when the Wars for Empire began. The French who followed Champlain’s example had already proven their willingness to fight alongside their allies. Bounties made sense not as a means to entice Indians to fight (as many Europeans understood them), but as part of the reciprocal gift-exchange essential to mourning war culture. By 1694, Frontenac had put much of the

335 RAPQ (1927-1928), 90-91, 202, 143-144.
King’s money behind this belief. New France was still paying 30 livres (10 ecus) for a single scalp.\textsuperscript{336} He was still offering this amount when he wrote to the King promising to follow “exactly what His Majesty prescribes for us regarding … the reward that had been offered for each Iroquois killed or taken prisoner, we are curtailing [it], as he orders.”\textsuperscript{337} The bounties, however, continued through the end of the war.

Despite debates over their expense, New France’s scalp bounties never approximated the amounts offered in New England. In 1696, Massachusetts offered “Fifty pounds per head for every Indian man, and twenty five pound per head for any Indian woman or Child … the Scalps … to be produced and delivered to the Commissioner” of War.\textsuperscript{338}

Table 1. Money of Account Denominations in the 1690s\textsuperscript{339}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ecu de Change</th>
<th>Livre Tournois</th>
<th>Sou Tournois</th>
<th>Pound (£)</th>
<th>Shilling (s)</th>
<th>Pence (d)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.1 French Money of Account</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
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Table 2. Rates of Exchange, 1696 and 1697\textsuperscript{340}

- **1696**: MA \textsuperscript{341} £1.3 = £1 (Sterling)
- **1697**: MA £1.35 = £1 (Sterling)

The rate for livres tournois (monnaie de France) and Canadian livres (monnaie du pays), established by the King in November 1672, remained stable until 1727.\textsuperscript{342} That rate was: 133.33 livres (monnaie du pays) per 100 livres tournois (monnaie de France).

Table 3. Comparative Colonial Bounty Values 1696 and 1697\textsuperscript{343}

- **1696 Massachusetts**: £50 (colonial currency, Old Tenor)
  - Value in £ Sterling: £38.46
- **1697 New France**: 10 Ecus (monnaie du pays)
  - Value in £ Sterling: £1.51

\textsuperscript{339} MA A\&R, 7:116. For clarity I have omitted the British Crown (4 Crown = 1 Pound; 1 Crown = 5 Shillings) and Farthing (1 Pence = 4 Farthings) as they rarely appear in the colonial records relevant to scalp bounties.

\textsuperscript{340} McCusker, Money and Exchange, 146-148.

\textsuperscript{341} Given in Old Tenor, as Massachusetts paper bills of credit, denominated in accordance with money of account, was called before 1750, when it was redeemed. I have used the annual average exchange rate for each year. For rates of English exchange, I employed the more stable London on Massachusetts rate given in McCusker’s table 3.2, McCusker, Money and Exchange, 146-150.

\textsuperscript{342} The “monnaie du pays” was money of French colonies compared to the “monnaie de France” or currency in France. For New France this value was set at 133.33 livres (monnaie du pays) per 100 livres tournois (monnaie de France) by the arrêt of 18 November 1672 and remained stable until 1727. There was no French livre coin, it existed purely as a money of account. McCusker, Money and Exchange, 282.

\textsuperscript{343} McCusker, Money and Exchange, 35, 88.
Thus, the 1696 Massachusetts bounty on men’s scalps (£50 in MA Old Tenor) amounted to twenty-five times the Frontenac’s offer a year later.

In March of 1697, Abenaki Indians attacked Haverhill on the northeastern borderlands of the Massachusetts Bay colony. On the 15th, the raiding party reached the Dustan residence, captured Hannah Dustan and Mary Neff, and marched the two captives to an Indian settlement over one hundred miles away. 344 There they met another captive, fourteen-year-old Samual Leonardson. 345 On the night of March 29, Dustan, Neff, and Leonardson waited until their Indian captors fell asleep and then attacked them with hatchets, killing ten of the twelve – two men, two women, and six children, probably an extended family. 346 The English trio began their escape but returned, at Hannah’s urging, to scalp the dead and then fled. They arrived in Haverhill several days later with the scalps. In June the Massachusetts General Court voted to pay fifty pounds to Hannah and her companions: twenty-five pounds to Dustan, and twelve pounds ten shillings to each of her accomplices. 347 Hannah also received informal gifts and sermons lauding her actions: Samuel Sewall, whom she visited in May, gave her “part of Connecticut flax” and Cotton Mather honored her as an embodiment of the Biblical Jael. 348

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344 Her last name is variously spelled Dustin, Duston, Dustan, and Durstan in the historical record. I follow the spelling that appears in Cotton Mather’s writing, the earliest and most frequently quoted recording of the tale.
345 Also spelled Samual Leonardson.
346 March 29, 1697, according to McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, 91, 139, 142, 147, 282.
While it is true, as one scholar points out, that Hannah would likely have received less attention from Mather and his contemporaries were it not for her gender,\(^{349}\) she would have received less still had she not presented scalps as evidence of her deed to the colonial government and claimed her bounty. Yet the scalps themselves have received comparatively little analysis by historians, who have tended to treat them either as objects of morbid curiosity or as merely secondary to the tale of Dustan’s transgressing behavior. On the whole, however, historians have tended simply to avert their gaze. Familiar as Hannah Dustan’s story is, it has never been studied as part of a larger, shifting pattern of postmortem mutilation in Early America; but it was just that.

In a single generation, accelerated by the colonial wars, bounties had moved from a tool born of exigency to a demand by the populace. Dustan’s bounty of twenty five pounds (300 shillings), earned her the equivalent of fifteen weeks of pay as a Captain of foot soldiers (who earned 20 shillings a week), hardly the “scanty reward” that Church bewailed, yet substantially less per scalp than the colony offered the year before.\(^{350}\) The smaller amount may reflect several circumstances. The 1696 bounty act had expired by the time of Dustan’s claim, making this an exceptional expense to the Massachusetts treasury. Furthermore, Hannah and her companions did not constitute a military party of the sort colonial bounty acts regularly sought to encourage. While clearly the reward encouraged the trio to return for the scalps, killing their captors offered a measure of security in their escape. Last, Hannah’s gender likely factored into the award amount. As a woman, she couldn’t petition for the reward herself. Her husband had appeal on her behalf. However, the legislators’ willingness to supply the reward demonstrates how complete colonial acceptance of scalp bounties had become.


For Mather, Hannah Dustan embodied the heroine Jael, overthrowing the fear of Indian attack by removing the very seat of the enemies’ souls. Like Jael she admonished the men of her tribe to destroy the enemy in like fashion. But beyond her biblical allusion, Dustan translated the terror of borderland conflict into a triumph of the emblematic non-combatant – the mother – tames the very acts of war, demonstrating the justice (and thereby their familiarity) of the colonial wartime market in corporeal trophies.

Although a few scholars argue bounties transformed the Native American cultural practice into an entirely economic one, suggesting that monetary rewards transformed corporeal trophies into commodities, this oversimplifies the exchange and depends upon a version of the “Noble Savage” stereotype. Based on the romantic notion that scalping -- deeply imbedded in Native American worlds of meaning and symbolism -- remained “noble” as long as it was undertaken by people from that culture for the “pristine” cultural reasons in which it made (spiritual) sense, this argument assumes that colonial bounties suddenly corrupted the practice, loosening its cultural bounds and unleashing a more destructive force. This reasoning not only flattens the nature of intercultural exchange, but presupposes a dualistic relationship between beliefs (particularly those cast as spiritual) and markets that construes the former as pure and therefore good, where the latter represents corruption and evil. Not only does this interpretation fail to recognize the degree to which exchanges of all types (gifts, trade, purchase) express cultural values and relationships, in the case of scalp bounties in the seventeenth century, it does not entirely explain the events.

Instead, this period offered Native American warriors additional options – such as surrendering scalps to French authorities – for items that still appeared to operate primarily in their original cultural context. In the Indian context it made little sense for Indians to exchange such valuable items with the Dutch governors who proved themselves poor allies. Sharing such a sign of friendship would have meant little against the other undertakings of the Dutch colonial government. Similarly, for Indians near the

English settlements, the cultural separation that had pervaded the previous generations, while not complete, was enough to convince most Native Americans in the region that they had little to gain for these otherwise precious items. The groups to whom the Massachusetts bounty appealed were undertaking a calculated diplomatic risk, rather than yielding to a market economy in human body parts.

If the French successfully persuaded their allies to fight for them, scalp bounties didn’t convince them. Instead, the scalps themselves -- as emblems of an alliance generations in the making -- made bounties work. Bounties operated as reciprocal gifts for the scalp which symbolized an alliance in which friends fought a common enemy in order to prevent those enemies from fighting on after their mortal end.

Bounties produced commodities by transforming human body parts into items of economic importance in a wartime market. But this model fit European settlers, especially the English, not Indians. During the seventeenth century, in a Native world caught in the tumult of new diseases and increased land disputes, corporeal trophies, and scalps in particular, still played too important a role in the symbolic language of alliance and loss to be easily transformed by European economic incentives. New England’s dispersed and largely Christianized Indian population provided a notable exception to this rule.

By the end of the seventeenth century, Christian Indians from Massachusetts praying towns joined provincial companies to combat French and Indian enemies of the English. Some of these units fought under English commanders, but many marched under Indian leadership. Like their colonial counterparts, these soldiers earned wages and organized according to adapted English military models. They also earned rewards for the enemy scalps they returned to colonial officials. By the eighteenth century, praying Indians whose lives most emulated their English neighbors became willing to join provincial units in which scalp bounties offered a supplemental form of wage. These men illustrated the degree of change that had occurred in regions where population decline, warfare, religious conversion, and cultural change undermined previous structures of native authority.

The parallel processes that transformed trophy-taking practices in the northeast swept these men into the wartime market in corporeal commodities that prevailed in many New England colonies. But in New France and Iroquoia scalp bounties encouraged subtler shifts in Native American warfare. By allowing individual men direct access to specie and trade goods that would otherwise be distributed through a sachem, premiums privileged small raiding parties over larger organized attacks on enemies. The explosion of Indian raids in the borderlands of New England during the Imperial Wars attests to this shift. But in areas with fewer colonial settlements, premiums also afforded a greater measure of autonomy by compensating for resources and trade undercut by warfare. Thus when hunters became warriors they had a means of providing essential goods for their families.

Furthermore, for Indians in New France and Iroquoia, unlike their Christianized counterparts in New England, scalps retained equal if not greater value in Native communities for traditional purposes. By the eighteenth century, warriors maximized their achievements by dividing scalps, a practice that increased the rewards they could claim while permitting them to retain a number of trophies to requicken lost relatives in their communities. By the eighteenth century, Indians in New France demanded bounties while alliance with the Five Nations prompted New Yorkers to refrain from enacting premiums, a turn of events that evidenced new developments in the corporeal vernacular.
CHAPTER V

“Suitable Incouragement” and the Colonial Scalp Hunter

In early November of 1724, John Lovewell, Josiah Farwell, and Jonathan Robbins submitted a proposal to the Massachusetts Legislature offering to lead “forty or fifty others” beyond bordering the westernmost settlements of New England “in order to kill and destroy their Indian Enemy.” The volunteers announced their intention “to range and keep out in the woods for several months” so long as the government provided sufficient “Incouragement.” They suggested “five shillings per day” would provide “suitable” encouragement and pledged to “kill any enemy Indian & produce their scalps” to receive “what the Government shall see cause to give them (over and above their wages) as a reward.” The off-hand reference to a scalp bounty belied the sizeable motivation of the reward. At the time, Massachusetts offered £100 for “every [Indian] male of Twelve Years or Upwards.”

The General Court granted the petition, although it reduced the per diem amount to 2 s. 6 d. – roughly an agricultural laborer’s daily wage. In their response, the representatives confirmed that Lovewell and the others could receive the full amount of “one hundred pounds

for each male scalp” they brought back to the colony in addition to all “premiums established by law to volunteers without pay or subsistence.”359 This included a lesser amount (fifty pounds) “the Scalps of all others that Shall be killed in Fight & the prisoners.”360 The men promptly raised a company of volunteers and set out ten days later, although the final group proved smaller than they had anticipated.361

After nearly a month trudging through thick underbrush in the biting cold of New England’s early winter, members of the bedraggled company probably contemplated the wisdom of their choice. Their bread – all four hundred and eighty-seven pounds of it – and bodies exhausted, they still had not encountered any “Indian enemy.” Without evidence of a successful military campaign they could not expect any compensation from Massachusetts. Their venture into the frozen borderlands of New England appeared futile and even foolish until, on December 19th, they spotted a narrow trail.362 Following it, the men stumbled upon a wigwam, surprising the inhabitants – an Indian man and an adolescent boy.

Certainly the two posed little threat to thirty-three men with muskets. But, after a month of shivering and eating what they could kill on their long marches, the New England volunteers saw an opportunity to claim success and return home for their reward. Killing the man, they took his scalp and marched his fifteen-year-old companion back to Boston as a captive.363 Lieutenant Governor William Dummer and the Massachusetts Council granted the returning company “fifty pounds over & above one hundred [for the scalp] & fifty pounds [for the young male captive] allowed them by law.”364 Split among thirty men it still provided better income.

360 MA A&K, 10:263.
than they could have earned on their farms during the season, and the excursion helped Lovewell raise men for a subsequent campaign.

The wars of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century drew Lovewell and a host of other New England men into the northeastern forests searching for French and Indian enemies whose death or capture promised financial reward. Many of these men came from borderland communities that endured waves of French and Indian attacks during the period and the parties they formed often coalesced after one or more noteworthy attacks on these settlements. Though revenge played a part in mobilizing some men, the dramatic increase in bounty amounts coupled with eulogies in which local ministers compared scalp hunters to biblical heroes encouraged anti-Indian and anti-French violence and promoted a culture of Indian hating among New Englanders that would stretch well beyond the Imperial struggles of the eighteenth century.

The scalping hero was a distinctly English archetype. Officials in New France did offer bounties, but paid significantly less for scalps than their New England counterparts.

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365 This champion of the English colonies appeared first in New England. The archetype appeared next the English colonies along the southern Atlantic seaboard during the Tuscarora and Yamasee wars, and still later in Pennsylvania. The model failed to wield the same power in New York (although they did periodically and unenthusiastically offer bounties) and in the first period of Pennsylvania’s peace with neighboring Indians. For the scalp hunter in the Tuscarora and Yamasee wars see: John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 43-47.

French authorities consistently provided greater premiums for captives over scalps, and offered these only to Native allies rather than French colonists. A smaller population and the failing market in beaver pelts encouraged economic innovation and during the eighteenth century New France turned to the Indian slave trade to meet this need. As a result, French officials preferred to reward their allies for live captives rather than scalps of dead enemies.367

Following the Grand Settlement of 1701, French diplomats exerted considerable pressure on their allies to relinquish Iroquois prisoners in particular. Iroquois diplomats had made return of their people captive among other Indian groups the central condition in their peace negotiations, something many French allies also demanded from the Iroquois. In exchange for adopting a position of neutrality in future conflicts, representatives of the Five Nations also required that the French-allied Indians replace Iroquois they had killed with new captives. Iroquois representatives effectively constructed terms that would ensure that mourning war aims continued to be met, while forcing French officials to oversee the continued capture and enslavement of other Indian peoples.368 In simultaneous negotiations at Albany, Iroquois leaders sought to maneuver themselves into a position as intermediaries between residents of the pays d’en haut and New York traders. The tenuous network of agreements left all parties wary and gained the Five Nations time to begin recovering from the demographic and social effects of nearly constant warfare.

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368 Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 156-158.
The Grand Settlement did not bring peace to the northeast, and in the warfare that ensued demography and location combined to produce different approaches to corporeal mutilation among three other peoples: New Yorkers, New England Algonquian converts living on town reservations ("Praying Indians"), and the Algonquian Abenakis of the New England coast. Residents of New York’s sparsely populated Hudson Valley, particularly traders in Albany, stood to gain more by trading with Indians than scalping them. Although the colony established bounties late in King William’s War, officials were slow to offer similar rewards in the imperial conflicts of the eighteenth century. Instead, Albany residents mediated prisoner exchanges among the Iroquois, officials in New France, and English governments.369

Abenakis and praying Indians of New England exemplified opposing ends of the spectrum of change in Algonquian treatment of corporeal trophies. Blocked from participating in the western slave trade due to their location and unable to hunt when warfare took the time and lives of their men, Abenaki leaders came to view scalp bounties as a wartime alternative to the fur trade. For New England’s Christian Indians, participation in scalping parties and transformed them into teachers who educated the volunteer companies of New England. For those who, like the Stockbridge Indians of Massachusetts, enlisted as provincial troops, scalp

369 Albany residents began this diplomatic role in the 1680s following King Philip’s War, into the 1690s during King William’s War and then into Queen Anne’s War. Many of the diplomats were Dutch, and had developed relationships among the Iroquois through the fur trade. Often these same men were New York’s Indian Commissioners (such as Robert Livingston). Their negotiations involved more than English prisoners. Albany traders negotiated the release of English and Indian prisoners held by the French, of French, English, and other Indian peoples’ prisoners held by Iroquoians (mainly through their trade relationships with the Mohawk, but also among the Oneida), and the release of French and Indian prisoners held by the English. Their interactions among these groups proved regular, if not persistently successful. For example, see: DRCNY 3:133-4, 152-4, 172, 248-9, 250-252, 256, 265, 395, 439-440, 478-9, 480-486, 510-511, 513-515, 519-520, 533, 536, 556, 563-564, 569-571, 778, 783; DRCNY 4:17-19, 38-39, 47-48, 63-64, 113, 116-117, 120-122, 199, 212, 309, 321, 339-341, 343-344, 350-352, 368, 371, 373, 401, 403, 407-409, 435-438, 487, 489, 493-500, 532, 558-561, 564-565, 567-573, 578, 598, 601-602, 691, 742, 744, 748-749, 792, 798, 894, 902, 918-919, 994; DRCNY 5:270, 475, 492-493, 567, 639, 663, 731; DRCNY 6:438, 442-445, 448, 451-455, 467, 476, 484-487, 500-505, 512-515, 520-521, 525, 539, 542-546, 561-567, 578-580, 685-690, 694-695, 698, 700, 714-716, 739, 742, 795-796, 812, 887, 1015; DRCNY 9:857; Munsell, *Annals of Albany*, 1:95, 288; 2:112, 161-163, 180, 188, 190. See also: G. M. Waller, “New York’s Role in Queen Anne’s War, 1702-1713,” *New York History* 33 (January 1952): 40-53.
bounties became supplements their wages, just as they were for English soldiers. Unlike the limited autonomy Algonquians of the pays d’en haut (many of whom were also Christian converts) negotiated through captive exchanges, assimilation into English military modes drew praying Indians of New England into an economic system in which scalp bounties supplemented regular wages and fed anti-Indian sentiment.

Bolstered by his reception after the initial campaign, Lovewell led another “march in quest of ye Indian enemy” weeks later. After twenty days in the New England woods, the men saw smoke rising amid the trees. Confident “they had found the object for which they had come so far into the wilderness,” the company waited “till about 2 o’clock in the morning” to attack the camp. When they had killed the sleeping men, they marched back to Boston with “the ten scalps stretched on hoops and elevated on poles” to claim the £1000 reward. The company’s actions illustrate how fluid definitions of “the enemy” became in the face of fear fueled by economic incentive.

Steadily increasing premiums throughout the eighteenth century promised potential windfalls to those willing to follow Lovewell’s example, transforming war into an economic opportunity and launching dry-land analogues to privateering expeditions. Like privateers, scalp-hunters were private citizens licensed to wage war by the colony; they differed, however,

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371 Jeremy Belknap, The History of New Hampshire, 3 vols. (Boston: Belknap and Young, 1784-1792; reprint, Dover NH: O. Crosby and J. Varney, 1812), quote 2:52; Sylvester, Indian Wars of NE, 243-244, 246; Kidder, “Lovewell Expeditions,” 18. The hoops and poles suggest either that the party included a number of Indians or that these scalps had been stretched by the men they attacked. This method of display does not appear in other accounts of scalping by colonists, although it had a long history among Algonquians in the region. Stretching and sewing the scalps to hoops made of young branches took expertise these colonists might have had, but the bounty act made no such requirement, nor did English men have a history of such display.
372 Grenier, First Way of War, 41.
in the structure of rewards and the potential for profit. Privateer vessels were armed merchantmen, owned and provisioned by ship owners and financed by merchants who received profits from the sales of captured cargoes and vessels; privateering crews shared in the profits, according to contracts executed with the owner and financier of the voyage. Although crewmen on vessels attacked by privateers might be killed if they resisted, they typically were regarded as noncombatants and could continue to collect wages if they joined prize crews in sailing captured vessels to the ports where they were condemned and sold. Insofar as there was no profit to be gained in privateering by killing enemy merchant crewmen, scalp-hunters differed from privateersmen; inasmuch as scalp bounty acts mobilized civilians in attacking enemy Indians, however, the analogy is an instructive one.373 Bounties delivered a pay-per-service solution to New England governments wrestling with the challenge of protecting expanding settlements with limited military resources that, at least theoretically, only rewarded verified success against legitimate enemies. Several New Englanders formed units as joint economic endeavors – companies in both the economic and military sense – in which investors provided material support or physical service in exchange for a share in the reward.374

From the end of King William’s War, when Hannah Dustan claimed her bounty for the family that held her captive, through the middle of the eighteenth century, New England scalp bounties increased twelve-fold – from £8 in 1689 to £100 in 1724 – while men’s wages grew by less than ten percent percent during the same period.375

374 Grenier, *First Way of War*, 41-42.
375 Based on wage tables in Gloria Main, “Measuring the Gender Gap,” table 1.
Reward amounts far outpaced fluctuations in monetary value. The dramatic increase in premiums accompanied an equally significant shift in targeted recipients. During King William’s War, even the English Board of Trade condoned paying Native American allies to attack English adversaries, recommending “Indians should be rewarded for any execution that they do upon the enemy, and the scalps that they bring should be well paid for,” suggesting that this would help to “secure them to the King’s interest.” When Massachusetts then went a step further initiating a cash bounty for colonists who volunteered to “go forth in pursuit of the Indian Enemy,” the use of treasury funds provided official endorsement for scalp hunting.

Lovewell met his end – and gained enduring fame – in his ill-fated attack on Pigwacket in 1725. That this relatively unsuccessful soldier should be called “the most famous scalp hunter … of the eighteenth century” reflects the power of the scalp hunting trope that rose in the psyche of eighteenth-century New England. Contemporaries interpreted his failure at Pigwacket as martyrdom and using Lovewell’s spotty biography – complete with fantastic tales of a father who lived to one hundred and twenty and had an (impossible) history of fighting in everything from Cromwell’s Army to King Philip’s War – transformed him into a champion of New England’s borderlands. Reverend Thomas Symmes published sermons eulogizing him and his men, Samuel Penhallow included an account in his *History of the Wars of New England with the Eastern Indians*, and several nineteenth century authors resurrected the tale of “Lovewell’s War.” At least one of these later authors used the accounts to champion his own relative as a

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376 See appendices for bounty amounts and comparative values.
380 Grenier, *First Way of War*, 50.
scalp-hunting colonial hero. Analogies between scalpers and biblical heroes invested their actions with cultural legitimacy.  

Other colonists received bounties, although no minister celebrated their efforts. Still more struck out in search of Indian villages hoping to return with scalps that would bring them fame and fortune, only to find their company “were sick, some lame, and some down-hearted, and the snow . . . somewhat hard” so that the project failed. In contemporary accounts, these men provided a counterpoint to the litany of Indian attacks on borderland settlements. They appealed to the undercurrent of insecurity and fear that prevailed among in exposed and outlying areas. Scalp hunters provided colonists a sense of power – even when their military contributions remained questionable – their trophies brought proof of revenge in a manner that co-opted the very form settlers associated with Indian warfare.

By the end of the 1600s, nearly every New England colony offered a reward for enemy scalps. Colonial governments established scalp bounties through statues or officers’ commissions as incentives for enlistment into volunteer corps – in addition to enlistment bonuses. In seventeenth century, award amounts varied based on the victim’s status: scalps from male warriors offered the greatest reward, scalps of women or children under “fighting age” were less valued. But as bounties gained legitimacy, the terms of the reward began to change in ways suggesting New England authorities were grappling with the moral implications of

382 MA A&R, 7:152; Penhallow, History of NE Wars, 105-110.
383 Sylvester, Indian Wars of NE, 3:245-246, see notes.
384 Benjamin Church, King Philip’s War, Part II, the History of the Eastern Expeditions of 1689, 1690, 1692 and 1704 against the Indians and the French, Library of New England History 3 (Boston: J. K. Wiggin & Wm. Parsons, 1867), 59 (emphasis added).
paying colonists for human body parts on the one hand, and the degree to which rewards functioned as supplementary wages on the other.

Several bounty acts clearly attempted to limit scalping to enemy combatants by stipulating the appropriate circumstances under which the individual was slain. These conditions suggest legislators worried that bounties might lead to unmitigated violence against any and all Indians, threatening relations with the few Amerindian allies New England had. Lovewell’s willing attacks only underscored this possibility.

Age and gender gradations indicated an attempt to target adult males who, as warriors, posed the greatest direct threat to colonists. Although tactically practical from the English perspective, presuming adult males represented the greatest danger overlooked the central role women often played in eastern Amerindian societies in inciting young men to violence. However, the laws did conform to evolving European military codes that increasingly distinguished between non-combatant and military populations as proper targets for violence. Fluctuations in the ratio between bounties for men’s scalps and those of women or children suggest colonial authorities wrestled with how to codify cultural assumptions in monetary terms. Protections according to age proved equally problematic. Presupposing one could correctly determine an individual’s age during an attack -- which, like Lovewell’s second, might occur in the darkest hours of night or in a smoke-filled wigwam – when did an individual in Amerindian society move from the partially-protected status of child into the category of threat? Some

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385 Hugo Grotius, is among the most frequently-cited theorists whose writings (especially *The Rights of War and Peace*) influenced these changes by identifying women and children as non-combatants and arguing that warfare should not include the complete destruction of the countryside. See: Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace* (1625), ed. Richard Tuck, Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005). For his influence on warfare in North America, see: Grenier, *First Way of War*, 89-92, especially 90; Rushforth, *Bonds of Alliance*, 79, 90-95, 122, 125, 137; Margaret Ellen Newell, “Indian Slavery in Colonial New England,” in *Indian Slavery in Colonial America*, ed. Alan Gallay (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2009), 33-36.
bounty acts left this assessment up to the scalp hunter, others set the mark at ten years old, but most identified twelve as the age of majority (militarily at least).\textsuperscript{386} Variations in rewards for prisoners indicated another conundrum facing New England’s legislators. Indians served as slaves and as indentured servants in colonial New England.\textsuperscript{387} In both the Pequot War and King Philip’s War, New England colonists took hundreds of Indian captives; most of the men were executed, the women and children mainly enslaved. But during the Imperial Wars, New England’s Indian enemies did not face the same “scale of enslavement.”\textsuperscript{388} Claims that these changes occurred as a result of “pressure from New York and from imperial authorities who feared alienating potential Indian allies” appear at odds with the direction of New England legislatures.\textsuperscript{389} Far from protecting local Amerindians from actions that might alienate them, officials in New England continued to offer nearly equal rewards for killing Indians versus capturing them. Most often the difference amounted to £5 or less. This hardly amounted to a prohibition against killing non-combatants. Those same victims’ scalps were worth nearly as much, didn’t need to be fed, and posed no risk of escape.\textsuperscript{390}

Many scalp hunters who rose to fame in New England learned their tactics from Native Americans who served in their parties, demonstrating that the clear boundaries colonists tried to draw between their communities and those of their indigenous neighbors remained permeable. Benjamin Church not only educated a series of colonists, including John Lovewell’s father (also John), in his methods but employed significant numbers of Amerindians in those companies.\textsuperscript{391} Despite their cultural prejudices, New Englanders recognized the value of Native American

\textsuperscript{386} Massachusetts bounty acts that differentiated by age used twelve as the age of majority. See appendices for the different acts.\textsuperscript{387} Newell, “Indian Slavery in Colonial New England,” 37-38.\textsuperscript{388} Newell, “Indian Slavery in New England,” 50. Newell does not clarify whether by “scale” she means numbers, percentage of population, or terms and length of enslavement.\textsuperscript{389} Newell, “Indian Slavery in New England,” 50.\textsuperscript{390} See Appendix C for Massachusetts Bounty Acts.\textsuperscript{391} For Lovewell’s connection to Church, and Church’s recruiting Indians, see Grenier, First Way of War, 33-35, 38.
warriors to colonial expeditions and beginning in King William’s War colonial authorities recruited Indian auxiliaries who formed “a substantial portion, at times as much as a quarter, of the forces” in the early portion of the war.\textsuperscript{392} Amerindian warriors most often augmented New England’s militia as scouts or in ranging parties under colonists whom they trusted.\textsuperscript{393} At the beginning of Queen Anne’s War, Massachusetts Governor Joseph Dudley requested that Fitz-John Winthrop, governor of Connecticut, provide 100 Mohegan warriors to counter the raids by the French and their allied Indians. To convince Winthrop, Dudley offered to pay the Indians “£20 for every enemy killed, with the profits from any sale of captives, or £40 to those furnishing their own provisions.”\textsuperscript{394} His proposal made explicit the function of scalp bounties as wages. Winthrop, recognizing the Mohegans presented a useful alternative to sending Connecticut militia men, convinced the colony’s assembly to provide an additional shilling per day wage for the Indians. A few months later, ninety-five Connecticut Algonquians went to serve in Maine.\textsuperscript{395}

While always a small portion of the overall New England forces, Indians continued to enroll for military service alongside colonists. Native Americans “whose way of life or political status had been most deeply affected by association with white society served in the greatest numbers with the colonial forces.”\textsuperscript{396} Indian men from these communities used military service as a means of deriving personal advantage from the circumstances of war. They, like voluntary English enlistees, stood to gain financially and perhaps socially from their service. For colonial governments, “Indian auxiliaries were also economical.”\textsuperscript{397} Indian recruits were paid just over

\textsuperscript{393} Johnson, “Usable Indian,” 629-630.
\textsuperscript{394} Johnson, “Usable Indian,” 630.
\textsuperscript{395} Johnson, “Usable Indian,” 630.
\textsuperscript{396} Johnson, “Usable Indian,” 637.
\textsuperscript{397} Johnson, “Usable Indian,” 637.
half the wages of their English counterparts, an inequity that “persisted even when wages were supplemented or superseded by . . . payment according to . . . the number of enemy scalps or prisoners.” But unlike English colonists their service had little impact on colonial economies. Mohegan and Praying Indians joined colonial forces at the same time that scalp hunting parties were gaining prevalence throughout New England and many warriors served in, and trained these companies in, woodland warfare. Despite the very real possibility that Indian auxiliaries might encounter their own kin among Algonquian groups in northern New England, enlistment offered warriors from southern New England a means to earn scarce cash wages when their communities were increasingly subordinated to colonial economic and social systems.

Preference for scalps over prisoners in New England reflected colonial demographics and economics. Scalp bounties amounted to premiums for killing Indians who occupied land that colonial governments sought to accommodate the demands of an expanding, agriculturally-oriented colonial population. Bluntly, residents of New England wanted Indians dead more, and more often, than they wanted them as slaves.

Officials in New France faced a different set of issues. On September 14, 1706, in the midst of Queen Anne’s War, Abenaki leaders complained to the Governor of Montreal that “since the war’s commencement, we have thus far derived no benefit, our cabins are filled with English scalps that float in the wind.” Targeted by English scalp bounties and receiving none from New France, Abenakis wondered if they should move their alliance (and even their settlement) toward Albany.

399 Johnson, “Usable Indian,” 641, 643-646.
400 Jean Gervais Protais Blanchet, Faucher de Saint-Maurice, and Benjamin Perley Poore, eds., Collection de Manuscrits Contenant Lettres, Mémoires, et Autres Documents Historiques Relatifs a la Nouvelle-France, Recueillis aux Archives de la Province de Québec, ou copiés a L'étranger; mis en ordre et édités sous les auspices de la Législature de Québec avec table, etc. 4 vols. (Québec: Imprimerie à Côté et Cie., 1883-1885), hereafter cited as Coll. Man., 2:456-457.
Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil’s response to the Abenakis revealed shifting French objectives. He confirmed that “it is true, regarding the scalps, I will not pay you for them … since the beginning of the war I’ve said the custom of paying for scalps seemed too inhumane,” but that he would gladly give them ten “écus d'Espagne” (likely silver, or “white” écus) for each prisoner.\footnote{Coll. Man., 459. Most likely, “écus d’Espagne” referred to Spanish “pieces of eight” that circulated throughout the Atlantic world. See, McCusker, \textit{Money and Exchange}, 280-281. For exchange values see appendices.} Abenakis, prepared to exchange scalps for goods and payment in accordance with previous custom, struggled with the impact of French policy changes.\footnote{Lozier, “Lever les Chevelures,” 3.}

In previous conflicts, French officials had regularly provided scalp bounties. However, in a contrast to the practices that spawned New England’s scalping-colonist hero, authorities in New France offered rewards exclusively to Amerindians. French governors did not issue formal laws stipulating premiums, nor did they pay scalp bounties to French soldiers or colonial militia. Instead, French Governors offered rewards at their own discretion.\footnote{Lozier, “Lever les Chevelures,” 3.} When he chose to offer bounties he could do so, provided the Intendant – who had to approve all expenditures – permitted it. Colonial representatives who sought Indian assistance carried news of the bounties to the villages and news spread by word of mouth.\footnote{Lozier, “Lever les Chevelures,” 3.} If bounty offers expired, they did so as unceremoniously as they began. Informal procedures permitted officials to surreptitiously continue scalp rewards despite royal orders, a precedent that proved helpful to changing circumstances in the 1700s. The French frequently offered goods that approximated the reward value, rather than coinage. The practice had economic benefits for French authorities who faced
a currency shortage. It also retained the semblance of community gifts essential to renewing diplomatic alliances.405

The growing practice of enslaving Indians drove New France’s preference for prisoners over scalps. Like colonial practices surrounding corporeal trophies, the slave trade developed out of and exemplified French and Amerindian cultural negotiation. The population of New France never approached that of New England and the colony faced perpetual, crippling labor shortages. Smaller numbers compelled colonists to seek political and economic success by exploiting and adapting to Amerindian practices and preferences in ways that fed French interests. The early fur trade had done just this by leveraging French numbers through diplomacy and alliance. But at the end of the seventeenth century, “a huge glut of beaver” in Europe pushed the market, and the French colonial economy, toward collapse.406

The surplus fur bloating European markets came primarily from France’s western posts. Established during the 1680s and 1690s these garrisons, provisioned with trade goods rather than military supplies, had flooded pelts into Europe. By the time officials in France tried to curtail the western trade, another impending war with England made closing the posts unthinkable, even if it had been possible. To contain English settlement in North America on the eve of Queen Anne’s War, Louis XIV ordered the French posts reestablished to promote the fur trade and the Indian alliances it supported.407 The French King’s ministers could not have foreseen that his strategy for containing the English would promote an escalation in the Indian slave trade.408

408 Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 63-65.
French colonists perceived the trade in captives as a solution to perpetual labor shortages and the dismal economic circumstances in New France. But slaves served different purposes among the Indian peoples of the pays d’en haut from enslaved individuals in Europe. When given as gifts they, like corporeal trophies, cemented and renewed alliances, mended social ruptures, and induced warriors to join battles. As marginalized individuals, they also reaffirmed the power of their master and his or her people and as incorporated (though subordinate) members of the group, they replenished and diversified its population, just as the display of scalps in native homes and villages proclaimed the power of warriors and the assimilation of enemy souls. To communities in the pays d’en haut the diplomatic functions of slavery were its most important. “Once slaves had been dominated and domesticated, they had fulfilled their most important purpose.” Canadian colonists built on the diplomatic language shared among peoples of the pays d’en haut, steering Indian captivity to fit the Atlantic model of human bondage. Slaves’ value to Europeans rested not so much in the process of subjugation as in its maintenance and the market that perpetuated the institution. Europeans’ valuation of slaves emphasized the latent economic resource – labor – inherent in the bodies of enslaved individuals.

The diplomatic function of captive exchange intensified with the Grand Settlement of 1701. During negotiations Louis-Hector de Callière, Governor-General of New France (1698-1703), promised the Iroquois that he would “cause to be released all the prisoners, in our, and our

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409 Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 63-65.
410 Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 65-67. Rushforth does not extend the analogy to scalps, but the parallel fits within both native and settler world views.
411 Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 65.
412 Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 65.
Indians’ hands.”\footnote{Anonymous, “History of King William’s War, and the Consequent Negotiations between the French and Indians, In America,” (18??), 165, available online at \url{www.champlain2004.com}, For Callière, see Dictionary of Canadian Bibliography Online at \url{http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?id_nbr=684} (accessed 8 December 2012).} Attempting to fulfill that promise and the parallel demands of Indians from the \textit{pays d’en haut} would prove central to the stability of the region since, as the Iroquois stated in another meeting, “the best proof of Peace is the surrender of Prisoners.”\footnote{Anonymous, “History of King William’s War,” 167.} Thus prisoner exchange became the focus of Canadian diplomatic efforts. The resulting tenuous peace made travel in the region easier, although it displaced hostilities to the south and west to feed the growing Canadian slave trade.\footnote{Rushforth, \textit{Bonds of Alliance}, 65-67.} By 1706, when Vaudreuil communicated his preference to the Abenaki for captives over scalps, many colonists in New France had come to depend on slaves.

Canadians’ reliance on the slave trade and the promise he saw in it for New France’s economic future, prompted Jacques Raudot, Intendant of the colony to counter Louis XIV’s 1707 declaration ending slavery in France with an ordinance of his own assuring residents that the king’s edict did not apply to New France where Indian slavery would remain legal. As the flow of slaves to Canadian settlements continued, Raudot, soldiers, merchants, and network of minor officials obfuscated the trade, describing captive redemptions rather than slave trades, eliding the economic motives at work.\footnote{Rushforth, \textit{Bonds of Alliance}, 10-12, 158, 165-68. For more on Jacques Raudot, see Dictionary of Canadian Bibliography Online at \url{http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?id_nbr=1062} (accessed 8 December 2012).}

French officials’ new emphasis on prisoners rather than scalps affected Amerindian peoples unevenly depending on their location. Captives who brokered peace in New France, Iroquoia, and the Great Lakes regions came from attacks by \textit{pays d’en haut} Indians on peoples further west and south. Thus, peace in the east brought war to the west. The Abenakis who complained to Vaudreuil in 1706, geographically separated from the Siouian peoples who
supplied the “panis” whose name became synonymous with slave in the eighteenth century.\footnote{Rushforth, \textit{Bonds of Alliance}, 165-173.} Abenaki warriors took captives from the outlying settlements of New England, whom the French replaced with panis slaves. French officials could then exchange the English for French prisoners held in New England or for payment from their families.\footnote{Rushforth, \textit{Bonds of Alliance}, 161.}

Despite the practice of captive slavery among the Abenaki, slave exchanges failed to meet their needs as fully as they did for native peoples of the \textit{pays d’en haut}. Abenaki leaders appealed to Vaudreuil to reflect that “since last year we haven’t done any hunting, having always been occupied in the war,” asking that he “give us powder and lead, it is the least thing you could give us.”\footnote{Coll. Man., 2:457. Author’s translation.} Responding to their plea, French officials reinstated scalp rewards to the Abenaki shortly after the 1706 meeting with Vaudrueil.\footnote{Lozier, “Lever les Chevelures,” 13.}

Thus, New France developed divergent policies, based on what we might today call an individual captive’s ethnic identity. They actively sought and traded for Indian captives for three reasons: first, in response to continual Iroquois demands for the remainder of their people living as slaves among other groups; second, to supply to native peoples who remained at peace with one another and the French as a result of the Great Peace; third, as commodities to buy and sell on the slave market. Vaudreuil’s initial refusal to offer scalp money reflected the importance and growing success of the Indian slave trade in western portions of New France and into the \textit{pays d’en haut}. But the Abenaki appeal cautioned the Governor against employing the policy uniformly. Despite his view of the practice as “inhumane,” Vaudreuil needed to ensure continued Abenaki raids. New France lacked sufficient military strength on its own to continue the war against New England without Indian allies.
Abenakis were the only eastern Indians allied with New France who retained substantial political and geographic autonomy, and their enduring animosity toward New England made them willing to unite their interests with those of the French. Frustrated with French reluctance to compensate them for their successful raids on New England and unable to hunt, their men “ayant toujours été occupés à la guerre” (having always been occupied in the war), some Abenaki fled to the Iroquois to stay out of the conflict.421 Those who remained, the Missiquois, Cowasucks, Sokokis, Pennacooks, Pigwackets, Ossipee, and Winnipesaukee, provided a barrier against English expansion and attacks.422 Warriors from these groups were well situated to launch small but punitive raids against outlying English settlements. These Abenaki peoples retained more traditional ways of life than did their relatives who lived in the many catholic mission settlements in the region. The history of Abenaki-English hostilities meant these peoples wanted English scalps and they wanted to retain, rather than sell their prisoners. Vaudreuil could overcome the latter by exchanging English prisoners for panis, but he could not overcome Abenaki warriors’ desire to scalp English victims. Acceding to these cultural demands, New France offered prisoner exchanges and scalp money to their independent Abenaki allies.

The other Native Americans relied upon were the “domiciled” Indians: Algonquian and Iroquoian peoples who lived in settlements throughout the borderlands of New France. French officials referred to these people, and often the independent Abenaki communities, as “our

422 For Western Abenaki peoples and their neighbors, see: Colin G. Calloway, The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600-1800: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People, Civilization of the American Indian 197 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 8-9.
While clearly reflecting French cultural chauvinism, the phrase also expressed the assumption that acceptance of Christianity and settlement with Catholic missionaries also connoted willingness to fight for French interests when requested. Indeed, French military objectives would have been entirely impossible without the regular support of these warriors. However, French officials commonly expected that they would serve under or beside French troops, or as independent raiding parties, as the frequent differentiation between French forces and “our Indians” in their correspondence indicated. This distinction could affect rewards for scalps, as French authorities often did not supply rewards to companies that mixed large numbers of Indians with similar numbers of soldiers.  

The familiar terms the French used for their native allies, and their dependence on Indian warriors minimized the enduring cultural and familial ties many Catholic Indians retained to Native American communities they had left behind. Indeed, the illicit trade between New York and New France depended upon Kahnawake connections to their Mohawk kin. The Kahnawake and other “domiciled” Indians of New France continued to retain captives and to take scalps, evidencing their continued adherence deeply-rooted Iroquois cultural traditions, even as they also relinquished captives into the slave trade. It remains unclear if Vaudreuil extended the scalp money he eventually offered to the independent Abenaki to these Indians as well.

By King George’s War, the French preference for prisoners dictated by the Indian slave trade manifested as distinctions between reward amounts for prisoners which commonly

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exceeded those offered for scalps. These rewards remained informally established and often took the form of merchandise rather than specie, but scalp prices, in colonial currency, remained relatively stable at around ten ecus blancs (30 livres tournois) – despite fluctuations in the relative value of this amount in local or international markets. Officials in New France literally valued corporeal trophies and prisoners differently from their counterparts in New England.

Both Indians and French colonists recognized the dominance enacted by enslaving another human. The process of enslavement posed moral conundrums for the French who considered it “far worse to reduce persons to slavery” than to keep them as slaves for their entire lives. To negotiate the dilemma between their morals and their pocketbooks, French colonists “came to separate the act of enslavement from the domination of human chattel,” and relegated the more problematic aspect – capturing and initially placing persons into slavery – to their Indian allies. Peoples of the pays d’en haut, by contrast, emphasized the capture and domestication of prisoners (which included physical mutilation) as the essential element, after which enslaved individuals lived lives “similar to the rest of the village,” although their enslaved status, like the scars on their body, never left them. The French, relieved of the burden of actually reducing an individual to bondage, considered it less problematic to take advantage of that status.

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427 Tanguay, Travers, 91-95; Frontenac et Champigny, 4 November 1693, RAPQ 1927-1928, 174.
428 Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 89-95, 134.
429 Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 134.
430 Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 65; for disfigurement in indigenous enslavement see: Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 42-44, 68-69, and Appendix A, particularly page 388.
431 As Rushforth and Newell point out this drew heavily on the writing of Hugo Grotius in The Rights of War and Peace. Newell argues that New England colonists also called upon Grotius in forming a similar form of Indian enslavement. The consistently high prices that Massachusetts and other colonies offered for Indian scalps (i.e. dead Indians) compared to the amounts they offered for Indian prisoners (often the same amount for scalps from the same
When colonial French ambitions made prisoners more valuable, the payment differential between prisoners and scalps reflected that change, as did officials’ initial reluctance to offer premiums for scalps. Iroquoians and northeastern Algonquians’ scalps functioned as substitutes for captives. They covered the dead, healing the rupture of the loss, and could be the target of violence in expressions of grief and vengeance. French translated these trophies into physical evidence of allied warriors’ success that they rewarded with both goods and specie. In New France, scalps remained part of the colonial vernacular by which French officials encouraged their military allies to advance French interests. For scalp-hunting New Englanders, however, proving wartime success became subordinate to the economic reward a scalp secured. Scalps were valuable because bounties made them so. They also represented the continued destruction of Native American communities that granted New England settlers access to Indian land.

The retention of traditional, mourning war motives in Iroquoian communities explains the repeated references to the Five Nations’ failure to relinquish their captives, much as the Abenaki refused Vaudreuil. Iroquoians, regardless of their location or religion, continued to adopt captives, viewed incorporation as preferable to exchange. In fact, adherence to neutrality by the members of the Iroquois Confederacy (at least four of them, as the French often questioned Mohawk adherence to neutrality), in the face of their dire need of captives to adopt into their population suggests that in the first half of the eighteenth century Confederacy leaders refrained from wars solely to obtain captives.

After years of fighting the French, members of the Five Nations had agreed to simultaneous cease-fires with the colonial governments of both France and England as an acceptable alternative to conflicts (both social and martial) that had battered and divided their social categories: women and children) suggests Grotius’s moral reasoning foundered in the face of New England’s lower demand for slaves and growing Indian hatred. See: Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 90-95; Newell, “Indian Slavery in New England,” 37-39.
populations. Neutrality allowed the Iroquois to continue demanding that New France orchestrate the return or replacement of their community members lost in Queen Anne’s War, while avoiding conflict with their kin who had moved to French mission settlements like Kahnawake. The aversion both Catholic Iroquois and Five Nations members demonstrated toward facing one another in battle evidenced an enduring kinship and lingering identity as Iroquoians. In a cultural setting with a long memory preserved through oral tradition, it may also have demonstrated the desire to avoid repeating the Intra-Iroquoian wars that had led to the formation of the Iroquois Confederacy.

Despite French reference to them as “our Indians” — a phrase they also used for the Abenaki – Iroquois who had moved into villages in New France in the latter part of the seventeenth century retained cultural ties to the Five Nations. Some of the best evidence of mission Iroquois multiculturalism comes from narratives of captives among their peoples. Catholic Iroquois peoples, while demanding conversion of Protestant prisoners like John Williams, also practiced the captive adoption and scalping associated with mourning war.

French Iroquois did not refrain from war following the peace of 1701. Instead they continued to participate in attacks against the English, such as that against Deerfield in 1704. They provided captives to the French who became part of the enslaved captive population exchanged in New France. They also retained some of these captives.

Iroquois Five Nations, particularly the Mohawks, benefited from neutrality by the resumption of trade and their attempts to facilitate trade between the pays d’en haut and New York. Relations between New Yorkers at Albany and the Mohawks made it mutually beneficial for both parties to mediate, rather than participate in, conflicts between New France, French-allied Indians, and New England. Infuriating as it was to New England residents, New Yorkers stayed out of the fray because they gained more by maintaining good relations with Mohawks and New France.

The illicit trade that had flowed through the Mohawk and their Kahnawake kin between New France and the merchants in Albany meant few in that settlement, and by extension few of their contacts in New York City, had any desire to upset the fragile peace. Throughout Queen Anne’s War, Peter Schuyler operated as a regular intermediary with New France. Despite their frustration with New Yorkers, New Englanders called upon him for the connections he had to bring an end to hostilities. He and other New Yorkers had more to gain by trade than by war.

While scalp hunting offered New Englanders “acting as entrepreneurs de guerre the potential for an economic windfall,” the road to fortune and power wound through very different territory in New York. After the English conquest of the colony in 1664, Albany provided a “bulwark” against French military and economic power. New France perceived the colony as a “rival for control of the fur trade, for English influence over the Iroquois, and for … [an] ice-free

437 CSP 1708-1709, 24, 139, 284, 328, 437.
439 Grenier, First Way of War, 42.
outlet down the Hudson to sea,” but a lively – if clandestine – trade developed between New Yorkers and New France.440 As much of this trade relied on Mohawk and Kahnawake as conduits, New Yorkers resisted offering a scalp bounty in King William’s war until 11 May 1697, just months before the Treaty of Ryswick ended the conflict, when Governor Fletcher offered “£6 reward for every enemy destroyed within three miles of any garrison on the frontier, or settled towns in Albany, Ulster and Duchess Counties.”441 No extant documents record payment on this bounty and given both the timing of the offer and the disinclination of New York residents to fight the very people on whom they relied for trade it is unlikely it encouraged any resident New Yorkers to take scalps.

In the following conflicts, Albany residents adopted a neutral position in the Anglo-French colonial wars and focused – as they had before the 1670s – on trade with their partners the Iroquois. This neutral position attracted additional trade from French coureurs de bois. Even as competition between England and France raised impediments – both legal and logistical – to trade with Canada, French policy created incentives for the coureurs to bring their goods to Albany. Some missionaries living in Indian villages and missions strongly objected to the “sale of brandy to the Indians and to the disorderly lives of the coureurs.”442 Clerics’ complaints often reached the King’s ear. “A vacillating policy resulted” that in combination with cheap English goods brought coureurs and western furs to Albany.443 By the 1680s and well into the 1720s,
Albany traders reaped a large portion of their profits by way of Montreal. Though prohibited by both the French and English crowns, trade between Montreal and Albany supplied one and others’ needs throughout the period.444

During Queen Anne’s War, this trade dissuaded New Yorkers from active participation in the violence. That predisposition became unofficial policy of the colony after David Schuyler’s meeting with Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, Governor of Montreal, as war loomed in Europe.445 On April 14th, 1701, Schuyler arrived in Montreal with “prohibited goods,” and “Resolved to ask ye governurs leave to expose them freely to Sale.”446 Schuyler not only received permission to sell the merchandize, but “was Invited to dine with ye govern’r.”447 Asked to speculate about whether the King of Spain’s recent death would trigger war between the French and English, Schuyler demurred but agreed, when Vaudreuil reminded him of the “Cruell and Barbarous murders committed by ye heathens in . . . ye late war” that “it was a shame to see Christian Blood soe spilt by heathens.”448 The French Governor then offered Schuyler the terms of a truce between Montreal and Albany, stating that “In case a war doe break out he will not be ye first to send out such parties against us [in Albany] as formerly.”449 Schuyler responded “that he beleved in case there came no skulking partyes from him [Vaudreuil] there would be none sent from hence [Albany].”450 Albany residents sent news of

444 Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1988), chapter 5, especially 73-75.
445 G. M. Waller interprets the meeting as occurring between Schuyler and the Louis-Hector de Callière, Governor-General of New France, see: Waller, “New York’s Role,” 45. New France’s Governor-Generals, however, resided at Quebec. Schuyler arrived in Montreal, an understandable location given his purpose (extra-legal trade), and sought the Governor’s permission to sell the goods, suggesting that Schuyler not only knew the Governor, but anticipated an affirmative response to the request. The Montreal Governor in April 1701 was Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil. Furthermore, Albany records distinguish between “ye Governur” and “Mons. Callier, Cheeffe govern’r of Canida, from Quebec.” Compare Munsell, Annals of Albany, 4:129 to 132.
446 Munsell, Annals of Albany, 4:129.
Schuyler’s pact with the French Governor to the Lieutenant Governor of New York, John Nanfan, recommending that he consider it as “a Method . . . to prevent ye Cruel and Barbarous murder which Innocent Christians most [sic] Enduer under ye hands of ye merciless Indians.”

Nanfan, likely contemplating the likelihood of encountering those very tactics himself in the near future, apparently took the Albany men’s counsel. No extant records record a scalp bounty in New York during Queen Anne’s War and the colony’s neutral position allowed trade to continue.

The Five Nations Iroquois, particularly the Mohawk who were bound up with the illicit trade, also had more to gain by remaining neutral. The trade influenced Iroquois League policy, but a desire to “preserve their values and way of life” held stronger sway. These traditionalist tendencies also explained the Iroquois reluctance to relinquish captives to the French. Captives still performed a vital role in community healing that was especially important on the heels of war against the French. Thus, while they made poor parties for the French slave trade, they retained greater autonomy than did the peoples more thoroughly caught up in that web. While the parallel interests of New Yorkers and the Iroquois Five Nations largely kept both out of the violence of Queen Anne’s War, the same would not hold true during the next clash between the European empires in which the Mohawk would find that the very relationships that made them conduits of the trade that ushered in a peace pact in 1701 would draw them into conflict.

The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 initiated a peace between England and France that lasted more than a generation. However, New England saw no such rest from warfare. Beginning in 1720, the Massachusetts legislature issued a new series of bounty acts and in 1721 declared war.

452 Brandao, Dissertation, 334.
on the “Eastern Indians,” or western Abenaki.\textsuperscript{453} Passed in September 1721, the war declaration formalized a conflict that began much earlier – or more accurately, had never resolved – and was only magnified by terms of the Utrecht agreement that transferred land rights “between the European sovereigns without consulting Indians.”\textsuperscript{454} This put Abenaki lands under the jurisdiction of land-hungry English. Abenaki leaders wrote to King Louis XIV that as a result, “maintenant la paix est ce qui me donne des sujets de trouble et de crainte” (now peace is what gives me topics to worry about and fear).\textsuperscript{455}

As Massachusetts laid plans for forts and new towns, Father Sebastien Râle, a French Jesuit who had lived among the Abenaki at Norridgewock for nearly thirty years, encouraged them to resist English settlement expansion.\textsuperscript{456} Anglo-Abenaki animosity had deep roots in New England. “From time immemorial,” Abenakis had raided English settlements for scalps and captives as part a persistent, low-level conflict.\textsuperscript{457} These attacks became more frequent after 1717.

Convinced that Râle caused the escalation, in July of 1720 the Massachusetts Legislature initiated a £100 reward for his apprehension and setting a £60 bounty on Abenaki scalps which they subsequently raised to £100.\textsuperscript{458} When initial attempts to capture the “Incendary of mischief,” Massachusetts raised the bounty for Râle’s capture to £200 (stopping short of a

\textsuperscript{453} MA A&R, 10:215-216; Calloway, Western Abenaki, table 1, pages 8-9, 114.
\textsuperscript{454} Morrison, Embattled Northeast, 166.
\textsuperscript{455} Coll. Man., 2:433-435.
\textsuperscript{457} Or at least since King Philip’s War. Abenaki au le Roi, Coll. Man., 2:434 (“time immemorial”).
\textsuperscript{458} MA A&R, 10:14 (Rales), 111-112 (declaration of war), 26, 58, 204 (bounty increases).
In August of 1724, two hundred New England militia set out for Norridgewock. The raiders found and killed the priest, their target. Returning to the scene French allies “found him pierced with a thousand blows, his scalp torn off, his skull crushed by hatchets, his mouth and eyes full of mud, his leg bones broken, and all his members mutilated in a hundred different ways.” Father la Chasse attributed the mutilation to the Indian allies that accompanied the New England units, but several accounts identify only three Native Americans who acted as scouts for the colonial companies. Other interpretations have suggested that some Abenaki may have mutilated his corpse themselves. But the men who attacked the town wanted no one to doubt who had caused Râle’s demise. Returning to Boston, they displayed the priest’s scalp, along with twenty-six others from the raid, “at which there [was] much Shouting and Triumph.” With the bounty on Râle at £200, and a £100 bounty for each male Indian scalp, they also met a significant financial reward.

The men not only made their point, they demonstrated the new grammar of corporeal trophies. Where the Massachusetts legislators had stopped, the militia did not. The act

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459 Morrison, Embattled Northeast, 181; Morrison’s exact source for the quote needs to be found in the many sources he cites in the footnote (34) for that paragraph.
462 Morrison, Embattled Northeast, 184-188.
concerning Râle called for his capture, stopping short of requiring his scalp, but legal details had been overpowered by a new symbolic language that fused hatred, economic gain, and the furor or combat. The New Englanders’ focus on Râle led Charelvoix to comment that “the English seemed to wage war only to get rid of one man, to whom alone they ascribed the opposition.”466 Certainly the officials expressed no concern regarding the turn of events. They may well have hoped to effect precisely that outcome while stopping short of putting their intentions in writing that could have the French into the conflict. Nonetheless, this new language had effectively directed the assassination of a European by a company of English soldiers.

But if the New Englanders expected to end the attacks on their settlements by killing one man, as Charlevoix suggested, they were sorely mistaken. Soon after the raid, Captain Kellogg reported from Northfield that “although we have had great advantage over ye eastern Indians by such a slaughter of them at Norridgewock … yet … the enemy is become more formidable than before.”467 The continued attacks on English settlements and the significant rewards encouraged John Lovewell and his compatriots to petition the Massachusetts court three months after the Norridgewock raid.

The period that confirmed the scalp-hunting hero in New England also moved bounties from payments for commodities (scalps) to a clear form of supplemental wage. This pattern worked for increasingly wage-oriented New Englanders and the Indians whose acclimation to English culture, especially through Praying Towns, meant they already lived within this

economic system. But the alchemy of hatred, violence, and money was perhaps more “suitable Encouragement” than officials who offered bounties ever intended.468

Outside New England, scalps remained powerful symbols. For the Iroquois Five Nations, retaining the traditional roles for scalps and prisoners was linked to the overall aims of cultural independence and societal regeneration. Abenakis continued to take scalps and prisoners for many of the same reasons that the Five Nations did, and they insisted that their French allies continue to support these practices in accordance with earlier patterns of exchange. Initial French reluctance to acquiesce to these demands grew from their own economic aims.

The Indian slave trade shifted French priorities and subsumed military alliance to its demands. Anxious to derive profit from an indigenous practice they could put to their own purpose, the French increasingly offered more for prisoners than for corporeal trophies. While this fit well with European theories of military ethics, in practice it presented a facile means for settlers in New France to get what they wanted, at least in for the time being.

CHAPTER VI

Empire and Extermination

As the sun set on August 8th 1757, Lieutenant Colonel George Monro instructed his engineer to survey Fort William Henry’s defenses. 469 Despite a week of bombardment the fort itself remained largely intact but material resources neared depletion, few cannon remained functional, and “the men [who] had been without rest five nights, were almost Stupified” with exhaustion. 470 When Monro convened a council at dawn the next morning his senior officers unanimously advised him to negotiate the best terms he could for surrender. 471 Although the preceding days of cannon fire had adhered with textbook perfection to the rituals of European siège en forme, and the French General offered favorable capitulation conditions under professional military etiquette, the events that followed would not conform to the same protocol. 472

French General Louis-Joseph, marquis de Montcalm-Gozon de Saint-Véran extended full military honors to the English forces on August 9th, mirroring the terms granted to the English commander who had surrendered Minorca the previous year. 473 The generous terms amounted to “an intentional compliment to Monro, acknowledging that he had conducted his defense according to the highest [European] professional standards.” 474 English forces were to “depart

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471 Steele, Betrayals, 109; Anderson, Crucible, 195.
472 Siège en forme: siege warfare, in this case “a conventional European cannon duel.” Steele, Betrayals, 99-100; Anderson, Crucible, 192, 251-253.
474 Anderson, Crucible, 195.
… with the baggage of the officers and of the soldiers … to Fort Lydius escorted by a detachment of [French] troops and by the principle officers and interpreters attached to the Indians."475 To Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, Montcalm’s aide-de-camp, the plans reflected the highest European standards of military honor and substantiated his belief that “[n]ow War is established here on the European basis."476 Sharing Montcalm’s preference for European codes of military professionalism, Bougainville viewed their implementation as evidence of progress in the conduct of war in North America. Neither he nor Montcalm had any idea that French ability to enforce these terms had disintegrated days earlier.

Unaware he had crossed such a threshold, the French General summoned his allied Native American war-chiefs to a council. After explaining the terms of surrender and his motives for granting them, he asked for the chiefs’ “consent and their promise that their young men would not commit any disorder. The chiefs agreed to everything and promised to restrain their young men."477 But the Indian leaders could no more have controlled their warriors than they could explain the absurdity of his request to Montcalm.

The treaty stipulations amounted to “outrageous” terms by Native American standards.478 “[N]egotiated entirely without consulting them, with notable disregard for what [Native American warriors] … regarded as their legitimate expectations” following a battle, the surrender’s generous conditions denied Indian warriors the compensation they expected. By forbidding plunder, prisoner capture, or scalping the treaty effectively repudiated the conditions

476 Bougainville, Adventure, 252.
477 Bougainville, Adventure, 170; Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791; the original French, Latin, and Italian texts, with English Translations and Notes, 73 vols. (Cleveland, OH: Burrows Brothers, 1896-1901), 70:176-177 (hereafter cited as JR).
478 Anderson, Crucible, 196.
under which Native Americans had previously accompanied French soldiers. European conventions of honor did not translate into the economic, social, and spiritual resources Native Americans sought in warfare. Combined with an allegiance to European warfare customs, Montcalm’s cultural ignorance led him to overestimate his control over events that interwove opposing interests of diverse players.479

As the defeated soldiers prepared to leave the shattered fort the next morning, the Indians “in great multitudes, came flocking Round the Encampment, and … began to Plunder.”480 The looting escalated as the English line began to move. Indian warriors dragged wounded from their huts and “killed and scalped them in plain view” of the colonial regiments, “Terrif[ying]” them “to the greatest degree imaginable.”481 Indians, blacks, and women (mostly regular soldiers’ wives) among the regiments and camp followers were “[h]auled out” and attacked.482 In the first moments, Indian warriors took more prisoners than scalps. Prisoners held higher cultural value for Native American communities as subjects for torture or adoption, and accomplished the same evidence of valor as scalps. In the economics of alliance, French authorities also paid higher premiums for captive than for scalps. In 1756, despite localized variances, French officials offered “60 livres … reward for an English scalp, and … prisoners

479 Steele, Betrayals, 99-101.
482 Steele, Betrayals, 115-116, Appendix 187-199. Steele’s Appendix lists missing New Englanders: Table 1, page 135, lists numbers by unit; Table 2, page 139, lists fate by unit. Indians likely selected women, who comprised significant portions of camp followers, for captive adoption. The Massachusetts regiment had no wives among the camp followers (Steele, Betrayals, 116) but the rear of the column included many of the regular soldiers’ wives. See also: Paul E. Kopperman, “The British Command and Soldiers’ Wives in America, 1755-1783,” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 60 (1982): 14-34; Fred Anderson, A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years’ War (Chapel Hill, NC: Omohundro Institute, 1984), 118-120.
were sold in Canada for 50 crowns each,” amounting to between two and four times more for prisoners than for scalps.\footnote{Robert Rogers, \textit{Journals of Robert Rogers: Containing an Account of the Several Excursions He Made Under the Generals who Commanded upon the Continent of North America During the Late War}, ed. Franklin Benjamin Hough (Albany, NY: Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1883), 54. Prisoners often became slaves in Canada, accounting for the more substantial reward. For slave trade in New France see: Brett Rushforth, \textit{The Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France} (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012). According to John J. McCusker, \textit{Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775: A Handbook for the Institute of Early American History and Culture} (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), Table 2.25, pages 97 and 282, in 1756 the French ecu was commonly called the crown. The source does not specify. There were still three livres to an ecu. McCusker notes that in Canada (unlike other French colonies) the currency was valued at the same as currency in France from 1717-1759 (McCusker, \textit{Money and Exchange}, 282). Therefore, if the “crowns” mentioned here were French ecu and not English crowns, the French were offering the equivalent of £2.53 (Sterling) for scalps and £6.31 (Sterling) for prisoners, the French were offering the equivalent of £2.53 (Sterling) for scalps and £6.31 (Sterling) for prisoners, meaning that they paid 2.5 times more for prisoners than for scalps. However, if by “crowns” Rogers meant colonial (Massachusetts) currency, then the French offer for prisoners amounted to £9.62 (Sterling), nearly four times the amount for scalps. Either way, the numbers reflect the continued value for captives who might be worth significant ransoms or provide opportunities for prisoner exchanges (if English) when they did not serve the Indian slave trade. See Appendices for values.}

But as the warriors turned to the “Provincial Regiments; some of whom they were … immensely inraged against … they [began to] cut them to Pieces; others they Led Off.”\footnote{Steele, “British Report,” 350.} As “things were running to extremes,” the anxious men broke line and began to run, “upon which the Indians began, some to Strip, some to Scalp, and others to carry off Prisoners.”\footnote{Steele, “British Report,” 350.} Montcalm, alarmed by actions that would not only void the terms of the surrender but destroy his professional honor as commanding officer, responded with desperate “prayers, menaces, promises” to the Indians, to stem the violence. “[A]t last [he]resorted to force” grabbing a young man from one of the warriors. “[B]ut alas! his deliverance cost the life of some prisoners, whom their [captors]… immediately massacred, through fear of a similar vigorous act” that would deprive them of any mark of their courage and any possible remuneration; as well as deny their communities the vital spiritual resource.\footnote{\textit{JR} 70:90-203 (quote, 183); Steele, \textit{Betrayals}, 119; Anderson, \textit{Crucible}, 197.} Montcalm’s attempts to ensure the capitulation process adhered to European models of honor, coupled with his misunderstanding of Indian
motives, intensified the very violence he hoped to control, as more warriors killed and scalped their captives to avoid returning home empty-handed.

The conflict between Montcalm and his Indian allies outside Fort William Henry evidenced the growing gap between European and Native American motives and cultures of honor by revealing the growing difference between European and Indian attitudes and assumptions about postmortem mutilation. For New Englanders who retold the story, the “massacre” fueled anti-French and anti-Indian sentiment that swelled militia and volunteer company numbers. Montcalm’s inability to maintain the European terms of the surrender ensured that, after Fort William Henry’s capitulation, “British officers would never be inclined to offer the honors of war to any French force” for the duration of the conflict in North America, although many among them would cleave to other aspects of professional European military conduct. The attacks also altered the history of post-mortem mutilation in America with devastating implications for Native Americans. In the next generations, rage and resentment increasingly fueled extirpative violence that exploded against Native Americans following inter-European imperial struggles – in the Seven Years’ War and subsequent battles for control – in North America. By 1763 scalping, once the hallmark of limited warfare practiced by Amerindians before and during early contact with Europeans, came to characterize attacks by Indian-hating English colonists.

For the French, the events heightened the disagreement already dividing military leaders in New France over the use of conventional European warfare tactics that depended on large armies and successful sieges, versus petit guerre techniques of small raids that relied on Indian

487 Anderson, Crucible, 199.
488 Kerry Trask, In the Pursuit of Shadows: Massachusetts Millennialism and the Seven Years' War (New York: 1989), 234-256, cited in Anderson, Crucible, 199.
489 Anderson, Crucible, 199; Steele, Betrayals, 132-133, 144-145.
allies to terrorize English settlements. Indeed if, as one scholar has suggested, French military efforts in 1756 – particularly at Oswego – “showed the marriage of European and frontier warfare, 1757 saw their divorce.”

This divorce resulted in part from the rift between General Montcalm and Pierre-François de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil de Cavagnial, the Canadian-born Governor of New France. The two men’s hatred of one another exacerbated their preferences for different forms of warfare. Where Vaudreuil, the Canadian-born Governor General, sought to employ Indian and colony regular (Troupes de La Marine) forces in small parties against the English so that British forces would focus on defending settlements rather than attacking Canada, Montcalm preferred traditional European modes of warfare: set-piece battles and sieges won by firepower and discipline.

The dispute between Montcalm and Vaudreuil reflected the discomfort of integrating two schools of warfare. Professional soldiers such as Montcalm saw Native American tactics as savage and dishonorable, but irregular warfare methods such as these were not entirely unfamiliar. They paralleled practices, equally disdained by most professional officers, known as petit guerre in Europe.

Fort William Henry confirmed Montcalm’s convictions and in the following campaigns he increasingly relied on “regulars and [French] Canadians” in tactics that conformed to the “European mode he preferred.”

He also launched a battle of letters asking the French Court to grant him greater authority over military affairs in North America arguing:

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492 One of the earliest studies of such tactics in Europe is Thomas Auguste le Roy de Grandmaison’s *La Petit Guerre, ou traité du service des troupes légères en champagne*, n. p., 1756. Louis Jeney advanced the French doctrine on these practices in Louis Jeney, *Le Partisan; ou, l’art de faire la petiteguerre avec success selon le genie de nos jours*, (La Haye, France: H. Constapel, 1759).
It is no longer the time when a few scalps, or the burning of a few houses is any advantage or even an object. Petty means, petty ideas, petty Councils about details are now dangerous and waste material and time; circumstances exact determined and decisive measures. The war is entirely changed in this part of the world according to the manner the English are attacking us; nothing less is at stake than the utter and impending loss of the Colony.494

Montcalm’s passionate argument for increased use of European methods of warfare reflected not only his distain for Native American tactics and motives, but his observation of several English expeditions aimed at French forts throughout the Northeast. Circumstances, both in terms of Amerindian participation and the nature of English military expeditions, had indeed changed. By the time Montcalm had won his fight for control of Canadian military endeavors in the spring of 1759 – receiving a promotion and authority over all French forces in North America – French-allied Indians and English enemy forces differed substantially from 1757. Though not a linear trajectory, the result produced two very different codes of military conduct, with dire consequences for Native Americans.

The first of those deathly consequences accompanied Indian warriors home from Fort William Henry and other 1757 campaigns. The warriors from the Great Lakes who had swelled French ranks at Fort William Henry did not join Montcalm again until 1759. Even French mission Indians proved increasing reluctant to fight alongside their Canadian neighbors.495 The small pox virus warriors transported to their villages with scalps and captives from Fort William Henry and other raids ravaged their populations, leaving few well enough to return to war.496 The epidemic complicated French-Indian relations as Native communities held their European

495 Steele, Betrayals, 131-132; Anderson, Crucible, 199.
allies partially responsible for the illness and the number of Indian warriors who willingly joined the French cause sank dramatically.497

Amerindian warriors launched attacks and joined European allies for reasons often obscure to French and English leaders. Throughout the conflict, officers in both European armies complained that Native American warriors abandoned expeditions after initial battles provided the scalps or prisoners they sought. Several officers commented that once the Indians had their trophies, they disappeared.498 The commanders’ grievances reflected the contradiction between European modes of warfare with objectives of conquest and Native American motives that occasioned more limited tactics.499 Indians who abandoned military campaigns after taking captives or scalps in early skirmishes demonstrated the continued importance of these prizes for their own communities. While prisoners gained value in the growing market for slaves and captive exchanges, as French authorities apparently moved away from scalp bounties, and New Yorkers – who had paid bounties to Indians in previous wars – failed to institute a reward, Native American warriors who sought scalps demonstrated the enduring cultural value of the corporeal trophies for their own communities. Most Amerindian warriors joined European military expeditions as a means of pursuing a parallel war that reflected their village’s disputes with regional settlers. The Abenakis accused of initiating the attacks at Fort William Henry descended on New England regiments as part of just such a parallel dispute. Although the

497 MacLeod, “Microbes and Muskets,” 50-55.
enmity between Abenakis and New Englanders dated back to King Philip’s war, recent violence had been prompted by renewed English settlement in Abenaki homelands at Cowass.500

The “Abnakis of Panaomska” whom French sources identified as having “commenced the riot” joined the campaign against Fort William Henry from northern New England.501 Bougainville downplayed the Abenaki assertion that they “recently suffered from some bad behavior on the part of the English” prior to “hurl[ing] themselves on the tail of the column which started to march out.”502 However, the colonial origins of their victims supports the claim. Two hundred and forty-five “Abenakis from Missisquoi, St. Francis, Bécancour, and Panaouamaské (Penobscot) were among the 1,800 Indian allies with the French at the capture of Fort William Henry.”503 The Abenakis fell on the rear of the surrendering column, where the Massachusetts regiment stood.504 Despite the insistence of Père Pierre-Joseph-Antoine Roubaud, the missionary priest who lived among the Abenaki at St. Francis, that he had convinced them to “abstain” from retributive violence, he later wrote that “The Savages … are alone responsible” for the violence against the surrendering English. “[A]nd it is to their insatiable ferocity and their independence that the cause of it can be ascribed.”505

Roubaud was no doubt correct regarding Abenaki independence. In a warning to the English in 1752 the Abenaki had threatened to go to war if English settlers continued to encroach on their lands or take resources – such as beaver and timber – from them. The Abenaki

501 Bougainville, Adventure, 172. Colin Calloway lists the name as “Panaouamaské (Penobscot)” in the Western Abenakis, 172.
502 Bougainville, Adventure, 172.
503 Calloway, Western Abenakis, 172.
504 Steele, Betrayals, 116-118.
spokesman who issued the warning stated that the demands came from the Abenaki themselves who, although “strongly attached to [the French King’s] interests,” were “entirely free” and autonomous. “[W]e are allies of the King of France” but the demands were their own. Both French and English military leaders failed to comprehend the accuracy of this statement, instead continuing to see Native American warriors in ways more akin to European mercenary troops than as independent agents.

When English settlement continued to expand, Abenaki leaders again warned the English that trespass would lead to war. But despite Massachusetts leaders’ assurances to the Abenaki, in March 1754, twenty men, including Captain Robert Rogers, began building a trail along the Connecticut River toward Cowass. The advance came on the heels of two Abenaki deaths, attributed to poisoning by the English and by the summer of 1754 Abenaki war parties began attacking English settlers.

As the conflict escalated, New England turned again to scalp bounties to raise provincial militia. To raise “voluntiers” for a campaign against the St. Francis Abenakis, Massachusetts officials began offering seventy-five pounds for every Indian prisoner and seventy pounds for “every Indian Scalp of those Tribes (or any Other, that in a hostile manners shall oppose them in such their Undertaking)” on April 24th, 1755. The declaration of war against “the Tribes of Indians eastward & northward of Piscataqua River,” included a bounty of forty pounds offered to

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507 Calloway, Western Abenakis, 165-166.

each soldier who “every male Indian scalp brought in [to Boston].”509 This law continued earlier practices of offering amounts that differed by age and gender of the victim. Scalps from women and boys under twelve were valued at half that amount of the scalps of adult males.510 Only months later, Massachusetts officials extended the bounty to include Indians on the “western frontiers” and then increased it to £220 on all Indian scalps without adjustments for the victim’s gender.511 The same law offered “private Persons not in the pay or Subsistence of this Government” £100 for every scalp.512

The Massachusetts government renewed the bounty acts each year. The initial renewal for 1756 returned the bounty to the lower level and again stratified the amount by gender and age: £40 for men over 12 and £20 for women or boys under 12.513 But three months later, as the war-fighting season began in earnest, officials voted to increase the bounty again, this time to £300 per scalp, without regard for age or gender. This act, and subsequent increases in later years, included a stipulation that helps to explain New England’s ability to raise ranger companies so effectively. The reward applied to private persons and companies “not in the pay of the Government, Who shall be disposed to go in quest of the Indian Enemy, & shall before they go signify in Writing, to the Chief Military Officer of yt part of the Province from which they shall go, their Intentions, with their Names.”514 The act passed in June 1757, offered the same three hundred pounds to private companies and individuals, and forty pounds per scalp to soldiers in government pay: three times a centinel’s wage or roughly equivalent to a captain’s

509 MA A&R, 15:343. The declaration initially exempted the Penobscots, whom officials hoped to use as scouts. This exemption was later dropped and the same bounty offered for Penobscot scalps. MA A&R, 15:396.
511 MA A&R, 15:349.
514 MA A&R, 15:552.
pay for a single campaign, and close to the annual income for a farm family (see Table 4, below).  

Table 4.
Massachusetts Provincial Forces’ Monthly Wages in Lawful Money, 1757

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Monthly Wages (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>£18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>£15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>£12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>£8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>£5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>£3.10s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>£6.8s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon</td>
<td>£10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>£2.3s.1d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporeal</td>
<td>£1.18s.7d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummer</td>
<td>£1.18s.7d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Soldier</td>
<td>£1.16s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

515 MA A&R, 16:113; Anderson, People’s Army, 49.
517 “Private Soldiers,” also called “centinels” comprised the majority of a Massachusetts provincial company. In 1756, Massachusetts law set the ideal company size at 38 centinels, three officers, seven non-commissioned officers, a clerk and a drummer. Actual company numbers varied throughout the Seven Years’ War. Anderson, People’s Army, 49, note 51, page 49. Table 1 (page 225) in Anderson, People’s Army, provides income amounts for Massachusetts Provincial Private Soldiers in the Seven Years’ War. In 1757, the total for an eight month campaign plus the enlistment bounty of £4.2s.7d. (including an approximated clothing value) amounted to £18.10s.7d.
Exorbitant rewards such as these strengthened New Englanders’ preference for temporally limited military excursions of small parties led by men they knew for specific purposes. Participation in ranger or scouting parties could prove far more lucrative than the few shillings per day these men might earn as provincial soldiers. It also allowed them to avoid service under British military rules many found abhorrent.\footnote{For a discussion of the difference between British professional military codes and colonial men’s experience, see: Fred Anderson, “Why Did Colonial New Englanders Make Bad Soldiers? Contractual Principles and Military Conduct during the Seven Years’ War, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser. 38, no. 3 (July 1981): 395-417; Anderson, *People’s Army*, especially 120-129.} The comparative wages for soldiers at the time included a two-dollar enlistment bounty – often increased by a few dollars if the man had his own gun – but even officers could not hope to earn in wages what a private individual could claim for a scalp, even if he split the reward with his whole company.

From the colonial government’s perspective, bounties combined recruitment incentives with cost-saving measures. The annual cost to equip a provincial company ran between £400 and £500 Lawful Money and by the middle of the Seven Years’ War soldiers wages amounted to an additional £600 for each provincial company.\footnote{Fred W. Anderson, personal correspondence, 12 November 2012. For payment amounts and relative wages and enlistment bounties for the Seven Years’ War, see: Anderson, *People’s Army*, 38-39, 48-52, 56 (Figure I), 59 (note 82), 225 (Table I); *MA A&R* 15:144-145, 229-300, 304, 311-312, 347, 442, 454-455, 669, 671, 686-687; 16:160-161, 307-309, 348-349, 460-461, 567, 721-723; 17:10, 177-178, 201, cited in Anderson, *People’s Army*, 255.} Since the up-front costs for a scalp-hunting expedition would have been similar to those of equipping a provincial company, high scalp rewards that induced men to band together, arm and provision themselves, and campaign at their own expense, saved colonial governments these expenses. Since treasuries only paid bounties to those who could prove the success of their expeditions by producing a scalp, such inducements provided a pay-for-service solution that left the financial risk with the volunteers companies and assumed that large bounties, divided amongst the group’s members, provided compensation similar to – and potentially greater than – a soldier’s earnings.
By the time of the formal declaration of war in Europe, every nearly every northeastern British colony offered premiums on Indian scalps. Thus, before the French and English troops had engaged in Europe, colonists in North America had declared war on their Indian neighbors. As a result, the formal declaration of war between England and France found British colonists with virtually no Indian allies to support their efforts. While Indian scouts had provided information, alarms, and fighting acumen for English forces in previous wars, as English colonies declared war on their Amerindian neighbors in 1755 and 1756, few warriors. In their absence, British generals turned to ranging companies like those led by Robert Rogers. These men appeared to fit the military leaders’ need for reconnaissance and “skirmishing” tactics European officers associated with irregular warfare.520

Like the majority of ranging companies in the Seven Years’ War, Rogers and most of his men originated from New England motivated by the colonial bounties on Indian scalps. Often these groups included small numbers of Indians. “Stockbridge, Mohegan, and Mohawk Indians [before their neutrality and later in the war] all served with Rogers’ Rangers in their campaigns against the French and Abenakis.”521 Initially aimed at the neighboring Indians in response to local attacks, colonial governments easily amended the acts to support efforts in other arenas. In late 1755 William Shirley, commander of English forces, directed Rogers to “distress the French and their allies, by sacking, burning, and destroying their houses, barns, barracks, canoes, bateaux, &c … and destroy their provisions … in any part of the country where [he] could find them.” 522 Rogers and his men launched several scouting trips throughout the summer and into the winter of 1756. Six months before events at Fort William Henry, Rogers led a calamitous

521 Rogers, Journals, 125-131, cited in Calloway, Western Abenakis, 170.
522 Grenier, First Way of War, 126; Rogers, Journals, 14-15.
excursion to Fort Carillon after which General Abercromby recommended that Rogers and his surviving men receive “payment for the prisoners they took” and killed: just what Rogers and his remaining men hoped. 523 His tattered group then removed to Albany. 524

While English like Rogers employed Native American men and techniques in the expeditions they launched in search of bounties, French-allied Indian warriors used their skills to multiply their successes. On July 24th, 1757, survivors of a French and Indian attack on an encampment at Fort Edward, just miles away, arrived at Fort William Henry telling of thirteen others who had been scalped by the raiders. 525 The French officer who led the attack, Lieutenant Marin, “unwilling to amuse himself making prisoners” took “only one [captive] and 32 scalps.” 526 But the scalp number reflected innovation rather than bloodthirstiness on the part of Marin’s Indian forces. “[T]he exact truth,” according to Louis Antoine de Bougainville, General Montcalm’s aide-de-camp, was “that the English had eleven men killed and four wounded, two of whom since died of their wounds,” explaining that “the Indians … know how to make two or even three [scalps] out of one.” 527 Such exaggerated accounts demonstrated how the incorporation of scalping into unlimited warfare objectives had changed the practice. Warriors could serve their community’s economic as well as spiritual needs by manufacturing additional scalps. Bounties encouraged Amerindians to maximize scalp numbers in order to increase the

523 Rogers, Journals, 71; Steele, Betrayals, 74.
524 Anderson, Crucible, 186; Rogers, Journals, 66-78. The group returned to Albany due to Rogers’s injury: a musket ball through the wrist. Rogers, Journals, 69. See also: John Stark, Reminiscences of the French War; containing Rogers’ Expeditions with the New-England Rangers under his Command, as Published in London 1765; with notes and illustrations. To which is Added an Account of the Life and Military Services of Maj. Gen. John Stark; with notices and Anecdotes of Other Officers’ Distinguished in the French and Revolutionary Wars (Concord, NH: Luther Roby, 1831), hereafter cited as Reminiscences, 36.
525 Steele, Betrayals, 96. Adam Williamson’s Journal, 24 July1757, Williamson Family Papers, Belfast Free Library, Belfast, Maine, (formerly held by Canadian National Archives, Quebec), Quoted in Steele, Betrayals, 96. French descriptions of the attack appear in DRCNY 10:591; Bougainville, Adventure, 141. The French and their allies attacked Parker’s expedition the same day.
526 Montcalm to Vaudreuil, 27 July, 1757, DRCNY 10:591; Doriel to de Paulmy, Quebec, 31 July 1757, DRCNY 10:593-4. Doriel states 300 as the number that accompanied Marin, stating that “150 Indians quit him on the way.” Montcalm’s gloss is the more dramatic, suggesting that Marin sent many of the men away for failure to follow.
527 Bougainville, Adventure, 142.
financial rewards they received. The practice also permitted the men to retain scalps to return to their villages to serve more traditional needs.

Even as most professional military leaders, English and French, continued to prefer conventional European tactics, both colonial powers continued to use irregular forces for scouting and raiding expeditions. These ranging companies increasingly became an assumed component of English forces despite European officers’ continued disdain. Most ominously, the bounties used to swell their ranks became an integral part of the companies’ mindset: the rules of war that applied to pitched battles and restrained post-mortem violence against enemies did not apply to these ranger companies. Irregular warfare tactics were wedded, at their inception, to trophy-taking. During the Seven Years’ War, English reliance on these forces and their methods spread, as did the grim commerce in corporeal trophies that helped produce them.

By spring of 1756, even Pennsylvania, once so proud of the peaceful relations with its Indian neighbors, had established bounties on local Indian scalps. With Quaker faction’s withdrawal from politics and increasing numbers of colonists pushing for western land purchases, Pennsylvania found itself – like New England colonies had a century before – engulfed in the quest for Native American lands. When Delaware Indians armed by the French launched attacks on settlements in the Ohio Valley in October 1755, the colony, handicapped by political disputes, proved unable to raise a militia. Faced with attacks they

528 Grenier argues that scalp hunting constituted the “third pillar” of this manner of war. Grenier, First Way of War, chapter 1, 16-52.
could not counter from enemies they did not see coming, Pennsylvanians responded by placing a price on the scalps of the neighbors whose friendship they had so celebrated. On April 14, 1756, Governor Robert Morris declared war on the Ohio Indians and offered a bounty (£30) for their scalps. Although Governor Morris had planned to wait “till he knows ye determination of the Six Nations” regarding what “can be done for our [Pennsylvania’s] Defense,” he and other colonists believed the Ohio Indians “will continue to murder our Inhabitants and destroy their Plantations until the Government shall offer high Rewards for Scalps.” The Pennsylvania Act, like the Massachusetts bounty on Indian scalps almost exactly a year earlier, encouraged colonists to attack Indians.

Writing to William Shirley, Johnson criticized the “very unadvised & unaccountable proceeding of Govr. Morris” of Pennsylvania. “I think,” he wrote, “without consulting your Excellency, without the concurrence of the other neighbouring Provinces, and without my receiving previous notice of it” that “These Hostile Measures wch. M' Morris has entered into, is throwing all our Schemes into Confusion, & … I tremble for the Consequences.” Johnson’s trembling, like his claim that he hadn’t received warning of Pennsylvania’s direction, was somewhat disingenuous. He had paid such premiums before, primarily to Indians but also to

Press, 1991), 187-189; JR, 69:150-199. English sources most often referred to them as Delawares or Delawares and Shawnees. While the designation obscures the heterogeneity of these settlements and in that sense oversimplifies the diversity of peoples and interests, the risk of obfuscation is outweighed in this case by the clarity it offers for motives of actors (primarily led in the region this study covers by Delaware and Shawnee sachems). While avoiding the literary redundancy of repeated references to the Ohio Indians, it also distinguishes the interests of this (primarily, but not exclusively) Algonquian group from those of their linguistic cousins in the Great Lakes (pays d’en haut) and northeast (Abenaki) regions. Timothy J. Shannon, Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier, ed. Colin G. Calloway, The Penguin Library of American Indian History (New York: Viking, 2008), 151.


532 SWJP, 2:426.
533 SWJP, 2:447.
534 SWJP, 2:447.
ranger companies. He shook, not for fear of the moral consequences but diplomatic, even personal ones. The Six Nations claimed suzerainty over the Delaware – this claim to conquest had provided the rationale by which Iroquois leaders could sell the Delaware land out from under them in the Walking Purchase. Johnson recognized that supporting Iroquois regional power would augment his own position as sole Indian commissioner (a position he gained after 1755). He balked at measures that might threaten to circumvent Iroquois claims to control their subordinates and that might lead to attacks on members of the Six Nations themselves.

While perhaps inflated by his own position, Johnson’s concerns were not unfounded. As Governor Morris contemplated issuing scalp rewards, attacks had escalated and some Pennsylvanians had already “killed and scalped some of the Seneca Indians” in the Province.\(^\text{535}\) This was precisely the sort of event Johnson feared. Once animated into bounty-fueled violence, Pennsylvania settlers found little reason to distinguish among Native Americans and proved equally likely to attack friend or enemy Indians. These murders required no bounty to encourage colonists who proved willing to murder and scalp regardless of a reward, suggesting a dire trajectory for anti-Indian violence. William Johnson was right to tremble.

When England declared war on France in May of 1756, only New York had resisted temptation to offer a bounty on Indian scalps. In an ironic twist, the very colony whose early (Dutch) government had offered the first recorded monetary rewards for scalps, and whose English governments had renewed them during the previous imperial wars, recorded no such bounty during the Seven Years War. This surprising exception to the practices of virtually every other English colony from Virginia to Maine reflected networks connecting the Iroquoian Indians to New York colonists and the diplomatic interests and ambitions for power of both groups.

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Throughout the 1740s and 1750s, trade mediated New Yorkers’ relations with the Six Nations of the Iroquois. Dutch and English traders brought English goods to posts along the Huron and Mohawk rivers and Lake Erie and returned with fur to English ports. Trade depended on personal relationships, established connections at the posts, and the price of goods. These relationships bound individuals from both groups to each other and helped avoid the cultural apartheid that dominated New England.\(^{536}\) For borderland residents (Indian as well as European) in the overlapping regions of northwestern colonial New York and southeastern Iroquoia, these economic and social relations frequently outweighed the interests of other Iroquoian communities, officials in New York City, or neighboring English colonies.

However, in previous conflicts these relationships not prevented New York officials from offering generous bounties for Indian scalps. In fact, as late as April 1748, just six years before George Washington’s encounter with French and Indians in the Ohio Valley launched violence in North America, New York’s colonial government paid rewards for scalps.\(^{537}\) Why then did New York decline to offer a scalp bounty during the Seven Years’ War? Trade, familiarity and


even kinship among settlers and Native American communities fail to explain the absence of a bounty in the colony in the 1750s, for each of these existed during previous conflicts in which the colonial government offered premiums.\textsuperscript{538} Furs steadily declined as a percentage of New York’s overall trade from the 1720s through the 1740s as the volume of “lumber and agricultural products” exported from the province increased.\textsuperscript{539} This meant relationships with Indian communities – suppliers of pelts – decreased relative to the value of land acquisitions – for timber and farming. One might expect, then, to find conflicts with local Indians on the rise in 1750s New York, a condition conducive to anti-Indian scalp bounties. Instead, evidence suggests fewer violent attacks occurred in New York and greater Iroquoia than in other areas of English settlement during the Seven Years’ War. And, despite French and Indian attacks on New York forts and settlements (such as Fort William Henry), the colony’s officials avoided a legislative mechanism they had employed in nearly every previous colonial conflict.\textsuperscript{540}

Evidence suggests that the Six Nations renewed neutrality policy and concern about pitting Iroquois kin against one another combined with William Johnson’s role in Indian affairs to prevent New York from offering a scalp bounty. Since the Grand Settlement of 1701, the Six Nations Iroquois amassed power by playing the French and English off one another.\textsuperscript{541} Iroquois regional power increased in proportion to their ability to keep colonial governments off-balance – by insinuating they would join the enemy – and European traders in their villages. Although

\textsuperscript{538} David L. Preston, \textit{The Texture of Contact: European and Indian Settler Communities on the Frontiers of Iroquoia, 1667-1783} (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), argues violence did not escalate in New York (versus Pennsylvania and other colonies) because of the close relationships between Indians and settlers in the region. This is in part accurate, but it fails to account for scalp bounties in earlier and later periods in New York’s history. His table comparing murder rates (182-183) does demonstrate low numbers of prosecuted homicides, however.

\textsuperscript{539} Richter, \textit{Ordeal}, 270.

\textsuperscript{540} Preston, \textit{Texture}, Chapter 5 discusses the 1757 attack on German Flats (only months after the Fort William Henry massacre) as one of the largest examples.

\textsuperscript{541} The Grand Settlement of 1701 referred to peace treaties between the French and Iroquois ending decades of conflict in New France and the simultaneous renewal of the Covenant Chain diplomatic and trade alliances through which the Iroquois mediated English-Indian relations and commerce.
this balancing act amounted to neutrality concerning conflicts between French and English
governments and colonists, non-involvement did not equate to pacifism, nor did it consistently
apply to all members of the Confederacy. 542 Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century,
Six Nations warriors continued to raid Native American peoples south of Iroquoia “especially
the Cherokees and Catawbas;” diplomats negotiated for control of lands in the Ohio Valley,
effectively disinheriting the Delawares and others who lived there; and trade helped generate
peace with “the French-allied Algonquians of the pays d’en haut.” 543

The Mohawks proved an exception to the neutrality policy. Mohawk war parties
augmented English forces at the behest, and sometimes under the command, of William Johnson
throughout the Imperial Wars. 544 Johnson arrived from Ireland in 1738 and quickly interjected
himself into the Mohawk Valley’s Indian trade. Positioning himself, and his trading post,
between the Iroquois and the Albany fur traders, Johnson developed close personal and kinship
ties to the Mohawks that connected him to many of the powerful sachems in the region. In the
early 1740s, he gained a new name as evidence of his adoption by Mohawks from Canajoharie
(also called the Upper Castle). 545 Redubbed Warrighiyagey, a name he translated as “Chief
Much Business,” Johnson’s ties to the Mohawks expanded with his trade. 546 Many of his
partnerships with leading Mohawk men like Chief Hendrick (Theyanoguin), grew through the
familial relationships Johnson developed. His relationship with Elizabeth Brant, Mohawk

543 Anderson, Crucible, 16.
545 SWJP, v1 p 7, v2 p 342; v 13 p 192, 724; O’Toole, White Savage, 41-43, 68-69; William Fenton, Elisabeth Tooker, and Bruce Trigger, “Mohawk,” in HNAI 15, 474-475.
546 SWJP, 2:342, cited in O’Toole, White Savage, 69.
mother of three of his children, linked him – through Iroquoian matrilineal ties – to influential
leaders such as Joseph Brant.\textsuperscript{547}

General Braddock appointed William Johnson as the Crown’s sole agent for the Six
Nations when he arrived as commander-in-chief of British forces in North America in 1755.\textsuperscript{548}
Called to Alexandria in April to attend Braddock’s meeting with colonial governors, Johnson
received a second commission to command a force of Iroquois (mostly Mohawk) and provincial
troops (largely from New York and New England) the French Fort St. Frédéric at Crown
Point.\textsuperscript{549} Johnson hosted over a thousand Iroquois at his estate that June, where he distributed
gifts and food -- an act of hospitality that reaffirmed his place in English-Six Nations relations.
He hoped to convince their leaders to support the expeditions Braddock had presented at the
April military council: Johnson’s own excursion to Crown Point to seize Fort Frédéric,
Braddock’s endeavor aimed at Fort Duquesne, and the third under General William Shirley
intended for Niagara.\textsuperscript{550}

In a private meeting, “Several Sachems” expressed reservations, “confess[ing] that …
pressing us to take up the hatchet [was] somewhat sudden.”\textsuperscript{551} Particularly they voiced

See also: Barbara J. Sivertsen, \textit{Turtles, Wolves and Bears: A Mohawk Family History} (Berwyn Heights, MD:
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Timothy Shannon, “Dressing for Success on the Mohawk Frontier:
Hendrick, William Johnson, and the Indian Fashion,” \textit{The William and Mary Quarterly}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Ser. 53, no. 1, Material
Culture in Early America (January 1996): 13-42; Gail D. Danvers, “Gendered Encounters: Warriors, Women, and


\textsuperscript{549} Anderson, \textit{Crucible}, 87-88.

\textsuperscript{550} Minutes from Johnson’s meeting with the Six Nations evidence that he requested warriors to support all three
missions. It’s likely, however that Iroquois reticence to join, let alone split their warriors among, three disparate
expeditions pleased Johnson immensely. See \textit{DRCNY}, 6:961-989 for meeting; quote, 981. Johnson resented
Shirley’s forays into Indian affairs. The conflict between the two men stretched across the Atlantic to patrons in
different factions of English government. Anderson, \textit{Crucible}, 91. For the dispute between Johnson and Shirley see:
O’Toole, \textit{White Savage}, 126-131; Francis Jennings, \textit{Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven
Years’ War in America} (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), 153-163; Milton W. Hamilton, \textit{Sir William Johnson,
Colonial American, 1715-1763}, National University Publications Series in American Studies (Port Washington, NY:

\textsuperscript{551} \textit{DRCNY}, 6:980.
uneasiness “on account of our Bretheren the Cognawagaes [Canaughwagas] … our own flesh and blood … many of us have Brothers, sons ettc about them and wish there was time given us to secure our kindred there from danger.” Conscious of the gathering storm, the leaders requested corn, “a necessary article,” and a smith to service their weapons – noting that no arms or “accoutrements of war” had been among the King’s gifts to them.

As Johnson organized his company, instructing that Indian warriors “are not to go a Scalping as in the late War, only to march with me where ever I go,” New England officials expanded their earlier bounty so that “the Same bounty for Indian Scalps … [was] allowed to the forces on the Western Frontiers as … to the Forces on the Eastern Frontiers.” In other words, men from Massachusetts who joined Johnson’s company would be entitled to rewards for any scalps they brought back to Boston. Three days later Massachusetts began enticing “Voluntiers to inlist and … penetrate into the Indian Country,” for thirty days at a time “in order to captivate & kill the Indians” by offering two hundred pounds for “every Scalp” they brought in. An additional proclamation increased the bounty “given to every Private Person or Persons” for “every Scalp” from forty to one hundred and forty pounds. New Hampshire initiated an equally lucrative reward weeks later. The incentive successfully raised over three thousand provincial troops who joined two hundred Mohawk warriors under Johnson’s command for the expedition intended for Crown Point.

But Johnson’s company never made it to their destination. Instead, Jean-Armand baron de Dieskau, recently arrived to lead French forces in North America, defied direct orders and led

552 *DRCNY*, 6:980-982.
553 Johnson: *SWJP*, 1:535-536; Johnson offered the Indians “encouragement” himself, but no bounty through the colony; *MA A&R*, 15:349.
554 *MA A&R*, 15:356.
555 *MA A&R*, 15:357.
a detachment to attack Johnson’s camp. The party he ambushed, led by Hendrick’s Mohawks, believed their closest enemies still miles away and moved quickly through the woods without scouting parties. Abandoning their customary caution proved costly. Someone, Dieskau alleged an Indian warrior, tried to warn Hendrick. Quite likely, Caughnawagas in the French party recognized their Mohawk kin and attempted to avert a familial tragedy. In the ensuing fight, the seventy-five-year-old Mohawk sachem was “stabbed in the Back” and amateurishly scalped. The capture of Dieskau and the arrival of reinforcements from Fort Edward gave the English control of the battlefield, but not the aftermath.

French-allied Indians killed and scalped many of their captives as they retreated. The trophies substantiated their status as warriors and offered less hindrance to a hasty departure than captives. The result raised English casualty numbers bringing them closer to French losses (roughly 330 missing, wounded or dead). But the departure of the Mohawks cost the English more dearly. As the English began to bury their dead, Johnson’s Iroquoian allies returned to

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557 Anderson, Crucible, 115-121; Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 191-193; O’Toole, White Savage, 135-151; Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 163-164. As Jennings notes, Governor Vaudreuil (with whom Dieskau had arrived in Canada) explicitly ordered the General not to divide his forces, DRCNY, 10:328.
558 Anderson, Crucible, 119.
559 Daniel Claus, Daniel Claus’s Narrative of his Relations with Sir William Johnson and Experiences in the Lake George Fight (New York: Society of the Colonial Wars, 1904), 13-14, documents an exchange between Hendrick and a Kaughnawaga Indian.
560 Claus, Narrative, 13-14. O’Toole quotes Claus’s explanation, White Savage, 139. According to Claus, some speculated that, the “Manner” and “size” of the scalp section removed (e.g. “not larger than an English crown”, p. 14) pointed to a female scalper is provocative. As both northeastern Algonquian and Iroquoian cultures appear from contemporary sources to have privileged men – warriors – over women as scalpers, the likely cause of the distinct “Manner” and “size” difference of Hendrick’s scalp is inexperience, regardless of gender. Hendrick, aged and lagging, “fell in with the french Indns. Baggage Gard of young lads & women” (14); one of whom probably scarped the elderly chief after he was stabbed to death. The act of scalping, as some anthropologists and historians note, takes both skill and practice and so an “inferior” job would suggest a scalper lacking experience. That said, Native American groups did remove different sections of the skin – some included the ears, for instance – and different individuals within a group had responsibility for scalping while others were prohibited (see Georg Friederici, “Skalpieren un ähnliche Kriegsgebräuche in Amerika” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Leipsig, 1906)). Contemporary accounts of Iroquois and Algonquian scalping regularly portray this as an act by male warriors who then returned the trophies to the clan matrons for appropriate treatment.
561 Anderson, Crucible, 121.
562 Steele, Warpaths, 193.
their villages with their prisoners and trophies. They would not return to his aid in substantial numbers for nearly four years. 563

Mortified at the events that had pitted kinsmen against one another, the Mohawk adopted the neutral stance with regard to Anglo-French disputes that other members of the Six Nations had maintained (and the Mohawks had largely ignored) since the turn of the century. 564 Cajole and condole as he might, Johnson and the English on their own could not convince the Iroquois to join their cause. “Lack of Iroquois cooperation doomed Anglo-American operations on the New York frontier to frustration and failure” while Algonquians in New England, the Ohio Valley, and the pays d’en haut launched parallel wars that conjoined with the Franco-English conflict. 565

Attempting to overcome Iroquois neutrality, William Shirley eventually instructed Johnson (perhaps for a second time) to pay Native American warriors a daily wage, including “a reward for every prisoner or scalp.” 566 Johnson criticized the measure as “unreasonable” and as an “additional weight of expense upon the Crown, [that] hath enflamed the natural avidity of the Indians in all other respects,” despite his willingness to offer scalp bounties, at least, to his Indian allies in earlier colonial conflicts. 567 Shirley’s plan to enroll Indian warriors would make them auxiliaries rather than allies. While similar arrangements succeeded with New England’s disparate Christian Indians, Johnson likely knew the independent Iroquois would see it as an attempt to undermine their autonomy. Eventually, however, Johnson did pay Indian warriors beginning in 1756, and received permission from General Shirley’s replacement, Lord Loudon,

563 Steele, Warpaths, 193-194.
564 Steele, Warpaths, 193; Steele, Betrayals, 26-53.
566 DRCNY, 7:10.
567 SWJP, 2:646; DRCNY, 7:10.
to continue to do so. But the “very wrong Custom” of commissioning and paying Indian warriors actually inhibited Johnson’s ability – both financially and in accordance with his previous methods – to raise Iroquoian men to join the English campaigns.

Gifts, rather than daily pay, allowed Johnson to maintain the stature of a generous sachem among his Mohawk kin. By performing condolence ceremonies in which goods and prisoners or scalps “covered the dead” to repair a family’s losses and by hosting councils at which he distributed European items as gifts, Johnson sustained his own influence among the Mohawks. Warriors who joined him on subsequent military expeditions enacted their portion of the established reciprocal partnership. Direct payment and formal organization into units with commissioned officers undermined that relationship and circumvented Johnson’s position. Johnson paid Indian officers, but apparently did not provide a reward for scalps. Instead, Johnson offered the scalps warriors brought to him “in the Room of … [Indian] People killed” and paid for “Wampum to Hang to it” in accordance with Iroquoian custom. As a result, while French and Indian attacks on other colonies led not only to rewards for prisoners and scalps but to increasing anti-Indian violence throughout and especially after the Seven Years’ War, similar levels of extirpative violence did not occur in New York until the Revolution.

For the first several years of the conflict – before formal declarations of war between the European empires and after – the English had been unable to field their greatest military advantage: their superior numbers. “As long as the Americans fought like guerillas, they were wasting their major advantage – manpower.” Disputes between British generals and colonial assemblies hamstrung efforts to raise colonial regiments. The influx of large numbers of British

568 SWJP, 2:625, 662, 566-645 (accounts).
569 DRCNY, 2:184-185.
570 SWJP, 2:566-646.
571 SWJP, 2:631, 609.
572 Ian K. Steele, Guerillas and Grenadiers, 132
soldiers that accompanied European commitment to the war only worsened the situation.

Disagreements over everything from quartering and feeding the regulars to the method of raising, paying and commissioning provincial forces brought colonial assemblies and British authorities into conflict.  

But early in Spring of 1758, new policies regarding the war in America ended the impasse. Letters from William Pitt, arrived in Boston on March 10th. In addition to directing the removal of the unpopular commander of British forces, John Campbell, earl of Loudon, Pitt’s instructions altered policies regarding colonial troops. He gave colonial legislators control over how their troops were raised, promising proportional “Compensation” for the costs of “Levying, Cloathing, and pay of the Men,” and raised the rank of colonial officers to equal that of captains in the British regulars. The policy shift broke the political log jam and overnight colonial governments voted to supply more than 23,000 men for the war effort. Massachusetts alone agreed to levy 7,000 men after previously refusing to commit 2,128. The stunning increase finally put the weight of England’s colonies – its population – behind the imperial cause. Pitt’s policy put the advantage of English colonial population numbers to work. In maximizing this manpower advantage, “European conventional warfare had clear advantages,” not the least of which was the minimal training it required for most recruits. However, “although the conflict … in this sense became Europeanized after 1757,” and though historians following

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573 Anderson, Crucible, 202-228; Anderson, People’s Army, particularly chapters 1 and 6.
574 Anderson, Crucible, 224-225.
577 Anderson, Crucible, 227-229; Steele, Guerillas and Grenadiers, 132.
578 Steele, Guerillas and Grenadiers, 132.
Francis Parkman have focused on the epic battles and heroic figures that fit this model, the transition was far from complete.579

Amherst assumed, as had other European commanders before him, that he could employ Native American forces like European mercenary troops. His inability to comprehend Indian motives led to repeat their errors and offend his Amerindian allies in his attempt to uphold military mores that denied them the compensation they most valued. Then, in early 1761, Amherst compounded the problem, ending gifts to native communities – because he “[did] not see why the Crown should be put to that Expence” – and restricting Indian trade.580 Although his dictates grew from a desire to control and improve Anglo-Indian interaction, they instead generated a surge of violence that continued after French defeat.581

As English fortunes in war improved, settlers began flocking to western Pennsylvania and the Ohio Valley. The region’s Indian population, already suffering from famine brought on by the wartime destruction of crops and harvests, dwindling access to goods thanks to Amherst’s policies, and the loss of their allies as the French abandoned the region, now staggered under diseases that accompanied the invading homesteaders. The devastation prompted calls for a total rejection of European – particularly English – culture and violent opposition to English presence. These movements coalesced under an Ottawa warrior named Pontiac who persuaded members of several villages in the Pays d’en haut (and later, Iroquoia) to join him in attacking British forts and settlements, beginning with a siege on Detroit in May of 1763.582

On the heels of formal war between the European empires, settlers transmuted their enmity into anti-Indian attacks throughout the Ohio Valley. In December of 1763, a group of men from Paxton launched an infamous series of attacks on local Indians. Their notoriety grew with the number of their victims – and supporters. In a petition to the colony, the Paxton Boys called for the end of interaction and trade between colonists and Indians and for renewed bounties on Indian scalps. Although the governor reissued a reward on Indian scalps offering 134 Spanish dollars (roughly £22 Sterling) for a man’s scalp and fifty (approximately £8 Sterling) for that of a woman or child, the call for a new act to urge colonists to attack Indians was largely moot. The Paxton Boys had killed and scalped their victims without such an incentive, and ominous twist to the practice. Colonists no longer scalped the dead to recoup the financial rewards the trophies might bring. Scalping had come to connote a particular variety of violence: murders perpetrated by anti-Indian posses.

The scalps demonstrated the indiscriminate anti-Indian hatred that fueled the bands’ extirpative motive. The imperial wars translated into the violence of conquest in which English colonists set out to “reduce” Native Americans by eradicating them from the land. Most colonists lacked any knowledge of how thoroughly scalping accomplished this goal, in the Indian cultural world. Removing the scalp, after all, prevented the individual’s reappearance in the afterworld.

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In the post-war violence New York again seemed oddly exceptional. New England’s Abenakis dispersed into family groups in the wake of their French allies’ disappearance. Retreating into the deep northern woodlands, small bands of Abenakis continued to live and avoid colonists well into the next century. While violence between colonists continued in western Pennsylvania and the Ohio Valley, New Yorkers avoided much of this upheaval. Murder numbers and violent clashes between colonists and Native Americans in New York simply didn’t match that of other colonies in the post-war period. As trade resumed, and the Six Nations response to calls for united Native American opposition to English power proved lukewarm, inhabitants of the region found more to gain in peace than enmity.

The period of concord in the New York-Iroquoia borderlands following the Seven Years’ War would last only a generation. Catalyzed by another Atlantic war, anti-Indian extirpative fever would infect that region as well, culminating in Major General John Sullivan’s expedition against the British-allied Six Nations Iroquois in 1779. Anti-Indian sentiment would spread after every major American war, against Europeans or between Americans themselves, for over a century.

Generals in the Seven Years’ War had imported European military strategies, tactics, and mores to America on a larger scale than ever before, but their codes did not completely transform military conduct. European doctrines of war in the eighteenth century depended upon

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586 Preston, Texture, Table I: “Murders and Assaults: New York Colonists and Iroquois, 1756-70.”
distinctions between combatants versus non-combatants, war versus murder, and prisoners of war versus enslaved captives. Formal hierarchies and strict discipline helped enforce these rules, ideally limiting the many cruelties of warfare to the battlefield. Eighteenth-century military professionals conceived the battlefield itself as defined by the tactics of pitched battles and sieges.\(^{588}\) Although European-trained generals in the Seven Years’ War preferred this model, in practice it coexisted with irregular warfare or *petit guerre* even in Europe.\(^{589}\) The “revolution” in warfare Bougainville declared as he observed “[p]rojects for campaigns, for armies, for artillery, for sieges, for battles” proved janus-faced.\(^{590}\) Rather than limiting the impacts of warfare to the battlefield, the elevation of bounty-funded volunteer parties to auxiliary ranger corps legitimized Indian-hating and ensured racially motivated attacks and their signature form of post-mortem mutilation – scalping – continued. In North America, the greater implementation of European military doctrine during the Seven Years’ War created a bifurcation of warfare practices that sanctioned postmortem mutilation and the use of terror tactics against Native Americans and other racialized groups but not against individuals of European descent; a pattern that became entrenched in American military culture.\(^{591}\)


\(^{589}\) Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, 46-47.

\(^{590}\) Bougainville, *Adventure*, 252-253. See also Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, 56.

CHAPTER VII

Conclusion: Race after Revolution

Empires need enemies. Enemies articulate the limits of imperial dominion. Delineating those boundaries imposes coherence and encourages a perception of unity (however fictive) within the domain. Under the constructs of mercantilism seventeenth-century, European empires competed for the world’s limited resources. Colonies advanced imperial designs by channeling the benefits of commerce “from the margins of empire to its center.” 592 In late seventeenth and early eighteenth century English colonies, this “empire of commerce” gave way to “settler colonialism” in which a growing population relied on increasing land acquisitions to expand the exploitation of American resources. 593 Demand for territory in this “empire of land” was “inherently eliminatory,” presuming the removal of indigenous peoples in favor of English settlers. 594 Colonial rewards for Indian scalps fused the “logic of elimination” with targeted violence. Scalp bounties simultaneously constructed racialized enemies and produced whiteness as the unifying principle for people of the British (and later American) empire. 595 When English victory in the Seven Years’ War removed the French threat to British territorial dominion in

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594 Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, xi-xii,79-183 (empire of land); Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism,” 388. Wolfe’s analysis focuses on settler-native dynamics rather than competing settlers. For the Europeans in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century North America, the “logic of elimination” (Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism,” 387) served, and (initially) remained subordinate to, the mercantilist colonial imperative that made European competition the primary context and consideration in colonialism.

North America this powerful racial idiom remained, casting Indians as the archetypal enemy of “the white people.”

Until the mid-eighteenth century, commerce dominated the colonial paradigms in New France, New York, and Pennsylvania, postponing the development of race as an “organizing principle” by emphasizing intercultural relationships rather than territorial expansion. After Dutch colonists established the practice of offering rewards to their Indian allies for enemy scalps, officials in New York and New France continued the practice. However, like the fur trade exchanges they replicated, these rewards emphasized links/relations between colonial settlements and specific Native American communities. These arrangements did not promote wide-spread scalp hunting by colonists, nor did they establish a monolithic, racialized Indian identity with the same speed as bounties in New England.

By contrast, colonists in Massachusetts and much of New England established insular, agricultural communities where apartheid rather than accommodation dominated Anglo-Indian relations. Demand for land grew with New England’s steadily increasing population, ensuring “all the native [peoples had] to do was stay at home” for colonists to perceive them as adversaries. In the violence that resulted, scalp bounties formulated the racialized Indian-as-enemy, an idiom that constructed race as it defined the targets of violence based in the logic of removing the human impediments to land acquisition. Bounty acts explicitly equated Indians with wild beasts that threatened colonial livestock, and therefore settlers’ livelihoods, and whom colonists sought to exterminate by creating a market for their pelts and scalps. New England’s

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597 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism,” 388; Hinderacker cautions that the line separating the “empire of commerce” from the “empire of land” was blurry and that they were “entirely distinct only as analytical constructs,” *Elusive Empires*, Xi.
early bounty acts implied what later expansionist ideology codified: Indians threatened the progress of the American empire just as wild animals had threatened the increase of New England’s herds. The effects of this dehumanizing equation expanded to other northeastern colonies during the eighteenth century.

The scalp bounty initiated by Pennsylvania Governor Robert Morris in 1756 marked that colony’s break from the earlier policy of intercultural accommodation and trade, even as Morris attempted to prevent indiscriminate violence against all Indians. The reward coincided with a declaration of war against the Delawares who had “sold themselves to the French.”601 Morris’s lengthy explanation to the Iroquois evidenced his continued attempt to distinguish between ally and enemy Indians. However, pressure to enact the 1756 proclamation had come from outlying settlements that grew as the colony transitioned from an economy of exchange to one based in land. Immigrants who swelled Pennsylvania’s population during the 1720s moved west to establish farms rather than trade relationships.602 Unlike their Philadelphia counterparts, these colonists – whose territorial “encroachments proceeded with remarkable speed” – viewed Native Americans as impediments to settlement.603 Morris’s attempt to contain the implications of the bounty act overlooked the power such rewards had to construct a monolithic Indian race “in the targeting” of native people.604

Contemporaries acknowledged the psychological effect scalp bounties had on residents in outlying settlements. Because it had come to epitomize Indian attacks on English settlements, scalping “could release an absolute exhilaration” among borderland residents.605 Inverting the paradigm “prompted by Revenge, Duty, Ambition & the Prospect of the Reward to carry Fire &

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601 Pennsylvania Archives, Council minutes, vol 7 75.
603 Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 149.
605 Silver, Savage Neighbors, 78.
“Sword into the Heart of the Indian Country,” even if few of them claimed rewards for any scalps. For men in the borderlands, like their New England counterparts generations before, “striking out against a racialized enemy became a means of reasserting authority” and power in their worlds. Defining all Indians as one racial group implied that all “white” people constituted another coherent group. Just as the racial idiom that emerged in New England had elided differences among the settlers themselves by asserting a “bodily and cultural superiority” over Native peoples that all English people could share, the racial division that emerged during the Seven Years’ War enabled borderlands settlers to call on officials in Philadelphia and England for support on the grounds of “racial unity.”

Throughout the Seven Years’ War, the racial definition gained power as publicists distinguished Native Americans from colonists whom publicists increasingly called “‘the white people’ or simply ‘the people.’” Racial identity became “a building block for public discourse” in the divisive political landscape of colonial Pennsylvania. Previous generations of northeastern colonists had described Native Americans in disparaging terms, but few had focused on color as distinguishing between European settlers and Amerindians. The rhetoric of the Seven Years’ War changed that by establishing a unity among “white people” that

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609 Silver, Savage Neighbors, 115.

610 Silver, Savage Neighbors, 115.

simultaneously condoned and produced Indians as both monolithic and categorical enemies to British colonists.

The racial divide promoted a “metonymic logic” that equated killing one Indian with extermination of all Native peoples.612 Because scalping epitomized Indian attacks, encouraging colonists to practice the same form of violence reduced feared enemies to “mere matter” by turning this archetypal act against the Indians themselves.613 In the context of a growing “monolithic racial identity” they helped generate, scalp bounties transformed an attack on “any Indian” into a metonymic attack on all Indians.614 Financial rewards Indian scalps further subjected all Native Americans to the power of the market and, by extension, implied that killing Indians – all Indians – could benefit the “white people.”615

Like the hair upon it, the scalp could be inherently individual, containing “the essence of individuality and personhood.”616 The scalp became “a synecdoche for the body” of its owner and in the context of racism, for the group to whom that body belonged. Scalars performed this semiotic work particularly well in the eighteenth century because for Europeans hair enjoyed a “great moment” in which it marked “ethnic divides” as well as gendered ones.617 In the “great age of classification,” hair became a “major criterion in Carolus Linnaeus’s categorization” of human beings.618 Linnaeus associated each phenotype with the four humors and the “corresponding temperaments.”619 Eighteenth-century scientists took for granted that classification implied hierarchy, and in beginning to perceive phenotypical differences as “more
“than skin deep,” they also began to class people according to their place on a race and gender pyramid.\textsuperscript{620} To hair-conscious eighteenth century Englishmen, lack of hair could connote “a form of emasculation.”\textsuperscript{621} Within this idiom, scalp bounties encouraged the emasculation of Indian men and even the people as a whole, symbolically leaving them impotent and enforcing sexual sterilization on the race.

Scalp bounties could also retroactively condone attacks. When Samuel Murray heard news of impending Indian raids in early July 1763, he and six other borderland residents followed three Indians for nearly twelve miles in order to shoot and scalp them. Murray then took off for Philadelphia to present the scalps to Governor James Hamilton to request a reward. Aware of the pivotal role bounties played in inciting outlying residents to join military efforts, Hamilton resolved to provide “Ten Pounds for Each Scalp.”\textsuperscript{622} News of the Governor’s decision spread and weeks later a party of “scalpers” embarked on attacks against peaceful Munsees.\textsuperscript{623} If the violent intents or actions of these and other Indian victims in the summer of 1763 could be rationalized, the December 1763 attack on a Conestoga town by the infamous Paxton Boys demonstrated that for many – if not most – residents of the British colonial borderlands all Indians, regardless of previous affinity or religious affiliation, were enemies. Conflating all Indians as members of the same “Nation,” the Paxton Boys demanded a bounty on all Indian scalps for, “Who ever proclaimed War with a part of a Nation, and not with the Whole?”\textsuperscript{624} Public uproar erupted in Philadelphia as riotous mobs appeared in the city countering provincial

\textsuperscript{620} Schiebinger, “Anatomy of Difference,” 396.
\textsuperscript{621} Rosenthal, “Raising Hair,” 9.
\textsuperscript{622} James Hamilton to Edward Shippen Sr., 10 August 1763, Burd-Shippen Papers, American Philosophical Society, Series 1: Correspondence, Box 3; also quoted in Silver, \textit{Savage Neighbors}, 164.
\textsuperscript{623} Silver, \textit{Savage Neighbors}, 165.
\textsuperscript{624} [Anonymous], \textit{A Declaration and Remonstrance of the Distressed and Bleeding Frontier Inhabitants of the Province of Pennsylvania} (Philadelphia, PA: n. p., February 1764).
officials’ “excessive Regard” for the Conestoga victims over “the white people.”625 When the uproar in Philadelphia subsided, just over four months later, Governor Penn responded to the borderland settlers’ complaints by establishing a bounty of “one hundred and thirty-four pieces of eight for the scalp of every male Indian enemy, above the Age of Ten Years” and fifty pieces of eight for that of each female Indian over ten.626 The proclamation officially condoned the Paxton Boys’ actions, while confirming that divisions in the province should hereafter be made on racial rather land political or class lines. It confirmed, as the French departed, that the true enemy of the British empire was the Indian.

During the Revolutionary War, propagandists on both sides of the Atlantic quickly deployed the language of Indian-hating to paint their opponents as the archetypal American enemy: the Native American.627 To encourage rebellion against the crown, Benjamin Franklin collaborated with the marquis de Lafayette to devise “Prints to Illustrate British Cruelties,” including a depiction of “Savages killing and scalping the Frontier Farmers and their families” as English officers issued orders.628 Both armies – and some colonial governments – also offered scalp bounties to mobilize forces during the Revolution.629 Major General John Sullivan’s 1779 campaign against the Iroquois demonstrated that mutilatory violence no longer required any financial encouragement. A day after scalping enemies at Newtown, New York, a party of Americans went in search of other Indian dead. “Toward noon they found them,” Lieutenant William Barton recorded, “and skinned two of them from their hips down for boot legs; one pair

625 Declaration and Remonstrance, 4, 8.
626 Young, “Scalp Bounties in PA,” 210 reproduces the proclamation.
629 Silver, Savage Neighbors, 257-258.
for the Major the other for myself.”  The following day, Sergeant Thomas Roberts reported “Our trupes found 2 Indians and Sking thear Legs & Drest them for Leggins,” adding these new trophies to the four scalps his company had already taken. No bounty rewarded such novel trophies. The items themselves mirrored the early parallel between scalp bounties for Indians and those offered by colonial governments for wild animals. Yet, as the Revolutionary ideology continued to depend on the Indian as emblematic enemy and savage beast, Sullivan’s men showed they no longer thought of Indians as predatory wolves and wild cats who preyed on unsuspecting New England livestock. Instead, the men they killed resembled deer – the animal whose hides became leggings for many other hunters in the thick American underbrush. Indians, their actions said, were prey.

At war’s end, despite loyalist fears that rebels would turn their ardor on their neighbors, the Indian, transformed by revolutionary rhetoric and scalp bounties into the enemy of all Europeans, provided a more compelling target. Racial divisions, exacerbated by Revolutionary propaganda that cast the opposition (rebel and loyalist alike) as Indians, provided a means of uniting members of the new nation. Americans gradually ignored their differences and turned against Indians, in part because of the “visible dividends” in western land that hate-driven extirpative war could pay to those who waged it.

631 Cook, Sullivan Expedition Journals, 244.
632 Silver, Savage Neighbors, 230.
The British relinquished all the territory from the Atlantic coast to the Mississippi between Nova Scotia and Florida to the new United States in the Treaty of Paris, ignoring the hundreds of thousands of Native Americans still residing on much of that land. To many Americans, Indians now presented the only impediment to their occupation of land they believed they were entitled to by “a charter of blood.” They began to act on this charter almost immediately.

As the age of taxonomy shifted toward the collecting frenzy and sentimentalism of the nineteenth-century, science reinforced the logic of elimination, combining the drive to exterminate those they now saw as “inherently deficient” with preemptive nostalgia for Native peoples whose inferiority made them “a living example of a species destined to extinction.” As scientists, curators, and anthropologists rushed to collect artifacts of this disappearing breed of humanity, scalps, previously burned or buried to prevent bounty-fraud, became objects for fetishistic display, safely exhibited behind glass to the museum-going public where they became evidence of Indian extermination and “civilization’s progress.” Such a fate awaited the scalp for which Adam Poe received a reward in 1780. A July 1782 entry in the accession list of Pierre-Eugène du Simitière’s American Museum records the addition of:

A Scalp taken from an Indian killed in September 1781, in Washington County near the Ohio in this State [Pennsylvania] by Adam Poe, who fought with two Indians, and at last kill’d them both, it has as an ornament a white wampum bead a finger long with a Silver Knob at the end the rest of the hair plaited and tyed with deer skin. Sent me by the

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633 Provisional articles of the treaty were agreed upon 30 November 1782, the final treaty was signed on 3 September 1783. Treaty of Paris (1783). National Archives, Washington, DC. Also available online at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/; Silver, 261-264.

634 Silver, Savage Neighbors, 284.


637 Billington, Land of Savagery, 138.
President and the Supreme executive Council of this state with a written account of the affair.  

Museum collections transmuted scalps into commodities on the market of museum display which performed yet another elimination of Native peoples that made room for the extension of the American empire. 

Behind glass or locked in the curator’s cabinet, scalps became artifacts that simultaneously signified and created as fact Native peoples’ demise. Scalps collected in Natural History museums and Wild West shows metonymically moved all Indians to the dusty corners of historical archives. Their display proved to the (urban, American) viewer that Indians, like the dodo birds and dinosaurs in the rest of the museum, were extinct. As objects of study, scalps – and by inference, Indian peoples – became artifacts subsumed to the interpretations advanced by scientists and anthropologists who used them to advance their careers in the academic market. 

The scalp in Du Simitière’s American Museum presaged the role these trophies played in the mythic “Wild West tradition” that relied on the decline of an objectified, monolithic, savage Indian; the penultimate enemy of urban, industrialized, “white” civilization. Whiteness was defined by its distance and difference from the Indian of the Wild West. Scalping became a “favorite theme” in European and American “Westerns,” in which vivid depictions of Indians scalping whites validated racist notions of Native Americans as “primitive man” who, “like the buffalo, must go” to make room for “industrialization and urbanization” that marked the progress of “civilization.” Nineteenth-century anthropologists, curators, and writers wove scalp

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638 William John Potts, “Du Simitière, Artist, Antiquary, and Naturalist, Projector of the First American Museum, with some Extracts from his Notebook,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 13, no. 1 (April 1889), 369; Young, “Scalp Bounties in PA,” 217 also quotes this item and notes that the written account it mentions is held in the Du Simitière Papers, Library Company of Philadelphia.


hunting and Indian-hating into the themes of Manifest Destiny. Blending the racial idiom
developed during the Seven Years’ War, nineteenth-century “image-makers” developed the
semiotics of anti-Indian violence that had united white Americans after the Revolution into the
language of a new American empire: an empire that defined its boundaries through racialized
violence.\(^642\)

\(^{642}\) Billington, *Land of Savagery*, used the phrase “image-makers” to refer to novelists, illustrators, journalists and
others who helped construct the image of the West in American culture during the nineteenth century.
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APPENDIX A

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<th>Massachusetts Old Tenor (begin 1690) London on Boston</th>
<th>Massachusetts Lawful Money (begin 1750) London on Boston</th>
<th>Massachusetts (standard metallic rate of exchange at Boston)</th>
<th>Massachusetts Old Tenor to £100 Sterling (after Lawful Money begins)</th>
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*Unofficial market rate continued from Dutch period and 1672 change instituted by the NY court of Assizes. McCusker, 157.*

*Commercial rate of exchange as expressed in McCusker, Table 3.5, 162-165.*

*McCusker, Table 3.5 reads "30.00" as 1698 average, but September 1698 value reads "130.00." I interpreted "30.00" as a typo.

**Royal edict set the value of Canadian colonial money as equal to that of France from 1717-1759. McCusker provides no Canadian rates after 1759. From 1760 I followed the rate for other French colonies: 150 livres colonial to 100 livres tournois.*
# APPENDIX B

## Massachusetts Bounties for Wolves and Wild Cats

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<td>1693</td>
<td>15 June</td>
<td>20 shillings reward per wolf, 5 shillings for a “wolve's whelp.” Requires submitting head to selectmen who cut off ears to show adult or juvenile.</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 1:120</td>
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<tr>
<td>1694</td>
<td>15 March</td>
<td>Clarification of payment method and fraud avoidance. Payments remain 20 s. per wolf, 5 s. for whelp as previous act. Reward does not cover unborn pups taken from female wolf’s body. Selectmen to provide receipt certifying wolf or whelp.</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 1:196</td>
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<td>1715</td>
<td>12 December</td>
<td>40 shillings for a grown wolf.</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 2:26</td>
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<td>1717</td>
<td>12 November</td>
<td>£4 per wolf; 20 shillings for whelp. Must bring head to constable to claim reward. Oath required if the kill is suspect. Reward does not cover unborn pups taken from female wolf’s body. Same reward paid to an Indian for wolf head or whelp. Indian must bring wolf’s whole body.</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 2:88</td>
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<tr>
<td>1722</td>
<td>5 July</td>
<td>Revives bounty from 12 November 1717 until the end of May 1730.</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 2:244</td>
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<td>1731</td>
<td>2 April</td>
<td>(same provisions as 1717 act, retroactive to 3 July 1730, expires in end of May 1736) £4 per wolf; 20 shillings for whelp. Had become practice to present “pate or scalp of wolf.” Now must bring head to constable to claim reward. Oath required if the kill is suspect. Reward does not cover unborn pups taken from female wolf’s body. Same reward paid to an Indian for wolf head or whelp. Indian must bring wolf’s whole body.</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 2:587</td>
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<tr>
<td>1737</td>
<td>4 February</td>
<td>Same provisions as 1731 act, retroactive to 6 July 1736, expires in end of May 1746. £4 per wolf; 20 shillings for whelp. Still forbids “pate or scalp of wolf” as equivalent. Now must bring head to constable to claim reward. Oath required if the kill is suspect. Reward does not cover unborn pups taken from female wolf’s body. Same reward paid to an Indian for wolf head or whelp. Indian must bring wolf’s whole body.</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 2:843</td>
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\(^1\) [Massachusetts], *Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay*, vols. 1-13 (Boston: Wright & Potter, 1869-1920).
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<td>1737</td>
<td>4 February</td>
<td>Retroactive to 18 August 1736, remains in force for ten years) 20 shillings for wildcats 1 year old or older; 10 shillings for cats under a year old. Must bring head to constable who will cut off and burn the ears. Constable to give claimant receipt for reward.</td>
<td><em>MA A&amp;R, 2:844-845.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1742</td>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>Reward for “wolf, bear, wildcat, or catamount,” including whelps or bear cubs. Wolf: 30s for wolf, 10s for whelp Catamount: 40s for catamount, 20s for whelp Bear: 10s for bear killed between April &amp; August, 5s for whelp Wildcat: 5s for wildcat, 2s6p for whelp Claimant must bring head and if kill is suspect, oath required. Same reward for Indians who may also bring head.</td>
<td><em>MA A&amp;R, 2:1095-1097</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1745</td>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>Retroactive to 24 April 1745, to remain in force 5 years. Wolf: 40s for wolf, 13s4p for whelp Catamount: 50s for catamount, 25 for whelp Bear: 10s for bear between April &amp; August, 5s for cub Wildcat: 6s for wildcat, 3 for whelp. Receipts from constable when head presented. Same reward for Indians; same oath-taking for suspected fraud.</td>
<td><em>MA A&amp;R, 3:243-244</em></td>
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### Appendix C:
**Massachusetts Indian Scalp Bounties**

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Summary</th>
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<td>1694</td>
<td>12 September</td>
<td>Volunteers who go in pursuit of “common enemy”: £50 for “every Indian, great or small, which they shall kill or take prisoner.” Defenders of house or garrison: £5 for every Indian slain in that defense. Soldiers “detached or impressed and listed in their majesties’ service” £10 “over and above” regular pay for “every Indian” they kill or take prisoner while in service. Claimant to present scalp. Reward to be shared equally among members of the party. Fraud provision: if scalp produced is not an Indian scalp, or from Indian not “slain in service as aforesaid,” offender to “suffer three months’ imprisonment” and forfeit double the payable sum: one half paid to government and other half to whoever informed on fraud. Remains in force until May 1695.</td>
<td>Volunteers: £50/scalp or prisoner</td>
<td><em>MA A&amp;R</em>, 1:175-176</td>
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<td>1695</td>
<td>17 June</td>
<td>1694 act continued. Indians of Natick, Hassanamiscox, Kekamoouchock to be protected. Reward “for any Indian woman, or person under fourteen years of age, that shall be killed or taken and brought in prisoner” £25. Adult male bounty remains at £50.</td>
<td>Volunteers: £50/♂ ≥14 y.o., scalp or prisoner £25/♀ or ≤14 y.o. Scalp or prisoner Soldiers: £10/scalp or prisoner Defender: £5/scalp or prisoner</td>
<td><em>MA A&amp;R</em>, 1:210-211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1696</td>
<td>16 June</td>
<td>Volunteers who receive commission from Lieutenant Governor or Commander in Chief and raise a company may now receive provisions, ammunition and wages for duration of expedition. May also receive vessels or boats for transport, all paid out of public treasury. Scalp bounty: £50/scalp or prisoner ♂ ≥14 years old; £25/scalp or prisoner of Indian woman or child under 14 years.</td>
<td>Commissioned volunteer parties: £50/♂ ≥14 y.o. scalp or prisoner; £25/♀ or ≤14 y.o. scalp or prisoner</td>
<td><em>MA A&amp;R</em>, 7:115-116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1697</td>
<td>20 October</td>
<td>Volunteer parties that go in pursuit of the Indian enemy:</td>
<td>£50 for every Indian man or woman slain; £10 for children under 10. Prisoners may be kept for their own use. For Indians slain in defense of house or garrison: £5 for men and women. Claimants must produce scalp and make oath regarding circumstances of “relating thereto.” Rewards shared equally among party, but captain to have 2 shares, lieutenant to have 1 ½ shares. Fraud provision (fraud discovered before payment): if scalp not an Indian scalp or of Indian not slain in service as described, offender pays 2 times award amount: half to government, half to informant; offender imprisoned for 3 months, no bail. For fraud discovered after payment: offender pays 2 times reward amount: ⅓ to government ⅓ to informant; same imprisonment as above. Act “expired upon the publication here of the Treaty of Ryswick” (MA A&amp;R, 7:598)</td>
<td>Volunteers: £50/scalp ♂ or ♀ ≥10 y.o. £10/scalp ≤10 y.o. Prisoners can be kept (and sold) Defenders: £5/ ♂ or ♀ scalp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1703</td>
<td>8 September</td>
<td>“Regular and detached forces, over and above” pay: benefit of sale of all Indian prisoners under 10 years, to be equally shared among officers and soldiers of party “proportionally to their wages.” Voluntary enlistees in service under pay, same benefit for prisoners. £10 for “every Indian killed” to be shared proportionate to wages of those in party that kill the Indian(s). Volunteer parties “at their own charge and without pay” who respond to alarm and defend town or garrison: £20 for every Indian they kill or capture, and benefit of sale of Indian prisoners, equally shared among officers and soldiers of party. All payments made when scalp produced and oath made. Same penalty for fraud discovered before payment as in 1697 act. No mention made of penalties for fraud discovered after payment.</td>
<td>Volunteers: £20/scalp or prisoner, can keep &amp; sell prisoners Voluntary Enlistees: £10/scalp, can keep and sell prisoners Regular Soldiers: Can keep and sell prisoners</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Reward</td>
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<tr>
<td>1703</td>
<td>16 November</td>
<td>Detached forces: £10 per scalp for every Indian over 10 years old killed in fight in next four months. Reward shared equally among officers and soldiers of party. Same penalty for fraud as provided for volunteers.</td>
<td>Regular detached soldiers: £10/scalp ≥10 y.o.</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:31-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1703</td>
<td>2 December</td>
<td>Volunteer parties under commissioned officer who go at own expense: £40 for scalp of Indian over 10 years old. All Indians under 10 years old can be sold as prisoners and party gets proceeds. New Hampshire volunteers receive 4/5 of the £40 reward or proceeds.</td>
<td>Volunteers (unpaid): £40/scalp any Indian ≥10 y.o. Proceeds of sale for Indians ≤10 NH companies: 4/5 of same</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:38-39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1703/1704</td>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>£200 paid to Capt Tyng and party for 5 scalps</td>
<td>£200 for 5 scalps</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:319 citing Penhallow, Indian Wars, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1704</td>
<td>6 January</td>
<td>£40 for 1 scalp to Richard Billing and Samuel Feild</td>
<td>£40/ 1 scalp</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1704</td>
<td>20 Mar</td>
<td>Volunteer parties under commissioned officer: £100 per scalp for every Indian over 10 years old; provisions, ammunition deducted out of premium amount, transport service at public charge. Prisoners under 10 years old, £3 from government or may sell for proceeds. New Hampshire volunteers receive 4/5 of bounty.</td>
<td>Unpaid volunteers: £100/scalp any Indian ≥10 y.o. £3 or profit from sale of prisoners Provisions &amp; ammunition advanced, cost subtracted from premium NH parties: 4/5 of bounty</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:44-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1704</td>
<td>24 March</td>
<td>£4 .3s .4p paid to Capt Wm. Southworth for 4 scalps to be divided among the 40 men in his company.</td>
<td>£4 .3s .4p paid for 4 scalps to party of 40 men</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:48</td>
</tr>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>Event</td>
<td>Reward Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>1704</td>
<td>9 June</td>
<td>£60 paid to survivors of party including Jonathan Wells and Ebenezer Wright for 1 scalp. £5 paid to each widow of the 4 men in the party who died. £34.17s paid for party’s losses sustained in fight.</td>
<td>£60 paid for 1 scalp £5/ widows compensation</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:66-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1704</td>
<td>27 October</td>
<td>£4 each to John Shepley and Samuel Butterfield for 1 scalp of Indian man killed in summer 1704.</td>
<td>£8 for 1 scalp</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:81, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1704</td>
<td>1 November</td>
<td>£21 paid to Caleb Lyman and party of 5 “friend Indians” who “slew seven of the Indian enemy and brought in six of their scalps.” At time, “no Law Provides Suitable Reward” for them, but Council agreed to pay £21.</td>
<td>£21 to Lyman &amp; 5 Indian allies for 7 dead (6 scalps provided)</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:83, 402-404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1704</td>
<td>18 November</td>
<td>1703 act revived. Volunteer parties enlisted under an officer “appointed and commissioned by the captain-general or commander-in-chief” who go out against enemy at their own charge: for every Indian male or youth “capable of bearing armes” slain £100; for women or “others, male or female,” over 10 years £10 “per head, the scalp to be produced and oath made.” Provisions and ammunition advanced on account to these parties and deducted from the reward amount. Benefit of prisoners under 10 to be divided proportionally according to wages, but no reward to soldiers under pay for any Indian they kill under 10 years old. Remains in force until 30 November 1705.</td>
<td>Volunteers: £100/scalp ♂ ≥10 y.o. £10/scalp ♀ or other ≥10 y.o. Can keep &amp; sell prisoners, any ≤10 y.o.</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 1:558-559</td>
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<tr>
<td>1706</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Premium for Indian scalps taken by volunteers without pay increased to £100/scalp</td>
<td>Volunteers without pay: £100/Indian scalp</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1706</td>
<td>14 August</td>
<td>For any male Indian “capable of bearing arms” or over 10 years old that is killed or captured: “Regular detached forces, under pay”:£10 Volunteers “actually in the service and under pay”: £20 Volunteers “without pay or subsistence”: £50 To those defending a town or garrison: £30 (regardless of military status), in addition to the “benefit of all Indian prisoners, being women or children under the age abovesaid.” Premiums and prisoners to be shared proportionate to wages but volunteer parties can make different arrangements. Scalps must be produced for rewards. Same fraud provisions as in 1703 act.</td>
<td>Volunteers: £50/ ♂ ≥10 y.o., scalp or prisoner Vol. Enlistees: £20/ ♂ ≥10 y.o., scalp or prisoner Reg. Soldiers: £10/ ♂ ≥10 y.o., scalp or prisoner Defender: £30/ ♂ ≥10 y.o., and sale of all prisoners</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 1:594-595</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Bounty for Scalps</td>
<td>Note</td>
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<tr>
<td>1707</td>
<td>7 March</td>
<td>£160 to Col Winthrop Hilton and company, to be divided proportionate to their wages, for 8 Indian scalps</td>
<td>£160 for 8 scalps</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1707</td>
<td>17 April</td>
<td>£10 paid to Capt John Pierson, his company at garrison, and town inhabitants who helped, for 1 Indian scalp</td>
<td>£10 paid for 1 Indian scalp to garrison company</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:220, 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1707</td>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>£40 to Col Winthrop Hilton and company, to be divided proportionate to their wages for two Indian scalps</td>
<td>£40 for 2 scalps</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 8:674,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1708</td>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>1706 act remains in force until 29 June 1709</td>
<td>Same as 1706 act</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 1:621-622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1709</td>
<td>10 June</td>
<td>£66 to Capt Benjamin Wright and company for “seven or eight” Indian scalps. £12 to Capt Wright, £6 each to men in company, in addition to their wages.</td>
<td>£66 for 7-8 scalps</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 9:62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1709</td>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>Continues 1706 act until 29 June 1710</td>
<td>Same as 1706 act</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 1:639-640</td>
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<tr>
<td>1709</td>
<td>4 November</td>
<td>£20 to Capt Andrew Robinson and company (£12 to Capt Robinson, remaining £8 to divide among company) for 2 Indian men’s scalps</td>
<td>£20 for 2 scalps (Indian men)</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 9:88</td>
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<tr>
<td>1710</td>
<td>23 June</td>
<td>Continues 1706 act until 29 June 1711</td>
<td>Same as 1706 act</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 1:657-658</td>
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<tr>
<td>1711</td>
<td>12 June</td>
<td>Continues 1706 act until 29 June 1712</td>
<td>Same as 1706 act</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 1:674-676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1712</td>
<td>12 June</td>
<td>Continues 1706 act, but increases the bounty on male Indians capable of bearing arms and those over 12 years old to £40 for those in service and under pay and they are allowed 6p per diem each. Remains in force until 29 June 1713.</td>
<td>Increases amount for vol. enlissee to £40/♂ ≥12 y.o., adds 6p/day pay</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 1:695-697</td>
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<tr>
<td>1712</td>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>Volunteer companies organized under an officer may be paid £60 per scalp for every male Indian “qualified as the law directs” (meaning over 12 years as directed 12 June). Specifies wages for those companies: Captain: 45s/week Men under his command: 6p/day per man</td>
<td>Volunteers under pay: £60/♂ ≥12 y.o.</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 9:251</td>
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| 1722 | 16 August | Volunteers without pay or subsistence: £100 for scalp of male Indian over 12; £50 for scalps of “all others” and any prisoners taken as well as the benefit (of sale) of prisoners. Volunteers without pay but who receive subsistence and ammunition: £60 for scalp of males Indians over 12; £30 for scalps of others and for prisoners, and money from prisoner sales. Those who respond to alarm: £30 per scalp of any killed; £10 for any prisoners and benefit of their sale. Regular detached forces in pay: £15 per scalp; £5 for prisoners. All to be shared by company proportionate to wages. Volunteers get equal shares unless they agree otherwise. Fraud penalty: 3 months imprisonment; 2 times reward amount, to be split equally between government and informer. To be in force for the present Indian war. | Vol. (unpaid):  
£100/scalp ♂ ≥12  
£50/scalp or prisoner ♂ or ≤12  
Vol. (paid):  
£60/scalp ♂ ≥12  
£30/scalp or prisoner ♂ or ≤12  
Reg. forces:  
£15/all scalps  
£5/prisoners  
Def:  
£30/scalps  
£10/prisoners | MA A&R, 2:258-259 |
| 1723 | 12 January | Offer to be made to the 5 Nations: For scalps of Indian men 12 years old or older: £100. For scalps of “all others killed in Fight, & prisoners”: £50 and “benefit of prisoners” To be paid to parties of Iroquois 5 Nations under 2 English men “at least” Parties of 5 Nations Indians to be supplied with ammunitions or provisions they need and the cost deducted out of scalp money. Any scalp money to be divided equally among the party and the English men with the party. | Parties of Iroquois 5 Nations under English men:  
£100/ scalp ♂ ≥12  
£50 all other scalps and prisoners, plus benefit of prisoners | MA A&R, 10:263 |
<p>| 1723 | 17 January | English men that accompany Iroquois 5 Nations parties are to attest to accuracy of oath regarding scalps and that the age/sex of scalps taken |  | MA A&amp;R, 10:269-270 |
| 1724 | 20 September | Mohawks (Maquas) to receive provisions and ammunition from Timothy Dwight without deducting from scalp bounty. If Mohawks want to be paid in money that Dwight can draw on Treasurer for claims. £500 worth of goods advanced to Dwight for these payments. |  | MA A&amp;R, 10:363 |
| 1724 | 14 November | £100 paid to Noah Ashley for an Indian scalp. | £100/ 1 scalp | MA A&amp;R, 10:481 |</p>
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<tr>
<td>1724</td>
<td>17 November</td>
<td>Response to petition by John Lovewell, Josiah Farewell, &amp; Jonathan Robbins: Volunteers under commissioned officers: .2s .6p/day £100 per male scalp and “other premiums established by Law to Volunteers without pay or subsistence.”</td>
<td>£100/ ♂ scalp</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 10:484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1724</td>
<td>20 November</td>
<td>£15 to Jacob Ames for scalp taken while defending garrison</td>
<td>£15/ 1 scalp</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 10:486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1739</td>
<td>19 December</td>
<td>200 acres unappropriated land granted to Joseph Neff, son of Mary Neff who helped Hannah Dustan scalp Indians, but never received reward for those scalps.</td>
<td>200 acres for portion of 10 scalps</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 12:621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744</td>
<td>25 October</td>
<td>Volunteers at own cost who kill a St. John’s or Cape Sables male Indian 12 years or older and produce scalp: £100 New Tenor (Lawful Money); £105 for male prisoners of any age; £50 for scalp of woman or child; £55 for female or child prisoners. To be extended to any other Indian peoples who go to war against colony. In force until end of June 1745. Act on same page sets captain’s pay a 20s per month.</td>
<td>Vol. (unpaid): £100/scalp ♂ ≥12 £105/prisoner ♂ ≥12 £50/scalp ♀ or ≤12 £55/prisoner ♀ or ≤12</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 3:218 (note); 13:399</td>
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<tr>
<td>1745</td>
<td>25 July</td>
<td>Revives premium for scalps and captives of St. Johns and Cape Sables Indians (and Penobscot and Norridgewocks if they refuse treaty). Volunteers at own cost: £100/scalp of male over 12; £105 for male captives; £50 for scalps of women or those under 12 years, £55 for female or child captives. Paid in new tenor bills of credit (lawful money). Volunteers who receive ammunition and provisions: £75 for scalps of males over 12; £78 for male captive over 12; £39 for women and any under 12 (doesn’t specify scalp versus captive). Soldiers: £30 for scalps of men over 12, £33 for captive; £15 for scalps of women and children, £16 for captives.</td>
<td>Unpaid volunteers: £100/scalp ♂ ≥12 £105/prisoner ♂ ≥12 £50/scalp ♀ or ≤12 £55/prisoner ♀ or ≤12 Provisioned volunteers: £75/scalp ♂ ≥12 £78/prisoner ♂ ≥12 £39/ ♀ or ≤12 Soldiers: £30/scalp ♂ ≥12 £33/prisoner ♂ ≥12 £15/scalp ♀ or ≤12 £16/prisoner ♀ or ≤12</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 13:488-489</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>Paid Volunteers</td>
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<tr>
<td>1746</td>
<td>7 January</td>
<td>For volunteers who enlist under officers: £80 male captive 12 or older, £40 male captive under 12; £40 for “Females of any age.” £75 for scalp of male 12 and over, £37 .10s for scalp of male under 12 and same amount for women’s scalps. Anyone who joins these companies also to be paid .25s/month wages.</td>
<td>Paid volunteers: £75/scalp ♂ ≥12 y.o., £37 .10s/ scalp ♂ ≤12 or ♀, £80/prisoner ♂ ≥12 y.o.; £40/ prisoner ♂ ≤12 or ♀</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 13:521-522</td>
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<tr>
<td>1746</td>
<td>25 April</td>
<td>For enlisted volunteers: £75 for scalps of males over 12; £37 .10s .6p for scalps of males under 12 or females any age; £80 for male captives over 12; £40 for male captives under 12 and for females of any age in addition to .25s/month, 1 pound powder, 2 pounds bullets, &amp; six good flints</td>
<td>Paid volunteers: £75/scalp ♂ ≥12, £37 .10s .6p/ scalp ♂ ≤12 or ♀; £80/prisoner ♂ ≥12 y.o.; £40/ prisoner ♂ ≤12 or ♀</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 13:577-578</td>
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<tr>
<td>1747</td>
<td>5 February</td>
<td>To Indian allies: £35 for scalps of male over 12, £10 for scalps of males under 12 or females any age; £40 male prisoner over 12; £25 for male prisoners under 12 or female prisoners. English who accompany Indian parties entitled to share in bounty.</td>
<td>Indian allies: £35/ scalp ♂ ≥12, £10/ scalp ♂ ≤12 or ♀; £40/prisoner ♂ ≥12 y.o.; £25/ prisoner ♂ ≤12 or ♀</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 13:685-686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747</td>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>To encourage volunteers, bounty raised for next six months to: £250 for Indian killed and scalp produced or Indian captives. For soldiers or those who defend self or another person: £100 for scalp or captive.</td>
<td>Volunteers: £250/scalp or prisoner  Soldiers: £100/scalp or prisoner</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 13:712-713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747</td>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>Since previous encouragement for scouting the woods for Indians has proved ineffectual: £250 pounds for each Indian killed and the scalp produced and for every Indian prisoner taken by a scouting party with permission to go as volunteers. Money to be equally divided among party regardless of pay or rank. Volunteer parties also provided 1 pound powder, 3 pounds bullets, and 6</td>
<td>Vol. (unpaid): £250/any scalp or prisoner  Soldiers: £100/any scalp or prisoner</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 3:342 (note)</td>
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Soldiers in pay: £100 for every Indian scalp or prisoner. Same amount for those who kill Indian in own defense or in defense of other colonists.

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<tr>
<td>1747</td>
<td>22 August</td>
<td>£30 to John Beamen for 1 Indian scalp</td>
<td>£30/1 scalp</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 14:38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>23 February</td>
<td>Volunteer enlistees to receive pay and subsistence to serve at forts Number 4 and Massachusetts as well as: £100 per scalp.</td>
<td>£100/scalp to voluntary enlistees</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 14:89</td>
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<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>9 March</td>
<td>As an encouragement to Capt Melvin and 25 others: “in equal parts the sum of two hundred and fifty pounds for each prisoner or scalp of said Indian enemy by them taken.” Wages and subsistence to be deducted from reward.</td>
<td>£250/scalp</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 14:107</td>
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<tr>
<td>1748-49</td>
<td>18 November</td>
<td>Capt Melvin’s party paid £25 for losses and £60 for bravery although no scalps returned.</td>
<td>Paid: £25 for losses &amp; £60 for “bravery” no scalps returned</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 14:185</td>
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<tr>
<td>1755</td>
<td>25 April</td>
<td>To men who go against Indians of the St. Francis tribe or “any other, that in a hostile manner shall oppose them in such their undertaking,” £75 per captive, £70 per scalp, plus provisions.</td>
<td>£75/prisoner, £70/scalp</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 15:308-309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755</td>
<td>10 June</td>
<td>To voluntary enlistees who go out against the Arasaguntacook Indians and all other tribes east of the Piscataqua River except the Penobscot tribe: £50 for captive male above 12, £40 per scalp of male over 12; £25 for female prisoners or male prisoners under 12, £20 for scalp of female or male under 12</td>
<td>Paid volunteers: £50/prisoner ♂ ≥12, £40/scalp ♂ ≥12; £25/prisoner ♀ or ♂ ≥12, £20/scalp ♀ or ♂ ≥12</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 15:343-345</td>
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<tr>
<td>1755</td>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>Same bounties for capture or scalp on the Western Frontier as on the Eastern, and bounty permitted to volunteers who are not under pay.</td>
<td>Paid volunteers: £50/prisoner ♂ ≥12, £40/scalp ♂ ≥12; £25/prisoner ♀ or ♂ ≤12, £20/scalp ♀ or ♂ ≤12</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 15:349</td>
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<tr>
<td>1755</td>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>For voluntary enlistees: 30 days provision and £220 for every captive brought to Boston; £200 for every scalp. To those who defend or respond to emergency: £110 per captive, £100 per scalp.</td>
<td>Paid volunteers: £220/captive, £200/scalp; Defenders: £110/captive, £100/scalp</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 15:357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Bounties extended to include Penobscot Indians</td>
<td></td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 15:396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>To soldiers in service: £50 for Indian prisoners over age 12 brought to Boston, £40 per scalp of Indian over 12; £25 for Indian prisoner under 12, £20 for scalp of Indian under 12.</td>
<td>Paid to soldiers: £50/prisoner ≥12, £40/scalp ≥12, £25/prisoner ≤12, £20/scalp ≤</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 15:474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>For volunteers who go in quest of the Indian enemy and who signify so in writing to the chief military officer in the area from which they depart: £300 for Indian scalp, £320 for Indian captive</td>
<td>£300/scalp £320/captive</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 15:552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>For scouting companies given pay and subsistence: £100 for a scalp, £110 for a captive</td>
<td>Paid volunteers: £100/scalp, £110/captive</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 15:616-617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Bounty to soldiers: £50 per Indian captive above age 12, £40 per scalp of Indian above age 12; £25 per Indian captive under age 12, £20 per scalp of Indian under age 12</td>
<td>Soldiers: £50/captive ≥12, £40/scalp ≥12, £25/captive ≤12, £20/scalp ≤12</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 15:708-709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>For private citizens who state in writing they are in quest of the Indian enemy: £300 for a scalp, £320 for a prisoner. For soldiers: £50 for a captive, £40 for a scalp.</td>
<td>Stated volunteers: £300/scalp £320/captive Soldiers: £40/scalp £50/captive</td>
<td>MA A&amp;R, 16:13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>