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The Audiences of Herodotus: the Influence of Performance on the Histories

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THE AUDIENCES OF HERODOTUS
THE INFLUENCE OF PERFORMANCE ON THE HISTORIES

by
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The Audiences of Herodotus: The Influence of Performance on the *Histories*
written by Ian Cody Oliver
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The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.
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The Audiences of Herodotus: The Influence of Performance on the Histories

Thesis directed by Professor Peter Hunt

Scholars have long recognized that Herodotus wrote his Histories when literature was often researched, composed, and circulated by oral rather than written means. Like his contemporaries, Herodotus gave oral demonstrations of his expertise (in Greek, epideixeis) in widely diverse settings across Greece. Most modern scholarship, however, treats Herodotus’ Histories as fundamentally unrelated to these performances, assuming instead that, in the Histories, Herodotus wrote for a single, broad, and Panhellenic readership. My dissertation argues that significant portions of the Histories in fact follow Herodotus’ earlier oral performances closely—sometimes so closely that the original audience and historical context can be identified. In my dissertation, I analyze three Herodotean battle narratives (Plataea, Salamis, and Thermopylae) where anomalies in composition appear to reflect these narratives’ origins as oral epideixeis with specific original performance dates. In short, my proposed original performance dates match the compositional context of Greece in the mid-fifth century BCE better than the traditional ‘publication’ date two decades later. If we recognize that Herodotus’ text reflects widely differing historical contexts, not only can we place Herodotus more satisfactorily in the oral culture of fifth-century Greece, we can also see how closely Herodotus engaged with the regional politics of his time. My approach thus challenges entrenched assumptions about the composition of the Histories, significantly improving our current understanding of Herodotus’ personal bias, his historiographical method, and his intended audience.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: *EPIDEIXEIS* AND THE *HISTORIES*

Modern scholarship has largely abandoned Jacoby’s separatist theories.\(^1\) Attempts to chop the *Histories* into a series of discrete ‘lectures’ (*logoi*)\(^2\) have given way to comprehensive analyses of a presumably unitary text that seek to extrapolate the tangled threads of Herodotean composition.\(^3\) Yet the complexity of Herodotus’ text continues to defy simple explanation, precluding straightforward interpretations of the author’s true convictions. Did Herodotus admire or fear Athens?\(^4\) Are the Persians noble paragons or savage barbarians?\(^5\) Most recent scholars—relying on such tools as narratology,\(^6\) source-criticism,\(^7\) and reader-response\(^8\)—have reached the conclusion that such questions miss the point, that Herodotus intentionally problematized his text to invite audience engagement. While this conclusion is elegant (and even productively applied), it simply cannot explain every quirk and whim of Herodotus’ text.

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2 E.g., Cagnazzi 1975.
4 E.g., Fornara 1971b: 37-58. “He is too detached to be an Athenian propagandist and too complex to permit his intent to be extracted by inference from an isolated passage” (ibid. 58).
5 E.g., Dorati 2000.
8 E.g., Baragwanath 2008.
On the contrary, some sections of the text seem quite distant from this unifying characteristic. To supplement this interpretation of the Histories, then, I propose to revisit Jacoby’s theory of ‘lectures’—not in its original form, of course, but adapted to recognize the fundamental unity of the text as we have it. In short, I argue not that the Histories is wholly made up of ‘lectures’, but partially: I aim to detect the presence of original performance audiences woven into the fabric of the Histories. By recognizing how Herodotus’ career as a performer shaped his final product (i.e., the complete, written Histories), we can better understand the vacillating seeming-whims of Herodotus’ narrative and place significant portions of the Histories in their original political, chronological, and modal ‘publication’ context.

The most surprising conclusion that this method produces is that Herodotus’ text does not all belong to the same political, chronological, and modal context. In particular, I isolate three sections (for which I use the term epideixis, discussed below) that imply a different audience, time, and modality from the written Histories. Although this conclusion runs counter to a scholarly preference to date the Histories to the 420s BCE (or later), it actually corroborates recent work on oral tradition, wisdom-performance, and Herodotus’ role therein. Essentially, if Herodotus’ narrative is complex and multi-faceted—even self-contradictory at times—this result is at least partially the product of the varied compositional contexts that produced it. The Histories, then, would represent a ‘final text’ that is conceptually unitary but nonetheless includes a number of smaller, discrete ‘performance texts’.

9 Examples identified below, §Project Overview. Such narratives, contrary to the Herodotean tendency observed by (e.g.) Dewald 1999: 223-33, seem to conform to rather than resist a partial and partisan authorial strategy.
10 For the early 420s, see Cobet 1977, 1987 and Sansone 1985. Cf. Stadter 2012a: 2 n.4. Fornara 1971a, 1982 dates the text to the 410s. References to events in the first years of the Archidamian War occur at 6.91; 6.98.2; 7.137; 7.233.4; 7.235.2; 9.73. Cobet 1971: 59-78 discusses all references to events after 479 BCE. Hereafter, all other dates will be BCE unless otherwise specified.
Wisdom-Performance and the Histories

To understand the Histories, we must attempt to peel back the layers—a sort of archaeology of the text as it survives to us—seeking to identify not only the context of its publication (i.e. ‘final text’), but also the context of the Histories’ oral foundations (i.e. ‘performance texts’). This stratification reflects the significant changes in Greek literary culture that occurred during Herodotus’ lifetime. The first half of the fifth century was fundamentally different from modern times, being dominated by orality and the textual uncertainty that accompanied it. The early fifth century Greeks were in a world of transition, trying to figure out what was, what could be, and what they should do about it.12 From this contemplation came a culture of wisdom, which soon produced the phenomenon of wisdom-performance.13 Each performer propounded his own brand of wisdom, or ‘sophiē’, and few had any awareness of the categories to which we now assign them. From this chaotic world of wisdom-performance, the term ‘sophist’ arose. The term is most familiar from its use by Plato and the post-Socratic philosophers, but in Herodotus’ own time the term still lacked its professional sense—Herodotus himself uses the term only to mean ‘teacher’ or ‘purveyor of wisdom’ (e.g., Hist. 1.29.1).14

12 E.g., Baragwanath 2008: 20 “The truth had not yet been categorized; the sophists were engaged in experimenting with manifold ways of attaining and presenting it; everyone claimed to possess it.” Thomas 2000: 101 has “We are perhaps at a point where ideas about knowledge and truth are on the move, different and competing conceptions coexist of how to get at the truth, the unknown, from the poets, from experience and evidence of experience, to schematic or abstract theories, all with their own plausibility, none quite satisfying or sufficient by itself to jettison all the rest.” Cf. Lloyd 1987; O’Grady 2008: 11.

13 Cf. Lloyd 1987. Wisdom-poets like Solon and Theognis gave way to an increasingly diversified array of thinkers: thinker-poets like Xenophanes coded the riddles of the universe into elegiac couplets; rhetoricians like Protagoras and Gorgias propounded the fundamentals of argument and speech-making; thinkers like Pythagoras developed theories of geometry and mathematics; physicians like Hippocrates claimed to understand the human body and how to cure illness. To these we might add the logopoioi like Aesop (cf. Thuc 1.21.1, citing logographoi) and those whom Herodotus calls logioi (Hdt. 1.1.1), presumably priests and local tradition-keepers. Even praise poets, rhapsodes, and bards—such as Simonides, Pindar, and Bacchylides—explicitly participated in this culture of knowledge and wisdom performance (e.g., Pind. Ol. 1.116).

14 O’Grady 2008: 10. Indeed, I would argue that Herodotus ought to be considered a ‘sophist’ himself—not in the later sense of ‘rhetorician’ and ultimately ‘youth-corruptor’ (i.e., ‘Socrates’ in Aristophanes’ Clouds), but in the proto-sophist sense of ‘wisdom-performer’. Hereafter, all references to the Histories will omit author and work.
It follows that any distinction between sophistry and history as it applies to Herodotus is anachronistic. Even if Herodotus deserves his designation as “father of history” (patrem historiae, Cicero De Leg. 1.5.1), his work shares much with the broad culture of wisdom-performance that produced him. Simonides, for example, dealt with recent history in elegiac couplets (the very Persian Wars which Herodotus records),\(^\text{15}\) the poet Panyassis, Herodotus’ own kinsman and a fellow Halicarnassian, also recorded his clan’s history in verse.\(^\text{16}\) Nor was Herodotus unique in writing prose, for Hecataeus (another Ionian ethnographer whom Herodotus engages directly as logopoios, 2.143.1) and many others also composed historical prose.\(^\text{17}\) In essence, it is better to think of Herodotus as an excellent and innovative participant in the fifth century wisdom-performance culture than to privilege his status as inventor of a new genre.\(^\text{18}\) Herodotus was as much a ‘sophist’ as he was a ‘historian’.

Testifying to this connection, Rosalind Thomas has convincingly demonstrated how Herodotus engaged much the same discourse as the natural philosophers and medical experts of his day.\(^\text{19}\) She places Herodotus in context with pre-socratics and sophists like Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes of Apollonia,\(^\text{20}\) thus supporting her impression “that a large range of thinkers are delving into the question of the nature of man, and Herodotus was among them with


\(^{17}\) Fowler 1996 provides a full argument against considering Herodotus as the earliest and most unique successor of Hecataeus of Miletus.

\(^{18}\) Cf. Plut. Them. 2, describing the Athenian Mnephiitus (mentioned also by Herodotus, 8.57.1): “He was neither an orator nor one of those called philosophers of nature. Rather he made a practice of what was called Sophia but was in reality political shrewdness (deinotes) and practical sagacity, and so perpetuated what one might call a school which had come down in succession from Solon. His successors combined it with the art of forensic eloquence, and, transferring their training from action to speech, were called Sophists” (tr. Guthrie 1971: 35).

\(^{19}\) Thomas 2000: e.g. 28, 149, 165.

\(^{20}\) Thomas 2000: 196.
his extensive curiosity about the whole of the known world – to its limits.” Thomas’ analysis prudently confines itself to more technical ‘scientific’ matters, but this apparent blending of genres within the Histories is not so much unique to Herodotus as it is a product of the intellectual climate of the early-fifth century. If one acquired a specialty of knowledge, the proper course of action was to put that knowledge into a talk and perform it. By connection with the notion of ‘sophié’ as knowledge broadly-defined, such a performance would therefore earn the performer a designation as ‘ sophist ’.

It is from this world of wisdom-performance and proto-sophistry that I (and Rosalind Thomas23) take the term ‘ epideixis ’, a term-of-art that came to demarcate an oral demonstration of wisdom, knowledge, or any other techné.24 Inasmuch as this term hearkens to the practice of the later sophists, it is admittedly somewhat anachronistic in its application to Herodotus. Still, lacking an official designation from Herodotus or his contemporaries, the term will suffice: after all, the description ‘epic’ is no less applicable to Homer for its later development. But in fact, Herodotus gives us something like an official name for his work in his preface: “Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἤδε” or, “the following is a demonstration (apodeixis) of the inquiry of Herodotus.”25 Apodeixis is not to be confused with epideixis, as Egbert Bakker has

21 Thomas 2000: 158.
24 I have used the Attic spelling in deference to common scholarly practice (in particular, Thomas 2000); the Histories generally employs the Ionic form (epideixis; cf. apodeixis in the preface). Herodotus’ original dialect is a thorny issue and far from settled (See McNeal 1983). Epideixis is generally used of shorter displays of learned skill (technē), such as rhetoric (e.g., Aristophanes, Knights 349), poetry (e.g., Pindar, Fragmenta 32; Plato, Laws 658b), and acquired ‘wisdom’ (e.g., Plato, Euthydemus 274a; Xenophon, Symposium 3.3). For the idea of epideixis in Herodotus, see Thomas 2000: esp. 249-69.
25 Hereafter, all translations will be my own unless otherwise indicated. Cf. Purvis 2007: “Herodotus of Halicarnassus here presents his research.” I have avoided translating the city of origin in deference to the variant Θουπιοῦ (Ar. Rhet. 1409a27-28).
recently demonstrated,²⁶ but we also ought not to confuse the written Histories (for which Herodotus uses apodeixis) with its oral foundations (which I and others have associated with epideixis). The Histories themselves were a demonstration of an entirely different magnitude, a landmark achievement and thus worthy of a slightly different designation;²⁷ by comparison, an epideixis is a momentary, fleeting performance piece—an agōnisma, to use Thucydides’ term (ἀγώνισμα, 1.22.4).²⁸ Essentially, in the absence of texts (or at least people willing to obtain and read them), collected wisdom would have been ‘demonstrated’ by performance. Thus, until Herodotus’ career culminated in his “ἰστοριής ἀπόδεξις,” Herodotus would have relied on a less grand (but far more common) unit of composition, the epideixis.²⁹

²⁶ Bakker 2002: 21-28; Ribiero 2010: 81-137. See Nagy 1987: 177. “In the context of the prooemium, and also in other Herodotean contexts where apo-deik-nusai in the middle voice is combined, as here, with the direct object ergon / erga ‘deed(s),’ it is to be translated simply as ‘perform’ rather than ‘make a public display of.’ Thus in Powell’s Lexicon to Herodotus we can find 29 contexts where apo-deik-nusai, in combination with direct objects like ergon / erga, is translated as ‘perform.’”


²⁸ Incidentally, I have not chosen to use the term ‘agōnisma’ in deference to the clearly pejorative and dismissive connotation with which Thucydides imbues it; yet such might nonetheless be an accurate characterization of epideixis, as scholars have frequently supposed. Cf. Hornblower 1991: 61-2 (§1.22.4). Objections have been made to considering Herodotus’ genre in these terms (e.g., Johnson 1994: 232-40), resting primarily on the observation that ἀκοφω could equally refer to the act of reading on account of the ancient practice of reading aloud, but given the context just outlined and the connection of Herodotus to the world of the sophist, I find such arguments unconvincing and unnecessary.

²⁹ Of course, his participation in the epideixis mode needn’t restrict Herodotus even to the broadly-defined ‘sophist’ category: as I have demonstrated, genre in the early-fifth century was far less restrictive, a construct placed on literature by a later age. This fluidity of genre is wonderfully exemplified in the Histories’ own resistance to simple categorization. Rather than a ‘sophist,’ for example, Gregory Nagy (1987: 179) argues that Herodotus in his preface situates himself among the logioi he cites. Nagy further parses this title by constructing a parallel between logioi and aoidoi (poets), arguing that both were equally concerned with the preservation of glory beyond death and that both of the resulting genres were fundamentally intended for public display: “Accordingly, I find it anachronistic to interpret logioi as ‘historians’” (1987: 181). Another title is logopoios, mentioned above as referring to Hecataeus and Aesop; Leslie Kurke, tracing “Aesopic fable elements,” has observed a ‘tension between Herodotus’ roles as histor and as logopoios that runs through the text of the Histories” (2011: 369, 380). Cf. Murray 1987 (2001): 25. “It is hard to resist the conclusion that he would have described himself as a logopoios, like Hecataeus (2.143; 5.36, 125) and Aesop (2.134).” These classifications, however, ultimately fall short, much like the descriptor ‘sophist’: such categories are simultaneously too restrictive and too indeterminate. Herodotus could easily have gone by any or all of these titles; conversely, the title might have been inconsequential. Ultimately, what matters (both for my thesis and for our understanding of Herodotus as an artist) is the common element: whether logios, logopoios, or ‘sophist’, Herodotus was fundamentally a performer. For Herodotus’ placement in an ‘oral’ culture, see Aly 1921: esp. 1-30; Luraghi 2005.
This characterization of Herodotus as performer has often been challenged because of the lack of reliable testimonia corroborating Herodotus’ engagement in such a practice.\(^{30}\) One of the first and enduringly influential critiques of these sources comes from Enoch Powell,\(^{31}\) who placed this evidence into three categories: the ‘Thucydides’ tradition, the ‘sophist’ tradition, and the ‘mid-fifth-century’ tradition.\(^{32}\) Powell’s objections to the ‘Thucydides’ tradition begin with Thucydides’ own awareness of Herodotus—or rather, lack thereof: Powell argues that the evidence found in Thucydides’ own work (esp. 1.22.4) does not convincingly imply awareness of the Histories. Although many have connected Thucydides’ designation ‘agōnisma’ with Herodotus, Powell argues that the passage cannot be convincingly tied to Herodotus any more than to his peers, the sophists whose practices I have outlined above.\(^{33}\) Yet Thucydides appears to have been extremely familiar with Herodotus: chronologically, Thucydides’ Pentekontaetaia picks up almost exactly where Herodotus left off (The Battle of Mycale, Thuc. 1.89.1), and furthermore Simon Hornblower has demonstrated that, in his speeches at least, Thucydides relies on the Thucydidean scholiast (§1.22.4) in the Hellenistic period (possibly Aristarchus). Cf. Priestley 2014: 200-201. This passage is treated at length by Johnson 1994: 232-40.

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\(^{30}\) The most recent concerted effort to deny the influence of oral performance on the Histories comes from Rösser 2002: esp. 84-85; Rösser relies largely on Johnson 1994, who in turn relies on Powell 1939. Even Rösser, however, does not object to Herodotus having had an earlier career as lecturer-logographer. Therefore I will concern myself mostly with the objections of Johnson 1994, and in particular his reliance on Powell 1939. Priestley 2014: 19-50 aptly questions the reliability of the biographical tradition much as Lefkowitz 2012 has questioned that surrounding the Greek poets, but she stops short of denying its plausibility. Priestley (2014: 21) does point out, however, that unlike the biographies of the poets, “most of the [Herodotean] traditions in fact have little to support them in the Histories. And while it is true that it is not possible to infer much biographical information from Herodotus’ first person statements, it is remarkable that much which could have been inferred does not feature in the extant traditions.” Her explanation relies on the interests of local traditions in appropriating a connection with Herodotus, but it does not exclude the possibility that some traditions were grounded in truth (see e.g. her discussion of Thurii’s claim, 2014: 25-34). Cf. Asher, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007: 1-2, 6-7.

\(^{31}\) Johnson 1994: 241. “Powell both conveniently collects and effectively disposes of these tales.”

\(^{32}\) Powell 1939: 32-36. Cf. Johnson 1994: 241-42. The designations are my own. Although scholarship has generally moved beyond Johnson and Powell’s objections without addressing them directly, I have not found any extended defense of the biographical tradition (other than Ribiero 2010: 151-161, which focuses almost entirely on Lucian). For the fascinating yet ultimately inconclusive treatment of the evidence by Jessica Priestley (2014: 19-50), see n.29 above.

\(^{33}\) The original connection was made by a Thucydidean scholiast (§1.22.4) in the Hellenistic period (possibly Aristarchus). Cf. Priestley 2014: 200-201. This passage is treated at length by Johnson 1994: 232-40.
on Herodotus almost exclusively for events that occur before 470.\textsuperscript{34} Of course, Thucydides’ apparent awareness of Herodotus could be the product of retrospective revision, and the dating of Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War is easily as embattled as that of the Histories,\textsuperscript{35} but if we acknowledge Thucydides’ pervasive and programmatic awareness of Herodotus, we may at least suspect that Thucydides was aware of Herodotus’ Persica material before its final publication in or after 428.\textsuperscript{36} Such awareness would most likely have come from some sort of oral presentation of the material, presumably a performance by Herodotus himself.

Powell’s second objection to the ‘Thucydides’ tradition is to the unreliability of a story in Marcellinus, a late Roman biographer who gives us a Life of Thucydides. Marcellinus tells the story of a child Thucydides weeping at one of Herodotus’ performances:

φαίνεται δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν Ἡρώδοτος χρόνων γενόμενος, εἰ γε ὁ μὲν Ἡρόδοτος μέμνηται τῆς Θηβαίων εἰσβολῆς εἰς τὴν Πλάταιαν, περὶ ἣς ἱστορεῖ Θουκυδίδης ἐν τῇ δεύτερᾳ, λέγεται δὲ τι καὶ τοιοῦτο, ὅτι ποτὲ τοῦ Ἡρώδοτος τὰς ἱδίας ἱστορίας ἐπιδείκνυμένου παρὼν τῇ ἀκροάσει Θουκυδίδης καὶ ἀκούσας ἐδάκρυσεν· (Vit. Thuc. 54)

It is clear that [Thucydides] was born in the times of Herodotus, since Herodotus recounted the advance of the Thebans at Plataea, about which Thucydides writes in his second book. And something like this is said too, that once, when Herodotus was performing (epideiknumai) his own histories, that Thucydides was present at the performance and while listening he broke down in tears.

Powell dismisses Marcellinus’ story on the grounds that “the temptation to invent it and thus bring the two historians into personal contact is easily understood.”\textsuperscript{37} Such traditions are indeed common, but Marcellinus’ story does not conflict with but rather corresponds to what is known


\textsuperscript{35} Badian 1993: 73n.2, for example, suspects a late composition date for the Pentekontaetia, which he terms “an insertion.”

\textsuperscript{36} For more on Thucydides’ debt to Herodotus, see Foster and Lateiner 2012: esp. the contribution by Philip Stadter on Thucydides as a ‘reader’ of Herodotus.

\textsuperscript{37} Powell 1939: 32.
about the exchange of ideas in the fifth-century BCE (especially in comparison with Marcellinus’ far more writing-reliant times), implying that some element of truth, at least, could be preserved here.\(^{38}\) It is almost impossible to say with certainty what elements of so late a story are reliable; it cannot therefore bear much argumentative weight.\(^{39}\) But ultimately the story exists and is compatible with our knowledge of the fifth-century world of wisdom-performance, especially in its use of epideictic terminology (e.g., \(\text{ἐπιδεικνυμένου}\)), and so at least should not be dismissed out-of-hand.

The second category which Powell identifies is that of Herodotus-the-performer (i.e. ‘sophist’) as substantiated primarily by Lucian, whose Herodotus inaugurates the historian’s career with a public performance (of the entire \textit{Histories!}) at the Olympic festival (\textit{Herodotus and Aëtion, 1}):

\begin{quote}
\begin{verbatim}
ἐνιστανται οὖν Ὀλύμπια τὰ μεγάλα, καὶ ὁ Ἡρόδοτος τοῦτ’ ἐκεῖνο ἦκειν οἱ νομίσας τὸν καιρὸν, οὗ μᾶλλον ἐγλύχετο, πλήθουσαν τηρήσας τὴν πανήγυριν, ἀπανταχόθεν ἔδη τῶν ἀρίστων συνελεγμένων, παρελθὼν ἐς τὸν ὁπισθόδομον οὐθετήν, ἀλλ’ ἀγονιστὴν παρέζηξεν ἐαυτὸν Ὀλυμπιόν ἔδωκαν τὰς ἱστορίας καὶ κηλὼν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀχρὶ τοῦ καὶ Μούσας κληθήναι τὰς βιβλίους αὐτοῦ, ἐννέα καὶ αὐτὰς οὔσας.
\end{verbatim}
\end{quote}

The great Olympian games were at hand, and Herodotus thought this the opportunity he had been hoping for. He waited for a packed audience to assemble, one containing the most eminent men from all Greece; he appeared in the temple chamber, presenting himself as a competitor for an Olympic honour, not as a spectator; then he recited his \textit{Histories} and so bewitched his audience that his books were called after the Muses, for they too were nine in number.\(^{40}\)

I discuss this passage further in the context of festival performance below (Chapter IV), but for now I will address only Powell’s objection, which is simple: the mention of book divisions is

\(^{38}\) As to the implied date being roughly mid-fifth century and therefore much earlier than the generally accepted publication date of the \textit{Histories}, I will address the objection of anachronism below.

\(^{39}\) See (e.g.) the relevant concerns raised by Priestley 2014: esp. 45-47 regarding the inventions of such narratives.

\(^{40}\) Tr. Kilburn 1959 (Loeb).
clearly anachronistic, since as late as the 1st century BCE (i.e., in the ‘Lindian Chronicle’) Herodotean book divisions were not yet standardized. Powell’s point is not unreasonable, but one minor element needn’t disqualify the usefulness of this remarkable story. Johnson admits as much, and goes on to argue that Lucian has co-opted the traditional milieu of the sophist as the foundation of his story. But by my analysis above, the ‘traditional milieu of the sophist’ is exactly what we would expect from Herodotus.

Indeed, several other ancient sources similarly testify that Herodotus ought to be considered part of the world of the ‘sophist’. Plutarch is our source for two of these: he cites Diyllus the Athenian (4th c. BCE) for a story that Herodotus received ten talents in thanks from the Athenians (862a-b) and cites Aristophanes the Boeotian (also probably 4th c. BCE) on the Thebans’ refusal to offer Herodotus any such honorarium (864c). First, the story which Plutarch attributes to Diyllus:

```greek
άλλα τούτο γε βοηθεὶ τῷ Ἡροδότῳ πρὸς ἑκείνην τὴν διαβολὴν ἤν ἔχει, κολακεύσας τούς Ἀθηναίους ἁργύριον πολὺ λαβεῖν παρ’ αὐτῶν. … ὅτι μέντοι δέκα τάλαντα δωρεάν ἔλαβεν ἔξ Ἀθηνῶν Ἀνύτου τὸ ψήφισμα γράψαντος, ἀνήρ Αθηναίος, οὐ τῶν παρημελημένων ἐν ἱστορίᾳ. Διύλλος εἴρηκεν.
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At least, there is something here to help Herodotus against the charge he bears of getting money from the Athenians for flattering them…But it is an Athenian, Diyllus, no negligible historian, who says Herodotus received, upon the proposal of Anytus, a prize of ten talents.  

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43 Diyllus lived from 357 to 297 BCE and wrote a history in twenty-six books following after Ephorus (Bowen 1992: 125). Cf. BNJ 73 F 3. Jacoby (FGrH 2 C Kommentar: 113) raises doubts about the payment of money, but suggests that as the son of the Athenographer Phanodemus, Diyllus likely found a document recording the honor. Hammond 1937 argues that Diyllus was an important source for Diodorus Siculus; Hammond 1991: 407 defends the historian’s competence on the basis of F1 and F4.

44 For both dates, see Bowen 1992: ad loc.

45 All translations of Plutarch, De Mal. are from Bowen 1992.
Powell again dismisses this story on a technicality—that the sum of ten talents was inconceivable. And indeed, the sum is enormous; but it is not unthinkable. Pindar, for example, is said to have received almost two talents for a single line (Isocrates, Antidosis 166). Also, such a small detail needn’t disqualify the whole story as evidence: historians mistake or exaggerate numbers regularly (Herodotus himself is among the most guilty), and the complications of currency exchange—or even his desire for a nice, round number—might explain such a mistake.

Rather, we ought to consider how Diyllus’ story resembles two other accounts, yet without any apparent derivation therefrom—accounts which Powell asserts (without evidence or argument) do not even “merit attention.” The first, mentioned above, is also included in Plutarch (De Mal. 864c-d) under the authority of Aristophanes the Boeotian:

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Aristophanes the Boeotian recorded that Herodotus asked the Thebans for money and failed to get it; when he tried to talk to their young men and to share their studies, he was prevented by the authorities because of their crude and anti-intellectual nature.

The other account (from Dio Chrysostom, a 1st c. CE Greek orator) records the Corinthians’ refusal to compensate Herodotus after he had performed his material (Orat. 37.7):

The bibliographical information for the references:

48 Powell 1939: 33.
49 Cf. Bowen 1992: 130. “Though [Plutarch] cites him with confidence both here and in 33/867A, we have no measure of the man’s worth.”
Again, Herodotus the historian also paid you a visit, bringing tales of Greece, and in particular tales of Corinth—not yet fallacious tales—in return for which he expected to receive pay from the city. But failing of obtaining even that—for your forebears did not deem it fitting to traffic in renown—he devised those tales we all know so well, the tales about Salamis and Adeimantus.\footnote{Tr. Crosby 1962 (Loeb).}

We have, then, three independent sources, albeit two preserved in Plutarch, testifying to Herodotus performing—or at least attempting to perform—in three different cities (Athens, Thebes, and Corinth) with three different results (ten talents, no interest, and a refusal to pay). Jessica Priestley has cautioned that such stories suspiciously resemble common practice in the Hellenistic period,\footnote{Priestley 2014: esp. 49.} but such resemblances needn’t negate the possibility that such practices began in the fifth century. If Herodotus’ inclusion in a pay-for-performance ‘sophist’ world is accepted, these three stories provide a diversified testament to Herodotus’ career (both successful and not) as an itinerant performer—as well as his willingness to shape his performance pieces around tendentious premises. I therefore find Powell’s complete disqualification of the ‘sophist’ tradition unjustified.

Finally, Powell’s third category consists of three late sources (Jerome [\textit{Ol.} 83.4], Eusebius [\textit{Ol.} 83.3 (\textit{sic})], and Syncellus [\textit{Chr.} 297]) that all include the same event in their annals: the Athenians voting to give Herodotus an award in the mid-440s (to this might be added Diyllus’ reference to Anytus above, who can be dated to the same period).\footnote{Cf. Davies 1971: 40-1; S. West 1999: 111; Priestley 2014: 47.} Admittedly, these sources might easily be derivative from the same source (or even from one another);\footnote{Priestley 2014: 47 n.115, while noting that Ἀνύτου is a conjecture for ἀντῖτο, proposes Diyllus himself as a possible candidate.} they all give different dates in the mid-440s, but the difference might be no more than a function of genre...
or an attempt to ‘correct’ and therefore improve upon their predecessors. But the validity of the original story needn’t therefore be dismissed entirely.

Powell dismisses the testimonia as “chronologically impossible, for the parts of the history that could alone deserve a reward were not written till fifteen years later.” But the premise of my thesis is only that Herodotus performed some of his work before the Histories were published, and I may therefore disregard the terminus post quem argument (all such evidence occurs outside the epideixeis). In fact, I will argue that the Plataea narrative in particular (and its implied Athenian audience) can be dated precisely to the early 440s, just a few years before the Athenians reportedly rewarded Herodotus. When combined with an apparent reference in Sophocles’ Antigone (904-20), a text that is dated to 442, and Athens’ role in settling Herodotus’ later place-of-residence (Thurii) at almost exactly the same time (444/3), I consider it entirely likely that Herodotus was both active and prominent in the Athenian world of the mid-440s and that, therefore, Powell’s objection that these stories are chronologically impossible is ultimately unfounded. The biographical tradition, then, despite being far from secure, nonetheless is consistent with several recent independent conclusions about Herodotus’ milieu and methods and therefore deserves consideration as at least being ‘plausible’.

The mounting non-biographical evidence for Herodotus’ oral performances corroborates this conclusion. Oswyn Murray, by isolating narrative traditions within the Histories (especially

54 Powell 1939: 33.
55 6.91; 6.98.2; 7.137; 7.233.4; 7.235.2; 9.73.
56 Cf. S. West 1999: esp. 112: “What is clear is that Herodotus’ work had made a notably favourable impression at Athens in the 440s, and though, even if Herodotus repeated his lectures to many different groups, only a small proportion of Sophocles’ audience can have heard him, the content of his lectures may well for a time have been the talk of the town. Though we should not look for subtle effects of intertextuality, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Sophocles expected some members of his audience to be reminded of Herodotus’ account of Persian affairs under Cambyses and Darius.”
57 See Priestley 2014: 28-34, which problematizes this biographical note but ultimately neither confirms or denies it.
those of mainland Delphi and of Ionian story-telling culture), argues that Herodotus’ “literary personality...is a product of the Greek oral tradition.”

J.A.S. Evans, citing Herodotus’ methodology, his connections with the logioi, and his apparent defensiveness against live audiences and their objections, similarly advocates for a performance background: “All of this suggests that, before the Histories were written down and published in its finished form, long passages existed in a prepublication state as oral history.” Philip Stadter, in his comparison of Herodotus to the living oral traditions of North Carolina, offers his own (unproven) hypothesis, that “the text we have is not a transcription of an oral performance or performances, but is based on stories conceived and developed for oral performance and in an oral performance tradition.”

Marco Dorati has argued on the basis of Herodotus’ inconsistent portrayal of the ‘barbarian’ that Herodotus was concerned to impress live audiences rather than a reading public. And finally, Brill’s relatively-recent Companion to Herodotus contains no fewer than four articles that assume (and argue for) a performance background. Thus Herodotus’ background as an oral

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58 Murray 1987 (2001): 21. He affirms this conclusion with a few qualifications in his ‘revisitation’ of the article twelve years later: “His Histories was certainly ‘a work based on oral tradition, rather than simply composed using oral sources’ (Luraghi, p. 1); but I still suspect that in its generic composition it was also oral.” (Murray 2001: 318). Murray 2001: 323 expands this point, saying: “Within the text as it is preserved, there is a conflict between an imagined ‘immediately present’ audience of Herodotus, which is an audience here and now in this city (once perhaps physically present, now represented by the individual reader), and a wider audience, for whom the written text was composed, which is all of the Greeks.” For Delphi, see Murray 1987 (2001): 31-33 and more recently, Kindt 2016: 16-54; for Ionian storytelling, see Murray 1987 (2001): 33-34.


60 Stadter 1997: 16.

61 Dorati 2000: esp. 178. “La ricerca di una coerenza su lunghe distanze non entra a parte dei suoi obiettivi, perché è sopraffatto al contesto immediato e alla sequenza breve che lo storico rivolge la sua attenzione.”

62 Bakker, de Jong and van Wees 2002: contributions in favor of recitation include Bakker (esp. 28-29), Moles (esp. 33-34), Slings (esp. 63), and Raaffa (esp. 150-53); but see Rösler’s contribution, which argues against Herodotus’ delivery of lectures (although Rösler [2002: 80] still admits the possibility of Herodotus having been a logographos).
performer may generally be considered a *communis opinio*, even with the uncertainties surrounding the biographical tradition.\(^{63}\)

But the question of what exactly is meant by ‘oral performance’ remains largely open to debate. Johnson, for example, assumes that “those who think that Herodotus’ *logoi* reflect a series of lectures would, I suppose, imagine that Herodotus stands before the crowd and begins with the words, Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἤδε.”\(^{64}\) Stewart Flory has argued that Herodotus simply could not have performed the entire *Histories* as a unit: even if he were able to persevere through the fifty-plus hours that the recitation would require, no audience would endure such a protracted event—not even the great Panhellenic festivals would have provided enough time.\(^{65}\) Yet even Flory agrees that Herodotus likely had some type of performative or recitative background.\(^{66}\) It follows that, if Herodotus did perform his work, the performances would have been selective, discrete narratives, much shorter than the mammoth undertaking that the entire work would have required. Thus, it is more likely that Herodotus initially composed short works rather than long, intended for oral presentation rather than written publication.

**The Case for Unitary Composition**

This likelihood was the basis for the standard model applied to Herodotean studies for the majority of the twentieth century: namely, Felix Jacoby’s ‘scissors-and-paste’ theory (“Arbeit

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64 Johnson 1994: 246. Johnson’s assumption is hardly very open-minded.

65 Flory 1980: 14; cf. pp. 27-28 below. The calculation is a conservative one based on the ratio 3 OCT pages = 10 minutes. Stephen Evans 2009: 11 (citing Honko 1998) has in fact observed that a fifty-hour performance has been attested by comparative anthropology, but he stops short of arguing for a single-sitting performance (Evans 2009: 15).

mit der Schere”). In his own attempt to understand Herodotus’ shifting style in terms of the biographical tradition outlined above, Jacoby proposed a Herodotean methodology whereby the Histories resulted from a stitching together of lectures written up for oral performance—a collected volume of sorts. This approach became known as the ‘separatist’ theory, the most dramatic expression of which came as late as the 1970’s, when Silvana Cagnazzi actually divided the entire Histories into a “Tavola dei 28 Logoi di Erodoto,” which ‘logoi’ might have been performed individually or in serial order.

Yet in spite of this theory’s initial popularity, some scholars insisted on the ‘unity’ of Herodotus’ Histories and therefore rejected Jacoby’s ‘lectures’. Such rejections of Jacoby’s theory remain popular today, often assuming the form of simple, lexical proofs derived from the text as it survives. One of the first to object was Enoch Powell, who dismissed Jacoby’s vision as a “chimaera” because of the existence of [1] cross-references and programmatic statements, and [2] the use of graphō which he observes scattered throughout the Histories. Yet Powell applies these arguments inconsistently. For the first point, the presence of a ‘cross-reference’ in the Histories depends on the definition thereof; Powell’s identification of cross-references, for example, requires no more than Herodotus’ redundant treatment of the same event. To give an example from the material that I will identify as epideictic below, Herodotus at 7.231 refers to Aristodemus’ later “accounting” (ἀνέλαβε) for his desertion at Thermopylae by his

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67 Jacoby 1913: col. 361.
69 Cagnazzi 1975: esp. 387. She provides the complete table in summary at 421-23.
71 Powell 1939: 1-3.
bravery at Plataea, an occurrence which is indeed mentioned at 9.71.3. Yet no explicit mention or expectation of Herodotus’ treatment of the same event at 9.71.3 is included at 7.231, and only the most oblique expectation that the reader is familiar with earlier Herodotean narrative is implied by 9.71.3. Furthermore, if we modify Jacoby’s scissors-and-paste theory to include some but not all of the Histories, some passages could belong to a later formulation of the text (or ‘final text’) that is indeed unitary—as I argue is the case with 9.71.3—without negating the possibility that other parts of the surviving text did belong to a composition that resembled Herodotus’ ‘lectures’ (or, by my own formulation, ‘performance texts’ or epideixeis). Thus there is every reason to believe that, when he wrote down the Histories, Herodotus was fully aware of which ‘lectures’ he was going to use and equally aware of what they included. Indeed, such ‘lectures’ would have been his most secure and well-known text.73

Secondly, the presence of graphō in the Histories has been one of the most frequently repeated arguments against the possibility of Herodotus’ text being intended for oral delivery: if Herodotus intended the text to be spoken aloud, why would he have included a verb of writing?74 Yet under scrutiny, any number of arguments can alleviate this critique. Most simply, prior to the intense development of literacy in the ancient world, graphō was not at all restricted to the act of writing. Nor were written works meant solely for reading; even the most literary works appear to have been read aloud. Compositions like the speeches of Demosthenes and Isocrates, which were certainly intended to be delivered to a live audience, include the same first-person form of graphō.75 Herodotus’ use of graphō, then, can be explained by the flexible and multifarious usage that graphō enjoyed in a culture transitioning from oral to literate. For

73 On the issue of cross-references issuing from within the epideictic narrative—an extremely rare occurrence, but also one that is generally problematic for my thesis—see my discussion of ‘authorial intrusions’ below, pp. 31-35.

74 More recently, see (e.g.) Rösler 2002: 88-90.

75 E.g. Isoc. 15.56; Dem. 9.76, 18.27; cf. Plato, Phaedrus 227c.
example, in accusing Ephialtes as the betrayer of the Greeks at Thermopylae, Herodotus states, “since Ephialtes was the one who led the Persians along the mountain path, I declare his guilt here.” (ἀλλ’ Ἐπιάλτης γάρ ἐστι ὁ περιηγησάμενος τὸ ὄρος κατὰ τὴν ἀτραπόν, τοῦτον αἰτίων γράφω, 7.214.3). But performance in the courtroom is precisely the context evoked here: the indictment of Ephialtes is thus couched not in the same terminology as the rest of the narrative but in specific legal phrasing. In essence, we may translate τοῦτον αἰτίων γράφω as “and so I am registering him as guilty.”

A more successful argument against Jacoby’s scissors-and-paste theory has taken the thematic unity of Herodotus’ Histories as proof of its unitary composition. These efforts began in earnest with Max Pohlenz, who observed Herodotus’ explicit declaration of a unitary theme: “Die Erbfeindschaft zwischen Europa und Asien.” But in spite of Herodotus’ explicit allegiance to this theme, its application is superficial and often overlooked, even in Herodotus’ most explicitly programmatic episodes (e.g., the tangents on Athens and Sparta [1.56–68] in the Croesus logos, which itself can be taken as an extended prologue of the Histories). Henry Immerwahr, amending Pohlenz’s observed theme to encompass the general expansion of Persian power, supports Pohlenz’s main argument more successfully with a shrewd analysis of the structure of the overall Histories, demonstrating that Herodotus did have a specific organization in mind. Taking this structure as evidence that the whole came before the parts, he argues that the Histories therefore existed first in a written form which could then be presented orally. Yet

76 Other examples of graphō within the Histories include 1.95.1; 2.70.1; 2.123.1; 2.123.3; 4.195.2; 6.53.1. All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
78 A salient parallel can be found in the modern colloquial substitution of ‘Thomas says…’ for ‘Thomas writes…’.
for all his structural analysis, he gives no reason that pre-existing oral compositions couldn’t have been inserted or adapted to suit the new agenda.\textsuperscript{82} Furthermore, Immerwahr’s division of the text into links of a chain is often forced to unify extremely protracted narratives (e.g., Unit 11: Books VII through IX) on the force of relatively minor transitional phrases or episodes.\textsuperscript{83} His organizing principles are therefore blunt and—however clever—ultimately fail to prove the unifying, integrated place of every episode in the \textit{Histories}.\textsuperscript{84} While Immerwahr’s argument that the \textit{Histories} is thematically unified remains significant and at least partially convincing, then, his larger project—to tie every episode within the \textit{Histories} to that theme on purely structural evidence—fails under the weight of its own ambition. Even if his project had succeeded, it would be practically impossible to argue definitively that the overarching organization came before the constituent parts: the parts might equally have inspired Herodotus to demonstrate his conclusion by creating the collected \textit{Histories} as an \textit{apodeixis}, a monument to his life of wisdom-gathering.\textsuperscript{85}

Later scholars found Immerwahr’s thesis convincing but his methods lacking, and so sought to change their proof. Donald Lateiner, for example, compiles a list of Herodotus’ methods, themes, and patterns, all of which are supposedly applied throughout the \textit{Histories}—Herodotus’ use of \textit{legetai},\textsuperscript{86} for example, or his treatment of epic poetry.\textsuperscript{87} This list is explicitly

\textsuperscript{82} Cf. de Laix 1966: 121.
\textsuperscript{83} Immerwahr 1966: 238-305.
\textsuperscript{84} Cf. Drews 1969: 91.
\textsuperscript{85} Cf. Lang 1984: 4. “Just because it is possible to identify a skeleton of causation, it is not necessary or even desirable to believe, as Immerwahr does, that the narrative was constructed in this way, that it was conceived first as a causally articulated skeleton and then fleshed out with narrative.”
\textsuperscript{86} Lateiner 1989: 22.
\textsuperscript{87} Lateiner 1989: 99.
intended to “refute the idea that his work is a hodge-podge of oral reports.” But while Lateiner’s study is both useful and indeed convincing to some degree, the connections that he observes prove only that the whole text was written by the same author (or even just with the same authorial style!), and not necessarily at the same time: it would be not only unsurprising, but rather entirely expected for Herodotus to maintain many of the same compositional and historiographical habits throughout his life. Furthermore, the unity which Lateiner seeks to prove is itself piecemeal: many of the trends are concentrated in one part of the Histories and entirely absent in other parts. Legetai, for example, never occurs in Herodotus’ Salamis and Plataea narratives after the opening chapters, and almost all of Herodotus’ explicit references to epic poetry (twelve out of thirteen) occur in the first four books. Lateiner’s effort to show that the entire Histories follows a single design, then, may even reveal how distinct some parts of the narrative are from others.

Another recent approach to the question of unity may be found in the argument that the end of the Histories in fact serves the function of a conclusion (and is not as incomplete as it may appear to be). Elizabeth Irwin, for example, has placed Herodotus’ concluding chapters in the context of the Histories’ beginning and even in the context of the outset of the Archidamian War. Similarly, Charles Fornara (1971a, 1981) and David Sansone (1985) use Herodotus’ multiple references to events at the beginning of the Archidamian War to argue for a terminus post quem that would apply to the entire Histories. But these works all assume that the whole Histories must conform to a single dating or a single agenda—in essence, that the entire Histories conforms to a line drawn between discrete points. Yet none of the passages that I have

89 For a more in-depth treatment of Lateiner’s various ‘unifying phenomena’, see Conclusion, pp. 194-95.
isolated as epideictic include material from the beginning, the end, or any of the passages commonly used to secure a *terminus post quem.* Therefore, we may consider references as part of the unitary whole—the ‘final text’—without assuming that everything included between the bookends is the product of the same compositional method and date.

Ultimately, however, the common thread through all of these scholarly works is that the final product is intended for unitary *consumption,* and I do not reject that thesis. Thus when recent works such as those by Emily Baragwanath (2008) and David Branscome (2013) operate under the assumption of textual unity, they do so correctly. Rather, I am proposing a refinement to the separatist position. I do not argue, like Jacoby and Cagnazzi, that the *Histories* is nothing more than a series of lectures strung together; nor do I suppose, like Immerwahr and Lateiner, that the whole of the *Histories* was composed at once, the product of one all-consuming design. I argue only that Herodotus incorporated discrete, pre-existing compositions into the broader unity with minimal adaptation. So while I accept that the final manuscript—itself a reflection of the published, complete *Histories*—is in fact intended by Herodotus to stand as a unit, this conclusion does not contradict a complex archaeology of composition.

**Audience-Based Analysis**

In order to understand the complex composition of the *Histories,* then, we must recognize two divergent scholarly approaches, both of which have proven their validity through productive application by numerous scholars over several decades. Simply, extensive scholarship has shown how Herodotus was both intimately enmeshed in an oral, epideictic culture—thus dealing in the short oral performances that the separatists argue constitute the *Histories*—and yet he also promulgated a unitary and explicitly-literate work, created “lest the actions of men become faded

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91 Most strikingly, Irwin 2013 begins her ‘end’ precisely where I set the end of the Plataea narrative, 9.71; Dewald, Boedeker, and Herrington all begin their treatment of the ‘end’ a few chapters later. References to events in the first years of the Archidamian War occur at 6.91; 6.98; 7.137; 7.233.4; 7.235.2; 9.73.
in time” (ὥς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, preface). Is it possible, then, to reconcile Jacoby and Pohlenz at last, to claim that the Histories were both a product of his career as oral performer and a unitary, literate composition? In this section, I will seek to demonstrate how their arguments—with only one slight modification—are in fact entirely compatible.

In the debate between separatist and unitary, oral and literate, one theory has enjoyed continued attention. In 1958, Richmond Lattimore considered the constraints of ancient book writing—practically a priori—and determined that it would be extremely impractical (and therefore unlikely) for Herodotus to revise his work in the modern sense. Thus, Lattimore proposed that Herodotus would have used a “progressive” method of composition that entailed composing ever in a forward direction:

Such a method of writing—to begin at the beginning and write straight on to the end, never working backward—was, I believe, the natural way to write at the time when Herodotus was writing. It was, I believe, the method followed by the predecessors of Herodotus in the fields of narrative and exposition, by Homer, Hesiod, and the elegiac poets; also, I believe, probably by the logographers, philosophers, and tragic and lyric poets as well. There are two good reasons for this. There is the fact that composed literature comes first and writing comes second; that the written piece is not for the reader to read to himself but for the writer, or his representative, to read from to others; that the writer therefore naturally thinks of himself as a speaker who, when he has contradicted himself or got his parts in the wrong order, cannot go back to correct or transpose, but must make the correction as he goes forward. There is also the fact that writing straight ahead is mechanically the easier way to write. In the time of Herodotus, writing at its easiest could not have been easy. We do not know exactly what writing materials he had, but we certainly know some of the writing materials he did not have. He did not have what we would call good paper, good ink, good scissors, or a good eraser. He did not have a set of identical sheets of paper and so he could not, if he found something objectionable on page 8, take it out and write a new page, number it 8, and put it in the stack where it belonged. He could not, in case
he needed to add to page 8, make a new page called 8a, and insert it. It was probably very bothersome to erase…

‘Edits’ and ‘revisions’ would consequently be made in stride, as the need arose; tangents and supplementary information would be provided parenthetically in the main body of the narrative. These are the very phenomena which Lattimore observes throughout the *Histories*. Lattimore therefore places Herodotus on the border between oral and written composition—essentially, Herodotus wrote down a work that he considered in fundamentally oral terms. The result is a strung-together style that reflects a forward-oriented approach to composition.

Lattimore’s theory has several implications, some of which he explores. First, it explains how Herodotus sometimes seems to correct himself a few chapters later. According to Lattimore, these ‘corrections’ would have occurred *during* the process of writing, and so ought to be considered a product of the literary side of composition. The progressive style also accounts for the tangled web of cross-references in the *Histories* (and especially those that remain unfulfilled). Lattimore’s observations thus take into consideration the incredible challenge that such a mammoth undertaking would have presented for Herodotus: at the least, his *Histories* must have been conceived and fully laid out before he started writing.

But perhaps the most significant implication is for dating Herodotus’ composition of the texts. Lattimore reasons in his conclusion:

The latest event which is absolutely datable and referred to in his work is the seizure and execution of Aristeas and other ambassadors in 430 B.C. (7.137.3; Thuc. 2.67). He died, therefore, at some time after this date; but if my view about

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92 Lattimore 1958: 9. Many scholars have shown some degree of support for Lateiner’s argument (e.g., Evans 1982: 17; Flory 1987: 15; Dewald and Marincola 1987: 38; Thomas 1989: 47 n.10; Kindt 2006: 34 n.3; Skinner 2012: 244). Still, see the objections of Johnson 1994:229 n.4.
93 Lattimore 1958: 10.
95 Lattimore 1958: 10-12.
composition is right, he lived long enough after it to complete 7.138-9.122, which was therefore composed after 430 and probably composed at Thurii or elsewhere in the Greek West.  

Here I must make only one distinction that Lattimore overlooks: there is a difference between ‘composition’ and ‘writing down’. If Herodotus had been active as an oral performer prior to writing down the Histories (a possibility which Lattimore fully endorses), he would have possessed any number of pre-existing compositions—whether we call them lectures, logoi, set-pieces, agōnismata (cf. Thuc. 1.22.4), or epideixeis. Without disagreeing with Lattimore on when the Histories were written down, then, I would propose the following: rather than re-composing narratives that he had already composed and performed, Herodotus would have incorporated or even relied on those performances when his narrative reached that point. Essentially, why couldn’t Herodotus have performed an epideictic ‘Thermopylae’ narrative before he even conceived of assembling the apodeictic Histories?

The question arises, however, whether such a pre-existing composition could have been preserved long enough to be included in Herodotus’ ‘final text’. Thankfully, plenty of evidence exists for both oral and written preservation of texts. As early as the sixth century, the Homeric poems began to be written down; Aristophanes testifies to the practice of writing down tragic scripts in the late-fifth century (Frogs 52-53); the Attic orators wrote down lengthy speeches for their clients to be delivered from memory at trial. Yet if Lattimore’s thesis (and my modification to it) is correct, Herodotus would not have written the pre-existing epideixeis into...

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97 Lattimore 1958: 19. All three of my epideixeis identified below fall within the limits of 7.138-9.122 which Lattimore singles out.
98 Lattimore 1958: 19.
100 Usher 1976 gives a detailed overview of Lysias’ arrangement with his clients, arguing that the final result is completely Lysias’, even if intended for delivery by the client. Cf. Trevett 1996: esp. 425, who argues that Demosthenes’ speeches as we have them are no more than Demosthenes’ working drafts, written in preparation for delivery before the assembly and unrevised prior to their ‘publication’. 
the narrative until at least the 420s, almost two decades after external evidence (the biographical tradition, outlined above) and internal evidence (see Chapters II-IV, _Dating the Epideixis_) suggests he began performing those pieces. Since I argue that the *epideixeis* are preserved in a form that is very close to the original, modified only by minor insertions (authorial ‘intrusions’, discussed below), I expect that the most dependable and likely mechanism for Herodotus to have preserved the *epideixeis* so precisely and faithfully over so much time and space was for him to have written them down. ¹⁰¹ And if such a narrative existed, having been refined, re-used, and tested in front of numerous audiences, wouldn’t it have eased the challenge of compiling the mammoth *Histories* to fall back on these perfectly serviceable—and possibly even famous—¹⁰²—pre-existing written compositions? Such a practice would not just be possible; it would be preferable. ¹⁰³

I therefore suspect that Herodotus—presumably having retired to Thurii—collected the fruits of his sophist labor into the framework of a massive, freshly-undertaken project, the revolutionary *apodeixis* of Herodotus’ inquiries that we have come to know under the title ‘*Histories*’. ¹⁰⁴ This work would not have been a ‘greatest-hits album’, a simple serial collection of performance-pieces (*agōnismata*) that were unrelated to each other except in their authorship. Rather, the *Histories* represents a unified masterpiece which incorporates the refined final products of Herodotus’ career as wisdom-performer. These ‘lectures’ (*epideixeis*) were not the primary substance of the *Histories* then, as Jacoby’s scissors-and-paste theory has it, but rather

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¹⁰¹ Cf. Worthington 1991: 55-64, who considers the likely process for Demosthenes. For an ancient discussion of the process of memorization and recitation, see the lively banter between Socrates and Phaedrus (Plato, *Phaedrus* esp. 227d-228b). I do not intend to deny the possibility that Herodotus kept the *epideixeis* solely in his memory (per Evans 2009: 11 citing Honko 1998); I only suggest that such a practice is less likely and ultimately unnecessary to posit.


¹⁰³ See, for example, the discussion of prepared texts at the beginning of Plato’s *Menexenus*, esp. 235d.

their foundation, the origin of the larger project, which Herodotus keeps always in sight. Thus
the separatist and unitary approaches, with their respective understanding of Herodotus as a
fundamentally oral or literate author, in fact complement each other: Herodotus stood astride
such boundaries, equally a master of the oral and a pioneer of the literate.

Herodotus’ inclusion of set-pieces in the Histories, however, would have resulted in an
interesting problem: what of the audiences that these performances were originally given to (and
presumably customized for)? Herodotus shows keen awareness of his audience throughout the
Histories, both explicitly (e.g., 7.139.1) and through his subtle manipulation of their reactions.
Furthermore, the biographical tradition—which I have argued cannot be entirely dismissed—
testifies to at least two audiences, at Athens and at Olympia, both in the mid-fifth century, that
patently differ from the general audience (presumably a Panhellenic ‘readership’) of the unified
Histories. I would argue, then, that Herodotus’ original compositions would have been as
aware of their intended audience (and its political, cultural, and ideological context) as was his
final product, the Histories. If my adaptation of Lattimore’s compositional theory is correct, this
awareness of specific audiences would have been imported into the written Histories whenever
Herodotus relied on those pre-existing compositions. A new method of analysis then becomes
available: audience-based analysis, whereby Herodotus’ narrative is considered not in its later,
broader, literary context but instead with a narrow, culturally- and ideologically-charged
awareness that is demanded of a performance piece intended for a specific audience in both time
and space. If Herodotus had such a specific audience in mind, it would have shaped his
composition every bit as much as his sources or personal bias. Thus, just as a number of recent

106 For Athens, see Fornara 1971b: 38-59 and especially on 7.139.1, which passage plainly implies that this
statement, at least, is not intended for an Athenian audience. For the festival context, see Davison 1962: esp. 155; cf.
Lattimore 1958: 19 n.31.
scholars have productively engaged a new brand of source-based criticism to better understand Herodotus’ complex sympathies and apparent bias.\(^\text{107}\) we might recognize that the audience would have affected Herodotus’ presentation of his raw source material. If discrete audiences fossilized within the framework of the larger Histories can be identified, we can better understand the authorial motivations and strategies that shape the narrative as it survives to us.

**Methodology**

With this strategy in mind, I will lay out my methods for identifying and analyzing portions of the Histories that exhibit an epideictic background. To begin, the passages identified ought to be of significant length: any number of small or tangential passages might arguably be founded in an epideixis, but without a sustained commitment to a specific audience that demonstrably transcends the influence of sources, bias, or even a momentary authorial whim, such an investigation would be inconclusive. Rather, the ideal evidence for an epideictic background would be found in the presence of performance-length pieces that are unified by themes, subject, and an apparent concern for the interests of the same audience, but remain distinct and capable of standing on their own, apart from the later framework of the unified Histories.

First, then, we must consider the expected duration of a ‘performance-length’ piece. In order to gauge spoken length in terms of performance equivalence, three metrics may be used: Rome (1952) calculates an approximate rate of 130 words per minute; Flory (1980: 14) provides a total of fifty hours which can be divided by a percentage calculation; and my own experimentation has confirmed Flory’s conservative metric of roughly 3 OCT pages = 10 minutes. When applied to the texts discussed below, all of these approaches produce results

\(^{107}\) Notable collected volumes include Luraghi 2001 and Giangiulio 2005; see Hornblower 2002: esp. 373 for a succinct summary and defense of the new, “looser” Quellenforschung.
within ten minutes of each other, so I will use Rome’s as the most precise unit of measurement (words per minute). Applying this metric to contemporary texts that we know were intended for live performance, such as Athenian drama, funeral orations, and other epideictic literature (e.g., the Hippocratic corpus) produces the following results: Lysias’ *Funeral Oration* and the funeral oration in Plato’s *Menexenus* would both have taken roughly thirty minutes; the Hippocratic *Airs Waters Places* (generally dated among the earliest of the Hippocratic treatises) would have taken about fifty minutes and the *Epidemics* almost an hour and a half; intended for an Athenian audience in the 450s, Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* would have taken approximately sixty-five minutes to recite straight through, and the other plays from the *Oresteia* a little over half of that. All of these examples are as near to Herodotus’ *floruit* as can be expected given the dearth of surviving texts from the period, so I propose that a suitable length for such a performance would have been approximately one hour, give or take thirty minutes. In the actual result, by the standard applied above and using the limits determined in the chapters that follow, the Thermopylae *epideixis* would have taken forty-five minutes to recite straight through, Salamis sixty-five minutes, and Plataea seventy-five minutes.

Within that space, there ought to be a demonstrable authorial strategy that transcends the vicissitudes of the chapter-to-chapter text. For instance, one story may show evidence of a Delphic source, another may have its roots in a Phocian source, but both stories should support a common authorial strategy, be it the support of Athenian ideology (Chapters II and III) or the defense of the act of medism (Chapter IV). Such a sustained authorial strategy would be all the more remarkable for the rarity of its occurrence in the *Histories*: almost any Herodotean

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108 Pericles’ funeral oration in Thucydides certainly reflects the genre of funeral oration in many ways, but Thucydides generally abbreviates his speeches making this speech less useful for chronological comparison.

109 This result tallies nicely with the longer examples considered by Pernot 2015: 82.

110 E.g., Bettalli 2005.
‘position’ that can be supported by some parts of the Histories can equally be undermined by other parts.Æ This authorial strategy, then, must be internally coherent, but likely will contradict statements that fall outside the epideictic material: thus Aristagoras’ embarrassing manipulation of the democratic process (5.97.2) seems incompatible with the unabashed favorability toward Athens and the democratic process that Herodotus promulgates in his narrative of the Battle of Salamis (Chapter III). Such an authorial strategy will be the most important factor in demarcating the epideixis and identifying its intended audience.

Other characteristics might be expected if the text was indeed originally composed independently from the final Histories. Since Herodotus would have been aware of the pre-existing compositions when he was composing the outer narrative, we might expect a number of references to the material in the epideixeis to appear in the non-epideictic text (e.g., 5.23Æ8.136), but few (or rather, none) in the epideixeis referring to the framing narrative. Secondly, if the epideixeis were composed for an earlier time than the final form of the Histories, we might also expect to see the narrative reflect a different historical context: for example, whereas references to and awareness of the Archidamian War reflect the compositional context of the framing narrative, the epideixeis will only mention events up to the time of their original composition. In fact, references to events later than the 440s are found in abundance on the edges of the epideixeis (e.g., 7.133.2; 7.233.4; 9.73.3), but not in the epideictic material itself.

Finally, in detecting bias and contemporary concerns, we must guard against deterministic assumptions brought on by our knowledge of how history actually turned out. For example, scholars frequently attribute any juxtaposition of Athens-as-sea-power and Sparta-as-land-power to the context of the Archidamian War, since that period historically provided the

ÆE.g., Formara 1971b: 10, 19; Kurke 2013: 367. “In the wake of the recognition that Herodotus is ‘before history,’ literary scholars, too, have begun to acknowledge the sheer weirdness and uncategorizability of Herodotus’s text.”
starkest example of that contrast. But already in the 460s (and arguably even during the Persian invasions themselves) the roots of that trend were manifest, so—short of explicit references to specific events and policies—such a contrast could be the product of several different historical contexts. Ultimately, though, these epideixeis should reflect a fundamentally different compositional context and motive from the larger apodeixis of the Histories.

Once the presence of such a passage is determined, the second task will be to delimit the beginning and end of the epideictic material. Such a locus might be marked by several narrative features: [1] a sudden, non-sequitur shift in subject, especially to the point of awkwardness, such as occurs at the beginning of the Salamis epideixis when Herodotus moves abruptly from a story about the Spartan Princess Gorgo to a list of participants at Artemisium (with an emphasis on Athens) without even a gesture toward transition beyond a simple μέν...δέ (7.239-8.1); [2] a clear shift from one prolonged authorial strategy to another, such as when Herodotus concludes his Atheno-centric narrative of Plataea (wherein the Spartans are mocked and practically censured for their incompetence and cowardice) with a catalog of Spartans exhibiting heroism (9.71-72); and [3] simple textual markers, characteristic of Herodotus’ own style, whereby he signals the end of one unit and the beginning of another (generally accompanied by some form of μὲν δὴ). For this last, I will consider Johnson’s objection that such ‘seams’ are simply undetectable and that such markers as mentioned in [3] above inherently contradict the possibility of oral performance (inasmuch as the μὲν...δὲ implies a conscious effort by the author

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112 E.g., Flower and Marincola 2002: §9.60.
113 Admittedly, the identification of such shifts is a somewhat subjective task that may be affected by our own distance from the original audience. However, simple motivations that are attested broadly throughout the Histories (e.g., the creation of a fluid and easy-to-follow narrative) may still be assumed with confidence.
to shape the text for publication).\textsuperscript{115} By the mechanism I propose, such markers are easily explained, having been added later as part of the ‘final text’. The question that Johnson raises of whether such a concluding sentence ought to be considered integral to an \textit{epideixis}, then, is ultimately immaterial: Herodotus could easily have added the μὲν upon writing the \textit{epideixis} into the \textit{Histories}, concerned as he was with continuing the narrative. The programmatic sentences themselves may even be considered part of the ‘final text’ rather than the ‘performance text’. The μὲν δὴ construction, then, does not represent the \textit{precise} beginning or ending of epideictic material so much as it indicates a transitional mindset in the author.\textsuperscript{116} By the same token, not every μὲν δὴ will be significant, just the occurrences that are accompanied by an obvious, programmatic declaration, reflecting a shift from framing narrative to pre-existing composition.\textsuperscript{117} Herodotus’ use of μὲν δὴ, then, is only one possible element of many that will help to determine the precise limits of the epideictic material.\textsuperscript{118}

We must recognize, however, that Herodotus might not play by the rules. After all, he was making up the rules as he went. I recognize that this presents a problem for proving my thesis, inasmuch as Herodotus proves inconsistent in his practice surrounding the epideictic material. But Herodotus’ goal in writing the \textit{Histories} was not so much to frame his pre-existing

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Johnson 1994: 247. Indeed, Johnson’s misled selection of an “obvious” conclusion to the Croesus logos (Λυδὸς μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ Πέρσης ἐδεδούλωντο, 1.94.7) can similarly be explained by Herodotus’ inclusion of non-epideictic material after the \textit{epideixis} is finished; once that possibility is recognized, the phrase “That is the story of the empire of Croesus and the first conquest of Ionia” (κατὰ μὲν δὴ τὴν Κροίσου τε ἀρχὴν καὶ Ἰωνίης τὴν πρώτην καταστροφὴν ἔσχε οὖσα, 1.92.1) provides such a clear marker of the narrative’s conclusion as to be a title.
\item Munson 2001: 25-27 shows the specific value of such transitional, programmatic statements in terms of the Herodotean “metanarrative,” a term which I count as the province of the later, \textit{apo}deictic Herodotean narrator.
\item Cf. Munson 2001: 25 on the use of the “summary conclusion.”
\item In some sense, where exactly to begin and end these large sections of narrative is inconsequential: the removal of a few chapters from the beginning or end makes the quantity of text handled no less significant. Furthermore, these limits are inevitably somewhat arbitrary: there is no reason that Herodotus could not have begun to rely on his pre-existing composition after he had already passed its original starting point, and there is equally no reason to assume that Herodotus would continue to rely on the narrative all the way through to its original ending. Any demarcation chosen for the current treatment, then, need not be considered to have been the original start or end of Herodotus’ \textit{epideixis}.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
compositions as to create a new and transcendent work;\textsuperscript{119} he used the pre-existing compositions in the process. The sections that we are discussing, then, may be almost entirely original material but still include some authorial efforts to smooth the narrative or otherwise adapt its functionality to the larger narrative. The original \textit{epideixeis} would not have shown any awareness of the larger project, but the version that survives in the ‘final text’ might: when Herodotus felt that the epideictic narrative was too dissonant or redundant with the larger project, he would have changed it, whether by adding something or taking something out. Such, at least, is the process that my amendment to Lattimore’s theory would imply.\textsuperscript{120} I propose to designate such a mechanism as a “metanarrative [authorial] intrusion” (or just, ‘intrusion’), following the narratological usage employed by Rosaria Munson.\textsuperscript{121}

For the purposes of this investigation, I will concern myself only with the intrusions that are problematically dissonant or incompatible with the authorial strategy that characterizes the narrative before and after the insertion. That is not to say that there are no other intrusions in the \textit{epideixeis}; in fact, such authorial intrusions are typical of Herodotus’ style.\textsuperscript{122} Rather, I am only concerned here with intrusions that prove problematic to my thesis by their existence in the epideictic narrative. Although nothing beyond a possible preference to keep the \textit{epideixeis} intact would prevent Herodotus from interjecting quite frequently, problematic intrusions are thankfully extremely rare in the narratives I have isolated—no more than one significant authorial intrusion occurs in any given narrative, and these are no more than a sentence in length (a few additional marginal and offhand references to the outer narrative also occur). These

\textsuperscript{119} Bakker 2002.
\textsuperscript{120} Cf. Lattimore 1958: 10-15.
\textsuperscript{121} Munson 2001: esp. 38-39. Munson uses the term “gloss” similarly, but I find its application to be overly broad for my purpose here.
\textsuperscript{122} See Lattimore 1958: 10-13 for a few examples; Baragwanath 2008: 22-26 also explores this phenomenon in terms of reader response.
specific authorial intrusions, then, will be identified by their fulfillment of their primary function, to smooth the seams between ‘performance text’ and ‘final text’.

Given the circumstances under which authorial intrusions might occur, two categories are obvious. The first would be ‘self-referential’. If Herodotus had already found occasion to include a list or calculation elsewhere in the Histories (whether in the same form or in an updated or expanded form), he might avoid redundancy by simply referring the reader to that list rather than repeating the tedious material in full. This happens only twice in the epideictic material I have identified, and both occurrences replace a lengthy list and calculation with the phrase, “as I said before” (ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἰρέθη, 7.184.3; ὡς καὶ πρότερον δεδήλωται, 9.32). Such passages, especially since they are extremely rare, are easily explained inasmuch as the writer of the ‘final text’ would have been fully aware of—and therefore concerned to avoid—such redundancy, even though a ‘performance text’ would not originally have included such a phrase.

A second type of intrusion may be termed ‘problematizing’ and is closely related to the most common form of authorial intrusion in the Histories: Plutarch considered such intrusions to be evidence of Herodotus’ malice toward certain parties in his narrative (e.g., de Mal. Her. 855c; 863a); Lattimore calls them “corrections-in-stride” and attributes their presence to the “progressive style” that he observes; Baragwanath considers them evidence of Herodotus’ concern with provoking a complex reader-response. In many ways, ‘problematizing’ intrusions prove to be the most problematic for my thesis, inasmuch as—they challenge the prevailing authorial strategy. Yet these intrusions are easily identified by their

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dissonance with the surrounding narrative and are furthermore demonstrably out-of-place, often directly contradicting Herodotus’ own commentary before and after their occurrence. For example, Herodotus’ proclamation that the Phocians medized “for no other reason than their hatred for the Thessalians” (κατ’ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν…κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἔχθος τὸ Ἡσσαλῶν, 8.30.1) draws no support from—and possibly contradicts—the story of their hostilities against Thessaly that precedes it (8.27-29), the noble suffering of the Phocians at the hands of the Persians that follows it (8.32-33), and even the explanation that Herodotus has the Phocians provide immediately thereafter: “They were simply unwilling to betray Greece” (ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔσεσθαι ἐκόντες εἶναι προδόται τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 8.30.2). 126 Whatever their function, then, such ‘problematizing’ intrusions are the established practice of the Herodotean narrator and therefore ought to be considered an interpolation in the ‘final text’, not present in the original ‘performance text’.

Finally, a third type of authorial intrusion may be suggested, although it is perhaps less parenthetical than transitional. 127 These intrusions may be called ‘marginal’, since they occur on the edges of the epideictic material. Presumably, these are again a function of the proposed writing-down method; Herodotus was more likely to adapt his material to the framing narrative when that narrative was more present in his mind (i.e. at the edges). To use Jacoby’s scissors-and-paste terminology, it stands to reason that the youngest element of any such process would be the glue—the place where epideictic narrative meets framing narrative. In practice, this expectation is confirmed in the passages that are most securely part of the ‘final text’: the material immediately before and after the epideixeis contains many of the Histories’ references

126 See my discussion, Ch. III, pp. 95-97.
127 See Munson 2001: 27-32 on Herodotus’ careful attention to the “rhetorical value of introductions and conclusions.”
to events of the Archidamian War (e.g., 7.133.2; 7.233.4; 9.73.3), refers the reader to other parts of the *Histories* (e.g., 7.171.2, 8.3.1, 9.71), and advances Herodotus’ larger critique of Athenian imperialism (e.g., 8.111, 9.71-122). It is in these margins, as he prepares to enter or leave off from his epideictic material, that the ‘final text’ asserts itself over the ‘performance text’ and Herodotus is therefore most at pains to smooth the seams and connect the disparate projects.

**Project Overview**

My thesis isolates three sections of the *Histories* that conform to these expectations by virtue of their length, structure, themes, bias, and lack of problematic authorial intrusions: the battle narratives of Thermopylae (7.172-233), Salamis (8.1-89), and Plataea (8.133-9.70). The first narrative that I isolate, the Battle of Plataea, covers what was by all contemporary accounts a Spartan victory. Despite explicitly recognizing this fact in his *Histories* (9.64.1), however, Herodotus seems far more intent on praising Athens, even to Sparta’s detriment. This pro-Athenian slant is more surprising in the context of the framing narrative: immediately before and after Plataea, Herodotus adopts an *opposite* authorial strategy—pro-Sparta and anti-Athens. This idiosyncrasy, I argue, reflects a shift in audience. Specifically, Herodotus’ version of Plataea seems to have been intended originally for an audience of Athenians, so much so that the narrative consistently legitimizes claims that were popular in Athenian funeral oration.128 The narrative privileges the actions of the Athenians throughout, and Athens is the only major Greek state whose heroism is unquestioned. For almost eighty chapters, Athens receives no slander—not even by implication—and even the chapters that do not directly involve the Athenians are nonetheless relevant to their interests.

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Even more surprisingly, closer inspection suggests that Herodotus’ Plataea was not only written for a different audience than the rest of the Histories, but for a different time. If we assume that the intended audience was indeed Athenian, Herodotus’ sympathetic portrayal of certain states (and his harsh portrayal of others) recalls a distinct political alignment—on one side, Athens, Phocis and Macedon are portrayed well, while on the other Sparta, Corinth, Thessaly and Thebes are disparaged, at times even reviled. This alignment is unique in the fifth century, confined to the early 440s—a period marked by the beginning of Pericles’ hegemony and the Second Sacred War. By the beginning of the Archidamian War, however, the Phocians were allied with Sparta against Athens (Thuc. 2.9) and Macedon had “from an old friend and ally been made an enemy” of the Athenians (ἐπεπολέμωτο ξύμμαχος πρότερον καὶ φίλος ὁν, Thuc. 1.57). Thus Herodotus seems to have written his Plataea narrative for an audience of Athenians in the early 440s.

In my second chapter, I argue that Herodotus’ narrative of the Battle of Salamis shows evidence of an intended audience that is similar to Plataea’s. The main polis protagonist is Athens; the main individual protagonist is an Athenian—perhaps one of Athens’ most famous citizens, Themistocles.\(^{129}\) Once again, we see the same alignment of nationalities—Phocis in particular is portrayed very positively, as are Aegina, Plataea, and Thespiae (all of whom were on good terms with Athens in the early 440s), while Sparta and Corinth, both instrumental to the victory at Salamis according to other historians (and even Herodotus himself, 8.93.1), seem thoughtless and utterly unhelpful in comparison with Athens.\(^{130}\) Just as with the Plataea narrative, then, Herodotus’ portrayal of the Battle of Salamis reflects an Athenian audience of the early 440s.

\(^{129}\) See Ch. III, pp. 117-18 for a defense of Themistocles as ‘Athenian cultural icon’ in the mid-fifth century.  
Since Athens’ significant contribution to Salamis was a generally recognized historical fact, of course, it is more difficult to demonstrate conclusively that Herodotus’ narrative of Salamis was written with a specific Athenian audience in mind. Still, Herodotus again plays up the Athenian role to the exclusion of others—even the Aeginetans, who were supposed to have earned the aristeia from the other Greeks.\textsuperscript{131} Herodotus furthermore portrays the controversial Athenian cultural icon Themistocles as an unambiguous hero, when not twenty chapters later he treacherously places his own self-interest before the Hellenic cause (8.108). But most convincingly, the narrative emphasizes a number of subjects that would have been particularly interesting for an Athenian audience: [1] rhetorical speeches are frequent and well-developed, [2] there is much discussion of naval strategy and achievements, [3] the topography of Athens and her allies—of Phocis in particular—features throughout (esp. 8.31-34; 49-55), [4] the connection of ships, walls, and men (a nexus of Athenian ideology)\textsuperscript{132} is repeatedly emphasized, and [5] specific Athenian rites and beliefs are emphatically affirmed in terms that were particularly relevant in the mid-fifth century. Herodotus’ narrative of Salamis, just like his Plataea narrative, is better suited to an Athenian audience of the early-440s than any other Hellenic audience.

The Salamis and Plataea narratives therefore reflect the audience we would expect following Diyllus’ testimony that the Athenians rewarded Herodotus for such a service (Plut. De Mal. 862a-b; see discussion above). The third chapter considers the possibility of the other attested ‘audience’ of Herodotus—the diverse assembly of Greeks at a Panhellenic Festival (Lucian, Herod. 1). Herodotus’ narrative of Thermopylae, I argue, would have been particularly suitable to an audience gathered at the Pythian Games. In large part, this argument rests on the

\textsuperscript{131} Pritchett 1974: 283-86, on the authority of 8.93 and 8.122; see also Diodorus Siculus 11.27.2. Cf. Marincola 2007a: 119.

\textsuperscript{132} Dougherty 2014: 130-70.
favorable and widespread inclusion of the Amphictyonic Council (which was responsible for hosting the festival) and its members in his telling of Thermopylae. Specifically, Herodotus resists the prevailing “Spartanocentric” version\(^\text{133}\) by elevating the roles of the other Greek defenders—and especially Thespiae—whereas for those Amphictyonic members who fought alongside Persia at Thermopylae, Herodotus seeks to explain and exculpate their medism. Almost every member of the Amphictyony did eventually medize, after all (cf. 7.132.1).\(^\text{134}\) By developing representative-champions of each group that participated in the Amphictyonic council, Herodotus overlooks or mitigates the charge of medism against these states and allows the noble actions of the few to stand for the true intentions of each group as a whole.

This Thermopylae *epideixis*, however, is more difficult to date than the others. For one, the political alignment that the narrative reveals (that of the Amphictyony) actually remained fairly consistent not just throughout the fifth-century but well beyond. Furthermore, there is very little evidence concerning the shifting political sympathies of the Amphictyony as a whole, nor do we have a nuanced understanding of any state outside Athens. But what evidence we do have points—as might be expected—to a mid-century audience: Herodotus’ treatment of Thebes suggests an ascendency of other states in Boeotia (especially Thespiae), which applies best to the mid-fifth century; the concern with promoting Delphi and an apparent Amphictyonic sympathy with Sparta (and not Athens) suggests the context of the Second Sacred War; and finally, the charge of medism was still potentially damning in the mid-fifth century, but less so as the century progressed (when Athens and Sparta both actively sought the support of Persia in the

\(^{133}\) Vannicelli 2007; cf. Branscome 2013: 178. Ancient evidence of such a tradition may be found in Diodorus Siculus 10.5-11 and Simonides F 11. For these sources, see also Flower 1998. Further discussion in Ch. IV, pp. 164-66.

Archidamian War). Thus, like the other *epideixeis*, Herodotus’ Thermopylae seems perfectly adapted to an audience in the mid-fifth century, in this case gathered at the Pythian Festival.

In total, then, I isolate three full-length narratives that stand apart from the rest of the narrative and furthermore seem to be aimed at pleasing a specific audience. By allowing that audience and its allies a major role in the story, by avoiding criticism of that group while heaping it on enemies, by engaging themes which that specific audience would appreciate, by including relevant local mythology or ethnic traditions, and—perhaps most strikingly—by promoting local ideology and political interests (like Herodotus’ promotion of democratic ideology in the first two *epideixeis* or his defense of medism in the Thermopylae *epideixis*), Herodotus produced narratives that would have been greatly appreciated by their respective audiences. And yet, these portrayals would not have been welcomed by a Panhellenic readership, as Herodotus knew well (cf. 7.139.1). These narratives, then, were composed for entirely different audiences—distinct from the late-fifth century Panhellenic readership, embroiled in the Archidamian War, and wary of Athenian imperialism—that the unitary *Histories* ultimately addresses.

135 Compare Herodotus’ many references to medism (and especially in the *epideictic* material) with Thucydides’ sole reference to a state’s medism, a defense by the Thebans that they were not responsible for their actions when they medized on account of a different government being in charge at the time of Persia’s invasion (3.62-64). Of course, medism continued to be a political black eye and an ideological talking point throughout the fifth century (as the story in Thucydides indeed illustrates); I point out only that the stigma of working with the Persians had greatly diminished. Cf. Myres 1936: 97-99; Vickers 1985: 12-17, 25-26.

136 For a Panhellenic readership, see Fornara 1971b; Grethlein 2010; Irwin 2013.
CHAPTER II

THE BATTLE OF PLATAEA: 8.133 – 9.70

Herodotus himself confirms that Plataea was thought of as a primarily Spartan victory (νίκην ἀναφέσται καλλίστην ἀπασέων τῶν ἥμεῖς ἰδμεν Παυσανίης ὁ Κλεομβρότου τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδεω, 9.64.1). Nor was Herodotus unique in this judgement: among contemporary sources, the Serpent Column (erected from the spoils of Plataea) lists Sparta first among the allies,¹ and Simonides begins his commemorative battle elegy by drawing a parallel between the Spartans and the Homeric heroes of the Iliad.² Yet in the Histories’ telling of Plataea, Sparta is generally marginal and ineffective, while Athens—a polis whose claims to greatness at Plataea are tenuous at best, almost solely attested by Herodotus—assumes the role of chief protagonist. Athens is involved in every major action; Athens is most willing to engage elite troops, whether Persian or Theban; Athens is even admitted—by the Spartans themselves—to be the most qualified to fight against the Persians. That the Spartans ended up engaging the Persians was a mistake: the Persians wanted to fight the Spartans, but the Spartans didn’t want to fight the Persians (9.46-48). Following Herodotus’ story, the audience is left wondering whether Greece

¹ For the Serpent Column, see Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 27; Yates 2011: 75-77, 150-54, 187-201; Stephenson 2016: esp. Ch.3.

² Despite its fragmentary nature, Simonides’ elegy (F 15.25) is clear as to the context of this comparison (especially considering that this particular fragment contains an invocation of a muse). I am not aware of an argument to the contrary, and many take this reading for granted. Cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 315-17; Kowerski 2005. For later sources confirming this general perception, see e.g. Plutarch, De Herodoti Malignitate; Diodorus Siculus 11.55.5 (following Ephorus? Cf. Marincola 2007a: 119).
in fact got lucky—it should have been Athens facing the Persians, and had it been so the victory would have been all the more secure. In this chapter, I propose that Herodotus’ tendency toward Athenian interests and bias in his Plataea narrative reflects an Athenian audience.

This inference also allows the detection of a specific historical context for the Plataea episode’s composition. Throughout the fifth century, Athens was deeply involved in Hellenic politics, meaning that the polis relied on a network of allies to compete with their rivals. No doubt Athenians would have celebrated Herodotus’ positive portrayal of themselves; that he would portray Athens’ allies in the same light would only add to their pleasure. And if Herodotus took pains to portray Athens’ rivals and enemies negatively, the Athenian audience would be all the more appreciative. By determining when Athenian attitudes would match the apparent sympathies of Herodotus’ Plataea narrative, then, we may assign the narrative to a specific historical context, both in time and space. As I will show, the evident alignment in this narrative (especially that of Athens, Phocis, and Macedon) applies nowhere else during Herodotus’ lifetime so well as in the mid-fifth century. My aim in this chapter, then, is to explain Herodotus’ otherwise unaccountably Athenian version of the Battle of Plataea by identifying its original epideictic audience.

**Setting Limits (8.133-9.70)**

For the reasons set out in the introduction (pp. 27-35), I will begin by demarcating a functional beginning and end of the epideictic material based on the observable presence of the factors outlined above. First and foremost, I will rely on the presence of Herodotus’ surprising pro-Athenian authorial strategy to delimit the narrative. However, other factors (some already anticipated in the introduction, pp. 28-30) deserve consideration in noting the transition from framing narrative to *epideixis*: [1] as Athens is portrayed positively, we would expect her
constant rival, Sparta, to be portrayed less positively in the *epideixis* and therefore the
delimitation ought to include as few unambiguously positive statements about Sparta (and its
allies) as possible; [2] the *epideixis*’ status apart from the rest of the *Histories* leads us to expect
minimal cross-references to parts of the *Histories* that fall outside the epideictic material; and [3]
the *epideixis*’ apparent earlier composition date (defended at length below) suggests that the
*epideixis* should not include references to events that occur later than their original performance
date in the early 440s. In short, the Plataea narrative chosen for analysis should resemble and
rely on the rest of the *Histories* as little as possible.

Following these criteria, the more secure limit is the endpoint, which can be placed with
confidence at 9.70. In that chapter, the Athenians are praised for their “valor and perseverance”
(ἀρετῇ τε καὶ λιπαρίῃ, 9.70.2)\(^3\) as they overthrow the wall of the Persian camp, a task to which
the Spartans had proven unequal; but then in the next chapter (9.71), Herodotus explicitly marks
the Spartans as better fighters than the Athenians and then the Athenians receive almost no
mention for thirty-three chapters. The only exception comes at 9.73, where an Athenian is
mentioned in the context of Sparta’s successful plundering of the Athenian countryside during
the Archidamian War; the inclusion of this very event (which must have followed the war’s
beginning in 431/0; cf. Thuc. 2.18-23) further corroborates the late composition of 9.73 and
implies that the chapter cannot be part of the original *epideixis*. By the end of the ninth book, of
course, the narrative focus returns to the Athenians—but only for Herodotus to warn of an
increasingly imperialistic Athens and the dangers of tyrannical hegemony, a message which
again evokes the historical context of the Archidamian War and so contradicts the criteria for

\(^3\) This latter term, λιπαρίῃ, is attested only twice in classical Greek—here and at Hdt. 9.21.2, where it is again
coupled with “ἀρετῇ.” Although in this instance the word is used by a Megarian herald, it introduces one of the
most pro-Athenian episodes in the Plataea narrative, the death of Masistius. The more common verb form (eight
total occurrences in the *Histories*) occurs twice in the Plataea narrative at 8.144.4 and 9.45.2 and applies to the
Athenians on both occasions.
recognizing epideictic material. Before 9.71, then, Athens is praised and Sparta is slighted, with almost no reference to the outside narrative or mention of the later events of the Archidamian War; but after 9.70, Sparta plays a prominent role throughout and Athens is practically absent until it is heavily criticized—precisely for its role leading up to and in the Archidamian War. So the last words of 9.70, quantifying those who died at Plataea, mark a clear end to the epideictic material.

The beginning of the epideictic material is less clear. If the presence of μὲν δὴ as a transitional formula carries any significance (see Introduction, pp. 30-31), the most obvious beginning of the epideictic material is 8.133, where the narrative abandons its earlier subject (the standoff between Greeks and Persians in the Aegean) in favor of an entirely new narrative that leads directly into the Battle of Plataea: Mardonius’ preparation to invade the mainland by land (οἱ μὲν δὴ Ἐλληνες ἔπλεον ἐς τὴν Δῆλον, Μαρδόνιος δὲ περὶ τὴν Θεσσαλίην ἐχείμαζε, 8.133). However, nothing in the following three chapters (8.133-35) significantly conforms to or digresses from the authorial strategy identified for the Plataea narrative above; only at 8.136 does Herodotus include a familiar pro-Athenian theme, that had the Athenians gone over to the Persians, the war surely would have gone in the barbarians’ favor (8.136.3). This is the very same theme marked by an apologetic admission of its disagreeableness to Herodotus’ audience earlier (7.139.1), but no such apology attends its inclusion here. Wherever the epideictic

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4 For this reading, see Boedeker 1988; Dewald 1997; and Irwin 2013.

5 At this point, I must also temper the certainty of my delimitations by pointing out that my suggestions here are no more than an educated guess; limits may be placed earlier or later following separate criteria (e.g., if the presence of μὲν δὴ is more convincing, we may place the end of the epideixis at the end of 9.69), but ultimately the most important observation is the sustained authorial strategy observed.

6 This delimitation is especially likely if we accept the interpretation of Evans 1991:68, whereby the narrative of Plataea is structured around the ‘tragic’ figure of Mardonius.
material begins, then, it must surely include 8.136, and 8.133 makes the most sense on the narrative and grammatical level.

Furthermore, the material immediately before 8.133—like the material after 9.70—is not at all concerned with Athens but with Artabazus (8.126-30) and the Spartans (8.131-32). Where Athens does enter the narrative (a little earlier, in the aftermath of Salamis), its role is imperialistic and foreshadows the later Athenian policy that would figure so heavily leading up to and during the Archidamian War (again resembling the material following 9.70): the Athenian hero Themistocles (a “proto-type of Pericles”\(^7\) who has just played a major, heroic role in what I will offer as my next example of an \textit{epideixis}, the narrative of Salamis) is blatantly accused of currying the favor of the Persian King and ruthlessly attacking other Greek cities for his and Athens’ profit (8.110-12), measures which the city of Athens has in fact approved (although Themistocles’ deceptiveness shares the blame on this occasion, 8.109).\(^8\) This negative, imperialistic portrayal of Athens, like that at the end of the \textit{Histories}, serves to criticize Athenian policy leading up to and during the Archidamian War and therefore conflicts with the authorial strategy and compositional context identified for the Plataea narrative. We see that the transition at 8.133, then, produces much the same effect as 9.70.

Within these limits, only two short sentences in almost eighty chapters conflict with the identified authorial strategy. These insertions may be marked as ‘authorial intrusions’ (see Introduction, pp. 32-35). The first is ‘self-referential’, a brief “as I mentioned earlier” (ὡς καὶ πρότερον δεδήλωται, 9.32) which cites a previous calculation of Persian soldiers at 8.113. We

\(^7\) Evans 1991: 76.

\(^8\) Deception, it must be observed, is an insufficient excuse elsewhere in the \textit{Histories}; indeed, Herodotus counts it as a major fault of the Athenian democracy (5.97.2). Other mentions of Themistocles in the material preceding 8.133 are no more flattering to Themistocles or Athens, recalling the unanimous resentment of the Greeks against Themistocles (8.124) and associating Themistocles with selfishness by recalling his closeness with Sparta in their honoring the victors of war (8.125).
needn’t look far for an explanation: it could easily have occurred to Herodotus to refer to his recent calculation of Persian troops as a testament to the accuracy of this number. In fact, this passage in the *epideixis* might have originally included a similar (the same?) calculation, prompting Herodotus to intervene here merely to avoid repetition. Either way, the statement bears the expected qualities of a ‘self-referential’ intrusion.

The second authorial intrusion, however, is inherently more problematic. At 9.64.1, Herodotus includes a remarkably pro-Spartan statement, one which also refers to the outside narrative twice (an oracle cited earlier at 8.114 and a genealogy listed at length at 7.204):

> ἐνθαῦτα ἢ τε δίκη τοῦ φόνου τοῦ Λεωνίδεω κατὰ τὸ χρηστήριον τοῦτο Ἑπαρτήνης ἐκ Μαρδόνιου ἐπετελέστο καὶ νίκην ἀναιρεῖται καλλίστην ἕπασέων τῶν ἡμέρας ἱμένεις Παυσανίης ὁ Κλεομβρότῳ τοῦ Ἀναξανθρίδεω τὸν δὲ κατύπερθε οἱ προγόνων τὰ σύνοματα εἰρήται ἐς Λεωνίδην ὕποτο γάρ σφι τυχχάνουσι ἑόντες. (9.64.1-2)

And so justice was exacted from Mardonius for the murder of Leonidas according to the oracle which the Spartans received, and Pausanias—son of Cleombrotus, son of Anaxandrides—achieved the greatest victory known to us; I have given the full progeny with that of Leonidas above, since they happen to be the same.

This statement is markedly dissonant with the surrounding narrative: the resounding praise that it unhesitatingly confers on Sparta and Pausanias is surrounded by a narrative that has continuously discredited both the Spartan regent and questioned the quality of his soldiers. In this narrative, Pausanias is never even mentioned in the context of combat—only his pietistic hesitance (9.61-62) receives any treatment; Leonidas, by comparison, participates heroically in the action at Thermopylae (7.224.1).²

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² Cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 213-14. “Some have suggested that Pausanias was consciously manipulating the omens and that his delay was actually motivated by strategic considerations, i.e. he was waiting until the enemy were fully committed to a fight at close quarters in order to neutralize the Persian superiority in cavalry and archers ([How and Wells 1928] II. 314; Hignett 1963: 336; Burn [1962 (1984)]: 530, 538), but religious and strategic considerations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.” See also Cartledge 2013: 116; Nyland 1992: 84 n.15; Immerwahr 1966: 295. For a rejection of the view that the Greek withdrawal was a deliberate ploy to trap the Persians into a premature advance, see Pritchett 1985: 134-37. I expand on this argument below, pp. 71-75.
Furthermore, the proclamation that Pausanias had won “the greatest victory known to us” comes immediately after the explicit attribution of his victory not to Spartan valor but rather to the deficiencies of Persian armor, saying that the Persians “fought against armed men despite being unarmed themselves” (πρὸς γὰρ ὀπλίτας ἐόντες γυμνῆτες ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῖντο, 9.63.2). Meanwhile, the sentence that follows the apparent intrusion completely undercuts this momentary Spartan achievement by attributing the killing of Mardonius to a “celebrated man in Sparta” (ἄνδρὸς ἐν Σπάρτῃ λογίμου, 9.64.2)—notable for dying in the Spartans’ ineffectual Stenyclerus assault during the helots’ revolt against Sparta in the 460s. This revolt, which Athens eventually sympathized with openly (inasmuch as, much to Sparta’s chagrin, they gave the revolting helots sanctuary at Naupactus following the war, Thuc. 1.103.3), in fact represents the precise historical moment when Athens became alienated from Sparta (prompted by Sparta’s much-resented refusal of Athenian troop-assistance in the revolt), and may even have begun with the anti-Spartan intrigues of Pausanias himself (Thuc. 1.132.4).10 That the “celebrated” Spartan, Arimnestus, died in the company of three hundred other Spartans may admittedly evoke the heroic stand at Thermopylae;11 but the parallel could equally serve to emphasize that that defense was ineffective rather than heroic. Indeed, Herodotus draws out the negative element of the comparison by concluding his reference with the statement that “he and his three hundred men were killed” (οὐτός τε ἀπέθανε καὶ οἱ τριηκόσιοι, 9.64.2). This immediate return to an unfavorable authorial treatment of Sparta accentuates how the marked praise of Sparta and Pausanias in the first sentence of 9.64 does not agree or belong with the surrounding narrative. The momentary lapse in authorial strategy ought therefore to be marked as a second authorial

11 See (e.g.) Baragwanath 2012: 298; Ruffing 2013: 204.
intrusion, presumably intended to prevent redundancy and to effectively tie this otherwise epideictic narrative of Plataea to the larger *Histories* as quickly and effectively as possible.

Outside of these two instances, the eighty-one chapters of narrative between 8.133 and 9.70 consistently and completely conform to the criteria for the authorial strategy set out above. This remarkable circumstance argues for isolating the intervening chapters and treating them as distinct from the framing narrative of the ‘final text’, presumably because Herodotus originally composed the material as an *epideixis* for a specific Athenian audience (which I will identify below).

**Pro-Athenian Bias in Herodotus’ Plataea Narrative**

Within these boundaries, Athens is clearly Herodotus’ protagonist. At several points in the narrative, Herodotus conspicuously and unnecessarily celebrates the Athenians’ valor and value on the battlefield. When the Megarians are in trouble, for example, the Athenians are the only ones brave enough to come to their aid; in the process they kill a Persian nobleman, Masistius, who appears to have been given prominence for the sake of this anecdote alone (9.20-25).¹² Nor is this the only occasion when the Athenians stand their ground where all others flee. For one, they faithfully remain by the side of the Spartans as Pausanias attempts to convince a subordinate officer that his decision to retreat from the Persians rather than stand and fight is not, in fact, motivated by sheer cowardice (9.54). This bumbling mishap actually ignites the final battle, where the Athenians take on a valiant corps of Thebans who resist so trenchantly that “three hundred of their first and finest died at the hands of the Athenians” (τριηκόσιοι αὐτῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ ἀριστοὶ ἐνθαῦτα ἔπεσον ύπὸ Αθηναίων, 9.67). There is no mitigation of Athenian

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¹² Burn 1962 (1984): 517 goes so far as to suspect this passage of being influenced by Athenian propaganda; cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 138-39. Petropoulos 2008 further demonstrates just how charged Herodotus intended this episode to be. Cf. Tuite 2006: vii, who nicely demonstrates the importance of Herodotus’ epic framing: “Equating Masistios’ corpse to the bodies of Patroklos and Hektor, the historian transforms the battle at Cithaeron into an epic duel, in which the Athenians play the role of a collective epic hero.”
valor here, as with the Spartan success against the “naked” Persians (γυμνῆτες, 9.63.2); it may also be worth noting that the Athenians here defeat 300 elite troops, where Sparta is remembered for losing 300 elite troops when they defeat the Persians (9.64.2) and, of course, at Thermopylae (7.224.1). Indeed, the Greeks rely on the Athenians—and not the Spartans—to the end of the battle. Herodotus characterizes the assault on the Persian camp:

 telah meg yar orfian o Αθηναίοι, oí d’ ἡμίχνωντο καὶ πολλῷ πλέον εἶχον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὡστε οὐκ ἐπισταμένον τειχομαχεῖν· ὡς δὲ σφι Αθηναίοι προσήλθον, ὡστοὶ δὴ ἱσχυρὴ ἐγίνετο τειχομαχή καὶ χρόνον ἐπὶ πολλὸν. τέλος δὲ ἄρετῇ τε καὶ ἱππαρί ἐπέβησαν Αθηναίοι τοῦ τείχους καὶ ἤριπον, τῇ δὴ ἐσεχέοντο οἱ Ἑλληνες. (9.70.2)

Until the Athenians arrived, the defenders baffled the Spartan attempts to assault the wall, unskilled as they were in seigecraft; but once the Athenians joined them, a violent and protracted assault began. In the end, by their courage and persistence the Athenians mounted the wall and tore it down, whereupon the Greeks poured in.

Thus the valor and value of the Athenians at Plataea is emphasized, often to the detriment of the Spartans and in relatively peripheral circumstances, which might otherwise have been omitted.

These Athenian acts of valor are even more remarkable considering that the central narrative contains so few successes by others. The ignominious contribution of most of the Greek allies is summed up nicely by the Spartans at 9.60.1:

 ἄνδρες Αθηναίοι, ἄγνως μεγίστων προκειμένου ἐλευθέρην εἶναι ἢ δεδουλωμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, προδοδόμητα ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἡμεῖς τε οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ Αθηναίοι ὑπὸ τὴν παροιχομένην νύκτα διαδράντων.

Men of Athens, as the greatest battle of this conflict looms, determining whether Greece will be free or enslaved, we have been betrayed by our allies—both of us, Spartans and Athenians alike—who have run off in the night.

As to Sparta, Athens’ only plausible rival in the narrative, a number of factors diminish their role. Most strikingly, Herodotus has the Spartans themselves repeatedly acknowledge and validate the preeminence of the Athenians. From the beginning of the Plataea narrative, the Spartans

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13 See n.11 above.
recognize that they are lost without Athens and are willing to assume a remarkably humble and suppliant position in order to convince Athens not to join with Persia (8.142). The Athenians, with great fanfare and rhetorical flourish, reassure Sparta that Athens would never abandon the Greek cause (8.143-44)—at which point Sparta promptly reveals its true self-interested nature and abandons Athens to her fate in order to improve their own defenses at the Isthmian Wall (9.7), which is itself a vain act without Athenian support (as Chileus the Tegean points out to the Spartans shortly thereafter, 9.9.2). Sparta also decisively upholds the Athenian assertion that their victory at Marathon proved them more worthy to assume the honored left-flank than the Tegeans (9.28.1). Herodotus then characterizes this battle position as “last—or in fact pretty well first” (τελευταῖοι δὲ καὶ πρῶτοι, 9.28.6), explicitly equating the honor of the Athenian position with that of the Spartans on the right wing. And the Spartans later attempt to defer even this honor to the Athenians before the final battle, balking at the prospect of facing the Persian foe (9.46). Even on the edge of the final battle, the Spartans use superlative praise of the Athenians in yet another plea for Athenian assistance: “We recognize that you have been our most eager allies in the present war” (συνοίδαμεν δὲ ύμῖν ὑπὸ τὸν παρεόντα τόνδε πόλεμον ἐοδίς πολλὸν προθυμοτάτοις, 9.60.3). If by some mistake the Spartans had previously been thought to be the most important or best fighters at Plataea, Herodotus makes it clear that Sparta itself rightly yielded that honor to the Athenians.

In fact, the Spartans hardly contribute anything at all. I have shown above how Sparta’s only real contribution, the defeat of the Persians, is specifically undermined by the narrative

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14 See Denniston 1954: 305 for the translation of δὲ καὶ as “or in fact pretty well…”.
16 Solmsen 1944: 249 remarks on how Herodotus’ version of Plataea balances Athenian and Spartan contributions. I hope to have shown here that the narrative is not balanced but rather entirely one-sided, in favor of the Athenians. Cf. Nyland 1992: 88.
surrounding the Spartan success as well as its unfavorable comparison with Athens’ own valor (9.63.2; see p. 46); I survey the many examples of Sparta’s incompetence and faintheartedness below (pp. 70-75). But for now, a comparison of the deaths of Mardonius (the commander of the Persian forces who dies at the hands of the Spartans, 9.63) and Masistius (an otherwise insignificant Persian nobleman who dies at the hands of the Athenians, 9.22-24) may epitomize the gap between Herodotus’ portrayal of Athens and of Sparta. When the Spartans kill Mardonius—whose death is marked only by the phrase “When Mardonius died…” (ὥς δὲ Μαρδόνιος ἀπέθανε..., 9.63.2)—the Persians neither resist nor attempt to recover the body but instead turn coward and flee. By contrast, after Masistius’ death (described in vivid and graphic detail, 9.22.1-2), the Persians fight fiercely and heroically, conceding the corpse to the Athenians only at great cost to themselves (9.22.3-23). And when news of Masistius’ death reaches the Persian camp, the entire army mourns, and once more the episode is imbued with vivid detail:

πένθος ἐποιήσαντο Μασιστίου πᾶσά τε ἡ στρατιὴ καὶ Μαρδόνιος μέγιστον, σφέας τε αὐτοῦς κείροντες καὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ τὰ ὑποξύγια οἴμωγῇ τε χρεώμενοι ἀπλέτω· ἀπασαν γὰρ τὴν Βοιωτίην κατεἶχε ἤχῳ… (9.24)

The whole camp grieved for Masistius—and Mardonius especially—shearing themselves and their horses and their oxen and lifting up a boundless wail; the echoing cries filled all of Boeotia…

Mardonius receives no such treatment. It is clear whose life the Persians (and Herodotus’ authorial strategy) valued more: Mardonius may have been in command, but his lieutenant Masistius was the more impressive Persian. Although Herodotus could easily have given equal glory and embellishment to either episode—indeed, the death of Mardonius would seem to require more embellishment—only when the Athenians are involved does he choose to elaborate. Thus although the Spartans are not entirely absent from the battle, they are hardly its most conspicuous participants.
Other Greeks do fight well, but each of these groups serves a clear function in a pro-Athenian narrative. The Thebans, for example, fight courageously, remaining loyal to their Persian allies until the very end of the battle (9.67-68). But no Greek would mistake Herodotus’ narrative as pro-Theban: they were fighting for the wrong side, after all. Rather, their valor here serves only to glorify their opponents, the Athenians. The only other Greek state that fights proficiently and courageously in the Plataea narrative is Tegea, Sparta’s closest ally. At first, this positive portrayal of a Spartan ally may seem to work against Athenian interests. But every positive Tegean action equally serves to discredit the Spartans: the Tegeans argue that they deserve the place of honor in battle precisely because they have bested the Spartans (9.26.3-5); they boldly engage the Persian foe while the Spartans balk at unfavorable sacrifices (9.62.1); a Tegean even ridicules the Spartan policy of building the Isthmian Wall, pointing out that it is useless without the support of the Athenians (9.9.2). The Tegeans, then, serve one major purpose: to make the Spartans look foolish by contrast. Thus the only polis in Herodotus’ Plataea narrative that is portrayed positively for its own sake, without qualification or ulterior function, is Athens.

A positive portrayal of Athens, however, is not enough on its own to establish an Athenian audience. One could argue, for example, that the Athenians did fight bravely and that Herodotus merely reports this. But no other account of Plataea fails to honor Sparta above Athens: Thucydidies names Pausanias “the hero of Plataea” (ἐν μεγάλῳ ἄξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν Πλαταιάσιν ἰγεμονίαν, 1.130.1); Polybius singles out the Spartans for “championing the freedom of the Greeks” (διαγωνιζόμενοι περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἑλευθερίας, 6.49.4); Simonides too apparently made Sparta the hero of his account, implicitly comparing them to Achilles and possibly even placing the Dioscuri beside Pausanias at the head of the
march (F 11). Diodorus Siculus (11.30-31) and Plutarch (Aristides 11-19) clearly rely heavily on Herodotus but nonetheless exhibit no hint of disfavor toward Sparta. Even Aeschylus attributes the victory at Plataea directly to “the Dorian spear” without mentioning Athenian participation (πέλανος αἰματοσφαγῆς / πρὸς γῆ Πλαταίων Δωρίδος λόγχης ὑπό, Persae 816-17). Among other patriotic Athenian sources, the best that is said of the Athenians at Plataea is that they “stood in array of battle” with the other Greeks (παραταξαμένους, Demosthenes 18.208) or that “in this exploit, at last, the Lacedaemonians cooperated with the Athenians” (κοινὸς ἡδη τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων, Plato Menexenus 241c). Herodotus has made an authorial choice to portray the Athenians better—and the Spartans worse—than any other surviving historian or poet that does not rely on Herodotus himself.

Secondly, Herodotus might simply favor Athens generally. But the Plataea narrative’s pro-Athenian bias is not consistent throughout the Histories. The anti-Athenian material collected at the end of Book Nine, the disgraceful actions of Themistocles after Salamis (8.109-12), and the plain recognition of anti-Athenian sentiment in his audience at 7.139.1 all reflect authorial strategies that are altogether incompatible with that evident in Herodotus’ Plataea. Are we to believe that Herodotus was continuously reversing his opinion of the Athenian polis as he progressed? Charles Fornara sums up the complexity of Herodotus’ text: “He is too detached to be an Athenian propagandist and too complex to permit his intent to be extracted by inference from an isolated passage.” Rather, I maintain that Herodotus is biased toward the Athenians

18 Cf. Lysias 2.46; Aeschines 2.75.
20 Fornara 1971b: 58.
here and not elsewhere in the Histories because his original audience for this section was Athenian.

Third, scholars frequently explain Herodotus’ problematic account of Plataea by blaming sources, although the identity of those sources is much debated. Most often, these sources are identified either as Athenian propaganda or as rank-and-file Athenian citizens. But this explanation is simplistic. Herodotus had great command over his material and used a wide range of sources; he needn’t have followed propagandistic accounts uncritically. Indeed, Herodotus (and his audience) would have known much more about this famous battle than the stories he tells here. Herodotus would have been familiar with at least one well-known account of the battle that was favorable to the Spartans—Simonides’ battle elegy. Furthermore, Herodotus includes a number of Greek and Persian perspectives in the narrative (he even explicitly cites Thersander of Orchomenus, 9.16.1), implying that he was in no way limited to Athenian sources. And the content of Herodotus’ account is reflective not of close personal experience such as might be gained from Athenian veterans (although some such narrative is included, e.g. the battle over Masistius, 9.22-24) but rather of the political wrangling that followed the battle. The pro-Athenian slant, then, cannot be attributed solely to Athenian propaganda.

A different source-based argument has been offered by Ray Nyland, who explains Herodotus’ odd rendering of the battle by arguing that Herodotus relied not on Athenian sources, but rather on medizing sources like those from Thebes, Phocis, and Macedon. While Nyland’s

conclusions are no doubt valid to an extent—Herodotus clearly had access to sources familiar with the Persian army—there is no cause to limit Herodotus’ scope of inquiry so severely. For instance, Nyland argues that Herodotus was unfamiliar with Athens’ role in the battle because Aristides’ role in the slaying of Masistius is minimized here but prominent in other historians.²⁶ But if that is so, where had Herodotus heard the vivid detail that he includes in the Athenian assault on Masistius and his Persians in the first place? No Greeks of any nation were included on the Persian side of this attack. Secondly, are we to believe that Herodotus collected stories from all across the Hellenic frontier, from Macedon to Thebes, from Argos to Orchomenos, but once he had finished collecting this information he neglected to consult with any Athenians (or Spartans, for that matter) for their version of events? And that even without this Athenian perspective, his narrative still managed to favor the Athenians unilaterally? If Herodotus had wanted to include different perspectives on Plataea, he surely could have done so; collecting stories was, after all, something that Herodotus excelled at. Rather, we should conclude that Herodotus himself chose to include any Athenian bias that is detectable in the Plataea narrative. The historian was no less bound by his sources here than anywhere else in the Histories.

An explanation must be sought, then, which recognizes that source-material is not a sufficient explanation for Herodotus’ historiographical stance and its favorability toward Athenian interests throughout the narrative of Plataea. The simplest explanation is as I have suggested: an Athenian audience. No other audience would be so delighted at the prominent role that Athenians play in this victory which was generally claimed by Sparta; no other audience would have so enjoyed the humbling and often derisive attitude toward the contributions of the

other allies. The material that Herodotus chooses to include in this version of the famous battle, then, was skillfully chosen and shaped to suit a specific audience of Athenians.

**Pleasing an Athenian Audience**

But more than just an Athenian bias would have made Herodotus’ narrative suitable to an Athenian audience. As might be expected, his version of Plataea would have been interesting, intelligible, credible, and otherwise unobjectionable to Athenians as well. The feature of the Plataea narrative that would have appealed most to an Athenian audience is its consistent showcasing of rhetorical expertise.27 Herodotus’ Plataea narrative includes a number of prominent and well-formed speeches that would have been greatly admired in the vibrantly democratic Athens. There are a greater number of prolonged speeches in this narrative and the Salamis narrative (for which I will argue a similar Athenian audience) than can be found in the rest of the *Histories* combined.28

Two speeches in particular stand out for their inclusion of arguments that would have been familiar to the Athenians. The first comes at the beginning of the epideictic material, after Alexander of Macedon brings word that Mardonius seeks a truce with the Athenians and Sparta sends an embassy to Athens out of concern that the city would agree to such a truce (8.140-42). Athens responds to both embassies with a strange but masterful speech that blends benevolence and contempt. While the Athenians appreciate the concerns that Alexander and Sparta are expressing, they assert that they would never ally themselves with Persia against Greece: “But

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27 Cf. Wallace 1998; Yunis 1998. Whether the practice of rhetoric was formally defined in Athens or had been fully transferred from Sicily by the mid-fifth century is immaterial: our Athenian sources attest to the importance of democratic institutions like the funeral oration and the agonistic court speech already in the mid-fifth century. Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* (458 BCE), for example, contains a complex system of court-like arguments, which the play cites as the predecessor of contemporary Athenian practice. Rhetorical exhibition was certainly already much admired in Athens by the middle of the fifth century (and perhaps before: cf. Knudsen 2014).

28 If the count is made by speech groups, this portion of the *Histories*—amounting to roughly 10% of the whole—contains 5 of the 9 major rhetorical episodes in the *Histories* (56%). By an individual speech count, the tally is 7 out of 16 (44%). Cf. Lang 1984: 80-131.
know this now, if you somehow missed it before: as long as one Athenian remains, we will never come to terms with Xerxes.” (ἐπίστασθε τε οὖν· εἰ μὴ καὶ πρῶτον ἐτυγχάνετε ἐπιστάμενον ἔστ' ἂν καὶ εἶς περὶ Ἀθηναίων, μηδαμά ὀμολογήσοντας ἡμέας Ξέρξη, 8.144.3). Twice they cite loyalty to the Greek cause on the basis of their shared culture, religion, and traditions (8.143.1, 144.2); twice they cite the Persian destruction of temples and shrines, the same temples and shrines which the Athenians refused to rebuild after the war as a sign of their dedication to the Greek cause (8.143.2, 144.2).29 These same concerns are in fact closely mirrored by a mid-century Athenian invitation to peace among the Greeks that was promulgated by Pericles no later than 447: Pericles proposed a Panhellenic assembly (σύλλογον) to “deliberate about holy places that the barbarian had destroyed, and about the sacrifices they [the Greeks] owed” (τοὺς βουλευσομένους περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱερῶν, ἃ κατέπρησαν οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν, ἃς ὀφείλουσιν, Plut. Per. 17.1).30 Such rhetoric would have been familiar, welcome, and effective if delivered to an Athenian audience.

A second speech, the Athenian defense of their heroic right to face the Persians (9.27), is equally impressive and reiterates many of the same themes as the Athenians’ reply to the Spartans and Alexander. In fact, the speech is so customized for an Athenian audience that—according to Nicole Loraux—it practically epitomizes the genre of Athenian funeral oration.31 The Athenians lament the inadequacy of speech for the occasion, a tactic observable in almost

29 Boersma 1970: 43-44; Meiggs 1972: 504-507; Ferrari 2002: 28; Rhodes 2016: 149. Cf. Yates 2011: 92-93: “The restoration of a temple within a state is a state matter. It needs a state explanation with or without recourse to an oath. I believe the decision not to restore temples makes most sense from a commemorative point of view. For thirty years, and in some cases longer, temples within Athens and throughout Attica were left charred and in ruins. Even in the imperial period Pausanias can point out two Athenian temples that showed the marks of Xerxes’ invasion (10.35.2). Like Berlin’s Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtnis-Kirche or Coventry’s St. Micheal’s Cathedral, such memorials would have had immense power, drawing particular attention to the devastation wrought on Athens.”


every surviving example of the funeral oration. Among mythical achievements, the Athenians cite their archetypal victory over the Amazons (famously depicted on the Parthenon and the shield of Athena Parthenos; also included in funeral orations), their offering of sanctuary to Eurystheus (commonly paired with the Amazonomachy in funeral orations), and their intervention in the Oedipal strife at Thebes to bury the body of Polyneikes and the Argive heroes (the subject of Euripides’ *Suppliant Women* and also a frequent inclusion in funeral orations); as Loraux states, “For the authors of the epitaphioi, these [latter] two episodes are an opportunity of recalling this generosity, this compassion for the weak and oppressed, which both tragedy and rhetoric agree are a principle feature of the Athenian character.” The Battles of Marathon and Salamis were also frequently cited by funeral orations, and although Herodotus here leaves out the latter (presumably due to its chronological proximity to Plataea and its irrelevance to land-combat), the Athenian claim of superior valor in this passage ultimately rests on the validity of Athenian success at Marathon: “Wouldn’t we be justified in assuming this position on the grounds of this one deed alone?” (ἆρ’ οὖ δίκαιοι εἴμεν ἐχεῖν ταύτην τὴν τάξιν ἀπὸ τοῦτο μοῦνο τοῦ ἔργου, 9.27.6). The speech is practically a collage of arguments that were popular in Athenian funeral orations (i.e. the epitaphic *topoi*).
Yet the Athenians’ speech at 9.27 does even more than a traditional funeral oration could have: by placing Athenian claims directly against the Tegeans’, Herodotus allows the Athenian argument not only to assert Athenian valor and heritage, but to refute other Greek claims to such honors as well—an ideal argument for a nation that founds its imperialistic ambitions on benevolent guardianship. Compared to the Tegean record fighting Greeks—however successful—the Athenian success at Marathon against the invading barbarian seems grand and noble by comparison. Thus the Athenian case against the Tegeans would have appealed to an Athenian audience for more than just its flattering content: it also represents a rhetorical coup and furthers the imperialistic ambitions that Athens and Pericles envisioned for the Delian league.

Two other examples of rhetoric are worth mentioning, although they are not delivered by Athenians. First, Alexander the Macedonian, whom Herodotus consistently portrays in a positive light, opens the narrative with a speech that Emily Baragwanath argues is meant to be convincing (8.140);\(^39\) that the Athenians are not persuaded is a tribute to their own heroic resolve rather than the fault of Alexander’s speech. And second, the Phocian general, Harmoclydes, delivers a battle exhortation that both exhibits a subtle perceptiveness in its character assassination of the Thessalians and pronounces a valiant adherence to Hellenic ideals in the face of death (9.17.4).\(^40\) Thus even the speeches of non-Athenians—both delivered by mid-century allies of Athens—promote an Athenian agenda and furthermore serve to satisfy an Athenian audience by their keen manipulation of rhetoric.

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39 Baragwanath 2008: 229. Badian 1994: 120 calls this speech “Alexander’s most conspicuous act of medism,” but as I will argue below, this judgment is obviated explicitly in the text by both Spartans (8.142.5) and Athenians (8.144.3). In general, Badian’s argument that the reader/audience is intended to perceive the importance of the “subtle silences” that imply Alexander’s role in the treaty between Athens and Persia in 508/7 rests overmuch on an argument from silence (as might be expected). It cannot be demonstrated that Herodotus intended his audience to uncover the meaning behind his ‘silences’, and so the historiographical argument (if correct) equally points in the opposite direction, that Herodotus was attempting to avoid criticizing Alexander I.

40 On battle exhortations as a primarily literary device, see Hansen 1993. See contra Pritchett 2002.
Herodotus also showcases the cleverness of the Athenians on several occasions. For example, when the Spartan retreat is interrupted by one of their own officers’ objections, the Athenians hold their ground and send messengers to the Spartans rather than retreat with them, “knowing full well how the Spartans tend so say one thing and do another…” (ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα ὡς ἄλλα φρονεόντων καὶ ἄλλα λεγόντων, 9.54.1). Their perceptive resolve once more affirms Athenian loyalty to the Greek cause and simultaneously questions Sparta’s own trustworthiness by comparison (cf. 8.144.1). Similarly, when the Athenians predict that a Persian invasion will follow directly on the heels of their refusal of Mardonius’ offer (8.144.5), Herodotus manifests their prediction immediately (9.1); Sparta, however, proves less perceptive and fails to bring aid to Athens in time (9.6-9). The Athenian response to Sparta’s inaction is harsh and frankly surprising in light of their earlier conviction not to give in to the barbarians: “The Athenians, since they have been wronged by you and have no remaining allies, will make peace with Persia however they are able” (Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὡς ἀδικεόμενοι ὑπὸ ὑμέων χήτει τε συμμάχων καταλύσονται τῷ Πέρσῃ οὕτως ὅκως ἂν δύνηνται, 9.11.1). As Emily Baragwanath shows, however, this apparent Athenian “volte-face” does not represent a betrayal of Athens’ earlier conviction and loyalty to the Hellenic cause; rather, the Athenian messengers are leveraging the Spartans with a clever rhetorical ploy—simultaneously calling the Spartans out for their selfishness and demonstrating how desperately they need the Athenians—and it works. Such insight and cunning would have been celebrated at Athens, especially in its application here.

41 The alternative explanation for their failure to appear, that they failed to provide assistance as a callous betrayal of their promise to bring aid to the Athenians, is still entirely plausible by Herodotus’ account (see esp. 9.8.2).

42 Baragwanath 2008: 234-39; Van der Veen 1996: 105 n.266 observes that scholars have largely neglected “the importance of 9.11 as the complement of Athens’ democratic pretensions.”
Several of Herodotus’ anecdotal episodes would also have pleased an Athenian audience. First, Herodotus manifests Athens’ conviction to stay loyal to the Hellenic cause in the episode concerning Mardonius’ second embassy to Athens, dispatched “with the hope that they would give up their foolishness now that all Attica was occupied and under his control” (ἐλπίζων δὲ σφεας ὑπῆσειν τῆς ἀγνωμοσύνης ὡς δοριαλώτου ἐστεὶς πάσης τῆς Ἀττικῆς χώρης καὶ ἐστεὶς ἡδη ὑπ’ ἐστυτό, 9.4.2). Upon the presentation of this embassy, a certain Lycidas—an Athenian—urges acceptance of Mardonius’ proposal. The Athenians then exact the terrible consequence that they had earlier threatened upon Alexander if he should be foolish enough to advise them to accept Mardonius’ offer a second time: they stone Lycidas to death on the spot (9.5.2; cf. 8.143.3). Nor does the episode stop there, but in a rage the Athenian women marshal themselves in heroic fashion to find and stone Lycidas’ entire household (9.5.3), an act which Flower and Marincola characterize as “a display of female daring” that “indicates the presence of supreme danger.”43 The Athenians clearly mean what they have said and are resolved to remain on the side of Greece no matter the cost.

A second incident indicates an Athenian audience both by its appealing content and by its cultural idiosyncrasy. When the Spartans order a general retreat, they are checked in their intention by a dissenting Spartan officer, objecting on account of the shame he felt at his commander’s orders: “Amompharetus, son of Polias, the commander of the Pitanate brigade, refused to flee the strangers, being unwilling to bring shame on Sparta” (Ἀμομφάρετος δὲ ὁ Πολιάδεω λοχηγέων τοῦ Πιτανήτεω λόχου οὐκ ἔφη τοὺς ξείνους φεύξεσθαι οὐδὲ ἐκὸν εἶναι αἰσχυνέειν τὴν Σπάρτην, 9.53.2). No doubt this insubordination by a ranking Spartan officer would have delighted the Athenians on its own; yet Herodotus further adapts his narrative to suit

43 Flower and Marincola 2002: §9.5.3.
an Athenian audience. As a symbol of his conviction, Amompharetus picks up a large rock and drops it at Pausanias’ feet, declaring that “with this pebble, he cast his vote not to flee before the strangers” (ταύτῃ τῇ ψήφῳ ψηφίζεσθαι ἡφε μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς ξείνους, 9.55.2), an incident which John Marincola calls: “Dramatic but inaccurate: voting pebbles were used at Athens, not at Sparta.”

To an audience used to dropping pebbles in a jar, the symbolism of this Spartan’s ‘vote’ would have been obvious: his single vote outweighs all the rest (as is the case, in fact, since he alone is denying the Spartan army their retreat). To an audience that votes by acclamation (as at Sparta) or another method, however, the anecdote would not have carried the same force. Besides, a Spartan audience probably would not appreciate one of their best acting as an Athenian—while openly defying his regent and commander, no less.

The simplest explanation for Herodotus’ approach here is an intended audience that would fully appreciate the episode’s significance (viz. the Athenians).

Finally, Herodotus’ concern to adapt his narrative to an Athenian audience is even evident on a more subtle scale—in his explanatory glosses. For example, when pointing out a mountain pass to the Persians, the Boeotians call it “Three Heads” and Herodotus immediately adds to this that “the Athenians call it Oak Heads” (τὰς Βοιωτίμὲν Τρεῖς Κεφαλὰς καλέοσι, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ Δρυὸς Κεφαλὰς, 9.39.1). Yet there are no Athenians present in the narrative, and this pass, which Herodotus describes as situated on Mt. Cithaeron, lies on the border between Boeotia and Megara, not Athens. Presumably, Herodotus has no reason to include the Athenian

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44 Marincola 1996: 599.
45 Flower and Marincola 2002: 205 point out that ψήφος can refer to a vote without a pebble, but this usage would defeat the humor of the event.
46 Cartledge 2013: 20 calls Amompharetus’ actions an “odd, out-of-national-character Spartan act.” Flower and Marincola 2002: 201 point out that a similar incident in the Peloponnesian War resulted in the exile of two Spartan polemarchs (Thuc. 5.71-3).
47 Cf. Baragwanath 2012: 309-10, which attributes Amompharetus’ stubbornness to an “over-amplified expression” of Spartan mythicizing, “never to abandon one’s post in battle.”
nomenclature except to more precisely specify the intended pass to an audience that names it differently—the Athenians. A second authorial gloss is included to explain the Spartan use of the word “ξεινος” for the more usual term, “βάρβαρος” (9.11.2), and indeed the same information is soon thereafter put to use in the aforementioned story of Amompharetus, who twice uses “ξεινος” to refer to the Persians (9.53.2, 55.2). This gloss would be unwarranted if Herodotus were telling the tale to Spartans, and would probably have seemed banal to those familiar with them, i.e. other Peloponnesians. The Athenians, on the other hand, were apparently poorly informed of Spartan custom and might have appreciated such a gloss (e.g., Thuc. 1.20.3). In this way, marginal oddities within Herodotus’ text further suggest the presence of an Athenian audience.

Unfortunately, even the presence of all these elements is not enough to prove that the audience was strictly Athenian. For now, however, it is sufficient to note that Herodotus’ inclusion of these elements, which are at least well-suited to an Athenian audience, would have made this *epideixis* welcome and effective in Athens, even if perhaps in other *poleis* as well. But the same was certainly not true of all Greek *poleis*. Had Herodotus performed this version of Plataea at Sparta, for example, where the battle featured heavily in local ideology, the audience would surely have objected vociferously and perhaps even violently. Besides, would Herodotus have so composed his Plataea narrative for the ‘final text’ when he knew how objectionable pro-Athenian content could be to its intended Panhellenic readership (cf. 7.139.1)? In the end, given

48 Scholars have suspected this passage of scribal interpolation (see Flower and Marincola 2002: §9.11.2; Wilson 2015), but in conjunction with its later application, mentioned here, I expect that the insertion ought to be considered original.

49 Ironically, here, Thucydides—an Athenian himself—may be betraying his own ignorance concerning the Spartan Pitanate lochos (for a summary of the argument, see Kelly 1981; cf. Hornblower 1991: 58). It bears mention that Herodotus’ lexical gloss hardly proves that the intended audience was Athenian, since any number of other Hellenic states might also have lacked the same knowledge; it does, however, imply a non-Spartan (and maybe even non-Peloponnesian) audience.
the fulfillment of the criteria enumerated above, we can at least conclude that Herodotus’ version of Plataea is composed for Athenians or audiences that were sympathetic to them—but certainly not the Panhellenic audience for which Herodotus is generally supposed to have written.

**Identifying a Political Alignment**

Other elements in the Plataea narrative may confirm this audience more precisely. Following the numerous indications cited above that Herodotus’ target audience for the Plataea narrative was indeed Athenian, we may attempt to place the narrative in a specific historical-political context by recognizing that Athens would have wanted to see its allies portrayed well, its enemies portrayed poorly, and its rivals portrayed at least unsympathetically. In fact, portrayals of *poleis* throughout the Plataea narrative are consistent: Phocis and Macedon are sympathetic and brave, defended against the charge of medism; and on the other hand, Sparta is marginalized, *poleis* like Corinth and Megara are portrayed as cowards, and still others (Thebes in particular) are denounced as traitors to the Greek cause. By analyzing the portrayal of each non-Athenian *polis* in Herodotus’ Plataea narrative, we may detect a defined and consistent inter-*polis* political alignment which will in turn allow us to identify the historical context of the intended Athenian audience. This alignment, given an Athenian audience’s affection for their allies and disdain for their enemies, will help establish a chronological context for the *epideixis*’ composition.

The positive portrayals of *poleis* in Herodotus’ narrative, though few, are emphatic and unwavering. These positive portrayals are all the more remarkable considering that both non-Athenian cases of positive portrayal in this narrative, Phocis and Macedon, were in fact fighting for the Persians, not the Greeks. But Herodotus goes out of his way to emphasize that both cases of medism were not only exceptional but excusable. To begin, the Phocians’ grudging
capitulation to the Persians stands in stark contrast with the ready medism of the Thessalians (9.1) and especially of the Thebans (e.g. the convivial banquet that directly precedes the pro-Phocian narrative, 9.16.1). Herodotus makes it clear that the Phocians joined the Persians only under the yoke of necessity: their reluctance is so pronounced that Mardonius decides to massacre the Phocian contingent rather than risk their betrayal of the Persians in battle (9.17.3). This action prompts the Phocian commander Harmocyes to declare as he prepares to resist:

“But let them each discover what happens when barbarians contrive to murder Greeks!” (άλλα μαθέω τις αὐτῶν δι᾽ ἐόντες βάρβαροι ἐπ᾽ Ἔλλησι ἀνδράσι φόνον ἔρρασαν, 9.17.4).

Herodotus thus explicitly aligns the Phocians with the Greeks—and against the “barbarians”—in spite of their actual medism. In the end, Mardonius is so struck by their valor that he recognizes their worth and recalls his attack (9.18.3), saying: “Take heart, O Phocians—for you have proven yourself to be useful” (θαρσέετε, ὦ Φωκέες· ἀνδρεῖς γὰρ ἐφάνητε ἐόντες ἀγαθοί, 9.18.3).

When listing the troops arrayed for battle on the Persian line, Herodotus further assures us that, although there was a Phocian contingent within Mardonius’ forces, a significant Phocian faction did not medize at all:

οὐ γὰρ ὄν ἄπαντες οἱ Φωκέες ἐμηδέευν, ἀλλὰ τινες αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ Ἔλληνον ἰξον περὶ τὸν Πάρνησσόν κατελήμενον, καὶ ἐνθεύτεν ὀρμώμενοι ἔφερον τε καὶ ἤγον τὴν τε Μαρδονίου στρατιάν καὶ τούς μετ’ αὐτοῦ ἐόντας Ἔλληνον. (9.31.5)

Of course, not all of the Phocians medized, but some served the Greeks well from their stronghold on Parnassus, and attacking thence they plundered and harried Mardonius’ army and the Greeks who were with him.

Of course, Phocian resistance to medism may well have been a historical truth: Herodotus mentions that the Phocians refused to medize elsewhere in the Histories (8.30.1). But the very same passage reminds us how differently Herodotus might have portrayed their choice. Just as Herodotus narrates the Phocian decision not to join the Persians, Herodotus doubts their loyalty to Greece, claiming that they resisted medizing “for no other reason—as far as I can determine—
than their hatred for the Thessalians” (οὐκ ἐμὴδίζον, κατ’ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὤς ἐγὼ συμβαλλόμενος εὐρήσκω, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἔχθος τὸ Θεσσαλῶν, 8.30.1). This sentiment runs directly counter to that of Herodotus’ Plataea narrative, where Phocian resistance is determined and heroic.  

Just as with Athens (7.139.1), then, Herodotus’ portrayal of Phocis contradicts his authorial strategy elsewhere in the Histories.

The only other positive portrayal of a Greek state in the Plataea narrative is given to Macedon (as represented by its monarch, Alexander). Paradoxically, the very fact that Macedon is a monarchy (and not a legislative government, like the other Greek states) allows Herodotus to portray Alexander favorably. When Mardonius is searching for an emissary to convince Athens to his side, he selects Alexander not only for his longstanding friendship with Athens (πρόξεινός τε ἔη καὶ εὐεργέτης, 8.136.1), but also because of his status as a monarch, related to the Persians by marriage. This puts Alexander in an awkward position. Upon his arrival in Athens, he explains his presence and his distasteful message by attributing his words to Mardonius and compulsion (8.140.α.1-2). But when he speaks for himself, he speaks warmly and of his

50 And to that of its context, for that matter. I argue below (Ch. III, pp. 95-97) that this statement is in fact another authorial intrusion (in the Salamis epideixis), similar to those identified above; this does not, however, imply that it was not the sentiment of the authorial Herodotus who was writing the Histories down in the 420s—this intrusion reflects a genuine Herodotean attitude every bit as much as, e.g., his statement against a favorable portrayal of the Athenians does (7.139.1).

51 Badian 1994: 121-26 argues that the very foundation of this benefaction (euergesia) was Alexander’s role in arranging the Athenians’ treaty with Darius in 508/7; however, as Badian admits (1994: 123 n.16), such a relationship may equally be explained by Macedon’s longtime role in (e.g.) supplying the lumber for Athens’ ship-building. Badian rejects this argument on the grounds that this benefit is too “obvious and relevant” not to be mentioned (1994:123), but his objection may be handled by two possible explanations: [1] that for an Athenian audience the explanation would have been so obvious or taken for granted as to have become irrelevant by the mid-fifth century; or [2] that the nature of Macedon’s service to Athens was more general than one or two good deeds and would therefore be tedious to enumerate at length. Even if Macedon’s role in arranging the treaty with Darius is accepted as one of the reasons for Macedon’s friendship with Athens, Herodotus avoids mentioning it when—he certainly might have done so.

52 Note that the reference to a connection by marriage here makes no mention of the relevant context of that marriage which Herodotus has narrated earlier in the Histories (5.21.2). In fact, Herodotus’ portrayal of Alexander I and Macedon is generally positive throughout the Histories (esp. 5.17-22), although not always (e.g., 6.44.1); more important here is the later passage’s seeming unawareness of the earlier passage (and yet the earlier [5.22.1] does point forward to the later [8.137-139]).
goodwill: ostensibly, it is only fear for his ally’s wellbeing that prompts him to advise Athens to collaborate with Persia (8.140.β.3). And indeed the Spartans, whose embassy is present solely to prevent Athens from being persuaded by Alexander’s concern, recognize the validity of Alexander’s excuse, if with a characteristic laconicism: “Tyrants do tend to work with tyrants” (τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ποιητέα ἐστὶ: τύραννος γὰρ ἐὼν τυράννῳ συγκατεργάζεται, 8.142.5).

The Athenians also appear to understand Alexander’s dilemma, dismissing Alexander kindly as “our proxenos and friend” (ἐόντα πρόξεινσε καὶ φίλον, 8.143.3).

Furthermore, when it comes to the battle of Plataea, any ambiguity over Alexander’s allegiance is removed. Alexander personally appears before the Athenians and, citing allegiance to his own Greek heritage (a defense of which Herodotus has given earlier in the narrative, 8.137-39), he warns the Athenians (note: not the Spartans) about the Persian attack planned for the morning:

But when this war is over, remember to do something for my freedom; for the sake of Greece I have undertaken this perilous duty, purely out of good will, lest Mardonius’ plan allow the barbarians to take you by surprise. I am Alexander of Macedon.

Just like Harmocides the Phocian, Alexander emphatically declares his allegiance to the Greek cause, emphasizing the distinction between Greeks and Barbarians (Ἕλληνων εἰνεκα; βάρβαροι). Herodotus’ meaning is clear: although Alexander medized, he did not do so of his own free will (ἐμέο ἐλευθερώσιος πέρι), and when the time came, he risked life and limb for the sake of
Greece (Ἑλλήνων εἴνεκα). In the event, Alexander’s warning alone allows the Greeks to prepare for the Persian assault before the morning (9.46-47). Thus Macedon is defended against the charge of medism and proven to be a brave, valuable, and dedicated proponent of Hellenic freedom.

On the other hand, Herodotus derides many of the other Greeks. Thebes and the rest of Boeotia are given the opposite treatment from Phocis and Macedon: they are repeatedly denounced for their overeager, inexcusable medism. Herodotus says of the Thebans:

“Medizing wholeheartedly, they were carrying on the war eagerly” (μηδίζοντες μεγάλως, προθύμως ἔφερον τὸν πόλεμον, 9.40); he further records the Thebans inviting the Persians to a banquet (9.15.4), where he describes the familiar bonhomie between the two peoples: “He even sat them not apart, but a Persian and a Theban on each couch” (καὶ σφεων οὐ χωρίς ἐκατέρους κλίνας, ἀλλὰ Πέρσην τε καὶ Ῥηβαῖον ἐν κλίνῃ ἐκάστῃ, 9.16.1). On several occasions, the Thebans gratuitously advise the Persians, showing their eagerness to help the invader’s cause (9.2.1, 39.1, and 41.4)—and they offer good advice, at that: in two of these instances (9.2.1 and 9.41.4), their advice not to engage the Greek forces and to try to subvert the Greek nations with riches is ignored, to the immediate detriment of the Persians (i.e. their loss at Plataea); in the third, their advice is taken and results in disaster for the Greeks (9.39.2).

Nor do the Thebans lose their resolve when at last face-to-face with a Greek enemy: in the final battle, while the sympathetic Macedonians attack only half-heartedly before breaking away and the Persian second-in-command Artabazus himself refuses to engage the Greeks before

53 Badian 1994: 118 casually remarks that Alexander I “had nothing to lose by this bold manoeuvre,” Yet I think this observation is patently false: had he been caught in his treachery, he would surely have suffered some consequence, possibly even execution—the Persians were capable of punishing even their most generous benefactors (cf. 7.39.3).

54 Medism was an extremely serious accusation at the time, as I show below (Ch. IV, p. 180; cf. Thuc. 1.95.5, 3.62). This charge may even have been true, but probably would have been obviated had Herodotus expected a Theban (or Theban-allied) audience (consider his treatment of Phocis, for example).
“fleeing at a run by the quickest route” (τὴν ταχύστην ἐτρόχαξε φεύγων, 9.66.3), the Thebans and Boeotians “fought eagerly and did not conscientiously retreat, such that three hundred of their first and finest troops fell to the Athenians” (οὗτοι ἔχον προθυμίην οὐκ ὀλίγην μαχόμενοι τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθελοκακέοντες, οὕτω ὡστε τριηκόσιι ἀώτων οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ ἁριστοὶ ἐνθαῦτα ἔπεσον ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, 9.67). 55 Herodotus is so concerned with maintaining the image of the Boeotians as medizers that when Mardonius cuts down Boeotian trees for his palisade, he emphasizes that Mardonius was not acting out of any hostility toward the Boeotians, but purely to satisfy his need for lumber (9.15.2)—an act which stands in immediate contrast with the destruction in Athens where “if anything happened to be left upright, whether wall or house or temple, he knocked it all down and collected it in piles of rubble” (εἰ κοῦ τὶ ὦρθὸν ἢν τὸν τειχὸν ἢ τὸν οἰκημάτων ἢ τὸν ἱρῶν, πάντα καταβαλών καὶ συγχώσας, 9.13.2). Through the whole of the Plataea narrative, the Thebans and Boeotians are deliberate and eager enemies of Greece.

The Thessalians and Argives are also singled out for their medism—if somewhat less so than Thebes—despite a generally favorable treatment of their medism in the Thermopylae narrative (see Chapter IV, pp. 172-75). 56 Herodotus says of the Thessalians:

tοῦτοι δὲ Θεσσαλίης ἤγεομένοις οὔτε τὰ πρὸ τοῦ πεπρηγμένα μετέμελε οὐδὲν πολλῷ τε μᾶλλον επῆγον τὸν Πέρσην, καὶ συμπρόεμεψε τε Θώρης ὁ Ληρισαῖος Ἑρέρην φεύγοντα καὶ τότε ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ παρήκε Μαρδόνιον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα. (9.1.1)

Now the leaders of Thessaly did not repent of their service to Mardonius—that is, far from it! They actually urged the Persians to advance. Thorax of Larisa not only provided an escort for Xerxes as he fled Greece, but now openly encouraged Mardonius against Greece.

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55 Although it might be objected that even under these circumstances it was admirable to stand one’s ground, Herodotus elsewhere in the Histories includes ἐθελοκακέω without any pejorative sense; on the contrary, the action seems quite sensible—even admirable—under comparable circumstances (1.127.3, 5.78). Similarly, προθυμίην evokes Herodotus’ numerous assertions that the Thebans medized “eagerly” (cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: §9.67).

56 For Thessaly, see 7.172-74; for Argos, see 7.148-49.
Despite the opportunity that Xerxes’ retreat provided, the Thessalians remain steadfast and eager allies of the Persians—much like the Thebans—thus negating any excuse of ‘necessity’ that might have applied earlier. The Thessalians are still loyally at Mardonius’ side on the cusp of the battle, when he mocks the Spartans to them (9.58.1).

The Argives too are portrayed as medizers: seeking to curry favor with Mardonius, “they chose the best of their long-distance runners and sent him as a messenger to Attica because they had promised Mardonius to keep the Spartan army from marching out” (πέμπουσι κήρυκα τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων ἀνευρόντες τὸν ἄριστον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, πρότερον αὐτοὶ Μαρδονίῳ ὑποδεξάμενοι σχῆσειν τὸν Σπαρτιήτην μὴ ἔξιέναι, 9.12.1). Like the Thebans and Thessalians, then, the Argives receive no excuse for their medism (such as Phocis and Macedon receive) but are denounced as eager traitors to the Greek cause.

Herodotus is not much more favorable to those who fought on the Greek side (with the exception of Athens, of course). By far the most prominent among these is Sparta. Sparta remains a significant player throughout the battle—to portray them otherwise would surely undermine Herodotus’ historical credibility—but they are generally weak and indecisive, and their only major contribution is severely diminished by authorial speculation (9.63.2; discussed above, p. 46). This less-than-favorable portrayal is particularly significant because it should be so positive: the Spartans more than any other Greeks could be portrayed positively. They were the ones that fought the Persians, they killed Mardonius, they were generally agreed to be the best Greek fighters on land, and their regent-general, Pausanias, was officially the leader of the united Greek forces.
But Sparta is entirely overshadowed by Athens in Herodotus’ account. Indeed, the Spartans are not merely displaced; they are inconsequential, even mocked.\textsuperscript{57} Pausanias, the Spartan supreme commander, plays almost no tactical role in Herodotus’ account. The only time Pausanias is more than a figurehead, he chooses to retreat and finds himself in a war of words with an insubordinate officer of his own army, Amompharetus (9.53-55, discussed above pp. 60-61). Herodotus takes the opportunity to include Amompharetus’ characterization of Spartan actions as cowardly flight and “a disgrace upon Sparta” (φεύξεσθαι…αἰσχρόν τὴν Σπάρτην, 9.53.2). Even with Herodotus’ explanation that Amompharetus hadn’t been at the council and so didn’t understand the motivations for the retreat, this episode is highly critical not only of Pausanias’ cowardly decision to withdraw—the Athenians, like Amompharetus, “held their ground, unmoved and unafraid” (εἶχον ἀτρέμας σφέας αὐτούς, 9.54.1)—but also of Spartan discipline and Pausanias’ ability to command obedience from his own soldiers.

Furthermore, the Spartans in Herodotus’ narrative are consistently impotent and indecisive, and are twice explicitly abused by the Persian army for being so. As the Greeks array themselves for battle, Mardonius taunts the Spartans for attempting to switch places with the Athenians so as to avoid facing the Persians:

\begin{quote}
ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὑμεῖς δὴ λέγεσθε εἶναι ἄνδρες ἀριστοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆδε ἀνθρώπων ... τῶν δ’ ἄρ’ ἣν οὐδὲν ἄληθές· πρὶν γάρ ἢ συμμίζαι ἡμέας ἐς χειρὸν τε νόμον ἀρέσκεσθαι, καὶ δὴ φεύγοντας καὶ στάσιν ἐκλείποντας ὑμέας εἴδομεν, ἐν Αθηναίοις τε τὴν πρόπειραν ποιημένους αὐτοὺς τε ἀντία δούλων τῶν ἡμετέρων τασσομένους. ταῦτα ὑδαμών ἀνδρῶν ἁγαθῶν ἔργα... (9.48.1-3)
\end{quote}

O Spartans, you are supposed to be the best fighters, at least according to the people who live around here. … But now it seems that none of this is true. Before we have even joined battle, we see you’re already running away and abandoning your post; you’re hiding behind the Athenians, hoping to face our slaves instead. Brave men don’t act like this.

\textsuperscript{57} Herodotus’ negativity here is even more striking considering the preponderance of pro-Spartan anecdotes elsewhere in the \textit{Histories} (e.g., 1.56, 7.102-04, 209-232, 9.71-72, 78-79).
Whether the audience considers the Spartans to be acting correctly on the basis of the Athenian arguments at 9.27 or not, by including Mardonius’ mockery here Herodotus explicitly challenges Sparta’s traditional claim to supremacy in land warfare.\textsuperscript{58} That the source of this abuse is a Persian and that Mardonius furthermore proclaims the Spartans to be cowards who are shirking their duty—a judgement which resonates convincingly with the surrounding narrative—only serves to make the criticism all the more poignant. And although the second occasion when Mardonius taunts the Spartans (9.58) serves also to make Mardonius’ impending failure more poignant, the content of his abuse is no less valid and its validity is no less evident in its new context, directly following the scathing criticism of the Spartan decision to retreat by Amompharetus (9.53-57). The Spartans (and especially Pausanias) appear as little more than cowards; they are unheroic and unworthy of praise.

In fact, Sparta’s only major contribution, the rout of the Persian forces, nearly ends in disaster. After being attacked by the Persians as they retreat, they wait for the sacrifice to turn out propitiously while their soldiers die helplessly (9.61.3)—not until the Tegeans throw caution to the wind and attack without the Spartans do the omens turn out favorably and the Spartans enter the fray (9.62.1). This is not a simple illustration of Spartan piety. For one, though sacrifices before battle were standard, the Spartans in this case might easily have been overrun if not for Tegean intervention; the Tegeans, on the other hand, waited for no propitious sacrifices and were granted a favorable outcome nonetheless. Although the Spartans were indeed notoriously observant of omens, they were not so rigid as to ignore necessity; as Goodman and Holladay put it, “[Sparta] was devout, but not to the point of extinction.”\textsuperscript{59} On the contrary, on one occasion the Spartan general Anaxibius actually proceeded with his attack in the face of

\textsuperscript{59} Goodman and Holladay 1986: 160.
unfavorable omens (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.36). That Anaxibius’ attack was unsuccessful is irrelevant; what matters is that a Spartan commander took the liberty of ignoring the omens in the first place, and under considerably less pressure than Pausanias. Furthermore, the nature of our sources is such that generals who succeed in spite of unfavorable omens (or generals who are forced to manipulate their seers into producing favorable omens) are unlikely to be reported. Rather, this instance is the only recorded instance of any Greek general refusing to respond to immediate, mortal pressure from an enemy for the sake of omens; if omens were regularly observed so rigidly, we might expect that an army would be overrun for that reason at least once in recorded Greek history. Rather, the Spartans hesitated to join battle with the enemy and engaged only after the enemy line was broken by the Tegeans.

Indeed, modern scholarship has often suspected Pausanias of consciously manipulating the omens, but scholars generally prefer a latent strategic explanation, presumably based on Sparta’s reputation for courage. I suspect such sentiment may be misguided, since Herodotus

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60 Cf. Diod. 13.97.5-7; Goodman and Holladay 1986: 156 n.26. “If a Spartan could do this we can be sure that other Greeks did. Of course, we are unlikely to be told of this in cases where generals ignored omens and got away with it.” See also, ibid. 155-56: “It is puzzling to know if this was truly typical of Greek armies and, if so, why there is so little trace in our sources…Perhaps some generals kept tighter control over their soothsayers or were more adroit at concealing, or interpreting, the omens.” For the possibility that Plato has confused this battle with Thermopylae, see Flower and Marincola 2002: 216.

61 The nearest example of Greek troops suffering under duress for the sake of observing oracles occurs under the command of the notoriously devout Xenophon, who refuses to issue a sortie when under siege (Xen. *Anab.* 6.4.19-25). On this occasion, although the Greek forces endure much hardship, they are never in danger of being overrun.

62 Cf. Plato, *Laches* 191c. “Rather than stay and fight, [the Spartans] fled; but when the ranks of the Persians had been broken…” (οὐκ ἠθέλειν μένοντας πρὸς αὐτοὺς μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ φεύγειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλύθησαν αἱ τάξεις τῶν Περσῶν). Admittedly, this incident is listed by Socrates as an exception to the definition of courage whereby the soldier stands his ground (ἐν τῇ τάξει μένους μάχηται τοῖς πολεμίοις, *Laches* 191a); yet the negative force of their initial action (φεύγειν) and their ultimate passivity (ἐλύθησαν) remains valid. At the least, Plato’s Socrates fails to mention Herodotus’ explanation of omens, implying that a positive account needn’t include such an explanation even in antiquity. Plato’s notoriously pro-Spartan sympathies (e.g., *Cri.* 52e5; *Smp.* 209d; *Rep.* 544c, 545a, 547d-e; *Laws* 631a) suggest that he might have included the religious element had it been considered more pro-Spartan. Cf. Irwin 1992: 62: “[Plato’s] admiration for Sparta is excessive and misguided, but still highly selective and critical.” Flower and Marincola 2002: 216 suspects that Plato has confused Plataea with Thermopylae here.

63 Cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 213-14. “Some have suggested that Pausanias was consciously manipulating the omens and that his delay was actually motivated by strategic considerations, i.e. he was waiting until the enemy were fully committed to a fight at close quarters in order to neutralize the Persian superiority in cavalry and archers
has not portrayed the Spartans as ‘courageous’ for almost eighty chapters. On the contrary—presumably under Pausanias’ orders—they have many times delayed (e.g. 9.8.1), grown frightened in the face of danger (e.g. 9.46.1), and retreated (e.g. 9.53.1). As we have seen, Mardonius brazenly mocks the Spartans for their cowardice (9.48, 58); and even Sparta’s own officers are ashamed at Pausanias’ failure to engage the enemy (9.53.2). So rather than assume that Pausanias here is performing an act of unparalleled piety in the face of mortal danger and the destruction of all Greece, we may far more reasonably attribute Pausanias’ failure to engage the Persians to cowardice.

Furthermore, Herodotus’ Plataea narrative seems particularly concerned to undermine Sparta’s claim to piety. Even before the battle begins, Herodotus implies that the Spartans used their religion as an excuse to avoid danger: he associates the Spartan failure to send promised aid to Athens with their observance of the Hyacinthia—an excuse which resonates with Sparta’s previous refusals to send aid on account of the Carneia, both before Marathon (6.106.3) and Thermopylae (7.206.1). But Herodotus at the same time mentions Sparta’s efforts in building the Isthmian wall (9.7), then explicitly prefers this latter explanation for Sparta’s failure to help Athens—and in blatantly incriminating terms:

οὐδὲ ἔχει εἰπεῖν τὸ αἴτιον διὸ ὅτι ἰππικομένου μὲν Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος ἐς Ἀθήνας σπουδήν μεγάλην ἐποιήσαντο μὴ μηδίσαι Ἀθηναίους, τότε δὲ ὀρθὴν ἐποιήσαντο οὐδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ γε ἢ ὅτι ἢ Ἰσθμὸς σφι ἐπετείχιστο καὶ ἐδόκεον Ἀθηναίων ἐτὶ δέσσαται οὐδέν· ὅτε δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρος ἀπίκετο ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, οὐκ ἄπετείχιστο, ἐργάζοντο δὲ μεγάλως καταρρωδηκότες τοῦ Πέρσας. (9.8.2)

I can’t think of a reason why the Spartans tried so hard to keep the Athenians from being convinced by Alexander of Macedon’s embassy and medizing, when they didn’t seem to care at all on this occasion except that maybe the wall across the Isthmus was now complete and they thought they no longer needed the

([How and Wells 1928] II. 314; Hignett 1963: 336; Burn [1962 (1984)]: 530, 538), but religious and strategic considerations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.” See also Cartledge 2013: 116; Nyland 1992: 84 n.15; Immerwahr 1966: 295. For a rejection of the view that the Greek withdrawal was a deliberate ploy to trap the Persians into a premature advance, see Pritchett 1985: 134-37.
Athenians. Back when Alexander was in Athens, the wall hadn’t been finished yet, but their fear of the Persians sped up their work a lot.

Herodotus’ cynical explanation is then ratified by the successful argument of Chileus the Tegean, who convinces the Spartans to march by pointing out that the wall itself is useless without the Athenians (9.9.2). At the least, Sparta appears manipulative and self-interested, and it is hard to avoid the further implication that Spartan ‘piety’ is only an extension of that self-interest.

The Plataea narrative’s treatment of the two battle-prophets further complicates Sparta’s claim to piety. In the first anecdote, Tisamenus, the seer of the Spartans and—according to Herodotus—the secret to their subsequent successes in battle (9.35.2), initially refuses to serve the Spartans. Tisamenus only joins the Spartans after he has manipulated them into offering both him and his brother full citizenship, a concession which Herodotus claims is unparalleled in all of Spartan history (9.33-35). The story of the Persians’ seer, Hegesistratus, whom Herodotus praises as “the most noteworthy of the Telliads” (τῶν Τελλιαδέων ἐόντα λογιμώτατον, 9.37.1), is even more unfavorable to the Spartans: Hegesistratus cuts his heel off and tunnels through a wall to escape Spartan captivity (9.37), eventually serving the Persians “eagerly, on account of his hatred for the Spartans” (προεθυμέετο κατά τε τὸ ἔχθος τὸ Λακεδαίμονιον, 9.38.1). Thus Sparta’s association with seers in the Plataea narrative is profiteering and ill-advantaged at best: one seer agrees to join Sparta only at great cost to them, the other hates the Spartans so much that he joins with the Persians to spite them. In the end, Pausanias’ failure to act in the face of the Persian attack (9.62) simply cannot be explained solely by his concern to follow the seer’s advice.

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65 The Telliads are a famous family of Elean seers. Cf. 8.27.3-4, where the eponymous Tellias leads the Phocians in their victory over the Thessalians.
Far from the heroes of Plataea, then, the Spartans are self-interested cowards who hide behind a veneer of piety.\textsuperscript{66}

Herodotus also portrays the other Greek allies in a negative light, although they are decidedly less prominent in the narrative. In fact, the other states are so absent from the Plataea narrative that Plutarch accuses Herodotus of “malice” on that count (κακοθείας, De Mal. 872b-e). Prior to the very end of the battle, Herodotus only mentions “the majority” (οἱ πολλοί) of Greek forces when the allies disobey orders in the midst of a fearful retreat:

\begin{verbatim}
nυκτὸς δὴ γινομένης καὶ έν οὐσίς τῆς ὥρας ἐς τὴν δὴ συνέκειτο σφι ἀπαλλάσσοντα, ἐνθαῦτα άριστηνες οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπαλλάσσοντο, ἐς μὲν τὸν χώρον ἐς τὸν συνέκειτο σφι ἐν νόῳ ἐχοντες, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐκπάθησαν ἔφευγον ἄσμενοι τὴν ἱππον πρὸς τὴν Πλαταιέων πόλιν, φεύγοντες δὲ ἀπικνέονται ἐπὶ τῷ Ἦραιον. … ἀπικόμενοι δὲ ἐθέντο πρὸ τοῦ ἱροῦ τὰ ὅπλα. (9.52)
\end{verbatim}

With night coming on and the hour of departure at hand, the majority of the allies packed up and left—not to the designated rally point, though. They were happy to go anywhere if it meant escaping the Persian cavalry! Some fled to the city of Plataea, and in their flight they came to the shrine of Hera … where they set down their shields.

Then we hear nothing of any other Greek ally until the Corinthians and Megarians learn of the Persian rout and haphazardly march back toward the action to loot the Persian camp (9.69.1), and then the Megarians are slaughtered by the Thebans as a result of their disorder (9.69.2). Thus the only praiseworthy Greek state to fight against the Persians at Plataea is Athens itself. Every other ally is fearful, incompetent, and self-interested.

This analysis, then, results in an alignment which remains remarkably consistent throughout Herodotus’ Plataea narrative: on the one hand, Athens is portrayed most positively, with Phocis and Macedon also receiving unambiguous praise despite fighting for the Persians; on

\textsuperscript{66} Thucydides (1.95.1-7) offers a similar portrayal of the Spartans in their mismanagement of events during their brief hegemony following the Persian War (which is replaced by the Athenian-led Delian League). It is possible, if my dating is correct, that Herodotus’ account is taking advantage of those relatively recent events to lend credibility to his negative portrait of the Spartans.
the other hand, Thebes, Boeotia, Thessaly, Megara, and Argos are all portrayed negatively. And somewhere in the middle of the spectrum—but still certainly on the negative side—Sparta is criticized and robbed of any real praise, which it might otherwise have deserved. Assuming an Athenian audience, this historical political alignment actually allows us to infer a surprisingly specific date for the epideixis.

**Dating the Epideixis**

The first observation that can be made about this alignment is that it is clearly not that of the Archidamian War, the period to which the Histories are generally dated. A number of elements have led scholars to date the Histories to this period: most incontrovertible are the several passages referring to events that happened within the Archidamian War itself, but other factors contribute—especially Herodotus’ patent disapproval of Athenian imperialist policy and the notable tension between Athens and Sparta that is present throughout the work. Of these three elements, the first two are entirely lacking in the epideictic material; for the third, I have shown that the Plataea narrative unilaterally favors Athens over Sparta, a historiographical stance that is uncharacteristic of Herodotus’ treatment of the two Hellenic superpowers elsewhere in the

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68 References to events in the first years of the Archidamian War occur at 6.91; 6.98.2; 7.137; 7.233.4; 7.235.2; 9.73. Cobet 1971: 59-78 discusses all references to events after 479.

69 E.g., Boedeker 2001: 131-32 attributes the palpable strife between allies in the Plataea episode as evidence of a date in the 430s or 20s; she does not consider the clear delineation of allies and enemies, nor the fact that Phocis is portrayed in a very different light from its allies in the 420s. She also neglects to acknowledge that such was the atmosphere from almost the first years after the Persian Wars, and certainly by the time of the mid-5th century.

70 Herodotus does not mention any events of the 430s and 420s within the epideictic material as I’ve defined it—which his reference to Spartan invasions of Attica in 9.73 shows he might have done had he wished. Indeed, the circumstance was ripe: it is surprising that Herodotus makes no mention of Plataea’s later destruction in an account which is otherwise eager to include anything of interest to the Athenians.
Thus the material that I have identified as epideictic entirely lacks the elements that scholars have traditionally used to date the *Histories* as a whole.

But more than just the lack of these three elements suggests that the traditional dating of the 420s cannot apply to Herodotus’ narrative of Plataea: when considered in a pro-Athenian context, the unambiguously and unwaveringly favorable portrayals of Phocis and Macedon alone make this date highly improbable. Phocis in the 420s was allied with *Sparta*, and actively at war with Athens and its allies (Thuc. 2.9, 3.95, 5.32.2), and Macedon (under Perdiccas) had “from an old friend and ally been made an enemy” of the Athenians (Περδίκκας τε ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς ἔπεπολέμωτο ξύμμαχος πρότερον καὶ φίλος ὦν, Thuc. 1.57; cf. 2.80.7). If Herodotus were composing in the context of the Archidamian War, he ought to have portrayed Phocis and Macedon as he does their allies of the time—Sparta, Thebes, and Corinth. Simply, the above-observed political alignment does not match any political alignment in the 420s. However, this exact alignment does exist in the mid-fifth century, in the conflicts surrounding the Second Sacred War (449-47). Following what little is known about political alignments in the mid-fifth century, every negative portrayal of a Greek state in the Plataea narrative has as its target an Athenian enemy or rival in the early 440s and every positive portrayal is of an Athenian ally at the same time.

This remarkably circumscribed period suits the entirety of the observed political alignment quite well. Athens’ chief continental ally during this period was Phocis (portrayed positively in the Plataea narrative), whom they supported to control the Delphic Oracle. Sparta attempted to wrest Delphic control from Phocis—and actually briefly succeeded in doing so.

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71 E.g., Fornara 1971b: 90. “With his sympathy for Athens and for Sparta he could see neither side as the villain of his day; in spite of Athens’ empire he could not simply fix the blame for the present crisis on that state.” Cf. Lateiner 1989: 133-35.

72 For the following reconstruction, see Thuc. 1.112-114; cf. Hornblower 2011: 28-29, 35-37.
without directly confronting the Athenians—but upon Sparta’s departure from the area Pericles immediately invaded Boeotia and reclaimed the Delphic seat for Phocis. This claim (and the attendant Athenian intervention) was challenged by Thebes (portrayed negatively in the Plataea narrative), who led a Boeotian League against Athens’ Delian League and ultimately defeated Athenian forces under Tolmides at the Battle of Coronea in 447, effectively ending the Athenian presence in continental Greece until the Archidamian War some fifteen years later.\(^73\)

Immediately thereafter, the year 446 saw the revolts of Euboea and Megara from the Delian League and a Spartan invasion (following the conclusion of the five-years peace), at which point Athenian policy shifted toward consolidation of their sea-empire, more or less abandoning any claims to the land empire—and thus to their alliance with Phocis—which they had pursued at the beginning of the 440s.\(^74\)

Macedon too was an important ally of Athens in the mid-fifth century. Despite being largely uninvolved in the Second Sacred War (at least, to the extent of our knowledge), Macedon represented an invaluable source of lumber for ships and other resources that were vital to the maintenance of the Athenian empire.\(^75\) Macedon also provided an important foothold for Athens in the north, where Pericles sought to extend and fortify Athenian influence in the mid-fifth century.\(^76\) As to why Macedon is included in a pro-Athenian version of Plataea at all, however, the murky evidence for Macedon in this period allows only speculation. Still, the mid-fifth

\(^73\) For the “bottom-up” nature of this Boeotian cooperation in the mid-fifth century, see Mackil 2014: 51-54.

\(^74\) This shift is traced in detail by Kagan 1969: 189. See also Robinson 2011: 194: “The picture that emerges, then, is of a defensively motivated and, at best, inconsistently applied Athenian preference for democratic factions and governments, arising most often in the context of helping to keep hold of allied cities.”


\(^76\) Badian 1993: 122 calls Athens’ interests in the north in the early mid-fifth century the “northern policy of Athens’ expanding ambitions.” Consider, for example, Athens’ foundation of Drabescus (c. 465), of Brea (c. 446) and of Amphipolis (c. 437). Cf. Borza 1990: 137-38. For an in depth consideration of the testimonia surrounding Drabescus, see Badian 1993: esp. 86.
century was a fertile period for Macedon: Pindar, for example, was commissioned to write an encomium to Alexander I in the mid-fifth century (F 120) and Dio Chrysostom (Orationes 2.33) further implies that such patronage was typical of Alexander during this period. It may well be that Herodotus participated in that trend.\footnote{Cf. Borza 1990: 130-31. There is even a late tradition that Herodotus entertained the Macedonian court in the years following Alexander’s death, though it is admittedly problematic (Suda Ἔλλανικος; cf. Priestley 2014: 35).}

Regardless, Alexander’s death shortly thereafter threw Macedon into a period of turbulence and transition.\footnote{The date and circumstance of Alexander I’s death is uncertain. Hammond 1972: 2.103-104 proposes 452 as the most likely date; Borza 1990: 133-34 prefers 454 based on the accession date of 494 (1990: 103 n. 16). Regardless, Macedon (and therefore Athens’ relations with it) would have been unstable during this period and greatly in need of reinforcement.} During this period, Athens would have been keenly interested to reaffirm ties with Macedon, and also to reinforce Macedon’s claim to supremacy in the region. Indeed, the Athenian tribute lists bear witness to an increased interest in the area around the time of Alexander’s death.\footnote{Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1939: 3.308-25 (with numerical tabulation on p. 312); see also the discussion by Borza 1990: 135-36. Without a strong allied presence in the north, the region could grow markedly unstable for the Athenians. Consider (e.g.) the destruction of Drabescus, which Badian 1993: 86 dates to this precise period of instability (453/52).} But this was certainly not the case by the 430s, when Macedon was actively working against Athenian interests: possibly in the failure of the Athenian colony at Brea (c. 438) and certainly in Spartan successes in the northern theater of the Archidamian War (e.g. Thuc. 1.57.2, 2.80.7).\footnote{Kagan 1969: 182-90; Borza 1990: 137; Badian 1993: 171.} For an Athenian audience, Herodotus’ portrayal of Alexander I in this narrative suits the Macedonian instability that was characteristic of the early 440s far better than it does Macedon’s well-attested hostility toward Athens in the 430s and 420s.

Herodotus’ portrayal of Sparta too is appropriate. Assuming an Athenian audience, it is surprising that Athens and Sparta are not in fact opposed to each other in this narrative. If anything, Athens is a loyal and helpful ally of Sparta in the name of Greece—in spite of Spartan disregard for their Athenian ally’s plight. Certainly some degree of rivalry between the two
states is implied by Herodotus’ narrative, but if we consider the entire scope of the fifth century, it is clear that there were few periods after the Persian Wars when the Athenians were not openly opposed to Sparta—or at least highly belligerent in their attitude. Even immediately after the Persian War, tensions between Athens and Sparta over how to administer the war in Ionia produced significant strife between the two states (e.g., Thuc. 1.90-92); by the mid-460s, Sparta so distrusted Athens that she sent home the Athenian hoplites whom Cimon had led out to assist Sparta in the Helot Revolt. 81 This dismissal sorely offended the Athenians, and after ostracizing Cimon (who generally sympathized with Sparta) Athens thenceforth embraced an anti-Spartan policy.

As I have suggested, though, the portrayal of Sparta in Herodotus’ Plataea narrative is not in fact hostile to Sparta. Herodotus’ version of the Spartans’ role in the battle is unimpressive and faultfinding to be sure, but the significance of Sparta’s contribution at Plataea is still acknowledged, and Herodotus is never as openly critical of Sparta as of the other Greeks. This attitude reflects an atmosphere of rivalry, no doubt, but not the intractable open hostility of the Archidamian War—nor, for that matter, does it reflect the context of the First Peloponnesian War (c. 460-451). 82 There was a period following the First Peloponnesian War, however, which did in fact reflect this slightly-less-than-hostile rivalry: the period of the five-year peace contracted between Athens and Sparta in 451, a peace which both Sparta and Athens kept with remarkable diligence—so much so that the Spartans delayed their invasion of Attica into the

82 For the date of the truce negotiated by Cimon, see Badian 1993: 18. Corinth was an ally of Sparta during this war and conceived their “deadly hatred against Athens” during this period (τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος ἦρξατο πρῶτον ἐς Ἀθηναίους, Thuc. 1.103.4).
summer of 446 (thus missing the opportunity provided by the revolts of Euboea and Megara), presumably in order to observe the midsummer implementation of the truce in 451.  

The period following 451 saw Cimon’s return from ostracism and likely marked a corresponding resurgence of his Spartan-cooperative policy. According to Ernst Badian’s reconstruction of events, even after Cimon’s death in 450/49, Pericles continued to pursue “his own version of a Cimonian policy,” replacing his “activist foreign policy” with a program of Athenian imperialism and consolidation of Athenian power. The only conflict between Sparta and Athens between the years of 451 and 446 was the “cold” Second Sacred War, in which Athens supported Phocis whereas Sparta backed Thebes and Delphi—but the two superpowers never faced each other directly, at least not in our historical records.

This historical context reflects the Plataea narrative’s portrayal of Sparta and Athens more closely than the Archidamian War does, even though scholars have often found evidence for the latter. For example, Michael Flower has argued that the Spartans’ request for Athenian aid at 9.60 is Herodotus’ own plea to Athens and Sparta to reconcile and cooperate as leaders of Greece: “For now, it is clear what we must do: defend each other to the best of our ability” (νῦν ων δέδοκται το ένθετεν το ιοπτέον ήμιν, ἀμυνομένους γαρ τη δυνάμεθα άριστα περιστέλλειν ἄλληλους, 9.60.2). But this plea better suits the tumultuous political climate of the mid-fifth century—when reconciliation was still conceivable and (under the waning influence of Cimon) Pericles had not yet fully re-committed to his anti-Spartan policy—than that of the early 420s,

83 Badian 1993: 59. See also Hornblower 1991: §1.114.
87 Flower 2000: 78-80. See also Boedeker 2001: 131-32; Flower and Marincola 2002: 211. More recently, see Marincola (forthcoming): 20, who doubts the importance of the political context altogether in favor of a literary explanation.
when Sparta and Athens were already openly and intractably at war. So, assuming an Athenian audience (as demonstrated above), Herodotus’ portrayal of Sparta in the Plataea narrative best reflects the period of 451-446—the period in which Athens’ and Sparta’s rivalry had cooled to an uneasy truce between two superpowers hoping for a lasting peace.

Herodotus’ treatments of a few less-prominent states, however, are not as easily understood in this context. First, the Thessalians had recently allied themselves with Athens (461/60), but soon thereafter they betrayed that alliance in favor of Sparta at the Battle of Tanagra (457), and so had certainly earned Athenian disfavor. Second, Herodotus’ positive portrayal of Tegea, Sparta’s chief Peloponnesian ally, has already been discussed at length (see above, p. 51): suffice it to say that Tegea allows Herodotus to belittle Sparta through the mouths of their own ally. Third, as illustrated above, Argos is cited in the Plataea narrative for its medism—medism which was perhaps not as shameless as Thebes’, but plainly medism nonetheless (9.12.1). This negative portrayal is surprising in an account composed for a mid-century Athenian audience because Argos was traditionally an enemy of Sparta and had been allied with Athens since the 460s. However, Thucydides (5.14.4) confirms that Argos entered a thirty-years peace with Sparta in 452/1; in so doing Argos would have terminated their alliance with Athens and perhaps even contributed to Athens making their own truce with Sparta one year later. Considering how little we truly know about this period, the Plataea narrative’s somewhat-negative portrayal of Argos seems sufficiently compatible with Argos’ vacillating allegiance to Athens during the mid-fifth century.

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88 Thuc. 1.107.7; Diod. 11.80.2. Cf. Badian 1993: 16-17, 102 n. 50.
90 This date is well defended by Kagan 1969: 105.
91 Besides, as Lavelle 1986: 150 points out, “The historian [Herodotus] was not at all well-disposed toward the Argives.” Perhaps this prejudice had formed already in the 440s.
Finally, Megara, who has the unfortunate distinction in the Plataea narrative of performing even worse than Corinth (9.69.2), was in fact part of the Delian league in the mid-fifth century. Megara’s treatment is hardly the worst given to the Greek states in the Plataea narrative, but it is certainly not very favorable. Still, the Plataea narrative itself indicates that the relationship between Athens and Megara was more complicated: for example, Athens’ heroic defense of the Megarians earlier in the narrative—“When the others refused, the Athenians stepped up” (οὐ βουλομένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίοι ύπεδέξαντο, 9.21.3)—implies that the Athenians at least still saw themselves as benefactors of Megara. However, all was not well with Athens and Megara’s relationship. In 446, after Athens’ defeat at the hands of the Boeotian League at Coronea (447), Megara promptly revolted from the Delian League (in apparent collusion with Sparta, who invaded Attica shortly thereafter, and Euboea, who also revolted in 446 but had no historical role at Plataea).

However, the Athenian defeat at Coronea also marked the end of the Sacred War and thus Athens’ loss of interest in Phocis and Boeotia. If the explanation for Herodotus’ positive portrayal of Phocis is accepted, 446 is one year later than the latest likely dating for the rest of the epideictic material. But we may easily surmise that a reciprocated hostility between Megara and Athens existed even before Megara’s revolt from the Delian League. For example, Thucydides records that Athenian enemies had been congregating in Megara before the revolt

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92 Thuc. 103.4; Diod. 11.79. Cf. Hornblower 2011: 25-32. Herodotus’ negative treatment of the Corinthians, who “conceived a deadly hatred against Athens” in the early mid-fifth century (καὶ Κορινθίοις μὲν οὐχ ἦκε στὰ ἀπὸ τοῦτο τὸ σφοδρὸν μίσος ἔρχετο πρὸ τοῦ ἐς Ἀθηναίους γενέσθαι, Thuc. 1.103.4), is unproblematic for either historical context, inasmuch as this hatred is maintained down to the beginning of the Archidamian War and beyond (Thuc. 1.68-71; this picture is complicated somewhat by the Corinthian speech before the Athenian assembly [Thuc. 1.40-42], but the Corinthians’ rhetoric here may easily be explained as strategically targeted to convince the Athenians). For the dating, see Badian 1991: 101 n.46.

93 Note that this rhetorical stance fits Athens’ ideologically-charged characterization of their imperial ambitions, discussed above p. 57 n.36.
Pericles moved so rapidly to suppress both revolts in 446 that such insurrection must not have been entirely unexpected.94

Finally, the political atmosphere in Athens during this period, beginning to be dominated by the ambitious Pericles, is similarly reflected in the Plataea narrative. Cimon had instituted a number of propagandistic building programs before his ostracism in the 460s; following Cimon’s return from exile and subsequent death in 450/49, Pericles—a long-time rival of Cimon’s— instituted his own propaganda campaign. Pericles’ program, remarkable for its grandeur and scope, initiated such projects as the Parthenon (c. 447) and the Odeon (c. 446); this latter was part of a larger program that featured the performing arts, the scope of which was far-ranging and highly propagandistic.95 And Athens certainly had need of such propaganda if her control of the Delian League was going to be preserved. Following the Peace of Callias in 449,96 Athens’ allies increasingly began to question the importance (and nature) of the anti-Persian alliance. Pericles would have wanted to remind everyone of Athens’ role as benefactor and guardian in the Persian Wars and further to assert how much Athens deserved its place of honor as the leaders of the Hellenic alliance represented by the Delian League. Herodotus’ narrative of Plataea would have done just that.97

But Herodotus’ narrative was more than a simple reminder of Athenian services to the Greeks during the Persian Wars: in this telling of Plataea, Sparta—Athens’ only viable

94 Hornblower 1991: 185. Although Thucydides does not narrate Athens’ invasion of the Megarid in detail, inscriptional evidence confirms Pericles’ rapid response (ML 51 = Fornara 101; see also Diod. 12.5.2).
96 I am persuaded by the arguments of Badia 1993: 1-72 on the historicity of this Peace.
97 Admittedly, this ideological strategy may have applied as late as the Archidamian War as well: the narrative of Thucydides suggests that Athenians were still using the Persian Wars to prove this point in 431 (e.g., Thuc. 1.73-75; cf. Hunt 2010: 192-97). It is nonetheless relevant that Pericles initiated this strategy in the 440s.
competition for the role of Greek hegemon—is not only self-serving and incompetent, but also cowardly and ultimately incapable of keeping the unified Greeks together. This notion of a unified Greece (and Athens’ commitment to support it) was particularly important to Pericles during the mid-fifth century, as evidenced by his attempt at convening a Panhellenic embassy to discuss a project of an inter-Hellenic peace and to set Athens up as the leader of the movement (Plut. Per. 17.1; c. 449).98 Sparta’s rejection of Pericles’ invitation single-handedly frustrated Pericles’ efforts and simultaneously added fuel to Pericles’ ideological fire—Herodotus’ portrayal of Sparta as self-interested and lacking the qualifications to lead Greece would have resonated powerfully with Sparta’s concurrent refusal to cooperate. Taking advantage of this state of affairs, Pericles launched his first Panhellenic propaganda campaign, portraying Athens as at the forefront of a unified Greece. What could have suited his purposes better than a highly tendentious narrative, tailored to Athenian interests, that could be performed as part of Pericles’ arts-initiative in Athens and maybe even around the Aegean?99 Thus the historical context of the Second Sacred War and of the early stages of Periclean imperialism suits both the larger themes and the smaller details of the Plataea narrative far better than does that of the Archidamian War.

**Conclusion**

Following this alignment and my analysis of the implied political context, then, I would conclude that the Plataea *epideixis* as I have identified it best suits an Athenian audience of the early 440s: after Sparta and Athens had contracted an uneasy five-years peace; before Athens’

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98 See Stadler 1989: 201-204.
99 Herodotus’ apparent authorial strategy in the Plataea narrative aligns so well with Periclean policy in the early 440s, in fact, that we might even suspect a Periclean commission of Herodotus—or at least some expectation of the reward attested by Plutarch De. Mal. 862b. If the impetus for Herodotus’ project did in fact come from Pericles, it may be pointed out that Herodotus’ prose version of Plataea would have represented a remarkable democratic counterpoint to the traditional aristocratic verse presentations of history (e.g., Simonides’ own version of Plataea). Cf. Loraux 1981 (2006): 88. See also Kowerski 2005: 61, 95 on Pausanias’ possible role in commissioning the Plataea Elegy.
loss of interest in Phocis and Boeotia following the Battle of Coronea; and concurrent with Pericles’ early efforts to establish the Athenian right to hegemony over the Delian League by citing Athens’ past services to the Greek cause, especially in the Persian War. Considering the highly defensible scholarly consensus that dates the rest of the *Histories* to the early years of the Archidamian War, the best available explanation for the apparent performance context of the Plataea narrative is its derivation from a separate, original composition intended for an earlier audience—an *epideixis* which Herodotus then included in his generally-unified, *apodeictic* exposition of *historiē*. 
Herodotus’ narrative of the Battle of Salamis also shows broad favoritism toward Athens. The main *polis* protagonist is Athens; the main individual protagonist (an element which Plataea mostly lacks) is an Athenian—one of Athens’ most famous citizens, Themistocles—and the narrative again manifests Athenian ideology and interests. In fact, for almost ninety chapters, Athens is practically the *only* Greek state that performs significant deeds or receives praise from Herodotus. The only other positive portrayals of Greek states are all of Athenian allies in the mid-450s—some are familiar from the Plataea narrative (e.g., Phocis and Macedon) while others appear only in the Salamis narrative (e.g., Aegina, Plataea, and Thespiae)—and once more, Athenian enemies from that period receive negative treatment (e.g., Sparta, Corinth, and Thessaly). Following the example set by Plataea, then, I propose a similar mid-fifth century Athenian audience for the Salamis narrative. On the other hand, a Panhellenic readership would have found Herodotus’ version of Salamis unpalatable, especially after at least two decades of aggressive Athenian foreign policy in her administration of the Delian League (if we follow the generally assumed publication date in the 420s).

Inasmuch as Athens’ significant contribution to the naval battle at Salamis was a generally recognized historical fact, of course, it is more difficult to demonstrate conclusively that this specific narrative was written with an Athenian audience in mind. Yet other elements
imply that Herodotus’ audience for this portion of the Histories was indeed Athenian. For one, the interests of the passage are again aligned with those of Athens: rhetorical speeches are frequent and well-developed, there is much discussion of naval strategy and achievements, the topography of Athens and of her allies—Phocis in particular—features conspicuously throughout the narrative (esp. 8.31-34; 49-55), and major tenets of Athenian ideology (especially their reliance on the ideological nexus of ships, walls, and men)\(^1\) are promoted widely. It may also be significant that oracles and other types of religion are more prominent here than in other parts of the Histories:\(^2\) the very same Sacred War that saw Phocis and Athens allied represented an Athenian attempt to replace the Delphians, who had recently been given charge of the oracle by Spartan military action, by returning control of the oracle to Phocis.\(^3\) Furthermore, during the same period Athens was embarked upon a propaganda campaign coopting the political-religious power instantiated in Delphi and other oracles.\(^4\) Once again, then, Herodotus’ narrative of Salamis, just like his Plataea narrative, is suited to an Athenian audience of the mid-fifth century.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Cf. Dougherty 2014.

\(^2\) Arguably, an interest in oracles could apply equally to all Greece, both geographic and temporal, but two elements suggest that the Salamis narrative’s specific treatment of oracular religion most suits an Athenian audience in the 440s: [1] all oracles either explicitly concern Athens or provide information directly relevant to Athenian interests and [2] Athenian policy in the 440s was particularly concerned with this type of religion. See below, pp. 130-33.

\(^3\) Bowden 2005: 137 points out that religious arguments would have been critical to Athens’ promotion of their policy in the Sacred War (c.449) and so would have been well recognized among the Athenian populace.


\(^5\) While we may detect a similar compositional context for both of these epideictic narratives with some certainty, it is more difficult to determine which narrative came first. Neither narrative refers to the other or builds on the other in any significant or discernible way. Yet the two are clearly related, sharing not only a common audience but also several themes, topics, and concerns. We may also consider that the Salamis epideixis has an obvious function for an Athenian audience whereas the choice to compose a Plataea epideixis favoring Athens is surprising to say the least—as I have shown in Chapter II, the role of the Athenians in this mostly Spartan victory is minimized or even omitted in most other historians of the classical period. By this standard, then, it stands to reason that the success of the Salamis narrative inspired a second, more polemical piece challenging the Spartan claim to the Battle of Plataea. But such a hypothesis is pure speculation; without clear references between the two narratives, the primacy of one or the other is ultimately unprovable.
Setting Limits (8.1-89)

Using the same criteria as with the Plataea narrative (see Ch. II, pp. 41-42), we may delineate the beginning and ending of the epideictic material associated with Herodotus’ Salamis narrative. The more secure limit—the beginning—can be found at 8.1, which inaugurates the story of Artemisium and thereby directly foregrounds the battle of Salamis. In fact, this chapter begins with perhaps the single roughest transition in the Histories. From an anecdotal story about the Spartan queen, Gorgo, and her clever uncovering of a secret warning about the Persian invasion sent by Demaratus (the former king of Sparta who has taken refuge with the Persians in exile; 7.239.4), Herodotus suddenly begins a catalog of Greek ships gathered at Artemisium: “The following Greeks made up the fleet …” (οἱ δὲ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τὸν ναυτικὸν στρατὸν ταχθὲντες ἦσαν οἶδε, 8.1.1). The transition is smoothed only by a μὲν … δέ clause (ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτω λέγεται γενέσθαι, 7.239.4) and does in fact feature the noted transition-marker: μὲν δὴ coupled with a conclusion that points backward in the narrative without any relevance to what follows (see Introduction, pp. 30-31). 6

The narrative following 8.1 has almost no relevance to the Spartan material that preceded it aside from its inclusion of the minor Spartan contribution to the catalog of Greek forces and a brief admission that a Spartan was in fact leading the forces—and this admission is immediately undercut by the explanation that Athens had yielded this position “because they were greatly concerned for the survival of Greece and knew that if they quarreled over leadership, Greece would be destroyed” (μέγα τε ποιεύμενοι περιεῖναι τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ γνόντες, εἰ στασιάσουσι περὶ τῆς ἠγεμονίης, ὡς ἀπολέσσαί ἡ Ἑλλάς, 8.3.1). Herodotus then confirms Athenian thinking with a statement that emphasizes the importance of the Athenian decision to defer—“Their assessment

6 Munson 2001: 25 calls such sentences “summary conclusions,” but this particular transition is so blunt that it cannot be explained by Herodotus’ attention to the “Rhetorical value of introductions and conclusions” that Munson considers (2001: 27-32).
was right on, for internal strife is worse than being unified in war by as much as war is worse than peace” (ὀρθὰ νοεῖντες: στάσις γὰρ ἐμφύλως πολέμου ὁμοφρονέοντος τοσοῦτον κάκιόν ἐστι ὅσω πόλεμος εἰρήνης, 8.3.1). He also points out that the Greeks eventually did give control to Athenians as a result of Pausanias’ mismanagement of and hybris against other Greeks during the continued Hellenic effort against the Persians (8.3.2). This latter assertion further evokes the precise function that I have argued these epideixeis serve: to validate and justify the ongoing Athenian claim to hegemony in (and after) the war against the Persians. Thus Herodotus moves from a pro-Spartan anecdote—with almost no relevance to the conflict at hand—into a polemical pro-Athenian defense of their benevolent choice not to assume command over the Greeks at Artemisium.

Only two elements make these three chapters less than ideal as a starting point for the epideictic material. The first is the seemingly anti-Athenian statement that, “should Sparta not lead them, the allies refused to follow Athenian leadership; they would rather abandon the upcoming expedition entirely” (οἱ γὰρ σύμμαχοι οὐκ ἔφασαν, ἤν μὴ ὁ Λάκων ἡγεμονεύῃ, Ἀθηναῖοι ἐψεσθαι ἡγεμόνεισι, ἀλλὰ λύσειν τὸ μέλλον ἐσεσθαι στράτευμα, 8.2.2). As I have shown above, however, this statement serves as an ideal springboard both to argue that Sparta was poorly suited to such a command and to explain the reality that a Spartan was in fact commanding the navy (and of course, even this authority is preempted by Themistocles in the narrative immediately following, 8.5). Furthermore, the “allies” who rejected Athenian command would hardly have been expected to act otherwise from a mid-fifth century

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7 Note how this sentiment tallies with that of 9.60.2 (see Ch. II, pp. 81-82).
8 Cf. Munson 2001: 214-17. Badian 1993: 132 states: “It is clear that the actual Athenian tradition, on which his interpretation undoubtedly depends, made no effort to deny that it was Athenian intrigue that had led to the allies’ “voluntary” submission to Athens and that Pausanias’ behavior was used as a convenient pretext. In Herodotus’ day the Athenians were probably rather proud of it.”
perspective: the Corinthians and the Spartans especially were on bad terms with the Athenians throughout the fifth century and it is unlikely that their opinion mattered much to an Athenian audience.⁹ Indeed, in 449, Pericles’ invitation of Sparta to a Panhellenic summit met with much the same treatment. In this historical context, that Sparta and the other allies gathered at Salamis refused Athenian leadership betrays those states’ unwillingness to set aside their differences for the sake of the Greece, a policy which Athens—both in the narrative and in the early 440s—explicitly and proudly champions.

The second problematic passage, however, includes a plain reference to the Sicilian embassy which is narrated earlier in the Histories at 7.157-62: “Even before the embassy to Sicily…” (πρὶν ἦ καὶ ἐς Σικελίην πέμπειν ἐπὶ συμμαχίην, 8.3.1). Inasmuch as it refers to material outside the epideixis, this phrase does not conform to the criteria for identifying epideictic material. Yet this statement matches the neatly parenthetical form of the other authorial intrusions and is by no means necessary for the sense of the passage. Still, it is not noticeably dissonant with its context like the other intrusions, nor does it serve to avoid repetition. We might proceed, then, by ignoring the first three chapters and beginning the epideictic material at 8.4—which is in fact a serviceable starting point—but to do so would ignore the clear suitability of the first three chapters to the epideictic program; furthermore, the contrast between 8.3 and 8.4 pales in comparison to the remarkably jarring transition between 7.239 and 8.1. On balance, the first chapter of Book Eight is the better place to begin the epideictic material.

If we consider the context of this insertion, then, we may observe first that this statement has the plain markings of an afterthought: it does not begin the sentence, but rather follows after the phrase, “For there had been discussion from the beginning…” (ἐγένετο γὰρ κατ’ ἀρχὰς λόγος,

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⁹ For Corinth, see Thuc. 1.103-106: “[Athens’ occupation of Megara in c.459] was the principle cause of the Corinthians conceiving such a deadly hatred against Athens” (καὶ Κορινθίοις μὴν οὐχ ἡκοῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦτο τὸ σφοδρὸν μίσος ἠρξατο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους γενέσθαι, 1.103.4); cf. Badian 1991: 101 n.46. For Sparta, see Ch. II, 79-82.
8.3.1) and it precedes the narrative of the Athenians being denied leadership over the fleet. Furthermore, the narrative that follows this parenthetical statement provides our best evidence that the aside is compositionally out of place: the story here directly contradicts the military and political circumstance that is evoked by the cross-reference. There, the Athenians are in fact in command of the fleet (7.161.2); here they are not. The insertion here, then, would represent an (unsuccessful) attempt to bridge that gap—an afterthought meant to make the epideictic material more compatible with the framing narrative. The appropriate beginning of the epideictic material, then, should be identified as 8.1, with this small phrase in 8.3.1 being identified as a ‘marginal’ intrusion.

The end of the epideictic material is less plain. Just as with the beginning, there is a simple ending that would be generally uncontroversial: 8.89 ends with the trophē of the Persian troops, the deaths of several Persian nobility, and the rout and destruction of the Persian fleet. This chapter also precedes four chapters which are blatantly favorable to the Aeginetans, often at the expense of the Athenians: the Aeginetans rescue a sinking Athenian ship (8.90.2), they destroy ships that get away from the Athenians (8.91), they taunt Themistocles with their manifest non-medism (8.92.2), and they are finally recognized for outmatching the Athenians in valor (8.93.1). After almost ninety chapters of narrative containing absolutely nothing that would be objectionable to an Athenian audience (or even any significant non-Athenian as protagonist), suddenly Herodotus seems to have switched his sympathy to Aegina, giving only pro-Aeginetan information and demoting Athens to a marginal role. Considering the sudden and pronounced nature of this shift, then, we may safely mark the end of 8.89 as an obvious shift away from the epideictic material.

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10 Presumably in response to Athens’ historic claims that Aegina had medized (6.49.2); cf. Irwin 2010a: 412-14.
Yet, as with the beginning of the epideictic material, there are three further chapters which would also provide a fitting conclusion. However, these three chapters (8.94-96) not only include a pro-Corinthian statement which contradicts our epideictic criteria (8.94.4) but also follow after the pro-Aeginetan passage outlined above and thus are not directly attached to the epideictic material. Still, in these three chapters, we may observe an apparent reprise of the epideictic material’s major themes: a pro-Athenian and anti-Corinthian story (8.94.1-3), an Athenian hoplite attack—also recorded by Aeschylus (Persae, 447-64)—under the leadership of the “best man” of the Athenians, Aristides (ἀνδρὸς ἀρίστου, 8.95), and the fulfilment of an Athenian oracle involving Athenian women and the Athenian shoreline (8.96). This last passage is furthermore an apt conclusion: the quotation of this oracle, marked as the final oracle of the narrative by a reference to other oracles that were included in the epideictic material (ὦστε ὕποπεπλήσθαι τὸν χρησμὸν τὸν τε ἄλλον πάντα τὸν περὶ τῆς ναυμαχίης ταύτης εἰρημένον Βάκιδι καὶ Μουσαίῳ, 8.96.2), is followed by a recognition of Xerxes’ departure: “But this was to happen after the king had been driven back” (τοῦτο δὲ ἐμελλε ἀπελάσαντος βασιλέως ἐσεθαί, 8.96.2). Following this chapter the break is clean: there are no more mentions of Athens or Themistocles (or Aegina, for that matter) for another twelve chapters. And when the former protagonists do finally return to the narrative, the previously inept Eurybiades corrects the previously heroic Themistocles’ blunder (8.108.3), Themistocles is accused of working to curry favor with Xerxes (8.109.5), and Athens votes to affirm Themistocles in his imperialistic, Persian-favorable policy, attacking Greek nations for profit rather than pursuing the Persian retreat (8.110.1). We may be sure, then, that no more epideictic material follows 8.96 until the beginning of the Plataea narrative at 8.133.
Yet the question of whether we ought to consider 8.94-96 epideictic in spite of the intervening Aeginetan material remains unanswered—perhaps even unanswerable. If we would mark the limits of the material which most clearly suits the epideictic narrative strategy, then, our limits will be 8.1-96 with 8.90-93 marked as intrusive Aeginetan material and 8.94.4 marked as a second ‘marginal’ intrusion; if we prefer more conservative limits, we may define the Salamis epideictic material as ending with 8.89. To avoid growing overly speculative, then, in this chapter I will conform to these latter conservative limits and mark any evidence from the less secure chapters as such whenever they do in fact enter the investigation.11

Within these limits there are a number of interesting passages that deserve consideration, but only one that will be marked as a ‘problematizing’ intrusion: 8.30.1-2. That passage, like 9.64.2, plainly clashes with the narrative on every level, serves an obvious corrective function, and is cleanly limited to a brief and parenthetical inclusion. At 8.27, Herodotus begins a seven-chapter narrative of Xerxes’ invasion of Phocis. In this narrative, Phocis is consistently portrayed very positively: a triumphant rival of Thessaly (8.27-28), a champion of the Greek cause (8.30.2), and a tragic stalwart in the face of Persian aggression (8.32-33). In the midst of this consistently and emphatically pro-Phocian passage, Herodotus includes a statement that calls into question the entire surrounding narrative: “The Phocians alone of the men in this region refused to medize, and for no other reason—as far as I can determine—than their hatred for the Thessalians” (οἱ γὰρ Φωκέες μοῦνοι τῶν ταύτη ἄνθρωπων οὐκ ἐμῆδιζον, κατ᾽ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὡς ἐγὼ συμβαλλόμενος εὐρίσκω, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἔχθος τὸ Θεσσαλῶ, 8.30.1). Herodotus continues: “Had the Thessalians supported the Greeks, I expect the Phocians would have medized” (εἰ δὲ Θεσσαλοὶ τὰ Ἑλλήνων ηῦξον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκέειν, ἐμῆδιζον ἄν οἱ Φωκέες, 8.30.2). These two short

11 For another section of the Histories possibly related to this epideictic material (7.139.2-144), see Appendix [a].
sentences plainly undercut any pro-Phocian reading that this section might otherwise have justified, prompting skepticism of the entire passage. If this brief aside were originally part of the *epideixis*, it would denote an audience that was significantly different from that of the Plataea narrative, where the Phocians are consistently portrayed positively and even heroically.

But this passage is demonstrably out of place—on several levels—when considered against the seven chapters of narrative immediately surrounding it. First, Herodotus attributes the Phocians’ choice to their hatred of the Thessalians, but it seems rather that the Thessalians are consistently the resentful aggressor—not just here (8.27.1, 8.28), but in the Plataea narrative (9.17.4) and even in the Thermopylæ narrative (7.176.4). The epideictic Phocians, rather than exhibiting an implacable hatred for the Thessalians, only ever appear as steadfast defenders of their own lands; the implacable hatred on all occasions is Thessalian, not Phocian. Presumably we might infer that the hatred Thessaly felt for the Phocians was reciprocated, but that reading is not in any way implied (except by the authorial intrusion, of course). Ultimately, Herodotus’ anecdote about Thessalian aggression provides very poor evidence for his claim that the Phocians hated the Thessalians so overwhelmingly that they chose to side with Greece and suffer the destruction of the Persian advance.

Just as these two sentences undercut the pro-Phocian tone of the surrounding seven chapters, the narrative immediately thereafter undercuts Herodotus’ argument that the Phocians refused to medize purely out of hatred for the Thessalians. Simply, the result of their refusal to medize is profoundly ruinous. The Phocian country is devastated (οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι τὴν χώρην πᾶσαν ἐπέδραμον τὴν Φωκίδα, 8.32.2); twelve significant Phocian cities are burned (Herodotus lists them all by name: κατὰ μὲν ἔκαυσαν Δρυμὸν πόλιν, κατὰ δὲ Χαράδραν καὶ Ὄρωχον καὶ Τεθρώνιον καὶ Αμφίκαιαν καὶ Νέωνα καὶ Πεδιέας καὶ Τριτέας καὶ Ἐλάτειαν καὶ Ἡμίπόλιν καὶ
Παραποταμίους καὶ Ἀβας, 8.33); their most holy sanctuary is plundered and set on fire (καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἱρὸν συλήσαντες ἐνέπρησαν, 8.33); and their wives are raped to death (γυναικῶς τινας διέφθειραν μισγόμενοι ὑπὸ πλήθεος, 8.33). By refusing to medize, the Phocians brought upon themselves a destruction that was likely far worse than they would have suffered even at the hands of the Thessalians. There is no narrative of resistance; surely this result was expected. Are we to believe that the Phocians chose devastation, death, and widespread ruin rather than fight on the same side as the Thessalians—a role which they in fact eventually assume at the Battle of Plataea (9.17.1)? And this when Herodotus never once (outside of this sentence) asserts Phocian hatred for Thessaly? Rather, if we overlook this brief interjection, Herodotus has provided a perfectly sufficient reason for the Phocian choice to suffer in the narrative itself: “they were simply unwilling to betray Greece” (ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔσεσθαι ἐκόντες εἶναι προδόται τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 8.30.2). Phocis, like Athens, suffers the slaughter of its people and the devastation of its countryside, homes, and temples for one preeminent reason: the good of all Greece.

This more likely conclusion directly contradicts Herodotus’ earlier statement that Phocis resisted medism only for the sake of its hatred of Thessaly. Perhaps, following much the same impulse that prompted him to include a disclaimer before the pro-Athenian passage at 7.139.1, Herodotus chose to include this aside because he felt the narrative had grown too pro-Phocian and thus unfavorable to any possible readers who would resent such a bias. Perhaps Herodotus merely sought to engage the audience further by complicating motivations that are otherwise fairly straightforward and heroic. Or maybe he even sought to throw a later reader off the epideictic scent, as it were, cultivating the appearance of objectivity by undercutting an overtly pro-Phocian section. Whatever his motivation, this interjection plainly does not suit its context:

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the theory that Phocis medized only out of hatred for the Thessalians is poorly supported by the preceding narrative and completely overthrown by the narrative that follows. We may mark this short aside, then, as a ‘problematizing’ intrusion much like 9.64.1: a corrective impulse that seeks to complicate a narrative which is otherwise perfectly suited to an Athenian audience of the mid-fifth century.

Beyond this short passage, the entire Salamis narrative is perfectly compatible with an epideictic performance to Athenians in the early-440s—just like the Plataea narrative. Still, a number of other passages deserve consideration. Whether because of ambiguity or because of differing assumptions about the *Histories*’ compositional context, these passages have received little scholarly notice, and that often contradictory. For example, at 8.44.2, Herodotus marks the Athenians as descendants of the Pelasgians. Two lines of scholarship have used this passage to argue *against* an Athenian audience, but from entirely opposite angles.\(^\text{13}\) Rosalind Thomas, citing Herodotus’ much earlier remark that the Pelasgians originally spoke a non-Greek language (1.57.2-3), concludes that Herodotus means to argue that “the Athenians were originally Pelasgians but joined the Greeks later and changed their language appropriately.”\(^\text{14}\) Thomas argues that such an observation contradicts the Athenian belief that they were autochthonous and thus would not have been popular with an Athenian audience.\(^\text{15}\) Yet the Pelasgian heritage of the Athenians seems to have been uncontroversial for fifth century Athenian audiences, finding expression not only in Aristophanes (*Birds* 1355) and Thucydides (1.2-3), but also in the mid-fifth century plays of Aeschylus (e.g., *Suppl.* 250-70).

\(^{13}\) Shapiro 1998: 131 interprets this passage as a claim to Athenian autochthony.


\(^{15}\) Thomas 2000: 122.
On the other hand, Angus Bowie in his commentary goes so far as to argue that their Pelasgian heritage was so well-known to Athenians that “they would not have needed to be given the information in § 2.”16 Of course, this argument raises a new and entirely different set of issues with ascribing this passage to an epideictic context suited to an Athenian audience. Against Bowie, then, we may point out that two of the three sources cited above—Aristophanes and Aeschylus—were certainly intended for Athenian audiences, so that it seems unfounded to argue that Athenians had no interest in hearing of their Pelasgian heritage. If a poet composed a verse for Charlemagne evoking his Roman ancestry, would the Holy Roman Emperor be bored or pleased? Rather, Athens in this time period was increasingly interested in their heritage. According to Alan Shapiro, it was precisely “the needs of the democracy and the growing importance of Athens in the Delian League” which prompted the Athenian belief in their autochthonous heritage to solidify in the first place.17 Believing that they were both autochthonous and descended from the Pelasgians, mid-fifth century Athens developed a renewed pride in their heritage. Not only would Herodotus’ mention of the Pelasgians be unobjectionable to the Athenians, it is perfectly in step with the mid-fifth century cultural program of Athens.

Next, the only positive action that is not taken by Athens, Phocis, or Macedon occurs at 8.84.2, where Herodotus records the Aeginetan version of the first encounter with the Persians at Salamis as competing with the Athenian version. Aegina was in fact a submissive member of the Delian league in the mid-450s;18 after Athens’ subjugation of the island in c. 457, Athenian

attitudes toward Aegina are consistently more dismissive than hostile. Yet the inclusion of an Aeginetan alternative here is startling, especially since it seems to challenge Athens’ claim to initiating the battle. Still, the narrative itself advances the Athenian version: the Athenian account is more detailed (e.g., the inclusion of the ship’s captain, Aminias of Pallene, 8.84.1); the Athenian account is explained in straightforward, naval terms—“When the Athenian ship became entangled and was unable to withdraw, at last the others came to the aid of Aminias and thus joined the battle” (συμπλεκείσης δὲ τῆς νεός καὶ οὖ δυναμένων ἀπαλλαγῆναι, οὖτω δὴ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀμεινῖῃ βοηθόντες συνέμισγον, 8.84.1)—whereas the Aeginetan version relies on heroes and miraculous portents (φάσμα σφι γυναικὸς ἐφάνη, 8.84.2); and lest the portentous apparition elevate the Aeginetans by its holy association, the figure expresses marked indignation toward the Aeginetans, accusing them of “backing water” (πρύμνην ἀνακρούεσθε, 8.84.2), an action which a Thucydidean scholiast glosses as portending a panicked rout. Furthermore, the Athenian version is immediately confirmed by Herodotus’ description of the battle order at 8.85.1: the Athenians face the Phoenicians, whose ship Aeschylus attests was the first attacked (Persae 409-11)—an attestation which Athenians would recall immediately (especially if Aeschylus reflected popular tradition rather than vice-versa) but might easily go unnoticed with a different audience. The Aeginetans, on the other hand, go entirely unmentioned until the anecdotes gathered after the epideictic narrative (8.90-93). Reading this passage in its immediate

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19 Pericles reportedly called Aegina “the pus of Piraeus” (λήμην τοῦ Πειραιῶς, Plut. Per. 8.5) around this time, and the Athenian Thucydides notoriously neglects Aegina in his history (cf. Dion. Thuc. 15; Irwin 2010b: 426-28).

20 In fact, Irwin 2010a: 405-406 argues that this alternative fact implicitly foregrounds the triumph of Aegina over Athens as heroes of Salamis which is realized in 8.91-93 (immediately following the epideixis).


22 Of course, Aeschylus’ account is itself Athenian, but that Herodotus echoes Aeschylus here only serves to endorse the Athenian version and ensure that Herodotus’ audience—if it was indeed Athenian—would understand the implication of the stated battle order.
context, then, Herodotus has provided this competing account of the battle’s inception not to compete with the Athenian version but to refute the Aeginetan one; the apparition’s incredulity at the Aeginetans balking in the face of the Persians only strengthens this refutation.

Finally, at 8.68.α Artemisia reminds Xerxes that Athens’ role in the Ionian Revolt was in fact the primary reason for the Persian invasion of Greece in the first place. Yet this assertion doesn’t seem to have been objectionable to the Athenians. In fact, the notion of Xerxes’ invasion as a reprisal for Athens’ success against Darius appears in Aeschylus’ Persae (472-75) and can even be found in the epideictic material leading up to Plataea (8.142.2). And inasmuch as Athens successfully repelled the Persians both at Marathon and at Salamis, ultimately no blame could be attached to them for carelessly endangering Greece. Therefore the only truly problematic passages in the Salamis narrative are the authorial intrusions at 8.3.1 and 8.30.1-2 identified above; every other passage conforms to or manifestly exhibits the expectations inherent in a historical narrative written for an Athenian audience in the mid-fifth century—the same audience as Plataea.

**Points in Common with the Plataea Narrative**

Inasmuch as the Salamis and Plataea narratives apparently share the same audience, some overlap with my analysis of Plataea in Chapter II is inevitable. For the most part, then, I will simply review the elements shared between the two narratives without repeating an explanation; the reader may refer to Chapter II for more detail. Before discussing shared characteristics, however, we should also address a shared objection: the question of sources. No one has questioned Herodotus’ sources for his narrative of Salamis primarily because, historically, Athens seems to have played a major part in the battle. We must note, however, that Aegina,

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24 See esp. my discussion of Nyland 1992, Chapter II, pp. 53-54.
who provided a significant contingent for every naval encounter and ultimately received the prize for valor in the decisive battle from the Greeks (8.93.1),\(^{25}\) merits no mention in almost ninety chapters of narrative leading up to—and including—the entire battle of Salamis (with the sole exception of the parenthetical aside addressed above, 8.84.2). Rather than celebrate or even acknowledge Aegina’s valuable role in these naval battles, Herodotus relegates all Aeginetan contributions to anecdotal additions at the end of the narrative—after the major action has already occurred and the Persian forces have been routed. By analogy with the Plataea narrative, then, we might explain this lack of Aeginetan material by positing limited Aeginetan sources, assuming that Herodotus had access only to Athenian sources and was ignorant of any major Aeginetan stories that merited inclusion in the thick of the battle narrative.

But that Herodotus had access to no competing versions of these hugely important battles in which so many Greeks took part again surpasses belief. At the least, Simonides is supposed to have written a lyric version of the Battle of Artemisium and an elegiac version of the Battle of Salamis; Lawrence Kowerski even argues that these two poems are one and the same with the ‘new Simonides’ elegy which has been thought to narrate only the Battle of Plataea.\(^{26}\) With regard to Aegina specifically (which by all rights ought to have figured more prominently in any narrative of the Battle of Salamis), Herodotus surely had access to Aeginetan sources. Being members of the Delian league as well as having a short and secure naval path to Athens, Aeginetan citizens visited Athens regularly and vice-versa. Their prominent role in maritime trade further guaranteed their presence in most ports around the Mediterranean. Whether living

\(^{25}\) The award appears to have been historical. See Pritchett 1974: 283-86, on the authority of 8.93 and 8.122; see also Diod. 11.27.2. Cf. Marincola 2007a: 119.

\(^{26}\) Kowerski 2005: 21-61.
in the Aegean or Italy, Herodotus would have had no trouble gathering Aeginetan stories about the battles of Artemisium and Salamis.\footnote{Figueira 1993: 79-85.}

Furthermore Herodotus’ own narrative offers plenty of evidence that he knew stories involving the Aeginetans: the Aeacidae whom the Greeks unceremoniously send for at 8.64 feature prominently elsewhere in the \textit{ Histories} (5.82-89) but receive almost no notice here; 8.84.2 shows that Herodotus was in fact aware of a story wherein the ships sent to retrieve the Aeacidae led the charge at Salamis, and Herodotus could easily have included some of the Aeginetan-favorable anecdotes collected at 8.90-93 in the first telling of the battle had he wished. He has simply neglected to do so. Instead, only the Athenians are singled out for any real bravery or distinction in the thick of the events (8.84.1, 8.85.1, 8.87.2); even when Aegina is mentioned, it is explicitly secondary to Athens (8.84.2, 8.86). Herodotus knew (or could have discovered) any number of Aeginetan versions of events, and with that he surely could have woven them into the narrative—after all, Herodotus’ wonder-seeking narrative often incorporates such parenthetical and tangential anecdotes.\footnote{Cf. Munson 2001: 8-17.} He did not include Aeginetan stories in the main narrative because it did not suit his audience.

The clear beneficiary of Aegina’s marginalization is Athens. Just as in the Plataea narrative, Athens is by far the most celebrated of the Greeks in Herodotus’ narrative of Artemisium and Salamis. At Artemisium, the Athenians are the first to take a Persian ship (8.11.2), and despite already supplying more than three times as many ships as any other Greek nation at the outset, the Athenians further provide a critical reinforcement contingent which itself outnumbers the next greatest contribution of ships and inspires the Greeks to fight with renewed vigor (8.14.1-2). On two separate occasions Herodotus singles out the Athenians as the best
fighters of the day without mentioning any other Greek participant (8.11.2, 8.17; cf. 9.71); when at last the Greeks are forced to retreat, the Athenians are the last to leave their post (8.21.2; cf. 9.54.2). And despite Eurybiades’ authority, Themistocles’ opinion prevails in every major tactical decision (e.g., 8.4.2, 8.74.2-83.1). The distinction and narrative importance of Athens in this telling of the Battle of Artemisium contrasts starkly with Herodotus’ narrative of the battle as it occurred earlier in the Histories (7.192-95; see also Conclusion, pp. 190-92), where the Athenians contribute almost nothing at all. Without a doubt, Athens is the hero of this story from the beginning.

And as the narrative progresses toward the final conflict at Salamis, the Athenian contribution is reiterated and enhanced. From the gathering of the navy before Salamis, the Athenians are singled out for providing “the greatest number of ships and the most seaworthy by far” (νέας δὲ πολλώ πλείστας τε καὶ ἀριστά πλεούσας παρείχοντο Αθηναίοι, 8.42.2). The superlative size of their contribution is again emphasized two chapters later: “The Athenians provided more ships than all the rest, one hundred and eighty ships all by themselves” (Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν πρὸς πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους παρεχόμενοι νέας ὀγδώκοντα καὶ ἕκατον, μοῦνοι, 8.44.1). Even the wrong-headed Athenians who stubbornly refuse to leave the Athenian Acropolis on the authority of their misinterpretation of the Delphic oracle fight resolutely and inventively against overwhelming Persian numbers, nearly staving off the Persian attack despite their clearly insufficient resources—both in numbers and in fortifications (8.52). And by the eve of the battle, Herodotus has Themistocles assert “that so long as they had two hundred fully-manned ships, Athens could claim a city and land better than anyone’s—for none of the Greeks could repel their attack” (ὡς εἴη καὶ πόλις καὶ γῆ μέξον ἤ περ ἐκείνοις ἐστ᾽ ἄν διηκόσια νέες σφὶ ἐωσὶ πεπληρωμέναι· οὐδαμοῖς γὰρ Ἑλλήνων αὐτοὺς ἐπιόντας ἀποκρούσεσθαι, 8.61.2).
Of course, Themistocles quickly neutralizes any suggestion that the Athenians in fact would attack other Greeks by asserting his concern first and foremost for the well-being of “Hellas” (ἀνατρέψεις τήν Ἑλλάδα, 9.62.1), an assertion that closely parallels Athens’ imperialistic-benefactor ideology. Instead, if the other Greeks do choose to abandon Salamis, he threatens, “we’ll just pack up our families and go to Siris in Italy” (ἡμεῖς μὲν ὡς ἔχομεν ἀναλαβόντες τοὺς οἰκέτας κομιεύμεθα ἐς Σίριν τὴν ἐν Ἰταλίη, 8.62.2)—a rhetorical ploy very similar to that found in the Plataea epideixis, 9.11.1. Herodotus explicitly confirms the validity of this argument, both in his own opinion and the opinion of the Greeks at Salamis:

ταῦτα δὲ Θεμιστοκλέος λέγοντος ἀνεδιδάσκετο Εὐρυβιάδης· δοκέειν δὲ μοι, ἀρρωδήσας μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀνεδιδάσκετο μὴ σφεας ἀπολίπωσι, ἢν πρὸς τὸν Ἰσθμόν ἀγάγη τὰς νέας· ἀπολιπόντων γὰρ Ἀθηναίων οὐκέτι ἐγινόντο ἀξιώμαχοι οἱ λοιποί. (8.62-63)

Themistocles’ speech changed Eurybiades’ mind. It seems to me that he was especially afraid that the Athenians take off if he led the ships to the Isthmus—and without the Athenians, the rest wouldn’t match up in a battle.

This passage mirrors the Tegean argument at the beginning of the Plataea epideixis (9.9.2) and Herodotus’ own conclusion earlier in the Histories (on which occasion he explicitly worries that the argument may be too pro-Athenian for his audience, 7.139.1-2). The Athenian contribution, then, is consistently and emphatically honored to the exclusion of every other Greek nation, both through Herodotus’ characters and the voice of the narrator himself.

Other features of the Plataea narrative occur in the Salamis narrative. For example, several of the funeral-oration topoi that feature at 9.27 (see discussion in Chapter II, pp. 56-58) are also rehearsed in the Salamis narrative. Herodotus especially emphasizes the Athenian funeral topos of autochthony by recording Athens’ ancestral claim to having been Pelasgians (8.44.2; see above, pp. 97-98). He achieves much the same end with his enumeration of “Ionians

descended from Athens” (Ἰωνεῖς ἀπὸ Ἀθηνέων γεγονότες, 8.46.3) and even with the story of 
Erechtheus and the competition between Poseidon and Athena for the patronage of the city 
(8.55).30 On the other hand, the Spartans are “a Doric and Macedonian tribe, emigrating last from 
Erineus, Pindus, and Dryopis” (Δωρικόν τε καὶ Μακεδόν τοῦ ἔθνος, ἔξ Θρήνεο τε καὶ Πίνδου καὶ 
tῆς Δρυοπίδος οὐστατα δρμηθέντες, 8.43)—the Dryopian region which is elsewhere called “the 
motherland of the Peloponnesian Darians” (μητρόπολις Δωριέων τοῦ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, 8.31).31 
Later, the contrast with Athenian autochthony is made explicit when the Spartans are called 
“immigrants” (ἐπήλυνθα, 8.73.2).32 In addition, Herodotus’ portrayal of the Persian siege of the 
Acropolis evokes the Amazonomachy (8.52),33 as does the Athenian rout of Artemisia (8.87-
88).34 In fact, in addition to being popular in funeral orations, both of these topoi are depicted on 
the Parthenon, which was begun at roughly the same time as my proposed date for the Plataea 
and Salamis epideixis (c. 447).35 Indeed, Herodotus’ Atheno-centric version of Salamis itself 
was likely similar to that celebrated in funeral orations.36 
Second, the apparent political alignment of the Salamis narrative—judged by positive and 
negative portrayals—is almost identical. Once again Herodotus gives consistently positive 
portrayals of Phocis and Macedon alongside Athens, and negative portrayals of Athenian 
enemies from the mid-fifth century like Sparta, Corinth, Thessaly, and various other 

31 Cf. Thomas 2001: 225. “It is worth wondering whether it was perhaps developed in part precisely to counteract 
the problem that the Darians seemed to have a more illustrious Greek ancestry. Autochthony, whether taken 
literally as meaning born from the earth or simply as meaning indigenous, original, could be a powerful claim to 
greater antiquity.” 
32 Note also that the Darians’ Macedonian origins further corroborate the story of Macedon’s Greek ancestry 
included in the Plataea epideixis at 8.137-9 and at 9.45.3. 
34 Lysias 2.4; Demosthenes 60.8; Plato, Menexenus 239b. Cf. Loraux 1981 (2006): 208-209. 
Peloponnesian states. I have already shown how unwaveringly positive the Salamis narrative’s portrayal of Athens is. If any nation could be said to share the spotlight with Athens in this narrative, it would be Phocis. Beginning at 8.27, Herodotus marks the Phocians as heroic, both by their valorous and steadfast repulsion of their Thessalian opponent (8.27-30) and by their uncompromising martyrdom for the Greek cause (8.30-33). I have treated Herodotus’ heroic portrayal of the latter above (pp. 94-97); his portrayal of Phocis’ war with Thessaly is equally impressive. Herodotus introduces the Phocians into the narrative by way of Thessaly’s hatred for them—a hatred that resulted from Phocis’ repeated frustration of Thessalian aggression (8.27.1). Herodotus describes every positive detail of this resistance, unsatisfied with merely marking their victory. In the first confrontation, Herodotus emphasizes the imbalance of forces (an imbalance rivaled only by the present conflict of Greeks against Persians): six hundred Phocians kill over four thousand Thessalians and put many more to rout (8.27.3-4). But perhaps more importantly, they succeed by a clever stratagem that is inspired by a prophet—none other than the eponymous Tellias (cf. 9.37.1)—and when they meet with success, they donate all of their plunder in spectacular form, half at their local shrine and half at Delphi (8.27.4-5). A second episode further exhibits Phocian cunning, recounting how the Phocians obliterated a Thessalian cavalry attack by placing wine jars in a covered pit and baiting their charge (8.28). Thus not only are the Phocians led to victory by their astute enactment of religious advice, they also make their own luck, using cunning and trickery to achieve victory over a numerically superior foe. These characteristics directly parallel the hero of this narrative, Themistocles, who correctly interprets and implements an oracle from Delphi (8.51.2; cf. 7.143.1-2) but equally relies on his own cunning and trickery to execute that divinely-inspired policy (e.g., 8.75).
Herodotus’ positive portrayal of Phocis is not only pronounced, it perfectly complements the thematic strategy of the Salamis narrative.

Macedon too is once again portrayed favorably, although Alexander’s role in the Salamis narrative is much smaller than in the Plataea narrative. In fact, Macedon (like Phocis) needn’t have been included at all, since it plays no necessary role in the events leading up to the naval battle. That Phocis and Macedon are featured so prominently, then, implies an authorial choice to include them. Thus when Alexander of Macedon goes to great lengths to “safeguard” (ἔσωξον, 8.34) the medizing Boeotians, we may marvel at this monarch and minor Hellenic player doing so much to help protect Greece and its people. Herodotus further emphasizes Alexander’s benevolence by contrasting it with Boeotia’s markedly less excusable medism: “And so he saved them, desiring to make it clear to Xerxes that these Boeotians sympathized with the Medes” (ἔσωξον δὲ τῇδε, δῆλον βουλόμενοι ποιέειν Ξέρξη ὥσπερ τὰ Μῆδων Βοιωτοὶ φρονέοιεν, 8.34).

Following directly after the ravaging of Phocis—heroically endured because Phocis “was simply unwilling to betray Greece” (ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔσπεσθαι ἐκόντες εἶναι προδόται τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 8.30.2)—this juxtaposition with Boeotia calls into question the motives of the other Boeotians in medizing while allowing Alexander to rise above them: he clearly has the interests of Greece in mind, but his unique status apart from the non-monarchical mainland Greeks exposes him to other obligations as well. Herodotus thus appears to include Macedon here for much the same reason as in the Plataea narrative, anticipating many of the themes that arise in the Plataea epideixis: in this short anecdote, Alexander’s allegiance to Xerxes is overlooked and implicitly excused (cf. 8.142.5), Alexander appears again as a friend and protector of the Greek cause (cf. πρόξεινόν τε καὶ φίλον, 8.143.3), Alexander’s unexpected loyalty serves to emphasize the disloyalty of the other Greeks (cf. 9.43), and ultimately Alexander cares enough for Greece that he will risk his
own wellbeing (in this case standing in the way of Xerxes’ otherwise unchecked ravagers) to preserve Greeks and their interests as much as he can (cf. 9.45.3). Thus Macedon’s inclusion here, though brief, is very much in line with its portrayal in the Plataea *epideixis*.

In a similar vein, many of the same nations that feature negatively in the Plataea *epideixis* again receive harsh or reproachful treatment. The Corinthians are represented by Adeimantus who, in his proposal to abandon the Athenian refugees to their fate and his subsequent rhetorical dismantling by Themistocles, proves himself a treacherous and unworthy ally of Athens (8.61; cf. 8.94). Thessaly is condemned by its speech against Phocis wherein they place personal politics over the good of Greece (8.29); subsequently, Herodotus twice emphasizes Thessaly’s traitorous role in guiding the barbarians through Phocis and Boeotia (8.31, 8.32.2). Thebes and Boeotia figure less in the Salamis narrative than in Plataea (as might be expected considering the predominantly naval subject material), but their appearances are marked and negative nonetheless: Herodotus emphasizes that “every single Boeotian medized” (Βοιωτῶν δὲ πᾶν τὸ πλῆθος ἐμήδιζε, 8.34) and the Thebans further inform against Thespiae and Plataea, prompting Xerxes to burn both cities (8.50.2). So every city that is portrayed negatively in Herodotus’ Plataea narrative is also portrayed negatively in Herodotus’ Salamis narrative.

Sparta too plays much the same role as in the Plataea narrative. The state that has just stood heroically against the Persian aggressor at Thermopylae now seems irrelevant and indecisive—just as at Plataea. We may compare the Spartan admiral Eurybiades to Leonidas from a few chapters earlier: the latter authoritatively makes every decision for the Greeks

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37 For an ancient objection to Herodotus’ treatment of Corinth in the Salamis narrative, see Plutarch, *De Mal.* 870d-871a.

38 Note that Herodotus does not allow the Thebans the excuse they provide in Thucydides: that their government was under a tyranny when it medized and so the *demos* of Thebes was not responsible (Thuc. 3.62).

39 For a discussion of how this portrayal matches Athens’ framing of Sparta in the mid-fifth century, see Ch. II, pp. 79-82.
(7.220.1) and fights heroically to the bitter end (7.224.1); the former is repeatedly preempted in his attempts to retreat in the face of the Persian threat (usually by Themistocles, e.g. 8.5 and 8.59). Herodotus even points out that Eurybiades is not descended from Spartan royalty (8.42.2), and that Eurybiades is given authority only because Athens allowed it, "being solely concerned with the survival of Greece" (οι Αθηναῖοι μέγα πεποιημένοι περιέναι τήν Ἑλλάδα, 8.3.1). Like Pausanias at Plataea, Eurybiades does little more than cling precariously to his shadow of authority, consistently balking in the face of the Persians and failing to provide the Greeks with any real plan of action.

Nor does Sparta herself contribute anything significant to the Greek cause: despite providing ten ships at Artemisium and sixteen at Salamis, no specific action of any Spartan other than Eurybiades is recorded (with the sole exception of the exiled Demaratus, 8.65). In the final battle, the Spartans are given no distinction but that they faced the unimpressive Ionians, "a few of whom—following Themistocles’ orders—pretended to flee in fear" (ἐθελοκάκεον μέντοι αὐτῶν κατὰ τὰς Θεμιστοκλέους ἐντολὰς ὀλίγοι, 8.85.1). And even still, the rest of the Ionians were extremely successful: Herodotus claims that he “can actually name many of the captains who captured Greek ships” (ἔχω μέν νων συχνῶν οἴνοματα τριηράρχων καταλέξαι τῶν νέας Ἑλληνίδας ἑλόντων, 8.85.2). If Themistocles’ clever stratagem had not worked, if the Ionians had attacked in full force, or if the Spartan position had been more important for holding the Greek line, the battle might not have turned out so favorably for the Greeks. In spite of Sparta having sole command over the naval forces, then, the Greeks receive no real benefit from the Spartan presence at Salamis.

Finally, several states feature in the Salamis narrative that have no appreciable role in the Plataea narrative. These too conform to an Athenian political alignment from the mid-fifth
century. I have discussed Aegina’s role in the narrative and its membership in the Delian league above (pp. 98-100); other members such as Lemnos (8.11.3), Croton (8.47), Tenos (8.82.1), and Chalcis (8.46.2) are also treated positively by Herodotus.\footnote{For Lemnos and Chalcis, see Kagan 1969: 119; for Croton, see Robinson 2011: 109; less is known of Tenos, but it is consistently on the list of Delian League tributaries and its neighbor Andros received an Athenian cleruchy in 447/6 BCE (Plut. Per. 11.5; Paus. 1.27.5). For the list of Spring 449, see IG I\textsuperscript{3} 263.}

The Plataeans, perhaps the most steadfast Athenian mainland ally,\footnote{From the late-sixth century (6.108) down to the Archidamian War (e.g., Thuc. 2.9.4).} participate admirably but modestly at Artemisium (8.1.1). They miss the actual naval battle at Salamis, however, being forced to attend to the evacuation of their own city (8.44.1). Of course, Herodotus records this absence not as a criticism but to underscore the fact that the Plataeans did not medize: the Plataeans are twice singled out for being one of only two Boeotian cities which refused to medize (8.50.2; 8.66.2). The other city, Thespiae, about which very little is known, nonetheless appears to have had similarly good relations with Athens in the mid-fifth century (e.g., IG I\textsuperscript{3} 23); yet the Thespians fought with Thebes against Athens during the Archidamian War (Thuc. 4.133.1).\footnote{Little else is known of Thespiae in the fifth century; see Lewis 1992: 96-97, 116 n.74 (\textit{CAH}, vol. 5) for some inconclusive speculation about Thespiae’s Athenian sympathies in the mid-fifth century.} Finally, Athens’ mid-fifth century ally Egypt receives distinction for their naval valor at 8.17; admittedly the Egyptians are fighting for the Persians, but the Athenians could hardly have held it against them inasmuch as Egypt was then a long-standing member of the Persian empire (since the conquest of Cambyses, 3.13; cf. Herodotus’ treatment of Alexander in the Plataea episode above, 9.50).\footnote{At 8.68γ, Artemisia besmirches the Egyptians as “of no use at all” (τῶν ὀφελὸς ἐστι οὐδέν), but such a deceptive comment would be entirely in line with the character of this emulous Halicarnassian queen, especially considering that the Greek audience would have known of the Egyptian revolt from Persia that followed soon thereafter (c.460).}

On the other hand, Doris and many states from the Peloponnesus (none of whom figured significantly in Herodotus’ Plataea narrative) are given negative portrayals. Marked as the “motherland of the Peloponnesian Dorians” (μητρόπολις Δωριέων τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, 8.31),
Doris would have stood directly in Xerxes’ path; yet “when the barbarians entered Dorian territory, they did not pillage it—for the Doriants had medized” (ταύτην ὄν τὴν Δωρίδα γῆν οὐκ ἐσίναντο ἐσβάλοντες οἱ βάρβαροι ἐμηδίζον τε γὰρ, 8.31). The Peloponnnesians too receive rough treatment. Herodotus emphasizes the betrayal felt by the Athenians upon their return from Artemision:

...πανδέσποτος Πελοπόννησος πανδήσιμος ἔχοντας ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ὑποκατημένους τὸν βάρβαρον, τῶν μὲν εὐρίων οὐδὲν ἔόν, οἱ δὲ ἐπιθαλάνοντο τὸν Ἰσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τεχέοντας, ὡς τὴν Πελοπόννησον περὶ πλείστων τε ποιεομένους περιείναι καὶ ταύτην ἔχοντας ἐν φύλακή, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ἀπείναι. (8.40.2)

For although they expected to find the Peloponnnesians occupying Boeotia against the barbarian in full force, they found nothing of the sort. Rather, the Peloponnnesians were still working on their wall, prioritizing the survival of the Peloponnese over everything else.

The general treatment of the Peloponnese here implicates all Peloponnnesians in the same guilt: the inability to consider the needs of Greece over their own (cf. 8.3.1; 9.7-9). Herodotus later emphasizes this guilt by calling out those who would not even come to help build the wall: aside from Sparta, Corinth, and the other Peloponnnesians who—despite abandoning Athens to its fate—at least were concerned enough to work on the Isthmian Wall, “the other Peloponnnesians just didn’t care that Greece was in danger” (τῇ Ἑλλάδι κινδυνεύοσι· τοῖσι δὲ ἄλλοισι Πελοπόννησίοις ἔμελε οὐδέν, 8.72). Thus the Peloponnese as a whole is characterized negatively: some only abandoned Athens to its fate, but the rest were so complacent in the face of the Persian advance that Herodotus condemns them outright: “If I may speak freely, their idle neutrality amounted to medism” (εἰ δὲ ἔλευθερος ἔξεστι εἰπεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατήμενοι ἐμηδίζον, 8.73.3).44

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44 For a discussion of Argos (who enters the Salamis narrative only by implication, under the broad category ‘Peloponnese’), see Ch. II, p. 82.
On the other hand, the Ionians and Aegean Islanders are shown as clearly medizing despite their presence in the Delian League during the mid-fifth century. This treatment probably reflects both historical reality and some degree of resentment felt by the Athenians that, even though Athens provoked Persia on their behalf, the Ionians nonetheless failed to resist Xerxes in any real way and ended up fighting against Greece in the end (cf. 8.22.2). Still, Herodotus mitigates the blame by treating the Ionians mostly as a unit—a unit which is plagued by factionalism and misgiving at the prospect of advancing against its mother country (e.g., 8.10.2-3, 8.19.1, 8.22.2, 8.85.2). Essentially, Herodotus allows the confusion of circumstances to conceal any opprobrium that might otherwise have been assigned, choosing instead to include all Ionians and islanders in a single group, of which some medized but others remained aloof as much as circumstance allowed. The only Ionian nation that Herodotus truly singles out is Samos at 8.85, yet he mentions Samos only this once in the entire Salamis narrative. Furthermore, in this instance the blame falls solely on two individuals whom Herodotus marks as particularly favorable to (and favored by) the Persians: “I record only these two because, for this deed, the Persians set up Themestor as tyrant of Samos while Phylacus—recognized as a ‘benefactor of the King’—was given a great estate” (τοῦτο δὲ ἐνεκα μένημαι τούτων μούνων, ὅτι Θεομήστωρ μὲν διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον Σάμου ἐτυράννεσε καταστησάντων τῶν Περσέων, Φύλακος δὲ ἐνεργήτης βασιλέως ὀνεγράφη καὶ χώρη ἐδωρήθη πολλῇ, 8.85.3). Thus although they clearly fought on the wrong side of the battle, Herodotus nonetheless generally excuses the Ionians by not accusing them, allowing them to remain nameless and innocuous. Just as in the Plataea narrative, then, every state and city that is mentioned—and there are many—either fits the

45 Compare their characterization here with Herodotus’ narrative of the Ionian Revolt (esp. 6.9-18).
46 It may also be significant that Samos revolts from Athens and the Delian League in 440/39 (Thuc. 1.115-17).
observed political alignment of mid-fifth century Athens or in some other way serves Herodotus' authorial strategy.

**Pleasing an Athenian Audience, Part II**

In many ways the Salamis narrative is even better suited to an Athenian audience than Plataea. Most obviously, its subject matter—the Battle of Salamis—was itself central to Athenian identity, and I have already shown how the Salamis narrative again propounds Athenian ideology (see above, pp. 104-105). Five other prominent subjects would also have appealed to a mid-century Athenian audience: [1] rhetoric and its effective deployment, [2] naval and maritime subjects, [3] local topography, [4] the interdependence of ships, walls, and men, and [5] local and oracular religion.

[1] **Rhetoric**

Even more than Plataea, the Salamis narrative features clever rhetoric and lengthy speeches. The practice of crafting public oration was especially well-entrenched in Athens by the mid-fifth century: Nicole Loraux dates the rise of the funeral oration no later than 464, and Robert Wallace and Harvey Yunis both observe rhetoric’s popularity in Athens by 450—even if not necessarily as a distinct ‘genre’. Pericles in particular is associated closely with the sophistic movement as early as 446. Though the study of rhetoric is traditionally believed to have originated in Sicily following the overthrow of the Deinomenids (c. 468), sophists and

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47 As in (e.g.) Aeschylus’ *Persae*. See also, Lysias 2.34, 36; Plato *Menexenus* 241a-c, 245a. Cf. Loraux 1981 (2006): esp. 94-100. Salamis’ status as a naval battle and its proximity to Athens contributed to this canonical status.

48 Cf. Ch. II, pp. 55-58. Admittedly, interest in rhetoric was a widespread phenomenon, common in all corners of the Greek world. Other interests of the passage will help narrow our focus, but for now I argue only that an Athenian audience would be interested in the deft manipulation of rhetoric as showcased in the Salamis narrative, even if other poleis might as well.


rhetoricians from across the Mediterranean would have been drawn to the vibrant democratic culture of Athens, and Athens in turn appreciated their craft immensely.\(^\text{52}\)

The Salamis narrative contains two of the six examples of prolonged rhetorical exposition included in the *Histories* (Plataea includes another two of these six).\(^\text{53}\) Themistocles’ speech at 8.60 seeks to convince the Greeks to fight at Salamis rather than retreat. The argument is complex and rhetorically wrought. His first display of rhetorical expertise in fact comes before he begins his speech. Themistocles initially brings his grievance to Eurybiades, but when he addresses the larger council of Greeks, he recognizes the demands placed on him by a new audience: “For with the allies present, he knew it was a bad idea to blame them. So instead, he used a different argument” (παρεόντων γὰρ τῶν συμμάχων οὐκ ἐφερέ οἱ κόσμον οὐδένα κατηγόρειν· ὁ δὲ ἄλλου λόγου εἴχετο, 8.60).\(^\text{54}\) He begins by encouraging the Greeks to “just listen, considering each side in turn” (ἀντιτίθημι γὰρ ἐκάτερον ἀκούσας, 8.60.α)—a sophistic phrase including a use of ἀντιτίθημι that evokes the highly rhetorical concept of *antithesis*:\(^\text{55}\) Then he follows this rhetorical formula, presenting the opponent’s argument first by outlining the disaster that retreat would bring (8.60.α) and comparing this result with the benefits of remaining to fight at Salamis (8.60.β).\(^\text{56}\) Themistocles even concludes with an obligatory gnomic utterance: “Everything tends to go as planned for men who plan well; but without good planning, the gods


\(^{53}\) I have defined ‘prolonged rhetorical exposition’ as a persuasive speech unit spanning a greater narrative space than a single chapter (counting alpha-numerals), and have counted speech groups as one unit (the other two examples are the Persian debates over government [3.80-82] and the Greek invasion [7.8-11]). Other prolonged speeches (e.g., that of Socles at 5.92) perform more of a narrative function, analogous to Odysseus’ role as secondary narrator in the *Odyssey* (Books 9-12). For detailed evaluations of rhetoric and discourse in Herodotus, see Lang 1984: 132-49; Zali 2014: 317-26.

\(^{54}\) Incidentally, this display of audience awareness is remarkably parallel to the tactic which I am arguing Herodotus adopted in his *epideixis*.


\(^{56}\) See (e.g.) Aristophanes, *Clouds* 940-44.
won’t likely support mortal intentions” (οἱκότα μὲν νῦν βουλευομένοισι ἀνθρώποισι ὡς τὸ ἐπίπαν ἐθέλει γίνεσθαι· μή δὲ οἰκότα βουλευομένοισι οὐκ ἐθέλει οὖδὲ ὁ θεὸς προσχωρέειν πρὸς τὰς ἀνθρωπηίας γνώμας, 8.60.γ). An Athenian audience would immediately have recognized this speaker as a crafty and deliberate rhetorician.

But Themistocles is not disparaged for his rhetoric like ‘Socrates’ in Aristophanes’ Clouds: he is a good sophist. He is a hero of μῆτις, like Odysseus.\(^{57}\) He takes and distributes bribes to the profit of all Greece—but also profits himself (8.5); he sows suspicion in the Persian ranks through his written message to the Ionians (8.22.3, cf. 8.85.1); he brings his rival Mnesiphilus’ excellent point to Eurybiades, but presents it as his own and thus appropriates credit for himself (8.58.2); he correctly interprets the cryptic oracle from Delphi (8.60.γ, 8.62.2);\(^{58}\) he pretends to turn traitor to force the Greeks’ hand, an act which ultimately brings about the success at Salamis (8.75); and in the end he restrains himself from announcing the fruition of his plan to get the Persians to surround the Greeks, knowing that Aristides is more likely to be believed by the Greek commanders (8.80.2). Themistocles even intervenes on behalf of the passive Eurybiades to prevent a departure of Greek forces (8.5, 8.54) just as his counterpart Odysseus had stemmed the frenzied departure of Achaeans on behalf of the passive Agamemnon (Il. 2.185-210). Discerning and clever yet bold and strong, Themistocles is presented as an Odyssean hero extraordinaire.\(^{59}\)

\(^{57}\) See Detienne and Vernant 1978: esp. 3, which defines μῆτις as “a type of intelligence and of thought, a way of knowing; it implies a complex but very coherent body of mental attitudes and intellectual behavior which combine flair, wisdom, forethought, subtlety of mind, deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, various skills and experience acquired over the years.”

\(^{58}\) See also 7.143; Appendix [a] provides an epideictic analysis of this section and argues that it is closely related to—perhaps even to be identified with—the Salamis epideixis.

\(^{59}\) Irwin 2010a: 408-409 associates Odysseus with Athens and Ajax with Aegina, then argues that the Salamis narrative (specifically 8.90-92) represents a “nice reversal of the myth [of Achilles’ armor] as mapped on contemporary events.” (Irwin 2010a: 408). However, prior to 8.90, the Salamis narrative is unilaterally a reenactment of the myth, with Themistocles proving far superior to any other rival (including the Aeginetans)
But, as with Odysseus, it is Themistocles’ skill with words that truly sets him apart. His entreaties to Eurybiades allow him an opportunity to make his argument (8.58.2); when given the floor he delivers a considerate, well-developed, and convincing speech (8.60, see above); he responds with ease to the threatening ridicule of Adeimantus the Corinthian (8.61.2); and his arguments explicitly succeed, convincing Eurybiades and the other Greeks (8.62-63). And like Harmocydês in the Plataea narrative (9.17.4), “Themistocles exhorted his troops better than everyone else” (προηγόρευε ἕξ ἔχοντα μὲν ἕκ πάντων θεμιστοκλῆς, 8.83.1), again by appealing to the best form of human nature on the grounds of logic (ἀντιτιθέμενα, 8.83.2). Ultimately, his words keep the Greek commanders in their position at Salamis, leading to the victory of the (reluctant) Greeks and driving Xerxes back to Persia with the majority of his forces. Thus, rather than making the weaker argument stronger, Themistocles’ rhetoric makes the better argument stronger.

This view of rhetoric as useful—even crucial—may actually help to date this heroic portrayal of Themistocles. Citing mid-century evidence like Sophocles’ understanding of technai (Antigone 360-70), Robert Wallace has argued that 430 BCE marks a watershed moment for rhetoric’s public perception in Classical Athens:

Democratic Athens did not create the sophistic movement, but certainly welcomed it, elite and demos alike. … In this earlier period, down to about 430, the sophists were actively involved with the democracy, and on the whole they were a benevolent force, working for the good of society. … After 430, by contrast, the sophists were less involved with Athenian politics, and they were a more negative intellectual force in the democracy.61

primarily on account of his mētis. Cf. Plut. De Mal. 869f. Marincola 2007: 30-31 argues that Themistocles is the “clearest example” of an Odyssean figure in Herodotus’ Histories.

60 Zali 2014: 252.
61 Wallace 1998: 214. Wallace productively applies this conclusion throughout his article, going so far as to associate the skillful deployment of rhetoric with Pericles’ cultural agenda (1998: esp. 218).
Thus Themistocles’ role as a good sophist—particularly if combined with an Athenian audience—helps place Herodotus’ portrayal of the hero in the context of the mid-fifth century, prior to rhetoric’s increasing disfavor later in the fifth century. He is portrayed as an Athenian hero exhibiting expertise in Athenian traits to save the Athenian people in a way that later became unpopular and stigmatized, but before was celebrated and novel.

Still, Themistocles’ later life prompts us to reconsider whether this positive portrayal of Themistocles would in fact have been appreciated by an Athenian audience. Themistocles’ relationship with Athens is confusing at best. After the Persian War, Themistocles was popular throughout Greece and not just in Athens. But in the end Athens actually ostracized Themistocles in the late 470s. Of course, ostracism is not necessarily a mark of opprobrium, and this ostracism appears to have been a shrewd political action brought about by a coalition of formidable political rivals, initiated in reaction to Themistocles’ immense political power and popularity at the time. Furthermore, Themistocles’ pro-Athenian actions during his ostracism (subverting Peloponnesian states like Elis and Argos against Sparta) probably worked to increase his popularity back home in Athens. Unfortunately, these actions also earned him the enmity of much of the Peloponnesus and resulted in harsh prosecution by Sparta. Because this prosecution was enacted under the authority of the Hellenic League, Athens was powerless to prevent Themistocles’ resulting exile from Greece. In the end, even though he died in the service of Persia, Themistocles appears to have been restored to popularity at Athens as something of a Periclean prototype. Later in the fifth century, Athens even retrieved his bones from Persia so

that he could be laid to rest in Athenian soil. Thus Themistocles came to represent the quintessential Athenian, skilled in all types of cleverness—and in rhetoric especially.

Yet Themistocles is not the only skillful rhetorician in the Salamis narrative. Artemisia’s advice to the Persian King, for example, is even longer than Themistocles’ speech at 8.60, presenting—like Themistocles—the benefits of her plan against the disastrous results that she expects from the present course (8.68). Like Themistocles, she begins her speech by recognizing the unique demands of her audience, urging Mardonius to “speak to the King for me, and tell him that I—whose actions were neither cowardly nor negligible in the battle off Euboea—say the following…” (εἰπέτεν μοι πρὸς βασιλέα, Μαρδόνιε, ὃς ἐγὼ τάδε λέγω, οὕτε κακίστη γενομένη ἐν τῇ σι ναυμαχίῃ τῇ σι πρὸς Εὔβοιῃ οὕτε ἐλάχιστα ἀποδεξαμένη, 8.68.α). She recognizes that it is the King, not Mardonius, whom she has to impress, and so uses evidence that applies specifically to Xerxes and not Mardonius to make her point. Again like Themistocles, she ends her speech with a gnomic utterance: “Good men tend to have bad slaves, whereas bad men tend to have good slaves” (τοῖσι μὲν χρηστοῖσι τῶν ἄνθρωπων κακοὶ δοῦλοι φιλέουσι γίνεσθαι, τοῖσι δὲ κακοῖσι χρηστοῖ, 8.68.γ). And as to her speech, even though it does not ultimately convince the King, it is nonetheless expertly crafted: the first part of her speech is grammatically and logically complex, while the second part is direct and effective in its candor. Furthermore, the Greeks would immediately recognize her advice—to wait for the quarrelsome Greeks to disperse

66 Schol Aristoph.: 37 (1.84); cf. Evans 1991: 91 n.11; Baragwanath 2008: 293 n.9; Blösel 2012: 232. See also Frost 1980: 10. “[The Athenians] would have remembered Themistocles with appreciation. His ambition, his quick wits, his ability to make a little money on the side—these were all qualities they admired.”

67 E.g., Lys. 2.42. Cf. Avezzù 1998; Hesk 2013: 56. Whether this picture of Themistocles equally suits a mid-420s Athenian audience is immaterial, since the rest of the narrative reflects an earlier composition date; here I only argue that Herodotus’ treatment of Themistocles reflects the interests of an Athenian audience. Still, some facets of Themistocles’ portrayal suggest an earlier date: for example, Blösel 2001: 186 points out that Themistocles’ rough treatment of Euboea (8.19) would have been shameful to an audience of Athenians in 420; not so in the 440s, when Euboea actively revolted against Athens.

68 Indeed, the speech is full of gnomic utterance: cf. Lang 1984: 59.

69 See Bowie 2007: 152 for a more in depth analysis of the speech’s structure.
(8.68.β.1)—as valuable and a marked improvement on Xerxes’ eventual course of action.

Xerxes’ failure to heed Artemisia’s advice comes not from any inadequacy of the queen’s speech so much as from the failures of her audience, Mardonius and (through him) Xerxes.

Still, Artemisia at first seems an odd heroine to offer to an Athenian audience: after all, she fought for the Persians against the Greeks. But such an allegiance seems not to have been particularly damning for monarchs, inasmuch as Alexander I too receives the benefit of Athenian respect and even praise in the Plataea narrative (8.143.3). Besides, on closer examination, many of Artemisia’s attributes make her an ideal choice. Her gender-charged rhetoric (8.68.α.1) and effectiveness in battle (8.87–8) serve to emphasize her remarkable status as female warrior, recalling the popular Athenian story of the Amazonomachy that was featured on the Parthenon (a building commissioned and begun around the mid-fifth century) and in funeral orations. 70 In fact, this same connection is made explicit several decades later, when Aristophanes associates Artemisia with the Amazons in his Lysistrata (675) and Thesmophoriazusae (1200)—references that by themselves imply a certain appreciation for Artemisia among Athenians. Whether this appreciation was the result of Herodotus’ efforts or merely an affinity that Herodotus is here taking advantage of, Artemisia must have been popular with Athenian audiences. Even Artemisia’s name serves to celebrate the Athenian success at Artemisium, which she evokes as described earlier in the epideictic narrative (8.9–10, 14, and 16) by referring to it explicitly in her speech (8.68.α.1). All this, along with her shared Halicarnassian nationality with Herodotus,

70 For the Parthenon, see Meiggs 1963: 38-39; Hurwitt 1999:224; Stuttard 2013: esp. 120-124. For funeral orations, see Lysias 2.4; Demosthenes 60.8; Plato, Menexenus 239b; cf. Loraux 1981 (2006): 208–209.
makes Artemisia a perfect heroine for this narrative—and an ideal complement to Themistocles. Athenian audiences would probably have reveled in the exploits of the clever pair.\footnote{Admittedly, Herodotus attests a certain Athenian resentment toward Artemisia at the time (for her gender, 8.93.2), but Artemisia’s heroization would have served to endear her—a sort of enemy-celebration—and her status as woman warrior served equally to recall the Amazons, a popular Athenian propaganda narrative.}

[2] Naval and Maritime Subjects

Since interest in rhetoric was such a broad phenomenon in fifth-century Greece (albeit highly concentrated in Athens), a second criterion will help narrow the focus: an interest in ships and maritime excellence. Athens was the premiere naval power of the fifth-century, dominating its Aegean empire with an overwhelming force of triremes, so it stands to reason that naval and maritime details would suit an Athenian audience \cite{Ps.-Xenophon, Const. Ath. 1.19-20}. Of course, as with rhetoric, interest in naval matters was by no means exclusive to Athens: other Greek states such as Corinth and Aegina were port cities with large navies too, if not as large as Athens. But when combined with an interest in democracy and rhetoric, an interest in naval and maritime details limits the likely candidates to a list of one—Athens. Eric Robinson has argued convincingly against the common misconception (dating back to the Old Oligarch, \textit{Const. Ath.} 1.2) that democracy and a navy go hand in hand. Rather, he comes to the conclusion that Athens was in fact the only attested mid-fifth century democracy that also constituted a significant naval power.\footnote{Robinson 2011: 236.} So the combination of these interests is in fact highly suggestive of an Athenian audience.

Indeed, the narrative’s concern with naval matters is quite apparent. Admittedly, the Battle of Salamis was first and foremost a naval battle, so some discussion of ships and naval warfare is inevitable. However, Herodotus includes three naval elements that transcend the bare requirements of a sea battle narrative: [a] the specific and expansive catalogues of Greek ships (a
well-known Homeric device but largely unparalleled in the *Histories*); [b] a discerning inclusion of specific naval tactics; and [c] a lively engagement with demonstrations of swimming skill (or lack thereof). All three elements have no necessary place even in a naval battle narrative unless Herodotus expected his audience to have an interest in naval and maritime affairs.

[a] Although Herodotus elsewhere tallies the Persian ships (7.89-99), only in the Salamis narrative does he extensively catalogue a gathering of Greek naval forces. Before Lade, Herodotus only gives the numbers briefly as a description of their battle formation (6.8); in the narrative of Artemisium preceding Thermopylae, only three Greek ships are listed despite the entire fleet being present and even engaging the Persians (7.179; 7.194). In fact, the catalogue that precedes Artemisium is only a precursor of that in the Salamis narrative, giving the Salamis narrative not one but two catalogues of Greek ships (8.1-2; 8.42-48). The first list admittedly lacks extensive detail (although it is still the second-most pointed and extensive in the *Histories*), but the list before Salamis contains more length and detail than any other list of Greek forces that Herodotus gives, on land or at sea.\(^73\) Furthermore, both catalogues are sensitive to subtleties in naval terminology and are careful to distinguish between triremes, triaconters, and penteconters (a distinction paralleled only by the Persian catalogue, 7.97). Thus these catalogues represent an abiding interest in naval assemblies, much like Homer’s own catalogue of ships (*Il.* 2.484-877).

In fact, although the second catalogue is much shorter than Homer’s, it nonetheless imbuces the forthcoming battle with heroic expectations—an epic echo that the Athenians (whose role in the Homeric catalogue was notoriously slight, 2.546-56) would surely have appreciated, especially since Herodotus’ catalogue noticeably privileges the Athenians as *promachoi*.\(^74\) Both

\(^{73}\) Bowie 2007: 88-90, 133.

\(^{74}\) Marincola (forthcoming): 20. Note also that, like Homer’s, the Salamis catalogue proceeds by geographic region (Bowie 2007: 133). On Herodotus’ relationship to Homer in general, see Rengakos 2006; Bowie 2012: esp. 271.
catalogues in the Salamis narrative praise the Athenian contribution above all others: the list before Artemisium counts the Athenians first and notes that they not only provided more than three times as many ships as any other Greek state but also furnished ships for the Plataeans and Chalcidians (8.1.1); and before the Salamis catalogue, the Athenian contribution is again mentioned first and singled out not only for its quantity, but also for its quality (πολλῷ πλείστας τε καὶ ἅριστα πλωούσας, 8.42.2). Thus, although a catalogue of ships might be appreciated by all Greeks alike for its evocation of Homeric precedent, these particular catalogues would be especially welcome to Athenians.

Still, the Salamis catalogue is also markedly shorter than that of the Persian forces in Book Seven (7.60-99) and so might be considered less significant by comparison. If the Salamis narrative should be isolated as epideictic, of course, such comparisons are rendered invalid: the only relevant precedent would be that of Homer, and the Salamis catalogue would not have suffered for failing to equal such lofty competition. Yet the apparently lesser scope of the Salamis catalogue may also be explained by performance constraints. Both of the longer catalogues serve as introductions to much larger conflicts (Homer to the Trojan War, the Persian catalogue to Xerxes’ entire invasion), but if Herodotus wished to include the entire narrative of Salamis in a single epideictic performance, he would have needed to limit this catalogue’s length. Thus Herodotus effectively scales the catalogue to his present narrative (appx. six percent of the epideixis),75 evoking the epic flavor of the Homeric catalogue of ships without using too much narrative space.

[b] Discussion of naval tactics in Herodotus is also remarkably confined to the Salamis narrative. In the rest of the Histories, Herodotus includes a specific naval tactic only once: the

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75 The Iliad catalogue represents appx. 3% of the total work, while Herodotus’ catalogue of Persian forces comes to appx. 5% of the last three books. See Appendix [a] for the possibility that 8.1-89 does not in fact represent the whole epideixis; if so, the epideictic catalogue may in fact be closer to the proportion of the other two catalogues.
breakthrough maneuver as performed by the Greeks at Lade (διέκπλοος, 6.12.1 and 6.15.2). The Salamis narrative, by contrast, contains a wealth of naval tactics. Not only does Herodotus recount the Greek use of the same breakthrough maneuver as at Lade (διέκπλοος, 8.9),76 he also mentions the use of tactical symbols (σύνθημα, 8.7.2; ἔσήμηνε, 8.11.1), an encircling maneuver (ἐκκυκλοῦντο, 8.10.1),77 a hedgehog maneuver (πρῶτα μὲν ἀντίπρωροι τοῖς βαρβάροις γενόμενοι ἐς τὸ μέσον τὰς πρύμνας συνήγαγον, 8.11.1), and the act of ramming the enemy’s vessel (ἐμβάλλει, 8.84). These latter three tactics are narrated only here in Herodotus and imply an audience with a certain technical sophistication in naval maneuvers—a sophistication which many Athenians would have acquired in their years of naval service.78

[c] Finally, the Salamis narrative appears to take a certain pleasure in Greek swimming expertise. At 8.8, Herodotus tells the story of the Chalcidicean diver Skyllias, who is said to have deserted to the Greeks at Artemisium by “swimming underwater through the sea for almost nine miles” (σταδίους μάλιστα κη τούτους ἐς ὕδωκοντα διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης διεξελθών, 8.8.2). Although Herodotus hesitates to believe this and other stories about Skyllias, his inclusion of the story here implies that he expected his audience to be interested nonetheless. Similarly, at 8.89.1 Herodotus relates—almost smugly—how many Greeks survived the wreck of their ships at Salamis because they could swim, but the Persians died due to their own inability (8.89.2). This latter story in fact seems rather suspect, considering how many of the Persian forces were composed not of mainland Persians but of the seafaring Ionians, Egyptians, and Phoenicians. This anecdote, then, must serve primarily to extoll Greek ability in swimming, an observation

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76 Bowie 2007: 101 marks this maneuver as “relatively new” and points out that “it required considerable skill and practice to get right.” Cf. the Ionian disgruntlement at training for the breakthrough maneuver, 6.12.2-4.


that would presumably be most appreciated by Greeks who could in fact swim. By contrast, the rest of the *Histories* mentions swimming only once: at 8.129.2, where Persian land forces drown in a sudden flood tide. Thus the Salamis narrative’s interest in swimming seems relatively unique when compared to the rest of the *Histories*.

[3] **Athenian and Phocian Topography**

The topography of Athens is also featured heavily in the Salamis narrative, especially in the Persian siege of the Athenian acropolis (8.52-55). The Persians besiege the Acropolis from “the neighboring hill, which the Athenians call ‘Areopagus’” (τὸν καταντίον τῆς ἀκροπόλιος ὄχθον, τὸν Ἀθηναίοι καλέουσι Ἀρήμον πάγον, 8.52.1) in a passage that closely mirrors Aeschylus’ mid-fifth century description of the Athenian Amazonomachy (*Eumenides* 685-90), “the temple of Aglaurus, the daughter of Cecrops” (κατὰ τὸ ἱρὸν τῆς Κέκροπος θυγατρὸς Ἀγλαύρου, 8.53.1) is used as a geographical marker, but without any explanation for a non-Athenian audience which likely would have been unfamiliar with this particular space; Herodotus also assumes knowledge of the Shrine of Erechtheus when he narrates the miraculous story of the olive tree’s rapid re-growth—and he does so while evoking the same story of Athena competing with Poseidon for patronage of Athens that is depicted on the Parthenon, the construction of

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79 Cf. Hall 1994: 56. “[The Greeks had] a cultural pride in their prowess in the water, and a conviction that it was one of the many features which signified their superiority over non-Greek peoples and enabled them to beat them in sea-battles.” See also Bowie 2007: 98-99.

80 The presence of this anecdote may even be explained by its closely following the Salamis narrative: if the method of final composition is as I have proposed, the story of Persians drowning due to their lack of swimming ability at Salamis would have been on Herodotus’ mind as he wrote down this later passage.

81 Of course, whether Athens had any great interest in swimming is difficult to determine, but considering its location on the Aegean and the importance of its navy we may at least consider such an interest likely.

82 Krentz 1997: 64-65.

83 Other examples of such descriptions rely on larger, more geographical markers like mountains or rivers (e.g., Mt Tmolus at 1.84.3, Mt Aegaleos at 8.90.4). Most narratives of besieged acropolises however contain practically no geographical detail whatsoever (e.g., Lycia 1.176.1, Samos 3.143-147, Sardis 1.15, 1.154, 5.100, Susa 3.79.1). There is some controversy concerning this particular sanctuary of Aglauros, but I find Dontas (1983: 58-61) ultimately convincing in his defense of Herodotus’ knowledge of Athens here. Cf. Podlecki 1977: 259; S. West 1985: 285 n.30.
which was begun in the mid-fifth century (8.55).\textsuperscript{84} Thus even when the narrative is darkest for the Athenians, Herodotus uses landmarks to evoke and celebrate the eventual Athenian triumph and the continuity of its rites and customs.

Herodotus assumes familiarity with Athens outside of the siege too. For example, Herodotus recounts an annual ritual with a snake and a honeycomb that takes place on the Athenian Acropolis (8.41.2-3); he also recalls the Eleusinian festival in a prophetic sign witnessed by the Athenian Dicaeus (8.65.4). He uses an Athenian name to identify the “Scironian Road” (τὴν Σκειρωνίδα ὁδόν, 8.71.2)\textsuperscript{85} and mentions the local landmark “The Hollows of Euboea” as though its location were well-known (τὰ Κοῖλα τῆς Εὐβοίης, 8.13). Herodotus even casually refers to topographical markers like Phalerum (8.66.1), Psyttaleia (8.76.1), and Piraeus (8.85.1) which would have been familiar to the Athenians but less so for other Greeks. These details and anecdotes are not only most suited to an Athenian audience, they might even be cryptic or unintelligible to an audience unfamiliar with Athenian customs and geography.\textsuperscript{86}

The geography of Phocis is similarly featured earlier in the Salamis narrative as a function of Xerxes’ destructive progress through territory that he considers hostile.\textsuperscript{87} The brief aside on Phocian history that Herodotus includes as a prologue to the Persian invasion features

\textsuperscript{84} Meiggs 1963: 38-39.

\textsuperscript{85} Bowie 2007: 161 (ad loc) traces the history of the path’s designation: “Named after Sciron the Megarian who, in Athenian tradition, treacherously pushed travelers to their deaths along that path. The Megarians also had a polemarch of that name who was supposed to have opened the route, but his relation to the road is unclear and the Athenian tradition better explains the road’s name.” At the least, the name would have added significance to Athenians, even if to Megarians as well. Cf. Pausanias 1.44.6-10.

\textsuperscript{86} Against the objection that these anecdotes would be uninteresting to an Athenian audience who was already familiar with these stories, see my discussion of 8.44.2 and Athenian fascination with their own heritage and culture above, pp. 97-98.

\textsuperscript{87} Herodotus has many invasion narratives in the \textit{Histories} (e.g. 1.6.3, 15-18, 103.3; 2.161; 3.25, 144-47; 4.87-143; 5.1-16, 100-101; 6.92.1; 7.118-19), but—excepting the Scythian invasion (4.87-143), which doubles as an ethnography—this is by far the most detailed, both in geography and in narrative.
important Phocian sites like Mt. Parnassus (8.27.3), the sanctuary at Abae (8.27.4), and the pass of Hyampolis (8.28). Similarly, the geographic arrangement of the cities that were sacked by the Persians not only showcases Herodotus’ knowledge of Phocian geography but also implies that the audience too would have had that knowledge. Beginning with 8.32.1, Herodotus’ narrative proceeds in geographical order from Tithorea, “an isolated peak which overlooks the town of Neon” (ἡ κορυφή <ἡ> κατὰ Νέωνα πόλιν κειμένη ἐπ’ ἐως τῆς, 8.32.1), to Amphissa on the plain of Crisa, to the Cephisus River, and following its banks the Persians sack—still in geographical order—Drymus, Charadra, Erochus, Tithronium, Amphiclaea, Neon, Pedieis, Triteae, Elateia, Hyampolis, Parapotamii, and Abae, with an additional recognition of Abae’s renown as a sanctuary of Apollo (8.33). Then, after a brief hiatus, Herodotus resumes his geographically-organized list of sacked Phocian cities with the cities of the Panopeans, the Daulians, and the Aeolians (8.35.1). Herodotus has clearly concerned himself with staying faithful to the geography of a region that would have been relatively unknown to many Greeks; but this territory and its faithful description would be immediately recognized by those who lived and travelled there regularly (i.e. Athenians and their Phocian allies).

The combination of these two geographical descriptions reflects an Athenian audience of the mid-fifth century in two ways. First, as I’ve shown in Chapter II (pp. 77-78), the pairing of Athens and Phocis is outdated by the late-fifth century, when Phocis had joined the Spartans against the Athenians in the Archidamian War. The mid-fifth century is the only time when any particular audience would care about both Phocis and Athens. Second, it may seem that Herodotus’ blow-by-blow recounting of the painful and tragic destruction of Phocis and Attica would have been unwelcome or embittering to an Athenian or Phocian audience, but in fact the

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88 Only Hyampolis of these is even remotely out of order—and that only just. It should be mentioned, however, that the location of Tritea is unknown; a second city of that name in Ozolian Locris does not appear to have been sacked nor does it apply to Herodotus’ narrative here.
Athenians were proud of what they and their allies had suffered at the hands of the Persian invasion. The ruins of the temples and monuments which were burned in the Persian War were not only preserved by the Athenians, they were memorialized and forbidden to be rebuilt. These ruins were a testament to Athens’ (and probably Phocis’) refusal to medize, a point of particular pride in the mid-fifth century when issues of medism were of great importance to individual poleis’ standing in the Greek community (cf. 9.13.2). Thus Herodotus, by validating a specific mainstay of mid-fifth century Athenian ideology, describes the details of the Athenian and Phocian countryside in a way that Athenians would not only appreciate but celebrate.


Another motif in the Salamis narrative, again unique in the Histories (except at 9.9.2 [in the Plataea epideixis] and 7.139-144 [see Appendix [a]]), is the effectiveness of a navy as the primary means of a state’s defense, and on the other hand the ineffectiveness of walls without a navy to back them up. Thus Eurybiades is entirely persuaded by Themistocles’ assertion that “the whole war depends on the fleet” (τὸ πᾶν γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῦ πολέμου φέρουσι αἱ νέες, 8.62.1); thus Themistocles cows Adeimantus the Corinthian by arguing that, even lacking a physical city, “so long as they had two hundred fully-manned ships, Athens could claim a city and land even better than theirs—for none of the Greeks could repel their attack” (ὡς εἶη καὶ πόλις καὶ γῆ μέξων ἂ περ ἐκείνοις ἐστ’ ἀν διηκόσια νέες σφὶ ἔωσι πεπληρωμέναι· οὐδὰμοις γὰρ Ἑλλήνων

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89 Boersma 1970: 43-44; Meiggs 1972: 504-507; Ferrari 2002: 28; Rhodes 2016: 149. Cf. Yates 2011: 92-93: “The restoration of a temple within a state is a state matter. It needs a state explanation with or without recourse to an oath. I believe the decision not to restore temples makes most sense from a commemorative point of view. For thirty years, and in some cases longer, temples within Athens and throughout Attica were left charred and in ruins. Even in the imperial period Pausanias can point out two Athenian temples that showed the marks of Xerxes’ invasion (10.35.2). Like Berlin’s Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtnis-Kirche or Coventry’s St. Micheal’s Cathedral, such memorials would have had immense power, drawing particular attention to the devastation wrought on Athens.”

90 See, for example, Pericles’ mid-century attempt to organize a Panhellenic congress to discuss “the Hellenic sanctuaries which the Barbarians had burned down” (περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱερῶν, ὁ κατέχαςαν οἱ βάρβαροι, Per. 17.1); cf. Stater 1989: 201-204.
αὐτῶς ἔπιόντας ἀποκρούσσεσθαι, 8.61.2); thus the oblique reference to the famous oracle (ξύλινον τεῖχος, 8.51.2; cf. 7.141.3) that describes the wall—rightly interpreted as ships—as “impregnable” (ἀνάλωτον), a term of utter confidence that in fact does not appear in the famous oracle cited at 7.141.3. So the argument of the Plataea narrative, that the Isthmian Wall is vain without Athens to defend the sea (9.9.2), applies equally to the Salamis narrative, and this section too must be intended for an audience that trusts physical walls only so far as it trusts its ships and the men who row them.

Although Athens was far from the only city in fifth-century Greece to rely on walls for defense, only their ascendant navy allowed the Athenians to vaunt the walls as true security: after the long walls were built (c. 460), a siege of Athens would be almost entirely ineffective so long as Athens had access to the sea. Until the end of the fifth century, no other polis could match Athens’ power at sea, and so Herodotus’ validation and celebration of sea-power suits an Athenian audience far better than any other fifth-century polis. In fact, Pericles’ famous refusal to meet the Spartans on land was first applied in the Archidamian War, when Athens had consolidated its naval forces and—after a period of significant naval setbacks and unrest among its maritime allies—restored its unchallenged naval supremacy in the Aegean. Without such absolute confidence in Athenian naval power, Athens could not have been as confident in their Long Walls as they were at the outset of the Archidamian War.

But the late-fifth century was not the only time that Athens relied on its ships, walls, and men: the same attitude characterized the mid-fifth century, when the first two long walls were

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91 Cf. 7.141.3, “τεῖχος...ξύλινον.” I argue in Appendix [a] for the association of the oracle logos (7.139-144) with the Salamis epideixis. The later passage does not depend on or explicitly refer to the earlier discussion of the oracle in any way, but the ancient reader would certainly have gained from the context and detail that the earlier passage provides.

92 Conwell 2008: 37-54.

Initially built. Indeed, the outer walls take for granted a complete control of the sea, since there is a large space between Piraeus and Phalerum where a navy might be able to land a force if they were unchallenged by an Athenian fleet. The construction of the outer walls, then, relied on the unquestioned Athenian naval supremacy that followed the destruction of the Persian fleet at Eurymedon (early 460s) and Athens’ steady consolidation of power over the Delian League. Thus the long walls would ensure that Athenian food supplies, especially grain from the black sea, would not be interrupted even if a land invasion succeeded. After 446, however, Athens built a third wall—a middle wall—which action David Conwell convincingly argues reflected the collapse of confidence that Athens felt in its navy and naval allies during that period. Not until the failure of the Sicilian Expedition in 413 was Athenian confidence in its navy again so low. Thus such a confident attitude toward the value of a navy—combined with so dismissive of an attitude against walls without a navy—suits two audiences: an Athenian audience of the Archidamian War, and an Athenian audience of the mid-fifth century.

Furthermore, Carol Dougherty has argued that this very ideological nexus—that of ships, walls, and men—became a cornerstone of Athenian ideology in the years following the Persian Wars, especially observable in Athenian tragedy. Aeschylus twice invokes the theme of ships, walls, and men in his plays of the mid-fifth century. *Persae* (472) uses precisely the same concept of citizens as a city’s only meaningful wall that Herodotus featured (8.61): “As long as there are men, the city [Athens] stands secure” (ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἔρκος ἐστίν ἄσφαλές, *Persae* 349). Likewise, his *Seven Against Thebes* (dated to 467) emphasizes the equation of ships with

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95 Conwell 2008: 55-60.
96 Conwell 2008: 74-77.
97 Dougherty 2014: esp. 131-32.
98 Tr. Benardete, in Grene and Lattimore 2013.
walls by its recurring nautical imagery (758-65, 795-98).\textsuperscript{99} In fact, the imagery remained potent into the later fifth-century: Sophocles closely imitated Herodotus’ wooden-wall imagery in his \textit{Oedipus the King} (dated c. 429; lines 54-57), presumably because his Athenian audience would recognize and appreciate its potency.\textsuperscript{100} Therefore, although it is difficult to assign this thematic association of ships, walls, and men to a specific historical context, its consistent and confident usage in Herodotus strongly implies an Athenian audience; at the least, Athenians would have appreciated Herodotus’ use of the motif.

[5] \textit{Local and Oracular Religion}

One final element of the Salamis narrative may help determine a mid-fifth century composition date as well as an Athenian audience: its concentration of local religious lore. The Salamis narrative contains more references to the prophets Bacis and Musaeus than any other comparable stretch of the \textit{Histories} and more citations of non-Delphic oracles than the rest of the \textit{Histories} combined: three out of five occur in the Salamis episode, and a fourth occurs in the Plataea narrative.\textsuperscript{101} Non-Delphic oracle-givers (\textit{chresmologoi}) and prophets are also given far greater attention and respect in this narrative than anywhere else in the \textit{Histories}: Herodotus celebrates the role of a Phocian diviner in battle at 8.27.3-4 much as he celebrates Hegesistratus and Tisamenus in the Plataea narrative (9.33-37)—in fact, Tellias is the eponymous patriarch of the tribe of Telliads, of which Hegesistratus is “most noteworthy” (τῶν Τελλιαδέων ἐόντα λογιμωτάτον, 9.37.1). The confirmation of one oracle of Bacis even prompts Herodotus to

\textsuperscript{99} Dougherty 2014: 145-46.

\textsuperscript{100} Dougherty 2014: 148-49. Although the later date of this tragedy is compatible with a publication of the \textit{Histories} just after the start of the Archidamian War, its use as a reference here implies popular familiarity with the theme (inasmuch as tragedy was performed for the general population of Athens). Either Herodotus’ treatment of the ships, walls, and men reflected an established Athenian portrayal of Salamis, or Herodotus’ version of the motif was in some way distributed widely prior to 429 (i.e., by public performance).

\textsuperscript{101} This tally includes the oracle in the possible epideictic material at 8.96. The fifth oracle is recorded in the Croesus narrative at the beginning of Book One, which itself shows signs of epideictic composition (see Appendix [b]).
generally affirm the entire genre of the *chresmologoi*, inasmuch as he “cannot deny the truth of such oracles” (χρησμοῖσι δὲ οὐκ ἔχω ἀντιλέγειν ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ ἀληθέες, 8.77.1). The Salamis narrative, then, contains a remarkable affirmation of and preoccupation with Boeotian and Phocian religion—appropriate for an Athenian audience in the midst of fighting the Second Sacred War in Boeotia on behalf of the Phocians (see Chapter II, pp. 77-78).

Nor does the Salamis narrative ignore the Delphic Oracle, control of which constituted the primary contest of the Second Sacred War. Only in the Salamis episode does action actually occur *in Delphi* as it does at 8.35-39, where Herodotus explicitly celebrates the power of that sanctuary and the validity of its authority by recording multiple divine occurrences (which ultimately succeeded at protecting an entirely undefended shrine, 8.37). Furthermore, Herodotus explicitly attests to *Phocis’* piety and dedication to the oracle of Delphi by recording their dedications to Delphi after their defeat of the Thessalians (8.27.5). As with Bacis and Musaeus, then, Herodotus’ treatment of Delphi is well suited to the sacred-war context identified in the first chapter and furthermore includes anecdotes that would legitimize Phocian control over the Delphic sanctuary.

Furthermore, Herodotus’ attitude toward religion here is inconsistent with his approach elsewhere, which tends to dismiss or at least refrain from engaging questions about the veracity of mystical events. I cited above the remarkably blanket confirmation that attended Herodotus’ rendering of an oracle of Bacis (8.77.1); this instance is by no means the limit of such sentiment in the Salamis narrative. Whereas Herodotus is generally quite skeptical of even the most unremarkable portentous occurrence, the miraculous events at Delphi (involving the spontaneous

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102 A notable departure from his usual, more skeptical stance (see below, pp. 131-32). However, see Bowie 2007: 166-67 for a summary of the objections made to this passage’s authenticity.


movement of armor, thunderbolts, falling rocks, and the appearance of two giant phantoms, 8.37-39) receive no word of skepticism or distancing such as the legetai that Herodotus often employs; rather, he uses legein only as a confirmation of sorts, to identify the names of the two phantoms (τούτους δὲ τούς δύο Δελφοί λέγουσι εἶναι ἐπιχωρίους ἥρωας, Φύλακόν τε καὶ Αὐτόνοον, 8.39.1). Herodotus furthermore attests to the physical evidence from this conflict as remaining observable even in his own day (ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἡμέας ἦσαν σόοι, 8.39.2). Similarly, the portentous dust storm that arises on the plain of Eleusis (8.65) and the phantasm of a woman that admonishes the retreating Greeks before the battle (8.84.2) are both recorded without skepticism.\(^\text{105}\) Herodotus even explicitly attributes the storm before Artemision to divine will: “All this was done by the gods so that the Persian numbers might be closer to the Greeks”’ (ἐποίετό τε πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὦκως ὃν ἔξισωθεὶ τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ τὸ Περσικὸν μηδὲ πολλῷ πλέον εἴη, 8.13). To these we might add Herodotus’ discussion of the feud between Athena and Poseidon for the patronage of Athens (8.55), which is depicted on the Parthenon,\(^\text{106}\) and a prophecy’s glorification of Nike (8.77.2), who is closely associated with Athena and the subject of another Acropolis temple begun in the 440s.\(^\text{107}\) Thus Herodotus’ respect for and trust in religious forces of all brands stands out in the Salamis narrative, especially considering his general policy of disbelieving—or at least questioning—divine intervention elsewhere in the \textit{Histories}.\(^\text{108}\)

Such respect and trust in the divine suits the context of the mid-fifth century sacred war well, as I have shown, but the same cannot be said for attitudes of the Archidamian War later in

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\(^{105}\) See also in the possibly-epideictic post-Aeginetan material, where Herodotus implicitly believes that the boat which restrained the Corinthian retreat was “sent by some god” (κέλητα θείῃ πομπῇ, 8.94.2), presumably Athena Skiras, and that the oracle of Lysistratus of Athens was fulfilled by the wreckage on the Colian shore (8.96.2).


\(^{107}\) Hurwitt 1999: 160-61. Still, the dating of this temple remains controversial, as Hurwitt dutifully admits.

the fifth century. After Sparta disrupted Athenian plans and re-established the Delphians as guardians of the Pythian oracle, Athens became less concerned with oracular religion, relying more and more on their own local religious observances (e.g., the Eleusinian Mysteries, the Thesmophoria, etc.). Of course, Athens hardly ceased to care about the Delphic Oracle—plenty of evidence indicates that Delphi remained important in the Athenian mindset—but many of the religious themes and initiatives adopted by Athens in the mid-fifth century gave way to more practical, secular strategies in the later fifth century. It seems that Delphi too inverted its position toward Athens, changing from remarkably pro-Athenian in the mid-fifth century—when the oracle described Athens as an “eagle in the clouds for all time” (αἰετὸς ἐν νεφέλησι γενήσεαι ἣματα πάντα, P&W 121)—to pro-Spartan on the eve of the Archidamian War.

And as to the prophecies of Bacis, Musaeus, and Lysistratus which are so celebrated and revered in the Salamis narratives, Athenian perception of ‘oraclemongers’ and traditional religion in the late-fifth century was a different matter altogether: oraclemongers were scorned as profiteering good-for-nothings and such prominent figures as Plato and Thucydides proved remarkably cynical with respect to theology and the divine. Thus once again Herodotus’ narrative of Salamis, just like his Plataea narrative, is far better suited to an Athenian audience of the mid-fifth century than to any other Hellenic audience.

109 Osborne 1999: 330; Bowden 2005: 62; Scott 2010: 101. “It seems that Athens’s disillusionment with Delphi, perhaps understandably, grew considerably during this period.” (Scott 2014: 134-35). This may have been a function of the war itself, which often cut off Athenian access to the oracle.

110 E.g., Xen. Anab. 3.1; Plat. Apol. 21a. Cf. Bowden 2005: 60, 64.


113 For mockery of oraclemongers, see e.g., Aristophanes, Frogs 1032-35. Cf. the story of the Athenian oraclemonger Onomocritus earlier in the Histories, where he encourages Xerxes to invade Greece by suggestively applying his trade—an action more in line with late-fifth century sentiment. For the general attitudes of literary Athenians like Thucydides and Plato, cf. Fontenrose 1978: 145-65; Morgan 1992: esp. 231-32; Bowden 2005: 35.
Conclusion

Although any of these topics on its own may be insufficient to identify both audience and date, their combined evidence is remarkably instructive: to sum up, the Salamis narrative’s portrayal of rhetoric indicates at least a democratic audience, and (if Athenian) probably prior to 430; its naval interests, if combined with the portrayal of rhetoric, help limit the ‘democratic audience’ to only Athens; the geographical focus of the narrative indicates an audience that is at least highly familiar with Athens, Attica, and Phocis, probably in the mid-fifth century; the ideological nexus of ships, walls, and men again reflects Athens, but throughout the fifth century; and the concern with oracular religion (again, if the audience can be assumed to be Athenian) reflects a mid-fifth century audience and the context of the Second Sacred War. Thus the prominence given to these five subjects and the occurrence of many of the same elements that helped date the Plataea epideixis (especially its apparent political alignment) combine to imply a specific audience: as with the Plataea narrative, Herodotus composed his version of the Battle of Salamis for Athenians in the mid-fifth century.
CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLAE: 7.172 – 7.233

My methodology to this point has been to identify passages that exhibit a demonstrable Athenian slant, uncharacteristic of other parts of the Histories—such that it would have been unpalatable to a late-fifth century Panhellenic audience—and to ascribe those prolonged sections to the obvious audience: Athenians. But Athens was by no means the only important polis in mid-fifth century Greece. Furthermore, if Herodotus was in fact a ‘wisdom-performer’, he would have performed not in only one city, but in many, travelling the Greek world in search of willing audiences and patrons. Therefore we may reason that other sections of the Histories were influenced by non-Athenian audiences. Such, I argue, is the case of the Thermopylae narrative, which reflects the interests and sympathies of a mid-century Amphictyonic audience, most likely gathered at the Panhellenic Pythian Festival. This non-Athenian audience thus provides a contrast not only with the framing narrative of the Histories, but also with the epideixis identified in Chapters II and III, further illuminating Herodotus’ methodology and authorial approach to the Persica material.

In general, however, seeking such an audience presents difficulties. First, Greece was a large and complicated place: the task of cycling through every possible candidate for a Herodotean performance venue and matching each with some as-yet-unidentified part taken from the whole Histories would be herculean, if not impossible. So our methodology will instead be

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to isolate a specific, likely audience for Herodotus and consider which passage might suit that audience. The second difficulty, however, is far greater: we have very little historical or literary information about any non-Athenian state in the mid-fifth century, and most of the information that does exist comes from Athenian sources. Thus our best source for the Pentekontaetia, the roughly fifty years that fell between the Persian Wars (where Herodotus’ narrative ends) and the Peloponnesian Wars (the subject of Thucydides’ history) is Thucydides himself, in the fewer than thirty chapters that preface his treatment of the later conflict.\(^1\) This source, even if it weren’t written by an Athenian, would inevitably skew toward an Atheno-centric perspective, especially since Thucydides chronicled those years to explain the rise of Athens and Athenian power (Thuc. 1.89.1). Almost all other sources are either late, fragmentary, or heavily-influenced by Athenian sources, leaving mainly inference and material evidence to fill in the gaps. Thus any analysis of non-Athenian audiences in the Histories must be equal parts cautious and open-minded. Given these difficulties, I proceed not from the immediate observation of an audience in the text, but rather from an exploration of Herodotus’ most likely performance venues. In the end, I will argue that Delphi—specifically the Pythian festival—would provide the ideal performance context for Herodotus’ narrative of Thermopylae.

**Performance at a Panhellenic Festival**

Aside from Plutarch’s transmission of Diyllus (discussed at length in the introduction, pp. 10-12),\(^2\) the only other direct testimony we have of Herodotus performing his art features a

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\(^1\) Thuc. 1.89-117. As to non-historical evidence, we have several Athenian tragedies which may be dated to the mid-fifth century (e.g., Aeschylus, Agamemnon, Libation Bearers, Eumenides; Sophocles, Ajax, Antigone.), but no such works survive from other Greek cities. Archaic elegy provides the most varied evidence for non-Athenian culture in Ancient Greece, but almost all of it dates to the 6th and 7th centuries BCE and is thus unreliable for the present period at best. Pindar, at least, composed during the mid-fifth century, but his surviving poetry is commissioned to celebrate individuals, and invariably elites, resulting in an inevitably incomplete picture of the cities involved; still, his poetry may be our best contemporary non-Athenian source for the period and so will be treated at length below. For the problems associated with our Atheno-centric material record, see Osborne 1999.

\(^2\) Plut. Her. Mal. 862a-b.
performance at a Panhellenic festival. Lucian records a remarkable and enchanting story of

Herodotus performing at Olympia (Herod. 1-2):

As soon as he sailed from his home in Caria straight for Greece, he bethought himself of the quickest and least troublesome path to fame and a reputation for both himself and his works. To travel round reading his works, now in Athens, now in Corinth or Argos or Lacedaemon in turn, he thought a long and tedious undertaking that would waste much time. The division of his task and the consequent delay in the gradual acquisition of a reputation did not appeal to him, and he formed the plan I suppose of winning the hearts of all the Greeks at once if he could. The great Olympic games were at hand, and Herodotus thought this the opportunity he had been hoping for. He waited for a packed audience to assemble, one containing the most eminent men from all Greece; he appeared in the temple chamber, presenting himself as a competitor for an Olympic honour, not as a spectator; then he recited his Histories and so bewitched his audience that his books were called after the Muses, for they too were nine in number. [2] By this time he was much better known than the Olympic victors themselves. There was no one who had not heard the name of Herodotus—some at Olympia itself, others from those who brought the story back from the festival. He had only to

3 Some scholars, of course, consider many more possible performance venues to be likely, e.g. Stadter 1997: 33. “What occasions did Herodotus or other Greek storytellers have for performance? Our information is restricted, but the possibilities are almost endless: basically, wherever men or mixed groups gather and wish to be entertained or informed.”
appear and he was pointed out: ‘That is that Herodotus who wrote the tale of the Persian Wars in Ionic and celebrated our victories.’\(^4\)

As compelling as Lucian’s narrative is, this source is intensely problematic.\(^5\) For one, Lucian lived in the second century CE, well after Herodotus himself; this chronological gap surfaces most in Lucian’s reference to Herodotus’ nine book divisions, which were not Herodotus’ own and hadn’t become standard even as late as the 1\(^{\text{st}}\) century BCE.\(^6\) Furthermore, Lucian’s style is jaunty and often satirical, prone to favor a good narrative over historical proof.\(^7\) But even more problematic, Lucian records Herodotus performing the entire Histories—a task which (given the Histories’ length of nearly twice the two Homeric epics combined) would have taken at least fifty hours and required an almost impossible display of endurance (that is, if we take Lucian’s story at face value and assume Herodotus performing alone).\(^8\) These numerous, entirely legitimate objections have prompted scholars as early as Enoch Powell to believe of this story that “the account of the recitation itself … has no great claim to be received.”\(^9\)

But some elements of the story ring true. For example, the most common objection suspects that Lucian must have been conflating his knowledge of sophists as itinerant wisdom-

\(^4\) Tr. Kilburn 1959 (Loeb).

\(^5\) The value of this source as evidence is defended in the Introduction, pp. 9-12.

\(^6\) On book divisions, see Petrie 1908: 276-76; Legrand 1932; Wallinga 1959: 204-53; Brown 1965: 72-75. Cf. Flory 1980: n.10; Johnson 1994: n.32. The earliest reference to a division into nine books is Diod. 11.34.6. For a Herodotean papyrus dating from before the surviving book divisions, see Snell 1929: 2-4; Welles 1939: 208. The ‘Lindian Chronicle’ (dated to c. 1\(^{\text{st}}\) cent. BCE by Blinkenberg 1915: 4) also uses an alternative book division, referring to an event in Book Three as Book Two: «Ἡρόδωτος ... ἐν ταύτῃ τῶν ἱστοριῶν» (29, C 38).

\(^7\) Jones 1986: 46-67. Indeed, Lucian often treated Herodotus in particular with derision (e.g., Lover of Lies 2.14 and True Story 2.5; 2.31), although his regular emulation of Herodotus implies some esteem. Cf. Kirkland (forthcoming): 3.141-51, especially 145 regarding the beginning of Herodotus and Aëtition 1.

\(^8\) Flory 1980: 14. However, see Evans 2009:11 citing Lauri Honko 1998, whose study has observed even longer oral recitations given in India. The objection still holds, however, that no Greek festival known to us would have been long enough for the full performance.

performers in the early fifth-century with a story about Herodotus; fourth- and fifth-century sources alike consider Panhellenic festivals to be great destinations for wisdom-performers and sophists. Plato’s *Hippias Minor* describes such a scene of sophist-epideixis, again set at Olympia and almost as vivid as Lucian’s:

καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινά ποιοίην, ὦ Εὔδικε, εἰ Ὁλυμπίαξε μὲν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πανήγυριν, ὅταν τὰ Ὅλυμπια ἦ, ἀεὶ ἑπανίων οὐκοθεν εὖ Ἡλίδος εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν καὶ λέγοντα ὅτι ἂν τις βούληται ὅν ἂν μοι εἰς ἔπιθεξσιν παρεσκευασμένον ἦ, καὶ ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἂν τις ἔρωτα, νῦν δὲ τὴν Σωκράτους ἐρώτησιν φύγομι. (Plato, *Hip. Min.* 363c-d)

Why, Eudicus, it would be strange conduct on my part, if I, who always go up to Olympia to the festival of the Greeks from my home at Elis, and entering the sacred precinct, offer to speak on anything that anyone chooses of those subjects which I prepared for exhibition, and to answer any questions that anyone asks—should now avoid being questioned by Socrates. Hippias’ description of sophistic performance, though somewhat less grandiose, resembles Lucian’s narrative closely; Lucian may even have had this facet of sophistry in mind. But this resemblance actually lends credibility to Lucian’s account. First, Lucian has laid out this narrative as a rejection of the itinerant sophist’s methods as inefficient—“collecting his recognition by degrees, scraping it together little by little” (οὔδὲ κατὰ διαίρεσιν οὔτω κατ’ ὀλίγον ἀγείρειν καὶ συλλέγειν τὴν γνῶσιν, *Herod.* 1)—so the sophistic model surely was not the full inspiration for Lucian’s narrative. And second, Herodotus’ engagement with the world of sophist-epideixis has now been extensively documented by Rosalind Thomas and has gained general acceptance by scholars. Herodotus’ participation in this world of sophistry makes it

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12 Tr. Fowler 1939 (Loeb). For the possibility that such epideixeis could be narrative in nature, see Plato, *Hip. Mai.* 286a-b; Stader 1997: 33-34.

13 See Introduction, pp. 4-5, and esp. Thomas 2000: 249-69. Hornblower 2004: 33 has even considered “the possibility of local, oral performance, perhaps of certain highly finished episodes” for Thucydides, speculating
likely that he engaged both modes of performance, itinerant and festival. So, what once was cause to disbelieve Lucian’s may actually contain an element of truth. At the least, we cannot dismiss Lucian’s testimony of Herodotus’ performance at Olympia casually.

This possible kernel of truth in Lucian’s story, then, warrants a consideration of the Panhellenic festivals as potential performance venues for Herodotus. Lucian’s own story, whether reliable or not, conveniently assembles many of the festivals’ advantages. First, citizens from all over Greece would have been in attendance (ἀθρόους που λαβεῖν τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀπαντας, Herod. 1), a somewhat rare event in a society so fragmented and decentralized as Ancient Greece. This particular advantage was significant on two levels: [1] in an age before mass media, there was no better opportunity to establish your reputation in so many places at once—imagine the diverse array of individuals, smoldering with enthusiasm for Herodotus’ story-telling, returning to their homes and sparking each city’s desire to hear more from this great Greek historian; and [2] no audience would be so capable of appreciating a story of Hellenic triumph as a Panhellenic audience—and after all, Hellenic history was Herodotus’ calling card, his true innovation (despite being paired with more traditional foreign ethnography in his Histories). Prior to Herodotus, ‘history’ had been either ethnographic or poetic (or possibly both, e.g. Panyassis’ Ionika). Herodotus, at least in his Persica, offered something truly new: a Hellenic history in prose. By performing a multi-ethnic work—in which all (or at least

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14 Indeed, although festivals were widespread, they were also fairly infrequent: the itinerant performer would not have relied on single, annual performances to support himself the whole year through.

15 E.g., Zelnick-Abramovitz 2014: 178 finds “no reason to doubt [the] veracity” of Lucian’s story. I consider her opinion somewhat credulous, but still a movement in the right direction: some elements, at least, may be believed.

16 Lateiner 1989: 211.
most) of Greece plays the hero—to an audience assembled for a Panhellenic event (and furthermore presumably induced to a Panhellenic frame of mind by the festival itself), Herodotus would have given his Persian War material its best chance to succeed.

Second, Lucian’s Herodotus observes that “those gathered were the very best” of their citizenries (ἀπανταχόθεν ἡδὴ τῶν ἀριστῶν συνείλεγμένων, Herod. 1), perhaps even in a formal capacity (i.e., the ‘aristocrats’). These were precisely the people that Herodotus needed to impress, inasmuch as they were both influential and wealthy and so capable of inviting Herodotus to be their guest and perform for them. As discussed in the introduction, we have no direct evidence of Herodotus’ own itinerant career (unless we count the far-ranging nature of his own Histories as evidence), but such a process of courting and receiving artistic patronage is in fact extremely well-attested elsewhere in a mid-fifth century Panhellenic context: Pindar, the epinician poet.

Of course, Pindar performed his works after the festivals, not during them, and he is a poet celebrating the specific triumph of one man rather than a proto-historian celebrating the general triumph of all Greece, but some of what we know about Pindar tallies nicely with the concept of wisdom-performance outlined above. First, Pindar successfully lived the itinerant career, contracted by patrons ranging from Libya to Tenedos. And once there, Pindar seems to have relied on the hospitality of his host to expand his wealth and livelihood—as Simon

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18 A salient parallel of this process may be found in Plato, Hip. Mai. 286a-b, where Hippias claims to have composed and performed an epideixis (although he calls it a “logos”) for the Spartans and for Eudicus of Athens.
20 This conclusion remains undecided, however (see e.g., Currie 2004: 17).
21 For the following, cf. Lefkowitz 2012: 61-70.
Hornblower suggests to explain Pindar’s affinity for Aegina—which was precisely the practice of sophists. Secondly, Pindar and Herodotus seem to have moved in much the same aristocratic circles: not only do both artists treat many of the same citizenries, they also name many of the same individuals. Likewise, their techniques and sources appear to have shared much in common: Herodotus explicitly used Pindar’s peer, Simonides—and possibly even Pindar himself—as a source. Furthermore, Pindar explicitly situates himself in this culture of wisdom-performance, declaring himself (e.g.) “eminent in wisdom among Greeks everywhere” (πρόφαντον σοφίᾳ καθ’ Ἐλλανας ἔόντα πανταῖ, Ol. 1.116). Thus, with due caution, Pindar may give us some sense for what a narrative composed for a festival audience might look like.

In particular, four elements of Pindar’s poetry could easily be deployed in a historiographical context. First, Pindar relies on the mythical, the gnomic, and the epic to make the recent past more grand. For example, the victory of Diogoras of Rhodes is celebrated with a story about the epic Rhodian, Tlepolemus (O. 7); similarly, the Aeginetans are often celebrated by their connection with the Aeacidae, whose hero cult was central to Aeginetan identity (I. 5; N. 3, 4, 8). Pindar evokes these locally celebrated myths, glues them together with gnomic universalisms, and ultimately asserts that the glory and honor of such gilded heroes of the epic

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22 Hornblower 2007b.
24 Hornblower and Morgan 2007: 4, for example, cites overlap with both Aegina (see Hornblower 2007a) and Thebes (Asopodorus: compare Isthmian 1.34 and Herod. 9.69); cf. Hornblower and Morgan 2007: 13, discussing Battus son of Aladdeir (Pythian 5.93 and Herod. 4.150-64) as indicative of the “shared world of Pindar and Herodotus.”
25 Hornblower 2004: 23; see also scholarship on the ‘new’ Simonides, (e.g.) Boedeker and Sider 2001.
26 Cf. (e.g.) N. 3.9; P. 2.56.
age has continued down even to his day, evidenced in the athletic achievement of the honorand.\footnote{E.g., \textit{N.} 3.40-42; cf. Pfeijffer 1999: 210.}

Such a practice is readily discernible in Herodotus’ Thermopylae passage, which regularly connects the Greek combatants with the mythical past through methods as diverse as geography (e.g., 7.193), lineage (e.g., 7.204), religious observance (e.g., 7.189), and literary allusion (e.g., 7.225).

Second, Pindar extends his praise of the individual honorand to his family and close associates. Thus \textit{Pythian} 10 celebrates not just Hippocleas, victor in the boys’ diaulos at Delphi, nor just his family, but all of the Aleuads (the powerful aristocrats of Thessaly, cf. 7.172.1).\footnote{P. 10.3-9; cf. Stamatopoulou 2007: 309-310 for a discussion of the significance of this particular instance.}

Yet it is also important to note that Pindar is careful not to speak against others. He summarizes his policy in comparison with the acrimonious Archilochus:

\begin{quote}

\textit{ἔμε δὲ χρεῶν
φεύγειν δάκος ἀδισφαπτὸν κακαγοριᾶν.
εἶδον γὰρ ἐκὰς ἐὼν τὰ πόλλα ἐν ἁμαγανίᾳ
ψογερόν Ἀρχίλοχον βαρυλόγοις ἔχθεσιν
πιανόμενον· τὸ πλουτεῖν δὲ σὺν τῷ πόλτῳ
σοφίας ἀριστον.} (\textit{Pythian} 2.52-56)
\end{quote}

But I must flee the persistent bite of censure,
for standing at a far remove I have seen Archilochus the blamer often in straits as he fed on dire words of hatred. And possessing wealth that is granted by destiny is the best object of wisdom.\footnote{Tr. Race 1997. (Loeb).}

Pindar is in the business of building up, not tearing down—and indeed, such an approach is advisable when relying on the patronage of many different parties. It is no surprise, then, that the Thermopylae narrative follows the same principle, conferring widespread praise on the Greeks
(and especially the Spartans), which then trickles down to individual states—only one state
(Thebes) receives any criticism at all.32

But when it comes to local politics, Pindar readily reflects his patron-of-the-moment’s
agenda, advancing a subtle propaganda that could profoundly affect the perception and
promotion of the honored regime. Kathryn Morgan, for example, has illustrated Pindar’s
concern to validate Hieron’s control over Sicily;33 Leslie Kurke has argued that a central function
of epinician was “to bind the various interests of the athlete’s polis, oikos, and aristocratic
peers”;34 perhaps the most dramatic example may be found in Barbara Mitchell’s demonstration
of how Arcesilaus IV of Cyrene drew on Pindar’s Pythians 4, 5, and 9 to outdo his aristocratic
rivals, recruit colonists, and distance himself from his medizing past.35 Pindar’s poetry was not
merely decorative. Rather, it served as compelling political propaganda, deployed by the
honorand as one more weapon for advancing his personal agenda. In the same way, Herodotus’
Thermopylae narrative addresses one of the most significant political issues facing those who
dwelt around Thermopylae—medism—by implicitly excusing all states alike.36

Finally, despite catering to the immediate demands of the occasion, Pindar is also
concerned to ensure that his poetry remains accessible to a broad audience and therefore to re-
performance in different settings. This concern is most evident from Pindar’s oft-repeated claim
that he will bring his honorand immortal fame with the power of his song (e.g., Ol. 1.82-5, Isth.

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178-80) for a possible historical explanation for Thebes’ treatment here.
33 K. Morgan 2015.
36 See below, §The Medizers: Thessalians, Malians (Trachis), Magnesians, Phthiotian Achaeans, Perrhaebians,
Aenianians, and Dolopians.
4.36-45). And indeed, such a concern with the suitability to repeated performance of a piece largely explains why we know so little about Pindar’s original performance contexts: he takes care to avoid mentioning such details lest a later audience (or readership) find such references inaccessible or alienating. If Pindar, like Homer, wished to convey immortal fame upon his subject, then his poetry must in effect become not a fleeting thing, but—to borrow a phrase from Thucydides—a “possession for all time” (κτῆμα ἐς αἰὲ, 1.22.4). And indeed, despite catering to the immediate demands of the occasion, Herodotus’ Thermopylae narrative too remains accessible to a broad audience and therefore to re-performance in different settings.

Herodotus’ Thermopylae narrative, then, resembles Pindar’s poetry in [1] its use of the mythic, epic, or gnomic to magnify the glory of recent events, [2] its extension of praise to peripheral associates and his corresponding avoidance of criticism or offense, [3] its subtle advancement of local propaganda, and [4] its concern with suitability for reperformance. But Herodotus’ circumstance of performance would have been different in many ways too. For one, we are assuming that Herodotus is performing at the festival, not after it. Thus Herodotus’ audience wouldn’t have been from one specific city-state (as was the case for Pindar) but from all over Greece. So, rather than the achievement of a single city or family, Herodotus would have needed a subject that all Greeks would have been interested in—such a subject as Greece’s

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37 For a full discussion of this theme, see Currie 2004.
38 Carey 2007: 200. “In a world without a significant readership or book market, repeat performability was critical and vagueness about specifics of performance was a useful way of promoting this.” Of course, Pindar is more constrained than Herodotus because his intricate metrical structures would have made even minor alterations tedious. Indeed, this difference between the authors may be responsible for the ability to detect Herodotus’ original audience in the first place, since Herodotus’ prose narrative was more malleable and therefore he was less concerned to avoid audience-influenced material in the first iteration, relying on extemporaneous alterations to avoid awkwardness.
39 Cf. Thuc. 1.22.1. See also Nagy 1987: 181: “In short, the language of Pindar makes it explicit that logioi are parallel to aoidoi ‘poets’ in their function of maintaining the kleos ‘glory’ of men even after death, and it implies that this activity of both logioi and aoidoi is a matter of apodeixis ‘public display.’ … Accordingly, I find it anachronistic to interpret logioi as ‘historians.’”
40 But see Currie 2004: 17.
defense against Persia, for example. And presumably Herodotus’ festival audience would have had a more diverse economic background as well: the impression that we get from Plato (Hipp. Min. 363c-d) is one of sophists performing in the open, inviting all comers (and therefore not just rich patrons). Still, prohibitive distance might have prevented some of the poorer Greeks from attending such a Panhellenic festival. Travel in the ancient period was uncertain, difficult, and often quite dangerous. Considering the constant demands of common occupations (e.g., agriculture) and the cost of supplies, transportation, lodging, and even baggage-handling (presumably provided by slaves), few of the working poor could have journeyed to a distant sanctuary or festival with any regularity. Thus a general Panhellenic festival audience would have been composed of two main components: the wealthy—from all over Greece and the Mediterranean—and a contingent of less affluent locals who had made the more manageable trip to the festival from surrounding districts.

I have now established the value of the Panhellenic venue for wisdom-performance, with particular interest paid to the conventions Pindar employed to please a similar audience and to the type of people who might be gathered there. It is notable, however, that the Pindaric odes come from all four Panhellenic festivals. Lucian shows Herodotus performing at Olympia, but what of the other festivals? As I have suggested, the Pythian festival too might equally be considered a likely performance place for Herodotus—perhaps even more so than Olympia—on account of Herodotus’ close relationship with Delphi. Whether citing the Delphians in his narrative (e.g., 1.20), praising them for their bravery in the face of the Persian invasion (e.g., 7.178), breaking with his usual policy of skepticism toward divine interference (e.g., 1.87, 8.37-39), or simply describing the sanctuary with the loving attention of an enthusiast (e.g. 1.50-51,

41 Casson 1994: 65-94. “Thus, as late as the end of the fourth century B.C., travel in and around Greece was neither easy nor particularly pleasant” (1994: 94). Casson does point out that these difficulties hardly discouraged all travelers, but the poor would have faced greater obstacles than the rich.
8.39.2), the *Histories* shows both familiarity with and affinity for the Delphic sanctuary.\(^{42}\) If it is likely that Herodotus performed at Olympia, it is even more likely that he performed at Delphi.

What, then, would have been the specific make-up of an audience gathered to hear Herodotus at the Pythian festival? First, we may consider Pindar’s *Pythians* for potential patrons gathered in the audience (inasmuch as anyone honored by these poems had by definition attended the games): these include the Sicilian Deinomenids, the Acragians (also from Sicily, a *polis* founded by Gela), the Cyreneans (Libya), the Aeginetans, the Athenians, the Thebans, and the Aleuads of Thessaly. These same wealthy individuals might easily have attended or known of Herodotus’ performance, so we might consider this list when considering Herodotus’ narratorial sensitivity. But ultimately, the audience that would have most concerned Herodotus would have been the locals—Delphians and others from surrounding *poleis*. They were the hosts of the festival, after all, and the groups most represented in the audience would have been those who made the trip from the surrounding country.

For the Pythian festival, we also have the advantage of an established, historically-attested confederation that represented this group of locals and furthermore sponsored the event: the Delphic Amphictyony, literally the “dwellers-around” of the sanctuary. This group was far from homogeneous, and even the list of nations remains somewhat murky for the early Classical period,\(^{43}\) but we may still approximate the membership of this group by relying on a list of fourteen compiled from later sources, namely Aeschines (2.116), Pausanias (10.8.2), and Theopompus (*FGH* 115 F63): the Delphians, the Phocians, the Thessalians, the Ionians, the

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\(^{42}\) Murray 1987: 32 actually suggests Delphic storytelling as a model for Herodotean narrative-composition.

Dorians, the Boeotians, the Locrians, the Perrhaebians, the Dolopians, the Phthiotians, the Magnesians, the Aenianians, the Malians, and (least-attested) the Oetaeans.  

**Setting Limits (7.172-233)**

These nations shared very little in common. Yet, in the context of the Persian Wars, one characteristic unites them: almost all of them fought for the wrong side. The list of medizers that Herodotus gives at 7.132.1 lacks only the Ionians, Dorians, and Delphians, and even these groups had members that did medize. If Herodotus wanted to please an Amphictyonic audience, then, he would have avoided awkward, incriminating anecdotes that featured his audience as ‘the bad guy’ (as is so often the case in the Salamis and Plataea epideixeis). No Persica-related narrative would have been more compelling or easier to spin favorably for this group than the first: the combined Hellenic effort to resist the Persians at the Battle of Thermopylae—after which most of the Amphictyony had switched sides.

Given a Pythian/Amphictyonic audience for the narrative of Thermopylae, then, two criteria should be set to identify epideictic material: [1] the positive portrayal of Amphictyonic members, and especially of Delphi, the host of the Pythian festival; and [2] a positive authorial stance on cooperation with the Persian enemy (viz. medism). With these criteria in mind, then, I will consider two phrases that could be used to delimit a serviceable beginning for the epideictic material, both programmatic statements that use Herodotus’ characteristic transitional phrase μὲν δὴ and that furthermore mark a major transition in the Histories’ narrative: [1] “These were the oracles the Athenians received” (τὰ μὲν δὴ χρηστήρια ταῦτα τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι ἐγεγόνεε, 7.145.1)

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44 Bowden 2003: 71; Cf. Sánchez 2001: 37-41, 518 (although this table does not quite correspond to the texts).

45 Ionians: the East Ionians and many Aegean Islanders fought at Salamis (e.g., 8.85); Dorians: most prominently, Doris itself medized (8.31, 8.66); Delphi: although he does not substantiate the accusation explicitly, Herodotus provides the tools to suspect Delphi of Persian sympathies in his failed-embassies narrative, analyzed below (pp. 149-53).
and later, [2] “And so the Pythia restrained the Cretans by reminding them of these things, although they wished to help the Greeks” (Κρήτας μὲν δὴ ἢ Πυθίη ύπομνήσασα ταῦτα ἔσχε βουλομένους τιμωρέειν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι, 7.171.2). To choose between these two summary conclusions,\(^4\) I will consider whether the narrative that falls between them—the four failed embassies of the Greeks—suits the epideictic criteria outlined above.

At first glance, the earlier limit (7.145.1) seems quite acceptable: the narrative in question deals with a related subject (the unsuccessful embassies between the Greek allies and other Greek states to request aid against the Persians at Thermopylae) and furthermore [1] features Delphi repeatedly and with apparent deference; and [2] rationalizes the failure of these nations to join the Greeks, inasmuch as each embassy explains the embassy’s failure in understandable and therefore sympathetic terms.\(^5\) Furthermore, several of the patrons of Pindar’s Pythians too play major roles in these embassies—the Deinomenids (7.153-167), the Acragrians (7.170.1; also their founding mother-city, Gela, 7.154), and the Athenians (7.161)—such that the material included might have caught the ear and fancy of some of the wealthier members of the audience. And lastly, considering that both the Plataea and Salamis narratives begin with embassy scenes (Plataea’s is protracted, 8.136-144; Salamis’ is shorter, 8.3), this beginning would establish a common narrative element between the three epideixeis.

But the narrative between 7.145 and 7.172 is complicated.\(^6\) To begin, in order to please an Amphictyonic audience, Herodotus ought to have kept Delphi’s role in these embassies positive, or at least neutral. In truth, he nearly does so: except for a few chapters and phrases in

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\(^{5}\) Baragwanath 2008: 210-22 observes a number of commonalities between this section and the later narrative of Thermopylae, the issue of sympathy for medizers’ plight being foremost among them.

\(^{6}\) The embassy scenes have often been the subject of intense scrutiny, recently by Cataldi 2005 and Baragwanath 2008: 210-22.
this narrative, Delphi acts as a wise adviser and guardian of the Greeks, by protecting Argos (7.148) and Crete (7.169) from their own enthusiasm to fight the Persians by citing previous service to the Greek cause or, in the case of the Deinomenid Gelon, by providing a neutral ground and therein safeguarding great wealth in a perilous time (7.163). But this last example manifests the problematic nature of these embassies: the ‘great wealth’ safeguarded at Delphi for Gelon is in fact tribute, intended for Xerxes if the Greeks should fail (7.163.2). To be sure, Herodotus gives Gelon plenty of excuses—he even synchronizes (and thus associates) Gelon’s victory at Himera against the Western “barbarians” (βαρβαροι, 7.167.1; viz. Carthaginians) with the Greeks’ victory at Salamis. But the reader knows all along that Gelon is in fact ready to surrender to Xerxes in a moment, and thus the pro-Hellenic appeal of the episode is tarnished—and Delphi’s role as guardian of the money intended as tribute for Xerxes is at the center of that blemish.49

The other failed embassies are similarly problematic. For Argos, Herodotus gives good reasons for the decision to stay out of the conflict at first: foremost, that the Delphic oracle advises them against joining (7.148). This advice, Herodotus implies, reflects consideration for recent Argive hardship, since they had just recently sustained huge causalities in a conflict with the Spartans. Therefore the Argives were unable to support the effort without risking their wellbeing after the war, regardless of the outcome. Thus far, Delphi’s advice seems sound. But Herodotus then includes a scathingly incriminating story about the Argives actively undermining the Greek position by communicating directly with the King (7.149-50; cf. 9.12), which Herodotus supports with circumstantial evidence (7.151) going so far as to rationalize the Argives’ betrayal of the Greek cause in general but nonetheless suggestive terms (7.152.2):

49 Cf. Priestley 2014: 166. “Although Herodotus refrains from explicit comment, it is clear that this mission is included to illustrate a duplicitous side to Gelon’s character…”
ἐπίσταμαι δὲ τοσοῦτον ὅτι εἰ πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὰ οἰκήμα τα κακὰ ἐς μέσον συνενείκασθεν ἀλλάξασθαι βουλόμενοι τοῖς πλησίοις, ἐγκύψαντες ἃν εἰς τά τῶν πέλας κακὰ ἀσπασίως ἐκαστὸι αὐτῶν ἀποφερόιστο ὑπίσω τά ἐσηνείκαντο.

(7.152.2)

But I do know this, that if everybody went to market, as it were, to exchange their own personal troubles for others’, after considering their neighbors’ lot they would be all too happy to return home with their own.

Even if Herodotus is sincere, the reader cannot help but question the sincerity of the Argives generally, which in turn casts doubt on Delphi’s motivation in allowing them the “excuse” (πρόφασις, 7.150.3) for staying out of the conflict.

The third embassy, sent to Corcyra, does not include Delphi but showcases a disingenuous cowardice that colors the reader’s response to the other failed embassies. Like the Argives and Gelon before them, the Corcyreans at first seem to be genuinely committed to the Greek cause, and for a perfectly sensible reason: “If Greece fell, they would certainly become slaves on the following day” (Ἡ γὰρ σφαλῆ, σφεῖς γε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δουλεύσουσι τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν ἡμερέων, 7.168.1). But Herodotus immediately undercuts this noble resolution. With deception in their hearts (Ἀλλὰ νοεῖν τες, 7.168.2), they deliberately fail to reach Salamis in time for the battle, “waiting to see how the war would turn out” (καραδοκέοντες καὶ οὗτοι τὸν πόλεμον τῇ πεσέται, 7.168.2). Like the Argives, then, the Corcyreans rely on an “excuse” (πρόφασις, 7.168.4). Simply by its association with the other failed embassies, the Corcyrean guilt further casts suspicion on the others.

This suspicion reaches fruition with the final embassy, sent to the Cretans. Again, there is nothing immediately suspicious about this embassy: like the Argives at the beginning of the embassy series, the Cretans receive advice from the Pythia not to engage the Persians and reasonably decide to follow it (7.169). But the reader has been conditioned by the disingenuous cowardice that has characterized the previous three episodes to notice the incriminating
difference between the Argives’ situation and the Cretans’: the Argives lost their soldiers in a recent war, but the Cretans are advised against joining the Greeks on account of their losses following the Trojan War (7.169.2). The oracle (and thus the Cretans’ pretense for failing to assist the Greeks) refers specifically to the legendary King Minos’ death at Camicus, which Herodotus attests to have occurred during Minos’ wanderings in Sicily in search of no less a figure than Daedalus (7.170.1). The narrative thus prompts the reader to suspect the Cretans’ motives in withholding their support as contrived—and possibly to suspect Delphi for once more providing the excuse.⁵⁰

Modern scholars have often followed Herodotus’ lead: H.W. Parke, Charles Hignett, and Robert Parker (among others) have all developed independent cases against Delphi on the evidence provided by these chapters.⁵¹ This suspicion has been challenged: Jon Mikalson, for example, adamantly insists that there is simply no evidence that the Greeks suspected the Delphic oracle in any way following the Persian War.⁵² But the fact remains that these scholars were able to reach an extremely negative conclusion about Delphi by relying almost entirely on the evidence surveyed above. In truth, to read these chapters as favorable for Delphi is nearly impossible. Whether Herodotus actually suspected Delphi of Persian sympathies or not, the oracle’s implication in these deceitful proceedings is enough to contrast markedly with the portrayal of Delphi as protector and even savior of Greece that Mikalson accepts—a portrayal that is in fact on display in the Thermopylae narrative not ten chapters later (7.178, discussed at length below). It follows that the series of embassies fails to meet our guiding criteria for identifying epideictic material: despite its superficial promise, the narrative from 7.146 to 7.172

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⁵⁰ After all, to cite a Hellenistic source, “All Cretans are liars” (Κρήτες ἄει ψέοσται, Callim. 1.8-9).
⁵² Mikalson 2003: 121. Cf. Bowden 2005: 27. “[Delphi’s medism] is entirely a modern fabrication: there is no scrap of evidence that any individual or state in antiquity thought that Delphi was acting for the Persians.”
neither portrays Delphi in a positive light nor truly excuses medism and therefore could not have been pleasing to a Pythian/Amphictyonic audience without significant revision (or perhaps un-revision?). If the *Histories* transmits unaltered epideictic material intended for an Amphictyonic audience, then, its inclusion must begin with the transition from the embassy scenes to the battle narrative proper: 7.172.

The end of the epideictic material, thankfully, is much clearer: it must come at the end of 7.233, after which Herodotus concludes with the phrase, “And that’s how the Greeks fought at Thermopylae” (οἱ μὲν δὴ περὶ Θερμοπύλης Ἑλληνες οὕτως ἡγονίσαντο, 7.234.1). We see in this phrase a clear marker of a narrative ending, further highlighted by Herodotus’ distinctive use of the transitional μὲν δή (see Introduction, pp. 30-31). Even more convenient, the phrase acts as an effective and illustrative title for the sixty-two chapters of preceding narrative. Of course, the last sentence of 7.233 admittedly contains a reference to the Archidamian War (the Theban attack on Plataea [431/0], 7.233.4); but in fact, the transitional sentence itself functions as a (meta)narrative signpost and so presumably belongs to the framing narrative rather than the *epideixis*.

The *epideixis*, then, would have ended with the branding of the Thebans, possibly supplemented by a concluding remark more suited to the epideictic mode (e.g., ‘The End’). This ending is both obvious and suitable, and so may be used with some confidence. Thus by assuming a Pythian audience for the epideictic material related to Thermopylae, we may arrive at the limits 7.172-7.233.

It may be noted, however, that while this passage’s length is still significant, the resulting *epideixis* would be somewhat shorter than the epideictic sections argued for Salamis and Plataea.

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53 Cf. Munson 2001: 25 on the “summary conclusion.” Furthermore, such a reference may well be permissible for the Thermopylae narrative, inasmuch as no precise date can be established on the paucity of evidence we have concerning the Amphictyony in any period, much less in the mid-fifth century (see the section on ‘Dating the Epideixis?’ below).
There are several possible (albeit speculative) explanations for this. First, even if 7.172 may be reliably marked as the beginning of the epideictic material, it may not be the original beginning of the epideixis but rather simply the locus that Herodotus identified as expedient to transition to his pre-written material. If more suitable narrative is sought, I have shown how the material that I have identified above as incompatible with the Pythian audience assumed for the Thermopylae epideixis (the embassy narratives, 7.145-171) contains much that, with a few modifications, would have met our criteria perfectly: if we suspect only a few later authorial modifications, we might easily posit an original narrative in which [1] Delphi was the hero and [2] furthermore provided legitimate excuses to several non-participants in the war, which would have foregrounded a narrative that defended many of the Amphictyones’ eventual choice to medize excellently. It may be, then, that the embassy scenes represent an adaptation or reinvention of earlier material that was originally part of the epideixis. Second, the possible inclusion of more original material is implied by Herodotus’ unfulfilled promise to treat the Athenadas narrative later (7.213.3; discussed below, pp. 158-59); since Herodotus chose to omit his story about the killer of the traitor Ephialtes here, the length of that narrative must have been long enough to distract from his authorial strategy. There could be other valid explanations too. In any case, these two possibilities provide enough justification to conclude—if only as a reminder of the complexity and uncertainty involved in such textual archaeology—that either narrative, if it were originally part of the epideixis, could easily have compensated for the difference in length between this collection of epideictic material and lengths of the Salamis and Plataea narratives.

\[54\] Cf. the lengths of known epideixeis and other comparable performance pieces listed in the Introduction, pp. 27-28.
Of course, even without these explanations the length of this epideictic material is not prohibitively short. Compositions vary in length. The same can be said for almost any genre, and the variance here is no more than, say, the variance between Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* and his *Eumenides*, two plays written for and performed at the same festival on the same day.⁵⁵ Perhaps Herodotus gauged that an Athenian audience was better prepared for a long narrative than a public that had not been conditioned by tragic festivals and funeral orations; or perhaps the audience would have simply walked away from the performance thinking, “Well, that was a short one!” Either way, the identified limits of 7.172-233 provide sixty-two chapters of epideictic material, which certainly would have produced a performance of sufficient length. Ultimately, Thermopylae’s length is close enough to the narratives of Salamis and Plataea that they may yet be considered to represent the same genre.

As to authorial intrusions, in the chapters identified above Herodotus makes only two references to the outside narrative,⁵⁶ both directly comparable to the intrusions identified in the Salamis and Plataea narratives. In fact, the first intrusion is almost *exactly* the same as that at 9.32, even in its wording. In counting out the Persian troops gathered at Thermopylae, Herodotus says: “These boats numbered three-thousand in total—*as I mentioned earlier*—which implies a total of 240,000 men on board” (συνέλέχθη δὲ ταῦτα τὰ πλοία, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἰρέθη, τρισχίλια ἣδη ὃν ἀνδρὲς ὥν ἔτεν ἐν αὐτοῖσι τέσσερες μυριάδες καὶ εἶκοσι, 7.184.3). The aside here, “as I mentioned earlier” (ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἰρέθη), differs only in the verb from the intrusion in the Plataea narrative (εἰρέθη instead of δεδήλωται, 9.32). And just as at 9.32, the insertion here serves a clear purpose: to refer to earlier computation and avoid repetition which might otherwise be tedious. Less than one hundred chapters earlier Herodotus has made many of

⁵⁵ A convenient summary of the scholarship is provided by Robson 2009: 17-20.
⁵⁶ Omitting the last sentence of 7.233 identified as ‘marginal’ above, p. 153.
the same calculations already (7.89-99), calculations which, as at 9.32, provide the basis for the totals included here. Herodotus is either avoiding repetition or, if my suggestion for the tally at 9.32 is correct, he used the arithmetic that he had already completed for this *epideixis* in an earlier and more apt spot, then simply referred the reader to that arithmetic rather than repeat himself.\(^57\). Furthermore, the total which occasions this intrusion isn’t actually fully equivalent, counting as penteconters generally what Herodotus had earlier included as not only penteconters, but also triaconters, light boats, and horse transports. That the epideictic version is the simpler one implies that Herodotus has either omitted detail to avoid repetition or that he had learned of more detail by the time that he was writing down the first tally. Either way, the epideictic version seems to have been composed before the earlier, more extensive count.

The second authorial intrusion, however, falls under the category of ‘problematizing’, and so must be treated at length. At 7.209.2, Herodotus includes in Demaratus’ spoken response to Xerxes’ inquiry about the Spartans a brief but certain reference to an earlier interaction between the two at 7.101-104:

\[\text{ἐκουσάς μὲν καὶ πρῶτερόν μεν, ἐμὲ ὁρμῶμεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, περὶ τῶν ἄνδρῶν τούτων ἀκούσας δὲ γέλωτά με ἔθεν λέγοντα τῇ περ ὀργήν ἔκβησόμενα <τὰ> πρήγματα ταῦτα. (7.209.2)}\]

You asked me about these men before, when we were just setting out against Hellas, and you laughed at me when I told you what to expect.

While this statement’s status as intrusion is obvious inasmuch as it patently refers to narrative that comes from outside of the epideictic material (7.101-104), it is far less dissonant with its context than the ‘problematizing’ intrusions at 8.30.2 and 9.64.1.\(^58\) Still, under close scrutiny, this short sentence produces a number of irregularities in the text. First, at 7.209, Demaratus has

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\(^{57}\) See Ch. II, pp. 44-45.

\(^{58}\) In fact, this ‘problematizing’ intrusion may be more appropriately classified as ‘self-referential’ like the intrusions at 7.187.3 and 9.32, with Herodotus having modified the language to suit the circumstance of being spoken by a character (Demaratus) rather than by the narrator.
no reason to fear reproach from Xerxes, even with the context of 7.101-104: the King asked him about a custom which his former countrymen were performing, and Demaratus’ reply is no more than factual. Yet Demaratus’ prefatory remark implies that he fears the same reprisal that he suffered after his earlier speech, which was much longer and more controversial. Demaratus’ response here simply does not warrant the fear expressed in the first sentence. This disconnect prompts the inference that Herodotus has here imported a sentiment that was not originally included in the passage. And indeed, in the event, Xerxes’ reaction betrays no recognition of the opening of Demaratus’ speech, overlooking Demaratus’ trepidation and only expressing astonishment at his assertion that the Spartans were in fact preparing to fight (compare 7.105, where Herodotus makes a point of observing Xerxes’ flat reaction).

Second, Demaratus is introduced in the Thermopylae narrative as though the audience were unfamiliar with him: “Demaratus son of Ariston was in the camp” (Δημάρητον τὸν Ἀρίστωνος, ἐόντα ἐν τῷ στρατόπεδῳ, 7.209.1). If the audience recalled the earlier conversation which Xerxes and Demaratus shared (as is clearly implied by the intrusion), there would be no need to introduce Demaratus thus. Rather, it should be assumed that Herodotus here recognized that the earlier incident at 7.101-104 would have affected Demaratus’ reaction to this enquiry and therefore modified his portrayal of Demaratus to match this shift in perspective. The third conversation between Demaratus and Xerxes, which Herodotus records after the epideictic material (7.234-35), further suggests Herodotus’ satisfaction with this character and his desire to explore the relationship between these Spartan and Persian kings more.59 It is likely not a coincidence that the two contributions that Demaratus makes outside of the epideictic material are protracted—even long-winded, exploring the exiled king’s character in depth—while the two

59 On the series of interactions between Xerxes and Demaratus, see Branscome 2013: 54-104.
statements that Demaratus makes *within* the epideictic material (the second is in the Salamis *epideixis*, 8.65) are brief and uncontroversial, adding little more to the narrative than a token Spartan perspective. Herodotus includes this aside to harmonize Demaratus’ speech here with his speech earlier in the book, but otherwise does not disturb his original *epideixis*.

Two other passages deserve mention, although in the end they prove perfectly compatible with the epideictic context. First, immediately after Herodotus declares the Thessalians unwilling to medize (7.172.1), they send messengers to what must be the same meeting of Greek representatives that sent out the embassies earlier (7.145.2). This common ground may seem to tie this chapter to the preceding chapters, but the anecdote at 7.172.1 not only introduces the meeting as though it were unfamiliar to the audience, explaining how “representatives of Greece were chosen from the cities which valued Greece’s safety” (πρόβουλοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀφελείαν ἀπὸ τῶν πολίων τὰ ἀμείνω φρονεουσέων περὶ τῆν Ἑλλάδα, 7.172.1), it also further specifies a detail about the meeting which is omitted in the first mention: the location of the meeting “at the Isthmus” (ἐν δὲ τῷ Ἰσθμῷ, 7.172.1). Without the preceding narrative, this brief setting of the scene is both succinct and necessary; if taken together with the last thirty chapters, however, the description is either repetitive or confusing, implying that there may have been a second meeting (which met at the Isthmus) in addition to the first which sent out the embassies. This reading is further justified by a second reference to the meeting’s location at the isthmus upon its dissolution (διαλυθέντες ἐκ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ, 7.177), a reference which recalls the meeting mentioned at 7.172.1 rather than the one mentioned at 7.145.2.

The second passage worthy of discussion is remarkable not because material appears to have been inserted into an *epideixis*, but rather the opposite: it seems as though Herodotus may have *removed* the story of Athenadas, the killer of Ephialtes, with the expectation of rehearsing
the story later in the text (7.213.3): “This Athenades killed Ephialtes for a different reason, which I will explain in a later story” (ὁ δὲ Ἀθηνάδης οὗτος ἀπέκτεινε μὲν Ἐπιάλτην δι' ἄλλην αἰτίην, τὴν ἔγῳ ἐν τοῖσι ὑπίστι σημανέω, 7.213.3). Nothing about this phrase is incompatible with the epideictic mode of oral performance. In fact, Herodotus’ designation of the material as ‘logoi’ matches the context of ‘story-teller’ (logopoios) better than it does that of the Histories as “exposition of research” (ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις, preface). The phrase “τὴν ἔγῳ ἐν τοῖσι ὑπίστι σημανέω λόγοις σημανέω,” then, might better be translated as “I’ll tell you that story some other time...”.

This particular unfulfilled cross-reference, the only one of its kind in the Histories,⁶⁰ implies only that Herodotus knew the story but didn’t include it: the promise to tell the story later is included here not because Herodotus meant to include it in his Histories, but because he intended to tell that story on a separate occasion (as story-tellers are wont to do).⁶¹

**Pleasing an Amphictyonic Audience**

Having set the limits of 7.172-233, then, let us return to our two criteria for a narrative that would be well-received by a Pythian/Amphictyonic audience: [1] positive portrayal of the Amphictyony and its members; and [2] a favorable spin on medism. To begin with the first criterion, we should revisit the list of members given at the outset of this chapter in greater detail. Only three lists survive in the ancient sources: two are from the fourth-century BCE, Aeschines (2.116), an Attic orator, and Theopompus (FGrH 115 F63), a historian from Chios; the third is from Pausanias (10.8.2), a periegetic writer of 2nd century CE Rome. Although each source provides a different list to fill out the well-attested canonical number of twelve Amphictyones, all but the Oetaeans are attested more than once—according to epigraphic evidence, the Oetaeans

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⁶⁰ There are, however, two similar references to ‘Assyrian logoi’. See Macan 1908: § 7.213.

were not sending *hieromnemones* at least by the mid-fourth century,\(^\text{62}\) so I find it likely that Aeschines (the only source which includes them) simply failed to subsume Oetaea under one of its more powerful neighbors, Aenania or Thessaly. Furthermore, the divergent genres and historical contexts of these sources suggest that their agreements and differences alike result from the whims of variant tradition rather than political malice or corrective polemicization. Therefore, the following list can reliably be said to include every historical member of the Amphiictyony: the Delphians, the Phocians, the Thessalians, the Ionians, the Dorians, the Boeotians, the Opuntian Locrians, the Perrhaebians, the Dolopians, the Achaean Phthiotians, the Magnesians, the Aenianians, and the Malians.\(^\text{63}\) I will examine each of these nations in turn.

*Group Identities: The Ionians and Athens*

In fact, some of the Amphictyonic members are better labeled ‘ethnic groups’ than nations: the term ‘Ionians’, for example, better reflects an assertion of common heritage than it does a common region or *polis*. Greeks of Ionian descent spanned the Aegean, though most of our sources (including Herodotus, 8.44.2; cf. 1.145-47) place their origins in Athens. It is unclear whether the designation of ‘Ionians’ on the list of the Amphictyones refers to the whole or simply to Athens and Attica—the political reality probably changed as power shifted\(^\text{64}\)—but it seems likely, considering Athens’ proximity to, interest in, and influence on the Amphictyony, that in practice Athens stood metonymically for the Ionians.\(^\text{65}\) Whatever the political reality, Herodotus would have welcomed such metonymy for his purposes in the Thermopylae narrative, inasmuch as most of the eastern Ionians (due to their proximity to Persia) joined Persian service

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\(^{62}\) Londey 1990: 59-60 provides a summary of the serial mid-fourth century inscriptions that list nations sending *hieromnemones*.


\(^{64}\) E.g., as Athens gained authoritative control of the Delian League (c.440), they might even have been considered a valid representative of the Ionian nation.

at an early stage of the conflict. Thus by the battle of Thermopylae, the eastern Ionians at least were fully committed to the Persian side. If Herodotus sought to downplay the significance and culpability of medism in this narrative, he could use Athens as a convenient representative-champion of the Ionians in this account.

And Herodotus does just that. Although—in a noticeable contrast with the Salamis and Plataea narratives—the Athenians are by no means the heroes of Herodotus’ Thermopylae narrative, they nonetheless figure prominently and with distinction—at least, as much as their role in the naval conflict of nearby Artemisium (i.e. not the actual battle of Thermopylae) might allow. Though Herodotus could easily have focused here only on the land battle and saved treatment of Artemisium for later, he twice features the Athenians in his account leading up to Thermopylae. First, they provide one of the three ships that the Greeks post to watch for the Persians (7.179), in which capacity they perform their function admirably and in fact feature as the final note in a tricolon crescendo of naval achievement: the ship from Troezen is captured straightaway and with little distinction (7.180); the ship from Aegina is captured too, but with such brave resistance that one of the marines is given the individual aristeia for that day (ἀνδρὸς ἀρίστου γενομένου ταύτην τὴν ἡμέρην, 7.181.1); and finally, the Athenians prove themselves fastest and most resourceful of the three ships by escaping the clutches of the Persians altogether and making their way back to Athens over land (7.182). As a token of how much less

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66 Indeed he actually does reengage the material in his Salamis narrative, see Chapter III. Furthermore, the material there is decidedly redundant with his narrative here (see Conclusion, pp. 190-92).

67 However, see Irwin 2010a: 399-405, who makes the charming observation that the passage “reads almost like an ethnic joke: ‘Three ships get chased by the Persian guard, a Troizenian, an Aeginetan, and an Attic one…”’ (2010a: 399). Still, [1] I find the ‘joke’ model to be somewhat anachronistic, since tricolon crescendos tend to apply the same portrayal to all three elements, only with increasing intensity; and [2] as I explain above, there is nothing cowardly or incompetent about the Athenian actions here. The Aeginetan ship’s valor may be worthy of celebration (cf. 2010a: 400), but the Athenian ship performs its function admirably and without loss of life. As to the “inadequacies in the Athenians’ behaviour” (their failure to go fight at Thermopylae rather than returning to Athens, 2010a:404), any number of explanations may be worth considering, among them that these sailors were not trained or armed as hoplites. In sum, I find no reason to suspect this passage of being negative toward the Athenians.
concerned Herodotus is with the Athenian audience in this narrative, it may be noted that in the Salamis and Plataea narratives, the Athenians never once “flee” as they do on this occasion (φεύγουσα, 7.182)—even in serious peril (e.g., 8.4-5; 9.54.2). But although Herodotus celebrates Athens less in his Thermopylae narrative, this story of maritime prowess nonetheless confers considerable and even unexpected honor on the Athenians.

Herodotus’ inclusion of the Athenian claim to have summoned Boreas is similarly significant yet comparatively lukewarm. On this occasion, Herodotus favorably relays the story of how Athenian prayers contributed to the storm that destroyed so many Persian ships (7.189.1). In telling the story he refers both to Athens’ divine lineage in naming Boreas their “son-in-law” (γαμβρόν, 7.189.2) and to the continued guardianship of that godhead, since Boreas had also destroyed Mardonius’ fleet (embarked against Athens) two years earlier near Mt. Athos (7.189.3). But he is careful to place this recognition in context, refusing to commit to the truth of the Athenian claim: “As to whether Boreas fell on the barbarians harboring there for this exact reason, I can’t say…” (εἰ μὲν νῦν διὰ ταῦτα τοῖς βαρβάροις ὁρμέουσι ὁ Βορῆς ἐπέπεσε οὐκ ἔχω ἐπιεῖν, 7.189.3). Admittedly, such an avoidance of conclusions about divine matters is typical of Herodotus, but he displays no such reticence two paragraphs later when recounting “the Hellenes” invoking “Poseidon Soter” as the true beneficent deity (τοῖς δὲ Ἐλλησι … οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐπίθυοντο, Ποσειδέωνι Σωτῆρι εὐξάμενοι, 7.192). So again, Herodotus gives Athenians credit for their participation, but exhibits significantly less pro-Athenian slant than in the Salamis and

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Although Herodotus here is admittedly less positive toward Athens than in the Salamis and Plataea narratives (see below), there is no reason to suspect any malice toward the Athenians on this occasion.

68 Herodotus narrates these events earlier (6.44.2-3), but with a decidedly different tone and with no mention of Boreas Soter or even Athens. Though it should not be pressed as an argument from silence, it is nonetheless worth pointing out that this reference provided Herodotus an opportunity to make reference to another part of the Histories which he fails to make (i.e., perhaps because the epideixis was originally independent).

Plataea narratives. The contrast is instructive. In the latter two accounts, Herodotus’ audience is more or less entirely Athenian; for Thermopylae, the Athenians constitute only a part.

**Group Identities: The Dorians, Doris, and Sparta**

Unlike the Ionians who had no eponymous *polis* or region, the Dorians came from Doris, located between Thermopylae and Delphi and therefore ideally situated to be counted among the ‘dwellers-around’ that constituted the Amphictyones. The title ‘Dorians’ therefore might plausibly refer to the ethnic group or to the current inhabitants of the region. Yet several arguments belie the latter conclusion. Most simply, there were really only two dominant ethnic groups in Greece: the Ionians were one, the Dorians were the other. So, the presence of one ethnic group on the list implies that the term ‘Dorian’ refers to the other. But perhaps more importantly, the same argument that numbered Athens as one of the Ionians (their interest in and influence upon the Amphictyony) implies that Sparta was numbered among the Dorians: namely, Sparta was demonstrably interested in and influential on the power of the Amphictyony throughout the fifth century, and therefore likely had some official connection therein.\(^7^0\)

Plutarch records the Spartans attempting to expel medizers from the council to gain influence over their votes in the aftermath of the Persian Wars (*Them. 20*); the Spartans defend the Dorians and Delphians against the Phocians in the 450s and 440s, culminating with their part in the Second Sacred War; and in the 430s, Sparta settles Heraclea Trachinia in the region, presumably with the intention of securing their influence on the Amphictyonic proceedings.\(^7^1\) Whether the designation ‘Dorian’ referred to the ethnic group or directly to the Dorian homeland, Sparta’s

\(^{70}\) Hornblower 2007b: 49-51, which responds to Lefèvre 2002: 436-44.

\(^{71}\) Hornblower 2004: 264. “[Thucydides’] spare account of the Second Sacred War (1.112.5)…should be seen as part of a longer process of which the Spartan foundation of Heracleia Trachinia in 426 was a part (Thuc. 3.92)—an attempt to increase Spartan leverage in the amphiktiony at Delphi.” But see Londey 2013: 138-39 for a strategic explanation. In fact, both concerns were likely and furthermore compatible in the contested atmosphere of the late fifth-century.
influence on and interest in the Amphictyony must have been enabled by their claim to Dorian heritage.

This conclusion is also reflected by Herodotus’ choice to treat the Dorians as he did the Ionians, allowing the bravery of a representative-champion to overshadow the medism of others in the ethnic group. Like the eastern Ionians, Doris was notorious for its medism (8.31, 66). So rather than bring up this blemish on the Dorians, Herodotus instead celebrates the Spartan triumph and ultimately their heroic sacrifice. And there is no doubt that Herodotus’ Thermopylae is pro-Spartan. Despite providing one of the smallest contingents from among the Greeks, the Spartans are always listed first when participants in the battle are recognized (7.202; 7.211.3; 7.226.1); most of the minor anecdotes concern Spartans acting in valiant defiance of the odds (7.208; 7.226); Leonidas above all is given prominence in this narrative, marked as the “by far the most admired” of the Greeks (ὁ δὲ θωμαζόμενος μάλιστα, 7.204) and celebrated for his resolve in the face of death (7.220.2); and Herodotus even has Demaratus praise Sparta as “the finest kingdom and city in all Greece—and the best men” (βασιλείην τε καὶ πόλιν καλλίστην τῶν ἐν Ἕλλησι προσφέρειαι καὶ ἄνδρας ἀρίστους, 7.209.4).72 Herodotus’ Thermopylae narrative is extremely favorable toward Sparta, which state may therefore be considered—like the Athenians for the Ionians—a representative-champion of the Dorians.

In fact, the tradition is so pro-Spartan that we might suspect a Spartan bias. But on the contrary, Pietro Vannicelli has recently argued convincingly that Herodotus’ narrative of  

72 And indeed, Thermopylae contains a greater concentration of references to Hercules than any other part of the Histories: if the Egyptian logos is set aside (a section which has its fair share of oddities and treats Hercules as a major link between Greek and Egyptian cultures, see Appendix [b], pp. 218-19), these twenty-six chapters contain more than a third of Herodotus’ references to Hercules. The cult of Hercules is mentioned once (7.176.3); the mythology surrounding Hercules is mentioned twice (7.193.2; 7.198.2); and that Leonidas traces his lineage back to Hercules is mentioned three times, each time with added emphasis (7.204; 7.208.1; 7.220.4). The only reference to Hercules in the Plataea and Salamis epideixeis, by contrast, is both marginal and unfavorable, as an aggressor accessory to the Malian conquest of the Dryopes (8.43). Cf. Diod. 4.37.1-2; Strid 1999: 51-66; Bowie 2007: §8.43.
Thermopylae actually resists a prevailing “Spartanocentric” version that was better known in fifth-century Greece.\footnote{Vannicelli 2007: 320; cf. Branscome 2013: 178.} Of course, Herodotus’ narrative does not diminish Sparta’s glory; nor should it be expected to, inasmuch as the inscriptions that the Amphictyones dedicated at Thermopylae equally exhibit a pro-Spartan bias (7.228.1-2).\footnote{Cf. Molyneux 1992: 175-179.} But Vannicelli argues that Herodotus’ narrative serves to problematize the story told by those inscriptions: in short, the very presence of the Thespians at the final battle contradicts the first inscription cited by Herodotus, which celebrates only the role of “four thousand Peloponnesians” (ἐκ Πελοποννάσου χιλιάδες τέτορες, 7.228.1) and entirely overlooks the ‘dwellers-around’ who also fought at the battle.\footnote{Vannicelli 2007: 319. See also S. West 1985: 287-89, which explains the oddity of the inscription by adducing Herodotus’ desire to include “a peculiarly impressive tricolon” (1985: 288).} There is, however, a simple explanation for the inscription’s omission: when the Amphictyones established this inscription, they could simply have been celebrating non-Amphictyonic aid, a thank-offering for the remarkable cooperative effort that went into defending Thermopylae (which, incidentally, neighbored the very seat of Amphictyonic power, 7.200.2).\footnote{Indeed, Strabo records the presence of five stelai in his time, and the sole inscription he transmits similarly lacks ethnic specificity: the Locrians mourn “those who perished in defense of Greece against the Medes” (τούσδε ποθεῖ φημινοὺς ὑπὲρ Ἑλλάδος ἀντία Μῆδων, 9.4.2).} However, by the mid-fifth century, in part thanks to the efforts of Sparta itself, the dominant narrative of Thermopylae seems to have become that of Leonidas and his three hundred, to the exclusion of other participants.\footnote{Vannicelli 2007: 321. “This divergence…reflects a fundamental problem: the total or partial eclipse, in the celebrations of the battle, of the contingents that were not Spartan; or to be more precise, the Spartanocentric character of the celebrations as reflected in epigrams fixed in stone at a time quite different from when Herodotus wrote.” Pausanias (3.14.1) implies that the tradition of Leonidas received particular attention from the Spartans in the mid-fifth century, probably in the mid-to-late 440s. On this reading, see Connor 1979: esp. 26-27. Cf. Richer 1994: 74-75 n.135: “Personnellement, nous inclinons d’autant plus à conserver la mention de quarante ans que c’est le même intervalle de temps qui, selon Pausanias (3.13.1), s’est écoulé après la mort de Castor avant que les Lacédémoniens ne vouent un culte aux Tyndarides; il nous paraîtrait naturel que le modèle mythique ait pu inspirer la réalité historique.” Lawrence Koverski (2005: 61, 95) suggests that a similar impulse is behind the “New” Simonides fragments, which he argues in fact reflect a Persica commissioned by Sparta and/or Pausanias.} Herodotus’ narrative reflects just such a context: the same pro-Spartan bias
that inspired the Amphictyones to set up the inscriptions in the first place remains, but there is an additional effort to recognize other Amphictyonic participation as well—and in particular, that of the Boeotian *polis* Thespiae.

**Group Identities: The Boeotians, Thespiae, and Thebes**

Which brings us to the Boeotians. Unlike the Dorians and Ionians, the Boeotians were a geographically-defined (i.e., not ethnic) group. But despite their occasional unity under political bodies like the Boeotian League, the Boeotians were almost as diverse and factious a group as the Amphictyony itself.\(^{78}\) Hegemony of the region generally fell to Thebes, but Thebes’ leadership was often challenged—generally by Thespiae, but also by Tanagra, Orchomenus, and Plataea—immediately after the Persian Wars,\(^{79}\) during their occupation by Athens and the democracy that accompanied that period (457-447),\(^{80}\) and even late in the Peloponnesian War (again by Thespiae, 414).\(^{81}\) If Thebes and Thespiae represented the Boeotians as Athens and Sparta did the Ionians and Dorians, then it is no surprise that both states figure prominently in Herodotus’ narrative. What is surprising, however, is Herodotus’ singularly unfavorable treatment of Thebes, to which we will return.\(^{82}\) For now, though, let us consider Herodotus’ treatment of Thespiae.

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\(^{78}\) Emily Mackil (2014: 46-59) has argued convincingly that the fifth-century Boeotian League was in fact a decentralized federation, built from the bottom up rather than relying on the power of any dominant state.

\(^{79}\) Rockwell (forthcoming): 4.74-79. “There is almost no information about Thebes for a couple of decades following the Persian Wars. Because the Thebans had sided with the Persians at the battle of Plataea, they probably lost their ability to persuade any of the Boeotian communities to follow their lead in war or politics” ([forthcoming]: 74).

\(^{80}\) See discussion in Robinson 2011: 54.


\(^{82}\) It is probably not a coincidence that the only group included on the Amphictyonic Council that has two major representatives has one negative and one positive. Thebes would have provided a valuable foil for Thespiae and the other Amphictyonic states (see below, pp. 169-70).
If anyone gained from Herodotus’ resistance of the prevailing Spartanocentric tradition, it was Thespiae. As Vannicelli’s reading implies, the Thespians are explicitly given equal kudos with Sparta for their contributions in the final conflict (7.226.1).\(^{83}\) They are even given an individual aristeia to match the Spartans’ (7.227). Thespiae is the only state (other than Sparta) to receive such praise. Even the Peloponnesians seem cowardly and self-interested by comparison (7.207; cf. 7.228.1); the Thespians alone remain by the Spartans until the bitter end. And if Herodotus sought a Boeotian exemplar that could by its elevation diminish the shame of the other Boeotians for their medism, Thespiae was the perfect candidate: not only did the Thespians refuse to retreat in the face of death, Thespiae itself was in fact one of only two Boeotian poleis that never actually medized (7.132.1).\(^{84}\) Herodotus thus installs Thespiae as a worthy representative-champion of all Boeotians, a shining example to eclipse any guilt that might otherwise have been assigned to the rest of Boeotia.

But if Thespiae is a shining example of Boeotian resistance to medism, Thebes certainly is not. Admittedly, Herodotus’ account is more favorable to Thebes than it might have been: after all, when Leonidas invited the Thebans to fight with him and thus defend themselves against charges of medism that were already circulating, the Thebans chose to fight (7.202; 7.205.3). Furthermore, the Thebans remain by the side of the Spartans for the duration of the battle, presumably fighting alongside the Spartans and other Greeks the whole time. In the end, the Thebans are one of only two nations to stay with the Spartans until the final conflict, when they—somewhat understandably—surrender to Xerxes rather than being killed to a man (7.225).

\(^{83}\) See discussion above of Vannicelli 2007: esp. 316-18.

\(^{84}\) The other polis was Plataea, which does not figure in this account. Herodotus probably had no cause to dwell on both poleis separately in an account that was apologetic toward medism, for fear of incriminating other poleis by comparison. He had a sufficient representative-champion in Thespiae and so had no need to mention its less-exciting rival, Plataea. Compare this reticence with my analysis of his treatment of Athens and Phocis in the Salamis and Plataea narratives above, pp. 67-69, 105-107.
If judged by their actions alone, the Thebans are very nearly as heroic as the Thespians and Spartans, failing in their courage only at the last instant.\textsuperscript{85}

But the Thermopylae narrative insists on doubting the Thebans’ motivations. From their first appearance in the narrative, the Thebans are marked as grudging supporters of the Greek cause at best: however the phrase “\textit{ἄλλα φρονέοντες}” (7.205.3) is translated, it contains an element of suspicion—in fact, Herodotus has just recently used a similar phrase of the Corcyreans in the heat of their treachery (\textit{ἄλλα νοε\=όντες}, 7.168.2).\textsuperscript{86} Then, prior to the final battle, Herodotus claims that “the Thebans remained unwillingly and against their will, for Leonidas held them back, acting as if they were hostages” (\textit{τούτων δὲ θηβαῖοι μὲν ἄκοντες ἔμενον καὶ οὐ βουλόμενοι. κατεῖχε γάρ σφεας Λεωνίδης ἐν ὀμήρουν λόγῳ ποιεύμενος}, 7.222), an allegation which is all the more peculiar for how strategically unsound it would have been for Leonidas to maintain hostages that outnumbered his own troops in an unfavorable and furthermore hostile environment—and that when he expected that he and those who remained with him would die anyway.\textsuperscript{87} But the tricolon of inevitable Theban medism reaches its peak with the final chapter identified as part of the epideictic material, when the Thebans surrender to the Persians and proclaim themselves eager medizers—on which occasion Herodotus comments, “truer words were never spoken” (\textit{λέγοντες τὸν ἀληθέστατον τὸν λόγον, ὡς καὶ μηδίζουσι καὶ γῆν τε καὶ ὅδωρ ἐν πρώτουσι έδοσαν <ἀν> βασιλέ}, 7.233.1). Herodotus is clear: the Thebans medized intentionally, even enthusiastically.

\textsuperscript{85} Indeed, Herodotus is much harsher with the Thebans later in the \textit{Histories} (e.g., 9.2, 9.16, 9.38, 9.67, and 9.69).

\textsuperscript{86} The shared phrasing needn’t signify direct intertext here, but may nonetheless strengthen the case for the embassy scenes as originally part of the \textit{epideixis}.

\textsuperscript{87} Leonidas himself was surely aware of this likelihood (cf. 7.220.1; 7.221). Indeed, if the Thebans had left with the other Greeks, what could Leonidas or anyone else have done about it, being out-flanked and out-matched by the Persians already? Plutarch lists a number of other objections as well (\textit{De Mal. Herod.} 865b-867c); cf. Macan 1908: §7.233.
Herodotus’ indictment of the Thebans furthermore contradicts another major account of Thermopylae: that of Diodorus Siculus, which presumably derives its authority from Ephorus. Rather than denounce the Thebans, Diodorus claims that the Thebans who fought at Thermopylae represented a faction that disapproved of the Theban choice to medize and therefore came to fight at Thermopylae in defiance of their polis (Diod. 11.4.7). We might be tempted to doubt Diodorus (indeed, on the strength of Herodotus’ narrative, many have), but Michael Flower has convincingly defended him—and through him, Ephorus—as credible. In fact, Flower’s defense favors Diodorus’ radically different version of the Spartans’ final stand (a night attack from which the Thebans were absent, Diod. 11.10; cf. 7.233). We are left with the unmistakable impression that Herodotus’ version of Thermopylae might have been much more favorable to the Thebans if he had wished. By the end of the Thermopylae narrative, then, it is hard to argue that the Thebans are heroes in any capacity—at least, not in Herodotus’ version.

So the question is why Herodotus chose to denounce Thebes for medism in an account that is otherwise generally apologetic toward that offense. The most obvious answer would be simple historicity—that Herodotus is just repeating what his sources told him—but even if Flower hadn’t called Herodotus’ authenticity into question here, I have shown how Herodotus includes several unnecessary, even unwarranted criticisms of the Thebans that he might otherwise have avoided, regardless of his sources. A second possibility is that Thebes’ flagrant medism both before and after Thermopylae made them a target and essentially unsalvageable for

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88 Flower 1998.
89 Cf. Thuc. 3.62; Bowen 1992: §865a.
90 Flower 1998: 365-68 provides a summary of such attempts.
91 Flower’s argument ultimately rests on the use of circular arguments regarding the archaeological evidence, Herodotus’ obvious use of literary models, and—perhaps most convincingly—the practical advantages of the night attack in understanding the Spartans’ choice to remain while sending off the other Greeks (i.e., through their participation in the Crypteia, every Spartiate theoretically had some training and experience in night combat).
narrative effect, and so Herodotus simply could not credibly include them in a positive light. This conclusion, if true, might point to a mid-fifth century date, since after the Battle of Coronea in 447 Thebes was not only powerful again, but also generally accepted back into the fold of Hellenic politics (much to Athens’ dismay; see “Dating the Epideixis” below). Third—and perhaps most attractive—the internal evidence of the Thermopylae narrative suggests that the choice might have been politically motivated in favor of Thespiae, though such a claim is destined to remain unprovable due to our lack of evidence. But regardless of any political context, Thebes provides a brilliant foil for Thespiae and Sparta, magnifying their loyalty and courage in the face of death by comparison, as well as providing an example of unambiguous medism and thus somewhat redeeming those Amphictyones who medized less eagerly. In the end, Herodotus appears to have chosen Thespiae (and rejected Thebes) to function as a representative-champion of the Boeotians, just as he featured Athens in place of the Ionians and Sparta in place of the Dorians.

The Other Defenders: Phocis and Locris

Yet Thespiae was not the only other nation to resist the Persians at Thermopylae. The very presence of future medizers like Phocis and Opuntian Locris on the list of nations that fought at Thermopylae (7.203) asserts their initial unwillingness to abandon the Greek side. Herodotus comes to the defense of Phocis in particular. Leonidas charged the Phocians with guarding the Anopaea Pass, and it is this pass that the Persian Immortals eventually used to out-flank the Hellenes. Therefore the Phocians might easily have been blamed for the entire disaster. Yet Herodotus effectively portrays the Phocian failure as an understandable—even noble—mistake: upon the arrival of the Persians, “they fell back and headed for the peak of the mountain,

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and there prepared to die” (οἴχοντο φεύγοντες ἔπι τοῦ ὄρεος τὸν κόρυμβον, ... καὶ παρεσκευάδατο ὡς ἀπολεόμενοι, 7.218.3). However much the Phocians failed in their task, Herodotus’ account is far less damning than it might have been—we need only consider his treatment of the Thebans to see how Herodotus might have framed this episode differently. Furthermore, earlier in the Thermopylae narrative Herodotus recounts a story of Phocian resourcefulness against the Thessalians (7.176.4) that greatly resembles Herodotus’ pro-Phocian account of their resistance against the Thessalians in the Salamis episode (8.27-29). Even if Herodotus’ portrayal is not nearly as superlative here as in the other two epideixeis, he nonetheless favors the Phocians and has made a concerted effort to excuse them for their failure at the Anopaea pass.

According to Herodotus, neither the Phocians nor the Locrians had anything but the best intentions when they came to fight at Thermopylae: on the contrary, both came to the aid of the Greeks “in full force” (πανστρατῇ, 7.203.1). In fact, it was the Phocians and Locrians who were betrayed. Disappointed in the Greeks’ promise “that these troops were simply the first wave, and that the rest of the allies would arrive any day now” (αὐτοὶ μὲν ἥκοιεν πρόδρομοι τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν συμμάχων προσδόκησαν πᾶσαν ἡμέραν, 7.203.1), the Locrians and Phocians “grow furious” (περισπερχθέντων) at the Peloponnesians’ cowardly decision (καταρρῳδέοντες) to return to the isthmus and guard their own homeland (7.207). Herodotus thus allows the Phocians and Locrians a brief share of the glory, thereby excusing them for their later medism.

**The Medizers: Thessalians, Malians (Trachis), Magnesians, Phthiotian Achaeans, Perrhaebians, Aenianians, and Dolopians**

The remaining Amphictyones, however, were already fighting for the Persians at Thermopylae. If Herodotus were composing for an Amphictyonic audience, he surely would have wanted to avoid that fact. His strategy for handling this indelicacy relies on [1] oblique
reference and [2] empathetic portrayals of medism. Thus, although all of these nations are included among the Persian forces in Herodotus’ account (7.185.2), the Thessalians are the only ones that receive significant treatment by Herodotus as medizers. Like Thespiea, Sparta, and Athens for their respective groups, Thessaly serves as a representative-champion for the medizers. In this case, then, Thessaly is defended as a proxy for the actions of the less prominent states.

And Thessaly does indeed receive a profound defense from the very beginning of the epideictic material: “The Thessalians medized first, but only under the yoke of necessity” (Θεσσαλοὶ δὲ ύπο ἀναγκαίης τὸ πρῶτον ἐμῆδισαν, 7.172.1).93 This “necessity” is given various proofs throughout the Thermopylae narrative, whether by the impressive tally of Xerxes’ forces (7.184-86),94 the story of Persian horses proving far superior to Thessalian horses, i.e. the pride and foundation of Thessalian military might (προθόμενος ὡς ἀρίστῃ εἶ ὁ Ἑλλῆς, 7.196), or even the rough treatment of the Thebans—who apparently did not medize quickly enough—at the end of the epideictic narrative: “The Persians killed some on the spot, and—on Xerxes’ command—they branded the rest with the mark of the King” (τοὺς μὲν τινὰς καὶ ἀπέκταναν προσιόντας, τοὺς δὲ πλεῦνας αὐτῶν κελεύσαντος Ξέρξεω ἔστιξαν στίγματα βασιλῆια, 7.233.2). The wrath of the King was not to be taken lightly, and so the argument from necessity was a strong one.

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93 I have followed Emily Baragwanath’s translation of ύπο ἀναγκαίης here (2008: 223); see ibid. for further discussion of this passage. Herodotus also mentions that the Aleuadai were the true cause of Thessalian medism, and that the rest of Thessaly in fact resented that stance. This potential excuse is handled differently here than elsewhere in the Histories: in non-epideictic passages, Herodotus makes no mention of the internal divide (7.6.2; 7.130.3); in the Salamis and Plataea narratives, on the other hand, the Thessalians and Aleuadai are of one mind and even actually conflated with each other (8.29; 9.1; cf. 8.31; 8.32.2; 9.58.2).

94 Cf. Baragwanath 2008: 205-10 for a discussion of 7.60-99, the earlier tally to which 7.184.3 refers, and the reader response which such a list conditions.
But the greatest argument against condemning the Thessalians for their medism comes from their remarkably evocative—almost tragic—pleas to the Greeks for help. I just mentioned the anger and betrayal felt by Phocis and Locris when the other Greeks abandon Thermopylae (7.207); Thessaly faces a similar betrayal before Thermopylae when the Greeks abandon Thermès (7.173.3). Facing this dire predicament, the Thessalians implore the Greeks: “It is not right that we alone should die for you, simply because our lands lie further north” (οὐ γὰρ τοι προκατημένους τοσοῦτο πρὸ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος μούνους πρὸ ὑμέων δεῖ ἀπολέσθαι, 7.172.2).

Again, Herodotus emphasizes their peril by twice evoking the same ἀναγκαίη that featured at 7.172.1: “But if you do not wish to help us, you can’t force us to stay—for no force is greater than sheer inability” (βοηθέειν δὲ μὴ βουλόμενοι ἀναγκαίην ἦμῖν οὐδεμίαν οἷοί τέ ἔστε προσφέρειν οὐδαμὰ γὰρ ἀδυνασίης ἀνάγκη κρέσσων ἔφυ, 7.172.3). Thus, when the Thessalians are at last forced to medize, “deserted by their allies” (ἐρημωθέντες συμμάχων, 7.174), Herodotus allows that “in the end, these men proved themselves most useful to the King” (ἡ στείρα πρήγμασι ἐφαίνοντο βασιλεῖ ἄνδρες ἐόντες χρησιμώτατοι, 7.174)—an unfortunate ‘actual result’ (as Herodotus’ use of ὥστε with the indicative makes clear) which was not in accordance with the wishes of the Thessalians but rather reflected the quality of the nation that the Greeks had lost.⁹⁵ Even still, Herodotus makes sure to record Xerxes’ suspicion of his new allies, expecting them to turn on the Persians as soon as they see a sign of weakness (7.191.1).⁹⁶ But the Thessalians ultimately stay loyal to the Persians out of fear—and who could blame them? At least, such is Herodotus’ implied argument.

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⁹⁶ Contrast this suspicion with Thebes’ actions at Plataea, where they prove the most loyal supporters of the Persian enemy (in direct contrast to the Phocians and Macedonians, who are useful to the Greek cause even as unwilling fighters on the Persian side).
Thus Thessaly proves a worthy representative-champion of the medizers who, by their insignificance and general “lack of power” (cf. ἀδύνασθίς, 7.172.3), are even more constrained by necessity (ἀναγκαίς, 7.172.1) than their far more powerful Thessalian neighbors. When the others are included on the list of Xerxes’ recently recruited land forces shortly thereafter (7.185.2), the reader is easily able to supply a pardon. Even the order of Herodotus’ list advises against too harsh a judgement: the Perrhaebians, Aenianians, Dolopians, Magnesians, and Achaeans are lumped together with nine other nations—a list which is motivated neither by geography (like the list at 8.33) nor by diligent precision (the last item on the list is collective, “whoever was dwelling in Thrace” [ὁσοὶ τῆς Ἡρακλείτης παραλίην νέμονται, 7.185.2]), but rather by its rhetorical argument: these Amphictyonic members were not the only—or the largest—nations to be pressed into the service of the Persians.

Thus Herodotus avoids including the medizers in the action. But he nonetheless finds other ways to incorporate these nations in the narrative. Much as he did in the Salamis and Plataea narratives,97 Herodotus once again plays to the home crowd by including local landmarks in the narrative. The Malians would have enjoyed the idyllic narrative-tour that Herodotus takes through their homeland, past the Trachinian Rocks and along the Spercheus and Dyras rivers; this last is celebrated as “the river that rose to help Hercules as he was burning” (τὸν βοηθόντα τῷ Ἡρακλεί κατοικώνῳ, 7.198.2). The Magnesians would have enjoyed Herodotus’ description of the Ovens of Pelion (7.188.3) and especially his etymology of the local port of Aphetae, whence (Herodotus claims) the Argonauts set sail for Colchis, leaving Hercules behind (7.193.2). And the Phthiotian Achaeans would have enjoyed Herodotus’ inclusion of the Grove of Alus, similarly accompanied by a mythical story about “how Athamas the son of Aeolus conspired

with Ino to bring about Phrixus’ death” (ὡς Αθάμας ὁ Αἰόλου ἐμηχανήσατο Φρίξῳ μόρον σὺν Ἰνοὶ βουλεύσας, 7.197.1). Herodotus’ narrative of Thermopylae thus overlooks the medism of these nations in favor of frivolous, yet delightful and mythologically-significant surveys of local geography.

The Pythian Host: Delphi

The only remaining Amphictyonic member is also the most germane to a Pythian festival: its Delphian hosts. Delphi receives ample praise in the Thermopylae narrative. Despite being “completely terrified” (καταρρωδηκότες, 7.178.1; the same word used for the Peloponnesians who abandoned Thermopylae, 7.207), the Delphians consult the oracle, which advises them to “pray to the winds” (ἀνέμοις εὔχεσθαι, 7.178.1). The Delphians, in response, choose to resist their terror and, by reporting the oracle to the Greeks, they materially fortify the Hellenic resolve:

Δελφοὶ δὲ δεξάμενοι τὸ μαντήμαν πρῶτα μὲν Ἑλλήνων τοῖς βουλομένοις εἶναι ἔλευθεροις ἐξήγειλαν τὰ χρησθέντα αὐτοῖς, καὶ σφί δεινοῖς καταρρωδεύσας τὸν βάρβαρον ἐξαγγείλαντες χάριν ἀθάνατον κατέθεντο. (7.178.2)

As soon as the Delphians received the prophecy, they sent the message to the Greeks who were fighting for their freedom—even though they were deathly afraid of the barbarians. For this act, the Greeks extolled the courage of the Delphians and promised their eternal gratitude.

The last four words—ἐξαγγείλαντες χάριν ἀθάνατον κατέθεντο—even scan as a hexameter, implying that Herodotus is either quoting an external verse (and thus evoking the celebration of the Delphians there) or that he is adding gravity to the anecdote by employing a poetic mode.

Herodotus’ Delphians are brave, pious, and have the interests of the Greeks at heart—compare this to the anti-Delphian suspicions (or at least, negative implications) that Herodotus weaves into the embassy scenes (see above, pp. 149-53).
After such an emphatically positive portrayal as Herodotus gives the Delphians in the Thermopylae narrative, the oracle that Sparta must either lose a king or be destroyed (ἵ μέγα ἀστυ ἑρυκυδές ὑπ’ ἀνδράσι Περσείδησι / πέρθεται, ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐχί, ἢ ὧμ’ Ἡρακλέους δὲ γενέθλης / πενθήσει βασιλῆς φθίμενον Λακεδαίμονος τιν᾽ / πέρθεται, ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐχὶ, ἢφ’ Ἡρακλέους δὲ γενέθλης / πενθήσει βασιλῆς φθίμενον Λακεδαίμονος τιν᾽; 7.220.3) seems critically interested in the safety and preservation of Greece: without this oracle, Herodotus implies, Leonidas might easily have abandoned Thermopylae with the others, sealing the fate of all Greece. The Delphians within the Thermopylae narrative are not just absolved of all suspicion, they are celebrated for their critical role in the defeat of the Persians.98

_The Collective Amphictyony_

Thus, apart from Thebes, every member of the Delphic Amphictyony is given a favorable role in Herodotus’ narrative of Thermopylae. Even the mention of these states is remarkable considering that most enter the _Histories_ only here and at 7.132.1, where they are categorically denounced for medism. This blanket positivity alone is worth noticing in the _Histories_: Herodotus almost never allows an unambiguously positive portrayal to last longer than a chapter, much less for sixty-two. In fact, the other most noticeable examples of a sustained positive portrayal in the _Histories_ are his accounts of Salamis and Plataea—which I have also explained in terms of _epideixis_—and although the Salamis and Plataea narratives are consistently favorable to the Athenians and their allies, Herodotus still unrestrainedly mistreats other Greeks throughout those two narratives.

Most of all, then, it is this _collection_ of positive portrayals that implies an Amphictyonic audience. It is hard to attribute the corresponding alignment of nations to any other circumstance. Indeed, the list of positive and sympathetic portrayals in the Thermopylae narrative is an

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unexpected grouping for any period in Greek history: these nations hated each other. Thessaly was constantly waging wars against Phocis, as Herodotus’ own account attests (7.176.4; 8.27-29); Phocis regularly challenged Delphi for control over the Pythian Oracle (thus the Second Sacred War in the early 440s); Boeotia fought with Athens and the Ionians almost as much as they fought with Sparta and the Dorians (especially in the 450s); and, of course, Athens and Sparta were practically arch-enemies. It would be next to impossible, then, to instantiate this group from a political or military alignment, but a Panhellenic religious institution like the Amphictyonic council explains the grouping perfectly.

Furthermore, the Amphictyonic council is remarkably well-represented in Herodotus’ Thermopylae narrative: the Thermopylae narrative includes the only instances of the Amphictyony acting on its own authority in the Histories. In describing the region around Thermopylae, for example, Herodotus mentions the Amphictyonic council as an aside, marking the “seats of the Amphictyones” (ἕδραι εἰςὶ Ἀμφικτύοσι) and the sanctuary of Demeter Amphictyonis—which incidentally (along with the Pythian Oracle) represented the charge and raison d’être of the Amphictyonic Council (7.200.2). Likewise, Herodotus singles out Ephialtes as the traitor of the Greeks by noting that he was later accused by the Amphictyones themselves (7.213.2), and Herodotus furthermore personally advances the judgment of the Amphictyonic Pylagoroi as being the representatives of all Hellenes:

τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τῶδε χρὴ σταθμώσασθαι, ὅτι οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Πυλαγόροι ἐπεκήρυξαν οὐκ ἐπὶ Ὀνίτῃ τε καὶ Κορυδαλλῷ ἁγγύριον ἄλλο ἐπὶ Ἑπίωτῇ τῷ Τρηχινίῳ, πάντως καὶ τὸ ἀτρεκέστατον πυθόμενοι. (7.214.2)

99 For the numerous examples of these trends, see Hornblower 2011.
100 The only other two mentions of the Amphictyony concern the rebuilding of the temple at Delphi (2.180, 5.62.2).
101 Cf. Macan 1908: §7.200. “The Amphiktyons met twice a year at Thermopylai, as at Delphi. The ‘seats’ were doubtless sub Jove. … These sacred buildings would at least have required repair after 480 B.C., though there was no reason why the Persians should injure them any more than Delphi itself. They were perhaps restored at the time of the attempted revival of the Amphiktyony.”
For it must be considered that the Pylagoroi of the Greeks did not put a ransom on Onetas or Corydallus, but only on Ephialtes the Trachinian, presumably having investigated the matter thoroughly.

The Amphictyones here are responsible and conscientious, fulfilling their duty as stewards of this sacred place by denouncing and pursuing the man who betrayed the Greeks to the Persians. This was much the same duty discharged by the Amphictyony’s erection of the monuments and inscriptions at Thermopylae (7.228.4), the very inclusion of which furthers Herodotus’ pro-Amphictyonic authorial strategy. This climactic display of the Amphictyones fulfilling their duty furthermore reveals an Amphictyonic concern with preserving the kleos of those who fought at Thermopylae—the very cause which Herodotus’ narrative promotes. The Thermopylae narrative, then, is uniquely positive toward the Amphictyonic council and its members. It would have been well received by an audience gathered at the Pythian Festival.

**Dating the Epideixis?**

Given the paucity of evidence surrounding both the mid-fifth century and the members and nature of the Amphictyony, however, establishing any specific historical context with certainty will be difficult, if not impossible. But it may still be worthwhile to consider what evidence there is. First, Herodotus’ choice to portray the Thebans negatively implies that Herodotus could reliably predict that his audience would share his negative opinion of Thebes. Historically, Thebes was shunned after the Persian War and, soon thereafter, Athens dominated Thebes until the Battle of Coronea in 447, at which point Thebes returned to its role as a major player in the inter-Hellenic political world.\(^{102}\) Therefore, when combined with the clear favor that Herodotus shows to Sparta and Thespiae (the latter of which was effectively subjugated under Thebes in the 430s but was especially resurgent during Thebes’ occupation by Athens in

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the 450s), Herodotus’ treatment of Thebes suggests that the period between 457 and 447 would provide the most receptive climate for a performance of the Thermopylae narrative at the Pythian festival.\textsuperscript{103}

It may also be worth considering the Thermopylae narrative’s effort to mitigate the charge of medism, as demonstrated above. The opprobrium associated with medism diminished as the decades passed, and by the late-fifth century Greeks were more concerned about who could get Persia to support them financially than about who had fought for Persia in the past.\textsuperscript{104} In the mid-fifth century, then, the Thermopylae narrative’s concern to excuse many of these states from their medizing past might have had greater force. By defending medizers, Herodotus would be attempting to justify the ongoing inclusion of medizing states in Greek politics, an increasingly common practice in the mid-fifth century—especially for Athens and Sparta, who used such states as pawns to secure their hold on the Boeotian plain and, perhaps more significantly, to influence the Amphictyonic Council and the Pythian Oracle.\textsuperscript{105} To forgive and forget was in the best interests for many Greeks at that time, and especially for those who would have gathered at the Pythian festival. Conversely, by the late-fifth century, their medism had largely been forgiven and forgotten.\textsuperscript{106} Considering the dating established for Herodotus’ Plataea and Salamis \textit{epideixeis}, then, I (tentatively) propose the mid-fifth century as the most likely historical context for Herodotus’ performance of the Thermopylae narrative at a Pythian festival.

\textsuperscript{103} But ultimately, such political lines are blurred and messy, not only because of our lack of non-Athenian evidence, but also because the contemporary political relationships were themselves blurred and messy.

\textsuperscript{104} As evidenced by (e.g.) the many Spartan attempts to solicit Persian support at the outset of the Archidamian War (Thuc. 1.82.1; 2.7.1; 2.67.1) and the Persian King’s own reciprocation (Thuc. 4.50.1). Following the failure of the Sicilian Expedition, Persian intervention became a mainstay of the conflict (see esp. Thuc. 8.5.5, 8.6.1 [Sparta]; and 8.47.2, 8.53.3 [Athens]). See Bagnall 2006: esp. 252-78.

\textsuperscript{105} Especially in the “cold” Second Sacred War, see p. 81.

\textsuperscript{106} The sole mention of states medizing in Thucydides, for example, is the Plataean denunciation of Thebes (3.56.4) and the Thebans’ response (3.62), which actually goes on to argue that supporting Athens amounts to a comparable betrayal of Greek freedom (3.63). Thuc. 1.89.2 obliquely refers to the Ionians’ former allegiance to the Persians.
Festival. However we date the _epideixis_, though, the indication of an Amphictyonic audience remains as stable as that council’s state membership through the fifth and fourth centuries.

**Conclusion**

In sharp contrast with Herodotus’ Salamis and Plataea narratives, then, the Thermopylae narrative reflects not an Athenian audience but an Amphictyonic one, most likely gathered at the Panhellenic Pythian festival. The Thermopylae _epideixis_ thus provides a remarkable contrast both with the framing narrative of the _Histories_ and with the other _epideixeis_ alike. When portrayals of states like Athens are decidedly less favorable than in the Salamis and Plataea narratives, whereas portrayals of medizers like Thessaly are noticeably _more_ sympathetic, we may explain these apparent contradictions in Herodotus’ sympathies by adducing an epideictic background. Due to the limited nature of non-Athenian evidence, however, a precise dating of the Thermopylae _epideixis_ is less possible than in the cases of the Salamis and Plataea narratives.

Still, several factors including the narrative’s negative portrayal of Thebes, its otherwise apologetic stance toward medism, and its avoidance of any reference—direct or oblique—to the late-fifth century conflicts suggest a date in line with those of the Salamis and Plataea narratives: the mid-fifth century. Therefore we may suspect that Herodotus produced his Thermopylae narrative and incorporated it into the _Histories_ using much the same process as proposed for

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107 Of course, nothing in the Thermopylae episode absolutely precludes a later date either. Therefore it would be imprudent to assume that any particular reference should or should not be considered part of the epideixis based on dating alone. Indeed, the yet-undetermined status of the material from 7.145-7.172 (discussed above, pp. 149-53) may bear on the dating too: the general theme of the embassy scenes is similar to the factiousness between Greeks that characterizes the Plataea episode (Chapter II), but with a patent disapproval of both Spartan and Athenian pride coupled with the judgmental tone of warning that surfaces in particular in the concluding books of the _Histories_ (which have been interpreted convincingly in the context of rising Athenian imperialism). The embassy to Sicily in particular evokes the atmosphere at the outset of the Archidamian war, especially in its foreboding narrative of Sparta and Athens’ unwillingness to relinquish their respective command of the Hellenic land and sea forces (7.159-61). Of course, we needn’t assume that the Archidamian War was Herodotus’ intended referential target here, inasmuch as the Spartans and Athenians were engaged in a similar rivalry for practically the entire duration of the fifth century. Herodotus might easily have provided the same commentary in the 450s when Sparta and Athens seemed on an equally irreconcilable collision course. But ultimately it seems prudent to conclude that, while certain factors suggest a performance context in the mid-fifth century (similar to that of the other two _epideixeis_), the state of our evidence simply does not allow a clinching argument in either direction.
Salamis and Plataea, albeit for a different original audience: an epideictic performance that was later incorporated into the final text, Herodotus’ *historiēs apodexis.*
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The composition of the *Histories* was complex. Even first-time readers notice the disjunctions and contradictions that practically define Herodotus’ style. Scholars from Felix Jacoby to Nino Luraghi have attempted to explain Herodotus’ style in terms of methodology, but Arnaldo Momigliano’s famous proclamation remains true: “The secrets of his workshop are not yet all out.”¹ By attempting to apply Rosalind Thomas’ theory that Herodotus was deeply engaged in the epideictic wisdom-performance culture of the mid-fifth century to the *Persica* material,² however, I hope to have opened up one more of those secrets. In order to truly understand the *Histories*, we must first understand their context. By my reading, that context is neither monolithic nor straightforward, but a mismatched collage of times, places, and even modalities. The *Histories* itself may have been complete, written, and unitary, but its epideictic roots helped shape—and indeed are preserved in—the final text.

On several levels, the results of my argument are not surprising at all. For example, despite the occasional skeptic,³ scholars have long suspected—based on testimonia (e.g., Plutarch *De Mal.* 862b), literary echoes (e.g., Soph. *Ant.* 904-20),⁴ and Herodotus’ connection

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¹ Jacoby 1913; Luraghi 2001; quote from Momigliano 1966: 129.
³ E.g., Podlecki 1977.
with the Athenian-led colony at Thurii (c.443)—that Herodotus had an intimate familiarity with Athens in the mid-fifth century.\(^5\) Similarly, for almost two millennia the tradition of Herodotus-as-performer was completely accepted as perfectly in line with the ancient practice of performing history that developed in Herodotus’ own time.\(^6\) This evidence has rightly been questioned as mostly circumstantial and therefore an unworthy foundation for any comprehensive theory of composition.\(^7\) However, by detecting mid-fifth century *epideixeis* within the text of the *Histories* itself—two of which *epideixeis* reflect an Athenian audience, the other an audience gathered at a Panhellenic festival—I hope to have effectively substantiated the tradition that Herodotus was active as a performer in the mid-fifth century.

For this argument, I have relied on several angles of textual analysis: most prominently, \([1]\) historical, \([2]\) ideological, \([3]\) cultural, and \([4]\) narratological. \([1]\) My historical analysis, especially that of the Salamis and Plataea narratives, questions the common assumption that Herodotus’ concern with Athens should generally be read against the background of imperialist ambition and rivalry against Sparta that characterized the years leading up to the Archidamian War (a reading which is admittedly justified in its application to other passages, e.g. the conclusion of the *Histories*).\(^8\) Rather, the apparent sympathies of these narratives for not only Athens but Phocis and Macedon as well—combined with a lukewarm rendering of Sparta as bumbling and deceitful but not outright malicious—far better reflect the context of the mid-fifth century, when Phocis and Macedon were closely allied with Athens, not engaged in open conflict with Athens under Spartan leadership. A similar historical context can be observed in the

\(^5\) See (e.g.) Fornara 1971a: 38-59; Moles 2002. Cf. Priestley 2014: 44. “Few would want to deny that Herodotus spent some time at Athens.”


\(^7\) See (e.g.) Johnson 1994; Rösl er 2002.

\(^8\) E.g., Irwin 2013: esp. 23-26.
Thermopylae narrative, especially in its elevation of Thespiae over Thebes (which was under Athenian control during the mid-fifth century, but quickly rose to prominence thereafter). Thus all three epideictic narratives best reflect a historical context in the mid-fifth century that is ultimately incompatible with the rest of the Histories on the evidence of not only clear evocations of the hostilities surrounding the Archidamian War but explicit references to events of the war as well.\(^9\)

[2] My ideological analysis has revealed (for example) remarkably divergent narratives of medism: in the Athenian epideixeis, states like Athens and Phocis that resisted medism are celebrated for their willingness to stand up to the Persian threat. The terrible consequences that both states were willing to endure for the sake of Hellenic freedom are repeatedly and emphatically emphasized in both the Salamis and Plataea narratives as a counter-example to the medizers’ argument from necessity—what ‘necessity’ could be greater than the loss of a city, the pillaging of temples, and even the massacre of citizens? Yet this is the very argument that the Thermopylae narrative is most concerned to deflect.\(^{10}\) Other ideological evocations that feature repeatedly include the various, diversely-appropriated forms of piety (which feature heavily in all three narratives) and the topoi of Athenian funeral orations (which recur in the Athenian narratives).\(^{11}\)

[3] These same topoi coincide with the Salamis and Plataea narratives’ numerous invocations of Athenian democratic culture that are almost entirely lacking in the Thermopylae narrative. For example, the epideixeis that I have identified as serving an Athenian audience feature numerous long and complex expositions of rhetoric—mostly by Athenians. In the

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\(^9\) References to events in the first years of the Archidamian War occur at 6.91; 6.98.2; 7.137; 7.233.4; 7.235.2; 9.73.


Thermopylae narrative, by contrast, the only two speech acts that last longer than two or three words are barely a third of the length of the longest Salamis and Plataea speeches (for Salamis, 8.60 and 8.68; for Plataea, 8.140, 8.143-144, 9.7, and 9.27). Furthermore, the speeches in the Thermopylae narrative serve primarily [a] to defend Thessaly for its medism (7.172.2-3) and [b] to praise Sparta for its resolve in battle (7.209.2-4)—both themes that are explicitly challenged in the Athenian *epideixeis*. At the least, Herodotus’ *Histories* commits itself to extended evocations of largely incompatible cultural frameworks in different parts of the text, a result which is best explained by different intended audiences.

[4] Finally, I have shown how the epideictic narratives can be read independently without compromising their narratological integrity.\(^\text{12}\) For the most part, the beginning and ending limits of these narratives are clearly demarcated in the text by programmatic statements often accompanied by μὲν δὴ (as is the case with 7.172, 7.233, 8.1, and 8.133); the two limits without μὲν δὴ (both endings of the Athenian *epideixeis*, 8.89 and 9.70) are nonetheless accompanied by suitable concluding statements and followed by material that directly contradicts the authorial strategy of the preceding narrative. And within these limits (which isolate almost fifteen percent of the complete text of the *Histories*), there are only four short ‘authorial intrusions’ that run counter to the identified narrative strategies—7.209.2, 8.3.1, 8.30.1, and 9.64.1, all of which can be shown to directly contradict the surrounding narrative—and only two quick, easily-explained references to the outside narrative (ὁς καὶ πρῶτερον εἰρήθη, 7.187.3; and ὁς καὶ πρῶτερον δεδῆλωται, 9.32). None of the three narratives make any unambiguous reference, oblique or explicit, to the Archidamian War or the events preceding it. Although the limits I have set are not necessarily the original beginnings and ends of the *epideixeis*, the

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\(^{12}\) For this brand of narratology, see the summary of Munson 2001: 20.
narratives that fall between those limits have almost no reliance on or awareness of the ‘final text’ which surrounds them.

If large portions of the Histories reflect specific original performance audiences that differ from that of the unitary whole, then we can attribute the shifting and often contradictory authorial strategies that characterize Herodotus’ narrative style to the compositional process rather than a confused author or that author’s over-reliance on specific yet diverse sources. Of course, my approach does not replace source-based criticism but rather complements it: Herodotus chose his sources and stories based not just on their historicity or entertainment value, but also on their resonance with his audience—which was not always a single Panhellenic readership, but sometimes one of the many specific audiences that correspond to Herodotus’ prolonged and far-ranging career as a wisdom-performer, wherein he adapted his narratives to specific chronological and political contexts.

As a result, audience-based analysis may have a number of implications for modern scholarship. First, it clarifies Herodotus’ role in the world of sophistic wisdom-performance and thus elaborates on Rosalind Thomas’ theories about Herodotus’ intellectual milieu. Similarly, it provides a new perspective on the world of Hellenic oral storytelling, which Wolfgang Aly, Philip Stadter, Nino Luraghi, Leslie Kurke, and so many others have explored. We may observe in particular that Herodotus wrote for single audiences, even if he intended to perform the same epideixis (perhaps in a slightly modified version?) for different audiences later. The epideixeis also provide us a sense for how long such performances might last and how easily they might be adapted to different contexts. We may also gauge how ready an audience might have been to accept favorable adaptations to common narratives—even if these adaptations

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14 Aly 1921; Stadter 1997; Luraghi 2001; Kurke 2011.
contradicted prevailing authority. And the very possibility of historical narrative being presented in the world of *epideixis* and wisdom-performance reminds us that—unlike in the late-fifth century, when a fairly narrow definition of ‘sophist’ had emerged (e.g., Aristophanes, *Clouds*)—there was no clearly defined limit on the mid-fifth century concept of ‘wisdom’: mid-fifth century Greece boasted a truly open-minded and vibrant culture of wisdom-performance, where any knowledge or methodology (*technē*) constituted a fair contribution. Thus our understanding both of Herodotus as performer and of the genre of wisdom-performance in general can be updated by analysis of these discrete examples.

**Comparing the *Epideixeis* with Each Other**

If these narratives did originally exist as *epideixeis*, then a comparison of the three narratives can further help us understand the epideictic mode—at least, as Herodotus defined it. Unsurprisingly, the *epideixeis* nearest each other in authorial strategy are Salamis and Plataea: they share an emphatic endorsement of democratic ideology, a credulous opinion of divine intervention and oracular religion, and an almost identical alignment of positive and negative portrayals of specific cities. I have explained this similarity as a function of their similar audience, both in time and space (mid-fifth century Athens). The most productive comparison, then, will likely be between the two Athenian *epideixeis* and the third *epideixis*, Thermopylae, which was written for a dramatically different audience (*viz.* Amphictyonic attendees of the Pythian Festival). In fact, despite the difference in performance context, the Salamis and Plataea *epideixeis* not only engage the same themes and arguments as the Thermopylae narrative, but follow many of the same narrative patterns as well—even if they are applied rather differently. These common elements reflect the similar compositional methods, political environment, and performance context which the *epideixeis* share; yet a number of differences still arise from the
difference in audience. By analyzing this contrast, we may better understand both the original audiences and Herodotus’ motivations in constructing his *epideixis*.

The narratives of Salamis and Thermopylae in particular have more in common than we might expect given their different audiences. The action of Thermopylae and Salamis takes place on a remarkably similar arc, matching up in narrative order on as many as fifteen points. In both narratives, [1] the initial action between Greeks and Persians occurs at Artemisium: a small, preliminary skirmish between Persians and Greeks (7.179-83 in the Thermopylae narrative corresponds to [hereafter, ~] 8.11 in the Salamis narrative), which is followed by [2] a decision to retreat (7.183.1~8.4.1). Following this battle, [3] a storm decimates the Persian fleet (7.190~8.12-13). Both narratives then include [4] a more significant naval battle between Greeks and Persians (7.194-95~8.14-16). After this battle is concluded, both narratives include [5] a detailed advance of Xerxes and his forces, described almost as tourism in both cases (7.196-198~8.31-34); [6] both advances mark the religious impact of the advance by the inclusion of a local shrine (7.197~8.33). Following Xerxes’ occupation of Greek territory, [7] the Greek forces are enumerated at length in both narratives (7.202-203~8.43-48). At this point, the Salamis narrative actually reprises Xerxes’ advance—through Attica this time—where Thermopylae does not, both in [*5] its topographical quasi-tourism (8.49-51) and [*6] its inclusion of a religious sanctuary (8.54). Most likely, this divergent reprise upon reaching Athens reflects the interests of the Salamis narrative’s Athenian audience.

After Xerxes sacks Athens, events return to their parallel structure. In both narratives, [8] the Peloponnesian proposal to fall back to the isthmus is overridden by Greeks whose territory would be lost by that action: Phocians and Locrians before Thermopylae (7.207), Athenians

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15 Cf. Immerwahr 1966: 257-67, who compares only Thermopylae and Artemision. In fact, Immerwahr meets with less success in his attempts at finding parallel constructions, focused as he is on unifying the entire Persian Wars narrative (Books 7-9) rather than studying the battle narratives independently.
before Salamis (8.60). After this discussion, [9] there is an episode featuring Demaratus in both narratives (7.209~8.65). Then [10] a traitor is identified (7.213~8.75, although the ‘traitor’ in the Salamis episode—Themistocles—is a false one). Next [11] the Greek debate about whether to stay and fight is summarily ended by a message that the Persians have surrounded the Greeks (7.219~8.79-81), followed by [12] the decisive argument of one man who resolves to stand his ground: Leonidas at Thermopylae (7.220) and Themistocles at Salamis (8.78). Both episodes are further accompanied by [13] an oracle that is proven true by subsequent events (7.220~8.77). And at last, [14] a decisive culminating battle is fought (although the action is remarkably circumscribed in both cases, 7.223-24~8.84-86), after which battle [15] Herodotus catalogues the death of brothers of Xerxes (7.224.2-225.1~8.89). Considering Michael Flower’s conclusion that Herodotus’ account of Thermopylae, at least, is less credible (and thus more adapted) than Ephorus’,16 these parallels most likely reflect literary affectation rather than historical reality.

Furthermore, the events of both battles are almost exclusively dominated by a similar narrative force: the actions of one central—practically Homeric—protagonist. At Thermopylae, Leonidas leads the troops (7.204-206), makes the important decisions (7.220-22), and ultimately dies with the most fanfare (7.224-25); at Salamis, Themistocles convinces the allies to stand their ground (both at Artemisium [8.4-5] and at Salamis [8.56-63]), is the only one to take proactive measures during the Greek retreat (8.19-23), and is also the only one who sees the danger of retreating to the isthmus (8.60), finally taking matters into his own hands when he tricks the Persians into attacking (8.75). Indeed, Artemisium is explicitly compared to and synchronized with Thermopylae in the Salamis narrative (8.15): each force fights for the sake of the other (although incidentally only the Greeks at Artemisium succeed in their intention, a difference

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which may again be explained by the presence of an Athenian audience). Thus we may observe that, on as many as fifteen discrete points as well as in their plot arc and character motivations, the narratives of Thermopylae and Salamis—for almost their entire lengths as identified in Chapters III and IV—are remarkably parallel.

Yet for all their similarities, Herodotus’ narratives of Thermopylae and Salamis are ultimately incompatible as consecutive episodes in the Histories—a result that I believe reflects their epideictic background. Many have observed the similarities between the two battle narratives, but rarely have scholars noted their incompatibility beyond a mention of curiosity. Yet much of Herodotus’ Salamis narrative repeats, repurposes, or even directly contradicts his Thermopylae narrative. At 8.4.1, for example, the Greeks “arrive” (ἀπικόμενοι) at Artemisium, although the Thermopylae narrative makes it clear that (for that narrative, at least) the Greeks were already present in force. Despite attempts by translators to smooth Herodotus’ transition here—for example, Purvis translates the phrase, “the Hellenes who had come to Artemision…”18—Herodotus’ meaning is clear enough: “καὶ emphāses emphāses ἐπὶ Ἀρτεμίσιον ... ἀπικόμενοι: ‘these Greeks who had finally arrived at Artemisium,’” as Angus Bowie points out.19 The grammar allows no other reading than that this arrival is intended as the Greeks’ first.

But even if the text weren’t clear, the immediate reaction of the Greeks thereafter is to balk at the forces of the Persians and consider retreat, surprised by their sheer magnitude (8.4.1). This surprise is simply incompatible with the events of the Thermopylae narrative, where the Greek forces have already arrived—and encountered Persian forces—not only once, but twice

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17 E.g., Vannicelli 2007: 318-21 discussing the different totals given for the dead at Thermopylae at 7.228.1 and 8.25. The variation has no bearing on my present discussion beyond the simple contradiction, which implies a different method of reckoning and a different authorial motivation for the two passages (which circumstance would be unlikely if the Histories were truly “unitary”).


19 Bowie 2007: 93.
(7.175, 7.192; naval encounters occur at 7.179-82 and 7.194). During this second conflict, the Greeks even manage to take hostages who give further details of the Persian force: “The Greeks asked these men what they wanted to learn about Xerxes’ army, then sent them off in chains”

(τούτους οἱ Ἑλληνες, ἐξιστορήσαντες τὰ ἐβούλοντο πωθέσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς Ξέρξεως στρατιῆς, ἀποσέμπουσι δεδεμένοις, 7.195). The Greeks in the Thermopylae narrative, then, have already been to Artemisium twice and are furthermore fully informed of the nature and size of the Persian forces. And even the information of the hostages would have been unnecessary for the sort of revelation that the Greeks experience at 8.4.1: with even a moment of clear weather, the Persian forces at Aphetae would have been visible as soon as the Greeks reached Artemisium.20

The narrative at 7.195-96 admits no other possibility than that the two forces were present in those places and therefore aware of each other already, and therefore directly contradicts their “arrival” coming first at 8.4.1.

Rather, as the Salamis narrative proceeds, it becomes clear that Herodotus is narrating the same events over again—a second version of the same Battle of Artemisium. As I have already pointed out, both narratives recount a divine storm which lasts three days and wipes out a good portion of the Persian fleet (7.190-92~8.12-14). In both narratives, the Greeks fearfully consider retreat at first (7.183~8.4.1), then resolve to defend Artemisium only after being encouraged by news of the storm and its decimation of the Persian ships both in harbor and circling Euboea (7.192~8.14.2). The only real variance between the two narratives here is that before Thermopylae the Greeks do in fact retreat from Artemisium, whereas before Salamis Themistocles convinces the Greeks to hold their ground. This variance might easily be explained by a difference in audiences: no doubt an Athenian audience would have objected to a

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20 Depending on which locations are accepted, the distance across the strait could have been as little as five miles.
retreat to the Euripus—a move which they probably would have recognized for the strategic blunder that it was because of their familiarity with the waterways of the region\textsuperscript{21}—and furthermore would have celebrated Themistocles’ successful persuasiveness in keeping the Greeks faithfully at their posts (much like the Spartans at Thermopylae). The proper reading of these two narratives is plain: the Greeks did not arrive, retreat or almost retreat, and then finally resolve to defend Artemisium following a storm’s decimation of Persian forces twice; Herodotus is merely narrating the same events for two different audiences.

Remarkably, though, despite exhibiting many of the same authorial strategies and agendas as Salamis (enumerated above), the Plataea narrative shares almost none of the narrative parallels observed between Thermopylae and Salamis. This result has an easy explanation: if Plataea and Salamis were in fact intended for the same audience, Herodotus wouldn’t have wanted to reproduce his first epideixis too closely for fear of becoming tedious or redundant. This initial result of the comparison of the three epideixeis, then, prompts three interesting conclusions: [1] that Herodotus is capable of relying on a proven model when composing his narratives; [2] that he is equally capable of varying his narratives to suit the circumstance of his performance; and [3] that Herodotus was concerned to change his narrative order when presenting to a repeat audience. These conclusions provide some limited corroboration for the audiences identified in Chapters II and III, and they provide some insight into Herodotus’ methods. I expect that further close comparative analysis of the epideixeis will be productive.

**Comparing the Epideixeis with the ‘Unitary’ Histories**

My thesis also has implications for our understanding of Herodotus as composer of the Histories. Combining my dating of the epideixeis and my proposed method of composition, I

\footnote{\textsuperscript{21}The Greek retreat to Euripus would have exposed the troops at Thermopylae to an uncontested landing by the Persians behind Thermopylae, thus obviating the need for the narrative of Ephialtes and the Anopaea path.}
would argue that Herodotus began not with the grand design of the *Histories* but rather as a story-teller. This argument has already been proposed for Herodotus as an ethnographer; my own investigation into Herodotus indicates that he was also interested early on in performing battle narratives. It is difficult to say which came first—his concern with ethnography or with historiography—but we may assert with some certainty that both preceded the larger work of the *Histories*, which for Herodotus represented his masterpiece (*apodeixis*), the culmination of his career as a *histor*, a traveler, and an oral performer.

Such a chronological reorganization has a significant impact on our understanding of the *Histories*’ composition: by implication, the foundational performance unit of the *Histories* would be the *epideixis* (rather than the more circumscribed *logos* or, on the other end of the spectrum, the “skeleton” of the unitary whole). The themes and philosophies of the *Histories* were not the product of isolated literary reflection on Herodotus’ part but rather grew out of his engagement with the turbulent mélange of cultures, genres, and identities that suffused the late-archaic world. We can see Herodotus as intensely embroiled in an intellectual movement, not a man apart or a sudden genius on a promontory but a participant in a larger discussion that pervaded early Greek thought.

In fact, the nature of the compositional method that I am proposing should allow us to trace the development of Greek identity in the text itself. If my theory is correct, Herodotus’ text represents (at least) two distinct chronological moments: one in the mid-fifth century (the composition of the *epideixeis*) and another after the beginning of the Archidamian War (when

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22 E.g., Fornara 1971b: 1-23.

23 Lang 1984: 4. “Just because it is possible to identify a skeleton of causation, it is not necessary or even desirable to believe, as Immerwahr does, that the narrative was constructed in this way, that it was conceived first as a causally articulated skeleton and then fleshed out with narrative.”

Herodotus wrote down the *Histories* in their current form). Therefore, we might observe an evolution of Herodotus’ authorial persona in the gaps between *epideixis* and framing narrative. For example, by comparing Herodotus’ two writing styles, we can detect differences that would theoretically correspond to different stages in Herodotus’ career. Donald Lateiner’s monograph *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (1989) conveniently compiles a number of Herodotus’ rhetorical and historiographical devices—a compilation which is intended, incidentally, to “refute the idea that his work is a hodge-podge of oral reports.”25 Yet many of Lateiner’s ‘proofs’ have little or no application to the *epideixis*, and other stylistic features are much more common in the *epideixis* and occur rarely in the rest of the *Histories*. Some idiosyncrasies found disproportionately in the *epideixis* (which on my interpretation represent Herodotus’ early style) include: [1] the otherwise common use of λέγεται is surprisingly rare in Salamis and Plataea (in fact, it never occurs within eight chapters of the *epideixis*’ limits);26 [2] the majority of individually identified sources come from within the *epideixis*;27 [3] fewer instances of Herodotus polemicizing against other Hellenic writers occur in the *epideixis*;28 [4] both Herodotean uses of Athenian epichoric chronology occur in the *epideixis* which show evidence of an Athenian audience;29 [5] elsewhere in the *Histories*, Herodotus “never chooses sides” between Athens and Sparta (whereas my first two chapters demonstrate that Herodotus does...

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25 Lateiner 1989: 58. While Lateiner’s study is both useful and indeed convincing to some degree, the commonalities that he identifies prove only that the whole text was written by the same author, not at the same time; it would be not only unsurprising, but rather entirely expected for Herodotus to maintain many of the same compositional and historiographical habits throughout his life.

26 I.e., where ‘marginal’ authorial intrusions occur and the narrative remains transitional; however, λέγεται has its normal frequency in the Thermopylae narrative. Ibid. 22.

27 Ibid. 83.

28 Ibid. 104.

29 Ibid. 117.
precisely that in his Salamis and Plataea narratives);\textsuperscript{30} [6] among the twenty-three criticisms of Persian tyranny which pervade the *Histories*, only two occur in the *epideixeis*, and these both deal with Xerxes’ and Mardonius’ tragic isolation (particularly surprising since all three *epideixeis* feature Persian tyrants as enemies of the Greeks);\textsuperscript{31} and finally, [7] Herodotus seems less reluctant to engage questions of divinity than in the rest of the *Histories*, especially if the first half of the Egypt *logos* may be considered an *epideixis* (see Appendix [b]).\textsuperscript{32} Lateiner’s effort to show that the entire *Histories* follows the same rhetorical structure, then, in fact reveals just how distinct the *epideixeis* are from the framing narrative.

A similar method may be applied to common themes and topics in the *Histories*. For example, the *epideixeis* display a deep, almost reverent fascination with the Persian ‘barbarian’. Not that the rest of the *Histories* avoids discussing Persia; rather, when the rest of the *Histories* treats the Persians, the stories are ethnographic, salacious, and prone to displays of barbarism and brutality. In the stories just outside of the Thermopylae, Salamis, and Plataea narratives alone, Pythius’ son is quartered in brutal fashion (7.37-39), eighteen Thracian children are buried alive (7.114), Xerxes commits flagrant adultery with the noble Masistes’ wife (whom Xerxes’ own wife subsequently mutilates, 9.107-13), and Xerxes himself mutilates the corpse of Leonidas (7.238).\textsuperscript{33} By contrast, the *epideixeis* seek to understand Persian motivation, exploring the Persians’ emotions and psychology much as Aeschylus did some twenty years earlier in his *Persians*.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. 133; cf. 135, examining the inconsistent characterization of Sparta.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid. 170; 172-79.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. 200-203.
\textsuperscript{33} In the framing narrative, Pausanias responds to a suggestion that he mutilate Mardonius’ corpse in retaliation by making this contrast explicit: “Such acts better befit barbarians than Greeks” (τὰ πρέπει μᾶλλον βαρβάροις ποιέειν ἢ περὶ Ἦλλησι, 9.79.1).
\textsuperscript{34} Bridges 2015: 11-45.
adversaries, not exotic curiosities. Of course, this same fearsome Persian power is deployed differently by Herodotus for different audiences: in Thermopylae, it helps the reader understand the choice to medize; in Salamis and Plataea, it gives the reader that much more respect for Athens, who resisted the choice to medize in the face of such danger. The respect and awe given to the Persian, then, would have been an attitude assumed across Greece, but the differences in its deployment reflect the ideologies and political circumstances of the discrete audiences. As the fifth century wore on, however, Greeks came to know and thus ridicule their Persian enemy (or in many cases, ally), which led to what Margaret Miller calls a “general interest in and desire to laugh at the East.” The different attitudes of the framing narrative and *epideixeis*, then, may reflect shifting Hellenic attitudes toward the Persians from the mid- to the late-fifth century.

In a similar vein, all three narratives take very seriously the practice of Greek religion and its effect on the Persian advance. The storms which decimate the Persian fleet in both narratives (7.190-8.12-13), for example, are both recognized explicitly as the will of the gods (7.189-8.13). Likewise, Delphi is given a prominent and favorable position in both accounts (7.178-8.35-39). Seers and oracularmongers play a much larger role in these narratives than elsewhere in the *Histories* too—Herodotus goes so far as to confirm the value of the seer Tisamenus to the Spartan army (9.35) and elsewhere to explicitly confirm the truth of oracles generally: “Indeed, when Bacis speaks so plainly, I dare not disbelieve in oracles, nor can I suffer such disbelief from others” (τοιαῦτα μὲν καὶ οὕτω ἐναργέως λέγοντι Βάκιδι <δι'> ἀντιλογίης χρησμὸν πέρι

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35 Bowie 2007: 6-11; cf. Dorati 2000. Such a narrative choice might be rendered specifically significant in the context of the recently concluded Persian War in c.450 and the common justification of Athenian hegemony during this period, the Persian threat.


37 Cf. Munson 2012: 244. “Thucydides’ ignore-the-barbarian brand of Hellenocentrism reflects the geopolitical situation of his time and a post-Cimonian and Periclean focus on Athenian predominance in Greece and the Aegean, which sees Thrace and the coasts of Anatolia as the virtual eastern and norther borders of the empire.”
οὔτε αὐτὸς λέγειν τολμέω οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλων ἐνδέκομαι, 8.77.2). In the *epideixeis*, then, Herodotus eschews his typical “reticence” about attributing results to a divine will—compare, for example, Herodotus’ frequent cynicism involving the bribery and manipulation of oracles elsewhere in the *Histories* (e.g., 5.62-63, 90; 6.66, 75, 84, 123). Might Herodotus have expected more receptivity to the idea of divine influence in a mid-fifth century performance context than in a late-fifth century readership of ‘published’ work? Such an expectation would have been reasonable in comparison with late-fifth century Athens at least, when Athenian perception of ‘oraclemongers’ and traditional religion had soured significantly. Or perhaps the difference is the result of different modalities, with skeptical views of the gods being confined to the elite intellectual Greeks who would *read* Herodotus’ *Histories* while the *epideixeis* were intended for lower-class audiences. Whatever the explanation, the observable difference in attitudes toward divine matters between the *epideixeis* and framing narrative is remarkable.

Finally, in the Athenian-oriented narratives of Salamis and Plataea, Herodotus portrays the ideals of democracy—and especially its interest in rhetorical skill—much more positively than elsewhere in the *Histories* (e.g., 5.97.2). This more positive take on the institutions of democracy may reflect the difference that Josiah Ober notices between oral and written sources in the fourth century. Still, as Nicole Loraux points out, prior to 440 we have almost no explicit testimony for a collective Athenian idea of democratic ideology—although she demonstrates that something like it must have existed. If my thesis is correct, then, these sections of Herodotus’ *Histories* can offer a rare glimpse into the Athenian democratic mindset

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39 See Ch. III, n.113 above.
40 E.g., Hedrick 2007: 284 considers philosophy and empirical science as alternative “competitors” of religion.
41 Ober 1989:160-61 uses Plato and Isocrates as representative examples thereof.
of the mid-fifth century, substantiating Loraux’s conclusion that the topoi common in Athenian funeral orations remained remarkably stable from the mid-fifth century on.  

Herodotus’ narratives, then, were intimately enmeshed not only in the culture of wisdom-performance, but also in contemporary political debates. These epideixeis were tendentious and powerful arguments, tailored to the opinions and concerns of his audience. This fact will not surprise any close reader of Herodotus. Numerous scholars have shown how elsewhere in the Histories (and especially in the final chapters of Book Nine) Herodotus engages the controversial situation surrounding the Archidamian War: he is sharply critical of Athenian administration of the Delian League, implicitly comparing them to Persia and warning them against a policy of unrestrained imperialism (a policy which was arguably justified before the peace with Persia, but after—with the suppression of revolting Delian League members beginning in 446—became transparently deliberate).  

Clearly Herodotus was willing to engage contemporary issues, shaping his ‘history’ as a commentary on his own times. My analysis shows that Herodotus was no less interested in such commentary when he wrote and performed his narratives of Thermopylae, Salamis, and Plataea: rather than the scattered and tenuous connections with the Archidamian War that scholars have read into these three narratives, we see Herodotus engaging with contemporary mid-fifth century politics on a profound and pervasive level throughout his epideictic work.

In this sense, Herodotus’ Histories can be seen to contain many layers, both chronological and thematic, into which the variegated opinions and attitudes of fifth-century

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44 I.e., the peace with Persia in 449 removed the very raison d’être for the Delian League. Cf. the Boeotian defense of their own medism by pointing out that supporting Athens amounts to the same betrayal of Hellenic freedom (Thuc. 3.63). This peace’s historicity is well defended by Badian 1993: 1-72.
45 E.g., Flower and Marincola 2002: §9.60.
Greece have been deposited. My audience-based approach thus enables a sort of archaeology of composition, a methodical investigation into the shifting sands of Herodotus’ prose. As I understand it, Herodotus’ elusive prose is at least partially the product of two factors: [1] his use of the (updated) progressive compositional method (see Introduction, pp. 22-24), wherein he imported pre-existing *epideixeis* into a freshly conceived masterpiece (*apodeixis*); and [2] the very difficulty of negotiating the transition from oral to written culture that produced the progressive style in Herodotus in the first place. The process of combining these two projects left visible seams in the text, seams which help to identify parts of the text that were composed earlier than the rest of the *Histories*. As a result, Herodotus’ prose ebbs and flows, bobs and weaves, adapting itself to the needs of the present audience in some parts, concerned with posterity, imperialism, and Panhellenism in others, but nonetheless unified throughout by a concern to preserve for posterity “the great and marvelous achievements of Greeks and Barbarians” (*ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλληνι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις ἀποδεχθέντα, preface*).
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APPENDIX

IDENTIFYING FURTHER EPIDEICTIC MATERIAL

It remains to investigate whether traces of the compositional method that produced Herodotus’ Thermopylae, Salamis, and Plataea epideixeis exist elsewhere in the Histories. Such material may exist in two forms: [a] epideictic material that may once have belonged with the epideixeis identified above but has been separated in the final text; and [b] epideixeis that are distinct from the three identified above that, although perhaps different in nature and subject, may yet have been performed apart from the rest of the Histories (whether in the context proposed for the three epideixeis identified above or in another context altogether).

[a] Related Epideictic Material (7.139.2-7.144)

For the first, there is a passage (7.139.2-144) that—although separated from the Salamis narrative by most of the seventh book—nonetheless parallels the Salamis epideixis closely, both thematically and aesthetically: so closely, in fact, that it could serve admirably as an introduction to that epideixis. Several elements recommend joining this passage with the epideictic material, such that we may indeed wish to consider the passage as prefatory to the Salamis epideixis itself. On a strictly aesthetic level, the beginning sentence is marked by a programmatic statement which separates the following narrative from what preceded it (and one which explicitly marks the upcoming material as pro-Athenian, 7.139.1); the final sentence is similarly marked by a programmatic statement—including another μὲν δὴ—which cleanly signals the end of the
episode: “These were the oracles the Athenians received…” (τὰ μὲν δὴ χρηστήρια ταῦτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἔγεγόνεε, 7.145.1). The passage is thus clearly delimited as a unit. And this unit furthermore contains no problematic authorial intrusions, no references to outside material, and no references to later events, making it an excellent candidate to be identified as epideictic text in everything but its separation from the related Salamis narrative.

Two further observations about this end limit mark it as a possible preface. First, the programmatic statement marks the entire preceding narrative as to do with oracles, when the last chapter in fact dealt with Athenian preparation for the war effort. Such a seam implies an author who is trying to fit this episode into the larger *Histories* and in so doing is removing the episode from its original setting. Second, the final phrase of this apparently prefatory material, marking Athens’ choice “to meet the barbarian assault by placing everyone on ships, trusting in the Pythia—and in any of the Greeks who cared to join them” (ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὸν βάρβαρον δέκεσθαι τῇ νησὶ πανδημεῖ, τῷ θεῷ πειθομένους, ἀμα Ἑλλήνων τοῖς βουλομένοισι, 7.144.3), neatly matches the beginning of the Salamis epideictic material as identified above: “The following Greeks were gathered in the fleet. The Athenians provided 127 ships…” (οἱ δὲ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τὸν ναυτικὸν στρατὸν ταχθέντες ἦσαν οἴδε, 8.1.1). The threads of naval action, Hellenic allies, and the unrestrained magnanimity of the Athenian commitment to the effort against the Persian aggressor are all maintained, incidentally making the transition from 7.144.3 to 8.1.1 much smoother and more effective than the existing transition from 7.239.4 considered in Chapter III (p. 75). When paired with the pleasing and programmatic thesis statement found at the beginning of this section—“If the Athenians had lost heart and abandoned their country, no one at all would have tried to resist Xerxes at sea” (εἰ Ἀθηναῖοι καταρρωθήσαντες τὸν ἐπίόντα κίνδυνον ἔξελιπον τὴν σφετέρην, … κατὰ τὴν θάλασσαν οὐδαμοὶ ἤν ἐπειρώντο ἀντιεὑμενοι

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Furthermore, this section suits the Salamis narrative in other ways as well. The narrative is extremely pro-Athenian—so much so that Herodotus felt compelled to apologize at the outset for including it (7.139.1)—portraying the Athenians as the saviors of Greece, dedicants of the Delphic Oracle, and followers of a great leader, Themistocles. This concern with Themistocles further connects the passage with the later epideictic material which features Themistocles at almost every turn, always characterized in precisely the same manner as he is here: resourceful, clever, and wise (7.143-44). Outside of the epideictic material and this passage, Themistocles never again receives so generous a characterization from Herodotus. These positive portrayals of Athens and Themistocles, with particular emphasis on Athens’ critical and pious role in the resistance against Persia, match the epideictic program of the Salamis narrative perfectly.

Both this passage and the epideictic material concerning Salamis are also eager to portray the Delphic Oracle in a positive light: the single largest oracular response in the Histories is recorded here, in a context which emphasizes the oracle’s critical function for Greece and especially Athens (7.140-41). Such a portrayal dovetails nicely with Herodotus’ portrayal of the miraculous defense of Delphi by what appears to be the god himself (8.36-39) and Athens’ involvement with the Oracle up to and during the Second Sacred War (449-47). And indeed, the very oracle which is recited at 7.141.3-4 is referred to twice in the epideictic narrative (8.41, 51). Neither reference uses any of the same terminology as the oracle cited at 7.141 and the oracle itself seems to have been fairly well-known in Athens, so there is no need to combine this prefatory section with the Salamis epideixis on a strictly functional level, but such a background

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46 Cf. Dougherty 2014: 149.
would add much to the impact of these references, evoking the performative political context and
adding religious significance. Much like the questionable concluding material that falls outside
of my conservative delimitation of the epideictic material (8.94-96), then, this section (7.139.2-
144) is unnecessary for the larger argument but suits the themes, form, and function of the
Salamis epideixis perfectly. We may, then, mark this passage as a possible—even likely—
extension of the epideictic Salamis material.

[b] Other Possible Epideixeis

Although the three epideixeis identified above all relate a major Panhellenic battle in the
Persian Wars, there is no need to assume that Herodotus limited his epideictic performance to
such narratives. In fact, the scholarship of Rosalind Thomas focuses much more on the earlier
books than on Herodotus’ Persica, and (e.g.) the Egypt logos is often identified as apparently the
earliest-composed section of Herodotus’ Histories.47 But we ought to consider briefly the other
battle narratives that do occur in the Histories, encouraged by the nature of the other three
epideixeis. The final battle in the Histories is at Mycale; however, it is not only extremely
circumscribed, but also proves to be an integral part of the apodeictically-motivated anti-
imperialist conclusion of the Histories.48 The only other viable candidate, then, would be the
Battle of Marathon and the narrative of the Ionian Revolt which precedes it. Yet the narratives
of the Ionian Revolt and Marathon actually represent something of a counter-example: where we
would expect to see widespread and consistent Athenian bias, there is instead a choppy narrative
full of lengthy tangents and exotic logot.49 The story darts from one topic to another, and the
major Athenian accomplishments are remarkably circumscribed—the sack of Sardis takes only

49 Cf. Irwin and Greenwood 2007, who divide Book Five into twelve sections, each with its unique interpretation
provided by a different scholar.
three chapters while the narrative surrounding the Battle of Marathon lasts no more than fifteen. While Athenians are often featured in Books Five and Six, they are given as much negative attention as positive; in addition, positive and negative portrayals of Sparta, Thebes, Aegina, Corinth and many others are equally common, reminding us of how the other battle narratives could have been composed (instead of with the uniform authorial strategy demonstrated above). Nor is there any significant isolatable section that might be dated to an earlier compositional context than the final unitary text: many parts of Books Five and Six are remarkably germane to the context of the Archidamian War, and there are numerous cross-references to the outside narrative scattered throughout (e.g., 5.36; 6.77). Small portions of the text may originally have been influenced by mid-fifth century Athenian ideology and propaganda, but if Herodotus ever composed an Ionian Revolt or Marathon narrative, very little of it remains intact in the Histories. As it stands, the evidence is far too slim to assert an epideictic background with any confidence.

Much of the rest of the Histories deals less with Greece and more with Persia and other foreign cultures, making the task of isolating political alignments or contemporary diplomatic agendas through subtle displays of bias and focalization more difficult and ultimately less reliable. However, armed with a theory of epideictic background, we may consider the possibility of an epideictic influence on several other sections of the Histories. The most evident possible epideixis occurs at the beginning of Herodotus’ second book, detailing the ethnography of Egypt. Perhaps the feature which most commends this section to examination is the presence of clear delimitations at roughly the same lengths as the three epideixeis examined above: the

50 E.g., the speech of the Corinthian Socles to the Spartans (5.92); cf. Baragwanath 2008: 307.
51 Besides, given their modest nature, these passages may reflect nothing more than an awareness of Athenian propaganda, which Herodotus would certainly have retained from his earlier career. These passages provide no internal evidence for dating beyond their reference to details and themes included in the other epideixeis.
sudden introduction of Psammetichus and Egypt (2.2.1) marks a clear beginning, while a marked methodological statement (2.99.1) separates the previous narrative from what follows. This section shares many of the tendencies which have been observed in the earlier *epideixeis*. In addition, it seems less integrated into the apodeictic project than other parts of the *Histories*. This last observation has prompted a number of scholars to assume that the Egyptian *logoi* were originally independent and therefore among Herodotus’ earliest works—possibly even the foundation of his cultivated historical method. If we assume that this section was in fact written as an *epideixis*, we may further speculate as to a mid-fifth century audience which would be glad of the information contained in them: the very same Athens which spearheaded a six-year expedition to aid Inarus in his attempt to supplant Persian rule over Egypt no earlier than 460. Whether during or after this expedition, Athenian interest in Egypt would undoubtedly have been very high. Ultimately, however, inasmuch as the sections do not deal much with Greek material, it is difficult to isolate an audience with confidence.

A second passage that deserves consideration is the story of Croesus which opens the *Histories*. It has often been observed that the Croesus *logos* in many ways anticipates and ties in to the larger project of the *Histories*. The point has been proven well and I do not argue against

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52 Marked also by the connective formula καὶ δή, which Denniston (1954: 248) assigns near equivalency with μὲν δή.

53 This very fact prompted Jacoby (1913: col. 426) and after him Cagnazzi (1977: 391-93) to begin and end their ‘lectures’ (*logoi*) at these same limits, albeit with an added division halfway through (2.34/5); cf. Johnson 1994: 247. Cagnazzi also identifies a second lecture (her third) between 2.99-182. While superficially rejecting the notion of ‘lectures’, Johnson (ibid.) plausibly assumes that these Egyptian lectures could have been presented as a series.

54 Beginning with Powell 1939: 7; cf. Jacoby 1913: col. 262-67, 331-32. See also Formara 1971b: 1-24; Vannicelli 2001. *Per* Formara 1971b: 23: “The presence, therefore, in Herodotus’s *Histories* of such a book as II provides all the evidence that is necessary to show his progression from something like a conventional historian concerned to give a broad picture of the political, intellectual, religious and social life of a people into an artist imaginatively harnessing this material to higher purposes.”


56 A second advantage to understanding parts of Book Two to predate the rest of the *Histories* is the removal of confusion about Herodotus’ claims to autopsy in Egypt: perhaps he visited twice, with more widespread inquiry the second time around. Cf. Armayor 1980; Redfield 1985.
However, the Croesus *logos* also shares a number of qualities with the identified *epideixeis*. The section forms a narrative unity, clearly delineated by a marked introduction of Croesus at the beginning (Κροΐσος ἦν Λυδὸς ἐν γένος, παῖς δὲ Ἀλυάττεω..., 1.6) and a concluding statement at the end: “And that’s the story of Croesus’ empire and the first subjugation of Ionia” (κατὰ μὲν δὴ τὴν Κροίσου τε ἀρχὴν καὶ Ἰωνίης τὴν πρώτην καταστροφὴν ἔσχε οὕτω, 1.92.1). The narrative within these delineations once more would require the same spoken length as the other *epideixeis*. Though thematically the story does look forward to later narrative, only one explicit reference is made to the external *Histories*, and that parenthetical (the same as the proposed Egyptian *epideixis*). However well the Croesus *logos* serves to introduce the *Histories*, then, it stands equally well on its own as a masterpiece of narrative and historiē.

It seems not overly speculative to suggest that the Croesus *logos* could have been performed apart from the *Histories*, even if it was written with and for the apodeictic *Histories*. This potential *epideixis* may even have provided the inspiration for the *Histories*—or vice-versa. There is no obvious historical audience aside from the Panhellenic readership that applies to the rest of the *Histories*. It is my opinion that the Croesus *logos* ought to be considered intimately related to the monumental undertaking (*apodeixis*) of the *Histories*—by Lattimore’s theory, it would have been among the very first words written down in the final text—but also as fundamentally influenced by Herodotus’ background as an epideictic performer. Possibly the

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58 Pace Johnson 1994: 248, who assumes the end of the Croesus *logos* at 1.94.1. This assumption is both unnecessary and overlooks clear textual markers to the contrary. Ironically, Johnson uses this unsuitable division as an example of how impossible it is to find a clean ending to a story in Herodotus.

59 Appx. 85 min, see Introduction, pp. 27-28.

60 Some relatively weak traces of aligned interests and portrayals indicate that the audience may have been Athenian, but the evidence is far from conclusive, nor is an obvious historical context observable. Further research, however, may prove worthwhile.

Croesus *logos* may have served as a representative narrative for the final text of the *Histories*, a ‘preview’ of sorts that Herodotus could recite to introduce his work without having to read aloud the whole fifty-hour text. It seems likely enough that the same epideictic background that I have detected in the battle narratives has also influenced the first *logos* of the *Histories*, implying that Herodotus’ participation in an epideictic performance culture did not arise suddenly, as the first historian was in the midst of composing his *Histories*, but well before he began the final undertaking. By the time Herodotus began his *apodeixis*, the epideictic background was ingrained enough that it influenced his final text—even when the text itself was not taken from a pre-existing *epideixis*.  
