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Language Ideologies in the Arabic Diglossia of Egypt

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This paper surveys studies on language ideologies in the Arabic diglossic environment of present-day Egypt. Specifically, it discusses linguistic and cultural implications of language ideologies associated with Classical Arabic (CA), Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), Egyptian Arabic (EA), and English in the Cairo area. The language ideologies of these varieties are a product of both the past and the present: they emerged during British colonialism in the late nineteenth century and are maintained in the postcolonial climate through discourses on the purity of Classical Arabic, on the linguistic corruption of the dialects, and on the increasing use of English as a symbol of Western capitalism and modernity. Aligning with Woolard’s (1998) definition of language ideology as a mediating link between linguistic features and social processes, this study demonstrates how language ideologies are communicated in structural aspects of the language varieties in the Arabic diglossia and how Egyptians use language varieties strategically to access the symbolic power of these ideologies. It argues that studies of language ideologies, language features, and discursive interaction are inseparable in uncovering how language is used in the Arabic diglossia in Egypt.

1. Introduction

Studies on language ideologies and language-related historical studies on nationalism in Egypt demonstrate that “the equation of language and nation is not a natural fact but rather a historical, ideological construct” (Woolard 1998:16). Language ideologies are social constructs that are illuminated through a micro-analysis of linguistic structures in discourse and a macro-analysis of the factors that lead to asymmetries in how languages are perceived. In line with Woolard, I emphasize the analysis of language ideologies within the linguistic practices of specific cultural settings, which means that language ideologies cannot have a single interpretation. They are in dialectical relation with social, discursive, and linguistic practices and often determine “which linguistic features get selected for cultural attention and for social marking, that is, which ones are important and which ones are not” (Schieffelin & Doucet 1998:285). In short, language ideologies are never about language alone, but rather, envision and enact ties of language to identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology. Through such linkages, they underpin not only linguistic form and use but also the very notion of the person and the social group, as well as such...
Taking these definitions as a conceptual blueprint, this study shows how these linkages play out in a specific linguistic and cultural setting: Arabic diglossia in Egypt. Present-day language ideologies in Egypt find their beginnings in British colonization from 1882 to 1922 (Mitchell 1988, Suleiman 2003, amongst many). In this period, the colonizers restructured Egyptian society according to Western ideals of modernity and economic progress. Among other projects, they initiated anti-Arabic, pro-English language policies that assigned symbolic value to these languages: Arabic was depreciated because it was perceived as chaotic and random, while English was projected as being modern, prestigious, and desirable. According to Mitchell (1988), language was one of the most far-reaching strategies of the colonizers to change Egyptian culture. He cites al-Marsafi’s (1881) *Eight Words*, a book concerning the controversy of eight particularly powerful words that penetrated Egyptian social and political life during British occupation: “nation”, “homeland”, “government”, “justice”, “oppression”, “politics”, “liberty”, and “education” (Mitchell 1988:131). These terms were the new vocabulary of modern nationalism, and their perceived misunderstanding and misuse created a national crisis: the Western values inherent in these eight words clashed with the cultural background of the Egyptians.

The impact of the colonizers on language and social identity was a breakdown of local culture (Said 1975, 1979; Abuhamida 1988; Mitchell 1988). Said’s (1975, 1979) controversial research on *Orientalism* sharply criticizes Western Orientalists for perpetrating this linguistic imperialism and rendering the Arabic language chaotic and random. Said points to textual biases in literature about the Orient. He claims, for instance, that Arabs are metaphorically associated with hot-blooded sexual prowess (416), while institutionally or culturally “they are nil, or next to nil” (416). The use of sexual metaphor to describe male and female Arabs was the Orientalists’ way of “dealing with the great variety and potency of Arab diversity, whose source is if not intellectual and social then sexual and biological” (416).

These ideological forces gave rise to linguistic conflicts in post-colonial Egypt: the desires for historical and linguistic nostalgia on one hand, and for modernization of language and society on the other. Religious conservatives, fueled with anti-Western sentiments and historical nostalgia, argue for a superiority of CA, and its purity is strongly anchored in Muslim Arab history, morality, and nationalism (Suleiman 2003, 2004; Haeri 2003). They relate “authentic” Egyptian identity to Islamic laws and values that are uncorrupted by the West (Suleiman 2003, 2004; Haeri 2003). This causes the religious conservatives to fight to keep CA undiluted with foreign borrowings. Suleiman (2004) points to military warfare metaphors in their Arabic rhetoric, such as “language regiment”, “defense of the national language”, and “enemies of Islam”
(50), while they are projected as “holy warriors”, “garrisoned troops”, and “patrons” of Classical Arabic (49). Any modernization of CA is lahn “linguistic corruption”, hadm wa-takhrib “sabotage”, or ghazw “invasion”, aimed at destroying the Qur’an and the hadith “the Prophetic Traditions” (50).

In contrast, pan-Arab nationalists propose a united Arabic language – MSA - to be the unifying force of all Arabic-speaking people in the Arab world. (Abuhamida 1988; Suleiman 2003; Haeri 2003; amongst many). These idealistic nationalists argue for a written language that is mutually comprehensible in all Arab nations and unifies the Arab world. One proponent of this view is the Egyptian government, which has been controlling the modernization of CA by overseeing institutions of learning, publishing, and social affairs since the middle of the nineteenth century (Haeri 2003; Van Mol 2003). The government is mainly concerned with “revitalizing” CA as a means of achieving social, economic, and political progress for Egypt. According to Haeri (2003), state officials, Egyptian intellectuals, educators, and high bureaucrats regard CA as too literary, flowery, and lacking in modern vocabulary needed for science and technology on a global scale.

Nevertheless, many voices point to the predicament that Egyptian Arabic, the vernacular, is ignored in writing and education, even though it is the mother tongue of Egyptians and the lingua franca used in face-to-face interaction. In this view, Egyptian Arabic cannot be divorced from the identity of Egyptian people and their local and national culture. Linguistic regionalists, mainly Arab and non-Arab writers, are calling for the consolidation of spoken varieties at the expense of the standard variety (Abuhamida 1988:42). According to Abuhamida (1988), this call for linguistic regionalism coincides with political regionalism.

Lastly, proponents of a modern cultural and linguistic landscape in Egypt advocate increasing use of English in many social domains in order to connect to the international community. Their argument is that English has always been present in the postcolonial period. Schaub (2000) states that “after a return to Arabic and Egyptian nationalism during the Nasser period in the 1950s and 1960s, the situation again changed towards favoring English after the 1973 October War against Israel” (228). He also explains that during the Sadat years (1970-81), Egyptian university students turned increasingly towards the United States. From 1974 on, “the U.S. Agency for Internal Development has offered assistance to Egypt in the training of public school teachers in English language instruction” (228). English in Egypt is strategically used by the government and the media to achieve economic progress and to strengthen political and economic ties with the West.

In sum, the interference of ‘modern’ Western thought in colonial and postcolonial Egypt acts as a powerful organizing force for present-day language ideologies: the devaluation of the local dialects as a result of both pan-Arab nationalism and religious conservatism; an elevation of CA to a carrier of tradition and religious morals; the authority of MSA as a contemporary standard variety able to reflect scientific and economic progress; and the use of English as
symbolic capital linking Egypt to the “prosperity” of the West. Proponents of
each position use essentialized cultural differences between the East and the West
as their logic and strategy to construct social action, morality, nationalism, and the
“right” interpretation of language.

In this highly contested, politicized language conflict over the “best”
language variety, it is relevant to ask “which linguistic features are seized on, and
through what semiotic processes they are interpreted as representing the
collectivity” (Woolard 1998:18). These topics are explored in section two, which
uses linguistic and sociolinguistic research to provide a description of CA, MSA,
and Egyptian Arabic (EA) in the Arabic diglossia in Egypt and to show how
language ideologies are linked to the linguistic structures of these language
varieties. Section three demonstrates how language ideologies are ranked, play a
structuring role in every-day interaction, and shape a variety of communicative
strategies. Speakers use the shared historical, cultural, and linguistic background
associated with varieties as an interactional resource in discourse. This dialectic
aspect of ideology shows that “simply using language in particular ways is not
what forms social groups, identities, or relations…; rather, ideological
interpretations of such uses of language always mediate these effects” (Woolard
1998:18). In such interactional uses speakers take advantage of the social, moral,
and political attributes of each variety, which leaves a picture of dynamic
reinterpretation of language use in Egypt. The effects of these communicative
strategies range from showing solidarity with the pan-Arab nationalist ideology to
transgressing social and geographic boundaries by tapping into Western
communicative styles.

2. Arabic Diglossia

According to Eisele (2002), dialect geography represented the most
dominant form of linguistic analysis of Arabic until the 1950’s (12). However,
Ferguson’s (1959) introduction of diglossia to the Arabic sociolinguistic
landscape “helped to crystallize modernist notions about this phenomenon and set
the agenda for subsequent studies” (Eisele 2002:12). Ferguson (1959, 1996)
conducted an extensive analysis of Arabic diglossia. Ferguson defines diglossia as

a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects
of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a
very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed
variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an
earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by
formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is
not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation (Ferguson

Ferguson claims that in Arabic diglossia, CA is the divergent, highly codified, and
superposed variety. It is seen as superior to vernaculars, such as EA, due to
widespread prejudices against vernaculars within the language community. In line with Ferguson (1996), this paper will use “H” for a high prestige language, such as CA or MSA, and “L” for the low prestige dialects, such as EA.

2.1 H and L

In diglossic situations, there is usually a belief that H is more beautiful, more logical, and more sophisticated (Ferguson 1996; Van Mol 2003). This is true for Arabic diglossia. According to Haeri (2003), CA is often perceived as a “language whose aesthetic and musical qualities move its listeners, creating feelings of spirituality, nostalgia and community” (43). CA “socializes people into rituals of Islam, affirms their identity as Muslims and connects them to the realm of purity, morality, and God” (Haeri 2003:43) and attributes of the language are often translated to the moral virtues of the user.

CA also attained high prestige due to its rich literary tradition (Ferguson 1996; Van Moll 2003, amongst many). There is a “sizable body of written literature which is held in high esteem by the speech community” (Ferguson 1996:29-30). In contrast to EA, the orthography of CA is well established and “has a long tradition of grammatical study and a fixed norm for pronunciation, grammar and lexicon” (Van Mol 2003: 43). The fixed norms of CA were established as early as the ninth century, when CA was codified and, as the language of the Qur’an, has been one of the major areas of study of Muslims scholars ever since (Parkinson 1991; Van Mol 2003). Scholars have produced grammars, dictionaries, pronunciation manuals, and stylistic conventions that restrict variation and protect CA from the influence of modernity. This recalls Woolard’s (1998:17) observation that “written form, lexical elaboration, rules for word formation, and historical derivation all may be seized on in diagnosing ‘real language’ and ranking the candidates” (17).

Somewhat contradictorily, Haeri’s (2003) research also shows that many Egyptians judge the spoken vernacular, EA, as the more beautiful variety, even for writing literature. She claims that “ordinary people describe it [EA] as easy, light, full of humor and more beautiful than other Arabic dialects, as a habit and as the language of Egyptians” (37). EA, or al-‘amiyyah “the common” is the mother tongue used for every-day communication in Egypt and serves as a marker of Egyptian identity and national culture (Haeri 2003:37). Nevertheless, EA is not generally recognized by religious scholars or pan-Arab nationalists as a language of writing; since it has layers of lexical borrowings from Coptic, Turkish, Persian, Greek, Italian, French, and English, it is criticized as “permissive”, “promiscuous”, or “weak” (38). Furthermore, it is perceived as the

1 It is important to note, however, that not all Egyptian dialects are valued equally. Urban dialects, such as Cairene Arabic spoken in the city of Cairo, usually have a higher prestige than rural dialects.
language of the ordinary Egyptians on the streets, and the image of an EA speaker is that of a common or backward man (Haeri 2003).

This argument, however, is not sound since the extent of foreign borrowings into CA and their acceptability or naturalization is obscured by the large timeframe in which it happened and “by the degree to which foreign elements have extended to be assimilated to the root-pattern system of the morphology and also by the organizing principles of Arabic dictionaries, whereby assimilated borrowings are listed under a theoretical ‘root’” (305). For instance, the medieval borrowing \( di:ba:j \) “silk brocade” from the Persian \( di:ba \) gave rise to the verb \( dabbaja \) “to embellish” (305). It then was reanalyzed in the modern lexicon with the trilateral root \( d-b-j \) and took on Arabic productive morphology, which can be seen in the derivation \( mudabbaja:t \) “figures of speech” (305).

Furthermore, concurrent with colonial times, “as western political, economic, and scientific ideas proliferated and ramified through the Arab world, transliterated foreign words, especially in the sciences, and uncontrolled and sometimes inaccurate loan translations began to pour into written Arabic” (308). This discrepancy between the ideologies and actual language features complicates the notion of the purity of CA. Ferguson (1996) states that the communicative tensions between the \( H \) and \( L \) varieties in diglossia may be resolved by “the use of relatively uncodified, unstable, intermediate forms of the language” (31). MSA is the most common intermediate form and is perceived as a “modern” version of CA. However, there are problems with defining MSA, to which I turn to next.

2.2 MSA

Many researchers show that there is no agreement as to what constitutes MSA (Parkinson 1991, 1992; Haeri 2003; Van Mol 2003). Opinions diverge as “to what extent and in what way Modern Arabic deviates from Classical Arabic” (Van Mol 2003:30) and to what extent colloquial or foreign linguistic elements, such as vocabulary, phonology, or syntax, are included. Van Mol (2003) claims that MSA shows a large regional differentiation due to the influence of dialects and “it is not (yet) clear in what respect these regional varieties of MSA exactly differ from each other and to what extent they differ as a group from their common origin, Classical Arabic” (4). This ambiguity has prompted many researchers to categorize fine-tuned intermediate language levels (Van Mol 2003, Bassiouney 2006, Blanc 1960, Meiseles 1980, Mitchell 1986, Badawi 1973, amongst many).

Interestingly, Parkinson’s (1991) approach to MSA differs from these accounts in that he is not interested in categorizing levels but in how people perceive MSA. He writes that “many of our problems in describing it [Arabic] stem from the fact that it forms a relatively broad but indeterminate section of a much bigger continuum, and while there is general agreement about the continuum, there is little agreement about where the natural breaks are” (60). In
that sense, the value in Parkinson’s (1991, 1991b, 1992) research lies in his claim that actual language use often is inconsistent with language ideology. In terms of ideology, he states that MSA is an imperfectly known, but functional, part of most Arabs’ communicative lives, associated with a rather high degree of linguistic insecurity, both respected and revered to the degree that it is viewed as a close relative or descendent of Classical Arabic, and despised and denigrated to the degree that it is taken to be a degeneration of Classical Arabic (1991b:48).

Speakers of MSA see it as “a prescriptive form, a standard language that comes completely with a set of rules which define it” (32), but they differ as to what these norms are. It seems to be a moving target because it is an ideal variety that most people aim for in writing and speaking (51). However, modern fusha “recedes for some into a classicized, metaphor-laden, complex style not achievable by most modern writers” (51).

Consequently, shared perceptions of language features are shared manifestations of ideologies, which are not only derived from strictly linguistic categories but from “words and expressions as these are used by specific, historically located groups of users in the division of linguistic labor” (Silverstein 1998: 128). Shared ideologies, such as pan-Arabism or linguistic purity, tie language to people, their culture, and their histories. There is a complex relationship between the structural features of a language variety and the ideologies associated with the variety, which is discussed in the final section of this paper. This section demonstrates Silverstein (1998)’s claim that ideology “is defined only within a discourse of interpretation or construal of inherently dialectic indexical processes” (128).

3. Language Ideologies in Interaction

Many researchers claim that in diglossia each language variety has a specific function (Ferguson 1996). Gumperz (1982) argues that “distinct varieties are employed in certain settings (such as home, school, work) that are associated with separate, bounded kinds of activities (public speaking, formal negotiations, special ceremonials, verbal games, etc.) or spoken with different categories of speakers (friends, family members, strangers, social inferiors, government officials, etc.)” (60). Silverstein (1998) calls these distinct applications “default” functions that determine situationally appropriate language behavior. H, for instance, is often used in a “sermon in church or mosque, personal letter, speech in parliament, political speech, university lecture, news broadcast, newspaper editorial, news story, caption on [a] picture, caption on [a] political cartoon, and poetry” (Ferguson 1996:28). Indeed, studies show that in present-day Egypt, MSA is seen as the language of the media, education, and government, and is used in birth certificates, national identity cards, court trials, or deliberations in
the Nagles el-Shaab, Egypt’s parliament (Schaub 2000). Homogeneity of language usage is also assumed for CA, which is reserved for the realm of religion. Schaub (2000) suggests that since 88% of Egypt’s population is Muslim, a link between CA and religious practice is frequently reinforced. In contrast, L is used for “instructions to servants, waiters, workmen, clerks, conversation with family, friends, colleagues, radio ‘soap opera’, and folk literature” (Ferguson 1996: 28).

However, these distinct applications are not so straightforward in communicative interaction. Speakers use language features from several language varieties in the same discourse in order to gain authority by tapping into specific language ideologies. According to Gumperz (1982), this “reflects conventions created through networks of interpersonal relationships subject to change with changing power relationships and socio-ecological environments, so that sharing of basic conventions cannot be taken for granted”2 (95). Violations of these conventions become a resource for effective communication. The following short case studies on text regulation (3.1), public speeches (3.2), and advertisement in the written media (3.3) show that, in Arabic diglossia, the selective use of language features from different varieties signals as much information as the propositional content of the message: choosing features from one variety over another is a significant marker indexing the position of the speaker in society, their knowledge of political and religious values, or their aspiration for social mobility.

3.1 Text Regulation

The Egyptian government is the largest employer requiring MSA in its public institutions, such as schools, and is actively involved in producing and controlling MSA as a modern version of CA (Haeri 1997: 800). Its aim is to create a language that carries modern worldviews in such fields as science, politics, or arts, while at the same time to guard it from colloquial elements (Haeri 1997). As Woolard (1998) argues, “an ideology of ‘development’ is pervasive in postcolonial language planning, wherein deliberate intervention is deemed as necessary to make a linguistic variety suitable for modern functions” (21). Haeri (2003) specifically points to state regulation of written texts through text editors, or professional “gatekeepers” (66), in Egyptian publishing houses. Their job is to change CA into

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2 At this point, Gumperz’s (1982) notions of situational and conversational codeswitching may be relevant. However, a discussion of codeswitching is beyond the scope for this paper. The immense complexity of integrating foreign or Arabic semantic and phonological components into another code, or whether material switched must maintain all the characteristics of the original code have led to a variety of approaches (Wilmsen 1996, Van Moll 2003, Bassiouney 2006, amongst others). The treatment of codeswitching in Arabic diglossia deserves another paper.
a medium for reporting all affairs of the world. Specifically, they decide what constitute grammatical mistakes, infelicitous stylistic turns, inappropriate lexical choices, and suitable headlines, and they determine the form of the layout of the page (60).

Haeri highlights the importance of analyzing how the text became what it is, including “ideologies, institutional inculcations, and historical practices” (57). She describes various interpretations and changes in text against the background of the language ideologies associated with CA and EA. The cultural and political movement of text regulation is a central component of the modern Arabic identity. Her investigation of three text correctors reveals pan-Arab nationalism (il-qowmiyya) as a crucial value (63). She also writes that “colonialism was also cited by all three as a reason for preserving and propagating Classical Arabic” (63).

Haeri’s account of reported speech is particularly revealing due to “the difficulties in accommodating, at one and the same time, incompatible, paradoxical and ambivalent ideologies with regard to both languages [CA and EA], and their relationships to culture…”(94). Furthermore, she notes that the gatekeepers also have to consider the status and the personality of the person they are quoting. Since EA has low prestige, “most prominent personalities cannot be represented as having spoken in that language” (98). To illustrate this point, Haeri compares the representation in the press of speeches and interviews of four famous personalities: the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the novelist Naguib Mahfouz, the actor Omar Sharif, and the Egyptian comedian Adel Imam. A short account of the reported speech of each interview is discussed next.

In a televised meeting with writers and intellectuals in 1996, the President of Egypt answered political and economic questions concerning Egypt in informal EA (99). However, in the newspaper al-Ahram, “every time the president was quoted, the quotation was in Classical Arabic” (99):

President: *da ihna rabbina bi-kul haazihi il-zuruuf il-sa’ba...* [EA]

‘why we thank our God (rabbina) that with all these difficult circumstances…’

Al-Ahram: *wa qaala al-ra iis: wa nihmad allah ’anna(hu) bi-kul haadhihi il-zuruuf al-s’aba...* [CA]

‘And said the President: and we thank God (allah) that with all these difficult circumstances…’ (99)

The demonstrative *da* “this” is used in EA idiomatically for emphasis, but is omitted in Al-Ahram’s quotation. Furthermore, the EA pronoun *ihna* “we” is replaced by the CA *nahnu* “we”, and the vernacular *rabbina* “our God” is replaced by the CA *allah* ‘God’. Haeri suggests that the translation from EA to CA “is meant for other Arabs – serving the cause of pan-Arabism – and the rest of the world” (100).
There are variations, however, in the ways in which reported speech is handled. When the writer Naguib Mahfuz gave a lengthy interview in EA to the magazine *Rose il-Yussef*, the bulk of Mahfuz’s statements were printed in CA, with few EA interjections:

- **Naas rafdiin al-mugtama** ‘people rejecting the society’
- **Nisaq fii miin?** ‘who should we trust?’
- **Ehh ili biyihsal da?** ‘what is happening?’
- **Wa geeh min enn?** ‘and where did it come from?’
- **Wa issayy?** ‘and how?’

Haeri suggests that this is due to the fact that “the widely respected and famous novelist can be represented as having spoken a few brief phrases in his mother tongue” (101).

The interview with the actor Omar Sharif was also conducted in EA, but here EA phrases are put in quotation marks. Haeri states that “one reads the actor speaking in CA, and then a quotation mark appears with EA inside” (102). For instance,

- **Omar Sharif: na’am ana mizaaji jiddan... laew qumt min al-nowm wa sinna min asnaani tu’limani “ab’a mish ‘aawiz’ashuuf hadd”**
  ‘Yes, I am very moody... if I woke up from sleep and one of my teeth were hurting “then I don’t want to see anyone”.

Haeri interviewed the text corrector who argued that CA is too formal and lacks feeling. “Omar Sharif would have ended up sounding more like a preacher or scholar [if he were quoted as speaking CA]” (103).

In the last interview, the comedian Adel Imam also answered questions in EA and, in contrast to the others, the reported speech was printed entirely in EA. Haeri claims that “it would probably be too much to represent the comedian as speaking anything other than his mother tongue, not only because that is how everyone knows him from movies and the media, but also because it seems to be judged as appropriate for a comedian not to speak CA” (104). In that sense, these four examples of reported speech show a definite hierarchy in which “the president of the country is not supposed to utter a word in the vernacular, the novelist a few more, the actor who has not lived in Egypt for most of his life and is considered somewhat aloof and Westernized can be represented as speaking both” (104).

Consequently, language regulation is not neutral or arbitrary, but “is based more often on political and social considerations than on linguistic or pedagogical factors” (Woolard 1998:285). The ideologies associated with CA and EA determine “which linguistic features get selected for cultural attention and for social marking” (Schieffelin and Doucet 1998:285). Determining factors
identified in Haeri’s study are pan-Arab nationalism and the ideologies of prestige or lack thereof associated with CA and EA, respectively, which compete and regulate language on a public and pervasive level.

3.2 Public Speeches

Public speeches in the Arabic diglossia of Egypt are generally delivered in MSA or CA, but EA is “invading formal domains such as preaching, education, and all kinds of public speaking” (Rabie 1991:422). However, the crossing-over of EA into other domains, such as public speeches, is not random and has significant consequences for the ideology of EA. While Haeri’s research above painted a picture of EA being associated with low prestige and with persons of lower social status, Holes (2004) shows that Gamal Abd al-Nasir, the late president of Egypt (1956-1965), used EA at mass rallies at the Islamic al-Azhar University in Cairo to win sympathy and achieve his political goals.

Holes’ (2004) analysis of al-Nasir’s speeches shows that often, in the same speech, “high-flown passages containing allusions to the glories of Classical Islam, or a peroration on the inevitability of socialist victory are leavened with others […] in which the rhythms and idioms of the street-wise Cairene predominate” (Holes 22). Al-Nasir’s speeches in pure CA usually entail that “mood and case endings are scrupulously respected throughout” (Holes 2004:23) and “even phonological aspects... show almost no colloquial influence…”(24). Al-Nasir is using CA as “the language of political abstraction and symbol” (24), which allows him to present Egypt as “a quasi-metaphysical essence,” defending its freedom and independence, or calling for peace, but declaring that it will fight (24). Its people are never directly addressed, but presented as stylized “sons of Egypt”, or the anonymous third-person “individuals” or “citizens” (24). Using CA allows Al-Nasir to build up Egypt’s moral strength by an impersonal revolution (24).

However, in other speeches with the same content, al-Nasir deliberately switches to EA to have a different communicative effect. He uses EA to indicate an audience-inclusive “we, the people”, a personalized picture of fighting “from house to house and village to village,” with the army “side by side with the people” (25). These forms are heavily EA in terms of syntax, word-level morphology, and suprasegmental features, which allows for a personal connection to the people. In the following excerpt, Holes points to the role-relationship of the speaker and the audience, which indicates brotherly solidarity, expressed through first- and second-person pronouns in EA:

\begin{quote}
hanuhaarih
“we will fight”
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
i\text{hna musta\text{\textgreek{d}i\text{\textgreek{d}}}i\text{\textgreek{n}}, \text{\textgreek{a}yyu\text{\textgreek{h}}}a l-ix\text{\textgreek{w}}a \text{\textgreek{\a}n nuqa\text{\textgreek{a}t}i\text{\textgreek{l}}} “we are ready, brothers, to fight”
\end{quote}
kuntu mawguud fi l-faluuga, zayyimaa intu taṣrufu
“I was at Faluga, as you know”

ana mawguud maṣaaku hina fi l-qakahira
“I’m with you here in Cairo”

ḥanuqaṭil, zayy maa ḍult ilkum imāriḥ li aaxir nuḍṭit dam
“We will fight, like I told you yesterday, to the last drop of blood” (25)

This performance provokes spontaneous audience participation. Al-Nasir’s aim is to inspire Egyptians to pull together “in order to fight and defeat a foreign invader” (26). Only EA seems to be able to convey this personal motivation. In that sense, al-Nasir also uses EA to persuade the audience in the following way:

1. kaanu biyūlu nnu fiḥ ḥurriyya siyaasiyya aw fiḥ dimuqraatiyya siyaasiyya [EA]
“And they used to say that there was political freedom and there was political democracy”

2. wa laakin il-istiylaal wa l-ḥaqaaḍ war raṣ il-maal al-mustayill qadaa ṣala kilmīt id-dimuqraatiyya [MSA]
“But exploitation, feudalism and exploitative capital put an end to the idea of democracy”

3. illi ḍaaluha [EA]
“which they meant”

4. ṣalaa waa kida ihna binūl [EA]
“So that’s why we say”

5. laa yumkin fi ʿaayi ḥaal an yuqaal anna hunaaka ḥurriyya ʿAla ʿAdaa tawaffarāt ad-dimuqratiyya s-stiyaasiyya maṣa d-imuqratiyya al-ṭigmiṣṣiyya [MSA]
“It is impossible in any circumstances for it to be claimed that there is freedom unless political democracy exists alongside social democracy” (32).

Holes writes that the MSA performances in (2) and (5) are presented as political axioms: democracy is indivisible, and cannot exist in an exploitative, feudalistic society (32). For sentence (1), on the other hand, Holes notes that “the wrongheaded claim of an anonymous ‘them’ that ‘democracy already exists’, is delivered in rapid, conversational ECA” (32). Holes reasons that al-Nasir’s reporting of the opposition’s claim in ECA is “in itself a means of indirectly
signaling that what ‘they’ say is to be accorded less weight, and has less truth value than his axioms” (32). Sentences (3) and (4) function as organizational: (3) anaphorically refers to “they” in sentence (1) while (4) faces both ways, linking what has gone before to what is to come (33).

Holes concludes that “these textually organizational elements are not in any way part of the message to be conveyed, but merely help the audience to recognize the real message – hence their rapid delivery in ECA” (Holes 2004:33). For personal, affective communication of domestic values, ʔaamiyya is used, which also organizes for the audience in “real time” the “timeless” fusha text (33). While MSA has been associated in the psychology of the Egyptian society as the language of “abstraction, idealization, and eternal values” (26–7), the switch to EA means that the relationship between speaker and audience moves from an impersonal one to one of friends.

3.3 Media and Advertising

In contrast to EA’s influence in text regulation and public speeches, the media, advertising, and consumer culture are increasingly suffused with foreign borrowings, especially from English (Van Moll 2003, Pimentel 2000, amongst many). Suleiman (2004), for instance, discusses a shop sign, which appeared in Heliopolis, a middle-class suburb of Cairo, in the 1970’s: *al-Salam Shopping Centre li-l-Muhajjabat* “The Peace Shopping Center for Veiled Women” (28). Suleiman explains that *al-Salam* is a popular term that arose in the 1970’s to refer to President Sadat’s policy of pursuing a unilateral peace treaty with Israel. The English term ‘shopping center’ is a reflection of “the strength of the Western-oriented consumerism of the Egyptian middle classes at the time, as well as the association between quality and foreignness” (28). The term *al-muhajjabat* “veiled woman” carries the ideologies of Islamic traditionalisms in Egypt due to the influence of the more conservative culture of the Arabian Peninsula and the belief in some circles that the Muslim dress code “can eliminate the visibility of the socio-economic disparities between the rich and the poor in society” (28).

Van Mol (2003) claims that foreign importations “are most easily integrated in the Arabic dialects” (82). He states that editors of Arabic language magazines and newspapers, especially those published in Europe, are under heavy pressure to use European phraseology in their articles (83). Schaub (2000) shows that the fashion bi-monthly *Cairo Pose* and the bi-monthly *Mother-to-be*, which are entirely in English, are consciously targeted at Egyptian readers (233). They are written for Egyptian couples of the upper and upper-middle classes with disposable income.

Furthermore, it is common that these foreign terms “gain currency in the spoken language before they find their way into writing so that they may be said to have come in not directly but via the colloquial” (76).
Pimentel’s (2000) examined foreign and colloquial borrowings\(^4\) in newspaper display advertisement in contemporary Egypt in daily newspapers such as *al-Ahrām*, *al-Akhbār*, *al-Gumhūriyya*, and *al-Masā* (37). He argues that Egyptian advertisers strategically use English as a tool “to fulfill their commercial, informational, and ideological goals” (2). Furthermore, instead of the fossilized, exclusively classical language sometimes described by Western scholars, the written Arabic of these ads proves flexible enough to address varying present-day needs: to convey new and innovative ideas, to communicate specifically to varying target audiences, and to be simplified as necessarily [sic] to facilitate communication (213).

Sometimes borrowings happen, according to Wilmens (1996), when “a term that is needed in a certain specialized use is borrowed from a code other than the base-level colloquial – be it literary Arabic or some second language” (84), such as when the members of a profession or other social group accept a foreign term as part of their jargon. Along the same lines, Pimentel (2000) claims that “borrowed lexical items in Egyptian newspaper advertisements mostly refer to new technologies introduced from outside the Arab world, having to do with computers, communications, electronics, and the automotive industry, as well as property, fashion, and entertainment” (56). Such borrowings include *intarnit* “internet”, *fidiyū* “video”, *bārbīkū* “barbeque”, and *sūbrānū* “soprano” (56). In addition, borrowed trademarks can be generalized into expressing a foreign concept, as is the case with *fiyūmāكس* “Viewmax”, which is used generically for “television with VCR” (56).

Compound lexemes are also often borrowed, despite the fact that they are not common in Arabic constructions without the possessive construction. These include, for instance, *garāj sīl* “garage sale” and *stayshin wāgan* “station wagon” (64). There are also compound loan structures mixed with Arabic words, such as *fagr shūbing santar* “Dawn Shopping Center”, *markaz nū stār* “the New Star Center”, *tayyība mūl* “Tayyība Mall”, and *hadāyā al-krīsmās* “the Christmas gifts” (64). The frequency of borrowing English compounds is even more significant “given the availability of a common Arabic structure to express similar semantic content” (68).

According to Pimentel (2000), these trends refer back to the “current

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\(^4\) Borrowing is usually treated as “the introduction of single words or short, frozen, idiomatic phrases from one variety into the other” (Gumperz 1982:66). This usually happens when a term is needed in a certain specialized field and is borrowed from a code whose speakers are members of a profession or social groups that have it as part of their jargon. In the Arabic diglossic environment, borrowings then mean “integration of a language L1 into another language L2, in which the borrowed item of L1 overtly takes on L2 characteristics, such as affixes and/or phonology” (Wilmsen 1996:84).
trends toward globalization (al- lawslama) and privatization (al-takhaskaša)" (212). As he claims, “globalization integrates Egypt more and more fully into the single, global economy dominated by western capital and technology” (212). English in particular conveys an international feel, and some ideologies associated with commercial products are as important as the linguistic meaning potentially conveyed (213). This process, however, is not without ideological consequences because foreign borrowings, and more so colloquialisms, are conspicuous to some middle class Egyptian readers. As Pimentel’s (2000) research shows, “established borrowings apparently give little offense, while newly-borrowed items like tāym shīr ‘time share’ and garaj sil ‘garage sale’ […] prompted scorn among conservative readers concerned with the welfare of Standard Arabic” (215).

Nevertheless, these terms are used in advertisements targeting upper-class audiences who perceive such usage as appropriately special and sophisticated. Borrowings such as rīmūt kuntrūl “remote control” and sāntrāl lūk “central locking system” are likely the most effective here, conveying the sophistication appreciated by the upper-class (215). Advertisements are “directed toward a population with specific cultural values within which the advertisements must function and also in the sense that those creating the advertisement operate within specific cultural norms” (11). In general, linguistic norms and sensibilities of the target audience are respected, but these high standards are sometimes maintained “at the expense of effective communication” (3). Furthermore, some informants in Pimentel’s study admit to the “usefulness of borrowings to describe technological innovations imported from outside the Arab world” (211) and “the use of English as a symbol of modernity is more important than communicating through it” (211). The cultural message is more important than the linguistic one. As Haeri (1997) argues, this revalorization is often widespread and reproduces the ideological superiority of the West.

The relationship between the different languages and their ideologies is, in fact, a complicated one; advertising may well be tapping into popular, sometimes prescriptively incorrect, usage, but in doing so, “it reinforces and promotes such usage which may in turn become even more appealing to advertisers and may eventually change perceptions of linguistic norms” (Pimentel 2000:3). Furthermore, “a multi-level understanding of the registers embedded in written Arabic begins to come into focus here, wherein the distinction between written and spoken Arabic becomes less sharp and more fuzzy” (214). In terms of ideology, this may first have a certain promiscuous character to it, but eventually the status of the word is accepted and it assumes a stable form in the language (Wilmsen 1996).

It is important to note that despite both English and MSA being H varieties, they have different symbolic capital, since only the upper-middle and upper classes have access to learning English in private schools as reported by Haeri (1997). In this report, Haeri offers a convincing argument against Bourdieu’s (1977) claim that proficiency in the standard or national language is always associated with the highest symbolic capital and prosperity. The national
language in Egypt, MSA, does not imply as much prosperity as English does. As Haeri writes, “if knowledge were always to equal power, the educated (lower) middle classes would have far more power than they do, since on the whole their proficiency in the official language is usually greater than the upper classes” (Haeri 1997:804). This situation causes resentment against English amongst the lower classes, and leads to wider resentment toward the government and foreign companies (Schaub 2000:228).

4. Concluding Thoughts

Moment-by-moment language use often involves innovative and imaginative employment of language features. Speakers in the Arabic diglossia build on their own and their audiences’ understanding of language ideologies associated with each variety. Cultural and linguistic frames have social histories, and this demands that we ask how seemingly essential and natural meanings of and about language are socially produced. Although there are pre-determined domains in which CA, MSA, EA, and English could be expected, I presented strong evidence that people tap into the communicative power of language ideologies in numerous ways. Speakers not only use the language variety appropriate for a given situation, but they appropriate various language features for communicative effect. Holes (2004) states that “although a person’s level of education, job, and social milieu will tend to determine the type and range of topics he/she usually talks about and who his or her regular interlocutors are, there is no automatic determination of style by the social identity of the speaker, except perhaps in the case of the completely illiterate” (15).

I hope to have shown how language ideologies link language features to social processes in the Arabic diglossia and how research focus on language ideologies could bridge linguistic and social theory. Coupland (2001) charges that sociolinguistics has been largely unquestioning of the influences of modernity and globalization on language, ideology, and identity. In that sense, a focus on language ideology allows us to relate the microculture of communication and lived experiences to political considerations of power in a global world.

References


Macmillan.


