Article

Abstract

• Metaethical non-naturalists maintain that normative or evaluative properties cannot be reduced to, or otherwise explained in terms of, natural properties. They thus have difficulty explaining what these irreducibly normative properties are supposed to be, other than by saying what they are not. I offer a partial, positive characterization of irreducible normativity in naturalistic terms. At a first pass, it is this: that to attribute a normative property to something is necessarily to commend or condemn that thing, due to the nature of the property attributed. This theory characterizes normativity in terms of the natural phenomenon of performing certain familiar speech acts. The hypothesis does other explanatory work as well: it provides for an account of the “queerness” of normative properties, one superior to other accounts; it explains why metaethical reductionism is bound to fail, in a way friendly to non-naturalism (as opposed to non-cognitivism); and it can help deflect arguments against non-naturalism from the “essential practicality” of normativity.

Creator

• Heathwood, Chris

Date Issued

• 2015-01-01

Academic Affiliation

• Philosophy

Journal Title

• Oxford Studies in Metaethics

Journal Volume

• 10

File Extent

• 216-244

Editor

• Russ Shafer-Landau

Subject

• normative properties
• normativity
• non-cognitivism
• non-reductionism
• hybrid theories in metaethics
• non-naturalism

Last Modified

• 2019-12-05

Resource Type

• Article

Rights Statement

• In Copyright

Language

• English [eng]

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