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THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMACY: THE PALATINATE AND
ANGLO-IMPERIAL RELATIONS IN THE THIRTY YEARS'
WAR

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**THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMACY: THE PALATINATE AND ANGLO-IMPERIAL
RELATIONS IN THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR**

by

Thea L. Lindquist

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy
(History)**

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN - MADISON

2001

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Anglo-Imperial Relations in the Thirty Years' War"**

submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Thea L. Lindquist

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Approval Signatures of Dissertation Readers:

Signature, Dean of Graduate School

J.P. Sommerich

Virginia S. Winshaw/ETH

Robert M. Kingdon

Michael H. Shaul

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACA	Arundel Castle Archives
Add. Mss.	Additional Manuscripts
AL	Autograph Letters
a. M.	am Main
AVA	Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv
AVCB	Archdiocese of York, Archepiscopal Visitation Court Books
BA	<i>Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges</i>
BI	Borthwick Institute, University of York
BL	British Library
Bodl. Lib.	Bodleian Library, University of Oxford
bt.	baptized
CCSP	<i>Calendar of Clarendon State Papers</i>
Clar. Mss.	Clarendon Manuscripts
cr.	created
CRS	Catholic Record Society
CSP	<i>Clarendon State Papers</i>
CSPD	<i>Calendar of State Papers Domestic</i>
CSPV	<i>Calendar of State Papers Venetian</i>
D&S	Doge and Senate

dau.	daughter
<i>EHR</i>	<i>English Historical Review</i>
Esq.	Esquire
<i>ESR</i>	<i>European Studies Review</i>
FA	Familienakten
Fasz.	Faszikel
Fr.	Father
FrA	Friedensakten
GB	Grundbücher
h.	heir/heiress
HAA	Hofadelsakten
HFB	Hoffinanzbücher
HHSStA	Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv
HKA	Hofkammerarchiv
<i>HMC</i>	<i>Historical Manuscripts Commission, Reports</i>
HMSO	His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office
HQ	Hofquartier
HZAB	Hofzahlamt, Rechnungsbücher (Hofzahlamtsbücher)
KA	Kriegsarchiv
Kart.	Karton
Konv.	Konvolut
KrA	Kriegsakten

NC	Norris Collection
NH	<i>Northern History</i>
PRO	Public Record Office
QB	Quartierbücher
RH	<i>Recusant History</i>
RK	Reichskanzlei
s.p.	sine prole (without issue)
s.p.s.	sine prole superstite (without surviving issue)
subs.	subsequently
suc.	succeeded
sum.	summoned to Parliament
SP	State Papers
StA	Staatenabteilung
StK	Staatskanzlei
SVENG	Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte
T	Treasury
TYW	Thirty Years' War
unm.	unmarried
Votr.	Vorträge
Westm.	Westmorland
WStLA	Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv
Yorks.	Yorkshire

CONVENTIONS

Calendar

The year is taken as starting on 1 January, and all dates are given as new style unless otherwise stated. Those documents for which dating style is not clear are marked by a superscript asterisk (*). In certain passages pertaining to non-diplomatic events in England, both old and new style dates are given for the sake of clarity.

Spelling

In the transcription of primary source material, spelling and punctuation are left as in the original, but contractions have been expanded. Where necessary, essential words needed to complete the meaning have been added in square brackets.

Place and personal names

Recognized English versions of place and personal names have been used (for instance, Vienna, The Hague, Munich, Gustavus Adolphus); otherwise the version found in vernacular documents has been employed (for example, Regensburg rather than Ratisbon).

Currency

As far as possible all sums of money are given in Imperial thalers (*Reichsthaler*) or English pounds sterling. Conversions, unless otherwise noted, have been made according to the following scheme:

1 pound sterling = 4.75 thalers
 7.12 gulden (florins, Rhenish florins)

CHRONOLOGY, 1635-9

Date	Political/Diplomatic Events	Military Events
1635		
<i>February</i>	Franco-Dutch treaty renewed French seek English alliance	
<i>March</i>	Senecterre's embassy to England begins	Spain occupies Trier, its Elector arrested (to 1645)
<i>April</i>	Franco-Swedish alliance (Treaty of Compiègne) Franco-Dutch partition treaty exposed in England	
<i>May</i>	Taylor's mission to Spain ends Peace of Prague between the Emperor and Saxony, followed by most German princes	France declares war on Spain
<i>June</i>	Ship money imposed on inland counties	
<i>July</i>	News of the Peace of Prague reaches England Taylor selected as envoy to the Emperor	
<i>August</i>	News of the marriage of Maximilian and Maria Anna reaches England Scudamore's embassy to France begins Second writ of ship money	
<i>September</i>	Taylor departs on his mission (7 Sept.) Young Oñate selected as ambassador to England	
<i>October</i>	Charles I proposes simultaneous restoration of Lorraine and the Palatinate	Bernard of Saxe-Weimar enters the French service

Date	Political/Diplomatic Events	Military Events
1635		
<i>November</i>	Aston's embassy to Spain begins Taylor arrives in Vienna (22 Nov.) Charles Louis arrives in England, Rupert follows	
1636		
<i>January</i>	Maximilian's reply to the Emperor	Sweden surrenders Mainz
<i>February</i>	Emperor selects Werdemann as envoy to England Emperor's offer to Taylor (24 Feb.) Encouraging dispatches from Taylor	
<i>March</i>	Emperor replaces Werdemann with Radolt as envoy to England Radolt departs on his mission (26 Mar.) Franco-Swedish treaty (Treaty of Wismar)	Emperor declares war on France
<i>April</i>	Arundel selected as ambassador extraordinary to the Emperor (1 Apr.) Arundel departs on his mission (17 Apr.) Radolt arrives in London (29 Apr.) Maximilian's reply to the Emperor Hopton's mission to Spain ends	
<i>May</i>	Leicester's embassy to France begins	
<i>June</i>	Arundel arrives in Linz (15 June)	
<i>July</i>	Arundel embarks on his intermediate travels (3 July) Maximilian's reply to the Emperor Young Oñate's embassy to England begins	Army of Flanders invades France

Date	Political/Diplomatic Events	Military Events
1636		
<i>August</i>	Arundel arrives in Regensburg (13 Aug.) French demanding firm alliance from Leicester	Army of Flanders at Corbie French take Upper Alsace
<i>September</i>	Regensburg electoral meeting (to Feb. 1637) Secret conference between Bavarian, Spanish, and Imperial representatives Emperor's offer to Arundel (11 Sept.)	Imperialists invade Burgundy Swedes advance into Saxony
<i>October</i>	King of Hungary arrives in Regensburg Arundel recalled (25 Oct.) Imperialists show renewed interest in Arundel's negotiations News of the Emperor's September offer reaches England Papal legate Genetti arrives at Cologne Third writ of ship money	Imperialists defeated at Wittstock French retake Corbie
<i>November</i>	Arundel's embassy ends, Taylor resumes his mission (18 Nov.)	Baner advances into Thuringia Imperialists driven from Burgundy
<i>December</i>	Attempts by the Emperor and Taylor to reach a compromise on the Palatinate question King of Hungary elected King of the Romans (22 Dec.)	
1637		
<i>January</i>	Arundel arrives in England (6 Jan.) News of the election of the King of the Romans reaches England Overtures from France for a treaty Arundel's account of his mission to King and council (25 Jan.) Decision taken to pursue French alliance and lend ships to Charles Louis Emperor's offer to Taylor (29 Jan.)	Swedish army withdraws to Torgau

Date	Political/Diplomatic Events	Military Events
1637		
<i>February</i>	Oñate's embassy to the Emperor ends Death of Ferdinand II; King of Hungary succeeds as Ferdinand III (15 Feb.) Charles signs amended French treaty, Leicester given powers to conclude	
<i>March</i>	Radolt's mission to England ends French refer treaty with England to Hamburg conference	
<i>April</i>	Charles briefly reopens negotiations with young Oñate	
<i>June</i>	Habsburgs suggest conference at Brussels Charles Louis and Rupert leave England for Holland	Swedish army withdraws to Pomerania (until Oct. 1638)
<i>July</i>	Senecterre's embassy to England ends	
<i>August</i>	Prayer book rebellion begins in Scotland	
<i>September</i>		French take Leucate (Catalonia)
<i>October</i>		Dutch take Breda
<i>November</i>	Correr's embassy to England ends	
<i>December</i>	Taylor accepts the Emperor's invitation to the conference at Brussels (24 Dec.) Princess Phalzburg's approach to Gerbier Bellevière's embassy to England begins	
1638		
<i>February</i>	Charles begins to reestablish friendly relations with the Habsburgs	Bernard initiates campaign on the Upper Rhine
<i>March</i>	Solemn League and Covenant Franco-Swedish alliance renewed (Treaty of Hamburg)	Imperialists defeated at Rheinfelden

Date	Political/Diplomatic Events	Military Events
1638		
<i>May</i>	Young Oñate's embassy to England ends Cárdenas's mission to England begins Duchess of Chevreuse arrives in England	English loan to Charles Louis for foreign troops Imperialists take Meppen Bernard defeats Imperialists in the Breisgau
<i>June</i>	Roe's mission to congress at Hamburg begins Aston's embassy to Spain ends Gerbier's negotiations with the Princess Phalzburg	
<i>July</i>	Hopton's embassy to Spain begins Princess Phalzburg's proposal	Baner advances into Pomerania
<i>August</i>	News of Scottish troubles impedes Taylor's negotiation Taylor requests his recall Giustinian's embassy to England begins	Bernard begins siege of Breisach
<i>October</i>	Queen Mother arrives in England	Charles Louis defeated at Vlotho; Rupert taken prisoner
<i>November</i>	Charles Louis arrives in Hamburg	Increased Franco-Swedish pressure on Imperialists
<i>December</i>	Cárdenas in disgrace at court	Bernard takes Breisach
1639		
<i>January</i>	Charles Louis leaves Hamburg for Holland	Baner's campaign in Brunswick Bernard's campaign in Upper Burgundy
<i>February</i>	Taylor recalled Collapse of Anglo-French treaty negotiations Scudamore's embassy to France ends	

Date	Political/Diplomatic Events	Military Events
1639		
<i>March</i>	Nassau selected as Imperial plenipotentiary, Richel as Bavarian plenipotentiary to Brussels conference Taylor's mission to Emperor ends First Bishops' War	
<i>April</i>	Taylor arrives in England Anglo-Danish treaty (Treaty of Hamburg)	Imperialists defeated at Chemnitz Charles Louis's overtures to Bernard
<i>May</i>	Investigation of Taylor launched	Sweden invades Bohemia (to 1640)
<i>June</i>	Pacification of Berwick	
<i>July</i>		Death of Bernard, France inherits all his conquests Charles Louis plans to command Bernard's army French capture Salces
<i>September</i>	Taylor committed to the Tower	
<i>October</i>	Charles Louis captured at Moulins, imprisoned at Vicennes	Dutch navy destroys Spanish fleet at the Downs France takes over Bernard's army

INTRODUCTION

In the midst of the Thirty Years' War, a series of diplomatic missions exchanged between the King of England and the Holy Roman Emperor stirred hopes for a peaceful settlement of the hostilities. Negotiations between the two rulers revolved around the settlement of the Palatinate question, one of the most vexing issues of the war. This dissertation focuses specifically on the missions of the three diplomats most intimately involved in Anglo-Imperial negotiations of the later 1630s. However, unlike previous work, this study investigates the European as well as the British context of early Stuart foreign policy. Drawing upon not only British archival sources but also the abundant material concerning Britain in Continental repositories, it presents a detailed analysis of the negotiations and shows that English foreign policy in these years, though it produced no tangible results, had the potential to succeed. Although historians have traditionally downplayed England's influence on Continental powers, the evidence shows that Charles I's favor was highly valued at the Habsburg courts and that he had more foreign policy options in the later 1630s than has been commonly assumed.

In the aftermath of the Peace of Prague in 1635, Charles I sent the first of these missions, led by John Taylor, to the Imperial court in an attempt to come to an agreement on the Palatinate question. The satisfactory resolution of this nagging problem had the potential to expand into a peaceful settlement of the hostilities in the Empire, which had already dragged on for seventeen long years. Once Taylor had laid a basis for further discussions, the King sent one of his most illustrious noblemen, Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl of Arundel, as ambassador extraordinary with plenipotentiary

powers to conclude a settlement. Arundel's embassy was the grandest of the attempts of the early Stuart monarchs to find a peaceful solution to the question that had been feeding the Continental strife for years. At the same time that Arundel was sent to Vienna, the Emperor Ferdinand II dispatched Clement Radolt, a councillor of the *Hofkammer*, or Imperial treasury, as an envoy to the English court to promote a settlement there. However, the interests of the major powers with a stake in the negotiations – England and the Emperor, but also Bavaria and Spain – proved difficult to reconcile. In the end, both Arundel and Radolt returned to their respective courts, but Taylor was ordered to remain with the Emperor for two more years in the hope of bringing the negotiations to a favorable conclusion. Ultimately, however, his endeavor was in vain; a compromise settlement was not reached until the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia almost a decade later.

The Palatinate question was sparked by the acceptance of the Bohemian crown by Frederick V, Calvinist Elector Palatine, from Czech rebels in 1619. This act ultimately lost him not only his newly acquired kingdom but also his ancestral lands and titles, for soon after Imperial forces defeated him at the Battle of White Mountain, the Emperor proscribed him under the ban of the Empire. These events might not have attracted undue attention in England if the victim had been any German prince other than Frederick; but he was the husband of Elizabeth Stuart, daughter of the English King James I and sister of the future Charles I. As matters stood, English dynastic interests and the Protestant cause in the Empire had suffered a crushing blow. Soon after Frederick's proscription, he and his family were forced into exile in Holland.

Although from a dynastic perspective the English kings were concerned with supporting the Prince Palatine's claims, they avoided making his affairs the ground for English military involvement

in the Thirty Years' War.¹ Instead they turned to diplomacy as the main avenue to address what came to be known as the Palatinate question – if, when, and how much of the Palatine lands and dignities would be restored to the Prince Palatine. To complicate matters, English attempts to reach a reasonable compromise with the powers which now held a stake in the Palatinate – the Emperor, Spain, and Bavaria – were violently opposed by both Frederick and Elizabeth, who would not be satisfied with anything less than the full restoration of their lands and dignities.² They feared that if a partial restoration were accepted, even with promises of a full restoration in time, those promises would be breached, and the Prince Palatine would be left with only a portion of his former possessions. Elizabeth and Frederick believed that force was the only means to regain their right permanently. After the death of her husband in 1632, Elizabeth continued to favor this strategy for the restoration of their son, Charles Louis.³

Meanwhile, the violence and devastation caused by the ongoing war, not to mention its expense, convinced many parties in the Empire and most particularly the Emperor that the time had come for compromise. The Peace of Prague, concluded in 1635 between the Emperor and Saxony,

¹G. M. D. Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, Modern British Foreign Policy, ed. Malcolm Robinson (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1974), 2.

²Francis C. Springell, *Connoisseur & Diplomat: The Earl of Arundel's Embassy to Germany in 1636 as Recounted in William Crowne's Diary, the Earl's Letters and Other Contemporary Sources with a Catalogue of the Topographical Drawings Made on the Journey by Wenceslaus Hollar* (London: Maggs Bros., 1963), 1.

³See, for instance, Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, *The Letters of Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia*, ed. L. M. Baker, with an introduction by C. V. Wedgwood (London: The Bodley Head, 1953), 92-4: 1 June 1636, 'Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, to Archbishop Laud. Charles Louis, Prince Palatine and Elector Palatine (after 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia restored the electoral dignity to his line) is referenced throughout this work as Charles Louis to avoid confusing him with his uncle Charles I, King of England. Charles standing alone always refers to Charles I.

was rapidly accepted by most of the Protestant states and free cities. Charles Louis, however, was excluded from the amnesty granted to the Protestant states accepting the Peace. Maximilian I of Bavaria, to whom the Emperor had transferred the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity in return for his military assistance against the unfortunate Frederick, was confirmed in these possessions. Charles Louis's position further deteriorated later the same year when Maximilian wed the Emperor's daughter, his own niece, for this union presented the possibility of a permanent Bavarian succession to the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity. Without a secure succession, there was still hope that the Palatine lands and dignities would revert back to the Palatine line of the Wittelsbach family. Thus the Peace of Prague and the union of Maximilian with his niece were serious setbacks to Charles I's policy of Palatine restoration.⁴

At about the same time that these events were taking place, England's importance in Europe was growing. English naval strength was reinforced in the 1630s by the ship money fleet, and France's declaration of war on Spain enhanced England's desirability as an ally or at least a neutral for both parties. English sympathy during these years was particularly important to Spain's war effort in the Low Countries, where Spanish troops had been fighting the Dutch rebels for over sixty years. In the mid 1630s, France's occupation of key territories blocked Spain's land supply routes to Flanders. Maintaining the Channel route, or "English road," became critical for Spain and depended heavily on the cooperation or at least neutrality of England with its large, modern fleet.⁵

⁴Springell, 2.

⁵Geoffrey Parker's work on the army of Flanders, José Alcalá-Zamora's on the Spanish navy, and Harland Taylor's on the English Road all emphasize the importance of England to Spain's maintenance of an open line of communication to the Low Countries (Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659*, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History, ed. H. G. Koenigsberger and J. H. Elliott [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972]; José Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano,

With renewed negotiating power, Charles was determined to explore his options for the recovery of the Palatinate lands and dignities: he sent Sir Thomas Aston to Madrid, John Taylor to Vienna, and the Earl of Leicester to Paris.

Charles sent Taylor to Vienna as a resident agent to urge the Emperor Ferdinand II to reverse the decisions made at Prague and to negotiate for the restoration of the Prince Palatine to his right.⁶ Taylor reported optimistically that the Emperor was ready to offer full restoration, albeit in time – the revocation of the ban and the Lower Palatinate immediately, and the Upper Palatinate and the electoral dignity after the death of the Duke of Bavaria.⁷ Taylor's news led the King to believe that all that was necessary for the final settlement of the Palatinate question was the dispatch of an ambassador to conclude the treaty. In late March of 1636, therefore, he selected the Earl of Arundel to lead an extraordinary embassy to the court of Ferdinand II. Arundel was to press Charles Louis's claims for full reinstatement with the Emperor and at the upcoming electoral meeting at Regensburg.⁸ At approximately the same time that Arundel was sent to Vienna, Ferdinand II sent Clement Radolt as his envoy to promote a settlement at the English court. Because of the interests

España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618-1639): La última ofensiva europea de los Austrias madrileños, Ensayos Planeta de historia y humanidades, vol. 13 [Barcelona: Planeta, 1975]; Harland Taylor, "Trade, Neutrality, and the 'English Road,' 1630-1648," *Economic History Review*, ser. 2, 25 [1972]: 236-60).

⁶Taylor was not a resident ambassador but an agent—a resident envoy without ambassadorial rank who did not represent his sovereign in the first degree.

⁷Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, *State Papers Collected by Edward, Earl of Clarendon, Commencing from the Year 1621, containing the materials from which his History of the great rebellion was composed, and the authorities on which the truth of his relation is founded* (Oxford: Clarendon Printing-House, 1767-86) [CSP], vol. 1, 446-7: 3 Feb. 1636, John Taylor to Secretary Francis Windebank.

⁸The German place name Regensburg is used rather than Ratisbon, which was widely used at the time.

of the major powers involved, however, both Radolt's and Arundel's negotiations failed to produce an agreement. And even though Taylor remained at the Imperial court until 1639 in the hope of bringing the negotiations to a favorable conclusion, this active period of Anglo-Imperial negotiation remained inconclusive. Soon after Taylor returned to England, the Second Bishop's War and then the Civil War increasingly turned the King's attention away from the Continent and toward his troublesome domestic situation.

These missions and the foreign policy that guided them are often considered failures, at least from the English perspective. One might ask, then, why they merit this close description and analysis. In retrospect, when one is fully informed of the political and financial realities facing both the Stuart government and the Emperor in these years, it might appear that their negotiations were doomed from the outset. However, we should not assume that because things did not happen, that they could not have. As much as possible, it is incumbent upon us to try to see these events and relationships as the statesmen of the day saw them. That perspective in and of itself provides valuable insights into their hopes and motivations. And, most importantly, failure can convey as much, and sometimes more, about past events as successes; as J. H. Elliott eloquently points out, "the study of the past is, or should be, something more than the study of successful men and successful designs. Failures have their histories, no less than successes, and they can tell us at least as much, and sometimes more, about that strange blend of circumstance, intention and personality of which the course of events is fashioned."⁹

⁹J. H. Elliott, "The Year of the Three Ambassadors," in *History and Imagination: Essays in Honor of H. R. Trevor-Roper*, ed. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl, and Blair Worden (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981), 180.

Furthermore, this dissertation views Anglo-Imperial relations from a new perspective. It incorporates a narrative account of the negotiations between Charles I and the emperors Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III that is generally more well-balanced or more detailed than those that currently exist as well as the perspective of the two other players in the best position to influence their progress and outcome, namely Bavaria and Spain. A variety of sources, both English and Continental, were used to construct this account, some of which have not previously been used for this purpose.

Most studies in early modern British history have been presented primarily from an English, or more recently a British, perspective that often ignores the wider European context of English politics. They clearly bear the imprint of what Conrad Russell has referred to as "the cloven hoof of Anglocentricity."¹⁰ This is the situation despite recent calls by several distinguished European historians – including Geoffrey Parker, H. G. Koenigsberger, Conrad Russell, J. H. Elliott, and Jonathan Israel – for developments at the English court to be placed in their broader European context. On this subject, Israel has inquired perceptively:

if the study of English history has long suffered from the mistaken but deeply entrenched habit of separating English from the rest of British history, what of the equally unwarranted and entrenched practice of viewing English history apart from that of continental Europe, the tradition based on the premise that everything of significance which happens in England must be due to English causes?¹¹

¹⁰Conrad Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-42* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), vii; quoted in Geoffrey Parker, "The World Beyond Whitehall: British Historiography and European Archives," in *The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Political Culture*, ed. R. Malcolm Smuts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 275.

¹¹Jonathan Israel, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 11; quoted in Parker, "World Beyond Whitehall," 274. However, the influence of the Thirty Years' War on English domestic politics has not been ignored completely; for instance, Thomas Cogswell, Simon Adams, Caroline Hibbard, Conrad

Nowhere should the placement of English affairs in European context be a more natural impulse than in the study of foreign relations, and yet treatments have remained surprisingly, even shockingly, Anglocentric. Over a hundred years ago, S. R. Gardiner drew upon Continental sources for his magisterial ten-volume political history of England from 1603 to 1642, particularly for the portions relating to foreign affairs.¹² But few have followed his lead. Early modern European historians, and not just English historians, tend to treat diplomacy from a national perspective.

This study, however, seeks to bring a more contextually situated approach to the foreign relations of early Stuart government. It investigates its foreign policy and international relations and sets them in a European context. This requires a more traditional approach, in the Gardnerian sense that non-English sources should be consulted to do so. Thus unlike the vast majority of works addressing English foreign policy of this period, it draws not only upon British archival sources but also upon the abundant material concerning Britain in Continental repositories.

In addition to contextualizing English foreign policy, this study will help to fill a gap in the historical coverage of this crucial period. Although most scholars of British history agree that the foreign policy pressures of the later years of the Personal Rule played an important role in the conflict between the King and his subjects that eventually erupted into civil war, there is an unfortunate dearth of detailed studies of foreign relations during this period.¹³ The main foreign policy issues confronting Charles I's government in these years revolved around the Palatinate and

Russell, and Kevin Sharpe all address this subject in their work.

¹²Samuel R. Gardiner, *History of England from the Accession of James I. to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642*, 10 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1884).

¹³Foreign affairs remains a comparatively neglected topic for the early Stuart period (Malcolm Smuts, "Introduction," in *Stuart Court and Europe*, 6).

England's potential role in the Thirty Years' War. These questions were highly charged with religious significance for many Englishmen, and public opinion was consequently divided. Some, particularly those with Puritan sympathies, believed that the King should actively intervene in Germany to support his nephew, thus striking a blow for the Protestant cause. Others, including the King and Secretary Windebank, saw the wisdom of negotiating with the Catholic Habsburgs, who were in the best position to restore Charles Louis to the Palatine lands and dignities. While many of his subjects favored a foreign policy motivated by confessional interests, Charles followed one that was largely dynastic. In the sensitive years of the later 1630s, his decision to negotiate mainly with the "popish" Habsburg powers instead of supporting international Protestantism contributed to the hardening of Protestant opinion against him that was manifested in the Long Parliament and eventually resulted in civil war.

In keeping with the lack of attention accorded to the foreign relations of the Personal Rule and the later 1630s in particular, there is little detailed information available on Anglo-Imperial diplomatic relations in this period.¹⁴ The foreign policy of the Personal Rule is often dismissed as vacillating, ineffective, and doomed to failure. This dissertation, in contrast, will examine English foreign policy of the later 1630s through a detailed account of the diplomatic relations between the Stuart and Imperial courts. The in-depth knowledge of early seventeenth-century international relations produced by this approach is integral to a proper understanding of Stuart foreign policy in the years leading up to the Civil War.

¹⁴The studies that do exist tend to focus on the 1620s, the period of active English intervention in the war.

A close analysis of the negotiations between Charles I and the Habsburgs also reveals much about the King's foreign policy strategy and his intentions in these years. It offers a view into the King's secret foreign policy with the Habsburgs, which resulted in a system where select members of the peace party – Weston, Cottington, and particularly Windebank – helped Charles make and implement a foreign policy hidden from many of his prominent councillors and courtiers. These trusted few established direct lines of communication with the diplomats who carried out the policy on the ground, at times bypassing the official reporting channels.

This detailed study will also shed light on the attitude of Continental powers toward England in these years. Although traditionally historians have downplayed the impact of English policy on these powers, evidence suggests that Charles' favor was more highly valued at the Habsburg courts than previously assumed. English negotiating power with the Habsburgs increased in the latter half of the 1630s for a variety of reasons, including the French entry into the war and the expansion of the English fleet. In 1635, England's conduct of foreign relations became more active to take advantage of the situation. Soon three embassies – one to the Emperor, one to Spain, and one to France – were dispatched to reassert the claims of the Prince Palatine.

England could use its assets to apply pressure to the Emperor, who had the power to remove the ban, invest Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire, and restore the electoral dignity, and to the two states occupying Palatine lands, Bavaria and Spain. The Emperor sincerely wished to put an end to the destructive war in the Empire and recognized the key role the settlement of the Palatinate question played in this work. He also wanted to avoid English entry into the war on any level, whether by direct military intervention or by providing naval and financial support to the anti-Habsburg cause. The Spaniards, for their part, were particularly concerned with the English fleet,

since they relied upon its assistance to transport men, money, and munitions through the Channel to supply their ongoing war against the Dutch. And the Duke of Bavaria saw new reasons to make some measured concessions in the Palatinate in the later 1630s.

In order to assess effectively Charles I's Habsburg foreign policy in the later 1630s, and more specifically his diplomatic overtures to the Emperor, it is critical to understand the religious and political motivations of and the relationships between the Emperor and his major allies, Spain and Bavaria. The Palatinate question is a complex diplomatic issue that cannot be understood without a clear view of the foreign policy priorities of the main powers involved. By taking these priorities and relationships into account, particularly those of the Emperor, this dissertation will help to shed light on not only on the motivations of the major players, but also on England's place in this power relationship.

A further reason for concentrating on the later 1630s is that this period has been neglected from a Continental as well as a British perspective. The history of the Thirty Years' War between the Peace of Prague and the beginning of the negotiations leading up to the Peace of Westphalia is barely researched – one needs only to pick up any study of the war to see how little attention it has received.¹⁵ These eight years are often considered a period of stagnation, undistinguished by great political or military triumphs.¹⁶ They were, however, a time of transition during which crucial changes of attitude took place that allowed Europeans to lay the basis for peace. This account of the

¹⁵Konrad Repgen, "Über die Geschichte der Geschichtsschreibung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges: Begriff und Konzeption," in *Krieg und Politik, 1618-1648: Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven*, ed. Konrad Repgen, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien, vol. 8 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 1.

¹⁶Adam Wandruszka, *Reichspatriotismus und Reichspolitik zur Zeit des Prager Friedens von 1635: eine Studie zur Geschichte des deutschen Nationalbewußtseins* (Graz: Böhlau, 1955), 7.

missions exchanged between England and the Emperor in that later 1630s, then, will make a contribution to the political and diplomatic history of this under-researched period of the war.

Finally, the 1630s were also an important period because the basis of political and diplomatic decision making was changing. From the early to the mid-seventeenth century there was a general trend away from confessional toward secular politics, a trend which was slowly reversing that of the half-century before. Developments in diplomacy paralleled this change. The disruption caused by religious war led Europeans to have second thoughts about the benefits of religious conflict.¹⁷ Religious adversaries cautiously repaired and re-established diplomatic contacts that had been strained and broken in the latter half of the sixteenth century because "negotiations with the enemies of one's faith looked more and more like heresy and treason."¹⁸ Questions that had ceased to be negotiable because of religious disagreements were again open for discussion. European rulers and their diplomats were guided less and less by ideological considerations; compromise and negotiation in the secular interests of the state were ascendant. This shift in outlook did not come soon enough to avert the Thirty Years' War, but it certainly helped to end it, as it was imperative for the successful conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia.¹⁹ The missions of Arundel and Taylor to the Emperor and Radolt to England took place in the midst of this momentous reversal. They therefore provide a convenient opportunity to draw some tentative conclusions about the extent to which religious

¹⁷Garrett Mattingly, "International Diplomacy and International Law," in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 3, *The Counter-Reformation and Price Revolution 1559-1610*, ed. R. B. Wernham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 165.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 156, 165.

¹⁹Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, Bedford Historical Series, no. 17 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1962), 207.

concerns intruded upon the relations of states of differing religions in the later 1630s. In this way, they can shed some light on the nature and timing of the crucial transition from confessional to secular diplomacy during the Thirty Years' War.

There is a solid foundation of primary source material relating to the missions exchanged between Charles I and the Emperor, most of it residing in English and Austrian archives. State papers dealing with the official side of the mission are abundant. A fair amount of the English papers were fortunately either printed or calendared (or in the case of the Clarendon Manuscripts, both). Whenever possible, the more relevant calendared documents were consulted in their original form, as were some printed documents that have never been reproduced in their entirety. The Austrian source material exists almost exclusively in manuscript form; very few are printed and none are calendared.²⁰

A good deal of the research for this study was centered on the state papers relating to English foreign affairs and central government housed in the Public Record Office in London. The State Paper Office, the forerunner of the Public Record Office, was established in 1578 for the reception and safe keeping of state papers, including those accumulated by the secretaries of state in the course of their duties. Unfortunately, in the early Stuart period this policy was followed only sporadically, with varying degrees of success. The result was that only a portion of the secretaries' papers relating to the missions to the Emperor in the 1630s, mainly Coke's official correspondence (or what he

²⁰Because of the close involvement of Maximilian I, a body of material related to Anglo-Imperial negotiations also exists in the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Munich, particularly in the collection Kastenschwarz. However, these documents are duplicated in part and supplemented by the holdings of the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, mainly the collections Palatina and Bavarica.

understood it to be), were ever deposited in the State Paper Office.²¹ These are presently found in collection State Papers Foreign, German Empire and Hungary, which consists chiefly of official correspondence with the English representatives, their instructions and credentials, correspondence between heads of state, and miscellaneous documents relating to the missions.²² Unfortunately there are no calendars to help the researcher exploit the riches of the State Papers Foreign for the early Stuart period.²³ One series does exist, however, that summarizes the reports of the Venetian representatives at foreign courts, including those of the Emperor and Charles I – the *Calendar of State Papers Venetian*.²⁴ These reports give many valuable insights into the political attitudes and diplomatic events of the time, but often the facts related by them are difficult to confirm and thus must be accepted carefully.²⁵

²¹Coke was first and foremost an administrator, and he was a strong advocate of preserving and organizing government records (Kevin Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992], 155). It follows that he would place at least some of his papers in the government archive. However, it is apparent that he did not turn over everything, because a portion of his official correspondence is found with his private papers in the Coke Papers, now housed in the British Library.

²²Public Record Office [PRO], State Papers Foreign, German Empire and Hungary [SP 80]. In addition, those for Flanders [SP 77] and Spain [SP 94] contain information about English negotiations on the Palatinate question with these countries.

²³The *Calendar of State Papers Foreign*, which is invaluable to the study of English foreign relations in the sixteenth century, halts in the 1590s.

²⁴*Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and Other Libraries in Northern Italy*, 37 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office [HMSO], 1864-1947; reprint, Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1970) [CSPV]. It should be noted that a *Calendar of State Papers Spanish* also exists, but it ends with the reign of Elizabeth in 1603.

²⁵In particular, Correr's interpretations were at times colored by his belief that Spanish influence dominated at the English court.

In addition to the State Papers Foreign, the Public Record Office houses the State Papers Domestic. These are documents of the most varied nature, from those produced by the daily functioning of government to private letters. As such they contain valuable information on a variety of subjects, including the King's negotiations with the Habsburgs and his policy making more generally, as well as public perception of them. Included in this collection, for instance, are some of the many letters that passed between Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, and courtiers such as Sir Thomas Roe and Archbishop Laud.²⁶ The hodge-podge of material included in the State Papers Domestic also gives insights into the non-diplomatic aspects of the lives of Arundel and Taylor. These papers are fortunately summarized, some in more detail than others, in the *Calendar of State Papers Domestic*.²⁷

Because early modern secretaries tended to keep their papers as private possessions even after the creation of the State Paper Office, many collections of state papers are to be found outside of the Public Record Office.²⁸ Windebank must have kept the records of his office as private

²⁶For Elizabeth's letters, see also *The Letters of Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia*.

²⁷*Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I, 1625-[1649]*, 23 vols. (London: HMSO, 1858-97; reprint, Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1967) [CSPD].

²⁸In the later sixteenth century, the tendency was for office-holders to "convert public offices into personal domains, wherever possible into bureaucratic fiefs...[retarding] the keeping of proper records." (Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 229). As previously noted, the State Paper Office was established in 1578, but office holders did not necessarily follow the policy of depositing state papers in the early Stuart period. Robert Beale complained in 1592 that "heretofore towards the latter end of King Henry VIII, there was a chamber in Westminster where such things [dispatches, instructions and other documents] were kept and they were not in the Secretary's private custody. But, since that, order hath been neglected, and those things which were public have been culled out and gathered into private books, whereby no means are left to see what was done before, or to give any light of service to young beginners, which is not well: And therefore I would wish a secretary to keep such things apart in a chest or place and not to confound them with his own." (ibid., 230). Although English archives were still considered incomplete under James I, attitudes towards the archives of an office were slowly changing in the early seventeenth century (ibid.; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 154). The deposit of governmental records was still left up to the

property, as a large portion of his official papers are preserved in the Clarendon Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.²⁹ Since he was unofficially responsible for coordinating the secret negotiations with the Habsburgs, much of the correspondence in this very important collection is with diplomats at Habsburg courts, including Aston, Hopton, Arundel, and Taylor, as well as some of their secret instructions. These documents are made much more accessible by two publications. They are summarized in the *Calendar of Clarendon State Papers*, and a good selection of them is printed in the eighteenth-century volumes of *Clarendon State Papers*.³⁰ In addition to the Bodleian Library, the British Library also contains much source material in its unbelievably diverse array of manuscript collections that is relevant to Anglo-Habsburg relations of the 1630s. Chief among them are the Additional Manuscripts, which include some of the papers of Lord Aston and Secretary Coke as well as the private correspondence of the Earl of Arundel,³¹ and the Egerton Manuscripts, which incorporate Sir Arthur Hopton's letter book.

discretion of the individual secretaries in the reign of Charles I.

²⁹Bodleian Library, University of Oxford [Bodl. Lib.], Clarendon Manuscripts [Clar. Mss.]. Although these documents are included in a portion of the collection that was assembled from a variety of sources in the nineteenth century, one may conclude that they came with the original bequest Clarendon's descendants made in 1759, since almost all of them were printed in the first volume of the *Clarendon State Papers* (1767). It is not certain how Windebank's papers came into Clarendon's hands, but many of the letters contained in the collection were given to Clarendon to aid him in his writing of *The History of the Rebellion* (*Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers Preserved in the Bodleian Library* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1869-1970] [CCSP], vol. 1, vi).

³⁰Cited above.

³¹British Library [BL], Additional Manuscripts [Add. Mss.] 15970 contains many of Arundel's letters to his art agent, the Reverend William Petty. Many of these are printed in: Springell, app. C; Mary F. S. Hervey, *The Life, Correspondence and Collections of Thomas Howard Earl of Arundel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921); and M. A. Tierney, *The History and Antiquities of the Castle and Town of Arundel: Including a Biography of Its Earls, from the Conquest to the Present Time* (London: G. and W. Nichol, 1834), vol. 2.

Finally, the Historical Manuscripts Commission has printed a large selection of calendars and primary source material from the period in question. Its mammoth series of reports has also yielded a good deal of information relating to the missions and the envoys who led them. The most important are *Denbigh V*, which contains Taylor's letters to Lord Feilding, the English ambassador in Venice, and the *Sixth Report*, which include the letters of Arundel and Windebank to Feilding.³²

The Earl of Arundel's mission is particularly well-documented because two gentlemen in his retinue published accounts of it. *A Trve Relation of All the Remarkable Places and Passages Observed in the Travels of the right honourable Thomas Lord Hovvard, Earle of Arundell and Surrey . . . Ambassadour Extraordinary to his sacred Majesty Ferdinando, the second, Emperour of Germanie, Anno Domini 1636* was written by William Crowne, whom Arundel employed to record the events of his journey across the Empire.³³ Despite its dry, factual style and omission of diplomatic events, it remains a valuable source for its detailed description of the places Arundel visited in Germany and of the misery wrought by the Thirty Years' War. Francis Springell's study of Arundel's embassy reprints Crowne's work along with many of Wenceslaus Hollar's artworks from the journey.³⁴ Sir Edward Walker, the Earl's personal secretary, also treats the embassy in his

³²Historical Manuscripts Commission [HMC], *Report on the Manuscripts of the Earl of Denbigh*, vol. 5 (London: HMSO, 1911) [*Denbigh V*]; *ibid.*, *Sixth Report*, with app. (London: HMSO, 1877-8).

³³William Crowne, *A Trve Relation of All the Remarkable Places and Passages Observed in the Travels of the right honourable Thomas Lord Hovvard, Earle of Arundell and Surrey...Ambassadour Extraordinary to his sacred Majesty Ferdinando, the second, Emperour of Germanie, Anno Domini 1636* (London: Printed [by F. Kingston] for Henr. Seile, 1637).

³⁴See below, 21.

Historical Discourses.³⁵ The combination of the textual and visual in these works gives us uncommonly rich insight into the experiences of Arundel and his retinue as they traveled across Germany.

Additional correspondence and references to Arundel dealing with topics other than the embassy are to be found in his official and private papers preserved in the Arundel Castle Archives in Sussex, most particularly in the Autograph Letters and Norris Collection,³⁶ as well as in assorted collections of printed documents and calendars.³⁷ David Lloyd's *Memoires*, though unreliable in many respects, can still be used with caution to help draw conclusions about Arundel's religious

³⁵Sir Edward Walker, *Historical discourses upon several occasions ...IV. The life and actions of Thomas Howard, earl of Arundel and Surrey, earl-marshal of England....* (London: W. B. for S. Keble, 1705); ms. copy in BL, Harleian Mss. 6272.

³⁶Arundel Castle Archives [ACA], Autograph Letters [AL] 1617-32; *ibid.*, AL 1632-1723; *ibid.*, Norris Collection [NC]. Some of these documents are reprinted in Hervey and Tierney.

³⁷Additional correspondence relating to Arundel is found in William Laud, *The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God William Laud*, Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology, vols. 51-7 (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1860), vol. 7; John Chamberlain, *The Letters of John Chamberlain*, ed. Norman Egbert McClure, *Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 12 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1939); Thomas Birch, ed., *The Court and Times of Charles the First, Illustrated by Authentic and Confidential Letters from Various Public and Private Collections*, 2 vols. (London: H. Colburn, 1848); Edmund Lodge, ed., *Illustrations of British History, Biography, and Manners in the Reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, & James I, Exhibited in a Series of Original Papers, Selected from the Mss. of the Noble Families of Howard, Talbot, and Cecil....*, 2d ed., 3 vols. (London: John Chidley, 1838); John Evelyn, *The Diary of John Evelyn and the Private Correspondence between King Charles I. and Sir Edward Nicholas and between Sir Edward Hyde (afterwards Earl of Clarendon) and Sir Richard Browne*, ed. William Bray, new ed., with a life of the author and a new preface by Henry B. Wheatley, 4 vols. (London: Bickers and Son, 1906); and Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, *The Earl of Strafford's Letters and Dispatches*, ed. William Knowler (London: Printed for the Editor, 1739). The CSPD and CSPV also contain numerous references to Arundel and his family.

leanings.³⁸ For John Taylor, the wills, parish registers, and ecclesiastical court books of the Borthwick Institute in York, provided rare insight into his family background.³⁹

Where Continental sources are concerned, much of the material for this study was drawn from manuscript collections in the main archive of the Habsburg court, the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna. The official diplomatic correspondence and records of central government preserved there are crucial to understanding Imperial foreign policy and the course of Anglo-Imperial negotiations during the Thirty Years' War. The most important materials consulted included the following collections: Staatenabteilung England, the Imperial equivalent of the State Papers Foreign for England, which includes the instructions, credentials, and reports of Imperial diplomats in England, memorials presented by English envoys, and correspondence between heads of state; Staatenabteilung Palatina, which contains correspondence, memorials, and Imperial privy council documents related to the Palatinate question; Staatskanzlei, Vorträge, which houses the records of the privy council; and Reichskanzlei, Kriegsakten, which consists of documents of mixed import relating to the war.⁴⁰

The collections of the Hofkammerarchiv offered valuable information about Radolt and his career, particularly the following: Familienakten R-10, which pertain to the Radolt family; the

³⁸David Lloyd, *Memoires of the Lives, Actions, Suffering & Deaths of Those Noble, Reverend, and Excellent Personages That Suffered by Death, Sequestration, Decimation, or Otherwise for the Protestant Religion, And the great Principle thereof...With the Life & Martyrdom of King Charles I.* (London: Printed for Samuel Speed, 1668).

³⁹Borthwick Institute, University of York [BI], Archdiocese of York, Archepiscopal Visitation Court Books [AVCB]; *ibid.*, Parish Registers for Bilton in Ainsty, County York.

⁴⁰Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv [HHStA], Staatenabteilung [StA] England; *ibid.*, StA Palatina; *ibid.*, Staatskanzlei [StK] Vorträge; *ibid.*, Reichskanzlei [RK] Kriegsakten [KrA].

Hoffinanzbücher, financial records; the Hofquartierungsbücher, Imperial court quarter records; and the Niederösterreichische Herrschaftsaktien, which contain information regarding Radolt's construction projects at the Imperial palace.⁴¹ The Hofzahlamtsbücher, the main financial records of the Imperial court, not only contain information helpful to reconstructing Radolt's career, but Taylor's as well.⁴² Other collections useful for the former task were the heraldic documents of the Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, the parish registers at the Diözesanarchiv, and the wills of Imperial officials in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, army records at the Kriegsarchiv, and the real estate records at the Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv.⁴³

As previously noted, few printed primary sources exist for the Austrian portion of this study. The main one is Franz Christoph Khevenhüller's *Annales Ferdinandeï*, a contemporary chronicle of the reign of Ferdinand II written by one of his privy councillors. This work offers an account of the events at the Imperial court from an insider's perspective and reprints some useful documents.⁴⁴ However its coverage ends in 1637 with the death of Ferdinand II, and of the missions discussed here, it only touches upon Arundel's in a meaningful way. All of the primary sources mentioned

⁴¹Hofkammerarchiv [HKA], Familienakten [FA] R-10; *ibid.*, Hoffinanzbücher [HFB]; *ibid.*, Hofquartier [HQ], Quartierbücher [QB]; *ibid.*, Niederösterreichische Herrschaftsaktien.

⁴²*Ibid.*, Hofzahlamt, Rechnungsbücher (Hofzahlamtsbücher) [HZAB].

⁴³Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv [AVA], Hofadelsakten; *ibid.*, Reichadelsakten; Pfarrarchiv St. Stephan, Barleibbücher, HHStA, Oberstmarschallamt, Testamente; Kriegsarchiv [KA], Hofkriegsrat, Protokolle; Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv [WStLA], Grundbücher [GB].

⁴⁴Franz Christoph Khevenhüller, Count Frankenburg, *Annales Ferdinandeï; oder Wahrhafft Beschreibung Käysers Ferdinandi des Andern, mildesten Gedächtniss, Geburth, Aufferziehung und bisshero in Krieg und Friedens-Zeiten vollbrachten thaten....* 12 vols. in 7, plus supplements (Leipzig: M. G. Weidmann, 1721-6). For more information about this work, see Kurt Peball, "Zur Quellenlage der 'Annales Ferdinandeï' des Grafen Franz Christoph Khevenhüller-Frankenburg," *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs* 9 (1956): 1-22.

here, manuscript and printed, together have allowed for the detailed analysis of Anglo-Imperial relations in the later 1630s that is integral to a proper understanding of English foreign policy in the period leading up to civil war.

Also, historians have written little about the Anglo-Imperial negotiations of the later 1630s. Since these negotiations were unsuccessful in their attempt to settle the question of the Palatinate or to effect any type of compromise, they may superficially appear to be of little consequence. This is, perhaps, the reason they barely receive a passing mention in most works covering the 1630s. Few studies address the missions discussed in this work in any meaningful way. The exceptions, however, are discussed below.

F. C. Springell's *Connoisseur & Diplomat* is the only monographic study devoted to any of the missions to the Emperor, namely Arundel's embassy, discussed in this dissertation. His is the most detailed account of any of the missions, and it reprints Crowne's *True Relation* with explanatory notes and some of Hollar's topographical drawings. However, while it devotes some space to the negotiations themselves, the work does not emphasize the politics of diplomacy. Springell is an art historian, and not surprisingly a significant portion of his book is dedicated to addressing the art historical aspects of the embassy: almost all of Arundel's letters that are printed in this work have to do with procuring works of art rather than with official embassy business; and it also includes biographical chapters on Hollar and Arundel's friend, art agent, and chaplain, the Reverend William Petty. Despite this focus, Springell's work provides the most thorough, albeit uneven, treatment of Arundel's negotiations. Its greatest value from the diplomatic perspective is that it is one of the few works that incorporates some Continental sources, mainly Bavarian. However he did not consult the rich array of Imperial records available at the Haus-, Hof- und

Staatsarchiv, particularly in the collections StA Palatina and England, that are mentioned above.⁴⁵

Since Arundel's negotiations were with the Emperor, this is a major omission.

A few other historians devote a chapter or section of their more general works to the missions. The best of these is Patricia Haskell's study of the career of Sir Francis Windebank, one of Charles I's two secretaries of state during much of the Personal Rule. She devotes a good deal of space to the diplomacy of the time, not only to the English missions sent abroad during Windebank's tenure but also foreign missions received at the English court. She therefore discusses not only the missions of Arundel and Taylor to the Emperor, but also that of Radolt to the King. She presents a well-balanced account based on a close reading of her largely English source material.⁴⁶ E. A. Beller also devotes a chapter to the missions of Arundel and Taylor in his dissertation on Anglo-German diplomatic relations during the Thirty Years' War. He presents a solid and enjoyable though less detailed narrative account, also based mostly upon English source material.⁴⁷ Mary F. S. Hervey's description of Arundel's embassy is encompassed in two chapters of her biography of the Earl. The several official dispatches she reprints and her overall framework of events are useful, but her account focuses more on interesting sidelights and Arundel's personality than the official negotiations. Kevin Sharpe's *Personal Rule of Charles I* gives a summary of Arundel's, and to a

⁴⁵In addition, Heiner Haan points out the oversight of reports of Bavarian officials in the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kastenschwarz 101, which include those of the Bavarian Vice Chancellor Richel at Regensburg (Heiner Haan, *Der Regensburger Kurfürstentag von 1636/1637*, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, vol. 3 [Münster: Aschendorff, 1967], 233 n. 38).

⁴⁶Patricia Haskell, "Sir Francis Windebank and the Personal Rule of Charles I" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southampton, 1978), 208-19, 319-23.

⁴⁷Elmer A. Beller, "The Diplomatic Relations between England and Germany during the Thirty Years' War: With an Introductory Chapter on Their Relations between 1603 and 1618" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oxford, [1924?]), 348-78.

lesser extent Taylor's negotiations, as does Samuel Rawson Gardiner's brief account in his *History of England*.⁴⁸

Very few historians writing from the Imperial perspective have touched on the negotiations in a significant way. Heiner Haan, who has written a meticulous study of the 1636 electoral meeting at Regensburg, touches on the negotiations of Arundel and Taylor there. His short section on the Imperial negotiations with England is the most considered and reliable account available from the German standpoint, utilizing mainly Bavarian and Austrian sources.⁴⁹ Taylor's negotiations for a conference in Brussels are treated briefly in M. Koch's study of the reign of Ferdinand III.⁵⁰ Finally, Jürgen Steiner's work on the fate of the Palatine electorate and lands during the Thirty Years' War provides good coverage of this question generally, based on printed sources, but it is thin on the later 1630s and barely mentions the English missions under discussion here.⁵¹

Several secondary sources have been helpful for tracing the policy and motivations of the Emperor's allies in the later 1630s. For Spanish politics during this period the essential work remains J. H. Elliott's *Count-Duke of Olivares*, which contains excellent insights on Spain's involvement in Germany, its relationship with the Emperor and Bavaria, and its negotiations with

⁴⁸Gardiner, vol. 8, 100-2, 158-61, 377-8; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 515-25.

⁴⁹Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 233-50.

⁵⁰M. Koch, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches unter der Regierung Ferdinands III.* (Vienna: Carl Gerold's Sohn, 1865-6), 93-4, 98-100. This work must be used cautiously, however, because Koch takes an uncritically pro-Imperial stance and incorporates misleading interpretations and factual errors into it. Unfortunately it is the only work covering Ferdinand III's reign that makes mention of Taylor's negotiations.

⁵¹Jürgen Steiner, *Die pfälzische Kurwürde während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges (1618-1648)*, Veröffentlichungen der Pfälzischen Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, vol. 76 (Speyer: Pfälzische Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, 1985).

England on the Palatinate and other issues.⁵² The background, goals, and outlook of Maximilian I are covered admirably in a host of publications by Dieter Albrecht. Maximilian's changing attitude toward the restitution of the Palatinate in the latter half of the 1630s can best be traced in Albrecht's magisterial biography of Maximilian and his article on the war and peace aims of the German states during the Thirty Years' War.⁵³ Further information on the tail end of the decade can be gleaned from Karl Schweinesbein's published dissertation on Maximilian's policy towards France from 1639 to 1645.⁵⁴

Much more has been written, almost exclusively by English historians, about the formation, nature, and impact of Charles I's foreign policy in the later 1630s. By and large, historians have not taken a favorable view of his largely neutral, pro-Habsburg foreign policy during the Personal Rule. Traditionally these historians, led by nineteenth-century giant S. R. Gardiner, have branded his foreign policy – and thus the missions guided by it – at best as ineffective and inconsistent, "futile" diplomacy in every sense of the word. Gardiner described the flurry of English diplomatic activity at the major European courts in this period, including the missions of Taylor, Arundel, Aston,

⁵²J. H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

⁵³Dieter Albrecht, *Maximilian I. von Bayern, 1573-1651* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998); idem, "Die Kriegs- und Friedensziele der deutschen Reichsstände," in *Krieg und Politik*, 241-73. See also: idem, "Bayern und die pfälzische Frage auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreß," in *Der Westfälische Friede*, ed. Heinz Duchhardt, 461-8, *Historische Zeitschrift*, suppl. vol. 26 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998); idem, "Das konfessionelle Zeitalter, zweiter Teil: Die Herzöge Wilhelm V. and Maximilian I," in *Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte*, ed. Max Spindler, 2d rev. ed. (Munich: Beck, 1977), vol. 2; and idem, *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians von Bayern, 1618-1635*, Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 6 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962).

⁵⁴Karl Schweinesbein, "Die Frankreichpolitik Kurfürst Maximilians I von Bayern, 1639-1645," (Ph.D. diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität [Munich], 1967).

Hopton, and Leicester, as "so complicated and unreal, that they only served to make the brain dizzy."⁵⁵ Charles used these concurrent and overlapping dealings to try to play off one state against another and thus negotiate the most advantageous deal possible for his nephew. In the view of Gardiner, these tactics were unethical and it was near impossible for them to result in a successful foreign policy: "no word of condemnation is too strong for the manner in which Charles treated the whole subject of his relations with the Continent. It had all the weakness of a purely selfish policy, without any of the apparent and momentary strength which a selfish policy receives from vigour of conception and boldness of action."⁵⁶ Despite – or perhaps because of – these myriad negotiations, it has been quite difficult for these historians to uncover a consistent English foreign policy. In Gardiner's opinion, the only constant aim of Caroline policy during these years was the reinstatement of his nephew in the Palatinate; this reflected its essentially dynastic nature.⁵⁷

In the view of traditional historians, this goal could not be achieved without calling Parliament, because without subsidies, the King could not finance the active foreign policy required to give him sufficient leverage with Continental rulers. The result of this weakness was that, according to J. R. Jones, "Charles's remarkably inconsistent intrigues during the 1630s possessed no practical importance."⁵⁸ Although the major protagonists, France and the Habsburg states, were continually engaged in negotiations with England in the later 1630s, Gardiner argues that these

⁵⁵Gardiner, vol. 7, 352.

⁵⁶Ibid., 391.

⁵⁷Ibid., 169-219, 352-3, 391.

⁵⁸J. R. Jones, *Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century*, Foundations of Modern History, ed. A. Goodwin (London: Edward Arnold, 1966), 24.

powers were merely spinning out time with the intention of preserving English neutrality. As long as England was not actively engaged against them, they did not require its friendship.⁵⁹ A century later, L. J. Reeve was even more censorious. In his view, the King's pro-Spanish policy reduced England to "a non-combatant satellite of Spain."⁶⁰ Both Gardiner and Reeve, like the English pan-Protestants of the day, saw alliance with the anti-Habsburg powers, most particularly Sweden and the United Provinces, as the best and surest way for England to recover the Palatinate and strike a blow for the Protestant cause.⁶¹

More recently the traditional interpretation of Charles I's futile and inconsistent foreign policy that was propagated by Gardiner and accepted by many others has been questioned by several historians who view England's foreign relations during the Personal Rule in a more positive light, among them Kevin Sharpe, Patricia Haskell, and Caroline Hibbard. In contrast to the opinions evinced by Gardiner, Reeve, Jones, and others, these historians argue that the English government had more bargaining power and diplomatic options in the later 1630s than has previously been assumed. While in the past, the King's apparent reluctance to ally with the anti-Habsburg side was considered imprudent, and by some even a betrayal of the Protestant cause, these "revisionist" historians have interpreted his foreign policy as a pragmatic policy based upon English dynastic and national interests.

⁵⁹Gardiner, vol. 8, 218.

⁶⁰L. J. Reeve, *Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule*, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 256.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 238-9, 251, 259, 268; *idem*, "The Politics of War Finance in an Age of Confessional Strife: A Comparative Anglo-European View," *Parergon* 14, no. 1 (July 1996): 102, 105; Gardiner, vol. 7, 205-6, 352-3.

Sharpe's *Personal Rule* presents the most thoroughgoing reevaluation of the English foreign relations in this period. He challenges the traditional view that Charles conducted "futile diplomacy" and that the missions sent to European courts in the later 1630s were doomed to failure from the outset. According to Sharpe, Charles pursued pragmatic and even coherent foreign policy objectives. He argues that England indeed was in a good bargaining position based upon its neutrality and formidable fleet, which the major European protagonists recognized could make a decisive difference in the course of the war. These powers therefore saw English neutrality and the assistance of its fleet as prizes worth bargaining for, actively sought an alliance with England, and took seriously the threat of English entry into the war. Although Charles did not intervene actively on one side or the other during these years, argues Sharpe, "the *possibility* of war was always a dimension of his diplomacy."⁶² In addressing the issue of Parliament and the royal finances, Sharpe contends that the importance of these considerations in policy making should not be exaggerated. Charles's foreign policy was not hog-tied by his reticence to call Parliament, and in any case there was no certainty that there would be any need to call one if he did decide to intervene actively. He points out, for instance, that the war with the Scots was fought without the financial backing of Parliament.⁶³

Regarding the sagacity of England's negotiations with the Habsburg powers in these years, Sharpe, Haskell, and others maintain this was simply the best course to regaining the lost Palatine lands and dignities since the Habsburgs were in the best position to restore them. This, they point

⁶²Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 88.

⁶³Ibid., 86-7; Caroline M. Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 28-9.

out, helps explain the willingness of the King and some of his advisors to negotiate with the Habsburgs despite the objections of many English Protestants. Indeed, one of the few points that most traditional historians and their critics, including Gardiner and Sharpe, seem to agree upon is that the restitution of the Palatinate was the King's most important foreign policy objective.⁶⁴ Haskell has questioned this, instead asserting that the protection of Flanders from Dutch and French encroachment was much more important to England than recovering the Palatinate, which actually ranked low in practicalities of diplomacy.⁶⁵ Haskell, Sharpe, and Simon Adams, among others, agree that Charles actually showed political foresight in his recognition of the up-and-coming Dutch and French rivalry with England.⁶⁶ And neutrality accorded England the profits generated by helping Spain transport troops and supplies to Flanders and by the increased carrying trade more generally.⁶⁷ Spain's greater reliance on English friendship and its fleet in these years, particularly after France's open entry into the war in 1635, for safe passage through the Channel gave England bargaining leverage.⁶⁸ Recast in this light, the King's foreign policy and his concurrent negotiations at various

⁶⁴Gardiner, vol. 7, 169; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 88.

⁶⁵Haskell, 282, and more generally chaps. 5-6.

⁶⁶Simon Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?: The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy," in *Before the English Civil War: Essays on Early Stuart Politics and Government*, ed. Howard Tomlinson (London: Macmillan, 1983), 101; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 75-8, 89-90.

⁶⁷J. S. Kepler, "Fiscal Aspects of the English Carrying Trade during the Thirty Years War," *Economic History Review*, ser. 2, 25 (1972): 261-83; Taylor, "Trade," 236-60; Hibbard, 25-8; Haskell, 185-6; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 90-2.

⁶⁸Hibbard, 28-9; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 509-11.

European courts were far from aimless and doomed to failure – they were a pragmatic exploration of the diplomatic options available.⁶⁹

It will be argued in this dissertation that English foreign policy in the latter half of the 1630s, though in the end it produced no tangible results where the restoration of the Palatinate was concerned and was in that sense futile, did have potential for success. Given the King's financial limitations and the realities of European politics, his diplomatic tactics were acceptable, pragmatic, and based upon the dynastic aim of restoring his sister's house to prominence in the Empire. He consistently pursued his primary objective, the restoration of the Palatinate, and was willing to do what he could to recover it without committing England to a full-scale military intervention on the Continent. It is true that Charles was limited by his antipathy to calling Parliament, which would have been the surest way for him to finance such an intervention over an extended period of time.⁷⁰ However, it is not clear that this is what would have been required to achieve his aims, and it certainly did not mean that he was unable to engage himself in a more limited way – by offering the services of the fleet, which he was already financing without Parliamentary subsidies – in return for concessions in the Palatinate. What this did mean, however, was that Charles was willing to accept a partial restoration to reach what he considered to be an acceptable compromise settlement, in spite of his sister's objections. He went about this along the most pragmatic route possible, that is via negotiations with the Habsburgs, since they were in the best position to restore the Palatine lands and dignities. His negotiations with the Emperor were an integral part of this strategy, as Ferdinand was

⁶⁹Ibid., 93-6.

⁷⁰Even if the King called Parliament, it is uncertain it would be willing to vote subsidies on the scale that a land war to regain the Palatinate would require.

in the position to remove the ban and reinstate Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire. In theory it was also within his power to restore the Palatine lands and dignities; in practice he needed to win the support of his allies, Bavaria and Spain, among whom these prizes had been distributed. Although this put the Emperor in a difficult position, he was the best placed to modify their demands for the advantage of all involved.

Even though the Habsburg option seemed the most promising to the King and some of his closest advisors (in particular Windebank, who conducted much of the King's secret business with the Habsburgs), they saw the wisdom of keeping their diplomatic options open and continued to negotiate with the anti-Habsburg powers, France in particular. If these powers did not make a more enticing offer, English negotiations with them would at least apply pressure to the Habsburgs to reach a satisfactory agreement. Although this conduct has offended the sensibilities of later-day historians, it was not unethical for the time; other nations used similar tactics.

Just as the King's policy had potential for success, so did the spate of missions he sent to the Continent in the later 1630s. All the players with a stake in the Palatinate were willing to make some concessions in the interests of finally settling this nettlesome issue. Most importantly, the Emperor and his allies were willing to yield more than most English historians have previously supposed. Their positions were strongly influenced by the fortunes of war, so England had more leverage in the negotiations at some times than others. The Emperor was keen to come to an agreement with England on the question of the Palatinate. By 1635, war had desolated the Empire, and France's entry into the conflict left no end in sight. The Emperor earnestly desired peace and knew that settlement of the Palatinate question was required to achieve this end. He was therefore motivated to find a compromise agreement that would satisfy both England and his allies. Maximilian of

Bavaria, who was in possession of the Upper Palatinate, right bank of the Lower Palatinate, and the electorate, had historically been a staunch opponent of restoration of any sort. His Palatine gains had been confirmed by the Peace of Prague in 1635, but soon afterwards – once it became apparent that this agreement had failed to bring peace to the Empire or secure his Palatine acquisitions – he gradually began to reconsider his recalcitrant stance. Maximilian decided that making some measured concessions in the Palatinate would be the most effective way to retain his hold on the parts he really valued (the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity), and the settlement of the Palatinate question thus became central to his goals for peace.

Spain, which occupied the left bank of the Lower Palatinate, also had good reason to reach an agreement with England, particularly after the outbreak of war with France in 1635. The French occupation of Alsace and Lorraine in the mid-1630s closed Spain's overland military supply routes to Flanders, leaving it reliant on the sea route and the assistance, or at least the benevolent neutrality, of England to maintain its war effort against the Dutch. In 1638, the importance of the sea route redoubled when the Habsburgs lost the bridgehead fortress of Breisach. Under these circumstances, though Olivares preferred the active support of England (the *convenientias* of the secret Cottington Treaty), he regarded the protection England's fleet provided in the Channel as invaluable to Spain's campaigns in the Netherlands. If Charles played his cards right to maximize his leverage (for instance by withdrawing these privileges and transferring them to France), he very well could have been successful in obtaining a partial restoration of the Prince Palatine's patrimony on the strength of the fleet, which until that time he had been able to maintain without Parliament. Finally, despite what Charles at times projected for the benefit of critics of his policy, he was himself willing to accept less than the plenary restoration of his nephew.

The King's objectives abroad and his political and diplomatic situation, while difficult, did not preclude an agreement with the Habsburgs on the Palatinate question. It is possible that an English monarch with the same foreign policy goals and in the same situation but with more foresight and fortitude could have brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion. The real problem was Charles himself and the way he made and conducted his foreign policy. Unfortunately but characteristically, he failed to make the most of the opportunities available to him and instead took steps that undermined its effectiveness. The Habsburg states saw the advantages of English friendship, but the King did not give them the necessary incentive to make concessions in the Palatinate in exchange. A case in point is Spain and the fleet. While English assistance in the Channel was of the utmost importance to the Spaniards, Charles was unsuccessful at transforming this need into concessions in the Palatinate for two reasons. The first was that he was too willing to help Spain transport men and supplies to Flanders. He only tried to extract concessions in return after the fact, without making any real threat to withdraw the aid of the fleet.⁷¹ The financial reward for providing this assistance was obviously too tempting for Charles to resist. The second reason was that the Spaniards were able to maintain an amazing "poker face" regarding the value of the fleet to their war enterprise. While they acknowledged its assistance, they refused to make any concessions in the Palatinate in return. If the King were to change their minds, he needed to convince the Spaniards that England's help would be of greater value to winning their war with the Dutch and French than the retention of the Lower Palatinate. But Charles did not take the steps

⁷¹The King squandered a similar advantage when negotiating the Treaty of Madrid (1630). He was in a good position to incorporate Spanish concessions in the Palatinate into the peace treaty, but he allowed himself to be swayed by Spanish professions of goodwill and promises that the problem would be dealt with at the next Imperial electoral meeting.

required to increase his leverage, namely withholding the assistance of the fleet and offering its services elsewhere, and instead allowed the Spaniards to draw out their negotiations with him. He thus offered them no further inducement to make the concessions he sought and frittered away advantages he could have used to strengthen his bargaining position.

England's failure to reach an agreement with any of the states with which it was treating can also be attributed to the secrecy the King maintained about his foreign policy with his own government. Through Windebank and a stable of diplomats – Taylor, Aston, and Hopton among them – Charles conducted negotiations with the Habsburgs that were hidden from the view of most courtiers, diplomats, and members of the foreign committee of the privy council, which was charged with advising the King in matters of foreign policy. From the King's perspective, this stratagem alleviated some of the criticism of his policies emanating from the war lobby, which included supporters of the Protestant cause and alliance with France, and allowed them time to bear fruit. Its pernicious effects can be seen in Arundel's embassy. Arundel's ignorance of the secret Habsburg negotiations, in spite of his status as a leading member of the peace party, negatively affected his ability to bring his negotiations to a successful conclusion.

If leaving most of his councillors and diplomats in the dark about his secret negotiations with the Habsburgs were not bad enough, Charles also kept information from the very envoys conducting them. His double dealing hampered their effectiveness because they were unaware or ill-informed about negotiations on the Palatinate being conducted at other European courts. John Taylor, for instance, knew little about the negotiations that Sir Balthazar Gerbier was carrying on in Brussels on the Palatinate, even though they had direct bearing on his negotiations in Vienna. In addition, the English diplomats at Habsburg courts were unable to get a clear idea of what terms were

acceptable to the King or what he would offer the Habsburgs in return, which presented a further impediment to their negotiations. The King's covert conduct of his foreign policy, therefore, undermined rather than strengthened his chances for diplomatic success.

In the end, Caroline foreign policy did prove to be "futile diplomacy," as Gardiner declared, but this was not its necessary outcome. The King had more foreign policy options in the later 1630s than historians have commonly assumed, and he could have achieved his main objective – the restoration of the Palatinate – through negotiations with the Habsburgs, and thus without active intervention in the war. If he had exploited his advantages, particularly given the military setbacks faced by the Habsburgs in the later 1630s, they could have reached a compromise settlement similar to that eventually accepted at Westphalia. This foreign policy, however, would have required more artful and resolute direction than Charles Stuart could provide. Still, the fact that many Protestants strongly disapproved of his negotiations with these Catholic powers and some of them eventually took up arms against the King should not be allowed to obscure the fact that his foreign policy had prospects for success.

The story of Anglo-Imperial relations in the 1630s will be told in the pages that follow. Part one of this dissertation sets the European political, military, and diplomatic backdrop for the Anglo-Imperial negotiations that took place from 1635 to 1639. Chapter one gives an overview of the course, outcome, and significance of the Thirty Years' War in order to contextualize the negotiations and the political and diplomatic developments leading up to them. Chapters two through four describe the major events of the war as well as the personalities and foreign policy of the major powers involved in the negotiations – the Emperor, Spain, and Bavaria on the one hand, and England on the other – from the outbreak of war until 1635, when the negotiations under discussion

commenced. Particular attention is accorded to the development of the Palatinate question in these years.

Part two provides a survey of the background, religious leanings, education, and political and diplomatic careers of the three diplomats most intimately involved in these negotiations. This will provide insights into why they were chosen for their missions and the ways they perceived and dealt with their diplomatic responsibilities. In many ways, the three men could not be more different. Chapter five discusses John Taylor, an optimistic Catholic gentleman from Yorkshire who made a career in the English diplomatic service serving at Habsburg courts. Chapter six delves into the life of Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl of Arundel, a proud, honorable nobleman, who through a strategic marriage and devoted service to his monarch almost singlehandedly restored his family to its previous eminence and ancient titles. As will be shown here, he privately leaned toward Catholicism, but he conformed out of intense loyalty to the Stuart dynasty; above all, the latter drove his actions. Chapter seven discusses the background and career of Clement Radolt, a lawyer by training who faithfully served the Emperor for over fifty years in various government positions, envoy to Charles I being one of many. Radolt rose through the ranks of the Imperial bureaucracy and social order, leaving his family a rich legacy to build upon.

Finally, part three gives a detailed description of the course of Anglo-Imperial negotiations conducted in these years and the various personalities and events affecting them, based mainly upon primary source material found in English and Austrian archives. This treatment gives a fuller view of the aims, motivations, and actions of the major players than previous studies. Chapter eight explores John Taylor's opening negotiations at the Imperial court following the Peace of Prague, which took place from November 1635 until the arrival of the Earl of Arundel as ambassador

extraordinary in June 1636. In fact Taylor's positive reports of his negotiations prompted the sending of an ambassador and led to Arundel's appointment in March 1636. Chapters nine and ten examine the Earl of Arundel's negotiations with the Emperor from June to November 1636, first at the Imperial court at Linz and then at the electoral meeting at Regensburg, with particular attention given to the interests of the powers involved and the obstacles to an agreement that arose. Moreover, they describe the adventures of Arundel and his retinue during their journey across the war-torn Empire. These chapters also detail Radolt's concurrent mission to England from May 1636 to March 1637, his activities at the English court, and the impact of his reports on Arundel's negotiations in Germany. Chapter eleven looks at the final stage of the Anglo-Imperial negotiations treated here. It recounts the resumption of Taylor's negotiation with the Emperor from Arundel's departure in November 1636 until Taylor's return to England in May 1639. In addition, it covers the inquiry into Taylor's conduct of the negotiations and his ultimate commitment to the Tower in September 1639, as a scapegoat for the secret Habsburg foreign policy conducted by the King and Windebank. The epilogue briefly recounts the story of Anglo-Imperial negotiations on the Palatinate question up until their effective conclusion with the outbreak of civil war in England. Finally, the concluding chapter evaluates the King's foreign policy toward the Emperor from 1635 to 1639, the expectations, interests, and willingness to compromise of the powers involved as evidenced in the negotiations, and reasons for their ultimate failure.

As a final note, every attempt has been made to present the events as they unfolded, and not only those consistent with the arguments made here. In doing so, this study attempts to convey the vacillation and inconsistency that was very much the reality of early seventeenth-century diplomatic

relations. It is hoped that this will help to reveal, rather than obscure, the political and diplomatic ethos of the time.

PART I: BACKGROUND

1

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

The diplomatic missions that are the focus of this dissertation took place in the middle years of the Thirty Years' War, a time of great transition in European political and religious life. In order to set these missions and the wider Anglo-Imperial negotiations of the period in context, this chapter surveys the background, course, and outcomes of the conflict. First, it describes the political and religious developments of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, more particularly the confessionalization of European states and subsequent polarization of international politics. Then, while charting the political, military, and diplomatic course of the war, it illustrates the importance of the Palatinate, explains the dissipation of the religious aspects of the conflict and the rise of a more secular view in European politics. Finally, it evaluates the importance of the Peace of Westphalia to the European state system and its political and religious legacy.

Cinder and Tinder

On May 23, 1618, Count Henry of Thurn with a band of followers burst into the room in the castle of Prague where the royal commissioners were seated, and, after an altercation, threw them bodily out of the window from a height of seventy feet above the moat, into which they dropped. "Jesus! Mary!" was the cry of Martinitz, as he fell. "Let us see if his Mary will help Him," said one of the crowd. "By God, his Mary has helped him!" was the exclamation as he, his associate Slawata, and their secretary crept out of the moat unhurt.

David Jayne Hill, *A History of European Diplomacy*

The infamous Defenestration of Prague marks the beginning of the series of military conflicts spanning the years 1618 to 1648 that came to be known as the Thirty Years' War.¹ Defenestration, while shocking to our sensibilities, was a traditional – if grotesque – gesture of Bohemian independence against established authority.² The Defenestration of 1618, then, is unsurprising when one considers its circumstances. Bohemian Protestants, who had only recently been granted religious liberties by their Habsburg ruler Rudolf II in the Letter of Majesty (1609), saw these liberties gradually eroded under his successor Matthias. This process was accelerated in 1617 when Ferdinand of Styria, a ruthless counter-reformer, was crowned King of Bohemia. In response to the anti-Protestant policies of Ferdinand's council of regents, a predominantly Protestant assembly of the Bohemian estates convened in Prague in May 1618 to mount a protest. The regents promptly ordered the delegates to disperse. This so incensed the assembly leaders that they forced their way into the council chamber in the Hradcany Palace to confront the regents about their offensive policies. In the brawl that ensued the former proceeded to heave two of the most outspoken Catholic

¹Geoffrey Parker's *Thirty Years' War* is in my estimation the best account available of the conflict. The bibliographical essay on pp. 248-72 is both detailed and insightful (Geoffrey Parker, ed., *The Thirty Years' War*, with contributions by Simon Adams, Gerhard Benecke, Richard J. Bonney, John H. Elliot, R. J. W. Evans, Christopher R. Friedrichs, Bodo Nischan, E. Ladewig Petersen, and Michael Roberts, 2d ed. [London: Routledge, 1997] [TYW]). For a brief historiographical survey of the war, see Theodore K. Rabb, ed., *The Thirty Years' War*, 2d ed. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1981). For an outline of its causes, see Myron P. Gutmann, "The Origins of the Thirty Years' War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 749-70. For a discussion of the concept of the Thirty Years' War, see Konrad Repgen, "Zum Begriff 'Dreißigjähriger Krieg,'" in *Von der Reformation zur Gegenwart: Beiträge zu Grundfragen der neuzeitlichen Geschichte*, ed. Klaus Gotto and Hans Günter Hockerts (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1988), 25-9.

²There was a similar defenestration of city councillors from the windows of the New Town Hall during the Hussite revolt in 1419.

regents and their secretary out the window amid the applause of the angry crowd.³ The delegates then appointed a provisional government and raised a small army in short order. Bohemia was in revolt.

The Defenestration was a deliberate challenge to the Habsburgs and to Ferdinand in particular. As he turned his attention to preparing military action against the rebels, the Bohemian estates deposed him in August 1619 and elected Frederick V of the Palatinate, a Calvinist and son-in-law of the King of England, in his stead.⁴ These actions made any future compromise between the two sides very difficult. In the end, this was an unfortunate circumstance for Frederick and the Bohemians, because Ferdinand – as King of Bohemia and (after 1619) Austrian Habsburg ruler and Emperor – could call upon vast reserves of support from his own hereditary lands, Spain, and the Empire to defend his interests. As confessional alliances fell into place on each side, the stage was set for war. Thus the Defenestration, seemingly a local protest of Bohemians against the policies of their Habsburg ruler, had a wider significance for the Empire and all of Europe. It sparked a much

³Providentialist Catholics believed that divine intervention saved the lives of the two Imperial regents Slavata and Martinitz and their secretary Fabricius and therefore saw their survival as a sign of God's support for the Catholic cause. The reason for their survival, however, more likely lies in the fact that their fall was broken by the refuse that filled the castle moat. The Emperor later bestowed upon Fabricius the tongue-in-cheek title *Freiherr von Hohenfall*, i.e., "Baron of the High Fall" (H. G. Koenigsberger, *The Habsburgs and Europe, 1516-1660* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971], 222). For Martinitz's description of the Defenestration, see Mirslav Toegel, ed., *Der Beginn des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Der Kampf um Böhmen: Quellen zur Geschichte des böhmischen Krieges (1618-1621)*, *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale Illustrantia*, vol. 2 (Prague: Academia, 1972; Vienna: Böhlau, 1972), 42-9; for Slavata's version, see Vilém Slavata, *Paměti nejvyššího kancléře království českého Viléma hrabete Slavaty: od l. 1608 do 1619*, ed. J. Jireček, *Monumenta historiae Bohemica*, 1 (Prague: Kober, 1866), vol. 2.

⁴Although the Bohemians would have preferred a Lutheran, John George of Saxony (the obvious choice) was not interested. He believed his interests would be better served by supporting the Emperor (Roger Lockyer, *Habsburg and Bourbon Europe, 1470-1720* [London: Longman, 1974], 343).

larger and more complex struggle, which, fueled by religious differences and dynastic rivalry, was destined to engulf the Holy Roman Empire and spread disease, famine, and desolation in its wake.

The Thirty Years' War was just one episode in a century continuously riddled by warfare. In fact, the first half of the seventeenth century did not see one full calendar year of peace in Europe.⁵ Geoffrey Parker convincingly argues that the polarization of international politics was responsible for this widespread belligerence. He points out that before 1580, most wars were waged just between two powers. After that date, however, wars between rival blocs of allies became increasingly common because for several reasons European states were more willing than ever to make firm commitments to allies, particularly those of the same confession.⁶ Firstly, a number of dogmatic, militant churches emerged in Europe in the later sixteenth century. These churches actively encouraged adherent states to form confessional alliances to defend and propagate their creed and to aid their co-religionists at home and abroad. At the same time closer diplomatic coordination among friendly states was made possible by improvements in diplomatic organization and in communications. This conjunction of circumstances insured that more European states, divided into politically and confessionally hostile camps, would be drawn into war than ever before.

⁵See Geoffrey Parker, *Europe In Crisis, 1598-1648*, rev. ed., Fontana History of Europe, ed. John Plumb (London: Fontana, 1984), 72 fig. 4.

⁶This coincides with the beginning of Heinz Schilling's third stage of confessionalization, 1580s-1620s, the apogee of confessionalization (Heinz Schilling, "Confessionalization in the Empire: Religious and Societal Change in Germany between 1555 and 1620," in *Religion, Political Culture and the Emergence of Early Modern Society: Essays in German and Dutch History* [Leiden: Brill, 1992], 226).

Thus the polarization of international politics goes far in explaining why the hostilities were so widespread and why making peace was so difficult in the period of the Thirty Years' War.⁷

Cause and Conflict

The Thirty Years' War was the climax of a lengthy period of religious warfare. By the time of its outbreak in 1618, the combustible combination of religion and politics, brought to new heights by the Reformation, already had been responsible for almost one hundred years of violence in Europe. In the Empire, there were the Knights' and Peasants' Revolts (1522 and 1524-6) and the Schmalkaldic Wars (1546-55); in France, the religious wars (1560-98); in the Netherlands, the Dutch Revolt against Spanish rule (1568-1648); and in England, the Pilgrimage of Grace (1536-7), Wyatt's Rebellion (1554), and the Revolt of the Northern Earls (1569).

In the Empire specifically, conditions became increasingly unstable during the last quarter of the sixteenth century. The Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) had temporarily put an end to confessional warfare in Germany by instituting the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio*. This arrangement allowed each secular territorial ruler to dictate the religion of his subjects – either Catholicism, as defined by the Decrees of Trent, or Lutheranism, as specified by the Confession of Augsburg. Although the Peace left the door open for the eventual re-unification of Christianity, religious divisions instead hardened as the competing creeds defined their positions ever more explicitly.

⁷Geoffrey Parker, "The Dutch Revolt and the Polarization of International Politics," chap. in *Spain and the Netherlands, 1559-1659: Ten Studies* (Short Hills, N. J.: Enslow, 1979), 65-6. For further explanations for the longevity of the war, see *idem*, *TYW*, 197-200.

In order to distinguish itself from rival churches, each confession carefully defined its doctrine as well as its religious practices.⁸ Once adopted, the new policies had to be propagated and enforced when necessary. For this churches had to rely to some extent on the assistance of secular authorities, "a help which was granted willingly, but not free of charge." Churches sacrificed their autonomy, in many cases their lands and income as well, to princes who saw the advantages of such an arrangement:

Early modern state-builders . . . knew very well that joining the process of "Confessionalization" would provide them with three decisive competitive advantages: enforcement of political identity, extension of a monopoly of power, and disciplining of their subjects. Therefore, it was obvious that a policy of religious toleration would not pay at that stage of state-building. Indeed, tolerant states were powerless states during the first centuries of modern history!⁹

As Wolfgang Reinhard points out, a distinct religious identity was particularly important to the political identity of the states and territories of the Empire, since they lacked a "national" culture to

⁸Clear delineation of creed was a key element in the process of "confessionalization." This concept is based upon the idea that "religion and politics, state and church were structurally linked together, so that under specific conditions of the early modern period the effects that religion and the church had upon society were not separate parts of a larger phenomenon, but rather affected the entire social system and formed the central axis of state and society." (Schilling, "Confessionalization in the Empire," 208). It is interesting that the process of confessionalization was closely paralleled in the various religious communities, despite their theological differences. For more on confessionalization, which has been treated at length in recent German historical literature, see: Wolfgang Reinhard, "Reformation, Counter-Reformation and the Early Modern State: A Reassessment," *Catholic History Review* 75 (1989): 383-404; Heinz Schilling, "Confessional Europe," trans. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., in *Handbook of European History, 1400-1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation*, ed. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Heiko A. Oberman, and James D. Tracy, vol. 2, *Visions, Programs and Outcomes*, 641-81 (Leiden: Brill, 1995); idem, "Die Konfessionalisierung von Kirche, Staat und Gesellschaft—Profil, Leistung, Defizite und Perspektiven eines geschichtswissenschaftlichen Paradigmas," in *Katholische Konfessionalisierung*, 1-49; Heinrich Schmidt, *Konfessionalisierung im 16. Jahrhundert*, *Enzyklopädie Deutscher Geschichte*, vol. 12 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992); and the work that started it all, Ernst Walter Zeeden, *Die Entstehung der Konfessionen: Grundlagen und Formen der Konfessionsbildung* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1965).

⁹Reinhard, "Reformation," 397-8.

legitimate their political sovereignty. At times there were not even separate dynasties clearly to distinguish one state from another, only rival lines of the same ruling house. In this situation, the individual branches usually embraced different creeds – for instance the Bavarian line of the Wittelsbachs was Catholic, while the Palatine line was Calvinist.¹⁰ The marriage between religion and politics during this period thus allowed territorial rulers to promote unity in their lands and their own autonomy in the Empire. However, it had a more destructive consequence as well – the acceptance of permanent confessional conflict as a way of life.

This situation contributed to the rise of two militant religious groups in the Empire that eventually destroyed the delicate balance created by the Peace of Augsburg. The first of these was the Calvinists, who became increasingly embittered after they were excluded from recognition under the Religious Peace in 1580.¹¹ Heidelberg became the major center of Calvinism in the Empire, and the Palatinate under Christian of Anhalt aggressively pursued a confessional foreign policy. This policy, which was most visible in repeated attempts to form an international Calvinist coalition uniting opponents of the Habsburgs and Counter-Reformation Catholicism, was driven by the fear of a Catholic conspiracy that would extirpate Protestantism in the Empire. Its goal was to destroy

¹⁰Ibid., 399.

¹¹In 1577, the Lutherans agreed upon the Formula of Concord, a more conservative interpretation of their confession of faith, the confession of Augsburg. In 1580, the Formula was incorporated into a new book of Lutheran doctrinal standards, the Book of Concord. The Calvinists could not accept either the Formula or the Book of Concord, and as a result they could no longer subscribe to the Lutheran confession. This is an important point, because the Religious Peace only recognized two confessions: Lutheran (Confession of Augsburg) and Catholic (Decrees of Trent). Thus, as far as the constitution of the Empire was concerned, the Calvinists were non-entities.

the Catholic threat once and for all.¹² The Calvinists' fears were not unfounded, for at about the same time, an opposing militant group of Catholics was forming in the Empire. They were spurred on by Jesuits and other radical Catholic reformers who championed an active offensive against the Protestants as a complement to the renewal of the Church set out at Trent. Ferdinand of Styria and Maximilian of Bavaria were ardent supporters of this crusade to reclaim German lands and souls for the Roman Church. Both rulers took steps to eradicate Protestantism from lands under their rule, as the Bohemian estates quickly discovered in Ferdinand's case.¹³ Both of these militant groups soon constructed confessional alliances – the Protestant Union, which included both Lutherans and Calvinists, was formed under Anhalt's leadership in 1608, while in answer the Catholic League was created under Maximilian's the following year.¹⁴ Each side was encouraged and supported by foreign co-religionists: the English, Dutch, and Bohemians in the case of the Union, and the Spanish

¹²Claus-Peter Clasen, *The Palatinate in European History, 1559-1660* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963), 21-2.

¹³The Jesuits William Lamormaini and Adam Contzen, confessors to Ferdinand of Styria (later Ferdinand II) and Maximilian I respectively, influenced these sovereigns and their policies. Although the extent of Jesuit influence was not as great as has been previously thought (see chap. 2, p. 68), there was a contemporary perception that it was, particularly at the Imperial court. It was said that Ferdinand followed Lamormaini's advice as a sheep does the shepherd ("wie das Schaf dem Hirten") (Ludwig Steinberger, *Die Jesuiten und die Friedensfrage in der Zeit vom Prager Frieden bis zum Nürnberger Friedensexekutionshaupttreß, 1635-1650*, Studien und Darstellungen aus dem Gebiete der Geschichte, ed. Hermann Grauert, vol. 5, nos. 2-3 [Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1906], 15). Rumors circulated that "both the lords and councillors were governed by Jesuits who were found with, beside, and near these men day and night...everything had to pass through their hands; whatever they organized and advised had to take place...." ("sowohl die Herren als die Räte von Jesuiten' regiert würden, 'die sich Tag und Nacht mit, neben und bei diesem Herrn befänden...es müßte alles durch ihre Hand laufen; was sie schafften und was sie riethen, das müßte geschehen...." [Friedrich von Hurter, *Geschichte Kaiser Ferdinands II.* (Schaffhausen: Hurtersche Buchhandlung, 1857-64), vol. 3, 245]).

¹⁴For the events leading up to the formation of the Union and League, including Anhalt's attempts to form an international Protestant alliance and the Protestant-Catholic confrontation in the Empire over the Cleves-Jülich succession and the Bavarian occupation of Donauwörth, see Parker, *TYW*, 22-8.

in the case of the League. The confessional blocks in the Empire were ready to face off. With Imperial political institutions paralyzed by confessional conflict, the only remaining question was which ember would set the volatile Empire ablaze.¹⁵ It just so happened that it was the revolt of the Bohemian Protestants against their Catholic Habsburg king, Ferdinand.

After the Bohemian insurgents had deposed Ferdinand, they needed a new ruler. Wishing to avoid reconquest and religious repression, on 26 August 1619 they decided to offer the crown to the Calvinist Elector Palatine, Frederick V. Frederick was one of the best-connected Protestant princes in Europe, and he was thus capable (so the Bohemians believed) of mobilizing considerable confessional support for their cause among his Protestant peers.¹⁶ Frederick hesitated, but was finally persuaded by the arguments of his militant councillors Anhalt and Ludwig Camerarius that he had nothing to lose by accepting, as a war to defend Protestant liberties against the Catholic axis bent on their destruction was inevitable. Therefore Frederick accepted the Bohemians' offer on 28 September, precipitating an important shift in the balance of power in the Empire – the Protestants

¹⁵Four areas were particularly susceptible to the outbreak of hostilities at this time and had the potential to ignite a war of European proportions: 1) the Netherlands, where the truce with Spain was due to expire in 1621; 2) the Empire, where the formation of the confessional alliances and the conflict between its Catholic Habsburg ruler and his Protestant estates threatened the peace; 3) the Baltic, where the antagonism between Catholic Poland and Protestant Sweden periodically erupted into hostilities; and 4) various areas of strategic importance (for instance Lorraine, Savoy, and northern Italy, all on the "Spanish Road"), in the event that dynastic war broke out between France and the Habsburg states. Contemporaries knew that the outbreak of a European war was only a matter of time given the many potential trouble spots and the network of international alliances that connected European states (Parker, *Europe*, 157).

¹⁶Parker points out that Frederick was in many ways a strange choice. A hostile contemporary wondered that the Bohemian rebels had elected as their new king "a man who had never seen either a battle or a corpse,...a prince who knew more about gardening than fighting" (M. Toegel, "Přičiny saského vpádu do Čech v roce 1611," *Československý časopis historický* 21 (1973): 560 n. 16; quoted in Parker, *TYW*, 47).

instead of the Catholics now held the majority in the Imperial electoral college.¹⁷ Ferdinand of Styria, newly elected as Emperor Ferdinand II,¹⁸ was now forced to take decisive action against Frederick and the Bohemian rebels, for with Bohemia's electoral vote in Protestant hands, Habsburg power in the Empire was under dire threat.¹⁹ Initially, the rebellion was quite successful; it spread to the Austrian crown lands, most notably Upper Austria, and the rebels twice laid siege to Vienna.

¹⁷The Golden Bull of 1356 invested the seven *Kurfürsten*, or Imperial electors, with the authority to elect the Holy Roman Emperor. They were also to hold certain important offices at the Imperial court, such as chancellor, almoner, cupbearer, and master of the horse. The Bull designated three ecclesiastical electors (the archbishops of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne) and four lay electors (the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Margrave of Brandenburg, the Duke of Saxony, and the King of Bohemia). In 1618, they were split religiously as follows—four Catholic (Bohemia and the three prince archbishoprics) and three Protestant (Lutheran Saxony and Brandenburg and the Calvinist Palatinate). Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian crown gave him control of two of the coveted electoral votes, tipping the balance in favor of the Protestants. For approximately 200 years, Habsburgs had been chosen as emperor because they were the most powerful of the princes of the Empire and defended its eastern frontier against the Turks. Habsburgs were also routinely elected as King of Bohemia for much the same reasons. With the deposition of Ferdinand and the election of Frederick as King of Bohemia, this tradition was flouted and Habsburg power in the Empire was thus threatened. As an interesting sidelight, Ferdinand was elected emperor shortly before Frederick accepted the Bohemian crown, and the latter had cast his Palatine electoral vote in Ferdinand's favor.

¹⁸Anhalt, in the hope of dividing the Catholic electors and thus forestalling the election of a Habsburg as emperor, attempted to persuade Maximilian of Bavaria to stand as a candidate. Anhalt was unsuccessful, much to his chagrin (he once said that he would rather see a Turk or the Devil elected than Ferdinand); despite Maximilian's wish to contain Habsburg power, he refused to act as a front for the Protestants (Parker, *TYW*, 33).

¹⁹The famous Imperial general Albrecht von Wallenstein, a champion of Imperial power, suggested a more radical solution to the impertinence of Frederick, whose actions endangered Imperial sovereignty: "The Friedländer openly declared [that] prince electors or other princes were not needed any longer and [that] they should no longer be treated with consideration [literally, their little "guest hat" should be removed, i.e., they should no longer be treated as guests]. They should be taught manners and shown that the Emperor was not dependent upon them, but rather they upon the Emperor." ("Offen erklärte der Friedländer, man bedürfe keiner Kur- und anderer Fürsten mehr und müsse ihnen das Gasthütel abziehen. Man müsse sie mores lehren und ihnen zeigen, daß der Kaiser nicht von ihnen, sondern sie von Kaiser abhingen." [Anton Gindely, *Wallenstein während seines ersten Generalats im Lichte der gleichzeitigen Quellen* (Prague: Tempsky, 1886), vol. 1, 176; quoted in Günther Franz, "Glaube und Recht im politischen Denken Kaiser Ferdinands II," in *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg: Perspektiven und Strukturen*, ed. Hans Ulrich Rudolf, Wege der Forschung, vol. 451 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977), 426]).

In the end, however, it was the Emperor who emerged victorious with the financial and military support of his Spanish, Bavarian, and Saxon allies. In November 1620, combined Imperialist troops crushed Frederick's forces outside of Prague at the Battle of White Mountain.

Frederick's failure to win the Palatinate's traditional allies over to his side contributed significantly to his undoing. He received negligible support from the very Protestant powers which the Bohemians were confident would support his claim to the throne, particularly his father-in-law James I of England and his uncle Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange, who refused to support the "*Hurra-Calvinisten*" (militant Calvinists) in their Bohemian adventure.²⁰ France remained neutral and offered only mediation. Frederick, largely isolated in Europe, could only stand by and watch as his German support also melted away. His only steadfast ally was Bethlen Gabor, the Transylvanian prince who was attempting to conquer Habsburg Hungary.

After his defeat at White Mountain, Frederick suffered for his insolence. League forces soon occupied the Upper Palatinate and the eastern portion of the Lower Palatinate, while Spanish armies took over its western portion. By 1622, Frederick and his family had fled into Dutch exile. Ferdinand made good on promises to reward Maximilian of Bavaria at Frederick's expense in return for League support. Frederick was outlawed by the Imperial ban in 1621, and his electorship was conferred upon Maximilian for life in February 1623.²¹

²⁰Heinz Schilling, *Aufbruch und Krise: Deutschland 1517-1648*, Siedler Deutsche Geschichte, vol. 5 (Berlin: Siedler, 1988), 414; Clasen, 25.

²¹The Imperial Diet had decreed perpetual peace, or *ewiger Landfrieden*, from 1495, officially condemning private warfare in the Empire. This provided the legal basis for the censure of rebel princes that would later take the form of the Imperial ban. (Jean Berenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1273-1700*, trans. C.A. Simpson [London: Longman, 1994], 128-9).

Ferdinand's moves against Frederick were a cause for great concern for German as well as foreign princes. Although most believed Frederick deserved to be ejected from Bohemia and stripped of his crown, complete dispossession of his hereditary lands and the transfer of his electoral title to Maximilian was another matter completely. No prince of the Empire could feel his possessions were completely secure after Ferdinand had deprived Frederick of his patrimony and then used it to repay a Habsburg ally.²² Also, with the Palatine electorate in Bavarian hands, the Catholics strengthened their majority in the electoral college, which Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian crown had so recently threatened. Understandably, Protestants feared more than ever for their religious freedom. The great powers, for their part, were concerned with the fate of the Palatinate, as it was one of the most important and strategically located principalities in the Empire. None of them wanted it to fall into enemy hands; therefore Protestant and anti-Habsburg states did not observe the developments of 1621-3 with pleasure. They constantly looked for ways to undermine Habsburg ascendancy in Europe and the Empire, and, as a part of this program, to restore Frederick to his lands and titles. The Palatinate therefore became the connecting link not only between the Bohemian conflict and its expansion to Germany, but also between the German conflict and dynastic power struggles in western Europe.

²²Given the infrequent changes to the electoral college, it is easy to understand the alarm caused by the Emperor's alteration of the Imperial constitution to accommodate Maximilian of Bavaria. No changes had been made in the electoral arrangement of the Empire for almost 300 years when the Palatine electorate was transferred to Maximilian in 1623 (it was secured for his line in 1628). In 1654, an eighth electorate was created for the Prince Palatine. Afterwards, the only changes that were made until the nineteenth century were: 1) the addition of Hannover as a ninth electorate in 1692; and 2) the amalgamation of the Palatine and Bavarian electorates in 1777 (thus bringing full circle the process which had begun in 1623), whereupon Hannover became the eighth.

Christian IV, King of Denmark and prince of the Empire, was one of the foreign princes who was disturbed by the course of events in the Empire. In 1625, spurred on by promises of English and Dutch aid made at the Hague Convention, he took the lead in defending German Protestantism.²³ Wisely or not, he sent his troops into the Empire to fight against Imperialist forces, which consisted mainly of the seasoned Catholic League army on the one hand and the Emperor's own army newly raised by Albrecht von Wallenstein on the other. Unfortunately for Christian, his allies did not come through with much of the assistance they had promised him.²⁴ After several inauspicious campaigns, the Danish army suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of Imperialist forces at Lutter in August 1626. In the following two years, Wallenstein's army pushed up through northern Germany and on into Jutland. Christian was finally forced to conclude the Peace of Lübeck in May 1629, by which he was allowed to retain Denmark and Holstein but was obliged to leave his German allies to the Emperor's revenge. Ferdinand, encouraged by his confessor and the militant Catholic party at the Imperial court, seized the opportunity to roll back Protestantism in the Empire. In March 1629, he promulgated the Edict of Restitution, which demanded the restoration of all Church lands seized by Protestants after 1552 in violation of the Peace of Augsburg. The Edict and Spanish plans to launch a fleet in the Baltic were enough to bring Sweden into the fray and make the conflict international.

²³Christian held lands in Holstein, which was a state of the Lower Saxon circle of the Empire. In addition to protecting Protestantism, he was anxious to extend his influence in the circle and to gain control of the secularized bishoprics of Bremen, Verden, and Osnabrück, which commanded the estuaries of the Weser and Elbe.

²⁴By the Hague Convention (1625), England and the United Provinces each agreed to pay 144,000 thalers a month to help support Christian's cause. England was particularly negligent in making payments—Christian only received a fraction of the promised amount (547,000 thalers) over the three years of fighting, most of it in 1626. The Dutch paid their subsidies more promptly, but also came up short of the expected sum (Parker, *TYW*, 69; Ronald G. Asch, *The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618–48* [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997], 88).

Once the longstanding Swedish-Polish conflict in the Baltic was resolved in 1629, the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus lost no time in undertaking his long-contemplated invasion of Germany. In June of the following year he invaded, purportedly to aid the German Protestants but also to prevent the Habsburgs from establishing firm control over northern Germany and the Baltic.²⁵ The initial dominance of Swedish forces over the Imperial armies was dazzling, but the tide of their success was ultimately stemmed at the Battle of Lützen, where the charismatic Swedish King fell leading the charge of one of his regiments. With Gustavus's death, the Swedish army lost the inspirational force behind their impressive sweep across Germany; thereafter, though the demoralized Swedes kept on fighting, they began to fall back before the advancing Catholic armies. The decisive blow came in 1634, when the combined Imperialist forces of Ferdinand, King of Hungary (the future Ferdinand III) and his cousin the Cardinal Infante Ferdinand of Spain annihilated Swedish forces at Nördlingen.

The Emperor took full advantage of his dominant position to open serious peace talks with the German Protestants. He was finally prepared to make some religious concessions to them in the

²⁵The confessional aims of Gustavus's policy should not be underestimated, as defense of Protestantism not only justified his action in Germany, but it was also the principle that legitimized his rule in Sweden. The Polish King, Sigismund Vasa, had been the King of Sweden before his uncle Charles (Gustavus's father) deposed him because he was a Catholic. From 1600 both Charles and Gustavus fought Sigismund (and after 1632 the latter's successor Wladislaw) on and off over the Swedish crown and the Baltic provinces of Estonia and Livonia (Asch, 102-4). Another important consideration for Gustavus in his decision to intervene in the Empire was the strong Imperial military presence in northern Germany, which he feared might be employed to aid the Poles against Sweden. For an alternative explanation of Gustavus's intervention in Germany, see Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years' War*, Cambridge Cultural Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For Gustavus's initial war aims, see: Michael Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus: A History of Sweden, 1611-1632* (London: Longman, 1953-8), vol. 2, 373-5 and 417-25; and Sigmund Goetze, *Die Politik des schwedischen Reichskanzlers Axel Oxenstierna gegenüber Kaiser und Reich*, Beiträge zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol. 3 (Kiel: Muhlau, 1971).

interests of ridding the Empire of foreign intervention. By the Peace of Prague of 1635 concluded with Lutheran Saxony, Ferdinand retreated from the strident demands of the Edict of Restitution in return for assistance in ousting the foreign invaders. Its terms were subsequently accepted by most of the Protestant states and cities of the Empire (including many of Sweden's erstwhile allies). The religious concessions made by Ferdinand assured many German Protestants that the formation of a united anti-Catholic front was no longer necessary to the preservation of their religious liberty. War-weary Germans of opposing ideologies were finally working together toward a common goal – peace. The spirit of secular compromise evidenced in the Peace of Prague marked a turning point in the Thirty Years' War.

Ultimately, the hope that this German settlement could end the conflict proved too idealistic, for the Thirty Years' War was no longer a German war, but a European war. Thus a viable peace would only be achieved at an international congress with the participation of the foreign powers involved, particularly France and Sweden, into whose hands the opposition to the Habsburgs had fallen almost entirely after 1635. France, already covertly aiding the Dutch and Swedes against the Habsburgs, announced its entry into the hostilities in May 1635 with a declaration of war on Spain. By the following year, the French were at war with the Emperor too. Thus the Thirty Years' War had degenerated into a conflict between France, Sweden, the United Provinces (in revolt against Spain), and their allies on the one hand, and the Habsburgs and their allies on the other.²⁶ By drawing in foreign states, an internal conflict had inadvertently turned the Empire into a theater of operations for outside powers to increase their influence and prestige.

²⁶Gutmann, 766.

Peace at Last

By the beginning of 1643, the pressure for peace was mounting. Spain, France, and Sweden were all experiencing difficulty in maintaining the war effort, and the war-weary Germans were calling for peace.²⁷ It had finally become apparent to all involved that a military solution to the confrontation in the Empire was unlikely, and that peace would only be achieved at the bargaining table. Thus an area was neutralized for an international peace conference in Westphalia, and delegates began to arrive shortly thereafter. Almost all of the European powers were represented, with the exception of Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and England. Protestants and Catholics were organized separately, with the *Corpus Evangelicorum* meeting at Osnabrück, and the *Corpus Catholicorum* at Münster. In addition to the foreign powers involved in the war, all of the Imperial estates had been invited to take part in the peace conference as well. This meant that Westphalia was not only an international conference, but also a meeting of the estates of the Empire capable of addressing German issues.²⁸

²⁷The financial situation of all parties involved was deteriorating. Internal dissension in Spain and France—revolts in Portugal (1640) and Catalonia (1640–52) and the portents of the "Fronde" (1648–53)—prompted both of these powers to seek an end to the German conflict. The destruction wrought by years of war in the Empire provided an obvious reason for the Germans' desire for peace.

²⁸Asch, 134–5. For Imperial policy during the peace negotiations, see Karsten Ruppert, *Die kaiserliche Politik auf dem westfälischen Friedenskongreß, 1643–1648*, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte (SVENG), vol. 10 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1979); for Bavarian policy, see Gerhard Immler, *Kurfürst Maximilian I. und der Westfälische Friedenskongreß: Die bayerische auswärtige Politik von 1644 bis zum Ulmer Waffenstillstand*, SVENG, vol. 20 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1992).

Difficulties, however, plagued the negotiations from beginning to end. After the two sides were finally assembled, negotiations were delayed by incessant disputes over rank and precedence that broke out among the delegates.²⁹ At Münster, for example, arguments erupted over

Who should make the first visit; how far a host should accompany his guest, whether to the door or to his carriage; how the ambassadors should be seated; what titles should be employed in addressing the different plenipotentiaries, — these were the momentous questions upon which the diplomatists spent months of anxious thought.³⁰

As a result, the first serious business was not transacted until the middle of 1645; but once they started, "They negotiated as hard as they fought."³¹ Even after the peace negotiations were well underway, military operations continued, with the diplomats continually assessing the military situation in an attempt to exploit a victory or play for time after a defeat. Fighting did not really cease until the final signatures were affixed to the treaty on 24 October 1648.

The Peace of Westphalia was a settlement of enormous significance for all of western Europe.³² Its territorial provisions were of great interest to non-German powers as well as German states. France and Sweden in particular secured significant territorial cessions. France gained

²⁹These hindrances were so tenacious that François Ogier, the attendant of the French plenipotentiary Abel Servien, wrote in frustration: "If they create in the substance of the business delays proportioned to those hitherto, I do not know that the unborn child Madame Servien is expecting can hope to see the end of a treaty to which our adversaries create such extraordinary obstacles." (François Ogier, *Journal du Congrès de Munster*, ed. Auguste Boppe [Paris: Plon, Nourrit, 1893], 88; quoted in David Jayne Hill, *A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe*, vol. 2, *The Establishment of Territorial Sovereignty* [New York: Fertig, 1967], 594).

³⁰Hill, 595.

³¹Parker, *TYW*, 160.

³²For an abridged version of the peace terms, see Geoffrey Symcox, ed., *War, Diplomacy and Imperialism, 1618-1763* (London: Walker, 1974), 39-62.

control of three Lorraine bishoprics – Metz, Toul, and Verdun – and most of Alsace. Sweden obtained, most importantly, possession of western Pomerania and the secularized bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, as well as an indemnity of five million thalers.³³ The Swiss Confederation and the United Provinces won official recognition as sovereign states, though they were already *de facto* independent of the Empire in 1618. The boundaries of the Empire shrank with the formal admission that neither they nor the bishoprics ceded to France were any longer Imperial constituents.

The peace settlement was also of fundamental importance, both politically and religiously, to the internal affairs of the Empire. With the decentralization of Imperial authority, the Habsburgs lost their political pre-eminence in the Empire, which split into a hodgepodge of independent principalities. Individual German territorial rulers became essentially sovereign in both ecclesiastical and political matters; thus, the Westphalian peace settlement can be seen as the legitimization of territorial absolutism.³⁴ Territorial cessions made to three of the German electors increased their importance while further eroding that of the Emperor: Bavaria retained the Upper Palatinate; Saxony kept Lusatia, which it had held as security for backing the Emperor during the Bohemian phase of the war; and Brandenburg gained the eastern portion of Pomerania and the secularized bishoprics of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and Minden. The electoral balance in the Empire shifted as an eighth (and junior) electorate was created for the Prince Palatine, Charles Louis, who

³³Stephen J. Lee, *The Thirty Years War* (London: Routledge, 1991), 65-8.

³⁴It should, however, be noted that while the sovereignty of the princes and estates of the Empire was affirmed by the Peace, and the Emperor was now to seek their consent in major political decisions, many of his prerogatives were not clearly defined and thus remained open to broader interpretation. Further, many of the smaller estates, too weak to take advantage of their new privileges, sought the protection of the Emperor now that some new limitations were imposed on his authority. Therefore, the peace settlement did not preclude a resurgence of Imperial power (Asch, 144-5).

was restored to his inheritance in the Lower Palatinate. The original Palatine electoral dignity was confirmed to Bavaria.³⁵

Perhaps the most portentous problem addressed from the perspective of the Empire was that of a permanent religious settlement. The agreement reconfirmed the Religious Peace of Augsburg and its partition arrangement, with 1624 as the normative date for the resolution of confessional disputes: "The Edict of Restitution was consigned to the dust heap of history for good."³⁶ Confessional disputes were no longer to be decided by Imperial courts but were to be negotiated in at Imperial Diet between groups of the Catholic and Protestant estates, the *Corpora Catholicorum* and *Evangelicorum*. And Calvinism was finally recognized as a third religious option.³⁷ Although the Austrian Habsburgs lost their political dominance in the Empire, they retained untrammelled sovereign authority in their hereditary lands and in Bohemia, giving them a free hand to complete the suppression of Protestantism there.

While the religious and political settlement agreed upon at Westphalia was successful at ending the fighting in the Empire, it failed to bring about a general European peace. War continued between France and Spain until the latter was defeated and they finally signed the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. The concern then became containing Bourbon rather than Habsburg power, as the many European wars against Louis XIV's France were to show. Despite its shortcomings,

³⁵The Palatinate, once one of the most prosperous territories in Germany, was desolated; it never regained its previous preeminence (Lee, 62; Clasen, 30).

³⁶Asch, 145.

³⁷Ibid.

however, the Peace of Westphalia was ultimately accepted by most European powers as an inherent, cardinal component of the post-1648 European state system.

The Westphalian peace conference and the settlement reached there constituted a watershed in international relations. It was the first great European peace congress in that it attempted to address all western European issues at once – a radical departure from previous peace negotiations, which only sought to deal with issues affecting two or three parties.³⁸ Also, the settlement recognized that the European international system was comprised of independent sovereign states acting in their own interests, as opposed to the medieval ideal of a united Christendom represented by pope and emperor.³⁹ Although the reality of universal Christendom had been indubitably destroyed by the onslaught of the Reformation, the ideal was only put to rest when the Westphalian settlement publicly revealed that political concerns had eclipsed religious ones.

The "Age of Ideology" Ends

Reason of state is a wonderful beast, for it chases away all other reasons.

von Thumshirn, a perceptive witness at Westphalia

Even before 1648, European politics were headed in a more secular direction. This shift was most apparent in the move away from confessional alliances in favor of those based on dynastic interest. Religion, of course, continued to be politically important, but it no longer governed international relations as it had a half-century before. In the end, Europeans had decided that the cost of religious

³⁸Georges Pagès, *The Thirty Years War, 1618-1648* (London: Black, 1970), 11-2.

³⁹Hill, 599.

warfare was too dear. Although it is difficult to date the waning of confessional politics precisely, Geoffrey Parker suggests that

As the task of defending the Protestant cause fell into the hands of the Lutherans, less militant and less intransigent than the Calvinists, and as the extent of non-German participation increased, so 'reasons of state' came to the fore. Naturally the balance did not swing entirely away from religion . . . [yet] the place of religious issues relentlessly receded.⁴⁰

The 1630s reveal the most obvious signs of the decline of the influence of religion on international politics, for instance the concessions made by the Emperor to the German Protestants in the Peace of Prague and, more conspicuously, Catholic France's bankrolling and support of Protestant Sweden against their Habsburg co-religionists for the sake of promoting French dynastic interests.

The process was certainly well underway at the time of the Westphalian negotiations, because modified attitudes toward confessional politics are what made compromise and settlement viable. This increasingly secular attitude was reflected in the posture of the Catholic delegates in Münster toward papal pronouncements on peace negotiations with the Protestants. Initially, there was papal mediation at the peace conference, but when the pontiff refused to sanction concessions to Protestants, Catholic powers dispensed with his services. They ignored the nuncio's remonstrations that the peace settlement legitimized heresy in the Empire, as well as a papal protest declaring it "perpetually null, vain, invalid, wicked and . . . without force and effect."⁴¹ The Catholic states' dismissal of papal objections to the peace exposed the ever-widening gap between the political

⁴⁰Parker, *TYW*, 196.

⁴¹Hill, 604. For an analysis of the papal politics at Westphalia and the protest, see Konrad Repgen, *Die römische Kurie und der Westfälische Friede: Idee und Wirklichkeit des Papsttums im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962) and idem, "Der päpstliche Protest gegen den Westfälischen Frieden und die Friedenspolitik Urbans VIII.," in *Von der Reformation zur Gegenwart*, 30-52.

and religious claims of the papacy on the one hand, and the realities of the European political situation on the other. As the papacy became increasingly irrelevant as a political force in international relations, so the promotion of the secular interests of individual states took precedence and became the *modus operandi* for the peace negotiations. This resulted in the foundation of the new system of international relations of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that allowed for the peaceful coexistence of confessions.⁴² A new basis of European cooperation and discussion had been established.⁴³

This is not to imply that religious considerations no longer played a role in international relations after 1648. That would be far too simplistic. The prominent role of confession in the early modern state-building process and resulting intricate relationship between religion and politics ensured that the two would never be completely exclusive of one another in this period.⁴⁴ Rather the decisive departure was that

⁴²Schilling, *Aufbruch*, 438.

⁴³For a historiographical discussion of the economic and social impact of the Thirty Years' War, see Parker, *TYW*, 186-92, 268-72.

⁴⁴Johannes Burkhardt convincingly argues that the interests of religion and politics became indelibly intertwined during the early modern state-building process as states looked to confession for help with legitimacy and organization. The early modern state came into its own as a confessional state. The complex, close relationship between religious and political power was obvious in the dynastic political myth of the *pietas Austriaca* (which dates from the Thirty Years' War period), the close association of state and church under the Austrian Habsburgs (Johannes Burkhardt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg*, Neue Historische Bibliothek, n.s., vol. 542 [Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1992], 139-43).

. . . reason of state, as opposed to religious allegiance, was much more openly acknowledged as the basis of high politics governing European power politics as well as relations between the Princes of the Empire. . . . [the] ideal of a princely government inspired primarily by religious and confessional principles, which had never been entirely realistic even before 1618, was now definitely *passé*.⁴⁵

These momentous changes in European political and religious life were well underway when the Emperor and Charles I exchanged diplomatic missions in the middle years of the 1630s.

⁴⁵Asch, 193.

2

**THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EMPEROR AND HIS ALLIES:
THE GERMAN WAR, 1618-25**

In order to assess effectively Charles I's Habsburg foreign policy in the later 1630s, and more specifically his diplomatic overtures to the Emperor, it is critical to understand the religious and political motivations and the relationships of the Emperor and his major allies, Spain and Bavaria. The next two chapters therefore explore how these issues influenced Imperial foreign policy decisions in the years leading up to Taylor's mission to the Emperor in 1635. The first deals with the years from the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 until just before the entry of Christian IV of Denmark into the fray in 1625. During this first period, the war was mainly fought by "German" combatants in the broader sense, that is, by states belonging to the Empire. The second discusses the years from the Danish intervention until the Peace of Prague of 1635. During this stage the war took on an increasingly international character, with Sweden and France following Denmark into the fighting in 1630 and 1635 respectively. The Peace of Prague concluded between the Emperor and Saxony was intended to put an end to hostilities among German states and expel the foreign intruders from the Empire. This agreement had important consequences for the Palatine house and by extension for Charles I's foreign policy and English diplomacy. In fact, the King's main motives for sending Taylor to Vienna was to register his protest against its terms and to negotiate a more favorable settlement for his nephew.

The following two chapters will discuss a variety of events and issues impacting Imperial foreign policy and the English negotiations with the Emperor in these years. They will introduce many of the important personalities involved, including Ferdinand II and Maximilian of Bavaria as well as influential councillors and foreign diplomats at the Imperial court. These chapters also look at policy making and the networks of influence at the Imperial court, the priorities and goals of the Emperor and his allies, and the relationships among them. They trace the development of the Palatinate question due to the imposition of the ban on Frederick, the division of the Palatine lands and dignities among Spain and Bavaria, and the refusal of many European and German states to countenance it. This problem had great consequences for all involved and had a particularly strong impact on English foreign policy in the early Stuart period. The events of these years, the issues under discussion, and the players involved had a significant impact upon the diplomatic negotiations between England and the Emperor in the later 1630s.

Ferdinand II and the Politics of the Imperial Court

Ferdinand of Styria, later Emperor Ferdinand II, was a friendly, trusting, and generous man.¹ He took his responsibilities as a ruler very seriously, and consequently he diligently spent many hours each day consulting with his councillors and poring over government documents.² Ferdinand's

¹Ferdinand II was born on 9 July 1578 in Graz to Karl II of Inner Austria (son of Emperor Ferdinand I) and Maria of Bavaria. Ferdinand was married twice: from 1600 to 1616 to his first wife, Maria Anna, daughter of Duke Albrecht V of Bavaria; and from 1622 until his death to his second wife, Eleonore, daughter of Duke Vincenzo I of Mantua. Ferdinand began his personal rule of Inner Austria on 4 December 1596. He was crowned King of Bohemia on 29 June 1617 and King of Hungary on 1 July 1618. He was elected Emperor on 28 August 1619 and crowned on 9 September of the same year. Ferdinand reigned as emperor until he died on 15 February 1637 in Vienna; he was buried in Graz.

²On Ferdinand, see Dieter Albrecht, "Ferdinand II., 1619-1637," in *Die Kaiser der Neuzeit, 1519-1918: Heiliges Römisches Reich, Österreich, Deutschland*, ed. Anton Schindling and Walter Ziegler

dedication to his duties as a sovereign was only surpassed by his religious devotion; indeed, in his mind the two were inextricably entwined. It was apparent that his belief in Catholicism was his defining personal characteristic:

on one matter all could agree: the emperor's Catholic convictions amounted to a consuming passion. He attended Masses at all hours of the day and night; he revered the Blessed Virgin and the relics of saints; he showed conspicuous favour to the priesthood and to the institutions of the Church, especially its monasteries; he went on pilgrimages and endured self-abasement; his private life was a model of piety and familial virtue. This devotion was not merely common knowledge: it was publicly paraded³

Ferdinand's strict Catholic upbringing by his Bavarian Wittelsbach mother and his education at the Jesuit University of Ingolstadt cemented his convictions and convinced him that his highest calling as a prince was to safeguard and extend the Catholic faith in domains under his control.⁴ Thus the defense and advancement of Catholic interests was his primary political goal as Archduke of Styria and later as Emperor.⁵ It should be noted, however, that religious and political interests were inseparable in Ferdinand's mind, as it was in the minds of many European rulers of the time: he identified the advancement of Catholicism with the advancement of dynasty and state. His inability

(Munich: Beck, 1990), 125.

³Parker, *TYW*, 75-6. Further, "Ferdinand carried personal piety to great lengths.... His routine included meditations and two masses, as well as kissing the floor five times in memory of Christ's five wounds. He would follow processions for hours, carrying a taper and bareheaded, even in the pouring rain." (R. J. W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700: An Interpretation* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979], 72).

⁴Ferdinand's education did more than simply reinforce his commitment to Catholicism: in addition to German, he spoke Italian fluently and Latin quite well, and he could also understand French and Spanish (Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 125; Johann Franzl, *Ferdinand II: Kaiser in Zwiespalt der Zeit*, 2d ed. [Graz: Styria, 1989], 230).

⁵Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 125; Franz, 415-7. According to Geoffrey Parker, "the ascetic faith lies at the root of all the emperor's political activity."

to separate the interests of Church and state created a dilemma that continually plagued him, namely to what extent he could sacrifice religious and moral as well as legal considerations in political decision-making to the necessity of *Staatsraison*.⁶ When push came to shove, in the Empire Ferdinand preferred political considerations to confessional ones when they came into open conflict with one another. Whenever possible, however, he tried to harmonize them. Perhaps the most visible example of this was his promulgation of the Edict of Restitution in 1629, when Imperial power was at its zenith.

Ferdinand's insistence upon furthering the Counter Reformation and his intolerance where religion was concerned convinced his opponents that he was a tyrant and bigot. He rarely relinquished ground in religious matters, even in moments of great adversity which called for measured compromise with Protestants. As Ronald Asch points out, Ferdinand was able to stand firm in the face of danger because he possessed

[a]n unshakeable faith in the justness of his own cause coupled with courage, or perhaps just great insensitivity at moments of danger. . . . Unable to understand the convictions of his opponents, he was equally incapable of imagining the disasters which might befall him if he continued to pursue his policy in the face of opposition. The steadfastness and resolution . . . enabled him to survive even periods of crisis without giving in to his enemies.⁷

⁶Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 126. His solution, as we will see, was to have his councillors thoroughly examine his policies for expediency and legality and his spiritual advisors for compatibility with natural and divine law.

⁷Asch, 57-8. Ferdinand's inflexibility in the face of danger bordered on foolishness. For instance, when Bohemian troops were threatening Vienna in 1619, Ferdinand met with a group of irate Lower Austrian noblemen to discuss their grievances (the Lower Austrian estates had declared their support of the Bohemian rebels). It was rumored that during the meeting, one of the nobles seized the embattled Emperor and shouted at him, "Give in Nandl, or you are done for!" However, Ferdinand only responded to this outburst with indifference (*ibid.*, 57).

Given Ferdinand's inflexibility, Protestants – particularly those directly ruled by the Habsburgs in the crown lands, Bohemia, and Hungary⁸ – had justifiable reasons to fear him.

For his part Ferdinand was convinced that Protestant heresy bred disloyalty among his subjects, and he resolved to extirpate it in the areas under his direct control.⁹ He therefore instituted his program of confessional consolidation or "confessional absolutism" in the crown lands, where Protestantism was well established by the later sixteenth century, particularly among the nobility who controlled the regional estates.¹⁰ He began in Inner Austria while he was Archduke of Styria by instigating a ruthless campaign against the Protestants there, effectively forcing their conversion or exile. Ferdinand was quick to recognize the advantages that religious unity brought to Inner Austria, and particularly that it strengthened his own position as ruler. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that shortly after his election as King of Bohemia in 1617, he embarked on a similar

⁸The Habsburgs ruled the Austrian crown lands, or *Erblände*, with direct sovereignty. These lands consisted of: Further Austria, or the *Vorlande*, in the west (the Tyrol, some islands of territory along the middle area of the Rhine, and portions of Alsace); Inner Austria, or *Innerösterreich*, in the southeast (the duchies of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola); and the core Austrian duchies of Upper and Lower Austria, *Ober- and Niederösterreich*. From 1526, the elective kingdoms of Bohemia (which besides Bohemia proper also included Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia) and Hungary (in this period a slice along its northwestern border, as the rest was controlled by either the Ottoman sultan or his vassal the prince of Transylvania) were also ruled by the Austrian Habsburgs. After the suppression of the Bohemian revolt, Bohemia also came under direct control of the Habsburgs; thus a case can be made for including it among the Austrian crown lands after 1627, as it was in the nineteenth-century Dual Monarchy. In the Empire, of course, the Habsburg emperors enjoyed only limited hegemony. For more details on the areas under Austrian Habsburg rule, see Evans, *Habsburg Monarchy*, chaps. 5–8.

⁹*Ibid.*, 68; idem, "The Austrian Habsburgs," in *The Courts of Europe: Politics, Patronage and Royalty, 1400–1800*, ed. A. G. Dickens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), 136.

¹⁰While Ferdinand made moves towards religious consolidation in the crown lands and later the Empire, monarchical rule was only a goal for the former (Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 126; Robert Bireley, "Religious War," in *Krieg und Politik*, 102). In his mind, he acted in the interest of his subjects' religious welfare, according to the law of the land and respecting their rights (idem, *Religion and Politics in the Age of the Counterreformation: Emperor Ferdinand II, William Lamormaini, S.J., and the Formation of Imperial Policy* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981], 13).

program there by steadily attacking the religious privileges of the Bohemian Protestants. The resulting friction between the Protestant estates and Ferdinand's government culminated in the Bohemian revolt. This conflict spread because Ferdinand, true to form, continued doggedly to pursue a narrow vision of his princely mission without adequately adjusting the policies that had been successful in Inner Austria to suit the situation in Bohemia. More importantly, once he became Emperor he did not adjust them for the Empire, where his authority was more limited than in either Inner Austria or Bohemia.¹¹

Ferdinand's decision to roll back Protestantism in the lands under his rule was influenced by the Catholic religious, particularly the Jesuits. Given the importance of religion in his public and private life, it is unsurprising that the clergy multiplied and influenced political decision-making at his court in Graz and later in Vienna. The most well-known religious figure at the Imperial Court was Ferdinand's confessor, the Jesuit William Lamormaini.¹² Although in theory confessors were to avoid political machinations, Lamormaini (like many of his peers) was unable to avoid the temptation to further the cause of the true faith by prevailing upon Ferdinand's tender conscience. Thus, even though he was not an official councillor of state, Lamormaini came to exercise significant influence on Imperial policy. Both in the confessional and as one of an official team of spiritual

¹¹"In a way he was out of his depth outside his hereditary lands. This explains to some extent why in the later 1620s he took recourse to the same sort of purely confessional policy in the Empire which he had previously pursued, ultimately successfully, in his own dominions. But in the Empire this policy was to lead to disaster." (Asch, 58).

¹²Lamormaini, who was from Spanish Luxemburg, became acquainted with Ferdinand in Graz, where the former was first a professor and then rector of the University. Appointed rector of the University of Vienna in 1621, Ferdinand chose Lamormaini as his confessor when the post fell vacant in 1624. For Lamormaini's influence on Ferdinand's political decision-making, see Robert Bireley's *Religion and Politics*, a detailed study of Imperial politics from 1624 to 1635. Bireley argues that religious motives often outweighed political ones with Ferdinand, and that Lamormaini was partially responsible for this.

advisors called upon to give its opinion on certain sensitive political/confessional issues, Lamormaini counseled the Emperor to accept his divine mission to restore and protect Catholicism in *all* his lands, including the Empire. Ferdinand, as we will see, found these arguments convincing when Catholic fortunes were ascendant.¹³

Despite the fact that the Catholic clergy at the Imperial court, and Lamormaini in particular, had some influence upon the Emperor, care must be taken when attempting to evaluate the actual effect of clerical politics on Imperial policymaking.¹⁴ Firstly, though Lamormaini's counsel certainly had an impact, it did not dominate Ferdinand's thinking. Secondly, depending upon the circumstances, the confessor's sway was stronger at some times (in the latter 1620s, with Catholic victories in the Empire and the declaration of the Edict of Restitution) than others (in the early to mid-1630s, with Swedish successes and the Peace of Prague). Thirdly, since the Emperor's religious advisors did not always agree on a course of action to be followed, they often undercut each other's position and offered so many alternatives "compatible with conscience" that he could pick and choose among them to suit the situation at hand. For example, Lamormaini and the Spanish Capuchins at the Imperial Court, especially the Queen of Hungary's Spanish confessor Diego de Quiroga, had a notoriously bad relationship with each other.¹⁵ Finally, Ferdinand's closest political

¹³Ibid., 6-12.

¹⁴The older literature stresses Lamormaini's leverage with the Emperor and the impact of his influence on politics (for instance, Steinberger, *Jesuiten*, 15). For more recent examples of this viewpoint, see Robert Bireley's work (for instance *Religion and Politics*). Many recent interpretations, however, deem this influence exaggerated (for example Evans, "Austrian Habsburgs," 136 and Parker, *TYW*, 77).

¹⁵The Queen of Hungary is perhaps better known as the Infanta María, sister of Philip III of Spain. She was the very Infanta whom James I of England indefatigably pursued as a wife for his son, the future Charles I. Instead, she married her co-usin Ferdinand, King of Hungary, heir of Ferdinand II.

advisors were his councillors, most of whom were not clergymen at all and supported a militant Catholic policy only when it was politically expedient to do so. Among the most influential were Johann Ulrich von Eggenberg and Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff.¹⁶

The most important of Ferdinand's political advisors were the Imperial privy councillors.¹⁷ The Imperial privy council, or *Geheime Rat*, was the principal organ of government for both the Habsburg lands and the Empire. It normally dealt with all important political matters, foreign and domestic, as well as administrative and judicial problems, though the Emperor could and did occasionally consult individual ministers instead.¹⁸ The council was a purely advisory body, without the power to act on its own initiative. Therefore, the great power it wielded was dependent on its influence – or the influence of some of its members – with the Emperor.¹⁹ He alone held the ultimate

¹⁶On Eggenberg and Trauttmansdorff, see below, p. 71.

¹⁷The council's membership was international, though it was dominated by the Austrian-Bohemian nobility, thus reflecting the pre-eminence of the hereditary lands in Ferdinand's *Habsburgpolitik*. In addition to the secular council members, a few high churchmen—most noticeably Anton Wolfradt, Abbot of Kremsmünster and later Prince-Bishop of Vienna, and Franz Cardinal Dietrichstein—were included. The council's core was made up of the directors of the various administrative and judicial governmental organs, to which were added assorted others with administrative or military ability, or family connections to other councillors (Henry Frederick Schwarz, *The Imperial Privy Council in the Seventeenth Century*, Harvard Historical Studies, vol. 53 [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943], 115-6, 399, 402-3).

¹⁸Although the Emperor conferred with advisors outside of the council circle, for instance experts from other governmental units or theologians, their advice was almost invariably incorporated into council deliberations on issues of importance.

¹⁹Not all attended every meeting; thus a smaller, more active group that attended on a fairly regular basis took care of most of the day-to-day business. From 1627 to 1637, this group included Franz Christoph von Khevenhüller, Wolfgang von Mansfeld, Leonhard Helfried von Meggau, Wilhelm Slawata (quite recovered from his fall), Johann Baptist Verda von Werdenberg, Johann Ernst Fugger, Cardinal Franz von Dietrichstein (after 1634), Johann Ulrich von Eggenberg (to 1634), Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff, and Anton Wolfradt, Abbot of Kremsmünster and later Prince-Bishop of Vienna. The latter three clearly exercised the greatest influence in Imperial counsels (Thomas Fellner and Heinrich Kretschmayr, *Von Maximilian I. bis zur Vereinigung der österreichischen und böhmischen Hofkanzlei*

power of decision, but he relied heavily upon his councillors for advice and almost always accepted the opinion of the majority of his council.²⁰

The heterogeneity of the court as well as the council was quite marked due to the varied backgrounds and political standpoints of its members. With advice coming from so many quarters with diverse interests, the formation of Imperial foreign policy under Ferdinand II was a complex business. Councillors, officials, and representatives of every stripe from the Habsburg lands, Empire, and foreign countries converged on the Imperial court, where they naturally coalesced into groups intended to defend and promote their particular interests. As might be expected, political coalitions were not static and often changed along with the circumstances at court and the individual issues under discussion.

Despite the amorphous nature of these interest groups, three major parties at the Imperial court can be delineated, each with a basic policy focus. The first of these was the "Spanish party," which consisted of supporters of Spanish policy whose main concern was the maintenance of the traditional dynastic alliance between the two branches of the House of Habsburg. In their eyes, Spain's enemies were also naturally the Emperor's enemies, particularly the insolent Dutch rebels and their calculating French allies. Another party was formed by the Catholic militants, who encouraged the Emperor to launch a general crusade against Protestantism regardless of the

(1749), pt. 1, *Die Österreichische Zentralverwaltung*, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs, vols. 5-7 [Vienna: Holzhausen, 1907], vol. 1, 44; Schwarz, 116).

²⁰Ibid., 111, 130-1. Schwarz rightly points out that the conscientious attendance of Ferdinand II (and later his son) at council meetings served to increase that body's influence. Ferdinand, however, seldom participated in the debates, instead leaving the weighing of advantages and disadvantages to his councillors, and almost always made his decisions according to the advice of the majority (ibid., 398; Franzl, 231).

consequences. The militants saw the Catholic victories of the 1620s as a sign of divine support for their cause and steadfastly opposed any compromise with the Protestants, even in the early 1630s when Swedish forces controlled most of the Empire. They rather naively envisioned the participation of all Catholic powers, including France, in the Emperor's divinely-inspired campaign to restore the Empire to the true faith. Finally, the third major party at the Imperial court was a loosely-based group of moderates who did not necessarily support either the Spanish or the Catholic militant program, but instead pragmatically promoted what they saw as the interests of Emperor and Empire. In their eyes, the Emperor's main responsibility was to preserve his influence in both the Habsburg lands and the Empire, which meant restoring peace and preventing foreign interference in these lands as well as avoiding foreign entanglements himself. The moderates supported a settlement in the Empire that would consolidate Catholic gains and finally bring peace to its war-torn population – even if it came at the expense of concessions to Protestants.²¹

Each of these political groups at the Imperial court had representatives among Ferdinand's most trusted advisors, for instance Lamormaini for the Catholic militant party, Johann Ulrich von Eggenberg for the Spanish party, and Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff for the moderate party. These latter two men were very influential, and their views actively tempered those of the militants. Although Lamormaini's opinions certainly had an impact upon the Emperor's policy, Eggenberg, who came with Ferdinand from Graz to the Imperial court, was the Emperor's most trusted and influential councillor until shortly before his death in 1634. As director of the privy council, he held

²¹Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 23, passim. Although each of these parties at the Imperial court had its own agenda, a general consensus on issues was often reached because there were those in each group who would compromise on one issue for the sake of another deemed more important.

the most important position at court aside from the Emperor.²² Although Eggenberg was a convert to Catholicism, his policy was mainly determined by political rather than religious considerations. In the sphere of foreign policy, he constantly aligned himself with Spanish interests, a policy which he believed would strengthen the Emperor's position in the hereditary lands and Empire as well as the position of the House of Habsburg as a whole.²³

Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff was the most influential of the loose group of moderates at the Imperial court. Politically independent, he did not seek to associate himself with any particular faction, but instead steered a middle course which he believed would best advance the interests of the Emperor and the Empire. In the end, this is what brought him together with other like-minded individuals. Although he was an influential figure since his nomination to the privy council in 1618, he became indisputably the most important figure at the Imperial court after Eggenberg's death in 1634. In addition to his privy council duties, Trauttmansdorff was the *Obersthofmeister* or Lord Steward to the King of Hungary (later Ferdinand III) and was one of the few men who really enjoyed his confidence; therefore, Trauttmansdorff exercised even greater influence from Ferdinand III's accession in 1637 until Trauttmansdorff's own death in 1650. Both Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III recognized that Trauttmansdorff possessed extraordinary political talents; as Henry Frederick Schwarz has pointed out, "Trauttmansdorf owed the great position to

²²"All contemporaries agree that he, more than any other man, held the conduct of affairs in his hands." (Schwarz, 114, 118). Eggenberg held the directorship until his death in 1634.

²³*Ibid.*, 118-9, 226-8; Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 18. Anton Wolfradt, Abbot of Kremsmünster and later Prince-Bishop of Vienna, another powerful member of the privy council, was one of the group that formed around Eggenberg and was therefore closely associated with the latter's pro-Spanish foreign policy. Wolfradt, who served on the privy council from 1624 until his death in 1639, often substituted as director in Eggenberg's absence (Schwarz, 119-21, 386-9).

which he rose at Court entirely to his merit, to his ability, and to the confidence he was able to inspire."²⁴ His service, above all others, forms a bridge between the reigns of the two emperors. As we will see, by the time that Taylor and Arundel arrived at the Imperial court in the later 1630s, the influence of Lamormaini had waned and more pragmatic political advisors like Trauttmansdorff were ascendant in the Emperor's counsels. In the interests of coming to an accommodation with England on the Palatinate question, particularly after the accession of Ferdinand III in early 1637, Trauttmansdorff would use his influence to try to moderate the demands of Bavaria and Spain for restitution.

In addition to the major representatives of the three political parties at the Imperial court, Peter Heinrich von Stralendorf was also an influential figure in foreign affairs. Stralendorf's political affiliation is more difficult to categorize, but at times he supported Maximilian of Bavaria's foreign policy stance.²⁵ Stralendorf was vice president of the Imperial aulic council, or *Reichshofrat*, and member of the privy council from the early 1620s.²⁶ More significantly, however, he was made

²⁴"In the entire seventeenth century, there was perhaps no greater and certainly no more admirable personality at the Imperial Court than Maximilian, Count Trauttmansdorff....[he was] a man with a breadth of vision and, for his times, extraordinary tolerance, with the supreme gift of the statesman—the ability to distinguish the possible from the impossible." (ibid., 127-9). Trauttmansdorff often served on diplomatic missions and was respected at foreign courts as well as at home for his integrity and negotiating skill. He was an obvious choice for chief Imperial negotiator at the Westphalian peace congress.

²⁵Ibid., 361-2; Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 18. The Imperial Chancellor *ex officio* was the Archbishop of Mainz. On the Imperial chancery and its relationship to the Austrian chancery, see Schwarz, 19-24, 42, and Gross, *Geschichte der Reichshofkanzlei*, 326-34.

²⁶The aulic council was the most influential government unit next to the privy council. Although in the seventeenth century its function was essentially judicial, it was often charged with delivering opinions on political issues (Schwarz, 16). For more on the aulic council, see Oswald Gschliesser, *Der Reichshofrat: Bedeutung und Verfassung, Schicksal und Besetzung einer obersten Reichsbehörde von 1559 bis 1806*, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs, vol. 33 (Wien, 1942), as well as Schwarz, 16-24, and Fellner, 143-59.

Imperial acting vice chancellor in 1623 and vice chancellor, or *Reichsvizekanzler*, in 1627, a post he held until his death in 1637. As active head of the Imperial chancery, or *Reichshofkanzlei*, Stralendorf oversaw Imperial foreign political and diplomatic correspondence and thus was responsible for distributing and reporting upon the letters and reports he received to the privy council. This put him in an influential position, as Schwarz noted: "In a word, the office of Imperial Vice-Chancellor offered to its incumbent not only the broadest possible view of affairs but also an unparalleled opportunity to influence decisions and events."²⁷ It fell to Stralendorf, Trauttmansdorff, and the Emperor's other major councillors, who often had conflicting views about the best course to pursue in foreign affairs, to attempt to guide their sovereign during one of the most difficult, divisive, and destructive periods in European history.

The Bohemian War

Despite the opposition of the various parties at the Imperial court to one another on issues of foreign policy, there was consensus in Vienna regarding the Bohemian revolt that broke out in 1618 – it was necessary that it be crushed. The resolve of Ferdinand and his secular and religious advisors, buttressed by the Spaniards at court and the leading princes of the Catholic League, was strengthened further when the Elector Palatine Frederick V accepted the Bohemian crown offered to him by the rebels. The transfer of the Bohemian electoral vote into Calvinist hands meant that an important shift had taken place in the balance of power in the Empire – the Protestants instead of the Catholics

²⁷Schwarz, 19.

now held the majority in the Imperial electoral college.²⁸ Ferdinand II, newly elected as emperor, now had no choice but to take decisive action against Frederick and the Bohemian rebels, for with Bohemia's electoral vote in Protestant hands, Habsburg power in the Empire was under dire threat. Furthermore, this insufferable affront to Ferdinand's dignity and power could not go unanswered. It was absolutely necessary to remove the insolent Frederick from the Bohemian throne, to subjugate the equally insolent rebels who put him there, and to eradicate the subversive influence of Palatine Calvinism from Bohemia.

The realization of these goals, however, would be difficult. Ferdinand was woefully underprepared to wage war, even against Frederick and his motley assortment of supporters. After the revolt, many of the areas under Ferdinand's rule defected one by one to the Bohemian side, most notably Lusatia, Moravia, Silesia, and Upper and Lower Austria. The parts of Hungary occupied by Bethlen Gabor, the Calvinist prince of Transylvania, also supported Frederick. With these territories in rebellion against him, the embattled Emperor needed outside assistance to defeat his enemies. Fortunately for him, military and financial aid was indeed on the way from Spain and Bavaria, the Austrian Habsburgs' traditional allies. Together these powers, determined to thwart the victory of the Bohemian rebels and subsequent Protestant control of the Empire, launched a massive intervention in Ferdinand's defense.

When the Bohemian war broke out, however, it was unclear how far either Spain or Bavaria would go in supporting the Emperor. Despite the traditionally close connections between the two branches of the House of Habsburg, the Spanish monarchy could not necessarily be counted upon

²⁸Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian crown gave him control of two of the coveted electoral votes, tipping the delicate balance in favor of the Protestants.

to support the Emperor completely.²⁹ Under the Duke of Lerma, the favorite of Philip III, Spain had followed a quiescent foreign policy in the early part of the century. Years of fighting the English and especially the Dutch had taken their toll, and Lerma believed that a peaceful policy was necessary if Spain was to avoid economic and military collapse. Under his leadership, Spain concluded peace with England in 1604 and the Twelve Years' Truce with the Dutch in 1609. Not everyone, however, agreed with Lerma's peaceful policy. There were influential Spaniards outside of the circle of power in Madrid, particularly Spanish diplomats, who opposed this policy because they believed it damaged Spain's reputation and power abroad. These men, among them the formidable Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, who served as Spanish ambassador in Brussels, Paris, Rome, and finally Vienna, and Count Oñate, Zúñiga's replacement in Vienna, instead promoted an active foreign policy that would reassert Spanish power against the enemies of Spain, the House of Habsburg, and Catholicism before it was too late.³⁰ Zúñiga in particular became an outspoken

²⁹Ties of blood had been the basis of Austro-Spanish relations since the time of Charles V, but reasons of state played an increasingly important role in Spanish policy making in the years leading up to the Thirty Years' War. Spanish statesmen began to place the needs and goals of the Spanish monarchy ahead of those of the *Casa d'Austria* as a whole, instead attempting to maintain its support of Habsburg authority in Central Europe through financial inducements and symbolic gestures designed to preserve the monarchy's reputation (Magdalena Sanchez, "Dynasty, State, and Diplomacy in the Spain of Philip III" [Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1988], iv-v). Dynastic obligation, however, was still a significant consideration. For a general overview of inter-Habsburg relations in the seventeenth century, see Grete Mecenseffy, *Habsburger im 17. Jahrhundert: Die Beziehungen der Höfe von Wien und Madrid während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, Archiv für österreichische Geschichte, vol. 121, no. 1 (Vienna: Rohrer, 1955).

³⁰J. H. Elliott, "Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis: Spain, 1598-1659," in *Spain and Its World, 1500-1700: Selected Essays*, ed. J. H. Elliott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 116-8; and idem, *Oliveres*, 56. For Oñate's machinations at the Imperial court, his encouragement of action against the Bohemian rebels, and his role in securing Spanish assistance against them, see Bohdan Chudoba, *Spain and the Empire, 1519-1643* (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), 210-48.

advocate for closer relations between Spain and Austria and a more active Spanish role in Central Europe.

It is questionable whether the appeals for help from Vienna would have met with a favorable reply from Madrid had Zúñiga not returned from the Imperial court in July 1617 to take his seat on the council of state. His return, as J. H. Elliott has noted, "mark[ed] the transition from the quiescent Lerma epoch to the new activism that would distinguish Madrid's policies in the 1620s and 1630s."³¹ Zúñiga's voice quickly came to dominate the Council, and he used it to encourage vigorous Spanish intervention in the Empire, which he knew intimately from his years of long service there. He and Oñate were convinced that this intervention was required to save the Emperor from the tide of rebellion and heresy sweeping his lands and threatening the Empire, because if the rebels were successful, they would take control of the Empire and undermine Spain's position in the Netherlands. This was the main reason for Spain's commitment in Germany.³² Also, Spanish military action in the Empire could secure the military corridors linking Spain's base in Milan to Vienna and Brussels. These corridors were essential to maintaining the war effort against the Dutch, which was likely to be renewed upon the expiration of the Twelve Years' Truce in 1621.³³ This show of Spanish might would not only assist the Emperor, but would also help restore Spanish *reputación* on the European

³¹Elliott, "Foreign Policy," 118. The council of state was the highest of all Spanish councils and was responsible for the making of foreign policy.

³²John Lynch, *The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598-1700*, A History of Spain, ed. John Lynch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 97.

³³Elliott, *Oliveres*, 56. Many Spaniards were convinced that Catholicism and Habsburg power in Europe were threatened by an international conspiracy orchestrated by the Dutch. This "siege mentality" may help explain the successful drive for Spanish intervention in central and northern Europe (J. H. Elliott, "A Question of Reputation?: Spanish Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth Century," *Journal of Modern History* 55, no. 3 [1983]: 482).

and world stage. Therefore, in the interests of both the Austrian party and Spain, Zúñiga initiated and guided Spanish intervention in Bohemia and central Europe between 1618 and 1621.³⁴

When surveying the situation from the Spanish perspective, it becomes apparent that in many ways Frederick had chosen the worst possible moment for a confrontation with Spain's Austrian cousin. With the truce due to expire in 1621, Spain had already decided to give a higher priority to Habsburg interests in central Europe in preparation for a renewal of the war in the Netherlands; but as this war had not yet resumed, Spain still had some resources available to support Ferdinand in Bohemia and the Empire. Thus, despite a shortage of funds, Spain quickly granted Ferdinand considerable financial assistance after the outbreak of the Bohemian revolt in 1618 and, after Lerma's fall in that autumn, substantial military reinforcement as well. Both proved critical to Ferdinand's political survival in 1619 and 1620.³⁵

Spain had already promised generous financial and military support to the Imperial cause to avert a Bohemian victory and Protestant control of the Empire, which would in turn undermine Spain

³⁴Elliott, "Foreign Policy," 118-20. For the reluctant process of Spanish intervention in Germany, see: Peter Brightwell, "The Spanish Origins of the Thirty Years' War," *European Studies Review* [ESR] 9 (1979): 409-31; idem, "Spain and Bohemia: The Decision to Intervene, 1619," *ESR* 12 (1982): 117-41; idem, "Spain, Bohemia and Europe, 1619-21," *ESR* 12 (1982): 371-99; and Eberhard Straub, *Pax et Imperium: Spaniens Kampf um seine Friedensordnung in Europa zwischen 1617 und 1635*, Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen der Görres-Gesellschaft, ed. Alexander Hollerbach, Hans Maier, and Paul Mikat, n.s., vol. 31 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1980), chap. 4.

³⁵Ferdinand had already received the considerable sum of 3.4 million thalers from Spain in July 1619, and in May 1619, 7,000 Spanish or Spanish-paid soldiers were sent from Flanders to Vienna to help the Emperor. Further reinforcements came from northern Italy, and later other Spanish troops attacked the Palatinate. In July 1620, Ferdinand had altogether about 12,000 Spanish soldiers at his disposal in Austria and Bohemia (Parker, *TYW*, 50; Asch, 205-6 n. 16; Hildegard Ernst, *Madrid und Wien, 1632-1637: Politik und Finanzen in den Beziehungen zwischen Philipp IV. und Ferdinand II.*, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, ed. Konrad Repgen, vol. 18 [Münster: Aschendorff, 1991], 18).

in the Netherlands. Spain, however, had no intention of remaining the Emperor's sole support, and from the beginning Ofiate encouraged Ferdinand to seek assistance from German Catholics, most particularly from his cousin Maximilian of Bavaria and the Catholic League.³⁶ Maximilian, one of the most adept rulers of his time, had attended Ingolstadt with Ferdinand and in many ways shared his vision of protecting and advancing the cause of Catholicism in the Empire.³⁷ Although he was pious, the interests of the Bavarian state and Wittelsbach dynasty determined his policy in the first line and at critical points took precedence over all other interests, including those of the Church.³⁸ Maximilian preferred dynastic-territorial considerations when they came into open conflict with

³⁶For Ofiate's successful efforts to reconstitute the Catholic League so it would assist the Emperor, see Peter Brightwell, "Spain, Bohemia and Europe," 372-6.

³⁷In many ways Maximilian was the opposite of his friendly, trusting, and generous cousin. (Ferdinand, as the son of Wilhelm V of Bavaria's sister Maria, was Maximilian's first cousin). Their relationship became even closer, in that scary way for which the seventeenth-century Habsburgs were renowned: when Maximilian married Ferdinand's daughter in 1635, Ferdinand became not only Maximilian's father-in-law, but at the same time—as the husband of Maximilian's sister Maria Anna—his brother-in-law.) By all accounts, Maximilian had a complex and difficult personality: he was humorless, mistrustful, and easily insulted, and was shrewd, vengeful, and calculating to boot. Maximilian was above all a dedicated statesman and strong personal ruler. He was strict and frugal, and the soundness of his finances rendered him more politically maneuverable than Ferdinand. He was little loved and much feared, but always respected (Dieter Albrecht, "Das konfessionelle Zeitalter, zweiter Teil: Die Herzöge Wilhelm V. and Maximilian I.," in *Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte*, ed. Max Spindler, 2d rev. ed. [Munich: Beck, 1977], vol. 2, 365).

³⁸Albrecht, "Konfessionelle Zeitalter," 366-8. As Albrecht points out, it is telling that Maximilian's father Wilhelm V built a church, while Maximilian himself built a residence of Imperial proportions. Maximilian's dearest confessional goals were to ensure Catholicism within his own borders and to uphold the confessional status quo in the Empire fixed by the Religious Peace—two goals which most definitely coincided with Bavarian state interests. Beyond these, advances for the Church were dependent upon opportunities to do so that were not disadvantageous to his political ambitions. Had Maximilian observed an unequivocal confessional policy, he would have unreservedly supported the Habsburgs in the Empire. As things were, he held back from intervening too intensively for the Emperor or for religious motives that might weaken or endanger his own position. Further, he actually sought to increase Bavarian independence at the expense of the Emperor and Empire (ibid.; idem, "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 271).

confessional ones, but he like Ferdinand tried to harmonize political and religious interests whenever possible. Many times when it seemed that his policy was motivated by Empire and religion, it was in reality underpinned by Bavarian dynastic and territorial interests.³⁹ Therefore, despite Maximilian's commitment to the Catholic cause, confessional motives never obfuscated his game of power politics.⁴⁰

Maximilian was a sober, realistic statesman who pursued limited objectives by cautious methods, but he was also an opportunist who did not hesitate to take advantage of a favorable situation.⁴¹ With great skill, he relentlessly pursued his twin goals – firstly, the aggrandizement of the Bavarian state, and secondly, the advancement of the Catholic religion. He was aided in the pursuit of these goals by the large personal fortune he managed to amass, which amounted to

³⁹Robert Bireley emphasizes the confessional motivation of Maximilian's policy and ascribes a major role to Jesuit influence. Bireley argues that Maximilian (who like Ferdinand struggled with the duality of his role as ruler and Christian) reconciled confessional and dynastic-territorial aims with the help of anti-Machiavellian arguments forwarded by his confessors Adam Contzen (1624-35) and John Vervaux (1635-51) that religious obligation and political advantage coincided (see Robert Bireley, *Maximilian von Bayern, Adam Contzen S.J. und die Gegenreformation in Deutschland 1624-1635*, Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 13 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975]; idem, "Antimachiavellianism, the Baroque, and Maximilian of Bavaria," *Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu* 53, no. 105 (1984): 137-59; and idem, "Religious War," 85-106; see also his contribution to the discussion of Dieter Albrecht's paper in *Krieg und Politik*, 349). Albrecht, however, presents the most convincing picture of the elusive Maximilian. Far from discounting religion as an important consideration in Maximilian's policy, Albrecht rather takes confessional influences into account and persuasively argues that many times what appears to be confessionally or constitutionally motivated policy is in reality predicated by dynastic-territorial interests, and that the latter prevailed when the two were at odds (see n. 38). He points out, however, that dynastic-territorial and confessional goals were not exclusive but rather often corresponded with each other. In this sense, they constituted a whole, the components of which Maximilian pursued as he was presented with opportunities to do so (Albrecht, *Maximilian I*, 1115). For further arguments against the overriding influence of religious concerns by Albrecht, Kathrin Bierther, and Konrad Repgen, see the discussion of Bireley's "Religious War," in *Krieg und Politik*, 319-20.

⁴⁰Schilling, *Aufbruch und Krise*, 404.

⁴¹Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, passim.

approximately 5 million florins between 1598 and 1618.⁴² So, as Parker has observed, "[u]nlike most of his fellow-rulers, he had money to put where his mouth was."⁴³ Thus Maximilian's combination of political acumen, religious conviction, and financial security made him a formidable figure on the European political stage.

Maximilian was indeed persuaded to send the Catholic League army to support the Emperor in Bohemia, a commitment that was formalized in the Munich agreement of October 1619. The Emperor, however, was compelled to pay a dear price for his assistance. With Oñate's encouragement, Ferdinand made Maximilian an attractive offer that would be difficult for the ambitious Bavarian Duke to refuse: in return for League military intervention in Bohemia, in the written treaty Ferdinand promised to compensate Maximilian for his war costs, if necessary through League occupation of any Austrian territories seized from the Emperor's enemies.⁴⁴ Ferdinand also assured Maximilian verbally that after Frederick's defeat the elector would be proscribed under the ban of the Empire, and that Maximilian would be rewarded with the transfer of the Palatine electorate to the Bavarian Wittelsbachs as well as any Palatine lands conquered by the League. In addition, Oñate promised Maximilian Spanish troops to reinforce the League army and a Spanish attack on the Lower Palatinate from Flanders.⁴⁵ To have made such a tempting offer, the Habsburgs must have known that the level of Bavarian commitment required to win in Bohemia could not be

⁴²About £830,000 (Parker, *Europe in Crisis*, 84).

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴The treaty is printed in C. W. F. Breyer, *Geschichte des Dreyßigjährigen Kriegs nach ungedruckten Papieren*, vol. 4, *Geschichte Maximilians I. und seiner Zeit*, ed. P. P. Wolf and C. W. F. Breyer (Munich: Bey Joseph Lindauer, 1811), app. 3.

⁴⁵Brightwell, "Spain, Bohemia and Europe," 381.

counted upon from Maximilian without the bait of territorial gains and particularly of the electoral dignity, which the Bavarian dukes had long coveted.⁴⁶ In the same fashion as Bavaria, Saxony was lured to the Imperial side with the promise of territorial rewards.⁴⁷ Thus Ferdinand incurred substantial political and financial debts because he lacked the strength to crush the Bohemian rebellion on his own.

However Ferdinand was not helpless without his allies. In fact, his unanimous election as Emperor in the summer of 1619, a mere two weeks after he was deposed as King of Bohemia, was a meaningful victory and immediately strengthened his position:

From the moment he was elected and crowned Ferdinand had an enormous political capital at his disposal. Even without an army at all, his authority was considerable. However many battles the Bohemians and the troops of the Elector Palatine might win, Ferdinand would still be Emperor, whereas a single lost battle could easily spell doom for his opponents. Without the Emperor's assent, no legitimate political settlement could ever be reached in Germany. . . . [He] could outlaw his enemies for breach of the Empire's peace and *crimen laesae majestatis* (high treason), and by carefully exploiting and manipulating the existing legal framework he could declare

⁴⁶Maximilian's desire to obtain the Palatine electorate for the Bavarian line was deeply rooted in the past. By the Treaty of Pavia of 1329, Emperor Louis IV, who was also the Duke of Bavaria, split the Wittelsbach lands between the Bavarian (Wilhelmine) and Palatine (Rudolphine) lines of the family. This agreement stipulated the alternation of the electorate between the two lines, but in 1356 the Golden Bull granted the electorate to the Palatine line alone. This was enough to cause tension between the two lines, tension which increased in the sixteenth century when the Palatinate became first Lutheran and then Calvinist. The rift widened further when the Protestant Union was formed under Palatine leadership and the Catholic League under Bavarian (Dieter Albrecht, "Bayern," 461-2). Given this history, it is understandable that Maximilian coveted the electoral dignity held by his relatives, especially since the Elector Palatine was considered the chief secular prince of the Holy Roman Empire. Also, in terms of land, Maximilian was particularly interested in the Upper Palatinate, which bordered northern Bavaria. Although the rewards offered by the Emperor were indeed great, Oñate doubted the League would be successful enough against the Bohemians to merit them (Parker, *TYW*, 51; Brightwell, "Spain, Bohemia and Europe," 381).

⁴⁷Albrecht, "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 271; idem., "Ferdinand II," 131. In return for John George's loyalty to the Emperor, the Catholic electors promised by the "Mühlhausen guarantee" that they would not attempt to recover secularized church lands in the Saxon circles without a legal hearing. In addition, Ferdinand promised him Lusatia as a pledge if he captured it from the rebels.

whole principalities forfeited and use these titles and dominions to reward his allies. Never clearly defined and often fragile, the Emperor's authority was nevertheless a factor of considerable significance in a political situation as confused as that created by the Bohemian rebellion.⁴⁸

Therefore, in his capacity as emperor, Ferdinand commanded new respect and wielded new powers, among them the ability to declare Frederick a rebel against his Imperial overlord, charge him with treason, and deprive him of his lands and titles. Ferdinand's elevation to the Imperial dignity consequently helped him win allies to his side, and it should not be underestimated as a factor in his successes in Bohemia and later in the Empire.

With the aid of Spain and particularly Bavaria, the Emperor defeated Frederick just outside of Prague at the Battle of White Mountain in November 1620 and drove him from Bohemia. The assumption of the Bohemian rebels that Protestant powers would leap to Frederick's defense proved ill-founded. The unfortunate "Winter King," as he was deridingly called by his detractors because he had reigned in Prague only one winter, had received little support from the very powers they had most counted upon, namely the Netherlands and England. Neither were prepared to assist him. The Dutch were readying themselves for a renewed Spanish attack upon the expiration of the Twelve Years' Truce, and Frederick's father-in-law James I (who in any case fancied himself a peacemaker) was not willing to support a rebellion against legitimate authority. Only a handful of German Protestant princes had aided Frederick, including the Margrave of Anspach, the dukes of Saxe-Weimar, and Christian of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. In comparison, the financial and military

⁴⁸Asch, 61.

support pledged to the Emperor by his allies was indeed superior and, once it had fully materialized, was instrumental in a swift Imperial victory.⁴⁹

As a result of his dependence upon his major political creditors – Bavaria and to a lesser extent Spain – these powers exerted a strong influence on Imperial policy even after Frederick's defeat in 1620.⁵⁰ This development would prove exceedingly important in the formulation of Imperial foreign policy for the duration of the Thirty Years War, since the Emperor could scarcely afford to overlook the interests of his powerful allies when making his own policy, much to the chagrin of the moderate councillors in Vienna who wished to follow a policy benefitting Emperor and Empire, not Bavaria and Spain. This being said, it should be noted that Imperial foreign policy was never completely subordinate to that of Bavaria and Spain, particularly under Ferdinand III, who reigned as Emperor beginning in 1637.

The Genesis of the Palatinate Question and the Spread of the War to the Empire

In spite of Frederick's crushing defeat and his expulsion from Bohemia, the war did not end on the plains of Prague as the Imperialists had hoped, but instead spread to the Empire. The extension of the conflict out of the Bohemian phase of the war and the inception of the Palatinate question is attributable to four related developments: first, and most importantly, Frederick's proscription under the ban of the Empire in 1621; second, the subsequent occupation of the Palatinate by Bavaria and Spain; third, the punishment and re-Catholicization which was carried out in Bohemia and Upper

⁴⁹In addition to the help he received from Spain and Bavaria, the Emperor was also aided by several Italian princes including the Pope, who sent subsidies to both Emperor and League (Parker, *TYW*, 52-3).

⁵⁰Asch, 58-9.

Austria by the Emperor and in the Palatinate by Bavaria and Spain; and last, the transfer of the Palatine electorate to Bavaria in 1623. Together these factors provoked enough consternation to persuade certain powers inside and outside the Empire to lend moral support to Frederick's cause, and in some cases financial and military support as well. This assistance allowed him to continue to resist the Emperor, this time in the fight to recover his hereditary lands and titles, and ensured the spread of the war to the Empire.⁵¹

After White Mountain, the Emperor – urged on by Maximilian – lost little time in punishing the unfortunate Frederick for his treacherous behavior. In January 1621, he proscribed Frederick under the ban of the Empire. The ban was the strictest penalty that the Emperor could impose: it deprived the offender of every legal protection for his person and his property and threatened his allies with the same fate, thus isolating him politically, socially, and economically from the rest of the community of the Empire. It also left him open to the confiscation of his lands and titles and ultimately the death penalty. Since Frederick had taken up arms against the Emperor, it seems that the latter was justified in invoking the ban against Frederick. This may be the case, but there were those inside and outside the Empire who, far from compliantly accepting Frederick's proscription, hotly contested it on account of the manner in which it was achieved.

The usual procedure for outlawing an Imperial offender under the ban was for an official trial to be held either before the Imperial Chamber Court (*Reichskammergericht*) in Speyer or the Imperial Aulic Council (*Reichshofrat*) in Vienna. At a minimum, the estates of the Empire assembled in the Imperial Diet (*Reichstag*) or the electors should approve the Emperor's declaration

⁵¹Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 132-3.

against the offender before it was published and carried out. Despite this custom, Ferdinand accepted his lawyers' argument that he need not work through the usual channels because Frederick was deemed a "notorious rebel" who was subject to the ban without due process of law because he had broken the perpetual peace of the Empire by taking up arms against the Emperor. Ferdinand therefore pressed ahead and outlawed Frederick by Imperial declaration.⁵² Once the ban was imposed, Ferdinand was free to confiscate Frederick's lands, titles, and dignities, and use them to satisfy the political and financial claims of his allies if he so chose.

Unfortunately, the legal issue was not as clear-cut as the Emperor might have liked, and his declaration against Frederick did not go uncontested. Although the majority of German princes accepted the Emperor's right to outlaw notorious rebels without due process of law, the assent of the electors was still considered essential, and some believed that the declaration against Frederick was made without suitable consultation with the Protestant electors.⁵³ In addition, Frederick's supporters challenged the basis of the Emperor's claim by insisting that all offenders must be legally tried before the ban could be applied. Beginning in 1620, the Emperor's opponents launched a pamphlet campaign against what they considered his dubious legal position. After Frederick's proscription early the following year, the question of the ban and particularly its application to the Palatine House

⁵²Christoph Kampmann, *Reichsrebellion und kaiserliche Acht: Politische Straffjustiz im Dreißigjährigen Krieg und das Verfahren gegen Wallenstein 1634*, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, ed. Konrad Repgen, vol. 21 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1992).

⁵³The lawyers of the *Reichshofrat* did advise consultation with the electors before the publication of the ban against Frederick. However, as Frederick had clearly ignored a 1620 mandate approved by the electors (except Frederick's Union ally Brandenburg) to clear out of Bohemia, the lawyers considered all legal obstacles to a public pronouncement and execution of the ban removed. Although the Catholic electors agreed with this reasoning, the problem remained that Protestant Saxony refused to consent to the ban though it had approved the mandate (*ibid.*, 55-70).

became one of the major themes of the public opinion wars in the Empire during the Thirty Years' War.⁵⁴

The second development that contributed to the extension of the war to Germany was the occupation of the Palatinate by Catholic armies in the course of 1621. In spite of the controversy surrounding the declaration of the ban against Frederick, the Emperor and his allies lost no time in occupying the hapless prince's territories. In 1620, Spanish forces from the Low Countries under the command of Ambrosio Spínola had launched a diversionary attack on the Lower Palatinate in order to relieve the military pressure on Vienna, which had been besieged by Transylvanian and confederate forces since early in the year.⁵⁵ The Spaniards soon occupied the Palatine lands on the west bank of the Rhine, which comprised the bulk of the Lower Palatinate, and gained full control of the Rhine valley. As foreseen by Zúñiga, Spain thus secured this pivotal and previously hostile

⁵⁴The Emperor's opponents argued that it was illegal for Ferdinand to adjudicate his own affairs, and that the offender should be summoned before a court of law to answer for his crimes. They also contended that Frederick's conflict was with Ferdinand *as King of Bohemia* rather than as Emperor, in which case it was wrong for the latter to use Imperial punishments. From 1631, pro-Swedish pamphleteers even made the argument that the Emperor himself could be viewed as a notorious criminal for breaking the perpetual peace by attacking peaceful estates of the Empire. The Emperor's defenders, on the other hand, argued that his actions were legal since he was allowed to take any measures necessary to restore peace in the Empire; and in cases of uncommon danger, particularly in the case of an attack on his hereditary lands that could lead to the collapse of the Imperial order, he could impose the ban on the notorious rebels involved without further legal formalities.

In 1636, Maximilian of Bavaria, who fully supported the Emperor's position (and in fact had pressured him to impose the ban on Frederick), technically resolved the ban controversy in the Emperor's favor. Maximilian achieved this by introducing a clause in Ferdinand III's election capitulation (*Wahlkapitulation*) confirming the Emperor's right, with the assent of the electors, to proceed against notorious criminals without trial. However, despite the technical resolution of the conflict, it continued until a political solution to the ban cases—particularly the *Pfalzfrage*—was agreed upon at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Other notorious rebels outlawed in the course of the war include the military entrepreneurs Ernst von Mansfeld and Albrecht von Wallenstein as well as the dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and -Güstrow (*ibid.*, 220-6).

⁵⁵For a detailed look at Spain's decision to invade the Lower Palatinate from Flanders, see Brightwell, "Spain, Bohemia and Europe," 386-95.

stretch of the Spanish Road, its main line of military communications between Italy and the Low Countries.⁵⁶ While Spain was busy securing its military corridor, Maximilian's Catholic League forces moved into the Upper Palatinate, which conveniently bordered Bavaria, as well as into the bit of the Lower Palatinate left by the Spaniards, which lay east of the Rhine. By the end of the year, all of the Palatine lands were under Catholic control save the fortress of Frankenthal (which the English held until 1623), the Protestant Union was dissolved, and Frederick and his family had fled into exile in the Netherlands.

The Catholic take-over of the Palatinate is closely related to the third factor that encouraged the continuation of war, namely the systematic re-Catholicization that was carried out in the lands occupied by the Imperialists. In addition to Frederick and his family, many others, particularly the Protestants in his lands, suffered on account of his defeat. The unfortunate situation of the Bohemian Protestants was apparent to Sir Edward Conway, an English ambassador to Germany, immediately after the battle of White Mountain:

the Imperials . . . as it seems, hold Bohemia now by conquest, and all immunities [and] privileges [are now] void, and if a new establishment by petition shall be obtained, it will be only the law of the Conqueror, who doth already finely call those of the [Protestant] Religion to account for what they have, and put it into safe keeping, so that they taste already their condition to come.⁵⁷

⁵⁶Parker, *Army of Flanders*, 53-5; Koenigsberger, 230. It was apparent to all that Spain's occupation of the Rhine Palatinate strategically coincided with its refusal to renew the truce with the Dutch, which was due to expire in April 1621. For more on the Spanish occupation of the Lower Palatinate, see Anna Egler, *Die Spanier in der linksrheinischen Pfalz, 1620-32: Invasion, Verwaltung, Rekatholisierung*, Quellen und Abhandlungen zur Mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte, vol. 13 (Mainz: Selbstverlag der Gesellschaft für Mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte, 1971).

⁵⁷Quoted in Hubert G. R. Reade, *Sidelights on the Thirty Years War* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1924), vol. 1, 388.

Conway's prognostication was correct, for the Emperor came to interpret his victories over the Bohemian Protestants as a divine summons to root out Protestantism and restore Catholicism to the areas under his control. This providentialist outlook was championed by the Catholic militants at the Imperial court, particularly Lamormaini, who saw the Emperor's victories as an opportunity to regain some of the Church's lost influence and territories in the Habsburg lands and the Empire.⁵⁸ Determined to punish the rebels and their supporters and restore Catholicism in the Habsburg lands, Ferdinand began a renewed and more thorough assault on the Protestants in Bohemia and Upper Austria. Most of Frederick's supporters there, if they did not lose their lives, lost their lands and titles and were forced to flee.⁵⁹ Spain and Bavaria followed a similar policy of re-Catholicization in the occupied Palatine territories.⁶⁰ The occupation of the Palatinate by the triumphant Imperialists and their moves to re-Catholicize lands that were formerly predominantly Protestant substantially complicated the Emperor's relationship with the German princes and with outside powers, particularly with Protestant ones. It was understandable that they wondered who would be next on his list.

⁵⁸Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 15. Lamormaini trumpeted his hopes to the Vatican: "great things can be accomplished by this emperor...Perhaps even all Germany [may] be led back to the old faith, provided...[pope and emperor together] take up the matter vigorously and see it through with persistence." (quoted in *ibid.*, 21).

⁵⁹More than 1,500 Bohemian landowners were tried for supporting the rebellion, and nearly half of their estates were confiscated (Parker, *TYW*, 80).

⁶⁰Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 132. For re-Catholicization in the Palatine lands, see Egler, *Spanier*, and W. Gegenfurtner, "Jesuiten in der Oberpfalz: Ihr Wirkung und ihr Beitrag zur Rekatholisierung in den oberpfälzischen Landen, 1621-50," *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Bistums Regensburg* 11 (1977): 71-220. Of course the process of re-Catholicization was not instantaneous; it took place gradually over a period of years and had long-lasting effects. Catholic churches and schools were opened, Protestant pastors and schoolteachers expelled, secularized Church lands recovered, and finally Protestants were given the choice to convert or leave.

Despite the reduction of Frederick and the Bohemians, the Emperor still could not afford to relax his military vigilance since Palatine supporters continued to oppose him. Ernest of Mansfeld, the Protestant military enterpriser who had fought with the confederates, had taken over command of the troops of the now-defunct Protestant Union and continued to fight in the Empire supported by Christian of Brunswick and the Margrave of Baden-Durlach. In addition to Mansfeld's activity in the west, Bethlen Gabor remained at large in the east and repeatedly attempted to expel Ferdinand from Hungary, often with the protection and support of the Turks. With these foes still active against him, Ferdinand remained reliant on his allies, particularly Maximilian and the League, to help him defend his position in the Empire.

In view of the continued military pressure in the Empire, Ferdinand was clearly in no position to renege on the verbal promises he had made to Maximilian of Bavaria at Munich, namely the transfer of a portion of the Palatine lands and the electorate to the Bavarian Wittelsbachs. Maximilian had in any case earned his reward when he led League forces to an almost single-handed victory over Frederick at White Mountain. Thus, in 1621, Ferdinand agreed that League forces should continue to occupy the Upper Palatinate and Upper Austria as security that his military expenses from the Bohemian war would be paid.⁶¹ Maximilian, however, was importunate about the reward he coveted most, that is, the transfer of the Palatine electorate to the Bavarian line.⁶² This was a prize the Emperor could not grant unilaterally, as it required the approval of the Imperial estates.

⁶¹In 1620 Maximilian occupied Upper Austria, which had endorsed Frederick's cause, after he put down a rebellion of the Upper Austrian estates led by the Calvinist Georg Erasmus Tschernembl.

⁶²Albrecht, "Konfessionelle Zeitalter," 429.

The Emperor consequently called a *Deputationstag* at Regensburg in 1623 to sanction the transfer of the electorate to Bavaria.⁶³ However, it was not effected as easily as he hoped. The claims to the electorate of Frederick's children, his younger brother the Duke of Simmern, and his close relative the Duke of Pfalz-Neuburg, who had recently converted to Catholicism, were raised against Maximilian's. Most of the influential princes of the Empire – with the exception of Maximilian's brother, the elector of Cologne – were against the hereditary transfer of the electorate to the Bavarian Wittelsbachs on constitutional and/or religious grounds. The opposition of Saxony and Brandenburg was particularly strenuous.⁶⁴

Spain also opposed the transfer of the electorate to Maximilian, and though it was an outside power, Philip III's desires as an ally and head of the senior Habsburg branch carried weight with the Emperor. Once again, Spain's objection was predicated on its primary foreign policy objective, namely to bring the war in the Netherlands to a favorable conclusion (see below, p. 98). The Spaniards realized that the transfer would prolong the war in the Empire and therefore prevent German troops from assisting Spain in the Netherlands. In addition, Spain wished to remain on good terms with England because English neutrality was an important ingredient in Spain's recipe for victory against the Dutch. It hoped to achieve this by opposing the electoral transfer as a gesture of

⁶³A *Deputationstag* was the meeting of the committee of the Imperial Diet that was called by the emperor in the absence of a full-fledged *Reichstag* to confer upon and present decisions on certain matters touching the Empire. The committee consisted of the electors as well as representatives of the colleges of the princes and the cities. In contrast, a *Kurfürstentag*, or electoral meeting, was simply a meeting of the electors called to advise the emperor on Imperial matters.

⁶⁴Albrecht, *Maximilian I*, 567-9.

support for Frederick.⁶⁵ Further, Philip regarded Maximilian with suspicion because of his jealousy of Habsburg power in the Empire, opposition to German intervention in the Netherlands, and his friendly relations with France. The latter in particular made Maximilian a security risk in the King of Spain's eyes. For all of these reasons, Spain wished to contain Bavaria's influence by obstructing the transfer of the electorate.⁶⁶

In the end, after contentious debate on the subject, the electorate was indeed granted to Maximilian, but with restrictions.⁶⁷ First, it was granted only for his lifetime rather than permanently to his line. Second, the Emperor should continue attempts to reach an agreement with England about the Count Palatine; in the case of successful negotiations or their ultimate failure, he and the electors should decide whether the electorate should be turned over to one of Frederick's children or relatives or if it should remain in the Bavarian line. Maximilian was forced to submit to this decision and face

⁶⁵Roderigo Ródenas Vilar, *La política europea de España durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años, 1624-30* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Escuela de Historia Moderna, 1967), 37; Elliott, *Olivares*, 83, 205; Ernst, 27. England might combine with the Dutch if hopes for Frederick's restoration through the good offices of Spain were dashed. From this standpoint, the snubbing of Bavarian demands for the electoral dignity and lands was an immediate requirement of Spanish policy. However, continued Spanish possession of the Lower Palatinate to ensure the supply lines to the Netherlands was also of strategic importance in securing a favorable outcome against the Dutch. Thus, while Spain represented itself to England as a supporter of Frederick's restoration, it is debatable how serious its efforts actually were. Because the restoration of Palatine lands and/or titles was in the Emperor's purview, Spain could afford to pose as a friend to Frederick; if decisions were made regarding the Palatinate that were unfavorable to Frederick's cause, Spain could defend itself to England by retreating behind the excuse that it was not within its power to prevent such decisions (Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 59-61). On Spanish opposition, cf. Straub, 161-2, 188.

⁶⁶Lynch, 108; Mecenseffy, 23.

⁶⁷With the significant exceptions of Saxony and Brandenburg, all the estates present accepted this agreement.

the possibility that he might have to relinquish the electorate in the future.⁶⁸ The new elector, who was of a vengeful nature and carefully delineated his friends from his enemies, would not forget Spain's opposition to the electoral transfer nor its propensity to deal with the English on the question of the restoration of the Palatinate.

Although this compromise settled the question of the Palatine electorate for the time being, its long-term future and that of the Palatine lands still remained unresolved: therein lies the origin of the Palatinate question, or *Pfalzfrage*. As long as the possibility for the restoration of the Palatine lands and dignities to Frederick and his family still existed, the matter continued to be debated at courts across Europe. An acceptable solution to the Palatinate question was a necessary ingredient for peace. No permanent settlement of the war was possible without prior settlement of this thorny question.⁶⁹

Everyone had his own opinion on how this difficult matter should be settled, particularly those who were directly involved. Maximilian, of course, intended for the electoral dignity and the Upper Palatinate to remain with himself and his heirs. The focal point of his policy from this point

⁶⁸Albrecht, *Maximilian I*, 569. For the text of the *Belehrungsbrief*, dated 25 February 1623, see Bernd Roeck, *Gegenreformation and Dreißigjähriger Krieg, 1555-1648*, vol. 4, *Deutsche Geschichte in Quellen und Darstellung*, ed. Rainer A. Müller (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996), 245-50. As early as September 1621, in a secret document Ferdinand assured Maximilian of the electorate for himself and his heirs. Maximilian was only personally invested in February 1623, but at that time Ferdinand secretly renewed his promise that the dignity would become hereditary (Albrecht, *Maximilian I*, 570-1; idem, "Ferdinand II," 259-60).

⁶⁹Albrecht points out that—though since the mid-1620s its resolution alone could no longer bring peace to Germany—it remained an integral element of a lasting peace settlement. Frederick's supporters, however, continued to argue that his restoration would quickly affect peace (Albrecht, "Bayern," 462-3).

forward, therefore, was to tighten his grip on both.⁷⁰ He knew that Frederick would never voluntarily give up his inheritance and that he would always have to reckon with the enmity of England because of the dynastic ties between the Stuart and Palatine houses. Spain's stance was more complicated, and vacillated along with the European political situation. On the one hand, Spain wanted to maintain its control over the Lower Palatinate; but on the other, it was ready to negotiate with England for the return of the Lower Palatinate to Frederick if the rewards for doing so were great enough. Further, what was considered great enough fluctuated with the fortunes of war. Frederick, for his part, campaigned constantly to build a grand alliance of all anti-Habsburg states to force his restoration. Defeated and dispossessed, he had nothing to lose by continuing to resist the Habsburgs.⁷¹

The Palatinate question was destined to become a problem of European proportions. Frederick was able to keep his cause alive because most of the German and European powers, particularly the Protestant ones, were not prepared to accept Frederick's proscription, the occupation and re-Catholicization of his lands, and the transfer of the electorate to Maximilian (even if only for life). Although the general consensus was that Frederick deserved to be ousted from Bohemia and

⁷⁰One of the ways Maximilian tightened his grip on the Upper Palatinate was to enforce a program of re-Catholicization there.

⁷¹The Palatine court-in-exile at the Hague crusaded tirelessly for the formation of an anti-Habsburg alliance in the 1620s and 1630s, with the ultimate goal of full restoration for the Palatine family. It served as an important point of contact for militant Protestants from all over Europe. F. H. Schubert has convincingly argued that the Palatine exiles rather than the Dutch were the driving force in the polarization of European politics in the 1620s in "Die pfälzische Exilregierung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des politischen Protestantismus," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte des Oberrheins* 63 (1954): 575-680.

stripped of his crown, it was another matter entirely that the Emperor dispossessed him of his hereditary lands and titles and parceled them out to Imperial, Catholic allies.

The Emperor's willingness to strike at Frederick's patrimony and alter existing power relationships in the Empire in favor of the Catholics caused princes both inside and outside the Empire to cast a wary eye upon him and his allies. Protestants were understandably disturbed by the occupation and forced re-Catholicization of formerly Protestant areas by Catholic powers, and, in the case of Spain, a foreign power. Even worse, however, was the transfer of one of the precious, Protestant-controlled electorates to a Catholic prince, which resulted in a decisive shift in the balance of power in the Empire in favor of the Catholics, who now held a solid majority in the electoral college. The Protestant princes (rightly so) began to fear for their religious freedom. The rest of Protestant Europe also felt threatened by the occupation of the Palatinate by Spain and Bavaria, which it saw as yet another manifestation of the operation of a militant Catholic axis linking Madrid, Brussels, Vienna, Munich, and Rome.

The Palatinate question was raised from a German to a European problem early on because of the interest of foreign powers.⁷² None of the European powers, Protestant or Catholic, could afford to ignore the occupation of the Palatinate by the Habsburgs and their allies because of its geo-strategic and political importance. It was one of the major principalities of the Empire, and its heart – the Lower Palatinate and capitol at Heidelberg – straddled the sensitive area of the Rhine that was a major crossroads of European communication. Spain's control of this key area gave the Habsburg cause in the Empire and the Netherlands, where war resumed in 1621, an important advantage. The

⁷²Albrecht, "Bayern," 463.

Habsburgs and their allies could transport their own men and supplies more quickly while obstructing or at least delaying those of their foes, particularly the United Provinces and France.⁷³ Therefore, the Dutch and French as well as German and European Protestants perceived the occupation of the Palatinate transfer of the electorate as a serious threat to their security or religious freedom, or both. With resistance building to the moves of the Emperor and his allies in the Palatinate, anti-Habsburg opposition groups began to coalesce with the aim to crush, or at least weaken, Habsburg power in Europe. Frederick therefore managed to rally more support for his restoration to his hereditary lands and titles than he had for his Bohemian escapade, and the fight for his cause in the Empire continued well after his defeat at White Mountain.

Still, the full extent of this support did not materialize immediately after his defeat, and initial campaigns on his behalf – by the allied army under Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, now employed by the Dutch, and Bethlen – did not meet with much success. Brunswick was summarily defeated at Stadtlohn by League forces led by Jean 't Serclaes, Count Tilly, in August 1623. Mansfeld managed to escape the same fate, but was forced to disband his army in early 1624 when his financial resources were exhausted. Bethlen, abandoned by his allies, was forced to sue for peace with the Emperor. None of Frederick's supporters could stand up to League armies, and, unfortunately for the Palatine cause – no international alliance capable of combating the Emperor and his supporters formed until 1625. But from it would, because anti-Habsburg European powers and Frederick's Protestant allies could not stand back and watch as the Palatinate fell to Habsburg and Bavarian imperialism. Neither could England for dynastic reasons; from this time, the

⁷³The former a Calvinist mercantile republic fighting to break away from Catholic Spanish rule, the latter a powerful Catholic monarchy threatened by Habsburg encirclement.

restoration of the Palatinate was a constant goal of English foreign policy. The Palatinate therefore became the connecting link between not only the Bohemian conflict and its spread to the Empire, but also between strife in the Empire and power struggles in western Europe.

Spain and Bavaria

The spread of hostilities to the Empire was an unfortunate circumstance for Ferdinand, for it meant that he must maintain a strong Catholic military presence there and continue to rely upon Spain and Bavaria for military and financial support. In return, each of his powerful allies expected to exercise influence on Imperial policy in matters that affected its interests. This created a particularly difficult situation for the Emperor, because his own ambitions were not necessarily congruent with those of his allies, and even worse, Spanish ambitions were seldom compatible with those of Bavaria. Spain's view was European (and where its overseas Empire was concerned, global), and it was constantly exerting pressure on Ferdinand to follow a policy that was favorable to its operations outside the Empire. Bavaria's view, on the other hand, was essentially German. Maximilian, whose first priority was the Empire and promoting Bavarian interests within it, resented Spanish interference in German affairs. The conflicting ambitions of Spain and Bavaria and those of their partisans at the Imperial court created a tense political situation in Vienna that was to last the duration of the war.

Spain's involvement in Germany was dictated by the drive to reassert its power in northern and western Europe, a policy guided first by Zúñiga and then, for the twenty years after his death

in 1622, tenaciously followed by his nephew the Count-Duke of Olivares.⁷⁴ The foremost objective of this policy was to conclude a respectable peace settlement with the Dutch, who had been in rebellion against Spain since the 1560s and were now a European power in their own right. Despite the fact that Zúñiga and many other Spanish councillors realized that it was highly unlikely that they could forcibly re-impose their religion or their rule on the Dutch, they still opposed the renewal of the truce due to expire in 1621 and instead supported the resumption of war.⁷⁵ At this point, the Spaniards no longer hoped to emerge victorious, but rather to apply enough military and economic pressure to the Dutch to force them to negotiate a new settlement acceptable to Madrid.⁷⁶ In order to accomplish this goal Spain required two assets – allies and a secure route to supply its troops in Flanders. German assistance could prove crucial in both categories.

⁷⁴Don Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares, became a member of the Spanish council of state in 1622, and soon came to dominate it just as his uncle had. Like Zúñiga, Olivares's main concern was to preserve Spain's status as a world power, and his plan to reassert Spanish power in northern and western Europe was an important aspect of this policy. For more on the life and political career of one of Spain's greatest statesmen, see J. H. Elliott's outstanding biography, *Olivares*.

⁷⁵This decision was based on several considerations, but economic ones were of the greatest importance. Dutch commerce was profiting from peace in Europe while it continued to penetrate the Spanish and especially the Portuguese overseas empires. Also, the Spaniards believed that the Dutch were exploiting the lull in hostilities to aid the enemies of the Habsburgs and recover their own strength for the next bout with Spain. Finally, because the terms of the Twelve Years' Truce of 1609 were so humiliating to Spain, these councillors opposed renewing it in order to preserve Spain's *reputación* as a great power. The terms of the 1609 truce that the Spanish found so objectionable included the virtual recognition of Dutch independence, the closure of the river Scheldt to traffic in and out of Antwerp, and the acceptance of Dutch commercial and maritime operations in the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires.

⁷⁶Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Spanish World, 1606-1661* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 66-85; Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 264-6; idem, *TYW*, 93; Elliott, "Foreign Policy," 121-2. For a detailed look at the long debate whether to renew the truce or not, see Israel, 66-85, and Peter Brightwell, "The Spanish System and the Twelve Years' Truce," *EHR* 89 (1974): 270-92.

In return for Spain's assistance against the Bohemian rebels, Olivares was counting on support from the Emperor, and hopefully from the League as well, to drive the Dutch rebels to the bargaining table. In fact, Olivares considered close Spanish-Imperial collaboration to be the key to lasting stability in the Empire and to the favorable resolution of the Netherlands problem, that is, to reestablishing a European order acceptable to Spain.⁷⁷ In his magisterial biography of Olivares, J. H. Elliott points out the importance of close collaboration between the two branches of the Habsburgs in the Spanish statesman's mind: "His foreign policy, like that of Zúñiga, remained resolutely 'Austrian', and its central axiom was that 'not for anything must these two houses [the Austrian and the Spanish branches of the Habsburgs] let themselves be divided.'"⁷⁸

For Spain to secure Imperial assistance, however, it was necessary for peace and stability first to be restored to Germany. Olivares thus worked tirelessly to end the insidious conflict in the Empire. He constantly urged peace – even at the cost of compromise with the Protestants – so that Imperial and League troops would be free to aid Spain against the Dutch. Maximilian and his League allies, however, strenuously opposed any proposal that would involve the Emperor or League in Spain's war with the Dutch. They avoided entanglement in what they viewed as a costly war

⁷⁷Straub, *passim*; Elliott, "Question of Reputation," 479. Olivares promoted close cooperation between the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs as a way to involve the Emperor in the war against the Dutch. From late 1624, he pursued a "Habsburg league," a formal offensive and defensive alliance between Vienna and Madrid, seeing it as the most effective way to secure peace in the Netherlands and the Empire. He even (unsuccessfully) sought to involve Maximilian and the League. Olivares's quest to construct this league, which was a major element in his foreign policy strategy, was long and disappointing. The negotiations between the two branches of the House of Habsburg are chronicled in H. Günter, *Die Habsburger-Liga, 1625-1635: Briefe und Akten aus dem General-Archiv zu Simancas*, Historische Studien, vol. 62 (Berlin: Ebering, 1908; reprint, Vaduz: Kraus Reprint, 1965), which includes a long introduction and collection of Spanish documents on the subject.

⁷⁸10 Nov. 1630, Olivares to council of state; quoted in Elliott, "Foreign Policy," 123.

waged for Habsburg benefit that would subordinate German Catholic interests to Spanish ones and jeopardize the gains they had already made in the Empire.⁷⁹

More importantly, Spain needed to secure reliable supply routes between Spain and Flanders if it hoped to drive the Dutch to the bargaining table. These routes ran either by sea through the English Channel (the "English Road") or by land through a network of military corridors from Milan to Brussels (the "Spanish Road"). The preferred corridor of the Spanish Road closely paralleled France's eastern frontier and ran mainly through Habsburg territory or that of its allies – from Genoa to Milan, up through Savoy, the Franche Comté, and Lorraine to Flanders. After 1601, however, the passage of Spanish troops through Savoy became much more difficult, and when Charles Emmanuel defected from the Habsburgs in 1622 the route through Savoy was closed to them completely.⁸⁰ Fortunately for Spain, an alternative corridor existed. It also ran from Genoa to Milan, but then veered up through the Alpine passes of the Valtelline to the Tyrol and passed along the northern shore of Lake Constance and the north bank of the Rhine. From here, Flanders could be reached in one of two ways. The first and fastest route was to proceed by ship down the Rhine. This was dangerous, however, because of the Prince Palatine's enmity towards the Habsburgs. Even after Spain's invasion and occupation of the Palatinate in 1620, it remained so – though to a lesser degree – because the lands ruled by less consequential princes unfriendly to the Habsburgs still abutted this route. The second, much safer route for Spanish troops passed through Habsburg and Habsburg-

⁷⁹Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 159-62.

⁸⁰When Savoy gave up territory to the French in the Treaty of Lyon (1601), this connection became tenuous at best for Spain, as it was reliant upon keeping open these narrow corridors of friendly territory to avoid transgressing upon French soil. In one area, it was confined to a single bridge across the River Rhône, which the anti-Habsburg French often obstructed to prevent Spanish reinforcements from northern Italy from reaching Flanders (Parker, *Europe in Crisis*, 124).

friendly lands, via Alsace and Lorraine.⁸¹ This land route, along with the sea route, served as Spain's principal military corridors during the Thirty Years' War.⁸²

The security of the sea route, which ran from Spanish ports up through the English Channel to Flanders, also fluctuated, as it was largely dependent upon the friendship or at least benevolent neutrality of England. Any time hostilities arose between Spain and England, the sea route became unsafe for Spanish ships. An example of this was in the latter half of the sixteenth century, when Elizabethan England financially and militarily supported the Dutch rebels and then was itself at war with Spain. After James I's accession to the throne and the conclusion of peace with Spain in 1604, conversely, Spanish troop ships sailing through the Channel to Flanders could depend upon English protection; they were also allowed to shelter in English ports if they came under attack from the Dutch.⁸³ The Dutch Republic was a great maritime power in the seventeenth century, and the security England could provide in the Channel was therefore of great advantage to Spain, particularly when its overland military routes became hazardous.

Spanish policy fluctuated as to the best way to ensure that at least one of these supply routes remained open, whether by land or sea. On the one hand, Spain curried England's favor to protect

⁸¹As the land route took two months to negotiate, the sea route was often more attractive, though it had its problems as well (Taylor, "Trade," 243).

⁸²Parker, *Army of Flanders*, 53-5. For representations of the different routes, see Parker, *TYW*, map 2, and Parker, *Army of Flanders*, figs. 6, 8-10. In the event of war with the Habsburgs, French security was reliant upon cutting Spain's lines of communication. In the words of J. H. Elliott, "This lifeline of the Spanish Monarchy in Europe looked like a noose to the French. But, as the Spaniards and French were well aware, it was a lifeline or noose that might be cut with reasonable ease at a number of critical points—the French border with Savoy, the Swiss valley of the Valtelline, or along the northern reaches of the Rhine...." (Elliott, *Oliveres*, 56).

⁸³Parker, *Army of Flanders*, 77.

the sea route. Beginning in 1614, Philip III dangled the prospect of a marriage between his daughter, the Infanta María, and Prince Charles before James. Then, after Frederick's proscription and exile in 1621, Spain also promised to effect his restoration to his lands and dignities through Spain's good offices with the Emperor. The settlement of the Palatinate question, therefore, was an attractive avenue for Spain not only to win English friendship but also to contribute to peace in the Empire that was necessary to gain German support in the Netherlands. On the other hand, though the sea route was important, Spain also needed to protect the land route. From this perspective, it was not in Spanish interests to support Frederick's restoration because continued Spanish occupation of the Lower Palatinate secured a pivotal leg of the land route and at the same time kept French ambitions in the region in check. Sir Henry Wotton, the English ambassador to Venice, pointed out that it did not bode well for England's ambition to restore the Prince Palatine that the Spaniards were "now able to walk (while they keep a foot in the Lower Palatinat) from Milan to Dunkercke upon their own inheritances and purchases, a connexion of terrible moment in my opinion."⁸⁴ Although these conflicting interests seemingly put Spain into an impossible situation, Olivares was able to turn it to his advantage. Because Frederick's restoration to the Palatine lands and titles did not lie in Spain's power but rather the Emperor's, and the Emperor and Maximilian at this point opposed it, Olivares could afford to express Spanish support for Frederick's cause and readiness to return the Spanish-occupied Palatinate knowing full well that it was unlikely that Spain would ever have to countenance actually doing so.⁸⁵

⁸⁴Logan Pearsall Smith, *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), vol. 2, 221: 18 Dec. 1621, Wotton to Sir Walter Aston.

⁸⁵Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 58-60.

Olivares was correct in assuming that Maximilian, who had no intention of relinquishing his hard-won rewards, would resist any move to restore Frederick to his patrimony. However, he could not count on Bavarian support to further Spain's agenda in Germany. Maximilian and his League allies – and the rest of the German princes for that matter – opposed continued Spanish occupation of the Lower Palatinate, which they viewed as a foreign intrusion on German soil that would certainly result in the erosion of German liberties. In addition, Maximilian feared that the Spanish presence on the Rhine might provoke France to intervene in the Empire, a move that would expand the conflict and thus endanger Bavaria's recent acquisitions.⁸⁶ His objections to the Spanish occupation of the Lower Palatinate, as well as to German intervention in the Netherlands, and his friendly relations with France all created a climate of distrust and antagonism between Spain and Bavaria.

Given these conflicts of interest, the Emperor found it increasingly difficult to please both of these allies, each of which had representatives and supporters at the Imperial court. As each side maneuvered to further its agenda, a tense political situation developed in Vienna. The consensus that had existed among the various parties at the Imperial court during the Bohemian phase of the war evaporated. After White Mountain, dissension surfaced in the Imperialist camp over issues that proved much more difficult to reconcile than how to go after the traitorous Bohemian rebels and their opportunistic leader.

⁸⁶Ibid., 159-60.

3

**THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EMPEROR AND HIS ALLIES:
THE EUROPEAN WAR, 1625-35**

All the wars that are on foot in Europe have been fused together, and have become a single war.

Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna

The Danish Phase and Habsburg Ascendancy

Unfortunately for the Palatine cause, no international alliance capable of challenging the preponderance of the Emperor and the Catholic princes in the Empire coalesced until 1625. From this time onwards, however, various anti-Habsburg combinations led by foreign powers formed to defend their interests and those of the German Protestant princes against what they perceived as the imperialism of the House of Austria. They justified their intervention in terms of the defense of German liberties, the Protestant cause, or both. These guiding principles were inextricably bound up with the Palatinate question and were ones from which the Prince Palatine could profit in his crusade for restoration. As foreign states – anti- and pro-Habsburg alike – became increasingly vested in the outcome of the conflict, so the character of what had been an essentially German war became increasingly international.

In the few years following Frederick's deprivation, his diplomats worked feverishly at courts around Europe to bring about the formation of an anti-Habsburg alliance committed to restoring his lands and titles. They concentrated their efforts upon leading Protestant powers such as England,

the Dutch Republic, Denmark, and Sweden, but they also attempted to convince Catholic France to support their cause.¹ While these powers were certainly disturbed by the fate of the Palatinate, they hesitated to spring immediately to Frederick's defense. Several events in 1624 and 1625, however, caused them to form an anti-Habsburg coalition in 1625 that was committed to limiting Habsburg power in Europe. These powers saw restoring Frederick to his lands and titles as a means to this end, which caused them to galvanize their support for his cause as well. In 1624, Cardinal Richelieu assumed direction of the French government and without delay firmly set its foreign policy in an anti-Habsburg track; that same year, France joined England and the Dutch Republic in a defensive alliance. England, for its part, had turned against Spain soon after the Spanish Match fell through and Prince Charles married the Princess Henrietta Maria of France, in 1625.² The marriage sealed the intention of the two powers to cooperate against Habsburgs, but neither they nor their Dutch allies were ready as yet to take active measures against the Emperor in Germany.

Instead of taking action themselves, the allies – egged on by Palatine leaders – proceeded to encourage Danish intervention in the Empire on Frederick's behalf. It was not long before Christian IV was persuaded by their arguments, which played upon his religious convictions and dynastic ambitions, to take up arms against the Emperor.³ Christian, however, imprudently made this

¹For more about the Palatine exiles and their diplomacy, see F. H. Schubert, "Die pfälzische Exilregierung," and idem, *Ludwig Camerarius, 1573-1651: eine Biographie* (Kallmünz: Lassleben, 1955).

²Charles had been spurned by the Infanta, and Buckingham by the Spanish government during their ill-fated jaunt to Spain in 1623. Both prince and favorite returned to England convinced that it must follow an anti-Habsburg foreign policy; they turned their considerable influence toward mustering support in Parliament for war against Spain, despite the resistance of the peace-loving James I.

³They exploited Christian's ambitions to extend his own influence in northern Germany and check that of his rival Sweden by letting him know that if he was not willing to lead an army into the

commitment before he had secured any binding promises of support from the allies. The impressive personal fortune Christian had managed to accumulate made unilateral Danish intervention in Germany possible, even over the objections of his council.⁴ So, wisely or not, he sent Danish troops into the Empire to confront Imperial forces: the seasoned Catholic League army commanded by Tilly on the one hand, and, unbeknownst to Christian, the Emperor's own army newly raised by Albrecht von Wallenstein on the other.⁵

The Imperial military establishment turned out to be more than Christian had bargained for, and he desperately needed help. At first it appeared some assistance was on the way from the anti-Habsburg coalition. In December 1625, Denmark, England, and the United Provinces concluded the Treaty of the Hague, which was directed against the Emperor and Catholic League as well as Spain.⁶ The signatories pledged to work together to fight for the rights and liberties of the German

Empire in defense of the Protestant and Palatine causes, his foe Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden would. As Duke of Holstein, Christian exercised considerable authority in the Lower Saxon Circle of the Empire, and he was eager to extend it to the secularized bishoprics of Bremen, Verden, and Osnabrück, thus giving him control over the mouths of the Weser and Elbe rivers and undercutting Sweden's influence in the Baltic (Parker, *TYW*, 65-7). For more on Denmark during the Thirty Years' War, see Paul D. Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648: King Christian IV and the Decline of the Oldenburg State* (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1996).

⁴By 1625, his assets totaled close to 1.5 million thalers, plus he had access to the huge fortune of his mother, Queen Sophia; ironically, the only other prince who approached his solvency was Maximilian of Bavaria, who had four million thalers in cash at his disposal in 1618 (Parker, *TYW*, 65).

⁵Albrecht von Wallenstein (or Waldstein) was from a noble yet impoverished Bohemian Protestant family. After converting to Catholicism, Wallenstein attached himself to Ferdinand while the latter was still Archduke of Styria; by 1623, Wallenstein was in the position to profit handsomely from the Bohemian confiscations following the Imperial victory at White Mountain. In 1625, Wallenstein was entrusted with the command of a new Imperial army responsible to the Emperor rather than Maximilian and the League. Wallenstein rose quickly through the social ranks: he was created Duke of Friedland in 1625 and, controversially, Duke of Mecklenburg in 1628.

⁶France's involvement against Spain in the Valtelline inhibited it from making a commitment to Christian in the Empire. On the strategic importance of the Valtelline, see Geoffrey Parker, *Army of*

princes and to contain Habsburg power; in a supplementary secret treaty, they also promised to struggle for the restitution of the Palatinate.⁷ In addition, both England and the United Provinces pledged financial support for the Danish military effort in the Empire.

Although these assurances of a network of support for the Danish war effort were encouraging, unfortunately for Christian it never fully materialized. His allies – particularly England – did not come through with much of the promised assistance.⁸ Charles, now King of England, instead turned the precious subsidies voted to him by Parliament towards his war against Spain, which had been initiated by the disastrous English attempt to attack the Spanish port of Cadiz in November 1625. Nor did the anti-Habsburg powers remain united, and Christian's support melted away as they began to squabble amongst themselves. The Anglo-French alliance collapsed first, and then in 1626 Richelieu refused officially to join the anti-Habsburg alliance because the English and Dutch had declined to help him crush the revolt of their Huguenot co-religionists. Even worse, the following year France and Spain made a short-lived alliance against England, which quickly retaliated by sending an ill-fated expedition under the Duke of Buckingham to assist in the defense of the Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle. At this crucial juncture for the Danes, neither England nor France had the time or the money to become involved in Imperial affairs. Therefore, though

Flanders, chaps. 2-3. The passes were theoretically controlled by the Swiss Protestant *Graubünden*, or Grey Leagues, but they were alternately occupied by Spanish, Austrian, French, and papal troops.

⁷Steiner, 110.

⁸By the Hague Convention (1625), England and the United Provinces each agreed to pay 144,000 thalers a month to help support Christian's cause. Also, English levies under the command of Count Mansfeld were to be integrated into Christian's forces. Christian only received a fraction of the promised amount (547,000 thalers) over the three years of fighting, most of it in 1626. England was particularly negligent in making payments; the Dutch paid their subsidies more promptly, but also came up short of the expected sum (Parker, *TYW*, 69; Asch, 88).

England, the Dutch, and France (the latter for much of the time anyway) continued to follow an anti-Habsburg foreign policy, it was largely aimed at combating Spain rather than assisting the Danes against the Emperor.

Without the promised help, Christian's war effort in the Empire faltered. After several inauspicious campaigns, half of his forces were wiped out at Lutter in 1626 by the League army under Tilly.⁹ In the meantime, his allies Mansfeld and Bethlen fared no better. Mansfeld died in 1626, and Bethlen was forced to make peace with Ferdinand in December of the same year because the Turks, who had just suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Persians, could no longer support his conquest of Habsburg Hungary. Christian's forces were driven back into Denmark, and by late 1627, Imperialist troops occupied Holstein, Schleswig, and Jutland. He was finally forced to conclude the Peace of Lübeck in May 1629, by which he was allowed to retain his lands but was obliged to leave his German allies to Ferdinand's revenge. The dukes of Mecklenburg, for instance, were summarily deprived of their lands and titles, which were then transferred to Wallenstein as payment for his military expenses.¹⁰ Because the Emperor's enemies were defeated or occupied elsewhere, he emerged from this latest contest stronger than ever. Catholic predominance was once again restored, and there was no longer an army to defend the Protestant cause in the Empire.

Despite his strong position, Ferdinand knew that the Palatinate question must be addressed for there to be lasting peace in the Empire. Too many dissatisfied elements in the Imperial community and among foreign powers refused to accept the disposition of the Palatine lands and

⁹Lockyer, *Habsburg and Bourbon Europe*, 350.

¹⁰For the confiscation of the possessions the dukes of Mecklenburg, see Kampmann, 90-8.

titles. As long as this remained the case, Frederick and his heirs would continue to find support to fight for their cause. Therefore, prodded by his council, Ferdinand began to pursue a peaceful solution to this lingering problem. However, he was careful not to push his ally Maximilian too hard to make unwanted concessions to Frederick. Ferdinand still could not afford to estrange himself from Maximilian, who continued to hold Upper Austria as security for repayment of his war debts. Nor did the counter-reforming Emperor particularly wish to reinstate fully the militant Calvinist Frederick to his preeminent position as an elector of the Empire. If a compromise on the Palatinate was indeed to be achieved, Frederick – who was even more inflexible than Maximilian on the subject of acceptable terms for his restoration – would have to make some real concessions to the Emperor, Maximilian, and the Catholic party in the Empire.

Almost immediately after Frederick's proscription and particularly after the Palatine electorate was transferred to Maximilian for life, various proposals for the settlement of the Palatinate question were advanced. All, of course, called for some sort of restoration of the deprived Palatines. Each of these plans, however, ran into difficulties just as quickly as it was presented. The electorate was the most controversial subject. At first, Maximilian insisted that the electorate be made hereditary in the Wilhelmine (Bavarian) line, and refused to countenance any plan that called for compromise where it was concerned. For instance, he summarily rejected a plan forwarded by Spain to restore the electorate to Frederick's heir if he were raised a Catholic.¹¹ In addition to his inflexibility on the subject of the electorate, Maximilian also refused to give up any part of the Palatine lands he occupied. In his mind, maintaining the lands and particularly the electorate in

¹¹Steiner, 113.

Bavarian hands was essential to the cause of the Empire, the Habsburgs, Catholicism, and most importantly Bavarian aggrandizement. And Frederick, despite his disadvantageous position, continued to insist on the full restoration of the Palatine lands and titles. With both sides taking a hard line, the prospects for an agreement were not good.

Still, in early 1627, Imperial and Palatine representatives held secret negotiations at Colmar to try and hammer out a solution. Ferdinand's proposals, however, were completely unacceptable to Frederick. In return for the restoration of a portion of his lands, Frederick would be required not only to submit humbly to the Emperor and renounce his claims to Bohemia, but also to renounce the electorate, allow Catholicism in any restored areas of the Palatinate, and reimburse the Emperor for his war costs. Frederick's proposals were no less exacting than Ferdinand's. In return for renouncing his claim to the Bohemian throne, Frederick expected that his lands would be fully restored and that he and Maximilian would share the electoral title until Maximilian's death, whereupon it would revert to the Palatine line. Also, Frederick was not prepared to accept Catholicism in the Palatinate. Since neither side was ready to make any substantive concessions, the talks at Colmar failed.¹²

The Palatines now hoped that the electors would offer a workable solution at the electoral convention of Mühlhausen, which met in the autumn of 1627 to look for ways to establish permanent peace in the Empire. This meant that the Palatinate question was sure to be on the agenda, as it was recognized that its settlement was essential to a stable peace. From the beginning, however, things did not bode well for Frederick and his family: Palatine, English, and Danish representatives were unable to get a grant of safe passage to attend the convention. With no representation on hand from

¹²Ibid., 114; Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 50-1.

the Palatine side, the electors gave Ferdinand their official opinion on the terms of Palatine restoration, which amounted to much the same offer as that made by the Emperor earlier in the year.¹³ The Catholic electors, however, gave their true opinion in a separate, secret memorandum to Ferdinand: the electorate should be made hereditary in the Bavarian line (and only if this line died out could it revert to the Palatine line); and Catholicism should be retained in any lands restored to the Palatine house. The electors referred a final decision to the Emperor, who with his victories in the Empire against the Danes had for the time being lost interest in negotiating with the Palatine party.¹⁴

With the Catholic electors' opinion regarding the Palatinate question, the way was open for Ferdinand to fulfill the secret promise he had made to Maximilian in 1623. Trauttmansdorff, in his diplomatic début, negotiated the Treaty of Munich of February 1628. By this agreement, Ferdinand went a step beyond the compromise made at Regensburg five years before and made the electorate hereditary in the Bavarian line. Also, he and Maximilian reached a final agreement on the question of the mortgaged Austrian lands and his debt to Bavaria: Ferdinand finally recovered Upper Austria by granting Maximilian the Palatine lands he occupied for thirty years as compensation for his war costs. Thus Maximilian essentially purchased the Upper Palatinate and the Lower Palatinate east

¹³Saxony and Brandenburg did, however, withhold judgment on the fate of the electorate and lands after the death of Maximilian and Frederick.

¹⁴Steiner, 116-7; Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 57; idem, *Maximilian von Bayern*, 86-7.

of the Rhine (the lands he occupied) for the sum of 13 million florins (his war costs).¹⁵ The Palatinate west of the Rhine remained in Spanish hands.

The treaty proved expedient for its signatories and the Catholic cause in the Empire. Once again, Maximilian profited the most. Ever since his occupation of the Upper Palatinate and more particularly the electoral transfer in 1623, he sought to strengthen his hold on these gains. As he had planned, the Munich agreement brought the Palatine electorate and lands even more firmly under Bavarian control. At this point, Maximilian was more determined than ever to hang onto the electorate or the Upper Palatinate; however, he would consider parting with the Bavarian-occupied Lower Palatinate if it were necessary to consolidate his hold on his other gains.¹⁶ Ferdinand benefitted from the settlement as well. For him, it was an opportunity to fulfill his promise to Maximilian and to regain Upper Austria. Given the state of Imperial finances, it would have been an impossible task for him to raise the money to repay Maximilian otherwise. Also, the Emperor conveniently ensured a Catholic majority in the electoral college at the same time he was hoping to secure the election of his son Ferdinand as King of the Romans (Emperor-elect). The Treaty of Munich undoubtedly dealt a harsh blow to the Palatine cause. It meant the loss of the first temporal electorate and a definitive alteration of the Golden Bull of 1356 (the constitution of the Empire), which bound the electorate to the principality of the Lower Palatinate. With the Imperialists at the

¹⁵*Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges in den Zeiten des vorwaltenden Einflusses der Wittelsbacher [BA]*, n.s., *Die Politik Maximilians von Bayern und seiner Verbündeten, 1618-1651*, pt. 2, vol. 4, *1628-Juni 1629*, ed. Walter Goetz (Munich: Beck, 1948), 28-31: 22 Feb. 1628, Treaty of Munich; Steiner, 117-8, 201-2; Albrecht, "Konfessionelle Zeitalter," 387; idem, "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 260. The sum equalled approximately 8,666,667 thalers.

¹⁶Albrecht, "Bayern," 461.

zenith of their power, Frederick would have to wait for the intervention of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden before serious negotiations on the Palatinate question could be reopened.¹⁷

Even while the Emperor was still making his half-hearted attempts to reconcile with the Prince Palatine in 1627, he was already discussing plans for Catholic restoration in the Empire with his councillors and the Catholic electors. Prodded on by Lamormaini and the militants, he resolved to capitalize on his recent military successes and promote the interests of the Catholic Church in the Empire as he had in the Habsburg lands. At the electoral convention at Mühlhausen in 1627, Ferdinand had officially revealed to the Catholic electors his intention to recover church lands for Catholicism that had been illegally alienated according to the Catholics' interpretation of the Religious Peace of Augsburg. His plan was received favorably, particularly by Maximilian of Bavaria and the Archbishop of Mainz, who emerged as the major proponents among the electors for Catholic restoration.

Although the Catholic electors and militants pushed for action on this initiative, some of the most influential Imperial councillors, including Trauttmansdorff, Stralendorf, and the Abbot of Kremsmünster (later the Prince-Bishop of Vienna) urged caution. They counseled Ferdinand against the aggressive restitution of church lands and instead recommended a more conciliatory approach that would be less likely to provoke the Protestant states of Saxony and Brandenburg into war. They reminded him that his top priority in the Empire should be the election of his son as King of the

¹⁷Steiner, 118-9.

Romans, and that achieving this objective would become much more difficult if he alienated the two Protestant electors.¹⁸

At the same time that discussions about Catholic restoration were underway in the Imperial camp, Catholic unity in the Empire began to crumble. One cause of discord was the Emperor's general Wallenstein. The electors, and Maximilian in particular, disliked the enormous power Wallenstein wielded and the large size of his army, which outstripped that of the League. Even more irksome to them was the fact that the more success Wallenstein's new Imperial army enjoyed, the less reliant the Emperor was on their forces and the more the general's power increased. The fact that Wallenstein's army supported itself in large part by coercing contributions from the populace of the principalities where it was quartered did not make him popular with German rulers no matter what their confessional bent. It caused destruction and depopulation wherever it was stationed. As early as 1627, the electors had demanded that Wallenstein reduce the size of his army and bring it under civilian financial control.¹⁹ In addition, they and other German princes suspected that Wallenstein had ambitions to suppress their liberties in order to augment Imperial power as well as his own authority and wealth.²⁰

The other important issue dividing Catholics both at the Imperial court and in the Empire was the conflict that broke out in 1628 between France and Spain over the succession to Mantua and Montferrat in northern Italy, territories that were strategically located on the land route to the

¹⁸Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 51-2, 58-9.

¹⁹Parker, *TYW*, 90-1.

²⁰Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 134.

Netherlands.²¹ The struggle immediately threatened to draw in the Emperor, for two reasons. Firstly, these territories were Imperial fiefs, and it was therefore the Emperor's prerogative to invest the new duke. And secondly, Olivares in his perennial search for allies once again called upon the Austrian Habsburgs for assistance.

In Vienna, the Imperial court was divided over the issue of active Imperial involvement in northern Italy. On the one hand, the Spanish party led by Eggenberg and Collalto predictably supported Imperial military intervention on Spain's behalf. On the other hand, the moderates and militants joined in opposition to it, instead encouraging the Emperor to avoid needless foreign entanglements and seek a peaceful solution to the Mantuan dispute. Then he could concentrate his attention on the Empire, where the moderates hoped he would promote peace, the militants Catholic restoration.²² The Catholic electors, especially Maximilian, also opposed Imperial involvement in Italy because it would distract Ferdinand from his program of Catholic restoration in the Empire. Also, they regarded his support of his Spanish cousins as purely dynastic and detrimental to German interests.²³ The Catholic electors were afraid that active Imperial support of Spain in northern Italy

²¹ After the Duke of Mantua died in 1628, the French-backed Duke of Nevers (the strongest claimant) took over the government, whereupon Spain laid siege to the fortress of Casale in Montferrat. Unfortunately for Spain, the surrender of La Rochelle in October 1628 freed a French army to march into northern Italy. Although the conflict over Mantua was a relatively contained affair, both Spain and France prepared for what both sides saw as the inevitable confrontation to come. Each mobilized their resources and searched for allies; as a result, they both hurried to make peace with England-France in April 1629 and Spain in November 1630. For the background and a more detailed account of the Mantuan succession dispute, see Parker, *TYW*, 36-7, 95-6.

²² Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 67, 72-3, 94; Straub, 338.

²³ Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 67; Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 136.

would result in the same in the Netherlands, thus prolonging the war indefinitely and drawing them in on Spain's side as well.

Maximilian had every right to fear being drawn into a costly war for Habsburg profit, for it had always been an essential element of Olivares's foreign policy strategy to secure Imperial and League assistance against the Dutch, if possible through a formal league of alliance with Spain.²⁴ Spain needed to drive the Dutch rebels to the bargaining table as quickly as possible, and Olivares regarded an offensive and defensive military alliance between Spain and the Emperor – a "Habsburg league" – as the best way to do it.²⁵ He forwarded his first proposals for such an alliance as early as 1624. Constructing the league he envisioned, however, proved as difficult for Olivares as forming an anti-Habsburg alliance had for the Palatines, not only because of Maximilian's resistance, but also because the Emperor and his German allies were occupied with their own war in the Empire and could see no immediate benefit from involving themselves in a war with the Dutch too.²⁶

Despite Ferdinand's reluctance to commit himself to a formal league of alliance with Spain or to intervene actively against its enemies, Olivares continued to press for a firmer Imperial commitment to Spain. To show Madrid's dedication to working in close partnership with Vienna, Olivares arranged a marriage in 1629 between the Emperor's son Ferdinand, King of Hungary, and

²⁴Elliott, "Foreign Policy," 128.

²⁵For more on the Habsburg league, see Günter, *Habsburger-Liga*.

²⁶"The presumed identity of interests between Madrid and Vienna, and the overriding necessity of preserving unity between the two branches of the family, were central to all [Olivares's] thinking about Spain's international position. All too often his hopes were defrauded: Vienna's priorities were not those of Madrid, and even on those occasions when the emperor had the will, he rarely had the wherewithal...and the German princes were unwilling to concur in a policy that threatened them." (Elliott, *Olivares*, 369). For Maximilian's attitude toward Spain's plans for a league in 1624-6, see Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, chap. 8.

Philip IV's sister, the Infanta Maria (who had previously been betrothed to Charles I).²⁷ His persistence finally paid off. In 1629, with relative peace in the Empire after Christian's defeat and the Imperial cause ascendant, Ferdinand finally agreed to send Imperial troops to support Spain in Mantua, despite the strong objections of the electors and many of his councillors. He only took action, however, after the Duke of Nevers (the French-backed candidate) repeatedly refused to recognize the Emperor's jurisdiction in Mantua and Montferrat, and a large French army, made available by the capitulation of La Rochelle, marched into northern Italy to his aid.²⁸ While Olivares succeeded in securing Imperial support in Italy, however, the much-desired Habsburg league still remained elusive. The reluctance on the part of the Emperor and his major councillors to commit to this design foreshadows the political and diplomatic split between the two branches of the House of Habsburg that would widen as time went on. It would manifest itself most conspicuously in the separate peace made by the Emperor with France at Westphalia.

At the same time that Olivares was promoting a Habsburg league, he advanced another, more specific plan for Spanish-Imperial cooperation that was aimed against the Dutch, namely the great "Baltic design."²⁹ He realized that the basis of Dutch power was economic, and that the best way to wage war against the Dutch Republic was to destroy its prosperity and therefore its war chest by attacking its maritime trade.³⁰ Thus in the later 1620s when Imperial armies occupied several

²⁷Elliott, *Olivares*, 369, 397.

²⁸More than 30,000 Imperial troops under the commanders Collalto, Gallas, and Piccolomini were sent to northern Italy to fight for Spain in 1629-30 (Parker, *Europe in Crisis*, 203).

²⁹For a detailed look at Spanish naval strategy in the Baltic, see: Alcalá-Zamora, 229-48, 267-76; Ródenas Vilar, 73-131; and Straub, 288-314.

³⁰Elliott, *Olivares*, 360.

important harbors in northern Germany, Olivares promoted a plan for a joint Spanish-Imperial trade war against the Dutch. It entailed building up a formidable Habsburg fleet in the Baltic and establishing a Habsburg trading company to destroy Dutch control of the lucrative Baltic trade. If the Dutch were cut off from this source of grain, timber, and naval stores, their economy would be so impaired that they would be forced to make peace on terms favorable to Spain.³¹ Although Ferdinand assented to the plan, in the end it came to nothing. Several problems – not least Wallenstein's failure to capture the key Baltic harbor of Stralsund and the resistance of the Hanseatic cities – had doomed the Baltic design to failure by 1629.³²

While Spain tried to persuade the Emperor to commit to a Habsburg league and Catholic unity was deteriorating over the problems of Wallenstein and Mantua, in March 1629 Ferdinand promulgated his long-awaited declaration regarding the restoration of Catholic lands in the Empire – the Edict of Restitution.³³ The Edict was the high-water mark of the Emperor's power in Germany. Even though he claimed that it was only designed to enforce existing Imperial law by compelling Protestants to return Catholic lands that, under the terms of the Religious Peace of Augsburg, had been illegally poached, the Edict actually demanded far more for the Catholic Church than the Peace had originally accorded:

³¹Parker, *Europe in Crisis*, 213-4; Elliott, *Olivares*, 332.

³²*Ibid.*, 361; Parker, *TYW*, 95.

³³A selection from the Edict is printed in Roeck, 267-76. For detailed studies of the Edict, see: Heike Ströle-Bühler, *Das Restitutionsedikt von 1629 im Spannungsfeld zwischen Augsburger Religionsfrieden 1555 und dem Westfälischen Frieden 1648*, *Theorie und Forschung*, vol. 159 (Regensburg: Roderer, 1991); and Michael Frisch, *Das Restitutionsedikt Kaiser Ferdinands II. vom 6. März 1629: eine rechtsgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, *Jus ecclesiasticum*, vol. 44 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1993).

The opening sections of the draft Edict seemed to confirm [the Emperor's claim]: all church lands seized since 1552 (the 'normative date' in the Augsburg peace) were to be restored. But the Edict also declared that ecclesiastical princes had the same right to enforce religious conformity on their subjects as secular rulers. This went far beyond the settlement of 1555 . . . Yet even this was not enough for the Catholic prelates: they proceeded to demand the inclusion in the Edict of a new prohibition of Calvinism, and the application of its terms to Imperial Free Cities, too. . . . the emperor and his advisors finally decided to include the ban on all Protestant sects other than Lutheranism, but to leave the cities out.³⁴

Thus the terms imposed by the Edict, especially the extension of the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* to territories ruled by ecclesiastical princes and the prohibition of Calvinism in the Empire, were far more advantageous to German Catholics (and therefore disadvantageous to German Protestants) than those of the Religious Peace had been.

Lamormaini and the militants as well as the Catholic electors and ecclesiastical princes, who provided the momentum for the Edict, naturally supported the Emperor's statement on Catholic restoration. However not everyone in Vienna was as pleased with it. Actually, Lamormaini was the only key figure at the Imperial court who wholeheartedly supported it. Indeed, many of the Emperor's councillors, particularly those identified with the moderate and pro-Spanish groups, had warned him against issuing the Edict. They thought that his militant Catholic policy would drive the Protestant electors and princes who had earlier supported the Emperor or remained neutral to armed resistance, thus igniting an all-out religious war in Germany. Trauttmansdorff and the moderates, though they did not actively oppose the Edict, had serious reservations about it because they believed that the Emperor and Empire were best served by peace. Eggenberg and the Spanish

³⁴Parker, *TYW*, 88.

faction actively opposed it because religious war in the Empire would distract the Emperor from his commitment in Italy.³⁵

These councillors had good reason to think that the Edict might force into armed resistance Saxony, Brandenburg, and the other German Protestant princes who before had supported the Emperor, or who had remained neutral. Initially, all the Protestants' fears about the Edict seemed justified:

Within eighteen months, six bishoprics and their lands were back in clerical hands, as were 100 convents (with more than 80 more in the process of restitution), while countless parishes, both rural and urban, were reclaimed for a Catholic incumbent. No distinction was made between rebellious (usually Calvinist) and loyal (mostly Lutheran) Protestant states and it was clear that the edict was but one of a series of intended measures aimed at extirpating Protestantism.³⁶

While it seemed that church lands in Saxony and Brandenburg, which had been secularized long before 1552, were for the time being protected from reclamation under the Edict, the Protestant electors still had ample reason for discomfort. Firstly, on the strength of the Edict, Catholics had reclaimed some lands that had been secularized before the normative date. Secondly, soon after the publication of the Edict, the Jesuit Paul Laymann's influential tract *Pacis Compositio* forwarded the argument that Protestants should return any land to which they could not produce valid title. And finally, the Emperor used Imperial troops to enforce the Edict, many of which were stationed close to the borders of Saxony and Brandenburg.³⁷

³⁵Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 78-9.

³⁶Parker, *Europe in Crisis*, 216.

³⁷Parker, *TYW*, 88-9. In the end, however, little was done to enforce the Edict outside of the rebellious Lower Saxon Circle, and nothing was ever done in either Brandenburg or Saxony.

The Edict had been issued by the Emperor with the support of the militants and the Catholic electors, but there were many at the Imperial court who opposed it or simply did not support it. These councillors instead supported more pragmatic and/or dynastic policies. This conflict was also apparent in the opposition of the moderates to the Emperor's intervention on the side of Spain in Mantua. This is important to note, because the voices of these men would grow stronger and more influential as time went on. Under the influence of the moderates, the Emperor did make some moves to find a solution to the Palatinate question. These efforts, however, were stopped dead by the refusal of either Frederick or Maximilian to consider any type of compromise. Bavarian, and particularly Palatine, inflexibility would remain a difficult obstacle to a settlement of the Palatinate question in the years ahead.

The Intervention of Sweden and Habsburg Decline

With the defeat of Christian IV and his Protestant allies and the promulgation of the Edict of Restitution, the position of the Habsburgs in the Empire seemed secure in 1629. But this appearance was deceptive. As the Emperor's moderate councillors had feared, the Edict had alienated German Protestants who had earlier supported the Emperor, or at least not opposed him. Also, despite the apparent Catholic unity generated by the Edict, the rift between the Emperor and his German Catholic allies continued to grow because of differences over Wallenstein and Imperial intervention in Mantua. Even worse, the strong Habsburg military presence along the Baltic provoked yet another foreign invasion of the Empire: on 6 July 1630, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden entered the German war. He declared his intention to defend the liberties of German Protestants, including

Frederick, whose restitution was specifically named as one of the Swedish war aims.³⁸ He also meant to prevent the Habsburgs from establishing firm control over northern Germany and the Baltic.³⁹ So, despite the Emperor's apparently strong position in the Empire as the 1630s opened, factors already existed that would contribute to the rapid and dramatic collapse of the Habsburg and Catholic position in Germany in the years ahead.

In the summer of 1630 Ferdinand called an electoral meeting at Regensburg in order to deal with the various problems confronting the Empire and, as always, to consider options for a permanent peace settlement.⁴⁰ The Habsburgs hoped to secure the approval and support of the electors for several concrete objectives: first and foremost, the election of his son as King of the Romans; second, military assistance for the Habsburgs in northern Italy and the Netherlands; and finally, after Gustavus's landing mere weeks after the opening of the meeting, the same to combat

³⁸However, there was no talk of restoring Frederick to Bohemia (Steiner, 121).

³⁹Parker, *TYW*, 109-10. Gustavus also bore a grudge against the Emperor for sending military aid in 1629 to the King of Poland, who was fighting a war against Sweden. The two sides concluded peace the same year, thus freeing Gustavus to undertake his long-contemplated invasion of Germany. For more on Gustavus's initial war aims, see chap. 1, n. 25.

⁴⁰For events at the Regensburg electoral meeting, see: *BA*, n.s., pt. 2, vol. 5, *Juli 1629-Dezember 1630*, ed. Dieter Albrecht (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1964); idem, *Auswärtige Politik*, chap. 13; idem, "Der Regensburger Kurfürstentag und die Entlassung Wallensteins," in *Regensburg-Stadt der Reichstage: Vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit*, ed. Dieter Albrecht, rev. and enl. ed., 88-108, Schriftenreihe der Universität Regensburg, vol. 21 (Regensburg: Universitätsverlag Regensburg, 1994; Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, chap. 6; and Otto Heyne, *Der Kurfürstentag zu Regensburg von 1630* (Berlin: Guttentag, 1866). The long list of dignitaries and representatives who attended the meeting attests to the importance of the problems—at both the Imperial and European levels—that would be addressed there. The Emperor, Catholic electors, and papal nuncio all attended personally. Saxony and Brandenburg made their opposition to the Edict known by sending only representatives. Many of the major European states—including France, Spain, Venice, Tuscany, and England—sent envoys. Sir Robert Anstruther represented the interests of England in the Palatinate. He was accompanied by Johann Joachim von Rusdorf, the Palatine envoy (Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 264-6). Over 2,000 participants and observers attended (idem, "Regensburger Kurfürstentag," 88).

the Swedes in the Empire. Maximilian and the other electors, however, were not in a conciliatory mood. They had their own concerns that they wanted the Emperor to address, particularly the dismissal of Wallenstein and the reorganization of the Imperial army. After much wrangling, the Emperor agreed to Wallenstein's dismissal (and his replacement by Tilly, the League's general) as well as the reduction and reformation of the Imperial army.⁴¹ However, Ferdinand gained little from these concessions. The electors still refused to pledge their support to the Habsburg wars either in Italy or the Netherlands and instead urged the Emperor to find a peaceful solution to the Mantuan war as quickly as possible. They also declined to recognize young Ferdinand as King of the Romans.⁴² This was a significant setback for Imperial policy. The one request to which they acceded was to help defend the Empire against the advancing Swedes. A further matter upon which the Emperor and Catholic electors agreed, despite the pressures to conciliate the German Protestants now that Swedish troops were on German soil, was the preservation of the Edict in its original form.⁴³

⁴¹Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 267-71; see also idem, "Regensburger Kurfürstentag."

⁴²Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 266.

⁴³In addition to the issues officially on the slate to be considered at Regensburg, the Catholics discussed the Edict of Restitution informally among themselves. With Swedish troops in the Empire, Maximilian and some of the Catholic princes decided that some relaxation of the Edict's provisions was advisable as a conciliatory gesture to the Protestants. The Spaniards, who still hoped for assistance from the Emperor and League, urged Ferdinand to moderate the Edict as well (Günter, 262-4: 23 July 1630, Philip IV to the Duke of Tursi, Spanish representative at Regensburg). However, the confessors—particularly Lamormaini and Contzen—successfully persuaded the Emperor and the Catholic electors that concessions to Protestants were "unacceptable to conscience and that God would give the Catholics complete victory if only they persevered in confidence." (Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 125; see also "Discurs uber des Reichs statum," in which Maximilian explains this interchange, printed in Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 379-81). They thus decided to preserve the Edict in its original form and rejected compromise in favor of Catholic restoration, even though compromise might have enabled the Emperor to maintain the allegiance of the Protestant states and repulse the Swedish invasion. Robert Bireley argues that this choice of Catholic restoration over reason of state reveals most clearly the

In addition to these issues, the Palatinate question was discussed at Regensburg. The Spaniards were particularly eager that the problem be considered at the electoral meeting, for it was an opportunity for them to foster the Anglo-Spanish peace negotiations that had been underway since 1629. Olivares was desperate to end the hostilities with England as soon as possible so Spain could concentrate on fighting the French in northern Italy. The negotiations, however, had constantly run aground over the issue of the Palatinate. Charles exploited the opportunity to recover at least part of the Palatinate for his brother-in-law Frederick: as a condition of peace, he insisted that the Spaniards include their promise to restore the Spanish-occupied Lower Palatinate in the written terms of the treaty. The idea was that once Frederick was in possession of a portion of his lands, he could use them as a springboard to recover the rest of his patrimony. But the Spaniards, who did not wish to relinquish the Lower Palatinate because of its strategic situation and value as a bargaining chip with England, repeatedly sidestepped the English demands.⁴⁴

Olivares finally succeeded in convincing the English that the question of Palatine restitution must be referred for resolution to the electoral meeting at Regensburg, where both the Emperor and Maximilian would be present. Their participation was necessary for a viable settlement, he argued, because the removal of the ban – a prerequisite to the restoration of any of the Palatine lands and titles, including the Spanish-held portion of the Lower Palatinate – was the Emperor's prerogative,

ideological nature of German war (Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 123; idem, "Religious War," 97).

⁴⁴Even during these negotiations, Spain was pursuing a contradictory foreign policy, as it was also pursuing the league with the Emperor and Maximilian that would all but preclude the settlement of the Palatinate question in favor of England (Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 232-6). From the Spanish perspective, whichever would join them against the Dutch would become the more influential.

and Maximilian was in possession of the rest of the Palatine lands and the electorate. Olivares promised England would have Spain's full support in championing Palatine interests at the meeting.⁴⁵

Despite these assurances, Olivares likely had no intention of Spain forfeiting the Lower Palatinate. Although supporting Palatine restoration and maintaining Spain's hold on the Lower Palatine lands were apparently contradictory aims, Olivares could pursue them both because any concessions to the Palatine family were contingent upon the approval of the Emperor and Maximilian. When they refused, as Olivares was almost sure they would, Spain could then conveniently place the blame at their door for the breakdown in negotiations and continue to hold the lands they occupied in the Lower Palatinate as well. Therefore, Olivares could support the Palatine cause as he had promised to seal the peace with England while minimizing the danger that Spain would actually have to forfeit the Lower Palatinate.⁴⁶ That Charles I allowed the referral of the Palatinate question to Regensburg at a time he had such leverage was a great mistake, as time would tell. Since he did not actually engage in war with the Habsburgs again in the course of the Thirty Years' War, it was unlikely he would have as much bargaining power later on as he had at this time.

Olivares's successful referral of the Palatinate question from Madrid to Regensburg increased the enmity that already existed between Spain and Bavaria. Maximilian's primary goal was still the

⁴⁵Ibid., 297-8. Both sides desired peace, so after further negotiations they signed the Treaty of Madrid in November 1630 without any mention of the Palatinate in its terms. Thus, as Olivares had hoped, in the end peace between Spain and England was not hindered by the Palatinate question. For a contemporary printing of the articles of the treaty, see *Articles, entercourse, and commerce concluded in the names of the most high and mighty kings, Charles by the grace of God King of Great Britaine...and Philip the Fourth King of Spaine...in a treaty at Madrit, the fift day of November after the old stile in the yeere of our Lord God M.DC.XXX* (London: Robert Barker by the assignes of Iohn Bill, 1630).

⁴⁶Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 298.

consolidation and full recognition of his position in the Palatinate, and he had always suspected that Spain might undermine this goal by coming to a separate agreement with England that would be detrimental to Bavarian interests and then persuading the Emperor to uphold it. Therefore, he grasped every opportunity to minimize Spanish influence on the settlement of the Palatinate question, or cut it out altogether if possible. Maximilian, for all his political acumen, did not understand that Spain was only slightly more willing than he was to give up its Palatine acquisitions.

This did not mean, however, that Maximilian was against referral of the question to Regensburg, as one might think. On the contrary, he supported it. At the electoral meeting, he could influence the outcome of the negotiations, rather than leaving Spain to make a bilateral agreement with England that would prove disadvantageous to Bavaria. It was characteristic for Maximilian to favor negotiations at venues where he believed he could influence the outcome and make measured concessions, all with the aim of cementing his hold on the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity for his line. Special negotiations with England, the Emperor, and Spain in the later 1630s would bear out.

In the end, Olivares's gamble paid off. As predicted, Maximilian resisted any kind of concession to the Palatines. And even though the other Catholic electors favored Frederick's reconciliation so that a viable peace could be made in the Empire, they could not accept the English and Palatine envoys' insistence on full restitution.⁴⁷ The most they were prepared to offer was the removal of the ban and restoration of a portion of the Palatine lands (with the appropriate protections for Catholicism in those lands), in return for Frederick's humble submission to the Emperor and his

⁴⁷They were willing to restore some territory to Frederick; the Archbishop of Mainz was willing to do so without any restrictions on religion.

renunciation of the Bohemian crown, his hereditary lands and dignities, and all alliances. The electorate was not on the bargaining table at all.⁴⁸ Once again, Frederick's insistence on full restoration rendered the negotiations futile. It was therefore safe for the Duke of Tursi, the Spanish representative, to support the demands of the English and Palatine envoys at Regensburg. As Olivares had hoped, Charles was assuaged by Spain's actions and continued to see negotiation with the Habsburgs as the best hope for Palatine restitution.⁴⁹ Maximilian, conversely, was convinced that Spain was an enemy to be resisted.⁵⁰

Alongside the discussion of German issues, the Emperor carried on negotiations with a French delegation sent to Regensburg to find an acceptable solution to the Mantuan problem. From the moment that Imperial troops had been sent to support Spain in northern Italy, Maximilian and his League allies had protested Ferdinand's dynastic foreign policy. They pressured him to conclude peace with France and turn his attention back to the Empire. At Regensburg, they were determined to press their agenda on this issue and stepped up the pressure for a Franco-Imperial settlement on Mantua.⁵¹ Between this and Gustavus's invasion, Ferdinand was inclined towards peace with the French so that he could turn the large Imperial army in northern Italy towards repulsing the Swedes. When news reached Regensburg in mid-July that the Imperialist army had taken the city of Mantua, the French representatives saw the necessity of concluding a quick settlement before their position

⁴⁸Steiner, 120; Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 299; Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 119-20.

⁴⁹Spain repeatedly used this disingenuous subterfuge to its advantage in its dealings with England, with greater and lesser success, up until the matter of the Palatinate was settled at Westphalia.

⁵⁰Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 299; Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 119-20.

⁵¹For a detailed account of the negotiations leading up to the treaty, and particularly Maximilian's role in them, see Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 284-97.

deteriorated even further. Therefore, in October 1630, they signed the Treaty of Regensburg with the Emperor, which stipulated the joint evacuation of French and Imperial troops from northern Italy, the withdrawal of French support from Imperial foes, and the investiture of the Duke of Nevers as ruler of Mantua and Montferrat.⁵²

In the end, Ferdinand had decided for the interests of the Austrian branch in the Empire rather than for the dynastic interests of the House of Habsburg as a whole. The Spanish Habsburgs, who had no hand in the treaty and had received nothing in return for the ten million ducats they had invested in the war, understandably felt sold out by their Austrian cousins.⁵³ Olivares considered the Treaty of Regensburg to be "an Imperial betrayal of Spain's interests – 'the most discreditable peace we have ever had.'"⁵⁴ Thus the Mantuan war, rather than bringing Madrid and Vienna closer together through a coordinated effort against the French as Olivares had hoped, instead "dangerously soured" their relationship and revealed that the two branches of the House of Habsburg did not necessarily share the same priorities.⁵⁵ This was an uncomfortable situation for Olivares, because by this time he was convinced that France and Spain were set on a collision course. Although confrontation was not yet imminent, it was only a matter of time before war erupted, and Spain

⁵²Parker, *TYW*, 102-3. Louis XIII, angered by the concessions made by the French representatives (who in any case did not have the powers to conclude the settlement), refused to ratify the treaty. He particularly objected to the renunciation of French support for allies or potential allies. Richelieu's authority was so undermined by this incident that he was nearly removed from power by the militant Catholic *dévo*t party ("The Day of the Dupes," 11 November 1630). Because Louis had repudiated the treaty, a final agreement was not reached until the Peace of Cherasco was concluded the following spring; the terms of this agreement were more to his liking.

⁵³Elliott, *Olivares*, 401.

⁵⁴10 Nov. 1630, Olivares to council of state; quoted in Parker, *TYW*, 98.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 97-8.

needed the Emperor's help to bring the war in the Netherlands to a satisfactory conclusion before it was obliged to fight France.

The electoral meeting at Regensburg did not solve the problems confronting the Emperor, but rather made them worse. The rivalry between Ferdinand's two most important allies, Spain and Bavaria, intensified. Bavaria had successfully opposed Spain at almost every turn at the meeting: League support was withheld from the Habsburgs in Italy and the Netherlands; the Edict of Restitution was upheld in its pristine form; the Palatinate question remained unresolved; and peace was concluded between the Emperor and France in northern Italy.⁵⁶ The mistrust between the Emperor's allies only made it more difficult for him to coordinate Imperial policy at a time when, thanks to the Swedish invasion of Germany, he was under intense pressure to do so. He also contributed to the erosion of his own position, as Bodo Nischan has accurately observed, when he bowed to the electors' wishes and dismissed Wallenstein and when he obstinately refused to renounce or alter the Edict:

By sacrificing Wallenstein, Ferdinand lost the one man whose ability and power might conceivably have enabled him to consolidate his recent gains and unite a weak and divided Germany under a strong Habsburg monarchy. By retaining the Edict of Restitution, the emperor and the League princes further alienated the north German Electors, thereby exacerbating existing Protestant-Catholic divisions. The events at Regensburg had, in effect, created a power vacuum. No one was now in control of the Empire.⁵⁷

The stage was set for the collapse of Habsburg and Catholic dominance in Germany and the dramatic upswing in Protestant fortunes driven by the military successes of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.

⁵⁶Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 297.

⁵⁷Parker, *TYW*, 101-2.

While the Emperor tried to deal with the problems that had surfaced at Regensburg, several threats to Maximilian's hold on his newly acquired Palatine lands and titles – the erosion of Imperial dominance, Frederick's restoration as a Swedish war aim, and Spain's support of the Palatine cause to court England – convinced him that he needed outside help to protect them. He turned to France, the arch-rival of the House of Habsburg, for this assistance.⁵⁸ After the Mantuan conflict, Richelieu like Olivares believed it was only a matter of time before war broke out between France and Spain. The Cardinal therefore cagily exploited Maximilian's insecurity regarding his acquisitions in the hope of concluding a Franco-Bavarian alliance that would separate the League from the Emperor and thus weaken Habsburg support. It worked. The two sides undertook secret negotiations for an alliance, finally reaching an agreement in May 1631, but only after Richelieu promised to recognize the hereditary right of the Bavarian Wittelsbachs to the Palatine electoral title.⁵⁹ By the secret Treaty of Fontainebleau, each side agreed not to attack or aid the enemies of the other.⁶⁰

As Maximilian negotiated an alliance with France in an attempt to guarantee his acquisitions, Gustavus was doing the same to try and rustle up some support for his war in the Empire. In January 1631, France and Sweden signed the Treaty of Bärwalde, by which France promised generous

⁵⁸Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 212-30; Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 96. Despite the outcome at Regensburg, his fears regarding Palatine restitution through the agency of Spain were not completely unfounded. Sir Francis Cottington had concluded a secret treaty with Madrid that included Spain's promise—albeit vague—to take steps to restore the Palatinate if England pressed the Dutch to make peace with Spain.

⁵⁹In addition to the reasons given above, the fact that both Pope Urban VIII and Maximilian's Jesuit confessor Adam Contzen favored an alliance with France played a role in Maximilian's decision to negotiate. Urban promoted this alliance as a Catholic counterweight to Habsburg power. He particularly wished to halt Habsburg expansion in northern Italy. Contzen supported the alliance in the hopes of further advancing the Catholic cause in the Empire (Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 128).

⁶⁰Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 253-7, 303-4, 378-9; Parker, *TYW*, 106-8.

financial support for the Swedish war effort in the Empire.⁶¹ Despite the fact that Gustavus had ostensibly intervened to defend German Protestantism, he at first received little open support for his effort from the very princes whose liberties he professed to defend, particularly Saxony and Brandenburg which had the most to lose by breaking with Ferdinand. These states did attempt, however, to create a "neutral third force" in the Empire to function as a buffer between the increasingly impotent Emperor and the foreign invaders. In April 1631, an assembly of Protestant princes called together in Leipzig created a Protestant defensive alliance supported by an independent army, the *Leipziger Bund*. The Protestants once again had an army to counter that of the League and assist Sweden if they chose. In the end the Protestant princes, most notably Brandenburg and Saxony, were compelled to join with the Swedes.⁶²

The Swedes, backed by French money and new allies, were poised for victory. When the Imperialists under Tilly moved on Leipzig, Swedish forces crushed them at Breitenfeld in September 1631 in one of the most resounding triumphs of the Thirty Years' War. Two-thirds of the formerly undefeated Imperialist army was lost.⁶³ With his own lands out of danger, John George of Saxony

⁶¹Convinced of the inevitability of war with Spain, Richelieu was determined to check Habsburg expansion in Germany, and he was happy to subsidize someone else to do it. By the Treaty of Bärwalde of 23 January 1631, France agreed to pay generous subsidies to Sweden (the equivalent of £83,000 annually) for five years in order to help Gustavus Adolphus campaign against the Habsburgs in Germany. In return, Gustavus agreed to respect Bavarian territory and tolerate Catholicism in the areas he occupied. The treaty amounted to open French support of the Protestant cause as well as an indirect declaration of war on the Emperor (Parker, *Europe in Crisis*, 208, 219).

⁶²George William of Brandenburg, under duress by the Swedish military presence on his soil, signed an alliance with Sweden in June 1631, after the sack of Magdeburg by Catholic forces. In September, John George had no choice but to join Sweden when Imperial forces threatened to invade Saxony.

⁶³Parker, *TYW*, 113.

immediately occupied Prague. The Protestants rejoiced – Breitenfeld was their first major victory in the field since the beginning of the war. The tide now turned in favor of the Swedes and their Protestant allies and the Imperial and Catholic advance in the Empire was finally stemmed. As Gustavus triumphantly marched through Germany, more supporters flocked to his banner (some more willingly than others).

After establishing their dominance in northern Germany, the Swedes turned their attention to the strategic areas of the Rhineland and southwestern Germany. They occupied Mainz as their headquarters and drove its Prince Archbishop into exile in Cologne. In the midst of the fray, Gustavus did not forget the Palatinate. He sent Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, a steadfast military supporter of the Protestant cause, to re-take the Lower Palatinate from the Imperialists.⁶⁴ Soon thereafter, Frederick joined Gustavus in the Rhineland to press his cause. Alsace, the hinge of Spain's overland military routes to Flanders, also fell into Swedish hands. The loss of the Palatinate and particularly Alsace dealt a damaging blow to Spain's efforts to keep these routes open.

After securing critical points in the Rhineland, Gustavus moved into southeastern Germany. In April 1632, he invaded Bavaria and routed the League army at Rain, where Tilly was mortally wounded in the fighting. Maximilian's precious duchy was plundered as Gustavus, accompanied by Frederick, marched triumphantly into Munich. Frederick's revenge seemed complete:

⁶⁴Bernard had fought with Protestant armies both in Germany and the Netherlands before joining the Swedish service. He was the joint commander of the Swedish army after 1632. When France joined the war in 1635, he and his army joined the French service. The dukes of Saxe-Weimar had supported both Frederick V and Christian IV against the Emperor, and they were dispossessed for doing so (Duke John Ernest [d. 1626] had been a military commander for the Palatines and then the Danes). They were implacable enemies of the Habsburgs and the Elector of Saxony because the Emperor Charles V had deprived their branch of the family (the Ernestine branch) of the electoral title and most of their lands in 1547 and granted them to the branch from which John George had descended (the Albertine branch) (Parker, *TYW*, 222 n. 17).

Gustavus and Frederick V held a triumphal entry into Munich on 17 May, reviewed their victorious troops, played tennis together on the ducal courts, surveyed the ducal art collection, and plundered it as thoroughly as the Bavarians had plundered Heidelberg ten years before. They also captured over 100 pieces of artillery, much of it belonging to Frederick and his allies. Maximilian was unable to return to his capital for three full years.⁶⁵

Maximilian and what remained of his League army were set to ignominious flight. The situation looked grim for the Catholics. Their fortunes in the war had reached a nadir. It seemed that Gustavus was unstoppable.

With Sweden's successes in the Empire and the Palatinate once again in Protestant hands, it seemed that there was a good possibility of effecting the restoration of the Palatine family. However, Frederick's hopes for restitution were once again raised – and dashed. If Frederick believed that Gustavus would simply hand the Palatinate back to him without any stipulations, he was sorely disappointed. Even before Gustavus had marched into the Palatinate, it was apparent to the English ambassador Sir Henry Vane, whom Charles had sent to negotiate an alliance with the Swedish King, that Gustavus would only relinquish it to Frederick for a price: "If this king gets the Palatinate, it will be hard fetching it out of his hands without satisfaction."⁶⁶ Vane's prognostication was proved correct. At first, Gustavus made Frederick's restoration contingent upon England providing troops and a monetary contribution to the Swedish war effort.⁶⁷ Then, in September 1632, the Swedish King raised his demands, insisting that England not only join the land war, but also provide naval protection in the Baltic. In addition, Gustavus asked for the military support of the

⁶⁵Ibid., 116.

⁶⁶PRO, SP 81, German States: 12 Nov. 1631, Vane to Viscount Dorchester, quoted in Gardiner, vol. 7, 189.

⁶⁷Gardiner, vol. 7, 189; Steiner, 122.

restored Prince Palatine and the equality of the Lutheran and Calvinist confessions in his lands. Charles realized that he would have to summon Parliament to finance these efforts; he thus rejected these demands.⁶⁸ Frederick, who continued to insist upon unconditional restoration to his lands and titles, also rejected the offer. He was as unwilling to accept the Swedish terms for his restoration as the Imperial terms, despite the fact that his expectations were unreasonable. When both Gustavus and Frederick died in late 1632, the fate of the Palatinate was left undecided. Swedish Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna named Frederick's brother Ludwig Philipp von Simmern administrator of the Palatinate, but only after he agreed to the limitations imposed by the Swedish occupiers.⁶⁹ For the time being, the Palatinate had become the pawn of Oxenstierna and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar.⁷⁰

As the Swedes marched across the Empire in the months after the meeting at Regensburg, where Bavaria had appeared to be so strong, Spain's influence rose dramatically at the Imperial court at Bavaria's expense. This development was primarily motivated by two occurrences. The first was the Spaniards' discovery and exposure of the secret Franco-Bavarian treaty in the spring of 1631, which they exploited to turn the Emperor against Maximilian and increase his reliance on Spain. The disclosure of Maximilian's machinations with France behind the back of his Habsburg allies aroused suspicion against him in Vienna and estranged him from the Emperor.⁷¹ It also confirmed

⁶⁸Gardiner, vol. 7, 196.

⁶⁹Ibid., 202.

⁷⁰Ibid., 123.

⁷¹Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 257-62. While Maximilian viewed the treaty as a way to protect his gains and Bavaria from Swedish attack, to the Habsburgs it seemed like a betrayal. Ferdinand feared Bavaria would make a secret arrangement with France and Sweden against the Habsburgs, while Maximilian suspected the Emperor might cut a deal with Saxony at the expense of Bavaria and Catholic interests, as Spain advocated (Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 170).

Spain's view that Maximilian was a tool of France, which meant to stir up trouble in the Empire and weaken the Habsburg position.⁷² The second factor that augmented Spanish influence with the Emperor was Sweden's success in the Empire. Ferdinand could no longer rely on Bavaria for support, as it was itself beleaguered by the Swedes, who shattered the League army and left the duchy in ashes. He therefore needed Spanish help more than ever to fend off his enemies.⁷³

Olivares, as always, hoped to exploit this development to secure a firm Imperial commitment against Spain's primary enemies, the Dutch and French. The chances for realizing the coveted Habsburg league increased as Gustavus continued his advance; in their desperation, the Emperor's ministers began to talk again about forming an alliance between the Emperor, Spain, and any German princes willing to participate.⁷⁴ But Olivares realized that the war in the Empire had to be brought to a successful conclusion before the Emperor and German princes could come to the aid of Spain. In order to achieve this, he supported a peaceful policy of accommodation with the Protestants, particularly Saxony, and the recall of Wallenstein to lead the Imperial army against the Swedes.⁷⁵ Even Wallenstein's old adversary Maximilian did not resist this move. Indeed he too

⁷²For the view of Madrid, see: Günter, 276-83: 22 Apr. 1631, Philip IV to Guastalla, Spanish envoy in Vienna; *ibid.*, 285-6: 28 May 1631, same to Cadereyta, Spanish envoy in Vienna; *ibid.*, 286-7: 19 June 1631, same to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, 287-8: 19 June 1631, same to Guastalla.

⁷³At the same time that Spanish influence was recovering at the Imperial court, that of Lamormaini and the militants waned. The Protestant successes quickly turned public opinion against those were identified with the policy of "no compromise" on the Edict. Leading members of the Imperial privy council, including Eggenberg, Stralendorf, Trauttmansdorff, and the Abbot of Kremsmünster (now Prince-Bishop of Vienna), continued to support the peaceful policy of accommodation with the Protestants that was advocated by Spain (Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 157, 171).

⁷⁴Günter, 97-105.

⁷⁵For an example of Olivares's advice to the Emperor to suspend the Edict and ally with Saxony, see Gardiner, vol. 7, 180-1 n. 2: 28 May 1631, Philip IV to Cadereyta.

called for Wallenstein's reinstatement, as he recognized that Wallenstein was the only general capable of turning back the Swedish advance. Just one year after signing the Treaty of Fontainebleau, the panic-stricken Duke begged the Emperor to save Bavaria and renewed his commitment to an Imperial alliance.⁷⁶

Wallenstein, after securing from the desperate Emperor significant concessions that bordered on military and diplomatic independence, quickly raised a new Imperial army and went on the offensive against the Swedes and their allies. First, he drove the Saxons out of Bohemia and Silesia, and then he invaded Saxony itself in order to draw the Swedes out of Bavaria. In November 1632, Wallenstein finally confronted the Swedes at Lützen. Although the battle itself was indecisive, the death of Gustavus Adolphus in the fighting was a victory for the Imperialist cause. Protestant spirits in the Empire and throughout Europe flagged at the loss of their charismatic leader, while Catholic enthusiasm was revived.

At Lützen, the tide of Protestant success was finally stemmed, and the two sides were placed once more on equal footing. This situation prompted them to scramble for the foreign support that might tip the balance in their favor, with "the hopes of Sweden pinned ever more firmly on France, those of the emperor fixed increasingly on Spain."⁷⁷ Under the influence of Spain, the Imperialists fought on after Lützen not to restore the hegemony they had enjoyed in the 1620s but to improve

⁷⁶When the Pope realized that the preservation of Catholicism in the Empire depended upon Bavarian-Imperial cooperation, he ceased to encourage Richelieu's attempts to separate them. Still, Urban's financial support to the Imperial cause remained paltry (Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 339-40).

⁷⁷Parker, *TYW*, 118.

their military position to the point that they would be able to secure reasonable conditions for peace with German Protestants.⁷⁸

After Gustavus's untimely death, Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna took over the reigns of power in Sweden and ruled in the name of the young Queen Christina. Sweden was exhausted by the many years of war in Poland and now Germany, and Oxenstierna realized that if the Swedish war effort in the Empire was to continue, it required more active support from allies in addition to subsidies. Oxenstierna thus took the lead in forming a united alliance of its Protestant supporters in west and south of the Empire, the Heilbronn League, in April 1633.⁷⁹ The Heilbronn confederates pledged to continue fighting until three goals were obtained: the preservation of German liberties, the restoration of Protestant estates, and appropriate compensation for Swedish involvement in Germany.⁸⁰ In September, France joined the Heilbronn League, thus openly supporting the Protestant side and repudiating its secret alliance with Bavaria.⁸¹ Saxony and Brandenburg did not join, but they threw in their lot with Sweden for another campaign.

While the Imperialists were pinned down fighting the Swedes in the Empire, Richelieu exploited the confusion by establishing French bridgeheads in the Rhineland. By 1633, Swedish and French advances in Germany completely blocked the military corridors that allowed Spain to provision its army in Flanders from its bases in Italy. After Gustavus's victory at Breitenfeld and

⁷⁸Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 189.

⁷⁹The coalition joined the Franconian, Swabian, and Upper and Lower Rhenish circles.

⁸⁰Parker, *TYW*, 121. As for appropriate compensation, territory on the south Baltic coast (namely Pomerania) sprung to Swedish minds, much to the chagrin of the elector George William of Brandenburg, who had a legitimate claim on the area.

⁸¹Steiner, 123.

invasion of the Rheinland in 1631, both the Palatinate and Alsace fell into Swedish hands. The loss of Alsace, the hinge of the corridors, was particularly damaging. Although the pivotal bridgehead of Breisach was saved, it became very difficult for Spain to move its recruits to Flanders.⁸² The loss of Alsace was serious, but the French invasion of Lorraine in 1633 cut all Spain's major military routes at once, because all depended on right of passage through the duchy.⁸³ Olivares lamented Spain's dire situation:

The King of France has entirely closed the Italy-Flanders route. France lies between Spain and Flanders, so that no help from Germany can reach either Flanders or Italy; none from Italy can reach Flanders; and none can reach Spain from Flanders or Flanders from Spain except by way of the Channel, bordered by French ports on one side and English ports on the other, and swarming with Dutch.⁸⁴

Spain was left to rely upon the sea route, and therefore the pleasure of England, to transport its troops and supplies through the Channel to Flanders.

Despite their advances and the new commitment made at Heilbronn, tensions grew between Sweden and her German allies. With the encouragement of the Emperor, Wallenstein exploited this rift by opening negotiations with the German Protestants, particularly Saxony and Brandenburg, in an attempt to detach them from Sweden and promote a settlement with the Emperor. At this time, Vienna was hoping for an agreement between Catholic and Protestant states that would serve as the basis for an eventual alliance to expel foreigners from the Empire and bring any renegade German

⁸²Parker, *Army of Flanders*, 55, 58, 73.

⁸³Ibid., 76. The French invaded Lorraine, occupying Nancy and other major strongholds, and forced Duke Charles into exile for aiding critics of the French government, including Gaston of Orléans (the French heir presumptive), and for allowing the Habsburgs to raise troops and occupy two key fortresses in Lorraine. The exiled Duke became a Habsburg general. A strong French military presence in Lorraine was essential to Richelieu's anti-Habsburg strategy (Elliott, *Olivares*, 464; Parker, *TYW*, 130-1).

⁸⁴Elliott, *Olivares*, 464.

states back into line.⁸⁵ Spain supported this move, hoping that a settlement between the Emperor and the Protestant princes would result in German aid for Spain against the Dutch and French.

Hopes of peace through Wallenstein's diplomatic endeavors, however, came to an abrupt end. The Emperor had become increasingly suspicious of his conduct of the secret negotiations.⁸⁶ The last straw was the General's attempt to render himself untouchable by requiring his officers to swear an oath of loyalty to his person at Pilsen in January 1634. The Emperor regarded this move as treasonous and decided that it was necessary to remove his overmighty subject.⁸⁷ By Imperial order, a group of Wallenstein's own officers assassinated him at his home in Eger on 25 February 1634. The Emperor's son, Ferdinand, King of Hungary, assumed supreme command of the Imperial army.

Habsburg Recovery and the Peace of Prague

The Habsburgs could not accept the altered situation in Germany with equanimity. They were determined to clear southern Germany of Protestant troops and to re-open the land route to Flanders.⁸⁸ The situation became all the more pressing when Archduchess Isabella, who had ruled

⁸⁵Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 198. Lamormaini and the militants predictably opposed reconciliation because it would mean concessions to Protestants.

⁸⁶Some of these negotiations were authorized (e.g., with Saxony) and some were not (e.g., with France).

⁸⁷Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 138. The Emperor declared Wallenstein a "notorious rebel" before he sent out his assassins. For a detailed look at the Emperor's proceedings against Wallenstein, see Kampmann, 101-72. Wallenstein had made many enemies. For a summary of the arguments of his critics and reasons for his dismissal by assassination, see Parker, *TYW*, 123-5. A contemporary account reported that the group of his own officers who killed him "drew him out by the heels, his head knocking upon every stair, all bloody, and threw him into a coach and carried him to the castle where the rest [of the dead] lay naked, close together...and there he had the superior place of them, being the right hand file, which they could not do less, being so great a general." (quoted in Lockyer, *Habsburg and Bourbon Europe*, 360).

⁸⁸Elliott, *Olivares*, 465.

the southern Netherlands since the death in 1621 of her husband, Archduke Albert, herself died in December 1633. The Cardinal Infante Ferdinand, brother of Philip IV and the new governor of the Netherlands, had to find a way to break through Germany and get up to Flanders.⁸⁹ In this time of difficulty, a closer collaboration emerged between Madrid and Vienna, much to Olivares's delight. The Habsburgs developed a plan for the Imperial army under Ferdinand, King of Hungary, and Spanish forces under the Cardinal Infante to join together in Germany. If all went well, this grand Habsburg army would expel the Protestants from south and southwest Germany and restore Spain's overland communications.⁹⁰ As planned, in September 1634 Imperial and Spanish armies met outside of the free Imperial city of Nördlingen in Bavaria. There the combined Habsburg forces led by the two Ferdinands met and inflicted a catastrophic defeat upon the Swedes and their Heilbronn allies under the joint command of Gustav Horn and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar.⁹¹

The success of the Habsburg cooperation at Nördlingen precipitated a breakthrough for Olivares's plans for a Habsburg League. Count Oñate, who was still serving as Spanish ambassador to Vienna, finally persuaded the Emperor to sign the long-discussed league of alliance with Spain,

⁸⁹The Archduke Albert, son of Emperor Maximilian II, served as viceroy of Portugal and advisor to Philip II before he was named governor of the Netherlands in 1596. Soon thereafter, he became joint sovereign ruler with his cousin, the Infanta Isabella (daughter of Philip II), whom he married in 1599. The Archdukes ruled the south Netherlands together from 1598 until Albert's death in 1621. Isabella continued to rule as governor-general until her own death in 1633.

⁹⁰Parker, *Army of Flanders*, 259.

⁹¹At Nördlingen the Habsburg army, 33,000 men strong, substantially outnumbered the Protestants, at 25,000 men. Almost half of the Protestants were killed on the field and around 4,000 more taken prisoner, among them Horn himself. Olivares dubbed the Habsburg triumph at Nördlingen "the greatest victory of our times." (Parker, *TYW*, 126).

the secret League of Ebersdorf, in October 1634.⁹² Under the terms of the treaty, the Emperor promised to assist Spain in its war against the Dutch and to allow it to maintain an army in Germany at its own expense. He also agreed not to settle the question of the Palatinate without prior consultation with Spain.

With the signing of this league, however, Spanish expectations were for the most part disappointed. Olivares hoped that the Emperor would assist Spain against both of its arch-enemies, the Dutch Republic and France. However, the Emperor would not commit to war with France, and at this point, it rather than the Dutch Republic was Spain's greater worry.⁹³ Imperial help against the French would have been particularly welcome, as they continued to control strategic areas in Alsace and along the Rhine, thus blocking Spain's overland military routes to Flanders.⁹⁴ Also, the Emperor still would not engage in war with the Dutch, let alone the French, until he had secured a favorable peace in the Empire.

The successful cooperation at Nördlingen, which Olivares had sought to exploit for Spain's profit, dealt a devastating blow to the Swedes and their Protestant allies. In fact, Nördlingen was as disastrous for the Swedes as Breitenfeld had been for the Imperialists. The Swedes lost southern Germany, and the military advantage swung back in favor of the Emperor and League. Many of Sweden's allies saw Nördlingen as a portent and deserted the alliance soon thereafter. Sweden itself withdrew from the Heilbronn League in December 1634.

⁹²Günter, 184; Mecenseffy, 29. The text of the secret League of Ebersdorf of 31 October 1634 is printed in Günter, 425-6.

⁹³*Ibid.*, 173, 184-5.

⁹⁴Elliott, *Olivares*, 482.

Perhaps the most damaging outcome of Nördlingen for the Protestant cause, however, was the defection of Saxony and its subsequent negotiations with the Imperialists. The Emperor, who was once again negotiating from a position of strength, decided the time was right to bring the German states together under his banner, drive the foreigners out, and restore peace to the Empire. And at this point, John George of Saxony was prepared to listen. Ten weeks after the battle, the negotiations between Saxony and the Emperor – those originally initiated by Wallenstein – yielded a tentative agreement, the Preliminaries of Pirna. Its terms were advantageous for both parties. The signatories recognized Saxony's right to Lusatia (which John George had held since 1620 as security for the repayment of his Bohemian war expenses) and Magdeburg, and the permanent transfer of the Upper Palatinate and electorate to Bavaria.⁹⁵ They agreed to form one army composed of Saxon, Bavarian, and Imperial troops to combat foreign forces in the Empire, and the Emperor promised to grant amnesty to secular rulers who had taken up arms against him. The normative date was set at November 1627 for the restitution of church lands and the exercise of permitted faiths, effectively suspending the Edict for the next forty years. This was a significant compromise that permitted Catholics to preserve their gains in southern Germany, but protected secularized lands in the north.⁹⁶

When news of the terms of the preliminary agreement with Saxony reached Vienna, there was an immediate confrontation at the Imperial court between those who supported concessions to Saxony and the other Protestant states and those who did not. Lamormaini and the militants predictably continued to uphold the cause of Catholic restoration by advising the Emperor against

⁹⁵BA, n.s., pt. 2, vol. 10, *Der Prager Frieden von 1635*, ed. Kathrin Bierther (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997), 1545-85: Preliminaries of Pirna.

⁹⁶Bireley, "Religious War," 100; Parker, *TYW*, 127.

concessions, particularly the backpedaling on the Edict.⁹⁷ Ranged against him were the moderates – the influential councillors Stralendorf, Trauttmansdorff, the Prince-Bishop of Vienna, and Cardinal Dietrichstein (who had replaced Eggenberg as director of the privy council). They were joined by many prominent clerics, notably Cardinal Pázmány of Esztergom and the court Capuchins. These men supported a policy of compromise and peace with Saxony and the other Protestant states that would enable the Emperor to oust the foreign invaders from the Empire and deal with any German states that continued to oppose him. This meant some modification of the Edict.⁹⁸

Although the majority of Ferdinand's councillors favored peace, their arguments alone were not sufficient to persuade him to complete the peace process. He needed reassurance that his preliminary peace proposals were acceptable to God. In February 1635, Ferdinand therefore put the proposals before a panel of his theologians, among them Lamormaini.⁹⁹ During the panel's deliberations, the confessor strongly voiced his interpretation of the Imperial victory at Nördlingen as yet another sign of God's support for the policy of Catholic restoration in the Empire. He consequently called on Ferdinand to reject all compromise with the Protestants and to abandon the agreement with Saxony. However, most of the other panel members viewed Nördlingen as a propitious victory that would not necessarily be repeated, and they accordingly advised Ferdinand

⁹⁷Instead he promoted the rather unlikely scheme of a rapprochement with France and a united Catholic front against the Protestants.

⁹⁸Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 208.

⁹⁹The Emperor, like many other princes of the day, called panels like this one on an *ad hoc* basis to consider certain questions of moment. Its membership was not fixed, nor did its decisions carry any weight beyond what the Emperor chose to assign to them.

to make peace with the Protestants before they regained the upper hand on the field of battle.¹⁰⁰ Not only did most Imperial privy councillors and theologians support conciliation with the Protestants and peace in the Empire, but so did Ferdinand's allies. Spain urged it in the hope that once internal squabbles were settled, the Emperor and German states would back Spain in its unavoidable war against France. Even Maximilian of Bavaria and the Elector of Mainz preferred the agreement to continued war.¹⁰¹ This showed how these interest groups, Bavaria and Spain among them, were willing to compromise in favor of pragmatic goals, even at the cost of the Catholic cause in the Empire.

Ferdinand, his conscience soothed, took their advice. On 30 May 1635, he signed the final peace agreement with Saxony at Prague. Its terms were essentially those of the preliminary agreement with a few alterations, most notably the enforcement of the Edict in a few additional areas and the rejection of amnesty for certain princes of the Empire, including the Palatines.¹⁰² All German states not specifically excluded by the amnesty were invited to submit to the Emperor by accepting the terms of the agreement and joining forces with him to expel the foreigners from the Empire and restore peace. By this time, most of them found the interference of foreign armies in Germany more menacing than the threat posed by the Emperor.¹⁰³ Tired of the destruction of war

¹⁰⁰Parker, *TYW*, 128; Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 214-9.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, 219; *idem*, *Maximilian von Bayern*, 213-20.

¹⁰²*BA*, n.s., pt. 2, vol. 10, 1606-31: Peace of Prague.

¹⁰³Throughout the 1620s and early 1630s, many German princes—particularly the Protestants—feared the unbridled extension of Imperial influence that was so blatantly exhibited in the deprivation of various princes and redistribution of their lands, the electoral transfer, and the promulgation of the Edict (which was single-handedly issued without consultation with most of the princes of the Empire or the approval of a Diet). These princes felt their liberties were under attack by the

and influenced by a rising wave of German patriotism, they accepted the Emperor's offer.¹⁰⁴ The Empire, for the most part, had made peace with itself.

Germany's destiny, unfortunately, was no longer in its own hands. A mere eleven days after the signing of the Peace of Prague, the long-anticipated war between France and Spain became a reality. Louis XIII declared war on Spain citing Spanish occupation of strategic points in Trier, which had been under French protection since 1632, and the arrest of its elector.¹⁰⁵ The Spanish actions in Trier, however, were a mere pretext for the French declaration of war. The real reason was that the anti-Habsburg cause in the Empire was incapable of mounting effective opposition to the Habsburgs after the annihilation of the Swedish army at Nördlingen and subsequent collapse of the Heilbronn League. French intervention, therefore, was necessary to prevent Swedish capitulation and keep the war against the Habsburgs in the Empire alive. France's support of the Swedish war effort and the continuation of war in the Empire would prevent Spain from turning its full fury on France and its Dutch allies. It would also put additional stress on the Spanish system, which was

Emperor, and some even suspected that he was attempting to establish an absolute Habsburg monarchy in the Empire. Although Ferdinand did see the war as an opportunity to extend his influence, he had no plans to transform the Empire into an absolute monarchy (Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 18-21; idem, "Kaiser Ferdinand II. und das Problem des Reichsabsolutismus: Die Prager Heeresreform von 1635," in *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg: Perspektiven und Strukturen*, 260-64; Burkhardt, 96-9; Asch, 36-7; Michael Hughes, *Early Modern Germany, 1477-1806* [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992], 88-9, 91; cf. Wandruszka, *Reichspatriotismus*, and Franz, "Glaube und Recht").

¹⁰⁴For the revival of patriotism in Germany, see Wandruszka, *Reichspatriotismus*.

¹⁰⁵Philip Christopher von Sötern. He remained imprisoned for ten years. Since 1632, France had slowly but surely established a military presence in the area between the French border and the Rhine by acting as protector to cities and principalities that wished to avoid Spanish or Swedish occupation. The French gained strategic footholds on the right bank of the Rhine, including the fortresses of Coblenz, Ehrenbreitstein, and Philippsburg when the Elector of Trier asked for French protection. They also established themselves in Heidelberg. The French presence along the Rhine made conflict with the Habsburgs a certainty.

already brittle from years of war. Richelieu hoped to engineer its final collapse. France's open entry into the war infused the anti-Habsburg cause in the Empire with the critical strength it needed to carry on, as it provided fresh troops and a large war chest. At this point a breach between the Emperor and France was unavoidable, but it was not until March 1636 that Ferdinand made his formal declaration of war.

The confrontation that Olivares had long predicted had finally arrived, and he once again looked to Vienna for support. He hoped that the conclusion of the Peace of Prague would enable the Emperor to destroy his remaining foreign enemies and deploy his resources against the Dutch Republic and hopefully France as well.¹⁰⁶ Despite all the support Madrid had provided to the Imperial cause in the Empire and the promises Ferdinand made when he agreed to the secret league with Spain the previous year, meaningful Imperial support for Spain's efforts against either the Dutch or French failed to materialize. Ferdinand was no longer interested in the league after Saxony and most of the other German states had joined with him at Prague. Ironically, the reconciliation that Spain had helped to effect between the Emperor and his domestic foes contributed significantly to the final collapse of Spanish plans for a Habsburg league.¹⁰⁷

In many ways Ferdinand's reluctance to come to the aid of his Spanish cousins is understandable, as the Peace of Prague failed to bring peace to Germany. Despite the apparent resurgence of German patriotism that permeated the peace process, the Peace did not unite the German states and the Emperor to the extent necessary to end inter-German strife, let alone drive the

¹⁰⁶Parker, *TYW*, 129.

¹⁰⁷Günter, 178, 198.

foreigners from the Empire.¹⁰⁸ Although most German princes – including all the electors – joined the Imperial side, some – particularly the northern princes – did so only halfheartedly and resisted making contributions to the unified Imperial army established in the Peace.¹⁰⁹ Others remained outside the alliance, either because they rejected the amnesty or were excluded from it.¹¹⁰ Among them were Bernard of Saxe-Weimar (who placed his army in the French service), William of Hesse-Kassel, and the new Count Palatine Charles Louis.¹¹¹ The Peace dealt a particular blow to the Palatine cause, because it not only excluded Charles Louis from amnesty, but also confirmed the transfer of his title and dominions on the right bank of the Rhine to Maximilian of Bavaria.¹¹² Given the close ties between Charles Louis and his uncle Charles I, this decision was bound to have a serious effect on Anglo-Habsburg relations, which despite the disappointment of Regensburg had been relatively harmonious since the Peace of Madrid of 1630.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸For the decline of confessional opposition and corresponding revival of patriotism in Germany, see Wandruszka, *Reichspatriotismus*. German public opinion denounced the presence of foreign armies on German soil as the source of all its misery.

¹⁰⁹For the military settlement at Prague and its implications, see Haan, "Kaiser Ferdinand II," 208-64.

¹¹⁰An important clause of the Peace of Prague stipulated that only those princes who had taken up arms against the Emperor after Sweden's invasion of Germany in 1630 were to receive an automatic pardon for their rebellion. All others must negotiate with the Emperor for a pardon. A number of them were excluded from the Peace altogether: this applied to many of the Calvinists, the Elector of Brandenburg being one of the very few exceptions.

¹¹¹William of Hesse-Kassel, who supported both Sweden and France, was driven from his lands and died in exile in 1637. The Emperor also excluded Kassel, Württemberg, Baden-Durlach, and exiles from Bohemia and Upper Austria from the amnesty (Steiner, 125).

¹¹²Maximilian, however, no longer controlled the portion of the Lower Palatinate he formerly occupied, because French troops had invaded it in the winter of 1634-5.

¹¹³For England's reaction, see chap. 8.

The Empire was not adequately united to drive out the foreign invaders, and those most deeply involved in the war in Germany, namely France and Sweden, had no intention of leaving. If anything, the Peace of Prague encouraged more committed foreign participation. On the one hand, the defection of Sweden's German allies to the Emperor was one of the main reasons France became openly involved in the war. On the other, the fact that the Peace failed to address the interests of foreign states made them even more determined to continue fighting against the Habsburgs. France and Sweden in particular already had too much invested in the struggle in Germany to simply desert it. Oxenstierna was determined to obtain territorial satisfaction for Sweden's military efforts in the Empire, and Richelieu refused to abandon the struggle until the Habsburgs were finally defeated. By the Treaty of Compiègne of April 1635, these powers agreed to fight on until their demands were satisfied. The Peace of Prague therefore did not promote peace in the Empire as the Habsburgs had hoped, but instead encouraged a Habsburg-Bourbon war for European hegemony that would be fought mainly on German soil for the next thirteen years, with the Habsburg states aligned against France, Sweden, and the Dutch.¹¹⁴ Habsburg hopes that the Peace of Prague would bring permanent peace to Germany were shattered. In the end, a German peace was inadequate to resolve what had become a European war.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 20-5.

¹¹⁵The Peace therefore changed the character of the war and the complexion of the group dedicated to opposing the Habsburgs in the Empire. With the defection of many of Sweden's former allies to the Imperialist side, the anti-Habsburg cause fell almost entirely into foreign hands. Without a sizable contingent of German allies to consider, the attitude of the interventionists changed accordingly. Although they continued to pay lip service to upholding German liberties and (in the case of Sweden) the Protestant cause, both Richelieu and Oxenstierna saw the war as an opportunity to increase the advantage and prestige of their countries (Parker, *TYW*, 138).

For all its failings, the Peace did mark a significant turning-point in the Thirty Years' War in that it brought about a notable scaling-down in the religious aspect of the struggle and paved the way for a lasting peace settlement.¹¹⁶ It showed that German Protestants and Catholics were no longer uncompromisingly ranged against each other in monolithic blocs, and that they were finally willing to work together to achieve a common goal. In particular, the peace agreement defused (though did not eliminate) confessional tensions between the Emperor and the Protestant German princes, which in turn fostered a relaxation in the political power struggle between them. When making political decisions, they now tended to give greater weight to political and dynastic rather than religious interests.¹¹⁷ These developments indelibly altered the character of the war and gave real hope that a lasting peace settlement between Protestants and Catholics could be achieved. The most aggressive phase of the Counter Reformation in the Empire was at an end.

With the rejection of the militant policy at Prague, there was a decided shift to moderate policies in Vienna and an atmosphere of anticipation of the peace that eventually would come at Westphalia.¹¹⁸ The political influence of Lamormaini and the militants on Imperial policy waned. The Emperor, supported by Maximilian and the other Catholic electors, had publicly repudiated his conviction that the cause of Catholic restoration in the Empire was guaranteed divine support and

¹¹⁶Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 15-8.

¹¹⁷There were times, of course, that religious and dynastic interests coincided and could not be easily delineated from one another.

¹¹⁸Bireley sees two major tendencies toward secularization of Imperial politics that result from the Peace of Prague: the rejection of revelation as a source of policy and "demise of the crusading spirit" that heralded the end of holy war; and the declining role of the papacy in Imperial politics. Both of these trends were confirmed by the Peace of Westphalia (Bireley, "Religious War," 102-3).

that concessions to Protestants were unacceptable to God.¹¹⁹ This is not to say, however, that they neglected the Catholic cause after this point, only that they accepted the argument of the moderates that religious concessions could be of greater benefit to Church and Empire than war.¹²⁰ With the triumph of their policy of peace with the German Protestants at Prague, the pragmatic, moderate councillors—among them Stralendorf, Trauttmansdorff, the Prince-Bishop of Vienna, and Cardinals Dietrichstein and Pázmány—gained the upper hand at the Imperial court. They would not relinquish control of Imperial policymaking until after the war had come to an end.¹²¹

In conclusion, the years between the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Prague saw events and developments that would have a great impact upon Anglo-Imperial relations in the later 1630s. The first was Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian crown, his subsequent defeat and proscription, and the dispersal of his lands and dignities. The Emperor's reliance on the assistance of Bavaria and Spain to combat Frederick and his supporters ensured that Imperial allies would have some influence on Imperial policy making, though how much fluctuated with time and circumstance. This created a difficult situation at the Imperial court, because the goals of Spain and Bavaria did not necessarily coincide with one another, nor with those of the Emperor.

¹¹⁹Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 224. Bireley shows that the militant policy championed by Lamormaini became increasingly difficult to maintain after 1630, with the Swedish advance in the Empire and the growing threat of French intervention. As his influence diminished, that of the moderate and Spanish parties, which supported conciliation and accord with the Protestants, increased. The Peace of Prague in March 1635 marked the decisive rejection of his plans for the restoration of Catholicism in Germany.

¹²⁰Many of these men had long advised Ferdinand that achievement of the militant program of Catholic restoration in the Empire was impossible, and that he should make peace with the German Protestants so he could consolidate his own position in the Habsburg territories.

¹²¹Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, 227-9; idem, "Religious War," 103.

During the Habsburg ascendancy of the latter 1620s, the Emperor was able to forward his Catholic agenda in the Empire and did not have much incentive to make concessions to the Palatine House, though he did take some small steps in that direction. The collapse of the Habsburg position soon after the entry of Sweden into the war, however, put him in a more conciliatory mood. His position in the 1630s was much less secure, particularly after the entry of France into the war, and he became more concerned with promoting his own interests by securing the election of his son as King of the Romans and putting an end to the war in the Empire. The Emperor's pragmatic, moderate councillors, who had gained the upper hand in his counsels by the mid-1630s, encouraged him to promote his own interests before those of his allies. To achieve his goal of lasting peace in the Empire, the Palatinate question had to be addressed. The thorny legal issues involved and the refusal of many European powers to accept the fate of the Palatinate ensured that the Emperor would encounter constant resistance. In the years to come, he would intensify his efforts find a compromise solution to this problem that both England and his allies could accept.

The conflicting interests of the allies showed that the Catholic side was not a monolith. The Emperor's pursuit of his own interests, readily discernible in the Treaty of Regensburg and the collapse of the Habsburg league, highlighted the divergence of interests between the two branches of the House of Habsburg. The Spaniards constantly complained about the fickleness of their Austrian cousins. The ambitions of Spain and Bavaria were even more discordant, and the Palatinate question became a major point of friction between them. Maximilian, for his part, was concerned with consolidating his hold on his newly acquired Palatine gains, particularly the Upper Palatinate and electorate. His inflexibility on the subject of Palatine restoration was eclipsed only by that of Frederick, whose unrealistic expectations were an even greater barrier to compromise than

Maximilian's opposition. The electorate was and continued to be the most controversial point. Maximilian would modify his demands as time went on, but the Palatines remained obdurate. The war against the Dutch, on the other hand, was Spain's main foreign policy objective. The maintenance of secure supply routes between Spain and Flanders was cardinal to this effort. After Swedish and French advances blocked Spain's overland military corridors in 1633, the sea route became crucial to the Spanish war effort in the Netherlands. Spain was thus reliant on the friendship, or at least the neutrality, of England to move much-needed supplies of men and money to Flanders. Its wish to retain its share of the Lower Palatinate and at the same time curry England's favor led to a fundamental conflict of interest. Spain therefore needed to be convinced that whatever England would offer in return for Palatine restoration would be more valuable in its war with the Dutch and later the French than keeping the Palatinate. In the years leading up to Taylor's embassy, Spain seemed more accommodating to England than Bavaria, but in the later 1630s Maximilian would show himself increasingly more amenable to compromise. The tensions caused by the conflicting aims of the Imperialists could be exploited to England's advantage in negotiations on the restoration of the Palatinate.

Finally, the Peace of Prague proved to be a turning point in Anglo-Imperial relations. As noted above, the Peace failed in its aims but heralded a notable scaling back of the religious aspect of the struggle. The implicit rejection of the militant religious agenda and a shift to moderate policies in Vienna boded well for English negotiations on the Palatinate. While the Emperor and Maximilian continued to advance the cause of Catholicism in the Empire where they could, when push came to shove, considerations of state came first; this was particularly apparent in the period after the Peace of Prague when both had reasons to come to some accommodation with England.

At the same time, however, the Peace struck a decisive blow against the Palatine cause, as it confirmed the transfer of the Upper Palatinate and electorate to Bavaria and rejected amnesty for the Prince Palatine. These setbacks were to have a major effect on English foreign policy, precipitating a burst of diplomatic activity.

4

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ENGLAND, 1618-35

In order to assess the effectiveness of Charles I's Habsburg foreign policy in the later 1630s, and more specifically his diplomatic overtures to the Emperor, it is critical to understand English foreign policy of the preceding years. This chapter therefore introduces the events, personalities, and issues that shaped English foreign policy from the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 until the Peace of Prague in 1635. It explores the networks of influence at the English court, the priorities and goals of the King and Parliament, and the volatile relationship between the two. The events of these years, the issues under discussion, and the players involved would have a significant impact upon the diplomatic missions exchanged between England and the Emperor in the later years of the personal rule, which marked the last really serious effort in a long string of attempts to resolve the Palatinate question by diplomacy.

The Palatinate question had a particularly strong impact on English foreign policy in the early Stuart period. During these years, foreign policy was guided primarily by the King's desire to effect the Prince Palatine's restoration to his lands and dignities. In pursuit of this goal, the early Stuart monarchs, James I and Charles I, tried a variety of foreign policy approaches, ranging from active intervention in the war to diplomatic pressure. Three major phases of foreign policy can be delineated for the period under discussion. The first was the pro-Habsburg peace policy of James I from the outbreak of war in 1618 until his death in 1625. The second period was the anti-Habsburg war policy of Charles I and the Duke of Buckingham from the new King's accession in 1625 until

the start of his personal rule in 1629. The last phase was Charles's return to a pro-Habsburg peace policy in 1629, which continued with intermittent breaks until 1637, when the failure of the Earl of Arundel's embassy provoked England to turn instead to a French alliance.

The Foreign Policy of James I, 1618-25

When news of the Defenestration of Prague reached England, James I was disgusted by this display of defiance to established authority in the name of religious freedom. At the time, however, he was unaware how closely it would come to touch him: the action of the Bohemian rebels initiated a series of events that would result in the proscription and dispossession of his son-in-law, the Prince Palatine. The issue of the restoration of the Palatinate – the Palatinate question – was destined to become the main focus of English foreign policy for the next twenty years.

As a staunch defender of monarchical authority and a self-declared peacemaker, James had no wish to involve himself in the Bohemian revolt. Although the Bohemian rebels were co-religionists ostensibly advancing Protestant interests, he could not support rebellion against a legitimate monarch. Aside from his belief in the legitimacy of Ferdinand's claim, James refused to aid the rebels because he disliked warfare of all kinds, and particularly confessional warfare. He viewed religious tensions as the greatest threat to peace and considered religious war "a disaster to be avoided at all costs."¹

Although England was widely viewed as the natural leader of the Protestant cause in Europe, James did all he could to ensure that his country would not become involved in the violent and costly religious strife on the Continent, a policy that was not appreciated by many of his subjects with

¹Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 87.

Puritan sympathies. In 1610, for instance, he had declined the presidency of the Protestant Union, which had recently been formed in the Empire under Palatine leadership.² Instead of contributing to the tense situation by becoming the leader of a confessional bloc, the King wished to act as a mediator between the two sides, styling himself as Europe's *Rex Pacificus*.³ In his view, this was the highest function of Christian kingship, and it had been a constant theme of his foreign policy since his accession to the English throne in 1603. However, to those who supported the cause of international Protestantism, James's refusal to take on the role of Protestant defender and his attempts to mediate a peace with the Catholic enemy represented the abandonment of Elizabeth I's Protestant foreign policy.⁴ They ardently wished for him to return to the anti-Spanish policy reminiscent of England's Elizabethan greatness.

In an effort to cast himself in the role of the peacemaker who was capable of negotiating a better understanding between rival confessional camps, James strove to increase his influence with both sides through a policy of dynastic marriages. He first arranged for a union between his daughter, the Princess Elizabeth, and the Calvinist Elector Frederick V of the Palatinate, the leading Protestant prince of the Empire. This marriage, which took place in 1613, elevated the King to new

²However he did sign a treaty of alliance with the Union in 1612. For more on the confessional tensions in the Empire in the years leading up to the Thirty Years' War and the formation of the Protestant Union and Catholic League, see chap. 1, p. 45.

³James was encouraged in this endeavor, for example, by his success in mediating the second Cleves-Jülich succession dispute together with France and Spain. His attempts to restore peace in Europe through diplomacy earned him the title of "the wisest fool in Europe." For more on the King's pacific bent, see W. B. Patterson, *James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁴As J. R. Jones has pointed out, James exhibited an attitude of religious moderation rare among his Protestant contemporaries, and he was at least "trying to escape from the sterile position of regarding all Catholic states as axiomatic enemies." (Jones, 17).

stature in Protestant circles on the Continent and provided him with an ideal platform from which to promote his agenda of peace. To balance Elizabeth's Protestant marriage and elevate his standing with the Catholic states, James sought to marry his son, Prince Charles, to a Catholic princess. Beginning in 1614, he doggedly pursued a match between Charles and the Infanta María, the daughter of Philip III of Spain. On the basis of this alliance, James intended for Spain and England to work together to preserve peace in Europe. He was encouraged in this hope by the Spaniards, who wished to keep England from allying with their longtime enemies, the Dutch. The Spanish ambassador in England, the Count of Gondomar, fostered the King's belief that an Anglo-Spanish compact to maintain peace in Europe in the face of religious extremism was a real possibility.⁵

Given his pacific bent and respect for monarchical authority, James did not aid the Bohemian rebels but instead attempted to mediate the dispute. In the spring of 1619, he sent James Hay, Viscount Doncaster, to open negotiations with both the Imperialists and the rebels. Respecting Ferdinand as the legitimate ruler of Bohemia, James instructed Doncaster to support Ferdinand's claim to the title. In return for the rebels' submission, James thought that Ferdinand might guarantee them religious freedom and general amnesty, though certainly nothing more. In spite of the King's support for Ferdinand's authority, the Imperialists did not take his mediation attempt seriously. After such great military expenditure, they had no intention of relinquishing the advantages that they had

⁵Simon Adams, "Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624," in *Faction and Parliament: Essays on Early Stuart History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 149. Thomas Cogswell neatly summed up James's intentions with this dual marriage policy when he wrote: "with prominent relatives in both confessional camps, the Stuart dynasty would stand as a potent safeguard against the revival of the religious wars which had wracked the Continent in the preceding century. In other words, a Spanish match coming on the heels of the Palatine alliance would provide a solid foundation to James' claim to be *Rex Pacificus*, the King of Peace." (Thomas Cogswell, "England and the Spanish Match," in *Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics, 1603-1642*, ed. Richard Cust and Ann Hughes [London: Longman, 1989], 111).

won thus far against the rebels. Doncaster returned to England soon thereafter, without having achieved the object of his mission.⁶

Soon after the breakdown of James's mediation attempt, the Stuarts became more immediately involved in the Bohemian quagmire when the rebels offered the Bohemian crown to his son-in-law Frederick, the Prince Palatine. The Bohemians believed that Frederick, as one of the best-connected Protestant princes in Europe, would be able to mobilize substantial support for their cause among his Protestant peers. Unsure of which course to take, Frederick hesitated. James, who disliked rebellion of all sorts, advised his son-in-law against accepting the rebels' offer. However, the offer was too tempting for the young and ambitious Frederick. Under pressure from his militant advisors Christian of Anhalt and Ludwig Camerarius, he ignored his father-in-law's counsel and accepted the Bohemian crown on 28 September 1619.

The rebels' assumption that the Protestant powers would leap to Frederick's side proved decidedly ill-founded. He received little support from the very states they had most counted upon, particularly the Netherlands and England. Neither were prepared to assist him. The Dutch were busy readying themselves for the renewed Spanish attack that would come when the Twelve Years' Truce expired in 1621. England also hung back, despite the support for Frederick's cause in English Protestant circles. James, who was appalled that Frederick had embarked on this Bohemian adventure, declined to support his son-in-law's defiance of Ferdinand's legitimate authority. The King not only refused to collect money for the Bohemian cause, but he also encouraged the

⁶Edward McCabe, "England's Foreign Policy in 1619: Lord Doncaster's Embassy to the Princes of Germany," *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung* 58 (1950): 471; Robert Zaller, "'Interest of State': James I and the Palatinate," *Albion* 6, no. 1 (Spring 1974): 145.

Protestant Union to hold itself aloof from the fray.⁷ Disavowing both the rebels and Frederick, James pressed instead for a cease fire and return to the antebellum status quo.⁸ The most he was prepared to do to help his son-in-law was to allow the levy of 4,000 volunteers to defend the Palatinate, to be placed under the command of Sir Horace Vere; under no circumstances were they to involve themselves in the Bohemian war.⁹ As it turned out, only a handful of German Protestant princes came to Frederick's aid, and the superior financial and military support offered to the Emperor by his allies, Spain and Bavaria, ensured a swift Imperial victory.¹⁰ While most of Protestant Europe looked on, Imperialist forces handily defeated Frederick at the Battle of White Mountain in November 1620 and drove him from Bohemia.

Soon after Frederick's defeat in Bohemia, the Emperor and his allies deprived the unfortunate prince of his hereditary lands and titles and forced him to flee into exile in the Netherlands. In January 1621, the Emperor proscribed Frederick under the ban of the Empire, thus leaving his lands

⁷Parker, *TYW*, 53.

⁸James sent Sir Henry Wotton, who was on his way to take up the post of ambassador at Venice, to Vienna at the beginning of 1620 to ask the Emperor for peace negotiations and a cease fire. Ferdinand was willing to grant the first request, but he dragged his feet on the second, claiming that his reputation was at stake. Wotton's embassy was overtaken by military events: Frederick's defeat at White Mountain insured its failure (Elmar Weiß, *Die Unterstützung Friedrichs V. von der Pfalz durch Jakob I. und Karl I. von England im Dreißigjährigen Krieg (1618-1632)*, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg, ser. B, Forschungen, vol. 37 [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1966], 28-9).

⁹*Ibid.*, 25. Only 2,250 men were eventually raised, but they were augmented by Dutch troops.

¹⁰In addition to the help he received from Spain and Bavaria, the Emperor also received financial aid from several Italian princes, including the Pope (Parker, *TYW*, 52-3). A Jesuit play performed in Antwerp satirized the paltry support of Frederick's allies, including England: "[the play] contained a scene in which a courier announced to the Elector Palatine that 100,000 herrings had just arrived from Denmark, 100,000 cheeses from Holland, and 100,000 ambassadors from England." (idem, *Europe in Crisis*, 166).

and titles open to seizure. Spain and Bavaria, for their part, lost no time in occupying the Palatine lands. Spanish troops quickly moved into the Lower Palatinate west of the Rhine, while Maximilian's League forces occupied both the Upper Palatinate and what remained of the Lower Palatinate. By the end of the year, all of Frederick's lands were under Catholic control except for the fortress of Frankenthal, which Vere's garrison continued to hold. In 1623, Frederick's dispossession was completed when the Imperial Diet agreed to transfer the electorate to Maximilian for his lifetime and Vere finally surrendered Frankenthal.¹¹

With the genesis of the Palatinate question, the restoration of the Palatinate became the major goal of English foreign policy.¹² While James had refused to assist Frederick in Bohemia, the Palatinate was another matter entirely. The fact that the Emperor had deprived him of his hereditary lands and titles and doled them out to Imperial allies struck directly at Stuart dynastic interests.¹³ This assault finally motivated the King to intervene on his son-in-law's behalf, and he was supported in this, to a greater or lesser degree, by Parliamentary interests. Although the King and Parliament were united in their determination that something must be done for the Palatine family, there were stark differences of opinion between them as to how and when this should be achieved.

¹¹Gardiner, vol. 4, 405; *ibid.*, vol. 5, 74.

¹²For more about the origins of the Palatinate question and its impact on European politics, see chap. 2, p. 84.

¹³James's policy, therefore, was dynastically motivated; however, he may not be classified as a strict dynastic ambitionist, as he had refused to support Frederick in Bohemia (Weiß, 125).

The King, true to his pacific nature, hoped to accomplish the restoration of the Palatinate through largely peaceful methods.¹⁴ While he was concerned to uphold Stuart dynastic interests, he carefully avoided English entry into the Thirty Years' War. In spite of his standing in Protestant circles and the importance that European Protestants had attached to the Palatine marriage, James refused to be drawn into a confessional war.¹⁵ In addition, James did not want to incur the high costs that military involvement in a war would bring. His relationship with Parliament had been turbulent, and he wished to avoid a war that would require him to rely heavily upon Parliamentary subsidies. Thus, given his pacific inclinations and problematic political and financial situation, he intended to honor his commitment to Frederick by diplomacy rather than war.¹⁶

Under these circumstances, the King's solution was to incorporate Frederick's restoration into the Anglo-Spanish marriage negotiations, which had been underway in earnest for some time. From 1621 until the breakdown of the negotiations in 1623, James attempted to effect a general settlement of the Palatinate question, and thereby the Continental conflict, within the framework of the Spanish match. The Spaniards, for their part, were more than willing to lend an ear to these overtures and promised to support his mediation attempts in Germany, which he took as a sign of their good intentions.¹⁷ They could not afford to alienate England at this crucial juncture in their war with the

¹⁴However, it should be noted that James's support to the Prince Palatine was also financial and military: his financial support totaled £800,000, and his military support came to 15,000 men, excluding 6,000 that were in the Dutch service in 1624 (*ibid.*, 126).

¹⁵G. M. D. Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, Modern British Foreign Policy, ed. Malcolm Robinson (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1974), 2.

¹⁶Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 88.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 89; Alcalá Zamora, 180-1, 217-8.

Dutch, which was underway again after the expiration of the truce. The reduction of the Dutch rebels was the main objective of their foreign policy, and the attitude of England could be decisive in this endeavor since it effectively controlled traffic in the Channel.¹⁸ The Bohemian war and Frederick's dispossession thus turned the Spanish match into a diplomatic means of settling the Continental conflict and relieving the pressure for England to intervene militarily on Frederick's behalf.

However, Spain had to weigh its willingness to accommodate England in the Palatinate against the interests of its allies. Archduchess Isabella, who ruled the Spanish Netherlands, wished to retain control of the Lower Palatinate to help keep the land route open to Flanders. The Emperor had proscribed Frederick and was the only one with the authority to restore him. In addition, Maximilian, who had been promised the Upper Palatinate and electorate in return for his support of the Imperial cause, vigorously opposed any attempt to restore them to Frederick.¹⁹ Caught in this bind, the Spaniards continued to encourage the King's hope that the Palatinate question could be settled within the context of the Spanish marriage negotiations – even once they had realized that it would likely not be possible – with the aim of placating James and keeping England neutral.²⁰

James's attempts to reach a diplomatic agreement on the Palatinate question with the Habsburgs fueled conflict with his subjects. Although they concurred that Frederick should be

¹⁸See chap. 2, p. 101.

¹⁹Straub, 173, 178; Egler, 76. James was aware that the Spaniards did not support the transfer of the electorate to the Duke of Bavaria, which encouraged his hopes recovering the Palatinate through their agency (Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 97).

²⁰Roger Lockyer, *The Early Stuarts: A Political History of England, 1603-1642* (London: Longman, 1989), 20.

restored to his lands and titles, they and the King could neither agree on the basis of this policy nor on the means to achieve it. For James, his foreign policy was motivated by dynastic loyalty and secular interest. He could not stand idly by while the Habsburgs and their allies summarily deprived his daughter and son-in-law of their lands and titles and drove them into exile, thus dealing a harsh blow to Stuart dynastic power. However, many of his subjects, particularly those with Puritan leanings, believed that English foreign policy should be conducted in defense of Continental Protestantism rather than dynastic interests.²¹ Rather than negotiating with the Habsburgs for Frederick's restoration, they supported England joining a general Protestant alliance including the Dutch, who they saw as natural political and religious allies, to support the recovery of not only the Palatinate, but also Bohemia.²² In their minds, Spain should be the target of English arms rather than overtures, as C. V. Wedgwood has observed: "The Puritan-Protestant tradition of Elizabethan policy imprinted in English minds the idea that Spain was the natural enemy and that the rightful place of England in foreign affairs was among the supporters of the Protestant Cause."²³ James did not share this view, particularly when it came to the Dutch – he was jealous of their commercial success and found the idea of a republican state repugnant.²⁴ With neither a common basis (dynastic or religious) for English foreign policy, nor an agreed mode of delivery (diplomatic or military), tensions flared

²¹Their fears of a Catholic revival in Europe were not unjustified: in 1590, Protestantism was the official religion of approximately half of Europe; by 1650, the resurgence of Catholicism had reduced its share to a mere fifth (Parker, *Europe in Crisis*, 50).

²²Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 87.

²³C. V. Wedgwood, "King Charles I and the Protestant Cause," *Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London* 19, no. 2 (1954): 22.

²⁴Lockyer, *Early Stuarts*, 22.

between the King and Parliament. The strain generated by foreign policy issues was a constant theme throughout the early Stuart period, and it would continue to factor heavily into the King's decision making process when he considered how to support the Palatine cause best.

Early 1621, however, seemed to be one of the few times that King and Parliament basically agreed on a course of action. In the wake of the Frederick's loss of Bohemia and proscription, Parliament met for a scheduled session. Recognizing the danger to his hereditary lands, the King and Commons agreed that England should take diplomatic measures to defend the Palatinate from encroachment by the victorious Habsburgs. If diplomacy proved unsuccessful, then military measures would be necessary. The Commons indicated their support of this plan in their declaration of June 1621 and voted the King two subsidies to show their earnestness.²⁵

The King, who ardently hoped for a peaceful solution, did not restrict his diplomatic overtures to Spain. He also opened a dialogue with the Emperor about Frederick's restitution. In June 1621, soon after the Palatine cause had suffered several serious blows, James sent Sir John Digby, later Earl of Bristol, to the Imperial court to demand the full restoration of Frederick to his lands and titles.²⁶ If the Emperor agreed to this demand, Digby was to promise that Frederick would unconditionally renounce the Bohemian crown and submit to the Emperor. However, if he refused, Digby was to inform him that England would be forced to recover the Palatinate by other, more bellicose means.²⁷ In the case that the Emperor would not accept a reasonable solution, James was

²⁵Adams, "Foreign Policy," 161; Weiß, 35-7.

²⁶At this point, the Spaniards had invaded parts of the Lower Palatinate, the Emperor had proscribed Frederick, and rumors began to circulate that the electorate would be transferred to Maximilian in return for his military service.

²⁷Zaller, 159-60.

counting on the Spaniards to support England's position as they had promised. Digby's embassy was the first in a series of Anglo-Imperial diplomatic negotiations to reach a settlement on the Palatinate question, which would culminate in the missions of Taylor, Arundel, and Radolt in the later 1630s.

Digby arrived in Vienna in July 1621 and, as instructed, immediately asked that the Emperor lift the ban against Frederick and fully restore him to his lands and titles in return for Frederick's unconditional surrender of his Bohemian claims. Otherwise, the King would be forced to take action. However, Ferdinand, who was reliant on continued Bavarian assistance in the Empire and already owed Maximilian a considerable sum for his services in Bohemia, was in no position to grant this request without the Duke's consent.²⁸ Thus the Emperor, while assuring Digby of his desire to grant the King satisfaction, moved to consult his nettlesome ally about what concessions might be made to England and warn him of the dangers that might ensue if Digby's mission failed. Ferdinand assured Digby that the matter of the electorate would be regulated at the upcoming Diet; however, he had already secretly decided to transfer it to Maximilian.²⁹ The Emperor, while he complained to Digby about Frederick's continuing military actions, also promised to extend the truce that he had established in April in the Lower Palatinate if Maximilian and Count Mansfeld, who continued to fight on Frederick's behalf, would do the same in the Upper Palatinate. Several occurrences conspired to undermine Digby's negotiating position. Maximilian flatly rejected the idea of a cease fire as well as that of the full restitution of the Palatinate. The ambassador's position was further eroded when Vere decided to quarter his troops in territory belonging to the Bishop of Speyer.

²⁸See chap. 2, p. 90.

²⁹Weiß, 39.

Frederick, for his part, further complicated matters by loudly announcing that he was unwilling to submit to the Emperor or to renounce his Bohemian pretensions unconditionally. The intercession of the Spaniards, upon which James had so depended, and that of influential Imperial ministers who advocated peace with their master did not significantly improve the situation.³⁰ Under these circumstances, Digby's mission produced no tangible results; he left Vienna in the middle of September. Several of the obstacles he encountered in his negotiations, particularly the intransigence of Maximilian and Frederick and the Emperor's need to consult with his allies about restoration, were to be constant features of future Anglo-Imperial negotiations.

Upon his return to England, Digby informed James of what he considered the best tactics to regain the Palatinate. His words were lent greater weight by Frederick's declining fortunes – by the time Digby arrived home, League troops had already occupied not only the Upper Palatinate but also the east bank of the Lower Palatinate. The ambassador strongly advised the King to support the small contingent of troops under Vere that still held strongholds in the Lower Palatinate. In addition, he counseled the King that it would be necessary to check Frederick's unrealistic demands and require him to yield to his father-in-law's direction if the Palatinate were to be regained.³¹ Digby's assessment was not off the mark. Frederick's high expectations and refusal to compromise would pose a formidable impediment to the settlement of the Palatinate question in the coming years. Elizabeth and to a lesser extent his heir, Charles Louis, perpetuated Frederick's stubborn attitude after his death in 1632.

³⁰Ibid., 40.

³¹Zaller, 160-71.

Given Digby's experience at the Imperial court and the further deterioration of Palatine fortunes, it was apparent to the King that he must take some action in support of the Palatine family. He decided that the threat of English military intervention on the Continent – conveyed via a truculent Parliament – would be the most effective way to bring about a diplomatic restoration of the Palatinate. In November 1621, he called Parliament back into session, and Digby related the events of his embassy before both houses. But the MPs did not require much convincing, as most of them had already agreed that measures should be taken to defend the Palatinate from further encroachment by Spain if diplomacy failed. On top of this, Spain's renewed war against the Dutch intensified their fears that the Habsburgs intended to restore Catholicism throughout Europe. The Commons therefore overwhelmingly agreed to support a military solution to Frederick's woes and at the same time strike a blow for the Protestant cause.

In spite of this promising start, relations between the King and Parliament rapidly disintegrated when Parliament began to debate matters of foreign policy, which he regarded as his privilege. To be fair, the Commons likely believed that the government was soliciting their views when Sir George Goring, one of Buckingham's clients, initiated a discussion on the Spanish match. Once asked, they certainly let the King know their mind – they not only rejected the match outright, but also petitioned him to wage war on Spain for the defense of Protestantism and marry Charles to a Protestant princess instead. In doing so, James felt that they had not only rejected his policies but encroached upon his prerogative, and he refused their petition outright. The Commons responded with a protestation reiterating their privilege of free speech. Needless to say, the King rejected their protestation as well. These actions resulted in political deadlock and ultimately in the dissolution of Parliament, before James had obtained the necessary financial support for military intervention

on the Continent.³² The events of the Parliament of 1621 illustrate the endemic problems that faced English intervention in Frederick's favor. The tensions between the King and Parliament raised by foreign policy issues only grew as time passed. The result was that James became increasingly unwilling to undertake a foreign policy that would require the financial backing of Parliament, because he feared that popular pressure might force him into a foreign policy he did not support.³³

Given the domestic difficulties associated with active intervention on Frederick's behalf, the King continued to rely on a diplomatic solution to the Palatinate question, and the Emperor was willing to continue the dialogue. Soon after the breakdown of Digby's negotiations, Ferdinand decided to send Count Schwarzenberg as his ambassador to England to discuss the cease fire that Digby had requested and impress the Emperor's peaceful intentions upon the King. In April 1622, Schwarzenberg arrived in London, where he was warmly received. After preliminary discussions about the cease fire, the two sides agreed to continue the negotiations at a conference at Brussels. However, due to disagreements among the various parties represented there – the Palatine, the English King, the Archduchess Isabella, and the Emperor – the conference broke up in September without having accomplished anything of import.³⁴

By the spring of 1623, Frederick's position had worsened perceptibly. The Imperial Diet had transferred the electorate to Maximilian for his lifetime, and Spanish and Bavarian troops had

³²Cogswell, "Spanish Match," 114-5; Adams, "Foreign Policy," 164; Zaller, 173-4.

³³Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 82. As Simon Adams has observed, "The need to reach agreement with members of parliament — and in consequence to permit discussion of policy—made reliance on parliamentary subsidy for military finance an unattractive prospect [for the King]." (*ibid.*, 81).

³⁴Weiß, 47-8. England was represented by Lord Treasurer Weston.

completed their conquest of the Palatinate.³⁵ After his defeat at Stadtlohn, Frederick finally gave up his military ambitions and surrendered his cause to his father-in-law's mediation. Because of his troubles securing Parliamentary funding on terms he could accept, James continued to move closer to Spain in the hope of achieving Frederick's restoration diplomatically, through an alliance with Spain based upon the Spanish match. In 1623, however, a series of unwelcome discoveries by Charles and Buckingham made it readily apparent that this tactic would not prove successful. Eager for the Spanish marriage finally to take place, the two had decided to undertake the journey to Spain so that the young Prince could personally woo his prospective bride, the Infanta Maria. Arriving at the Spanish court unannounced, they demanded a speedy conclusion to both the marriage treaty and the restoration of the Palatinate. The response they received was both unexpected and objectionable. Charles was treated to a rude awakening from his dreams of a tender reception from the Infanta:

The Infanta . . . went into hysterics, shrieked, and fell on the ground, when Charles, thinking to approach her as a lover, jumped over a wall into a garden where she was walking. Her confessor had reminded her how comfortable it would be to think of him who should lie by her side and be the father of her children as "certain to go to hell!"³⁶

No less disagreeable was the exposure of Spanish expectations that Charles convert to Catholicism and promise English Catholics toleration as conditions of the marriage. When he made clear that he had no intention of agreeing to either of these stipulations, the Spaniards' already lukewarm interest in the match became even cooler. Moreover, during Buckingham's discussions with the Spanish ministers, he discovered that they had no real intention of restoring the Palatinate, which served as

³⁵Gardiner, vol. 4, 405; *ibid.*, vol. 5, 74.

³⁶Hill, 565-6.

an important link on their supply route between the Netherlands and Italy.³⁷ Buckingham, now convinced that Habsburg religious and dynastic ambitions posed a significant threat to all non-Habsburg states, saw the construction of a grand anti-Habsburg alliance as the only means to curb their pretensions, preserve English independence, and recover the Palatinate.³⁸ The French and Dutch, both of whom were concerned with warding off "encirclement" by the Habsburgs, would be natural allies in this endeavor.³⁹

Spurned by the Infanta and the Spanish government, Charles and Buckingham returned home determined to redeem their personal and national honor by leading England into war against Spain.⁴⁰

³⁷The Spaniards were considering a scheme for the Lower and Upper Palatinate to be returned (the latter upon payment of six million gulden, or four million thalers), for the electorate to revert to the Palatine line after the death of Maximilian (they also considered creating an eighth to satisfy Maximilian's claims, which the Duke rejected), and for Charles Louis to be brought up a Catholic at the Imperial court and married to the Emperor's daughter. Maximilian was fearful that the Anglo-Spanish marriage negotiations might actually result in Frederick's restoration. He was right to worry, because Olivares was indeed willing to make concessions to England in the Palatinate, if England helped bring the Dutch to the bargaining table. Maximilian thus sought support from France to secure his gains and also attempted to cut the Spaniards out of the picture by sending Francesco Rota (the Capuchin Alexander von Hales) to persuade James to deal directly with him on the Palatinate question, with the mediation of the curia. James at first rejected this idea, preferring to deal with Spain, but he lent an ear to these overtures after the breakdown of the marriage negotiations. It was during these unofficial discussions that James first put forward the idea of an eighth electorate. Maximilian considered this option, so long as he kept the first temporal electorate, and Frederick was invested with the new one. However, these discussions stuck on the condition that Charles Louis be brought up Catholic (Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 106-17; idem, "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 265; Weiß, 61-6; Steiner, 101).

³⁸Lockyer, *Early Stuarts*, 21.

³⁹Weiß, 125.

⁴⁰Charles was utterly "disgusted with the conduct of his intended bride and the exactions of the Spanish court" (Hill, 566). The following statement made by Charles to Henry Rich, who was negotiating the terms of the Prince's marriage treaty to Henrietta Maria, made it clear that Charles attempted to woo the French not because he esteemed them, but rather to get back at the Spaniards: "The Monsieurs have played you so scurvy a trick, that if it were not for the respect I have for the person of Madame, I would not care a fart for their friendship. I mistrust them wholly; and if they insist upon these new grounds, let them go hang themselves." (CSP, vol. 1, app., x; quoted in Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 89-90).

In spite of the resistance of the peace-loving James, they turned their considerable influence toward mustering support for their plans in Parliament, which was eager to comply. In concert with the humiliated prince and favorite, the Commons clamored for war against Spain, making it a precondition of their vote of adequate subsidies for military intervention on the Continent. In the end, they voted funds meant to support the Protestant cause through rearmament and military assistance to the Dutch.⁴¹

James agreed to break off the treaties with Spain, but he would not go along with their demands to wage a more generalized, confessional war against the Habsburgs. He was only interested in recovering the Palatinate and thus would only commit to a limited military action to restore Frederick to his hereditary lands and titles. He had still not given up on a diplomatic solution to the Palatinate question, and though he had no plans to wage a larger war, he did hope that the threat of one might bring pressure to bear on Spain to restore the Palatinate peacefully. With this idea in mind, James actually invited Parliament to discuss foreign policy in the hope this move would persuade the Commons to vote him subsidies.⁴²

Buckingham wasted no time in constructing his anti-Habsburg edifice. In 1624, with his prompting, negotiations for a French marriage alliance for Charles got underway in earnest. In addition, England and France concluded a defensive alliance with the Dutch and discussed financing

⁴¹Adams, "Foreign Policy," 165.

⁴²Lockyer, *Early Stuarts*, 210. Until his death the following year, James continued to hope for a more satisfactory offer from Spain. He even engaged in secret negotiations with Maximilian, mediated by the curia (see above, n. 37).

a joint expeditionary force under Mansfeld to recover the Lower Palatinate.⁴³ Even without a firm commitment from France, James authorized Mansfeld to raise 12,000 troops to be supported at English cost. The King, not wishing Mansfeld's force to provoke hostilities with other states, gave the general strict orders not to engage in military action outside of the Palatinate. He need not have worried, because the expedition was plagued, both literally and figuratively, with difficulties from the outset, and Mansfeld's army saw little action outside of its training field. Two thousand men deserted before the force even left England. Soon after landing in the Netherlands in February 1625, it was reduced to an ineffective rump by disease, starvation, and desertion. Short of funds, the commander repeatedly petitioned the King for payment so he could compensate and supply his troops. James, however, was in no position to respond – he had died soon after Mansfeld left England.⁴⁴

The Early Foreign Policy of Charles I, 1625-9

After his accession in 1625, Charles and Buckingham were free to pursue the aggressive anti-Habsburg foreign policy previously hampered by the pacific James. In doing so, the new King's main concern was for the reestablishment of his sister and her family in the Palatinate. This dynastic motive was the consistent thread in the foreign policy of his reign. Buckingham, however, had more ambitious plans. He had expanded his objective to include not only the recovery of the Palatinate, but also the containment of Habsburg power through a secular alliance of Protestant and Catholic

⁴³Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 144. In 1625, Richelieu withdrew his support from the expedition. He had hoped to use Mansfeld's troops against Spain in the Valtelline rather than in the Palatinate, as James had planned.

⁴⁴Weiß, 77-9.

anti-Habsburg powers, and he convinced the King to pursue this course.⁴⁵ The dynastic and secular nature of early Stuart foreign policy was preserved in the transition from father to son.

Parliament, which would be called upon to finance these military undertakings, objected to the secular nature of the new King's foreign policy, just as it had to his father's:

... the English gentlemen who made up the political nation and dominated the House of Commons, which alone could provide the financial underpinning for English participation in the Thirty Years War, never understood – and insofar as they did understand, deeply disapproved of – a secular foreign policy. They were the prisoners of the Elizabethan legend, and wanted Charles to do what they believed his older brother, Prince Henry, would have done – namely, place himself at the head of a protestant crusade against the powers of darkness represented by the Pope and the King of Spain.⁴⁶

Even after England declared war on Spain in 1625 and France in 1627, Parliament refused to adequately supply the King. Thus he was unable to play a meaningful role in the Continental war and meet his obligations to his allies.⁴⁷ In any case, waging a simultaneous war against powerful states like France and Spain was a ridiculous idea, as would become painfully apparent.

Even before James's death, Buckingham had set to work building a grand alliance against the Habsburgs that would be capable of regaining the Palatinate by force. To advance this scheme, he arranged for a marriage alliance between Charles and Henrietta Maria, the sister of Louis XIII of France. He also promoted the Treaty of the Hague, which was concluded between England, Denmark, and the United Provinces in December 1625. The signatories pledged to work together

⁴⁵Lockyer, *Early Stuarts*, 32.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 32-3.

⁴⁷For the King's failure to fulfill his commitment to his his uncle Christian IV, see chap. 3, p. 107.

to contain Habsburg power and restore the Palatinate to Frederick.⁴⁸ In addition, both the English and the Dutch pledged financial support for Christian IV's military effort against the Habsburgs in the Empire.⁴⁹ Much to Buckingham's chagrin, France could not be persuaded to join the league, in spite of the marriage alliance.⁵⁰ To make matters worse, Richelieu made peace with Spain in the Valtelline the following year.

Eager to show England's military might, Charles and Buckingham embarked without delay on a string of ventures on the Continent. All proved to be fiascos. Mansfeld's expedition had failed miserably in 1625: in spite of German reinforcements, his army continued to dwindle because he had no money to pay his men. By the summer of 1625, it was apparent that he was in no position to advance the Palatine cause by force of arms.⁵¹ Later that same year, Buckingham attempted a diversionary attack on the Spanish treasure fleet at Cadiz, which resulted in nothing but the initiation of war between England and Spain. The combined Dutch and English fleet charged with this task not only missed the treasure fleet entirely but also failed to inflict any notable damage on Spanish shipping or settlements. It limped home, having lost a third of its ships and many of its men.⁵² Finally, in 1628 Buckingham attempted to relieve the Huguenots, who were besieged by French

⁴⁸Steiner, 110.

⁴⁹By the Hague Convention (1625), England and the United Provinces each agreed to pay 144,000 thalers a month to support Christian's cause. Also, Mansfeld's levies were to be integrated into Christian's forces (Parker, *TYW*, 69).

⁵⁰Richelieu had good reasons for this. First, his primary goal was not to win the struggle in the Empire, but rather that with Spain in the Valtelline. Second, he needed to concentrate his energies on quelling the French Huguenot revolt that broke out in January 1625 (Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 144).

⁵¹Weiß, 84-5.

⁵²Parker, *TYW*, 69.

forces at La Rochelle, by landing English troops on the nearby Isle of Rhé. This mission also proved a debacle, and the starving Huguenots were left at Richelieu's mercy.⁵³

Due in part to these ignominious military setbacks and other issues related to foreign policy, relations between the King and Parliament deteriorated rapidly. The war ~~hœ~~ and Buckingham were waging was quite different from the one Parliament had agreed to fund in 1624. Parliament was also reluctant to continue financing the King's wars because it objected to the inefficient manner in which Buckingham was conducting them and blamed him for the military defeats. Parliament thus made several deliberate attempts to remove the favorite from power. In 1626, the Commons made supply contingent upon his impeachment. This attempt backfired, for in order to save Buckingham, the King was compelled to dissolve Parliament before it had voted any support for his military undertakings. The lack of financial support, and the low yield and slow receipt of subsidies more generally, forced him to turn to extra-Parliamentary sources of revenue to maintain his war effort.⁵⁴ The most visible of these was the forced loan, which was extremely unpopular with his subjects and the source of many Parliamentary grievances. The King, however, blamed his humiliating defeats

⁵³Buckingham's policy toward the Huguenots was actually quite callous, as he hoped to use La Rochelle as a bargaining chip to persuade Richelieu to help restore the Prince Palatine. The support England lent the Huguenots was actually a cruel deception, since Buckingham was negotiating with Richelieu the entire time, promising to withdraw England's support if France would declare in favor of Frederick. His efforts were in vain because Richelieu forced the surrender of La Rochelle in 1628, shortly after the favorite's assassination (Parker, *Europe in Crisis*, 201). For the background to the crisis at La Rochelle and its effect on the relationship between the King, Buckingham, and Parliament, see: Thomas Cogswell, "Foreign Policy and Parliament: The Case of La Rochelle, 1625-1626," *EHR* 99, no. 391 (Apr. 1984): 241-67; idem, "Prelude to Ré: The Anglo-French Struggle over La Rochelle, 1624-1627," *History* 71 (1986): 1-21.

⁵⁴Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 13.

on Parliament's failure to provide adequate supply, and he therefore felt fully justified in collecting this money.

Parliament's persistent attacks on Buckingham for the Mansfeld and Cadiz disasters, and posthumously for La Rochelle as well, coupled with the King's willingness to turn to extralegal sources of revenue to finance his wars, did nothing to improve his relations with Parliament.⁵⁵ In 1628, Parliament condemned the forced loan in the Petition of Right. Even after Buckingham's assassination in 1628, the situation continued to worsen. The following year, the Commons again raised grievances over extra-Parliamentary taxation, among other issues, and enshrined them in the Three Resolutions, which were read out while members of the opposition held the speaker down in his chair. The King, incensed by their audacity, immediately retaliated by dissolving Parliament.

The Foreign Policy of the Personal Rule to 1635

With inadequate funding, an increasingly hostile Parliament, and a string of disastrous military interventions and the elimination of the favorite who supported them, war was no longer an attractive prospect for the King. Given his unpleasant experience with Parliament in the first four years of his reign, he had determined to rule without it and its subsidies as long as he could. Thus, he finally bowed to financial and domestic pressures, made peace with his enemies, and withdrew from the war. From 1629 to 1640, Charles would rule England without resort to Parliament. In consequence, he could not easily afford an active foreign policy. Thus Buckingham's death and the King's decision to rule alone marked the effectual end of England's military involvement in the Thirty

⁵⁵In violation of the Subsidy Act, which stipulated that the Parliamentary funds voted in 1624 should be used for rearmament and to aid the Dutch, Buckingham had siphoned off £62,000 for Mansfeld's expedition (Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 99).

Years' War. From this time forward, the King would seek a diplomatic solution to the Palatinate question.

Peace was the first priority of Charles's personal rule. He first came to terms with the French, who were eager to end the hostilities with England so they would be free to protect their interests in northern Italy against the Habsburgs.⁵⁶ In April 1629, the two sides quickly concluded the Peace of Susa. Peace with Spain, however, took more time because the negotiations constantly ran aground over the issue of the Palatinate. The King, who had prosecuted the war against Spain with the aim of recovering the Palatinate, hoped to incorporate its restitution into the peace. Sir Francis Cottington, the English negotiator, insisted that Spain's promises to return the Spanish-occupied Palatinate be included in the written terms of the treaty. Olivares, though desperate to end the hostilities with England so he could concentrate on fighting the French, repeatedly sidestepped this demand because he did not wish to relinquish this strategically situated territory.⁵⁷

The wily Spanish statesman, however, finally managed to persuade the English to drop their insistence on the restoration of the Palatinate as a prerequisite to the peace by convincing them that it was necessary to refer this question to the electoral meeting at Regensburg, where the other affected parties (the Emperor and Maximilian) would be present.⁵⁸ Philip pledged his full support to English endeavors for Frederick at the meeting, and his immediate reinstatement in the Spanish-

⁵⁶In 1628, a conflict broke out between France and Spain over the succession to Mantua and Montferrat, territories that were strategically located on the land route to the Netherlands. For more on the Mantuan succession dispute and the effect it had on the relationship between the Emperor and his allies, see chap. 3, pp. 114, 127.

⁵⁷Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, 232-6.

⁵⁸For the aims of the Spaniards and the events of the electoral meeting, see chap. 3, p. 124.

occupied Palatinate once the Emperor had removed the ban. With these reassurances, Charles acquiesced and the Treaty of Madrid was finally signed on 15 November 1630. It included no reference to England's claims for the restoration of the Palatinate; the best Charles would get was Philip's written assurance of his best efforts to promote the Palatine cause.⁵⁹ That the King allowed the Palatinate question to be referred to Regensburg when he had such bargaining power proved to be a great mistake. Since he never again engaged the Spaniards in hostilities, this was his best opportunity to persuade them to relinquish their portion of the Palatinate.

Two years after Buckingham's death, England was once again at peace. This did not mean, however, that the King had given up on the idea of recovering the Palatinate. On the contrary, it continued to be the primary objective of his foreign policy throughout the 1630s. The main difference is that he was now obliged to seek a diplomatic rather than a military solution to the Palatinate question. After the challenging war years that launched his reign, his policy in the years of the personal rule necessarily became more pragmatic and was shaped by his dynastic concerns, economic interests, financial limitations, and understanding of the changing nature of European politics.

From 1630 until 1635, Lord Treasurer Weston, who came the closest to replacing Buckingham as the King's chief advisor, and others who favored a policy of peace and cooperation with Spain exercised considerable influence upon the King in foreign affairs. With their encouragement, in these years the King focused his hopes for Palatine restoration mainly on a negotiated settlement with the Habsburgs, who were in the best position to restore the Palatine lands

⁵⁹Gardiner, vol. 7, 173-4, 176.

and dignities. Much to the chagrin of those who supported a Protestant foreign policy, Charles abandoned whatever commitments he still had to his Protestant allies and sought the restoration of the Palatinate elsewhere. He had few qualms about doing so because he considered the Protestant cause to be "a political force no different from any other and not the cause of true religion."⁶⁰ In any case, he recognized that European politics were becoming increasingly secular and that the warring sides could not claim to break cleanly on religious lines.

The debate over foreign policy was associated with the rivalry of factions at court, all of which had influential spokesmen who attempted to sway the King to their views. The religious sympathies of their adherents were often related to their attitudes on foreign policy. Those who supported intervention in the Continental war, for religious reasons or otherwise, wrestled with those who favored peace. Weston (later Earl of Portland), the earls of Bristol and Arundel, Cottington, and Windebank were the main figures affiliated with the Spanish or peace party. This group preferred peace and cooperation with Spain as opposed to collaboration with the anti-Habsburg side, which would certainly involve England in war, and tended to include those who were sympathetic to Catholicism.⁶¹ It should be noted that the peace party supported a policy of pro-Habsburg neutrality rather than active intervention on the Habsburg side. Its opponents, the war lobby, promoted decisive military action on behalf of the Palatine family in alliance with the French, Dutch, and/or Swedes. It was made up of two basic groups. The first was the Protestant party, which aimed

⁶⁰Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 90.

⁶¹Albert J. Loomie, "The Spanish Faction at the Court of Charles I, 1630-8," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 59 (May 1986): 48. Archbishop Laud and Sir Thomas Wentworth, two of the King's most influential councillors, also supported a policy of peace, but they are less clearly identified with this party.

not only for the active promotion of the Palatine cause, but also that of the Protestant cause in Europe more generally. Its adherents preferred to accomplish this in alliance with the Dutch and Swedes, but some were also willing to consider an alliance with France as a powerful confederate of these Protestant states. Supporters of a Protestant policy included the earls of Essex, Southampton, Pembroke, and Bedford, as well as Sir Thomas Roe and Secretary Coke. The second group was the French party, spearheaded by Queen Henrietta Maria, the Marquis of Hamilton, and the earls of Holland and Carlisle, who promoted an alliance with France. Unlike the others, this party was not united by religion; it included those with Protestant as well as Catholic sympathies. The peace party tended to rally around the King; the war party, around the Queen.⁶²

Given the divisive nature of court politics and the substantial opposition to his Habsburg diplomacy, the King decided to make and conduct his most sensitive foreign policy in secret. This led to a system whereby prominent members of the peace party – Weston, Cottington, and particularly Windebank – helped Charles make and implement his secret foreign policy. They established direct lines of communication with the diplomats who carried it out on the ground, at times bypassing the official reporting channels. These secret negotiations were hidden from the view of most courtiers, diplomats, and members of the foreign committee of the privy council (which was charged with advising the King in matters of foreign policy), including Secretary Coke. From the King's perspective, this stratagem alleviated some of the criticism of his policies coming from the war lobby and allowed them time to bear fruit.

⁶²Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 91.

However, the secrecy the King maintained about his negotiations with the Habsburgs was obstructive to the ultimate success of his foreign policy. His diplomats, who were often unaware or ill-informed of secret negotiations regarding the Palatinate at various European courts, were disadvantaged in their own negotiations. An example of this is the English ambassador Sir Robert Anstruther's ignorance of the secret Habsburg negotiations simultaneously carried out by John Taylor at Regensburg and Vienna.⁶³ If this were not bad enough, Charles kept these diplomatic dealings secret not only from most of his councillors and diplomats, but also from the very envoys conducting them. The King's strategy, therefore, undermined rather than strengthened his chances for diplomatic success.

In January 1631, immediately after the Treaty of Madrid failed to settle the Palatinate question, Cottington and Olivares arrived at a secret agreement that would provide a basis for all further Anglo-Habsburg negotiations (secret or otherwise), despite the fact it was never ratified by Charles.⁶⁴ By the secret Cottington Treaty, Spain would take steps to restore the Palatinate if England in turn pressed the Dutch to make peace with Spain. The two countries would join in an offensive and defensive alliance against the Dutch, and if they could not be brought to peace, their territories would be subject to partition.⁶⁵ This agreement would come into force only once it was

⁶³See below, p. 183.

⁶⁴Weston had convinced the King that he would be able to wring concessions from Spain in the Palatinate on the basis of the peace and accompanying assurances of Philip, without ratifying the secret treaty. Weston's error would become apparent at Regensburg (L. J. Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper of 1631: A Missing Link in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy during the Thirty Years' War," *EHR* 101 [1986]: 921).

⁶⁵*CSP*, vol. 1, 35: 2 Jan. 1631, Secret Cottington Treaty; Gardiner, vol. 7, 176-7; Albert J. Loomie, "Olivares, the English Catholics and the Peace of 1630," *Revue Belge de Philologie et Histoire* 47, no. 4 (1969): 1154-66. In addition to the treaty itself, there was a paper that had passed between Olivares and Cottington proposing the restoration of the Palatinate was contingent upon England bringing

ratified by their monarchs. Before he left Spain, Cottington also worked out a mutually beneficial arrangement with Olivares whereby Spanish bullion would be brought to England, a portion of which was to be minted at the Tower of London, and then safely convoyed to Flanders in English ships. This arrangement was advantageous to English merchants and royal revenues.⁶⁶

There was no consensus, however, between England and Spain as to how the terms of the secret treaty should be interpreted. Each did so to their own advantage. To Charles and the peace party, the terms of the treaty suggested that the full restoration of the Palatinate would be possible if he would mediate a peace between Spain and the Dutch. They were optimistic that Spain would give up its own share of the Palatinate and bring pressure to bear on Bavaria and the Emperor to relinquish the rest of the lands and electoral dignity. Although there were questions as to whether Spain would be willing or able to affect this, the King believed negotiations with the Habsburgs, who were in the position to restore the Palatine lands and titles, were the best hope for a diplomatic restoration.⁶⁷ The Spaniards, on the other hand, held to a more extreme interpretation of the secret treaty. For them, the price of restoration was an active English alliance against the Dutch, which they claimed had been promised in a paper given by Cottington to Olivares; otherwise, a few words on the behalf of the Palatine cause at the Imperial court should suffice.⁶⁸ These conflicting interpretations were characteristic of Anglo-Spanish relations across the board – each side

the Dutch to satisfactory terms. The Spaniards came to regard this paper as a kind of codicil to the Cottington Treaty (Gardiner, vol. 7, 187; Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper," 919).

⁶⁶Loomie, "Spanish Faction," 38; Elliott, "Three Ambassadors," 167.

⁶⁷Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 93.

⁶⁸Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 100.

continually overestimating the advantages it could gain in return for the minimal concessions it was willing to make. As would become painfully apparent, their mutually gauging approach would lead to many conflicts in future attempts to settle the Palatinate question through diplomatic negotiation. The dispute arose repeatedly whether Spain should initiate the alliance by restoring the Palatinate, or whether England should by making war on the Dutch. Because of Spain's necessary involvement in any Anglo-Imperial negotiations with the Emperor about the Palatinate, this dispute was also an impediment to their success.

With Spain's assurances of support, the King had also opened negotiations with the Emperor for the restoration of the Palatinate at the electoral meeting at Regensburg. In the summer of 1630, he sent Sir Robert Anstruther, a client of the war party, as his ambassador, first at the electoral meeting at Regensburg and then afterward at the Imperial court in Vienna. On the basis of the peace with Spain, Anstruther was to demand that the Emperor lift the ban and restore at least the Lower Palatinate to Frederick. However, the Spaniards only payed lip service to supporting Frederick's cause at Regensburg. Since he had surrendered much of his leverage with them when he made peace, they had little motivation to press their allies seriously to give the King satisfaction – that is, unless he activated the secret treaty and intervened with the Dutch. As the 1630s would bear out, Spain would not support England's ambitions for the restoration of the Palatinate in more than a superficial way without a corresponding English commitment to bring the Dutch to satisfactory terms, by diplomacy or, if necessary, military force.⁶⁹ If England would make this commitment, the Spaniards were prepared to give up their share of the Lower Palatinate and intercede with its allies

⁶⁹Gardiner, vol. 7, 187; Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper," 918.

for the rest. The King, however, was in no position to pressure the Dutch to anything so long as he refused to call Parliament. Only once he built up the ship money fleet, and France declared war on Spain and blocked the Spaniards' land route to Flanders, would he recover some of this leverage with the Habsburgs.

In October, John Taylor, who had been sent to Regensburg in an unofficial capacity to gather information for Weston and the peace lobby, joined Anstruther there. Alongside the ambassador's official negotiations, Taylor met with Imperial and Spanish ministers to promote the peaceful settlement of the Palatinate question. This is an example of the typical end-run maneuver the peace party employed to bypass the war lobby: Taylor was aware of Spain's expectations for the restoration of the Lower Palatinate – that is, England's mediation of an acceptable peace between Spain and the Dutch, and if this effort failed, England's active assistance against the Dutch – and he did not share them with Anstruther. In fact, the ambassador finally learned of the Spanish demands through the Queen of Hungary's confessor, Quiroga. Thus not only the Spaniards, but the English peace party and the King himself withheld vital information about Spain's conception of the basis of its negotiations with England from those associated with the war lobby, even those whose negotiations were directly affected by it.⁷⁰ Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Anstruther was unable to reach an agreement with the Emperor on the Palatinate question. Frustrated by the Habsburgs' intransigence and Taylor's meddling, he finally departed Vienna in the autumn of 1632.⁷¹

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 921-2.

⁷¹PRO, SP 80/7, f. 220: [1630?], Taylor to [Weston]; *ibid.*, SP 80/8, f. 86: 21 Oct. 1631, "Anstruther to [Weston?]. Taylor had departed in August (PRO, SP 80/8, f. 217: 20 Aug. 1632, Taylor to

Even though the Habsburg option seemed the most promising to the King and some of his closest advisors, they saw the wisdom of keeping their diplomatic options open. If he could obtain the restoration of the Palatinate on better terms, it was immaterial to him if he did so "by the aid of France or Spain, of Protestant or Catholic."⁷² At the very least, continuing negotiations with the anti-Habsburg powers would put pressure on the Habsburgs to come to a satisfactory settlement on the Palatinate question. Charles's willingness to negotiate with whichever power was in the best position to help restore the Palatinate was not unethical for the time; other nations used similar tactics. However, his multiple negotiations necessarily resulted in the vacillating foreign policy condemned so vigorously by Gardiner.

In addition to his negotiations with the Habsburgs, the King continued discussions with the anti-Habsburg powers as well, which offered an alternative route to the restitution of the Palatinate and negotiation with the Habsburgs. In 1631, Charles allowed Hamilton to levy volunteers for Sweden. Like Mansfeld, Hamilton finally assembled a force whose "numbers were more imposing than the quality."⁷³ In July, he left for the Baltic with 7,000 men, but his forces soon eroded away as Mansfeld's had seven years earlier.⁷⁴ Given the unsatisfactory outlook for Anstruther's negotiations with the Emperor in Vienna, in May Charles decided to send Sir Henry Vane to Germany to negotiate an alliance for the restoration of the Palatinate with Gustavus Adolphus. After the Swedes and their allies had swept through Germany in 1631 and 1632, regaining control of the

Weston).

⁷²Gardiner, vol. 7, 97.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 183.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 191.

Palatinate in the process, Vane's negotiations took on new importance because the Palatinate could no longer be recovered through a negotiated settlement with the Habsburgs.⁷⁵ With the Palatinate once more in Protestant hands, the possibilities for effecting the restoration of the Palatine family seemed promising. However, it soon became apparent to Vane that the Swedes would only relinquish the Palatinate for a high price. At first, Gustavus made Frederick's restoration contingent upon England providing troops and a monetary contribution to the Swedish war effort.⁷⁶ Then, in September 1632, the Swedish King raised his demands, insisting that England not only join the land war, but also provide naval protection in the Baltic. In addition, he asked for the military support of the restored Prince Palatine and the equality of the Lutheran and Calvinist confessions in his lands. Charles realized that he would have to summon Parliament to finance these efforts; he thus rejected these demands.⁷⁷

Historians continue to debate the sagacity of the King's decision. According to the traditional view, an alliance with Gustavus offered the best chance for the restitution of the Palatinate, and Charles was a fool to turn it down.⁷⁸ Revisionist historians, on the other side, contend that the King

⁷⁵For Gustavus's victories and the recapture of the Palatinate, see chap. 3, p. 131. The Habsburgs would not be in the position to restore the Palatinate again until after their victory at Nördlingen in 1634.

⁷⁶Steiner, 122; Gardiner, vol. 7, 189.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 196. Frederick, who continued to insist upon unconditional restitution, also rejected the offer. After the death of both Gustavus and Frederick in late 1632, Oxenstierna installed Frederick's brother Ludwig Philipp von Simmern as the administrator of the Palatinate, but only after he agreed to the limitations imposed by the Swedish occupiers (Steiner, 202).

⁷⁸Reeve, *Charles I*, 238-79, *passim*; *idem*, "The Politics of War Finance in an Age of Confessional Strife: A Comparative Anglo-European View," *Parergon* 14, no. 1 (July 1996): 102, 105; Gardiner, vol. 7, 205-6, 352-3.

was right to reject Gustavus's harsh terms – English military intervention on land and sea.⁷⁹ However, the King's wisdom in steering clear of war is more convincingly argued by Michael Young, who calls attention to the great risks involved in waging the all-out war Gustavus demanded. He points out that the necessity of calling Parliament to finance this war would have likely put the King in the same confrontational domestic situation in which he found himself in the late 1620s. In addition, Gustavus's death in 1632 would have left him in an unenviable position, heavily engaged in the military deadlock that followed the loss of the inspirational leader.⁸⁰

Possible alliances with France and the United Provinces also fell through. The French made overtures to England for a league, particularly after Gustavus's death forced them to become more involved in the war to prevent the collapse of the anti-Habsburg opposition. As war between Spain and France drew closer, their efforts intensified. Although French ambitions in Germany were suspect, Charles continued to negotiate with Richelieu to keep his options open and at the same time apply pressure to his negotiations with Spain.⁸¹ The Dutch also courted an English alliance, but Charles regarded them as republicans and economic competitors rather than natural allies. He differed in this view from many of his subjects who "preferred the company of the godly to that of the adherents of antichrist."⁸² The traditional view that Charles made a great mistake in declining alliances with the Dutch and French, as he had the Swedes, also has recently been challenged by

⁷⁹Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 78-82.

⁸⁰Michael B. Young, *Charles I*, British History in Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 89.

⁸¹Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 82-6.

⁸²Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 101.

historians who believe that he actually showed political foresight in his recognition of the up-and-coming Dutch and French rivalry with England.⁸³

In the meantime, Charles continued to treat with Spain for the restoration of the Palatinate. In 1634, Windebank and Cottington negotiated a secret maritime treaty with the Spanish resident Necolalde. The King offered to equip a fleet of twenty ships to protect the sea route to Flanders if Spain would subsidize the cost. In return for this favor, he expected the restitution of the Palatinate – the removal of the ban and return of the Lower Palatinate and an arrangement for the recovery of the Upper Palatinate and electorate in the future. Spain, however, had no plans to finance the fleet unless it would be used openly against the Dutch. Although the drawn-out negotiations resulted in a draft treaty, it was never concluded, leaving the King to support his newly strengthened fleet at his own expense.⁸⁴

In 1635, the conjunction of several events helped England to recover some of the negotiating power it had lost when it signed the Treaty of Madrid. Firstly, relations between England and Spain became estranged when they failed to conclude the maritime treaty and the news of the Peace of Prague and its unfavorable terms for the Prince Palatine reached England.⁸⁵ Under the

⁸³Ibid.; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 75-8, 89-90.

⁸⁴Gardiner, vol. 7, 351; Alcalá Zamora, 350; Haskell, 309-13; Loomie, "Spanish Faction," 40-2. The King, disillusioned with Necolalde's conduct of the treaty negotiations, sent Taylor to Spain in 1634 to request the Spanish resident's recall and expedite the negotiations in tandem with the English resident, Sir Arthur Hopton (see chap. 5, p. 212).

⁸⁵This treaty, which confirmed Maximilian in his Palatine acquisitions, coupled with his recent marriage to his niece, which presented the prospect of a permanent Bavarian succession, were thus both serious setbacks to Charles I's policy of achieving the restoration of his nephew by peaceful means. After all of the Spaniards' promises, the King and his peace party supporters felt betrayed. For more on the Peace of Prague and its reception in England, see chap. 3, p. 142, and chap. 8, p. 305.

circumstances, Olivares could no longer safely assume England's benevolent neutrality. Secondly, the newly strengthened ship money fleet, in Gardiner's words "the most magnificent in size and numbers that had ever left English shores," enhanced England's desirability as an ally in the eyes of other European powers.⁸⁶ From this point on, Charles attempted to use this bargaining counter to his best advantage in diplomacy, playing one would-be ally off against the other. Lastly, France's declaration of war upon Spain further aided in the restoration of England's bargaining position with these powers. In a state of war, their communications in the Channel became even more critical than previously, and England's friendship consequently became more desirable to them, particularly in view of the large, modern fleet it commanded. Both France and Spain rushed to curry England's favor, since its aid could be decisive to either. Because of his new-found leverage, which would further increase when France blocked Spain's land route to Flanders, the King had more foreign policy options in the later 1630s than historians have commonly assumed.

It remained to be seen, however, how effectively Charles would use his improved bargaining position. The Peace of Prague, which confirmed Maximilian in his Palatine acquisitions, coupled with his recent marriage to his niece, which presented the prospect of a permanent Bavarian succession, were thus both serious setbacks to Charles I's policy of achieving the restoration of his nephew by peaceful means. The English realized that it was crucial that they take some action in support of Charles Louis's claims. With diplomatic advances being made by both France and the

⁸⁶Gardiner, vol. 8, 154. Edward Nicholas believed this to be the case because "writs have been sent to the sheriffs of every county in England, to levy money to defray the charge of a fleet for next year of double the strength of that employed this year [1635]." He continued, "This seconding soe powerfully the former honourable expedition will...make the world see that his Majesties amity is more considerable than it hath bene rendred by some neighbors malevolent to this crown." (HMC, *Sixth Report*, vol. 1, 279: 20 Oct. 1635?, Edward Nicholas to Lord Feilding, English ambassador in Venice).

Habsburgs, debate raged at court over the best means to pursue the Palatine interest. Characteristically, Charles avoided coming down decisively on one side or the other and instead chose to keep his options open. He still believed that he could regain the Palatinate for his nephew by treaty rather than arms, and he decided to take advantage of the hostilities between France and Spain by making overtures to both sides and seeing which held better prospects for success.⁸⁷ He therefore continued to consider the alliance with France offered by Senecterre while at the same time sounding out the Habsburgs on the restoration of the Palatinate. Seeking to gain from the situation, Charles began to conduct a more active foreign policy, soon dispatching three embassies – one to the Emperor, one to Spain, and one to France – to reassert the claims of his nephew.

With the complete dispossession of the Palatine family in 1623, the restoration of the Palatinate became the primary objective of English foreign policy for the next twenty years. Disagreements over how to achieve this and England's role in the Continental war more generally sparked conflict between the King and his subjects. The Protestant party, which had a strong following in Parliament, urged James I and then his son Charles I to intervene militarily in support of the Prince Palatine, thus striking a blow for the Protestant cause. The Stuart kings, however, viewed the restoration of the Palatinate as largely a dynastic question and not a confessional crusade. In this charged environment, the King and Parliament clashed repeatedly over foreign policy issues. Parliament voted James subsidies for war, but he favored negotiations with the Catholic Habsburgs. When Charles took up arms against the Habsburgs in response to the failure of the Spanish match, the way he and Buckingham conducted and financed the war so disgusted the Commons that they

⁸⁷BL, Egerton 1820, f. 518: 3 Aug. 1635, Windebank to Hopton.

were unwilling to vote adequate subsidies. The resulting political deadlock finally convinced Charles that it was preferable to rule without recourse to Parliament. Over the next eleven years, he consequently relied upon diplomacy to achieve the reinstatement of his nephew in the Palatinate, focusing his energies mainly on the Habsburgs. Given the opposition that still existed to this course, the King made and conducted his most sensitive foreign policy secretly, with the help of a few trusted councillors and a stable of diplomats abroad. Among the diplomats involved in these secret Habsburg negotiations was John Taylor, who had served at Habsburg courts in Brussels and Madrid. In September 1635, in the wake of the Peace of Prague, he embarked upon his most important post to date when he was sent to discuss the Palatinate question with the Emperor Ferdinand II.

PART II: THREE PORTRAITS

The background and life experiences of the three major envoys involved in Anglo-Imperial negotiations of the later 1630s – Taylor, Arundel, and Radolt – invariably influenced their conduct of the negotiations. An understanding of their family ties, social background, religious leanings (particularly Taylor and Arundel as English Catholics), education, and political and diplomatic career both before and after their employment in the 1630s provides important insights into the reasons they were chosen for their missions and the ways they perceived and dealt with their diplomatic responsibilities.

John Taylor, who was from a minor gentry family in Yorkshire, was brought up as a Catholic and educated on the Continent. After deciding against a religious vocation, he spent most of his career in the English diplomatic service at Habsburg courts in Brussels, Madrid, and Vienna. He was positively inclined towards the Habsburgs, and even in the face of adversity he remained a strong proponent of a pro-Habsburg foreign policy for England. The Earl of Arundel, on other hand, came from what was arguably one of the most powerful noble houses in England. He was raised a Catholic, and though he publicly converted to Protestantism to take his place at court, privately his true religious inclination toward Catholicism continued. He was exceedingly loyal to his sovereign and was a man of the highest character. Like Taylor, Arundel supported a peaceful policy with the Habsburgs, and as such was identified with the pro-Habsburg element at court. However given adequate reason, he did not hesitate to reevaluate his stance. Unlike Taylor and Arundel, Clement

Radolt's Catholicism was a non-issue. Radolt belonged to a bourgeois, bureaucratic family in Vienna. After receiving his doctorate in canon and civil law, he joined the Imperial service. His steady rise in social rank and long and successful career attest to the trust the Emperor placed in him. This combined with his legal training, which would be useful for explaining the justice of the Emperor's actions against Frederick V, were likely criteria for his selection as envoy to the English court.

These men are of very different backgrounds and took divergent career paths. They did, however, all share the same religion. And for a few short years in the later 1630s, they treated with the same aim in mind – a peaceful accommodation between their crowns on the question of the Palatinate.

5

JOHN TAYLOR (1597-1655)

Background

The first English diplomat sent to negotiate with the Emperor in the aftermath of the Peace of Prague was John Taylor "the diplomatist,"¹ who served as resident agent at the Imperial court in Vienna from 1635 to 1639. Taylor was born in 1597 in Yorkshire as the eldest of five children (three sons and two daughters) of Stephen Taylor of Bickerton and his wife Dowsabell, daughter of William Grimston of Newport, Isle of Wight.² The Taylors were a minor gentry family resident at Bickerton Hall in the parish of Bilton in Ainsty (the county of the city of York). They had a tradition of service

¹So dubbed by a later commentator to distinguish him from his contemporary John Taylor, The Water Poet. Because of the prevalence of certain Christian names in the Taylor family, keeping the individual family members straight in one's mind can be a difficult task. Fig. 1 is a useful aid in this respect. Also, the descriptive tags "senior" and "junior" are applied as needed in this section to differentiate John Taylor the diplomatist from his grandfather and uncle respectively. Please note that A. F. Pollard's article on John the diplomatist in the *Dictionary of National Biography* contains fundamental errors (Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, eds., *The Dictionary of National Biography: From the Earliest Times to 1900* [London: Oxford University Press, 1885-1901] [DNB], vol. 19, 438. This will be rectified by my replacement article forthcoming in the *New DNB*.

²William Dugdale, *The Visitation of the County of Yorke, begun in...1665 and finished in...1666*, Surtees Society Publications, no. 36 (Durham: Surtees Society, 1859), 214. The union of Stephen Taylor and Dowsabell Grimston is but one example of the intermarriage and other close connections common among the officers' families; Dowsabell's brother was William Grimston, gentleman, the Earl of Cumberland's receiver in Cumberland (Richard T. Spence, "A Royal Progress in the North: James I at Carlisle Castle and the Feast of Brougham, August 1617," *Northern History* [NH] 27 [1991]: 55; idem, *The Privateering Earl*, [Far Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucs.: Sutton, 1995], 38).

to the Clifford earls of Cumberland, one of the great magnate houses of the North.³ Like most gentry families, they were entitled to bear arms.⁴

John Taylor senior's sons Stephen and John junior (the father and uncle of John Taylor the diplomatist respectively) were both senior estate and household officers in the service of the earls of Cumberland.⁵ The Taylors were among the gentry families which provided the Cliffords with successive generations of officers, "parallel dynasties almost," who dealt with the multitude of activities necessary to manage the affairs of a great noble house.⁶ For a time, the Taylors were the Clifford earls' most trusted officers, playing an important role in the management of their financial and legal affairs as well as their residences and vast estates in Cumberland, Westmorland, and Yorkshire. Stephen Taylor was the steward of Skipton Castle (the heart of the Clifford inheritance) and the family estates in Bickerton as well as receiver-general in Craven under the 3rd and 4th earls. In addition to these duties, he participated in the day-to-day decision making and management of

³Male members of the family were often designated by the ordinary style of gentleman, at times as esquire. For a good general overview of the gentry in this period, see Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes, *The Gentry in England and Wales, 1500-1700* (Basingstoke, Hamps.: MacMillan, 1994).

⁴On 12 April 1635, John Taylor junior received a confirmation of arms to himself as well as to his father, his brothers Stephen, Thomas, and Robert, and all their descendants. These arms appear on John Taylor the diplomatist's seal (College of Arms, Miscellaneous Grants 7.29; M. R. Trappes-Lomax, "Who Was John Taylor the Diplomatist?," *Recusant History* [RH] 7, no. 1 [1963]: 45). The Taylor arms are described as argent on a pale sable three lions passant of the field, the crest as an ounce passant proper resting the dexter paw on a shield of the arms (Dugdale, 214).

⁵Although Albert Loomie lists John Taylor senior as a steward to the 4th Earl, this is impossible because the former died in 1605, before the 4th Earl inherited (Albert J. Loomie, "Canon Henry Taylor, Spanish Habsburg Diplomat," *RH* 17, no. 3 [1985]: 234).

⁶Spence, *Privateering Earl*, 39.

1 The Taylor Family

Legend: Bold = Catholics; Italics = probable Catholics; Underline = possible Catholics; Regular = absence of information or not Catholic; attended ● = St. Omer's; ○ = Douai; □ = St. George's, Madrid; † = English College, Rome; ‡ = English College, Valladolid

Clifford affairs along with his brother John Taylor junior.⁷ John junior was the Clifford earls' "man of affairs," and as such had a wide range of responsibility.⁸ He was most deeply involved in their financial and legal affairs; for instance, he dealt with the 3rd Earl's multitude of creditors and acted as the executor of his will.⁹ Under the 4th Earl, John Taylor junior represented his master at court, was involved in negotiating the claims made by Lady Anne Clifford, the 3rd Earl's niece, on the Clifford inheritance, and arranged for the lavish entertainments for James I's 1617 visit.¹⁰ There is

⁷Richard T. Spence, "The Pacification of the Cumberland Borders, 1593-1628," *NH* 13 (1977): 141; idem, "Royal Progress," 62.

⁸In an earlier publication, Loomie also mentions that John Taylor junior was a steward of the Earl of Cumberland's estates and a Catholic; however, there is no evidence in the sources he gives to substantiate these claims (Loomie, ed., *Spain and the Jacobean Catholics*, CRS Publications, vol. 64 [London]: CRS, 1973], vol. 1, 9 n. 9).

⁹*CSPD 1603-1610*, 402: 7/17 Feb. 1608, Release for John Taylor and other executors of the late Earl of Cumberland. For the swashbuckling and extravagant life of George Clifford, 3rd Earl of Cumberland, see Spence, *Privateering Earl*. His 1605 will is printed in J. W. Clay, "The Clifford Family," *Yorkshire Archaeological Journal* 18 (1905), 387-91.

¹⁰Complete with hiring beards, hair, and other guises for the actors and procuring gifts for the King. For a interesting and detailed description of James I's visits to the royal castle of Carlisle (under the governorship of the Earl of Cumberland) and to Brougham Castle in Westmorland in August 1617, and John Taylor's junior's role in making arrangements for them, see Spence, "Royal Progress." For his general duties, see: idem, *Privateering Earl*; Thomas D. Whitaker, *The History and Antiquities of the Deanery of Craven in the County of York*, ed. A. W. Morant, 3d ed. (Leeds: Dodgson, 1878), 361-3; HMC, *Report on Manuscripts in Various Collections* [London, HMSO, 1901-14], vol. 7 [*Var. Coll. VII*], 293: 9/19 Nov. 1634, John Taylor to Sir Gervase Clifton; ibid., *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Salisbury (Cecil Mss.)* [London: HMSO, 1883-1976], vol. 15 [*Salisbury (Cecil) XV*], 37: 7/17 Apr. 1603, Tobie [Matthew], Bishop of Durham, to the Earl of Cumberland and Sir Robert Cecil; ibid., *Salisbury (Cecil) XVI*, 291: [after Aug. 1604], Earl of Cumberland to Viscount Cranborne. For the inheritance dispute between Lady Anne Clifford and Francis Clifford, 4th Earl of Cumberland, as well as John Taylor's role in the negotiations, see Richard T. Spence, *Lady Anne Clifford: Countess of Pembroke, Dorset and Montgomery (1590-1676)* ([Phoenix Mill, Gloucs.]: Sutton, 1997).

evidence to indicate that another of John Taylor senior's sons, Thomas Taylor, also was a senior officer in the Cliffords' service.¹¹

It is apparent that the Taylors, while trusted servants, were on a more personal footing with the Cliffords. Not only was John Taylor junior the executor of the 3rd Earl's will, but he also was remembered in it.¹² He was chosen to accompany Henry Lord Clifford, later 5th Earl of Cumberland, as an esquire on the occasion of his being made a Knight of the Bath in June 1610.¹³ The relaxed demeanor between the two men is apparent in their correspondence.¹⁴ Henry Clifford was also on good terms with John's brother Stephen Taylor and his family. He stood as godfather to Stephen Taylor's eldest daughter, Dowsabell.¹⁵ She later became one of gentlewomen of Countess Grissell, Clifford's mother.¹⁶

¹¹Thomas Taylor was a steward to the 3rd Earl, but also performed other official duties for him (Edward Peacock, ed., *A List of Roman Catholics in the County of York in 1604* [London: Hotten, 1872], 61; HMC, *Salisbury (Cecil) XV*, 260: 16/26 Oct. 1603, Earl of Cumberland to Lord Cecil; *ibid.*, *Salisbury (Cecil) XVI*, 428: [between 20/30 Aug. and 5/15 May 1605], the same to Viscount Cranborne).

¹²"I appointe the said righte honorable friend, Robart, Earle of Salisburie, Edward, Lord Wotton, and my well beloved brother, Sir Francis Clifford, knight, and my servante, John Taylor, who I have for many yeares paste employed in all my businesses, and bred him upp in my service, and have ever founde him faithfull and honeste, assuringe myselfe he will soe continue to my house, my executors.... To my trustie servant, John Taylor, the lease of the new parke for twentye yeares, payinge twentye nobles yearlie." (Clay, 390).

¹³Trappes-Lomax, 45.

¹⁴A 1611 letter from John Taylor junior to Henry Lord Clifford in France gives a sampling of the important duties entrusted to Taylor and conveys the relaxed relationship between them (Whitaker, 361-2: June 1611, Taylor to Clifford).

¹⁵BI, Parish Registers, Bilton in Ainsty, County York. Dowsabell ("Dowse") was baptized on 16/26 September 1599.

¹⁶Dowsabell numbered among the Countess's gentlewomen in 1610 (I am grateful to Dr. Richard T. Spence for this information).

Religion

The Cliffords were unconcerned about employing Catholics in their service, a fortunate circumstance for the Taylors, for many of them were Catholics – whether recusants, church papists, or somewhere in between.¹⁷ The Cliffords' lax attitude may be due in part to the fact that recusancy was not unusual among Yorkshire gentry families in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹⁸ Hugh Aveling notes that "[t]he community of hereditary Catholics in the West Riding [including Ainsty] counted as one of the largest, most productive of martyrs and vocations, and wealthiest in England."¹⁹ He estimates that until the end of the seventeenth century, approximately a quarter of

¹⁷The earls of Cumberland often stayed at Bickerton, and the Taylors' Catholicism did not worry them. They generally maintained amicable relationships with many Catholic relatives, gentry, and estate officers (Spence, *Privateering Earl*, 37-8). In the seventeenth century a recusant was one, particularly a Catholic, who refused to attend the services of the Church of England; recusancy was a statutory offense. A church papist (or to Catholics a schismatic), on the other hand, was a Catholic who conformed outwardly to the established church. There are, of course, many shades between the two. Many English Catholics conformed only sporadically and were therefore periodically in trouble with church authorities for recusancy (see also n. 20).

¹⁸For an insightful and thorough discussion of the Catholic gentry in Yorkshire, see J. T. Cliffe, *The Yorkshire Gentry: From the Reformation to the Civil War*, University of London Historical Studies, vol. 25 (London: Athlone Press, 1969), chaps. 8-10. Just as the Catholicism of Stephen Taylor's family did not prejudice their relationship with the Cliffords, neither did it seem to affect negatively their status in the parish of Bilton. The parish registers show that Dowsabell stood as godmother to two children, and eleven more were named after her—and these numbers are limited to those children baptized in the established church.

¹⁹Hugh Aveling, "The Catholic Recusants of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 1558-1790," *Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society, Literary and Historical Section* 10, no. 6 (1963): 191.

the nobility and landed gentry in the West Riding was recusant.²⁰ Stephen Taylor's family, including his son John the diplomatist, was among them.

During a time when persecution was driving many Catholics to conformity,²¹ John Taylor the diplomatist was brought up in a firmly Catholic household. His parents Stephen and Dowsabell were both Catholic. Despite Anglican baptisms for most of their children, they were repeatedly called before Yorkshire ecclesiastical courts to answer charges of recusancy and noncommunicancy, though it appears they never complied.²² At one point Stephen was cited for neglecting to send his servants and children to be catechized, and later Dowsabell was expelled from the established church for "standing excommunicate for seven yeares or thereabouts."²³ In January 1606, the Bishop of London complained to the Earl of Salisbury that Stephen Taylor and one of his sons, among others,

²⁰Ibid. By 1604, recusancy was largely restricted to the gentry and those associated with them; even then, however, few gentry families were purely recusant (ibid., 228). Many times the head of the family was a church papist in order to retain his offices and lands and to avoid fines and/or imprisonment. Also, children raised in recusant households did not always remain Catholic. This is unsurprising given the censures against Catholics during this time, even if they were not carried out to the letter of the law.

²¹Cliffe calls attention to the marked decrease in Catholicism among the Yorkshire gentry between the Northern Rebellion and the Civil War with the following figures: in 1570, 368 of 567 total Yorkshire gentry families were Catholic; in 1604, 254 of 641; and in 1642, 163 of 679 (Cliffe, 186). These numbers work out to 65%, 40%, and 24% of the total respectively. However, while the percentage of Catholics declined, those who remained true to the faith became more firmly recusant: in 1604, 112 of the 254 Catholic families were at least partly recusant; in 1642, 138 of 163 (ibid., 189). This equals 44% and 85% respectively.

²²BI, AVCB 1604, f. 26; ibid., 1615, f. 32; ibid., 1619, ff. 23-4; ibid., 1623, f. 20; ibid., 1627, f. 31. It is possible that some of the latter citations for Dowsabell may actually refer to John Taylor's sister rather than his mother. For a list of recusants in the West Riding of Yorkshire to 1780, arranged by parish, see Hugh Aveling's "Catholic Recusants," app. I.

²³BI, AVCB 1619, f. 24.

were harbored at the Spanish ambassador's house and reportedly attended mass there.²⁴ Their Catholic upbringing made a deep impression upon Stephen and Dowsabell's children. John the diplomatist's younger brothers Stephen junior, a medical doctor in York City since 1627,²⁵ and Francis, a priest, court chaplain to Emperor Ferdinand III, and almoner to Emperor Leopold I²⁶ were

²⁴"We are informed that there is harboured in the Spanish Ambassador's house one Dr. Tayler and his brother, his servant and one of his brother's sons,...with many other English people that resort to the house and are generally reported to hear mass." (HMC, *Salisbury (Cecil) XVIII*, 23: 17/27 Jan. 1606, Bishop of London to Salisbury). Dr. Robert Taylor was Stephen's brother and Secretary of English Letters at the Spanish embassy in London from 1603 to 1609. Stephen was his only brother who had more than one son (see fig. 1).

²⁵Stephen was born in 1607 rather than earlier, as surmised by Albert Loomie (BI, Parish Registers, Bilton in Ainsty, County York). Stephen, described as "a definitely recusant doctor," set up his practice in St. Martin's, Coney Street in York city. Over the years, he and his family were repeatedly cited for recusancy (Hugh Aveling, *Catholic Recusancy in the City of York, 1558-1791* [London: Catholic Record Society [CRS], 1970], 240, 242 n. 15, 243, 248, 250-2). During the Interregnum, the York committee sequestered the property of well-off Catholics in the city, of which it found only four worthy of its attention, among them Dr. Stephen Taylor; however, it appears he eluded the fines (ibid., 85, 89; *Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Compounding & C., 1643-1660* [London: HMSO, 1889-92; reprint, Nendeln, Liech.: Kraus Reprint, 1967], vol. 3, 113: 23 Apr./3 May 1648, Rob. Homer, mayor, and the Committee for the City and County of York to the Committee for Compounding). For a list of recusants of York city similar to that for the West Riding, see Aveling, *Catholic Recusancy*, app. I.

²⁶John Thurloe, *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe...Containing authentic memorials of the English affairs from the year 1638 to the restoration of King Charles II.*, ed. Thomas Birch (London: Printed for the executor of F. Gyles, 1742), vol. 4, 169: 17 Nov. 1655, a letter of intelligence from [H. Manning in Cologne] to [J. Thurloe]; Dugdale, 214; Loomie, "Henry Taylor," 235. Francis Taylor studied at St. Gregory's College, Seville from ca. 1636 to 1638. He took minor orders in 1636, and was sent as a priest to England in the summer of 1638, but was apprehended upon his arrival there (Martin Murphy, *St. Gregory's College, Seville, 1592-1767*, CRS Publications, Records Series, vol. 73 [London: CRS, 1992]). It is known that he carried letters to England for William Johnson, a Jesuit residing in Spain (CSPD 1625-49, 576-7: 2/12 May 1638, Johnson to Dr. John Wilson; Martin Murphy, "The Cadiz Letters of William Johnson vere Purnell S. J. (1597-1642)," *RH* 21, no. 1 [1992]: 4). By 1641, Francis Taylor had entered the service of the Emperor Ferdinand III as a court chaplain (HKA, HZAB 87 [1641]). At this time his brother John the diplomatist was already well-known to the Imperial court as Charles I's resident agent from 1635 to 1639. After John's death in Vienna in 1655, where he was representing Charles II in exile, Francis stepped in to keep Secretary Nicholas informed of the latest news from the Imperial court (BL, Egerton 2536, f. 80: 2/12 Apr. 1656, Francis Taylor to Secretary Nicholas).

both decided Catholics, as was his sister Dowsabell.²⁷ Although the religious leanings of his other sister, Elizabeth, are not as clear cut, it is very likely she was a Catholic for at least part of her life.²⁸ Given the religious affiliation of most if not all of his nuclear family, it comes as no surprise that John Taylor the diplomatist was a steadfast Catholic.

John Taylor's own testimony upon entrance to the English College at Rome in October 1619 confirms not only the Catholicism of most of his immediate family, but his own as well. Each entering scholar was asked to write an account of his life up until the time of his entry into the College. These statements, known as the *Responsa Scholarum*, incorporate valuable information about a scholar's family, upbringing, education, health, religious background, and intended vocation. In his statement, John Taylor affirms that he comes from Yorkshire, that his parents are Catholic, that he has two brothers and two sisters (one of whom is non-Catholic), and that he has always been a Catholic himself.²⁹ Thus S. R. Gardiner's oft-quoted statement about him was only half true: Taylor was decidedly a Roman Catholic, though not actually "half a Spaniard by birth" as Gardiner claimed.³⁰

²⁷Dowsabell may have been cited for recusancy on several occasions (BI, AVCB 1619, f. 23; *ibid.*, 1623, f. 20; *ibid.*, 1627, f. 31); however, one or more of these citations may refer to her mother. In any event, her Catholicism is confirmed by her brother John's statement upon his entrance to the English College, Rome.

²⁸Elizabeth was the sister that John designated as a non-Catholic in his statement. However, it is unlikely she remained so throughout her life—she married Robert Trappes of Nidd, who was of a known Yorkshire recusant family and a recusant himself (Dugdale, 214; Bill Williams, *Bilton through the Ages* [York: Published by the author, 1985]). Additionally, an Elizabeth Taylor was cited for recusancy in the parish of Bilton in 1623 and 1627 (BI, AVCB 1623, f. 20; *ibid.*, 1627, f. 31).

²⁹For the text of the statement, see Anthony Kenny, ed., *The Responsa Scholarum of the English College, Rome*, pt. 1, 1598-1621, CRS Publications, Records Series, vol. 54 ([London]: CRS, 1962), 327.

³⁰Gardiner, vol. 8, 101. Gardiner may have been misled by a letter of Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, in which he wrote that Taylor bore the delays of the Imperial Diet "like a man bred in the

When surveying the religious leanings of the members of the extended Taylor family (those descended from John Taylor senior) through two generations, the unmistakable picture of a predominantly Catholic family emerges.³¹ The number of family members who were priests and/or held prominent positions in the Catholic community at home and abroad is quite overwhelming. Among them was Dr. Robert Taylor, John the diplomatist's uncle, who married Mary Fowler (very likely the daughter of John Fowler, a distinguished printer of early recusant literature).³² Dr. Taylor himself was a professor of civil law at Douai and later secretary of English letters for the Spanish ambassadors in England from 1603 until 1609.³³ He was known to shelter priests, including the

Court of Spain." (CCSP, vol. 2, 327: 27 Mar. 1654, Hyde to Bellings). It is also possible that John Taylor had an accent: his command of spoken English may have suffered during his years of educational exile and diplomatic service on the Continent.

³¹See fig. 1. It is interesting that John Taylor says that his kinfolk are mainly "heretical," i.e., non-Catholics, in his *Responsa* statement. Perhaps this seemed true in comparison to the steadfast Catholicism of his own nuclear family.

³²Albert J. Loomie, "Francis Fowler II, English Secretary of the Spanish Embassy, 1609-1619," *RH* 12 (1973): 70. As a widow, Mary Fowler Taylor was paid a pension by the Spanish ambassador Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, later Count of Gondomar (idem, "Sir Robert Cecil and the Spanish Embassy," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 42 [1969]: 36 n. 4). After her husband's death, her brother Francis Fowler took over the English secretaryship of the Spanish embassy, serving from 1609 to 1619 (idem, "Fowler").

³³He left England for the Continent early in Elizabeth's reign. He lectured at Douai from the early 1570s, where he earned the degree of *Doctor Utriusque Juris* in 1602. For more on Dr. Robert Taylor and his involvement in the most sensitive Anglo-Spanish negotiations of the day, see: Loomie, "Sir Robert Cecil;" idem, *The Spanish Elizabethans: The English Exiles at the Court of Philip II* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1963); idem, "Toleration and Diplomacy: The Religious Issue in Anglo-Spanish Relations, 1603-1605," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, n.s. 53, pt. 6 (1963); idem, *Spain and the Jacobean Catholics*, vol. 1; and L. Hicks, "The Embassy of Sir Anthony Standen in 1603: Part I," *RH* 5 (1959-60). For his involvement in the trial of Father Henry Garnet in 1606, see Loomie, "Sir Robert Cecil," 36. For his part in procuring Garnet's ear, deemed a relic by Catholics, for the Spanish ambassador Don Baltazar de Zúñiga, see Henry Foley, ed., *Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus: Historic Facts Illustrative of the Labours and Sufferings of Its Members in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (London: Burns and Oats, 1875-83; reprint, New York: Johnson Reprint, [1966]), vol. 4, 127-8. And for the strange story of Garnet's ear in general, with contemporary accounts and illustrations of the ear, see *ibid.*, 120-34, and Philip Caraman, *Henry Garnet, 1555-1606*,

infamous Father John Gerard in the aftermath of the Gunpowder Plot in 1605; in April 1606, the Taylors were imprisoned for hiding yet another priest.³⁴ The children of Dr. Robert and Mary Taylor (thus first cousins of John Taylor the diplomatist) were raised strictly Catholic in exile in Flanders. All three of their sons went on, or intended to go on, to careers in the Church: Anthony, who studied at St. Omers and the English colleges in Madrid and Valladolid, died before he could realize his goal; Thomas, who studied at St. Omers and the English College at Rome, was ordained in 1628 and sent on mission to England, where he subsequently died; and perhaps the most illustrious, Henry, who after study at St. Omers and the English College at Rome went on to become a resident agent

and the Gunpowder Plot (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1964), app. D.

The story of Garnet's ear unfolded more or less as follows. On one of the husks of an ear of straw stained with Garnet's blood, Catholics discerned the image of a face resembling Garnet's own. Then, two afflicted women were reported to have been cured by an application of it. As the ear's fame grew, both Catholics and Protestants flocked to see it. Fearing its subversive influence, English authorities (in particular the Richard Bancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury) sought to gain possession of the ear. Several witnesses were examined, but none could (or would) say where it could be found. Through Dr. Robert Taylor's efforts, Zúñiga had the ear in his possession for a time and showed it to others. Both men were therefore questioned as to its whereabouts by the Earl of Salisbury, and both denied they knew where it was. Zúñiga told Salisbury: "From curiosity I have seen the said straw of which several before have spoken to me but I have never been such an enemy to my money as to give it for straws as you have been told. After having seen it I kept it for two or three days...and since then have returned it." (HMC, *Salisbury (Cecil) XVIII*, 357: 8/18 Dec. 1606, Zúñiga to Salisbury).

³⁴Michael Hodgetts, "A Topographical Index of Hiding Places," *RH* 16, no. 2 (1982): 176. Dr. Taylor had associations with the plotters. According to notes of meetings related to the "gunpowder treason," he was in attendance at the Thursday "sennett" which gathered at the Mitre tavern in Broad Street for dinner in the days before 5/15 November 1605. Plotter Robert Catesby was also present. However, it is not likely the Plot itself was discussed. Taylor was overheard telling the group that "all princes' ambassadors were but honorable spies." A telling statement coming from one who worked closely with the Spanish ambassador (HMC, *Salisbury (Cecil) XVII*, 522: [Nov. 1605], Gunpowder Plot; Alan Haynes, *The Gunpowder Plot: Faith in Rebellion* [Phoenix Mill, Gloucs.: Sutton, 1994], 74).

for the Spanish Habsburgs in London, priest, court chaplain in Brussels, and eventually Dean of Antwerp Cathedral.³⁵

In addition to Dr. Robert's family, other Taylor relatives remained faithful to the Roman Church. John Taylor's only paternal aunt, Anne, married John Fowler, who was most probably the son of the Catholic printer of the same name and brother of Mary Fowler Taylor and Francis Fowler, who succeeded Dr. Robert Taylor as Secretary of English letters for the Spanish embassy. Anne Taylor Fowler became a well-known Catholic bookseller out of her home near the Inns of Court.³⁶ John the diplomatist's cousin Thomas Taylor, son of his uncle Thomas Taylor and Mary Ann Neville, though raised a "heretic," was removed to Flanders by his uncle Dr. Robert Taylor. Young Thomas attended St. Omers and the English College at Rome, and eventually returned to England as a priest.³⁷ Finally, many of the Taylors of Tadcaster, which is located only a few miles from

³⁵Geoffrey Holt, *St. Omers and Bruges College, 1593-1773: A Biographical Dictionary*, CRS Publications, Records Series, vol. 69 ([London]: CRS, 1979), 258; Foley, vol. 6, 300, 510; Godfrey Anstruther, *The Seminary Priests: A Dictionary of the Secular Clergy of England and Wales, 1558-1850*, vol. 2, *Early Stuarts 1603-1659* (Great Woking: Mayhew-McCrimmon, 1975), 314-5; Loomie, "Henry Taylor." Henry and Thomas Taylor's statements upon entering the English College, Rome are printed in Kenny, vol. 1, 333-4, and vol. 2, 367, respectively. Interestingly, Henry states that he has no plans to become an ecclesiastic, while Thomas knew that he himself had a vocation. Henry Taylor was later a candidate for the Bishopric of Chalcedon (England) and an executor of the will of Sir Tobie Matthew (Sir Edward Nicholas, *The Nicholas Papers: Correspondence of Sir Edward Nicholas, Secretary of State*, ed. George F. Warner, Camden New Series, vols. 40, 50, 57, Camden Third Series, vol. 31 [London: Printed for the Camden Society, 1886-1920; reprint, New York: Johnson Reprint, 1965], vol. 2, 272: 3 May 1655, Marmaduke Langdale to Nicholas; Anstruther, 314-5). For an excellent study of the whole of Henry Taylor's career, see Loomie, "Henry Taylor." For his diplomatic duties in England, see *CSPD 1629-1631*, 528, 534, and *ibid.*, 1633-1634, 333, 529, 532, 539. Many of his dispatches are in the registers of the Archdukes Albert and Isabella (HHStA, Belgien, Rep. PC 11, Fasz. 64-5).

³⁶Loomie, "Fowler," 75.

³⁷Kenny, vol. 1, 326; Foley, vol. 6, 290, 510; Holt, 258. Although young Thomas records in his *Responsa* statement that his parents and three sisters are heretics, it is questionable that his parents consistently conformed, since a "Thomas Taylor gentleman, steward to ye Earle of Cumberland . . . & his wief" were cited for recusancy in the parish of Bilton (Peacock, 61).

Bickerton, were also recusant Catholics; they are possibly cousins further removed of the Taylors of Bickerton Hall.³⁸

Education

John Taylor the diplomatist's parents saw to it that he was brought up and educated in the Catholic faith. It is likely that he was taught the fundamentals by either his parents or a private tutor (often an itinerant priest) or perhaps in clandestine Catholic schools, which were actually quite widespread in the North of England.³⁹ In 1612 at age fifteen, he was enrolled in the Jesuit-run St. Omers College in Flanders, the leading English Catholic preparatory school on the Continent, where he studied for the next seven years.⁴⁰ It may have been at this time that he took the alias John Grimston. St. Omers was a place for English Catholic boys to perfect their learning; some educational background, including instruction in Latin, was assumed. Like most Jesuit preparatory schools, St. Omers offered a humanities course in five forms, or levels: rudiments, grammar, syntax, poetry, and rhetoric. This course ensured students a solid grounding in the classics and enabled them to proceed on to higher

³⁸BI, AVCB, for instance 1636, ff. 44-5, and Cause Papers, H 463; Aveling, "Catholic Recusants," app. I. The Taylors of Tadcaster had held the place of postmaster there since the late 1570s. The place was lost after Thomas Taylor was executed by the Parliamentary commander Lord Fairfax for carrying an express to Prince Rupert to hasten the relief of York (PRO, State Papers Domestic, Charles II, vol. 6, f. 180: June? 1660, Petition of Thomas Taylor to Secretaries Nicholas and Morice; BL, Add. Mss. 28566, n.f.: "Iter Boreale, Anno Salutis 1639": John Aston's Diary; CSPD 1637, 331: 27 July/6 Aug. 1637, Warrant to pay for posts).

³⁹A. C. F. Beales, *Education under Penalty: English Catholic Education from the Reformation to the Fall of James II, 1547-1689* ([London]: Athlone Press, 1963), ix, 56-7, 74-5, 81, 83; Cliffe, 194-5. Although it was illegal for a Catholic to employ a tutor for his children, for a school to be opened without permission, or for children to be sent to Continental seminaries, most escaped prosecution because these laws were laxly enforced (ibid., 184).

⁴⁰Holt, 258.

education.⁴¹ The main emphasis was on the mastery of Latin composition and conversation (the boys were required to speak Latin at all times, except during recreation), which was taught "not for the manufactured reasons of a later age but as a practical instrument of culture;"⁴² however, the students learned the basics of Greek as well. The majority of students at St. Omers were lay, that is, without a vocation.⁴³

John Taylor decided he might have a vocation, because in 1619, after finishing his classical studies at St. Omers, he was admitted as a convictor at the English College in Rome. The English College was the place through which "all currents of English Catholic life flowed . . . by virtue of scholastics arriving, priests leaving and visitors great and small."⁴⁴ Upon his entry into the English College, he gave his statement included in the *Responsa Scholarum*. In addition to the information he recorded about himself, his family, and their religion discussed above, he indicated that he had reached rhetoric, the fifth form of his preparatory training, but had not yet decided upon his vocation.⁴⁵ The seven-year course of study at the English College was comprised of three years of philosophy and four of theology. Therefore, Taylor's background in Latin was undoubtedly

⁴¹Beales, 132-3, 159.

⁴²Ibid., 163. Cliffe rightly observes that "[a]t a time when Latin was still extensively used in works of literature and official and legal purposes, no one could afford to regard himself as an educated man unless he had a good working knowledge of the language." (Cliffe, 72).

⁴³The proportion was roughly four to one (Beales, 169). Such an education was not inexpensive—fees amounted to at least £25 a year and had to be paid six months in advance (ibid., 160). The fact that the Taylors were willing to pay such a sum and risk persecution for themselves and their eldest son in order for him to receive a Catholic education underlines their strong religious commitment.

⁴⁴Ibid., 121.

⁴⁵Kenny, pt. 1, 327. Beales notes that because St. Omers was at times desperate for boys wishing to continue on to Rome, the English College was obliged to admit students who were not prepared to the usual standard or unsure of their vocation (Beales, 130).

sufficient to enter philosophy at this time. The art of disputation was cultivated, and all conversation was to be in either Latin or Italian.⁴⁶ Therefore we can assume that he further honed his linguistic and debating skills during his tenure at the English College.

Taylor apparently decided to forgo a religious career, because he left the English College in the late spring of 1621, after less than two years of study. His whereabouts and activities during the following seven years are unclear, though it may be during this time he married Jane Gibbs, by whom he had three children by 1639.⁴⁷

Career

Though all our Recusants be the King of England's subjects, yet too many of them be the King of Spaines Servants.

R. Johnson, *Kingdom and Commonwealth*

John Taylor settled instead upon a career in government service. By 1628, he had secured his first government employment, and by 1630 he had begun his long career as a diplomatic agent at foreign courts, particularly those of the Habsburgs in Vienna, Brussels, and Madrid.⁴⁸ Taylor secured his

⁴⁶Ibid., 121-2.

⁴⁷PRO, State Papers Domestic, Charles I [SP 16], vol. 433, f. 102: 25 Nov./5 Dec. 1639, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, SP 16/470, f. 164: [Oct?] 1640, Petition of Jane Taylor to Charles I.

⁴⁸"But where as he hath bene employd these seaven yeeres in his Majesties servise, having on many long and dangerous iournys and lived in the dearest Courtes with very small allowance where by he hath bene forced both in this last voiage as in divers others to disburse sundry summes of his owne by which he is much empared in his estate as allso by neglecting all other occasions where in he might have benefitted him selfe...." (PRO, SP 16/189, f. 145: 29 May 1635, "The Accompt of John Taylor sent into Spaine for his Majesties affaires, 13 July 1634"). In letters to Secretary Windebank in July 1638, Taylor asks for recompense to his wife and children for his continual absences and in consideration of his ten years' service (Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 113: 5/15 July 1638, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, ff. 119-21: 11/21 July 1638, same to same). In another from the Tower of the winter of 1639, Taylor states that he has served the King continually for eleven years (PRO, SP 16/433, f. 102: 25 Nov./5 Dec. 1639, same to same). A diplomatic servant of the Crown pleading for reimbursement for his expenses is a recurring

government employment on the strength of his aptitude for languages and, in all likelihood, contacts made through the earls of Cumberland.⁴⁹ He would have been well known not only to the Cliffords but also to Thomas Wentworth (later Earl of Strafford), the diplomat Sir Edward Wotton, and other notables who journeyed with them, all of whom were in the position to help Taylor to a government post. In fact, it is apparent Taylor and Wentworth were well acquainted in 1633, when Taylor was assisting him with a scheme to promote trade between Ireland and Spain. At this time Wentworth gave his encouragement and affirmed his friendship to Taylor, writing "and this not for a start and away, but reposedly and constantly . . . [being] one of those . . . that shall be the latest and loathest in the world to lose the respects I am enabled to do my friends through mutability and change."⁵⁰

In his dealings abroad during the Thirty Years' War, Taylor served the interests of the party that supported peace with the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs as opposed to the party that supported intervention on the anti-Habsburg side (Sweden, the Dutch Republic, France, or a combination thereof).⁵¹ The differences of opinion over early Stuart foreign policy contributed to an English government and foreign service divided roughly along the lines of the peace and war lobbies. Competing lines of diplomatic communication developed, with Secretary Dorchester and his

theme.

⁴⁹According to Nicholas Kendall, a jealous rival, John Taylor had "nothing but language to help himself." Kendall believed that he deserved preferment in the King's service rather than Taylor (PRO, SP 16/273, f. 151: 24 Aug./3 Sept. 1634, Kendall to Windebank).

⁵⁰David Masson, *The Life of John Milton: Narrated in Connection with the Political, Ecclesiastical and Literary History of His Time*, new and rev. ed. (New York: P. Smith, 1946), vol. 1, 695.

⁵¹This was often a difficult task, for, as previously noted, the Emperor had deprived Charles I's brother-in-law, Frederick V of the Palatinate, of his hereditary lands and titles and parceled them out to Spain and Bavaria.

protégées representing the war party, and Secretary Windebank and his agents the peace party.⁵² Most of Taylor's foreign assignments were to the various Habsburg courts, and he accordingly corresponded primarily with those associated with Charles I's secret Habsburg negotiations, namely Sir Richard Weston, Earl of Portland (until his death in 1635), Sir Francis Cottington, and Windebank. Indeed, Taylor and other diplomats sent to Habsburg courts were specifically instructed by Windebank to conduct the meaningful part of their negotiations through him alone and to only send general news to Secretary Coke (Dorchester's replacement). Therefore knowledge of Taylor's activities were often limited to Weston, Cottington, Windebank, and the King while many of his privy councillors, including those on the committee for foreign affairs, were kept in ignorance. Likewise, Taylor was privy to information about secret negotiations with the Habsburgs that was kept from these councillors and many other diplomats, particularly those who advocated intervention on the Protestant side.⁵³

On his first known assignment, Taylor gathered news for Weston in Brussels, where he was present in April 1630.⁵⁴ He was soon sent to the Empire in an unofficial capacity to gather information for the peace lobby, first at the electoral meeting at Regensburg in October and November 1630, and then afterwards at the Imperial court in Vienna.⁵⁵ Alongside the official

⁵²As previously discussed, Charles encouraged this fragmented system by enabling his leading pro-peace ministers, Weston (later Earl of Portland), Cottington, and Windebank, to conduct secret negotiations with the Habsburgs that were kept from the war lobby, and by extension from most members of the privy council and foreign affairs committee, whatever their affiliation.

⁵³For more on Taylor's secret negotiations, see chaps. 8 and 11.

⁵⁴PRO, SP 77/19, f. 335: 18 Apr. 1630, Taylor to [Weston].

⁵⁵His correspondence, mostly directed to Weston, is found in PRO, SP 80/7-8 and HMC, *Denbigh V*. Taylor indeed acted as Weston's agent in Imperial political circles but not as a Spanish agent

negotiations of Sir Robert Anstruther, the accredited English ambassador to the Emperor and client of the war party, Taylor met with Imperial and Spanish ministers to promote the peaceful settlement of the Palatinate question. This provides an example of the typical end-run maneuver the peace party employed to get around the war advocates: although Taylor was aware of Spain's real terms for the restoration of the Lower Palatinate (the implementation of the secret Cottington Treaty), he kept them from Anstruther.⁵⁶ Therefore in both England and the Empire, the Spaniards and those Englishmen who favored a peaceful settlement, including the King, withheld Spain's conception of the basis of its negotiations with England from those associated with the English war lobby.⁵⁷ Since the two English envoys in Vienna were not working from the same script, it is not surprising that the parties did not reach an agreement, and Taylor departed Vienna in August 1632.⁵⁸

Taylor returned to Brussels in October and resumed his news-gathering activities there for a time.⁵⁹ However, he soon returned to England, where he was investigating the scheme to promote trade between Ireland and Spain for Wentworth in the summer of 1633. Both Wentworth and Taylor

in England as L. J. Reeve asserts (Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper," 921). Reeve has confused John with his cousin Henry.

⁵⁶Anstruther let Weston and Taylor know that he found Taylor's presence in Vienna inconvenient to his negotiations (PRO, SP 80/7, f. 220: [1630?], Taylor to [Weston]). Later, Anstruther's frustrations are clear when he complains that the Imperialists talk more freely with Taylor than him and that Taylor will inform the reader of what he has discovered (PRO, SP 80/8, f. 86: 21 Oct. 1631, Anstruther to [Weston?]).

⁵⁷Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper," 921-2. For a more general discussion of Anstruther's negotiations, see chap. 4, p. 183.

⁵⁸PRO, SP 80/8, f. 217: 20 Aug. 1632, Abstract of letter from Taylor to Weston.

⁵⁹PRO, SP 77/22. Taylor remained in Brussels at least until December (*ibid.*, f. 306: 7 Dec. 1632, Taylor to [Weston]).

were in contact with the Spanish resident agent in London, Juan Necolalde, to whom Wentworth looked to support this business.⁶⁰

Taylor quickly became more involved in Spanish affairs. From July 1634 through May 1635, he was employed on a diplomatic mission to Madrid to expedite negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish maritime treaty already underway in England.⁶¹ Initially Taylor's charge was to complain about the behavior of Necolalde, who was blamed for the slow progress of the negotiations, and to secure his recall. Taylor accomplished this with dispatch, and by August Philip IV had nominated the Count of Humanes as Necolalde's replacement.⁶² Once this was achieved, Taylor was ordered to remain in Spain until news of the conclusion of the treaty came from England. During this time he and the

⁶⁰*Strafford*, vol. 1, 95-6: 1/11 Aug. 1633, Taylor to Wentworth; *ibid.*, 104: 22 Aug./1 Sept. 1633, same to same. At this time Taylor's cousin Henry was serving as Necolalde's secretary; it is highly likely that he, not John, is the interpreter (Mr. Taylor) to whom Wentworth and Necolalde refer (*ibid.*, 112, 118-9; Loomie, "Canon Henry Taylor," 227).

⁶¹Taylor's correspondence while in Spain is in *PRO*, SP 94/37, and *CSP*, vol. 1. He arrived in Madrid on 5 August 1634 (*PRO*, SP 94/37, f. 97: 14 Aug. 1634, Taylor to Portland). Taylor was to be paid 10 shillings a day (Gary M. Bell, *A Handlist of English Diplomatic Representatives, 1509-1688*, Royal Historical Society Guides and Handbooks, Main Series, vol. 16 [London: Royal Historical Society, 1990], 260). For Taylor's financial account for his service in Spain, see *PRO*, SP 16/289, f. 145, and *ibid.*, SP 94/37, f. 181. At the time this account was drawn up, shortly after his return to England, he had actually already been paid £200 of the £368 he claimed in ordinary and extraordinary expenses, and requested the remainder due.

⁶²*CSP*, vol. 1, 126: 22 Aug. 1634, Sir Arthur Hopton to Windebank; *CSPV* 1632-36, 291: 27 Oct. 1634, Anzolo Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate [D&S]. Humanes's departure was repeatedly delayed, so long in fact that he died, in September 1635, before he could make it to England (*CSP*, vol. 1, 329: 29 Sept. 1635, Hopton to Windebank; *CSPV* 1632-6, 471: 2 Nov. 1635, Correr to D&S). It is interesting to note that Necolalde and Taylor's cousin Henry had disagreements over the intentions of the English ministers they dealt with in the secret negotiations for a naval alliance (namely Weston, Windebank, and Cottington). Necolalde, who believed that Henry Taylor was too partial to the English position, essentially asked for the latter's recall in 1634. This is not the first time Henry Taylor had been suspected of English partisanship; in 1631 he reported rumors that "I am too much an Englishman and that I was raised among the Jesuits." (Loomie, "Canon Henry Taylor," 226). John Taylor encountered similar suspicions throughout his career, but in reverse: Englishmen who supported the Protestant cause considered him a partisan of the Habsburgs.

English resident agent Sir Arthur Hopton kept Windebank and Cottington, Charles's main negotiators of the maritime treaty in England, abreast of developments at the Spanish court. Back in England, Charles became weary of Necolalde's intransigence, and he sent Hopton powers in February 1635 to conclude the treaty in Spain. Before leaving, Taylor had several discussions about important issues (among them the Palatinate) with Olivares, to whom he was particularly directed.⁶³ The Spanish minister was favorably inclined towards Taylor, though this may have stemmed more from the latter's pro-Habsburg stance than his skill in negotiation.⁶⁴ Still, in Hopton's estimation, Taylor was "a very honest and careful man" who performed his diplomatic duties in Spain quite satisfactorily.⁶⁵

Soon after his return to England, Taylor secured an important post as resident agent to the Imperial court in Vienna, where he remained from November 1635 until early 1639.⁶⁶ This embassy was the most important of his career, as he was entrusted with negotiations on a sensitive matter of great importance to both sides (England and the dispossessed Palatines on the one hand, and the Austrian Habsburgs and their Spanish and Bavarian allies on the other) and to the peace of Europe: the Palatinate question. The negotiations that took place in the years from 1635 to 1639 between

⁶³PRO, SP 94/37, f. 128: 18 Oct. 1634, Taylor to Olivares; *ibid.*, f. 130: 18 Oct. 1634, Philip IV to Taylor; *CSP*, vol. 1, 150: 16 Oct. 1634, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 236: 24 Feb. 1635, same to same; *ibid.*, 262: 25 Apr. 1635, Hopton to same.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 268: 22 Apr. 1635, Olivares to Cottington.

⁶⁵Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 5, f. 324: 13 Aug. 1634, Hopton to Windebank.

⁶⁶Taylor's instructions are in PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 34-47. The bulk of his correspondence is in: PRO, SP 80/9-10; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss.; HMC, *Denbigh V*; and *CSP*, vol. 1. He was paid 40 shillings a day for his labors, fourfold what he was paid in Spain.

England and the Austrian Habsburgs form the centerpiece of this dissertation and are discussed in more detail in chapters eight through ten below. John Taylor figured prominently in them.

Despite an auspicious beginning to his negotiations with the Emperor, John Taylor's fortunes took a turn for the worse. Periodically during his tenure at the Imperial court he was reprimanded by Windebank for "indiscretions" in his conduct of the negotiations. In early 1639 he was recalled from Vienna. In April he reached England and was soon called to account for promoting a conference with the Habsburgs at Brussels without the commission to do so.⁶⁷ The real cause of his disgrace, however, was not his undertakings with the Habsburgs – which were covertly encouraged by the Crown – but rather that their exposure prejudiced English negotiations underway for a French treaty at Hamburg.⁶⁸

Taylor was committed to the Tower in September 1639, where he remained for at least seven months.⁶⁹ He was miserable in his confinement. Not only had he purportedly offended his sovereign

⁶⁷For specifics, see chap. 11.

⁶⁸This tactic was not new, though the repercussions were. When Taylor was negotiating in Vienna in 1636, in England "they have never even been willing to admit that Taylor has powers to engage in any particular negotiations...and declare that if he has gone beyond his instructions he has done so of his own caprice and not by order of the court. However they do not go so far as to blame him or to say that they will punish him if he has gone beyond the limits of his instructions. This makes it probable that they propose to adopt this method to attribute to the imprudence of the minister all the unpleasant results which they will gather from the negotiations at the Imperial court." (*CSPV 1632-6*, 529: 14 Mar. 1636, Correr to D&S).

⁶⁹A. F. Pollard's old *DNB* article on John Taylor the diplomatist claims that Taylor's books and papers were seized from the Inner Temple around the time of his arrest. However, as M. R. Trappes-Lomax suspected, these items were not the property of our John Taylor but another man of the same name (Trappes-Lomax, 45). Secretary Windebank did indeed order his secretary Robert Reade to seize the books and papers of a "Mr. Taylor of the Inner Temple, gent." shortly before our Taylor was sent to the Tower. However, this was a mere coincidence. These things almost surely belonged to the John Taylor who soon after the seizure argued that the Secretaries of State have no place in the House of Lords (unless they were lords or were called by writ). Reade was told of this argument by an informant of the Inner Temple; thus it came to Windebank's ears (PRO, SP 16/429, f. 49: 26 Sept./6 Oct. 1639,

and been imprisoned under embarrassing circumstances, but he was in dire financial straights. In debt due to financial obligations incurred during his diplomatic service and unable to earn money to support his family, Taylor repeatedly petitioned Windebank to intercede with the King on his behalf, if not for his own contrition and misery then for the sake of his family.⁷⁰ Taylor's wife Jane also petitioned the king, pleading for her husband's liberty. According to her account, Taylor was so melancholy that she feared for his life, the loss of which would result in the "utter ruine" of herself and her children. Windebank, who had helped Taylor in the past and felt guilty about his disgrace, did intercede with the King; he sent Jane Taylor's petition under cover of his own letter advising Taylor's release.⁷¹

The difficult financial situation in which Taylor found himself was compounded by the loss of his inheritance. In November 1639, he lamented to Windebank: "I know not now by what means possibly to help or relieve my self for amongst other great crosses having lost my Uncle and not only the hope which I had in him, but have been hardly dealt with all and wronged in my Father's estate."⁷² There is no indication that either John the diplomatist, as the eldest son, or his brothers Francis or Stephen came into their father's estate. After their father Stephen's death in 1618, it is possible that the inheritance passed instead to their uncle John Taylor junior, perhaps because of the

Windebank to Reade; *ibid.*, SP 16/446, f. 52: 25 Feb./6 Mar. 1640, Allan Boteler to same).

⁷⁰PRO, SP 16/431, f. 52: 16/26 Oct. 1639, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, SP 16/433, f. 102: 25 Nov./5 Dec. 1639, same to same; *ibid.*, SP 16/448, f. 112: 21/31 Mar. 1640, same to same.

⁷¹PRO, SP 16/470, ff. 164-5: [Oct?] 1640, Petition of Jane Taylor to Charles I.

⁷²PRO, SP 16/433, f. 102: 25 Nov./5 Dec. 1639, Taylor to Windebank.

threat of fines or sequestration of the estate under the penal laws against Catholics.⁷³ These laws, though often laxly enforced, provided that parents like Stephen and Dowsabell who sent their children to Continental seminaries were liable to forfeit their lands and goods; the same penalty applied to children who refused to conform, like their three sons.⁷⁴

All indications point to this conclusion. John Taylor junior was still resident in Bickerton and a relatively wealthy man in October 1639, when he made his will being "sick of body but sound of mind." He left the great bulk of his estate to Matthias, a distant cousin. Among other bequests, he left the sum of £50 to his nephew John Taylor the diplomatist and his children, as well as some money to the children of his brother Dr. Robert Taylor.⁷⁵ Thus if Stephen's estate indeed did pass to John junior, it would fall to Matthias upon the latter's death. From John the diplomatist's own words, it seems highly likely that he still nurtured the hope of regaining his father's estate from his uncle. Surely then, he had every right to be very upset when he received the news in November

⁷³I have no direct proof that John Taylor junior was a Catholic, nor does his name appear in the Bilton parish registers as a party to an Anglican baptism, marriage, or burial. It should be noted, however, that in 1604 a John Taylor in the Parish of Bilton and two of his servants, one of them named Jane Spinck, were cited for noncommunicancy at Easter last (Peacock, 61). Further, in the Bilton parish registers, a simple, undated list at the end indicates that a Mr. Taylor engaged three servants: William Taylor, Alice Spinck, and Jane Spinck (no date given). The fact that said Mr. Taylor had three servants in his pay indicates that he was a man of some means. Therefore, Mr. Taylor could possibly be either John Taylor senior or junior, who were both active at this time; or he could be someone else entirely.

⁷⁴Cliffe, 194, 198.

⁷⁵In the early 1630s, John Taylor junior had enough money to be fined for failing to take the order of knighthood at the coronation of Charles I (one of the King's underhanded tricks to supplement his revenues during the personal rule). Taylor compounded at £12, while the average Yorkshire compounder paid only £10 (W. Paley Baildon, "Compositions for Not Taking Knighthood at the Coronation of Charles I," in *Miscellanea*, Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series, vol. 61 [Leeds: Yorkshire Archaeological Society, 1920], 87, 99). In his 1639 will, he bequeathed all freehold lands, tenements and hereditaments to his cousin Matthias; his wife Mary and her heirs were to receive the remainder of his goods, chattels, debts, credits, and "other estate" (PRO, Probate Registers 11, vol. 182, ff. 206-7; BI, Original Wills, Dec. 1639).

1639 that his ailing uncle had instead left his estates to a distant cousin and attempted to settle John the diplomatist's claim with a disappointing £50. Locked away in the Tower, however, there was little he could do against it, and by December 1639 his uncle was dead. Regardless of the actual mechanics of his dispossession, we do know the outcome, namely that John the diplomatist felt cheated of his inheritance and that his father's legacy in Bickerton was lost.⁷⁶

John Taylor was finally granted his release from the Tower, probably sometime before the outbreak of the English Civil War. Despite his bad treatment, he remained a staunch royalist, and at some point he left England for the Continent, eventually returning to Vienna where his brother Francis was serving as chaplain to the Emperor Ferdinand III.⁷⁷ Although he was lightly esteemed by Sir Edward Hyde, one of Charles II's leading ministers and acting secretary of state, Taylor was employed during the Interregnum on the strength of his loyalty and good reputation with the Emperor to muster support for the King's cause with the Emperor and some of the Catholic princes.⁷⁸

⁷⁶Even if the estate did not pass from Stephen to John junior, it went to someone other than Stephen's sons. The parish registers to the end of the seventeenth century provide no further clues about what happened to the Taylors of Bickerton Hall. It is ominous that they are not mentioned in the 1642 will of Henry Clifford, 5th Earl of Cumberland (printed in Clay, 397-9). One would think he might leave something to the Taylors (if any of them were still in his service), before the Clifford inheritance passed to his cousin Anne.

⁷⁷Francis Taylor was in the service of the Emperor Ferdinand III in 1641 and was still serving him ten years later (HKA, HZAB 87 [1641]; *ibid.*, HZAB 97 [1651], f. 204).

⁷⁸It is unclear exactly when Taylor resumed his diplomatic duties in Vienna. He may have served as the English agent to the Emperor for some weeks in the autumn of 1649. Niccolo Sagredo, the Venetian ambassador in Germany, wrote to the Doge and Senate that a "gentleman sent by the king of England, who gives himself the title of ambassador, although as a matter of fact he is not recognized as such by the Court," visited the Imperial court in the fall of 1649 to try and secure aid for the royalist cause (CSPV 1647-52, 116: 11 Sept. 1649, Sagredo to D&S; *ibid.*, 118-9: 25 Sept. 1649, same to same; *ibid.*, 120: 2 Oct. 1649, same to same). The year 1651 is the earliest I can pinpoint Taylor with any certainty in Vienna. At this time, the Imperialists considered him to be the English resident agent; they were also defraying his costs (HKA, HZAB 97 [1651], ff. 334, 472). I have found no independent evidence to indicate that Taylor was actually accredited by Charles II in 1651; however, Hyde was in

In 1652, Hyde made it no secret in his correspondence with Sir Edward Nicholas that he did not hold Taylor in high regard.⁷⁹ Still, it is apparent that Hyde considered Taylor's services useful, as he was seriously considering sending Taylor to ply Charles II's cause at the Imperial court in Vienna and the upcoming Diet in Regensburg. Hyde turned to Nicholas for advice, writing

I have often forgot to ask your opinion of Taylor, whom I know not at all, but it seems he was Agent in the last King's time with the Emperor; and many and amongst those the Lord of Norwich, have very much commended him to me; if he were to be judged by his letters I should believe him a fool, yet they say he hath great and real reputation with the Emperor, and all men confess he is very honest and passionate for the King's interest, so that I believe it necessary to him which is resolved.⁸⁰

Hyde and the King decided that Taylor's loyalty, previous diplomatic experience, and connections at the Imperial court would make him an effective instrument to solicit support from Catholic rulers, because in September 1652 Taylor was accredited as resident agent to the Emperor Ferdinand III and the electors of Cologne and Mainz.⁸¹

touch with Taylor in Vienna in June 1652, before the latter was accredited to that court (*CCSP*, vol. 2, 138: 22 June 1652, Hyde to Taylor).

⁷⁹Hyde deprecated Taylor to others as well, including Sir Richard Browne, who served Charles II as an agent in Paris (Evelyn, vol. 4, 256-7: 31 July 1652, Hyde to Browne).

⁸⁰*CSP*, vol. 3, 96: 13 Sept. 1652, Hyde to Nicholas. Nicholas obviously did not know Taylor well either, because he confused Taylor with his brother Francis when he encouraged Hyde to send William Curtius, the Protestant resident agent in Frankfurt, to the Protestant princes at Regensburg rather than Taylor. Nicholas's objection was predicated on the fact that he considered Taylor "a factious papist, [who] hath not so much reputation with the princes of the Religion Reformed. ...[and] tho well affected, is but a busy, weak man." However, Nicholas agreed that "he may be fit (as you say) to intimate so much to the Emperor (with whom he is a domestic) and some Catholic princes." However, Nicholas was thinking of Francis Taylor, the Emperor's chaplain, rather than his brother John Taylor when he made this statement (Nicholas, vol. 1, 307-8: 5 Sept. 1652, Nicholas to Hyde; cf. *CSP*, vol. 3, 103: 4 Oct. 1652, Hyde to Nicholas).

⁸¹*Ibid.*; *CCSP*, vol. 2, 148: 6 Sept. 1652, Charles II to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*, 149: 13 Sept. 1652, same to the electors of Cologne and Mainz. For Taylor's credentials and Hyde's side of the correspondence see Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss., and *CCSP*, vol. 2. For his memorials to the Emperor, see HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1. For his letters to Prince Rupert, see BL, Add. Mss. 18827, ff. 15-6. Later

Taylor's final mission at the Imperial court was fraught with difficulties. His relations with Hyde were strained. In fact, shortly after Taylor's appointment, the two had a falling out over what Hyde perceived as Taylor's blatant promotion of a friend, Sir John Henderson, for diplomatic employment. Hyde wrote Taylor a letter of rebuke and was incensed even further by the latter's purported indiscretion in showing Henderson the letter.⁸² Taylor was so disgusted by the whole affair that for a time he dropped all correspondence with Hyde. Hyde, equally disgusted, wrote to Nicholas that he was glad that Henry Wilmot, Lord Rochester, would be sent as ambassador to the Emperor and Diet, because he was "sure a wise man is wanting there; for Taylor is the most absolute fool I ever heard of."⁸³ While complaining acidly of Taylor's indiscretion and his long silences, Hyde apparently still recognized the value of his loyal service; he wrote to Rochester that Taylor has "much affection, zeal and integrity to the cause, . . . [which] is recompense for many infirmities, which it may be he can no more mend, than he can the color of his eyes or hair."⁸⁴

Hyde explained Taylor's effectiveness in this role to William Curtius: "Mr. Taylor's credit may be great with Catholic princes, but his temper is not so proper to deal with those of our religion. In intercourse with Catholic princes, the style current in their courts must be used, seasonably and secretly, in mentioning the Pope." (*CCSP*, vol. 2, 174: 7 Feb. 1653, * Hyde to Curtius). The Emperor continued to defray Taylor's costs by 600 florins (400 thalers, or = £82) a year during the time he was accredited as resident agent (HKA, HZAB 99 [1653], f. 378; *ibid.*, HZAB 100 [1654], f. 394; *ibid.*, HZAB 101 [1655], f. 327).

⁸²Taylor apparently claimed that Henderson was drunk when he saw the letter (*CCSP*, vol. 2, 214: 13 June 1653, * Hyde to B. Belling, Secretary to Lord Rochester, English ambassador to the German Princes and Imperial Diet).

⁸³*CCSP*, vol. 3, 121: 30 Nov. 1652, * Hyde to Nicholas. This though he was not fond of Rochester and initially opposed his appointment (*CCSP*, vol. 2, 156: 22 Nov. 1652, * Hyde to Nicholas; *ibid.*, 162: 10 Oct. 1653, * same to same; *ibid.*, 262: 10 Oct. 1653, * same to same). At this point Rochester was still Lord Wilmot, but soon thereafter—before he left for the Diet—he was created Earl of Rochester (*CCSP*, vol. 2, 163: [21 Dec.] 1652, * Preamble of the patent creating Wilmot Earl of Rochester).

⁸⁴*Bodl. Lib.*, Clar. Mss. 45, f. 192: 28 Mar. 1653, * Hyde to Rochester.

Rochester was sent as ambassador to the Emperor, German princes, and Imperial Diet in late 1652 to persuade them to support Charles II's cause both morally and financially. He was to consult with both Taylor and Sir William Curtius, the resident agent at Frankfurt.⁸⁵ Taylor soon met Rochester in Regensburg, where the Diet convened in 1653 and 1654, but he delayed presenting his credentials, perhaps because of his feud with Hyde and the King's failure to pay for his expenses.⁸⁶ Taylor, however, did work with Rochester to convince the Emperor and princes to contribute to the King's relief. With the assistance of the elector of Mainz, they succeeded in securing promises of financial assistance for his cause – a sum voted by the Diet plus a donation of 100,000 thalers by the Emperor.⁸⁷ However, this contribution was dependent upon the actual collection of the four subsidies (*Römermonate*) that had been promised.

This difficult task was divided among the King's agents in Germany – Rochester, Colonel William Gunn, Sir Henry de Vic, Curtius, and Taylor – with each assigned a collection quota. Taylor was charged with collecting the promised money in the Austrian and Bavarian circle,

⁸⁵CCSP, vol. 2, 162: 21 Dec. 1652, "Rochester's commission as envoy to the German princes and Diet; *ibid.*, 163: 21 Dec. 1652, "Rochester to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*, 166: [Dec.] 1652, Instructions for Rochester. It was rumored that after a few drinks, Rochester was not above publicly protesting against the House of Austria's carriage towards Charles I. On one such occasion, Taylor purportedly attempted to "divert the discourse, but the other [Rochester] took his advertisement so ill that they were like to have fallen by the ears yester." (Nicholas, vol. 2, 6: 5 Mar. 1653, "Extract of a letter from Vren). Rochester, however, denied such behavior (CCSP, vol. 2, 190: 4 Apr. 1653, "Hyde to Nicholas; *ibid.*, 248: 5 Sept. 1653, "same to Rochester; *ibid.*, 261-2: 10 Oct. 1653, "same to Nicholas).

⁸⁶CCSP, vol. 2, 158: 30 Nov. 1652, "Hyde to Taylor; *ibid.*, 164: 24 Dec. 1652, "Charles II to same; *ibid.*, 169: 4 Jan. 1653, "Hyde to same; *ibid.*, 174: 7 Feb. 1653, "same to same.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 341: 24 Apr. 1654, "Hyde to Richard Clement (alias of Hyde's correspondent at Rome); *ibid.*, 349: 5 May 1654, "Official notification for Rochester; *ibid.*, 354: 18 May 1654, Ferdinand III to Rochester.

including the Emperor's 100,000 thalers.⁸⁸ Apparently Taylor had doubts that the Emperor would pay, and he suggested to Hyde that he instead go to Rome to convince the Pope to support Charles's cause. However Hyde disagreed: "[I] cannot believe that when the Emperor sent his Great Seal for the payment of 100,000 rix-dollars to the King, he intended that he should have nothing for it but the wax."⁸⁹ He ordered Taylor to remain in Vienna lest the Emperor might believe himself absolved from his promise.⁹⁰ According to Clarendon, neither the Emperor nor even princes such as the Elector Palatine or the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel paid their share. In all, the sum the King received amounted to less than £10,000, and most of this was spent on Rochester's negotiations.⁹¹

John Taylor therefore continued in his discouraging task.⁹² He carried out his diplomatic duties at the Imperial court, the last of his career, up until his death in late 1655.⁹³ We can only hope that his brother Francis provided him with solace in his last days.⁹⁴

⁸⁸Thurloe, vol. 2, 469: 28 July 1654, Henderson to Richard Bradshaw, English resident at Hamburg; *CCSP*, vol. 2, 441: [1654], Papers relating to the German Diet.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 381: 8 July 1654, Hyde to Taylor.

⁹⁰Hyde also pointed out that any negotiation undertaken at Rome would have to be conducted secretly, and certainly not by a known agent like Taylor (*ibid.*).

⁹¹Clarendon, vol. 2, 349-50.

⁹²In December 1654, six months after his departure from Regensburg, he wrote to Prince Rupert: "As for our business, I get nothing (as yet) but empty promises for the King being put on the Romer months, your Highness will know the uncertainty of them, especially as there are such factions amongst the German Princes." (BL, Add. Mss. 18827, f. 15: 16 Dec. 1654, Taylor to Prince Rupert).

⁹³In October or more likely November (Thurloe, vol. 4, 103: 2 Nov. 1655, [Manning] to [Thurloe]; *ibid.*, 169: 17 Nov. 1655, same to same).

⁹⁴Prince Rupert was sent to negotiate with the Emperor in Taylor's place, and Francis Taylor continued to correspond with the English court-in-exile (*ibid.*; BL, Egerton 2536, f. 80: 12 Apr. 1656, Francis Taylor to Nicholas).

As we will see, Taylor's background and experiences influenced his conduct of the negotiations with the Emperor in the 1630s. He was convinced that the best route to the restoration of the Palatinate was via Vienna and Madrid, and throughout most of his diplomatic career, he remained a strong proponent of a pro-Habsburg foreign policy. The connections of his family members with Habsburg courts and diplomacy surely reinforced the desirability in his mind of close cooperation between England and the Habsburg states. Also, his Catholicism and education in Flanders likely supported his positive inclination towards the Habsburgs. Taylor so ardently wished that some accommodation may be found between the Habsburgs and England on the Palatinate question that he was willing to minimize the obstacles and exaggerate the possibilities for an agreement, both in his own mind and in his dispatches home. For all these reasons, Taylor was suspect to many Protestants. Despite his optimism, however, Taylor conducted his negotiations in what he considered to be the best interests of crown and country.

6

THOMAS HOWARD, 2ND EARL OF ARUNDEL (1585-1646)**Background and Education**

Charles I's ambassador extraordinary to the Emperor in 1636, Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl of Arundel, came from one of the most influential noble houses in Tudor England.¹ The Dukedom of Norfolk had been hereditary in the Howard family since 1483, when King Richard III bestowed it upon Lord John Howard, an ardent supporter of the House of York. From this time, the Howard dukes filled various important political posts, among them the offices of Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, and Earl Marshal. The latter post, in fact, practically became hereditary in the Howard family over the course of the sixteenth century.

Howard fortunes rose and fell with surprising regularity during the Tudor period. While rich and powerful (or perhaps because they were), they proved an ill-fated bunch. In the first half of the century, several members of the family ended their lives on Henry VIII's scaffold, including his wives Anne Boleyn and Katherine Howard as well as the "Poet" Earl of Surrey, renaissance man and heir of the 3rd Duke of Norfolk. The first three Dukes and the Poet Earl were all attainted.² Despite

¹See fig. 2.

²John Howard, 1st Duke of Norfolk, was killed fighting on the side of Richard III at the Battle of Bosworth (1485). Henry VII attainted both the 1st Duke (posthumously) and his heir Thomas Howard, 2nd Duke of Norfolk. However, shortly before his death in 1509, Henry restored him in property. The new king, Henry VIII, restored the 2nd Duke in title after he led the English to a glorious victory against the Scots at the Battle of Flodden (1513). According to legend, the "Flodden" Duke personally slew King James IV of Scotland in combat. Thomas Howard, 3rd Duke of Norfolk, was the scheming uncle of the duo of beheaded queens Anne Boleyn and Katherine Howard; he was also instrumental in the downfall of

2 The Howard Family (Dukes of Norfolk)

Legend: * = Earl Marshal

Based upon Robinson, *Dukes of Norfolk*, Genealogical Table II

these periodic falls from grace, however, the negative effects of the attainders were reversed time and again by the loyal service the Howard family rendered to the crown.

In spite of the fall of his father the Poet Earl of Surrey, Thomas Howard, 4th Duke of Norfolk held a pre-eminent position at court. When he assumed his titles in 1554, he was the sole duke and greatest magnate in England. However, he ensured his own downfall when he attempted to court Mary Queen of Scots, Queen Elizabeth's Catholic rival. Through his association with Mary, he was soon implicated in the Ridolfi Plot, an international Catholic scheme to dethrone Elizabeth and replace her with Mary, thus restoring England to the papal fold. The 4th Duke, though his involvement in the plot was obscure and he was likely framed by his political enemies, was found guilty of treason, attainted, and finally executed in 1572.³

[in] Courting her [Mary's] love, he lost his Mistress Queen *Elizabeth*, who spilt that bloud then called *amorous*, rather than *traiterous*, that he intended to make Royal, and to prevent a Marriage between him and the Queen of *Scots*, divorced his Head from his Body, making him contented to lie in his Ancestors cold Grave, for aspiring to a Queens warm Bed.⁴

The 4th Duke's punishment marks the beginning of the most severe and long-lasting of the Howard falls from grace, which was completed by his son, Philip Howard, 1st Earl of Arundel of

Henry VIII's favorites Cardinal Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell. The 3rd Duke was himself imprisoned and attainted in 1547 after his conservative faction lost the power struggle over the protectorship of the young Edward VI to the Protestant faction. Only saved from execution by Henry's death, he remained in the Tower during Edward's reign, only to have his attainder reversed by Mary I in 1553. The 3rd Duke's heir, the Poet Earl of Surrey (so called because he introduced the sonnet to England), was condemned on the charge of quartering royal arms.

³Walker, 63-6; John Martin Robinson, *The Dukes of Norfolk: A Quincentennial History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 63-6.

⁴Lloyd, 284.

the new line.⁵ Although the latter began his public life as a charmingly wanton courtier and favorite of Queen Elizabeth and he had been brought up a Protestant,⁶ he was reformed under the influence of the Jesuit Edmund Campion into a pious Catholic. Because of his new-found interest in Catholicism, Arundel began to drift toward the cause of Mary Queen of Scots, the one person he should have avoided in light of his father's experience. In any case, his timing could not have been more unfortunate: Elizabeth was moving into the most active phase of her war on Catholicism as she had become convinced that the old faith posed the greatest threat to the religious settlement upon which her rule was founded. The mere rumor, therefore, of Arundel's association with the Throckmorton Plot – another of the numerous Catholic plots to replace Elizabeth with Mary – was all the reason she needed to place him under house arrest. Arundel, who decided that the freedom to practice his religion was dearer to him than his country, attempted to flee from England by boat but was caught offshore and subsequently committed to the Tower in 1585. During his imprisonment, he was accused of praying for the victory of the Spanish Armada. For this treasonous offense he was attainted and condemned to death. Although the death sentence was never carried out, Arundel died a martyr to his faith in the Tower in 1595.⁷ With his own attainder, he lost all the

⁵His mother Lady Mary FitzAlan was the heiress of Henry, the last earl of the FitzAlan line (see fig. 2).

⁶A godson of Philip II, Philip Howard was brought up as a Protestant with John Foxe as his tutor. After the 4th Duke's execution, Lord Burghley became his guardian.

⁷Robinson, 72-7. Philip Howard and his relatives played a significant role in the first stage of the English Counter Reformation. He was canonized in 1970 by Pope Paul VI as one of the Forty Martyrs of England and Wales, only seven of whom were lay Catholics (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, "Forty Martyrs of England and Wales," <http://www.eb.com:180>, accessed 12 Sept. 2000). Philip Howard's remains lie in Arundel Cathedral, Arundel, Sussex.

lands, titles, and incomes that he had been allowed to retain after his father's attainder, namely those of his maternal grandfather, the last FitzAlan earl of Arundel. Howard fortunes had hit their nadir.

Philip Howard never saw his son Thomas, who was born in 1585 at the parsonage of Finchingfield in Essex, shortly after his father's incarceration in the Tower. When young Thomas made his appearance in this world, his future prospects looked anything but promising: his grandfather had been executed for treason, his father was imprisoned in the Tower, his family estates and possessions were confiscated, and all of their titles were in abeyance save the courtesy title of Lord Maltravers. Thomas's early years were therefore quite grim. He was brought up in the latter years of Elizabeth's reign in relative poverty and obscurity by his austere and pious Catholic mother, Anne Dacre, the eldest daughter of Lord Dacre of Gillesland. She educated her son at home to the "strictest observances of Catholic orthodoxy,"⁸ though once he was older, he may have taken daytime instruction at the Westminster School.⁹

After he had received adequate preparatory training, Thomas, like so many of the sons of the English nobility and gentry during this time, may have enrolled in university. He was admitted to the degree of Master of Arts in 1605 at Cambridge, but it is more likely that it was conferred as an honorary degree rather than earned.¹⁰ The questionable Lloyd places him at Trinity College, but

⁸Anne Dacre was a zealous protector of the Jesuits in England but was without political motives. She was also the founder of the Jesuit College in Ghent (Hervey, 10, 15).

⁹Lloyd, who is a dubious source at best, claims that Thomas attended the Westminster School and St. Omers. Whether he actually attended either is highly questionable. There is no list preserved for the former institution before 1763 (Hervey, 15), and I have found no indication that he did attend that cannot be traced back to Lloyd. Also, his name is not among the student lists of St. Omers.

¹⁰John Venn and J. A. Venn, comps., *The Book of Matriculations and Degrees: A Catalogue of Those Who Have Been Matriculated or Been Admitted to Any Degree in the University of Cambridge from 1544 to 1659* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913), 363; idem, *Alumni Cantabrigienses*:

Arundel is not recorded in its register.¹¹ Given his penchant for family tradition, Arundel would have most likely attended St. John's, the Howard college of choice. However it was improbable that he was enrolled there, since in his own words he wished that his Cambridge-bound son "should be of St. John's College, where my father and uncles were scholars," omitting to mention himself.¹² Further, there is no evidence that he had previously taken a Bachelor of Arts. However, if he indeed did earn his master's degree, he would have been very proficient in Latin and classical studies and schooled in the art of disputation, since the Elizabethan statutes at Cambridge provided for the study of all the arts and the three philosophies by the end of the master's course.¹³

Whether he was Cambridge-educated or not, Arundel's language skills were well-honed, for a contemporary who knew Arundel well noted that he "understood the Latin tongue very well, and

A Biographical List of All Known Students, Graduates, and Holders of Office at the University of Cambridge, from the Earliest Times to 1900 (Cambridge: University Press, 1922-54), pt. 1, vol. 2, 416.

¹¹These lists, however, are by no means complete.

¹²David Howarth, *Lord Arundel and His Circle* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 122. Arundel's father and two of his paternal uncles (Thomas, Earl of Suffolk, and Lord William Howard of Naworth Castle), his two surviving sons (Henry Frederick, Lord Maltravers, and William, Viscount Stafford), and three of his five grandsons (Henry Frederick's three eldest sons Thomas, the 5th Duke, Henry, the 6th Duke, and Philip, Cardinal Norfolk) received degrees from St. John's (Venn, *Alumni Cantabrigienses*, 415-7; Lawrence Stone, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965], 689).

¹³In the four years leading up to the bachelor's degree, an undergraduate would study rhetoric in his first year, logic in his second and third year, and philosophy in his fourth year; if a Trinity student, he studied grammar as well. In addition to the completion of his course of lectures, he was required to complete a course of academic disputations and pass an oral examination by the proctors and regent masters of the arts before he would be admitted to the degree of bachelor of arts. After the bachelor's degree, an additional three years of study would be required to attain a master's. During this time, the bachelor would continue with his disputation exercises and his study of philosophy (conceivably progressing from moral philosophy on to natural philosophy and metaphysics), and added the disciplines of astronomy, drawing, and Greek (Mark H. Curtis, *Oxford and Cambridge in Transition, 1558-1642: An Essay on Changing Relations between the English Universities and English Society* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959], 87-92).

was master of the Italian."¹⁴ Therefore, in addition to the Latin training he would have received at Cambridge and most certainly received in his earlier education, Arundel acquired a thorough command of Italian. Whether his training in Italian was formal or informal is not known.¹⁵ He certainly had the opportunity to hone his skills during his many trips to the Italian peninsula over the years, the first being in 1612. The education of his youth and his trips to Italy almost surely laid the foundation for his later interest in art and classical scholarship, and thus for his marked favor of such scholars and antiquaries as Sir Robert Cotton, Sir Henry Spelman, and John Selden and artists as Anthony Van Dyck, Wenceslaus Hollar, and François Dieussart. All of these skills and interests indicate that he was well prepared to discuss a variety of academic and artistic subjects with educated peers, a great advantage in practicing the art of diplomacy. Before turning to a discussion of Arundel's religious tendencies and political career, it is useful to first assess his character, which influenced both the public and private aspects of his life, including his conduct of the negotiations with the Emperor.

Character

[H]e was of a stately Presence and Gate, so that any Man that saw him, though in never so ordinary Habit, could not but conclude him to be a great Person, his Garb and Fashion drawing more Observation than did the rich Apparel of others; so that it was a common Saying of the late Earl of *Carlisle*, Here comes the Earl of *Arundel* in his plain Stuff and trunk Hose, and his Beard in his Teeth, that looks more like a Noble Man than any of us.

Sir Edward Walker, *Historical Discourses*

¹⁴Walker, 221.

¹⁵Italian was among the the extra-statutory modern languages offered at Cambridge in the early seventeenth century (Curtis, 139-41).

Once grown, Arundel was widely considered to be a man of strong character and solid virtues: honor, loyalty, and pride were his most evident qualities. Authors who dedicated books to him stressed his solid virtues in contrast to the apparent frivolity of the early Stuart court. His contemporary, Sir Edward Walker, praised his honesty and integrity, promotion of the traditional values of order and sobriety in public life, and unwavering support of the interests of the crown and ruling elite. M. A. Tierney, quoting Walker, describes him and his many positive qualities:

The zealous "assertor of the splendour and greatness of the crown," as well as of "the ancient honour of the nobility and gentry," he was . . . not less respectful in his carriage towards the sovereign, than rigid in his demands of deference from his inferiors. In council he was bold, honest, and uncompromising; in action he was firm, dignified, and prudent. Unconnected with party of any kind, his merits were his only passport to his various employments . . . his kindness and hospitality were universal; his friendships were few but sincere.¹⁶

Arundel was preoccupied with order and formality and displayed a gravity of bearing; he was a personification the classical virtues of *dignitas* and *gravitas* (see fig. 3).¹⁷ Even Edward Hyde, later Earl of Clarendon, who was a personal and political enemy of Arundel, could not completely ignore the noble aura he exuded.¹⁸

¹⁶Tierney, vol. 3, 485-6.

¹⁷Kevin Sharpe, "The Earl of Arundel, His Circle and the Opposition to the Duke of Buckingham, 1618-1628," chap. in *Politics and Ideas in Early Stuart England: Essays and Studies* (London: Pinter, 1989), 204-5; Robinson, 108.

¹⁸There are several reasons Clarendon had a strong prejudice against Arundel. Clarendon, whose uncle Sir Nicholas Hyde was Buckingham's lawyer, disliked Arundel because of the latter's opposition to the Duke. Also, as Earl Marshal, Arundel won a power struggle with Clarendon's uncle in a jurisdictional dispute between Earl Marshal's court and the King's bench. Clarendon obviously did not forget this loss, for during the Short Parliament of 1640 he led the attack on the jurisdiction of the Earl Marshal's court (Esther S. Cope and Willson H. Coates, eds., *Proceedings of the Short Parliament of 1640*, Camden Fourth Series, vol. 19 [London: Royal Historical Society, 1977], 260-2; Sir Thomas Aston, *The Short Parliament Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, ed. Judith D. Maltby, Camden Fourth Series, vol. 35 [London: Royal Historical Society, 1988], 12). When he later wrote his history of the rebellion, "he still

3 Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl of Arundel (1629/30), Engraving after Peter Paul Rubens

While he was in England negotiating the preliminaries for peace between Spain and England, Rubens drew studies that resulted in a stunning three-quarter length portrait of Arundel, after which this engraving is patterned. The painting, which shows Arundel standing in front of a wine-colored curtain dressed in glowing armor, successfully conveys the romantic image of a great noble. Today it hangs in the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston.

From Birch, *Portraits of Illustrious Personages*, vol. 3 (London, s.d.).

It cannot be denied that he had in his person, in his aspect, and countenance, the appearance of a great man, which he preserved in his gait and motion. He wore and affected a habit very different from that of the time, such as men had only beheld in the pictures of the most considerable men; all which drew the eyes of most, and the reverence of many, towards him, as the image and representative of the primitive nobility, and native gravity of the nobles, when they had been most venerable.¹⁹

Although Arundel was dedicated to upholding the interests of the old aristocracy, a sense of fair play was inherent in his character.²⁰ He also possessed a keen sense of antiquity and history, particularly as related to his own family background. The first was expressed in his interest in antiquities, particularly classical, and in his patronage of classical scholars. The second is clearly seen in his

remembered with feeling the days when as Mr. Edward Hyde he was at cross purposes with this Earl of ancient lineage." (D. N. Smith, *Characters from the Histories and Memoirs of the Seventeenth Century* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920]; quoted in Sharpe, "Earl of Arundel," 183). A final explanation for Clarendon's hostility is that he suspected the Earl of being an atheist (Richard Ollard, *Clarendon and His Friends* [London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987], 329).

¹⁹Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, ed. W. Dunn Macray (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888; reprint, London: Oxford University Press, 1958), vol. 1, 70. A bevy of likenesses of Arundel exist because he was a avid patron of the arts. A sampling includes: individual likenesses such as portraits by Rubens (Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, Boston [see fig. 3]; the National Gallery and the National Portrait Gallery, London; Ashmolean Museum, Oxford), and by Mytens (Arundel Castle, Sussex), a bust by François Dieussart (Ashmolean), and etchings by Wenceslaus Hollar (Ashmolean; the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge); and likenesses with others such as portraits with his grandson Thomas, later 5th Duke of Norfolk, and with his wife Alethea Talbot by Van Dyck (Arundel Castle; J. Paul Getty Museum, Malibu), and a portrait with his wife, grandchildren, and a dwarf by Philip Fruytiers (Arundel Castle).

²⁰His regard for justice extended to his inferiors as well as his peers, as evidenced in his letter to Sir Edward Dering respecting the continued imprisonment of Francis Jenifer at Canterbury, whom he had ordered to be set at liberty: "Sir Edward Deering. At your last being here you may remember that upon complaint made of the imprisonment of Francis Jenifer at Canterbury you were ordered to take some course for his speedy enlargement, which was promised should accordingly be done. But being informed that the poore man remaines yet in durance, and the cause of his comittment being so slender as was represented, (onely for killing hauks meate) I cannot but once more require you to set the man forthwith at libertie, or to send me some reason for this his detention thus long, contrary to your owne promise. I shall expect to heare your instant answers." (BL, Stowe Manuscripts 743, ff. 118-9: 23 Mar./2 Apr. 1635, Arundel to Dering).

interest in family history. He was instrumental in developing the Howard "cult of the past" that has been strongly characteristic of his family ever since.²¹

Clarendon's unflattering assessment of Arundel is considered by many modern historians to be to be spiteful and unfair.²² Clarendon dismisses him, for all things, as a collector.²³ There was, however, some basis in truth for his criticisms. Arundel had a reserved and retiring nature that was at times misinterpreted as arrogance. Clarendon scathingly wrote:

He was a man supercilious and proud, who lived always within himself, and to himself, conversing little with any who were in common conversation He resorted sometimes to the Court, because there was only a greater man than himself; and went thither the seldomer, because there was a greater man than himself. He lived toward all favourites and great officers without any kind of condescension; and rather suffered himself to be ill treated by their power and authority . . . than to descend in making any application to them.²⁴

Of course it must be remembered that Arundel and Clarendon were not on good terms, and Arundel was only one of many who fell prey to Clarendon's acid pen.

More disturbing than Arundel's aloofness was his penchant to take immediate offense at any perceived slight to his honor or that of his family. In one incident, he took an oversight by the Lord Mayor of Chester as a personal affront:

²¹Robinson, 79. A provision in his will shows how important family history was to him: "I desire great care to bee had for Collecting all the Materialls for an History to bee written of my Noble Auncesters whereby their good memory may bee preserved, and those that shall succede may bee invited to bee virtuous, or at least ashamed to bee vitious." (Hervey, 461).

²²R. W. Harris, *Clarendon and the English Revolution* (London: Chatto & Windus; Hogarth Press, 1983), 27.

²³Clarendon, vol. 1, 69-70.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 69.

In 1634, the Earl of Arundel, Earl Marshal, came to Chester, and not finding . . . the mayor . . . in attendance, sent for him by warrant. The mayor attended with all the insignia of office, when the Earl said, "Mr. Mayor, I sent for you to tell you your offence you have committed, in not giving your attendance as you ought, and now do you come with your authority." The Earl then *plucked the rod from the mayor's hand*, and put it in the window, saying, "I will teach you to know yourself, and attend peers of the realm. Though I care not for your observances, yet, because you want manners, I shall teach you some, and you shall further hear from me: I would have you know, I have power to commit you, to teach you to know yourself and me, and give better attendance."²⁵

In another instance, he refused a barony and absented himself from court because he was mortified at a rumor that he had bought a barony, even though, as the center of royal patronage, it was the only place to rebuild his family fortunes:

The fear which he had to be thought to buy a barony has been the special cause why he has this long absented [himself] from Court, it may be he stands on too nice [a] point of reputation Though he knows that to strive for precedency has ever been thought a womanish ambition, yet doubting lest the ghosts of the Dukes of Norfolk, from who he is descended, and of King Edward the Fourth's Queen, his great grandmother (whom he knows the King himself would somewhat respect) might chide him for giving place to such as can hardly prove themselves gentlemen, he thought fit so far to urge their right as to crave either a convenient place, or no barony.²⁶

Even worse than an insult to Arundel's own reputation was one to that of his family. These he was particularly keen to avenge. This is clear in a verbal altercation he had with Lord Spencer in 1621 that resulted in Arundel's commitment to the Tower, when the Lords were discussing whether Sir Henry Yelverton should be given a hearing after his speech in the Commons against

²⁵Corporation Book of Chester; quoted in Tierney, vol. 3, 442.

²⁶HMC, *Salisbury (Cecil) XV*, 190-1: 14/24 July 1603, Arundel to Robert, Lord Cecil. In 1495 the 3rd Duke, Arundel's great-great grandfather, married Anne Plantagenet, daughter of Edward IV and Elizabeth Woodville and sister of Henry VII's Queen, Elizabeth of York. Their issue, however, died in infancy. Arundel is descended from Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, who was the son of the 3rd Duke and his second wife, Lady Elizabeth Stafford (see fig. 2).

Buckingham's promotion of monopolies. At this time an ally of the Duke, Arundel strongly supported Yelverton's censure by the Lords without a hearing. Lord Spencer pointed out to Arundel that some of the latter's own ancestors had been condemned as traitors without a hearing, Arundel vehemently flung back that his ancestors had suffered "and it may be for doinge the Kinge and country good service, and in such times as perhapps the Lord's auncestors that spake last kept sheep."²⁷ Arundel was asked three times to apologize to Spencer for the affront, which the former adamantly refused and thus was sent to the Tower, where he was "very much visited and courted, by the Lord of Buckingham and all the Grandes of that side."²⁸ His hasty temper in matters of family honor did not serve to boost his popularity at court.

Family pride also motivated Arundel's overriding ambition to re-establish the position of the senior branch of the Howard family through a full restoration of the titles, possessions, and standing that his ancestors had enjoyed:

His ambition developed out of his ancestor worship and family pride. His ancestors had been distinguished for their role in the affairs of the State and in their patronage of scholarship and the arts. He intended to renew that pattern in his own life; he was therefore consciously following family tradition in almost everything he did.²⁹

If successful in his program of restoration, the senior Howard line would occupy a place second in wealth and status only to the royal family. Arundel pursued this goal relentlessly throughout his life, and despite periodic setbacks, he was surprisingly successful. As we will see, he managed to regain

²⁷Robinson, 102.

²⁸Chamberlain, vol. 2, 374-5: 19 May 1621, "John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carleton; Wallace Notestein, Frances Helen Relf, and Hartley Simpson, eds., *Commons Debates, 1621* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935), vol. 5, 204, 380, vol. 6, 395, 403-4.

²⁹Robinson, 99.

many of the lost estates and titles, play an important role in English political and diplomatic affairs, and make a name for himself as the foremost patron of the arts in England. In the end, only the restoration of the dukedom of Norfolk eluded him.

Early Career under James I

At the first opportunity Arundel launched a crusade to re-establish his political position as the head of the Howard family. After the death of Queen Elizabeth, he was quick to present himself at the court of the new king, James I. However, if Arundel hoped for immediate benefits as compensation for his family's loyalty to Mary Queen of Scots, the King's mother, he was sorely disappointed. Raising the specter of his mother was the last thing that James wanted to do in the early years of his reign, when he was attempting to gain the confidence of his English subjects. Arundel did indeed benefit from renewed royal favor, but it was slow in coming.

Perhaps Arundel's prospects would have improved more quickly if members of the cadet branches of the Howard family had been less eager to profit from their younger relative's misfortunes. They were just as quick to present themselves to the new king, and – led by Arundel's cousin Lord Howard of Effingham, his uncle the Earl of Suffolk, and his great uncle the Earl of Northampton – they advanced rapidly at court. The Howards were so successful in their quest for royal favor that they virtually monopolized court posts and royal patronage after the death of the Earl of Salisbury: the early part of James's reign is known for the revival of the Howard role in English political affairs. Once they were ensconced, they "lighted on his [Arundel's] estates to pick the carcass of any flesh and leave only the bony remains of the ancestral castle at Arundel."³⁰ It was

³⁰Howarth, *Lord Arundel*, 9.

hard enough that the 4th Duke's estates, which would have come to Arundel, were divided after his attainder between the Queen, Arundel's father Philip, and the latter's half-brother Suffolk, but his father Philip's estates again had been divided between the Queen and Arundel. When James restored the bulk of the estates seized by the crown to the family, he did not necessarily return them to Arundel as the rightful heir, but instead parceled most of them out to his powerful, grasping relatives.³¹ Thus the recovery of these properties understandably became one of his primary goals.³² He was eventually successful in his crusade to regain them, but only at great expense to himself. Northampton willed much of his share to Arundel, but he was compelled to purchase that of Suffolk and Effingham. The cost was so great that in 1608, Arundel grumbled that he would have been among the buyers at an art sale "if the Admirall [Lord Howard of Effingham] were not damned for makinge me pay foure thousand pounce for [Arundel] house."³³ Arundel, however, was not entirely forgotten during the general resurgence of Howard fortunes – in 1604, he regained Arundel Castle and other lands in Sussex along with the title of earl of Arundel and Surrey.³⁴

In 1606, Arundel strengthened his position immeasurably when he married Alethea Talbot, daughter and co-heiress of the Earl of Shrewsbury, thus uniting "the two families of classic English

³¹Stone, 413.

³²Hervey, 21-3.

³³Lodge, *Illustrations*, vol. 3, 331: 17/27 Nov. 1608, Arundel to the Earl of Shrewsbury. Arundel House was regranted to Arundel in January 1608.

³⁴See Act of Parliament, 21 Jac. I, 1604. The letters patent restoring him to the titles and precedence enjoyed by his father, who had been attainted on 14/24 April 1589, the earldom of Surrey, the baronies his grandfather had lost by attainder, and various manors and estates were not issued until 1608 (ACA, Thomas [Howard], Earl of Arundel [1585-1646] G 1/87: 22 Nov./2 Dec. 1608, Letters patent; there is a full-length portrait of James I in the initial letter, and about three-fourths of the Great Seal remains).

nobility – Howard and Talbot – in which Catholicism was most prevalent."³⁵ The Talbot family was no less distinguished than the Howards and enormously wealthy to boot, which was surely not unattractive to Arundel given his ambitions. It was certainly a match of great advantage for him, as his wife's inheritance transformed his financial situation making possible the recovery of lands and position as well as the building of art collections, a passion the couple shared.³⁶ Although at times they led lives quite independent of one another, a sincere bond of affection developed between them as is evidenced in the proliferation of letters from Arundel to his "dearest harte." The couple had six

³⁵ John Bossy, *The English Catholic Community, 1570-1850* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1975), 150.

³⁶ Arundel is considered to be the greatest early modern English art collector and patron. He was a connoisseur of international stature, having collected hundreds of pictures, drawings, prints, books, manuscripts, antique marbles, and gems. His picture collection had reached nearly 800 pieces by the eve of the Civil War (Stone, 719). He amassed "the largest and choicest treasure of Greek and Roman antiquities that was ever possessed by an English subject." His collection of Holbeins was the greatest ever assembled. Around him he gathered a circle of scholars, heralds, genealogists, painters, engravers, and sculptors. He was a patron of artists such as Van Dyck, Rubens, Dieussart, and Hollar. For more on Arundel's activities as a collector and patron, see: David Howarth's thorough study, *Lord Arundel and His Circle*, as well as idem, "Lord Arundel as an Entrepreneur of the Arts," *Burlington Magazine* 122 (Oct. 1980): 690-2. A recent issue of the international art magazine *Apollo* (Aug. 1996) is devoted entirely to Arundel and his collections. A beautifully illustrated volume by Christopher White, *Anthony van Dyck: Thomas Howard, The Earl of Arundel*, Getty Museum Studies on Art (Malibu: Getty Museum, 1995) focuses on the relationship between Arundel and Van Dyck. For specific aspects of Arundel's collecting, see: Denys Haynes, "The Arundel Marbles: The Formation and Dispersal of the First Great Collection of Classical Sculpture in England," *Archeology* 21 (Apr. 1968): 85-91, 206-11; Graham Parry, "Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel," chap. in *The Golden Age Restor'd: The Culture of the Stuart Court, 1603-42* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981); John Peacock, "Inigo Jones and the Arundel Marbles," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 16, no. 1 (1986): 75-90; Denys Sutton, "Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel and Surrey as a Collector of Drawings," *Burlington Magazine* 89 (Jan.-Mar. 1947): 2-9, 32-4, 75-7; Francis Taylor, "The Father of Virtù in England," chap. in *Taste of Angels: A History of Art Collecting from Rameses to Napoleon* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948); *Patronage and Collecting in the Seventeenth Century: Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel, The Ashmolean Museum Nov. 1985-Jan. 1986* (Oxford: Ashmolean Museum, 1985). BL, Add. Mss. 15970 includes many letters from Arundel to the Reverend William Petty, his art agent; a list of them is printed in Springell, app. II.

children, of whom only two – Henry Frederick, Lord Maltravers, who succeeded his father as Lord Arundel, and William, Lord Stafford – survived their parents.

Throughout James' reign, Arundel made gradual progress towards attaining what he considered to be his rightful place in public life. He and his wife took an active role in court life, participating in masques and jousts. They also had a good relationship with the royal family. During these early years, Arundel became an intimate friend of Henry Frederick, Prince of Wales, with whom he shared a passion for art, books, and collecting.³⁷ In 1607, the King stood as godfather to the Arundels' eldest son, his namesake James.³⁸ As a further mark of royal favor Arundel was created a Knight of the Garter in 1611.³⁹ By the following year he had improved his position to the point that the Venetian ambassador reported:

[Arundel is] the premier Earl of this Kingdom, in which there are no Dukes save the King's sons . . . nor Marquises save Winchester who does not come to Court. Arundel will be, through his wife, . . . heir to sixty thousand crowns a year; he is nephew of Northampton who has no children and is very powerful in the government.⁴⁰

Arundel used his position as premier earl of the realm to become ever more involved in public life, but in 1612, threatened by consumption, he was obliged to leave court to take the waters. During his travels, he visited the Low Countries, France, and Italy. Much to his grief, Prince Henry died tragically during his absence. The death of his royal friend did not, however, impede his rise.

³⁷Arundel's son Henry Frederick was named after the Prince of Wales.

³⁸James, Lord Maltravers, died in 1624 of smallpox at Ghent; Henry Frederick then became Arundel's heir.

³⁹Chamberlain, vol. 1, 245-6: 20/30 July 1607, Chamberlain to Carleton.

⁴⁰*CSPV 1610-3*, 438: 26 Oct. 1612, Antonio Foscarini to D&S.

After his return to England in 1613, he carried the sword of state at the wedding of the Princess Elizabeth and Frederick V, and he and his wife were among the principal members of the retinue chosen to escort her to her new home in Heidelberg. After fulfilling his duties there, he proceeded on to Italy, where he traveled extensively with Inigo Jones. Arundel further cultivated his taste for the arts during his Italian sojourn, and then returned to England in 1614.⁴¹

In Arundel's political career, 1616 was an auspicious year. In July, his public position was confirmed with his appointment to the privy council. Then, six months later, he publicly conformed to the Anglican Church by taking communion in the King's Chapel on Christmas Day.⁴² This act removed the final barrier standing in the way of his continued advancement. By the following year, Arundel was well enough established in the King's counsels for figures such as Sir Dudley Carleton and Sir Horace Vere to seek his patronage.⁴³

In the final years of James's reign, Arundel continued to make progress toward the restoration of the position of power his ancestors had enjoyed. In 1618, when Suffolk was deprived of his offices in the wake of the Overbury murder, Arundel was not implicated and was able to continue his political and social advance unaffected. In this case, the coolness between the senior and cadet branches of the family actually worked to his advantage.⁴⁴ In 1621, Arundel was permanently

⁴¹For Arundel's Italian jaunt, see David Howarth, "Setting a Style of Patronage: Lord Arundel and Inigo Jones in Italy," *Country Life* 157 (24 Apr.-1 May 1975): 1052-4, 1138-40.

⁴²Chamberlain, vol. 2, 18: 20 July 1616,* Chamberlain to Carleton; *ibid.*, 47: 4 Jan. 1617,* same to same.

⁴³ACA, AL 1617-32, no. 224: 3 Nov. 1617,* Carleton to Arundel; *ibid.*, no. 231: 7 July 1618,* Vere to same.

⁴⁴Robinson, 101.

appointed to the office of Earl Marshal, a powerful position that in the sixteenth century was traditionally vested in the Howard family. This was the greatest mark of the King's esteem to date and was a major step in the restoration of Howard political power. As Earl Marshal, Arundel also became one of the senior members of the privy council.⁴⁵ In the same year that he received this important appointment, he served as president of the committee of peers that presided over Sir Francis Bacon's impeachment case. In addition, he held several lord lieutenancies over the years – Sussex (1608-36), Norfolk (1615), and Northumberland and Cumberland (1633-39).⁴⁶ These positions provided their incumbents with great prestige and social power, and their responsibilities were wide, including the militia, tax collection, and formal and informal mediation between the center and localities.

By the end of James's reign, therefore, Arundel had become exceptionally influential figure. He was a powerful landowner, holding vast estates in Sussex, East Anglia, the Midlands, and Ireland. He also held key positions in government, serving on almost every important commission and committee. In short, by 1625 Arundel had already come a long way in his quest to rebuild his family's reputation and fortune.

⁴⁵The office of Earl Marshal brought great power and status to its incumbent, who was "the head of the nobility and the custodian of honour." The King allowed Arundel to claim the widest jurisdiction for this office (ACA, Earl Marshal's Papers, no. 257: 1/11 Aug. 1622, Writ establishing jurisdiction of Earl Marshal). He presided over the court of the Constable and Earl Marshal, which as "a court which, besides the cognizance of all matters relating to chivalry and deeds of arms, extended its judicial powers to contracts, slanders, assaults, challenges, and even...to appeals of treason," influenced the system of patronage and thus the well-being of the ruling classes (Tierney, vol. 3, 440-1; Howarth, *Lord Arundel*, 3). The position only became hereditary in the Howard family in 1672.

⁴⁶ACA, NC G 1/10: 20/30 May 1633, Commission of Lieutenancy to Arundel [et al.] in counties of Cumberland, Northumberland, and Westmorland; *ibid.*: 2/12 June 1636, same for county of Sussex.

Religion

A Church-Papist...comes to Church not to serue God, but the King...He loves Poperie well, but is loath to lose by it.

John Earle, *Microcosmography*

From the moment Arundel took holy communion in the King's Chapel, his true religious identity and his motivations for publicly adhering to the Anglican Church have been cause for speculation. His contemporaries as well as modern historians all have had their own opinions on the subject, running the gamut from the claim that he was a genuine convert to Anglicanism to a crypto-Catholic forced by political circumstances to conceal his true faith to an agnostic. Some of them directly address the questions of his true religious leanings as well as his motivations for conforming, but, more often than not, they discuss one question and not another or merely hint at their conclusions. The aim here is to present the different arguments and then to address both questions in a comprehensive manner, integrating the many valid points brought up by previous authors and supporting these conclusions with new evidence. Ascertaining Arundel's true religious leanings and his motivations for conforming, as well as how they were perceived by contemporaries at home and abroad, will help more fully to understand his political and diplomatic career and his 1636 mission to the Emperor.

The opinions of Arundel's contemporaries set forth in works for public consumption give no clear idea of his religious identity. For instance, embedded among the many barbs directed at Arundel in Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion*, there is one pertaining to his religion, or lack thereof:

He was rather thought not to be much concerned for religion than to incline to this or that party of any. . . . and [he] had no other affection for the nation or the kingdom than as he had a great share in it, in which, like the great leviathan, he might sport himself, from which he withdrew himself, as soon as he discerned the repose thereof was like to be disturbed, and died in Italy, under the same doubtful character of religion in which he lived.⁴⁷

Clarendon concluded that because Arundel was indifferent to religion, he had no trouble sacrificing it to political ambition. The *Historical Discourses* of Sir Edward Walker, Arundel's personal secretary during the 1636 embassy, leaves us with the impression that Arundel was a moderate Christian: "He was in Religion no Bigot or Puritan, and professed more to affect moral Vertues than nice Questions or Controversies."⁴⁸ Walker, however, gives no explanation for Arundel's conversion. Neither does David Lloyd, a Protestant clergyman, but he at least has drawn a conclusion about Arundel's religion, describing him as a "Church Catholick." Of course none of these sources are without bias. Clarendon was an old enemy whose remarks about Arundel were invariably unflattering. Walker on the other hand was Arundel's client, and his biography of Arundel presents him in a favorable light. And Lloyd, whose work is in any case is often unreliable, was an Anglican clergyman seeking to honor loyal supporters of the martyred king.

Given the disagreement regarding Arundel's religion and in contemporary works, it comes as no surprise that historians also hold differing opinions on the subject. The first historian really to address the issue was M. A. Tierney, chaplain to the 12th Duke of Norfolk. Tierney believes that Arundel's conformity was motivated by political ambition and hints that he remained a Catholic at heart: "[S]everal of his grandsons are known to have been entrusted to his care; and it is not an inapt

⁴⁷Clarendon, vol. 1, 70-1.

⁴⁸Walker, 223.

illustration of his real sentiments that they were educated Catholics. . . . Dignity and power were ready to confer their rewards on his conversion."⁴⁹ However, as pointed out by later historians, Tierney makes the argument of political ambition on the false assumption that Arundel converted in December 1615, *before* his appointment to the privy council; he therefore saw Arundel's advancement to this important post as the reward for his apostasy.⁵⁰ However, the King arguably would have discussed his conversion with him before appointing him to the council.

Mary F. S. Hervey, Arundel's biographer, stands at the opposite end of the spectrum. Her account of Arundel's public and private life is generally well-supported. However, on the point of his religion her analysis – though more thorough than that of her predecessors – is less convincing. She claims that after Arundel publicly conformed, he became a true convert to Anglicanism.⁵¹ Further, she contends that Arundel showed an inclination to Protestantism and willingness to desert Catholicism in his early years. She sees Arundel's 1614 trip to Italy as the catalyst, as it was during this trip that he became closely acquainted with the worldly materialism of the Catholic Church. The Catholic intrigue and abuses that he encountered there were such an affront to Arundel's sense of integrity, she argues, that he eventually abandoned the old religion: "Lord Arundel's whole being revolted against th[e] mixture of the spiritual and the material. Political intrigue disguised under the cloak of religion was abhorrent to his sincere soul."⁵² Therefore, Hervey considers unacceptable

⁴⁹Tierney, vol. 3, 429 n. b, 430.

⁵⁰See the arguments of Mary F. S. Hervey and Godfrey Anstruther below.

⁵¹She does not, however, claim that he was a zealot; on the contrary, she specifically points out that "the minor divergences of doctrine between Catholicism and forms of Protestantism seemed unimportant to him." (Hervey, 117).

⁵²*Ibid.*

conduct rather than doctrine to be the main reason Arundel rejected Catholicism, and she deems his religious conversion as well-considered and sincere. The dire fates suffered by his father and grandfather as well as the influence of the King may have also played lesser roles. She rejects, however, the idea that it was an impulsive step motivated by self-interest, as Arundel was appointed to the privy council months *before* he received Anglican communion.⁵³

There are significant problems with Hervey's interpretation: her analysis is weak and source material problematic. She bases her assertion that Arundel showed leanings to Protestantism in his youth in large part upon Lloyd's claims that Arundel was educated at Westminster School and later at Trinity College and that he at times attended Protestant services. However Lloyd offers absolutely no authority for these assertions, and I have found no reference to them that cannot be traced back to him.⁵⁴ Even if Arundel did attend one or both of these institutions, this did not mean that he would convert to Protestantism. His mother still had control of his education during much of this time, and plenty of Catholic children, particularly heirs of aristocratic houses, were placed in non-Catholic schools to receive an education. Also, Catholics were relatively free to attend university at the time Arundel would have studied at Cambridge. Hervey denies that Arundel's conversion was out of self-interest on the basis that he was already a privy councillor when he converted and that he was disgusted with Catholic worldliness. The first, however, assumes that the King had no foreknowledge that Arundel might conform when he was appointed to the council. The second is based upon a few critical comments in a time when many loyal Catholics disapproved of abuses.

⁵³Ibid., 112-8.

⁵⁴Lloyd's *Memoires* has been characterized as of "slight historical or biographical value...wherein are almost as many errors as lines," and gained its author "not only the character of a most impudent plagiarist, but a false writer and meer scribbler." (*DNB*, vol. 11, 1295).

She also disregards the fact that most of Arundel's contemporaries considered him to be a secret Catholic rather than a genuine Protestant.

The Jesuit J. H. Pollen, who published his article on Arundel's religious identity shortly after Hervey's biography appeared, answers many of her points and makes a convincing case that Arundel was a crypto-Catholic after his conversion (though curiously he does not state this conclusion very strongly) and was reconciled to mother Church before he died, all the while castigating his subject for his faithless lapses.⁵⁵ He judged Arundel to be a loyal Catholic through early manhood, who out of loyalty to the King and hopes for further royal favor accommodated himself by degrees to the times and finally publicly conformed on Christmas Day 1616. He goes so far as to claim that James made Arundel's promise requisite to his appointment as a privy councillor, a "test" of his loyalty;⁵⁶ though this may be the case, Pollen offers no authority for this assertion.

While Pollen notes that soon after conforming Arundel took certain steps that seem to attest to his sincerity of his conversion (mainly comments against popery reported by Protestants and the consecration of his new chapel at Greenwich House by an Anglican bishop), he spends more time enumerating mitigating factors and drawing Catholic connections throughout Arundel's life. He points out that the anti-papal utterances may have had something to do with his support of the Oath of Allegiance, which his openly Catholic wife also supported;⁵⁷ thus Arundel's desire to show his

⁵⁵J. H. Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel, and His Catholicism, 1585-1646," *The Month* 138, no. 689 (Nov. 1921): 385-98.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 391.

⁵⁷As Earl Marshal, Arundel administered the oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance to all present at the 13/23 April 1640 meeting of the Commons (Maltby, 1). As he himself mentioned five days later, all the Lords took the Oath of Supremacy (Cope, 62).

loyalty to the King may explain this. Arundel was on good terms with the papal agents in England in the 1630s, and he served as a trustee for a Catholic charity.⁵⁸ Also, Pollen makes much of the strong Catholic streak in Arundel's immediate family and finds it probable that the head was associated with it.⁵⁹

Although much of this evidence is circumstantial, Pollen's argument is strengthened considerably by an important bit of information to which he was privy and that it seems previous historians were not, namely that Arundel was reconciled to the Roman church before his death. Vincenzo Caraffa, the Jesuit Father General, wrote to Father Henry Silesden shortly after Arundel's death:

I rejoice greatly to hear that the Earl died in the bosom of the Catholic Church. Moreover, as I am not ignorant of the merits of that noble family towards our humble order, I will gladly apply to the relief of his soul a thousand masses and as many rosaries. I pray and beg Our Lord *Jesus*, that he would approve from heaven of these our suffrages, and if anything still remains to be atoned for, may He with His blood blot it out⁶⁰

Despite this, Pollen points out that Arundel was determined to conceal his secret to the bitter end, and that he was aided by his family in this endeavor. When his grandson Philip joined the Dominican order at Cremona, Arundel and family did all they could to extract him from the clutches of the friars. Neither his will nor the inscription he wrote for his tomb contain any hint of Catholicism; even William managed to deliver a non-denominational eulogy for his father.⁶¹

⁵⁸Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel," 392-3.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 397.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 396: 22 Dec. [1646], Caraffa to Silesden; the original Latin text is printed in Pollen, "The Religion of Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel," *Times Literary Supplement*, 21 July 1921: 468.

⁶¹Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel," 397.

As interesting as Pollen's arguments are, for many years those who speculated about Arundel's true religious leanings and motives for conversion—historians, art historians, and Catholic clergymen alike—did not refer to them. Thus Godfrey Anstruther, a Dominican, makes no real judgment as to Arundel's true religious bent, noting only that he was uninvolved in the established Church and uninterested in religious controversy. Instead he turns to righting Tierney's error in dating of Arundel's conversion, showing even more convincingly that it took place in December 1616, a half year after his appointment to the privy council, rather than in December 1615. In the absence of evidence that Arundel directly benefitted from his change of faith, Anstruther is at a loss to explain it. Besides, he believed Arundel to be without political ambition and anyway too high principled to sacrifice his faith to worldly motives.⁶² A pair of art historians, Francis Springell and Graham Parry also seem unacquainted with Pollen's work. Springell only attributes Arundel's conversion to religious indifference and opportunism,⁶³ while Parry posits the idea that Arundel was a pious Christian, undistinguished by creed: "It is probably fair to say that he regarded the theological entanglements with indifference, and maintained the central Christian beliefs in harmony with a strictness of conduct that amounted to a form of Christian Stoicism."⁶⁴ In the absence of a strong leaning to one confession or the other, Parry sees Arundel's conversion as an act of allegiance to the King rather than the Anglican Church. John Martin Robinson takes much the same view, but goes a step further by characterizing Arundel's outlook as "more neo-Stoic than Christian" and

⁶²Godfrey Anstruther, *A Hundred Homeless Years: English Dominicans, 1558-1658* (London: Blackfriars, 1958), 197.

⁶³Springell, 5.

⁶⁴Parry, 115.

arguing that philosophy and art were more important to him than the Bible. Robinson attributes Arundel's conversion to political ambition, because he (like the others who subscribe to this viewpoint) assumes it took place before he secured a privy council seat.⁶⁵

The most complete recent argument about Arundel's religious beliefs has been made by Edward Chaney in several footnotes to his book on Richard Lassels, an English Catholic on the Continent during the Civil War. Chaney convincingly argues that Arundel, while not devout, lived and died a Catholic, effectively countering the views of Hervey and Parry.⁶⁶ He suggests that in publicly conforming, Arundel was attempting to maintain the "best of both worlds." By early 1617, Arundel was fairly successful in convincing people he had turned against popery.⁶⁷ However, there were several signs over the years that he had not given up the old faith. Just over two years after his public conversion, a Capuchin friar wrote to Arundel expressing his confidence in the constancy of the Earl's Catholic faith. In wider society, many contemporaries considered him a church papist, including Panzani, papal agent to Queen Henrietta Maria in the 1630s. Also, the strong Catholic character of Arundel's family pointed to his own involvement. The Catholic treatise *A Patterne of Christian Loyaltie* was dedicated to Arundel.⁶⁸ In 1640, Puritans attacked those they considered

⁶⁵Robinson, 101, 108.

⁶⁶Edward Chaney, *The Grand Tour and the Great Rebellion: Richard Lassels and 'The Voyage of Italy' in the Seventeenth Century*, Biblioteca del Viaggio in Italia, vol. 19 (Geneva: Slatkine, 1985), 293 n. 96.

⁶⁷Despite his utterances against popery in early 1617, the Jesuit Edward Coffin had written a testimonial in January of that year stressing Arundel's solid Catholic background and aid to distressed Catholics (see quote in Anstruther, *Hundred Homeless Years*, 197). Surprisingly, Chaney seems to accept the 1615 date of conversion (i.e., before Arundel's appointment to the privy council) given in the *Complete Peerage* rather than the 1616 date (i.e., after) (Chaney, *Grand Tour*, 304 n. 10).

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 304-5 n. 10. Also see below, p. 255.

enemies of the true faith, especially Catholics: Arundel's wife, son William, and William's wife were all among "Fourteen hundred and thirty persons to be proceeded against for recusancy," a list drawn up by the Long Parliament in December 1640. That same year, the Puritan pamphleteer William Prynne composed *Rome's Masterpiece*, which accused Arundel of involvement in a "grand popish plot."⁶⁹ Finally, Chaney points to the plaque in the cloister wall of St. Antonio's in Padua behind which Arundel's entrails were immured, "its very presence there arguing for Arundel's orthodoxy." It inspired the following comment from Richard Lassels:

In the cloister in the monastery...I found written upon a black marble stone, these words: *Interiora Thomae Howardi Comititis Arondeliae*: that is: *The bowels of the Earle of Arondel, late Lord Marshal of England*. No wonder if his bowels be encased in marble after his death, who in his lifetime loved marble *con todas sus entrannjas with his whole bowels*, as the *Spaniards* say. His *Marmora Arondeliana* commented upon by learned *Selden*, shewed this sufficiently. In this one thing he was happier than the other *antiquarians* of his country and time; that by loving *Antiquities* so much as he did he fell in love with the best peice of *antiquity*, the ancient *Faith*.⁷⁰

Even Chaney, who draws together most strands of the argument concerning Arundel's true religious beliefs in his work on Lassels, is not immediately aware of Pollen's evidence of the deathbed reconciliation. It is only in his 1996 article about Arundel and the sculptor François Dieussart that Chaney, citing Pollen, first unequivocally declares that any lingering doubt about Arundel's true religious identity is dispelled by the fact that he died a Catholic.⁷¹ Chaney's original oversight is understandable, for it is apparent that this fact has not yet found its way into the historical mainstream. Neither has much of what Chaney himself has contributed to the debate on

⁶⁹Ibid., 300 n. 6, 304 n. 10, 324 n. 25.

⁷⁰Richard Lassels, "The Voyage of Italy," 650-1; quoted in Chaney, *Grand Tour*, 305-6 n. 10.

⁷¹Edward Chaney, "Thomas Howard, 14th Earl of Arundel," *Apollo* (Aug. 1996): 49-50

Arundel's religion. Kevin Sharpe – the author of a massive history of the personal rule of Charles I and the historian most engaged with Arundel in recent years – does not refer to Pollen (or many of the others for that matter) and simply maintains, though not incorrectly, that Arundel was probably a tolerant, private Catholic.⁷² Likewise, Caroline Hibbard in her book on Catholics and the Caroline court does not seem to be fully conversant with much of the evidence.

Now let us return once again to our original questions: what was Arundel's true religious identity and why did he conform? After surveying the scattered secondary source material, the evidence strongly supports the idea that Arundel was a secret Catholic; however, on the point of his motivations for taking Anglican communion, the verdict is less definite. Below, both of these issues will be addressed in a comprehensive manner, for the first time bringing together all of the salient points brought up by previous authors and supporting these conclusions with new evidence. From this labor a clearer and more complete view will emerge not only of Arundel's religious identity but also of how the liberties he took with it inform his actions as a whole.

Up until the fateful day when Arundel took communion in King's Chapel, he seemed a good Catholic. He was head of one of the foremost English Catholic noble houses. He had been brought up a strict Catholic by his devout mother, who made certain that he was instructed in the Catholic faith as well as conventional subjects. In connection with his education, at Westminster School and Cambridge (if he indeed attended them), he may have been expected to attend Protestant services. In this respect, he was not unlike the many upper-crust Catholic boys – particularly heirs – who were

⁷²Sharpe, "Earl of Arundel," 202.

educated in England.⁷³ Arundel received his degree from Cambridge in 1605 and the following year married Alethea Talbot, the daughter of another very important English Catholic noble house and herself an unabashed Catholic. A son, James, was born to the couple the next year. The King stood as godfather, and the baby thus had an Anglican christening in the Royal Chapel despite the Arundels' own religious beliefs. The case was the same when the Queen stood as godmother to their short-lived second son.⁷⁴ However, this should not be seen as a lapse of faith – many Catholics were obliged to conform on this point, particularly with the King in attendance.⁷⁵

Arundel's devotion to the Catholic faith was not questioned before his public conversion and was in fact the subject for positive comment by foreign co-religionists at the English court who undoubtedly had contact with him. In 1612, Spanish envoy Alonso de Velasco praised Arundel's courageous and devoted behavior at the execution of two priests:

On this day the Earl of Arundel showed his courage and devotion for without fear of worldly reprisal he accompanied them [the condemned priests] on horseback from the moment they emerged from prison until the moment they expired and he uttered threats at the executioner lest he cut the ropes before they were fully dead so as to cut out the entrails and heart while half-alive.⁷⁶

⁷³It was an especially risky venture to send an heir like Arundel to be educated abroad, as he was very visible and had the most to lose if he or his parents were prosecuted under the penal laws; also, there was the danger he would fall ill or into the priesthood (Cliffe, 181).

⁷⁴Hervey, 117.

⁷⁵Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel," 389.

⁷⁶Loomie, *Spain and the Jacobean Catholics*, vol. 1, 196: 8/18 June 1612, Alonso de Velasco to Philip III. According to Pollen, the two were Robert Newport and William Scott (Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel," 390).

In 1612, John Chamberlain wrote to Sir Dudley Carleton that Arundel's trip to Spa was an opportunity for "a holy as well as a healthful pilgrimage."⁷⁷ Two years later, Chamberlain told Sir Ralph Winwood that it was rumored that William Cecil, Lord Roos, gave negative intelligence of Arundel's presence in Rome and his entertainment and conversation there; the King, however, was satisfied with his explanation.⁷⁸ The Spanish ambassador, the Count of Gondomar, characterized Arundel two years later as "the head of his family and a very genuine Catholic . . . [who] has been in Italy three years, together with his wife and children, with the king's permission to have the opportunity to see Italy but the more certain reason is to enable him to live as a Catholic in public."⁷⁹ In mid-1616, Arundel was still regarded as the "head of the Catholics" by the Venetian secretary Lionello; and in 1617, after the conversion, he was still thought to be a Catholic in Spanish circles.⁸⁰

At this point one wonders what might move Arundel, a seemingly contented Catholic, to conform publicly to the established church. The answer is complex; it can be found in the confluence of three interconnected and, at times, conflicting systems of belief that informed all of his actions, to one extent or another: first, his loyalty to the King; second, his devotion to Howard family pride and tradition; and third, his dynastic and personal ambitions. Taken together, one can easily understand why, under the circumstances, Arundel preferred occasional gestures of conformity and private Catholicism.

⁷⁷Chamberlain, vol. 1, 372: 23 July 1612,* Chamberlain to Carleton.

⁷⁸Ibid., 568-9: 5 Jan. 1615,* same to Winwood.

⁷⁹Loomie, *Spain and the Jacobean Catholics*, vol. 2, 39: 20/30 June 1614, Gondomar to Philip III.

⁸⁰CSPV 1615-7, 245: 21 June/1 July 1616, Lionello to D&S; Loomie, *Spain and the Jacobean Catholics*, vol. 2, 93: 18/28 Sept. 1617, Augustin Perez to Gondomar.

Arundel's loyalty to the House of Stuart was a great motivation for his public adherence to the established church on Christmas Day 1616.⁸¹ For him, conforming was a gesture of appreciation and allegiance to the crown and did not represent an ideological switch to the Anglican Church. He owed all that had been restored to him to James; thus the King's influence surely played a large role in Arundel's decision to conform – it is instructive that he received communion in *King's Chapel*. Arundel's unwavering fidelity to the crown throughout his political career and beyond when he was in exile on the Continent, was noted by many contemporaries, and it was the greatest virtue for which he wished to be remembered if Walker's "Life and Actions" is any indication.⁸² It was also the basis for his inclusion in Lloyd's *Memoires*.⁸³ Arundel's wife was devoted to the Stuart dynasty as well. George Conn, the papal agent to Henrietta Maria's court, was disappointed to find that though Lady Arundel was a steadfast Catholic, she was still unwaveringly loyal to the cause of the

⁸¹There is no reason to doubt that Arundel conformed in 1616 (rather than in the previous year, as some authors have assumed). Both Hervey and Anstruther make a convincing argument in this respect, and their interpretations are corroborated by contemporary observers (Hervey, 115; Anstruther, *Hundred Homeless Years*, 197).

⁸²Another author, in his dedication, listed Arundel's greatest merits as "a Mecaenas to Arts, and...forwardnesse in the service of your King and Countrey; neither in hope of praise, expectation of reward, or least ayme of Ambition, but meerey in your vertue. Since all that know you know so much, what I from them have learnt..." (James Wadsworth the younger, translator, in his dedication to César Oudin, *A Grammar Spanish and English*, trans. J. W. [London: John Haviland for Edward Blount, 1622]).

⁸³Lloyd included his subjects because they had suffered for Protestantism and/or allegiance to their sovereign. Since Lloyd brands Arundel a "Church Catholick," he was obviously included for his devotion to his sovereign. The fact that Lloyd included Arundel as a Catholic when he had publicly converted to Anglicanism leads one to believe that this was actually the case, as it would have been in Lloyd's interests, as an Anglican clergyman, to include Arundel among those who had suffered for Protestantism and as he did not hesitate to twist the truth where he could. Being that Lloyd's *Memoires* were published so soon after Arundel's death, perhaps the Earl's memory was still too fresh in the minds of contemporaries for Lloyd to declare Arundel a devoted Protestant safely.

Palatine family.⁸⁴ Despite the fact that the English Catholic authorities condemned the Oath of Allegiance, she believed that Catholics could and should take it.⁸⁵ It was likely that Arundel supported it as well – the royalist Catholic treatise *A Patterne of Christian Loyaltie*, which argued that Catholics could in good conscience swear to the Oath and penal laws should be relaxed for those willing to do so, was dedicated to him. The piece was actually penned or was at least inspired and guided by the Benedictine Thomas Preston, champion of the Oath, and published under Arundel's cousin William Howard's name.⁸⁶

Allegiance to sovereign, however, was not the only factor motivating Arundel to conformity. The Howard family pride and tradition that was so precious to Arundel also promoted a degree of public adherence to the established religion and private Catholicism. On the one hand, he sought to rebuild the family fortune and uphold the Howard tradition of leadership in government by assuming his rightful place in political life. On the other, the Howards had a strong tradition of

⁸⁴Hervey, 402.

⁸⁵Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel," 392. English Catholic opinion was divided over its legality. The Benedictines were identified with leniency toward the Oath, while the Jesuits took a hard line against it.

⁸⁶David Lunn indicates that Preston actually wrote the work, while Ruth Grun believes that Howard did so with the inspiration and guidance of Preston. At the government's behest, Preston had penned numerous books in support of the Oath under the name Roger Widdrington (David Lunn, *The English Benedictines, 1540-1688: From Reformation to Revolution*, foreword by Cardinal Basil Hume [London: Burns and Oates, 1980], 126; Ruth E. Grun, "A Note on William Howard, Author of *A Patterne of Christian Loyaltie*," *Catholic Historical Review* 42, no. 3 [Oct. 1956]: 330-40; c.f. W. K. L. Webb, "Thomas Preston O.S.B., alias Roger Widdrington (1567-1640)," *Biographical Studies, 1534-1829* 2, no. 3 [1954]: 216-68). William Howard was Arundel's first cousin twice over, since their fathers were half-brothers and their mothers sisters. The dedication states that "the experience I have had of your Noble and gracious favour to my selfe in particular, gives me assurance, that you will not bee displeased, if for protection in an undertaking exposed to so much opposition, I addresse my selfe to your *Lordship*." (William Hovvard, *A Patterne of Christian Loyaltie: VVhereby any prudent man may clearely perceive, in what manner the New Oath of Allegiance and every Clause thereof, may in a true, and Catholike sense, without danger of Perjury, be taken by Roman Catholikes....* [London: R. Badoer, 1634]).

adherence to and active promotion of Catholicism. As the head of the senior branch of the family, Arundel had to find a way to balance these conflicting interests. His ultimate goal was to restore his family to its previous glory. If he lived as an unabashed Catholic, progress toward it might be halted or even reversed. A loyal career in the service of the king, however, would augment the legacy he would leave to future generations of Howards.

In the early modern period it is difficult to separate the elevated desire to uphold family pride and tradition from the selfish one to advance personal and dynastic interests. It is even harder to delineate personal from family interests. Nor should we try, because this line of reasoning would be incomprehensible to Arundel or his contemporaries. The byproduct of aggrandizement of family was very often the aggrandizement of self, so in many ways Arundel's desire to further Howard family interests may also be interpreted as the promotion of his own ambitions. For instance, Arundel's privy council appointment was certainly an important move forward for him, but it was just one stepping stone of many to reach his ultimate goal of Howard restoration.

Surely there was a healthy degree of personal and dynastic ambition in Arundel's decision to conform outwardly. Although the fact that he was appointed to the privy council beforehand seems to support the idea that he conformed out of loyalty to the monarch rather than mere ambition to become a councillor, this point does not completely eliminate motives of advancement, as Hervey and Anstruther suggested. It is important to note that James already knew of Arundel's plans to conform when he called him to the privy council: Thomas Viscount Fenton, Captain of the Yeoman Guard, wrote to his cousin John, Earl of Mar that "The Erl of Arundell is made of the consell this last Tewsdaye; noe man there did know of it before it was spokin. He is or shall be a trew Christian

and will communicat as his Majestie hes saide."⁸⁷ In any event, public conversion certainly made his political advance less complicated. Though neither James nor Charles excluded Catholics from court life or royal councils, a public gesture of adherence to the established church made their participation much more acceptable in the eyes of the political nation, particularly that substantial segment with Puritan sympathies. Thus, given Arundel's most strongly held ideals – loyalty to sovereign, family pride and tradition, and dynastic and personal ambition – and the situation in which he found himself, it is apparent why he found outward conformity particularly appealing.

Even after his public act of conformity to the Anglican church, Catholic incidents dot the landscape of Arundel's existence. Throughout his life, reports continued to circulate that he was privately still a Catholic, and hard evidence supports this conclusion. Very compelling is this letter addressed to Arundel by a Capuchin over two years after his supposed conversion:

Jesus † Maria. I placed my sister with you I thought to provide for her good as well spiritual as corporal that hereby she might have better and freer means to be established in the Catholic faith, for I full well knew your house to be so far remoted from any persons of suspected religion, and your family so catholicly given, which you have ever sincerely kept and devoutly professed that you abhor and detest all other religions as impious and pernicious doctrines introduced by the devil to the perdition of men's souls.⁸⁸

⁸⁷HMC, *Report on the Manuscripts of the Earl of Mar and Kellie* (London: HMSO, 1904-30), vol. 2 [*Mar & Kellie II*], 64: 17/27 July 1616, Thomas, Viscount Fenton to John, Earl of Mar. Fenton was likely correct, as he was at court when Arundel was appointed to the privy council. Both Fenton and Mar had connections at court. They were childhood friends of James I, and Fenton was also close to Sir George Villiers, Master of the Horse, afterwards Duke of Buckingham, calling him "my sone."

⁸⁸HMC, *Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Cowper (Coke Manuscripts), Twelfth Report*, app. 1-3 (London: HMSO, 1888-9), vol. 1 [*Cowper I*], 105: 30 Apr. 1619, Friar Angel Englis to Arundel.

In 1621, the Venetian ambassador Girolamo Lando remarked that Arundel "is known by everyone to be a Catholic."⁸⁹ Arundel held the trust and the proxy votes of Catholic peers throughout his political career.⁹⁰ In 1625, his father-in-law Lord Shrewsbury sent his proxy and trusted that Arundel would be as vigilant as before in bestowing it, particularly in matters of religion and conscience.⁹¹

These reports continue through the reign of Charles. John Richards applied to Arundel for aid in 1630, because of "[h]is charitable disposition towards distressed Catholics."⁹² Indeed he continued to serve as a trustee for a Catholic charity.⁹³ The following year, a Protestant knight seeking a husband for his daughter asked suspiciously if a suitor had at one time "belonged" to the Earls of Shrewsbury or Arundel.⁹⁴ George Sprat, a water-bearer, admitted under examination in 1634 that he heard an apprentice named Richard say that "These 'prentices will this night come to St. James's and pull down Queen's Mother's Chapel there, and Somerset House Chapel, and my Lord of Arundel's Chapel, because he maintained Popery."⁹⁵

Arundel's many trips abroad to Italy and Flanders only encouraged wagging tongues. Even when on the King's business to the Emperor in 1636, he was targeted by the Jesuits, who assumed

⁸⁹*CSPV 1621-3*, 100: 27 July/6 Aug. 1621, Lando to the Inquisitors of State.

⁹⁰He held proxies for four of them in 1626—the Marquis of Winchester, the Earl of Shrewsbury, Lord Windsor, and Lord Petre (Vernon F. Snow, "The Arundel Case, 1626," *The Historian* 26, no. 3 [May 1964]: 330).

⁹¹*ACA*, AL 1617-32, no. 272: 9/19 May 1625, Shrewsbury to Arundel.

⁹²*CSPD 1629-31*, 246-7: Apr. 1630, John Richards to same.

⁹³Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel," 393.

⁹⁴*HMC*, *Cowper I*, 446: 18/28 Nov. 1631, T. Gilbert to Coke.

⁹⁵*CSPD 1634-5*, 22: 15/25 May 1634, Examination of George Sprat, water-bearer of Saint Giles' Without Cripplegate, taken before Edward Lord Newburgh.

that he was a secret Catholic and potential ally. They hoped he would use his influence with the King to improve the position of English Catholics, and also that he would be won back to open Catholicism. In keeping with these aims, William Lamormaini, the Emperor's Jesuit confessor, made certain that Arundel was sufficiently entertained during his travels to Vienna and Prague.⁹⁶ Thus evidence to support Arundel's Catholic leanings comes from many different sources – Englishmen and foreigners, those of low and high estate, friends and foes of Catholicism – and may not be dismissed as mere speculation by rumormongers. Few believed that his conversion was sincere.

Several works published over the years by writers of varying religious persuasions give more insight into contemporaries' perception of Arundel. *A Grammar Spanish and English*, which was dedicated to Arundel by its translator, appeared in 1622. Although it sounds innocent enough on the surface, its Catholic lining is exposed after a little detective work, when one discovers that the translator (J. W.) is actually a Jesuit, James Wadsworth the younger. In 1634, the same year that the apprentices conspired to raze the chapel at Arundel House, *A Patterne of Christian Loyaltie* appeared. This work, which was also dedicated to Arundel, argued that English Catholics could take the Oath of Allegiance in good conscience. The Puritan William Prynne, the scurrilous earless critic of the Caroline court, implicated Lord and Lady Arundel in a grand popish plot of 1640 in his

⁹⁶For example, Arundel describes a play performed for him by the Jesuits in Prague in a letter to Windebank (*CSP*, vol. 1, 597: 20/30 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank).

polemic *Rome's Masterpiece*.⁹⁷ All of these works suggest (or in Prynne's case, proclaim) Arundel's support for the old faith.

Prynne's accusations, while wild, were obviously not the first made against the Howards because of their Catholic leanings. Over the years, Arundel, his wife, and other members of their family were charged with recusancy. In 1629, the King himself ordered the attorney general under his sign manual to do what he could to prevent the conviction of Lord and Lady Arundel for recusancy.⁹⁸ That the accusations continued beyond this act of conformity is unsurprising, as the bulk of his family remained avowed Catholics – his mother, his wife, his younger surviving son, and most of his grandchildren were all ardent adherents to the Roman faith, and most of them also married Catholics.⁹⁹ Arundel was devoted to his family: "Hee was most faithful and affectionate to his Lady, indulgent to his Children, and more to his Grandchildren. His Recreations were Conversation with them, and care of their Education."¹⁰⁰ At least one of his two children and all his grandchildren were brought up and educated for the most part as Catholics.¹⁰¹ Since Arundel was involved with their

⁹⁷Chaney, *Grand Tour*, 300 n. 6. In 1637 Prynne had his ears, which had already been cropped as punishment for a previous prosecution, completely cut off for his open criticism of Charles's Arminian religious policies. He also had the initials "SL" for Seditious Libeller branded onto both of his cheeks.

⁹⁸BL, Egerton 2553, f. 73: 17/27 Apr. 1629, [Charles I] to Attorney General.

⁹⁹The children of his elder son and heir, Henry Frederick, were brought up under Arundel's guidance, and they were open Catholics even if their father was not. Two of them, Francis and Philip (later Cardinal) Howard, joined the Dominican order. As far as Henry Frederick was concerned, it made good political sense for him to outwardly conform or at least to avoid Catholic connections. Many heirs of the Catholic nobility and gentry employed this tactic to circumvent the penal laws which prohibited Catholics from inheriting (though they were not consistently applied), thus preserving the family lands and titles intact in their line. Arundel certainly agreed with this strategy.

¹⁰⁰Walker, 223.

¹⁰¹Hervey, 448 n.1. His eldest son Henry Frederick may not have been brought up openly as a Catholic for the same reasons that Arundel conformed.

education, it is unlikely that this was solely the doing of Lady Arundel. The strength of Arundel's family connections to Catholicism are quite overwhelming. He is the son of a martyr and saint, the father of another martyr (William, Lord Stafford, who was implicated in a Catholic plot by Titus Oates and executed), and the grandfather of a cardinal (Philip Cardinal Norfolk). The strong Catholic influence in the Howard family at this time is immediately apparent, and it is likely that Arundel, as the head of the family, was allied with it.

Even though all this anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that Arundel was in fact a secret Catholic or church papist, the compelling fact of his deathbed profession of the Catholic faith leaves little room for doubt.¹⁰² Arundel, however, was just as careful to conceal his true religious leanings in death as in life. No trace of Catholicism, or any other religion for that matter, is apparent in his letters or his will. His self-composed epitaph expresses only that he wishes for his soul to be transported to heaven, and reveals nothing about his religious affiliation. It is instead spiritual in tone and focuses on celebrating his family history.¹⁰³ Even the eulogy composed by his openly Catholic son William, Lord Stafford, never mentions his religion – the way Arundel undoubtedly would have preferred it, for the sake of his heir Henry Frederick and the general welfare of the Howard family. That in the end he chose Catholicism, particularly after all the pains he took during his life to disassociate himself from it, speaks volumes. The fact he professed secretly reinforces the idea that this was the way that he dealt throughout his life with the problems posed by adherence to Catholicism.

¹⁰²His bowels were even immured in a wall of the cloister of St. Antonio in Padua. See Lassels's comments about it, on p. 250 above.

¹⁰³His will, epitaph, and last wishes are printed in Hervey, app. II.

It was obviously in the interest of Arundel and his family to deflect suspicions about the orthodoxy of his religious beliefs. He feared his enemies would take up these suspicions, and that their activism might lead to official accusations against him that would not only damage his reputation with the king, but also cause him to lose all that he had managed to recover for Howard posterity. If Arundel wished to retain his status and perhaps recover the dukedom, he could not afford to be discovered.¹⁰⁴ This goes far in explaining his behavior in the following situations. In one case, he was very upset that his son William had been married by a Catholic priest, with Lady Arundel's knowledge but (purportedly) without his own.¹⁰⁵ It is improbable, however, that they would leave the head of the family completely in the dark about such plans. Arundel likely knew that the wedding was to take place and absented himself as a precaution, thus avoiding any accusations about his own religious loyalties. Another, more powerful example is shown in his keen disappointment at the news that his grandson Philip had joined the Dominican order at Cremona in 1645. In fact, not only Arundel but his whole family, many of whom were open Catholics, engaged in a very public campaign for his return:

When at last they [the family] learned what had happened, . . . the Earl was greatly perturbed, not only on account of the injury and scandal and disgrace to families of the highest rank that often result from entering religion thus hastily and rashly, but

¹⁰⁴It seems he did quite a good job of it. In 1618, Tobie Mathew, Archbishop of York, asked Arundel's assistance in convincing his errant Catholic son Sir Tobie Mathew to return to the Anglican Church. The Archbishop wrote to Arundel that he believed his son would listen to the Earl because of "his dependance...on your favour and your judgement." He assured Arundel that his son remained a dutiful and faithful subject to the King (Lodge, *Illustrations*, vol. 3, 291-2).

¹⁰⁵BL, Add. Mss. 15390, f. 378: 11 Aug. 1637, "Conn to Cardinal Francesco Barberini; *ibid.*, f. 410: 18 Sept. 1637, "same to same; *ibid.*, f. 458: 23 Oct. 1637, "same to same; quoted in Hervey, 407-8. "It was the priest...that so annoyed him...especially as Lord Arundel himself had so solemnly declared for an opposite policy. There was certainly, however, no breach of affection between him and his wife." (Hervey, 408).

from the very serious dangers threatening the whole House of Howard, and possibly many other persons as well, from this step on the part of Philip. The Earl therefore left no stone unturned to withdraw his grandson from his purpose, before the thing should become widely known. . . . if this act of Philip is reported to the English Parliament, as is certain to be the case, Parliament would undoubtedly be moved to declare the Earl's property proscribed, and himself liable to imprisonment, . . . the Earl must take some other measures for protecting himself against present and future dangers, namely, by making clear by authentic proofs that he, so far from being responsible for Philip's resolution, is excessively grieved at it and has done all in his power to divert him from it. Therefore the aforesaid Philip, most humbly entreats your Eminence, . . . graciously to apply some suitable remedy . . . so that it may appear beyond a doubt even *in foro externo*, should Parliament think fit to take proceedings against the Earl, that he himself and all his family are entirely innocent of connivance in Philip's action¹⁰⁶

In this case, it is obvious that Arundel's chief concern was averting prosecution and the threat to the status of the family rather than any injury to his religious beliefs. It quickly became apparent that, despite his grandfather's protestations, Philip had a true calling, for he went on to a very distinguished career in the Church and eventually became a cardinal.¹⁰⁷ In both of these cases, Arundel's reaction should not be interpreted as anti-Catholic, but rather as avoidance of reprisals against himself and his family.

¹⁰⁶From "Petition of Henry Howard to the Holy See to exclude Philip Thomas Howard," in *Dominicana: Cardinal Howard's Letters, English Dominican Friars, Nuns, Students, Papers and Mission Registers*, CRS Publications, vol. 25 (London: CRS, 1925), 258-60. For a full account of the wrangling between the Church and the Howard family over the vocation of young Philip, see Anstruther, *Hundred Homeless Years*, chap. 9.

¹⁰⁷Cardinal Norfolk was the founder and first prior of a Dominican monastery at Bornhem in Flanders and founder of a convent of Dominican nuns at Vilvorde. A royalist, he was involved in plotting an uprising in favor of Charles II during the Interregnum. Norfolk was later to play an important role in Anglo-Roman relations—during the Restoration, he was chaplain and grand almoner to the Queen and leader of the Catholic party at court, Cardinal Protector of England and Scotland, and chief councillor to Rome in matters touching England. He rebuilt the English College in Rome and revised the rules of Douai College.

Finally, it should be noted that though he was a secret Catholic, Arundel was no religious zealot. He considered the doctrinal differences between the Christian confessions to be negligible during a time that they were a source of excitement for many of his contemporaries.¹⁰⁸ He did not condemn any religion; on the contrary, he was very tolerant of the religious views of others, and religious differences were for him no barrier to genial understanding.¹⁰⁹ This fact, coupled with common intellectual interests in history, art, antiquities, and architecture, explains his friendships and patronage of with such men as Selden, Cotton, and Wentworth.¹¹⁰ Selden, for example, was engaged by the Earl to compile a scholarly catalog of his marbles, the *Marmora Arundelliana* (1628).¹¹¹ Arundel's tolerance was highlighted by the fact that he not only associated with the papal representatives Panzani and Conn,¹¹² but was also a patron of the Protestant diplomat and Secretary of State Sir Dudley Carleton (Lord Dorchester) and Samuel Harsnett, Bishop of Chichester, who

¹⁰⁸Arundel determined that "the distance between the Catholick and Reformed Churches grew not from their Controversies, but their Interests; not from the Opinions themselves which might be compounded, but from the passions of those that managed them...." (Lloyd, 284).

¹⁰⁹Hervey, 118.

¹¹⁰Sharpe, "Earl of Arundel," 202.

¹¹¹John Selden, *Marmora Arundelliana; siue Saxa Græcè incisa ex venerandis priscæ Orientis gloriæ ruderibus, auspicijs & impensis herois illustriss. Thomæ Comitis Arundellia & Surriæ, Comitis Marescalli Angliæ, pridem vindicata & in ædibus eius hortisque cognominibus, ad Thamesis ripam, disposita* (London: Guiljelmi Stanesbeij, 1628).

¹¹²The Oratorian Gregorio Panzani was sent as the papal envoy to England in 1634, allegedly to reconcile differences between certain groups of English Catholics; his real mission was to obtain permission for official papal diplomatic representation at the court of Henrietta Maria. While in England, he carried on secret talks with Secretary Windebank about a possible reunion between the Catholic and Anglican Churches. In addition, he was to acquaint himself with prominent Englishmen and contemporary English opinion and thought. Lord and Lady Arundel were among the notables with whom Panzani socialized. Panzani's mission was a success—his successor George Conn arrived in 1636 as the accredited papal agent to the Queen's court (Hervey, 396-7).

subsequently became Bishop of Norwich and Archbishop of York.¹¹³ Another example of his tolerance which underlines his devotion to the King comes from 1605, long before his conversion. While in Flanders to take charge of an English volunteer regiment to assist Spain in its war against the Dutch, Arundel discussed the situation of English Catholics with the papal nuncio there. Arundel took the opportunity to support James's recent proposal for an ecumenical council, stating that it might help to alleviate pressures on Catholics.¹¹⁴ Arundel, who was so influential in the councils of state, was uninterested in the details of religious politics. His tolerance is a pleasant divergence from the religious fanaticism of the time.¹¹⁵ The evidence presented above shows that he was a loyalist Catholic who was faithful to his monarch and family, and tolerant of the beliefs of others.

Career under Charles I

Regarding Arundel's political loyalties, as opposed to his religious ones, there need be no debate. He was a strong royalist who faithfully served the House of Stuart, which was responsible for his restoration. Walker's opinion on this subject echoed that of other contemporaries: "the Vastness of his [Arundel's] noble Designs . . . being only the Glory and Ornament of his Country . . . he must by all wise and noble Persons be lookt upon as the greatest Assertor of the Splendor and Greatness of the Crown."¹¹⁶ The Stuart kings constantly relied upon Arundel's devotion and expertise, though he never attained the status of favorite as did his rival Buckingham. Arundel was an upright minister

¹¹³ACA, AL 1617-32, no. 224: 3 Nov. 1617, Carleton to Arundel; Hervey, 118-9.

¹¹⁴Patterson, 69.

¹¹⁵Robinson, 108.

¹¹⁶Walker, 223.

who avoided intrigues and rejected bribes.¹¹⁷ Even during his early years at court, he showed a rare distaste for graft. In 1606, a correspondent informed William Trumbull: "The Archduke hath sent my L. Arundell a patent of 1000*l.* the year to be, if he will accept it, *circa la persona*. But he meaneth to deliver it back and return shortly to England."¹¹⁸ It is apparent that the Habsburgs considered him a possible ally from the beginning, probably because of his Catholic faith and the fact that some of his relatives received Spanish pensions. But promoting the faith was less important to Arundel than serving the crown. He refused to become embroiled in Catholic political intrigue despite his personal religious leanings.¹¹⁹ He was "too honest and cool-headed to become a regular partisan."¹²⁰ His religious leanings were intensely private to him, and they seemed to have had little or no effect on his public life, including his conduct of negotiations with the Habsburgs.

Arundel's loyalty to the Stuarts extended to Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, her family, and the cause of the restitution of the Palatinate. He was her friend even before the Arundels escorted her as a bride to her new home in Heidelberg; there, their personal ties were strengthened further. The bond of trust and affection between Arundel and Elizabeth is clear from their correspondence.

¹¹⁷On this subject Walker wrote: "He was free from Covetousness, and so much above a Bribe or Gratuity (for Favours done) as no Person ever durst tempt him with one." (Ibid.)

¹¹⁸HMC, *Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire* (London: HMSO, 1924-95), vol. 2 [*Downshire II*], 12: 6/16 July 1606, J. Beaulieu to William Trumbull.

¹¹⁹This is illustrated in a letter from the papal agent Conn to Cardinal Barberini: "[Arundel] assured me...of his own wish to be a good instrument in what relates to the service of Catholics in this country. With the authority he has, he could, no doubt, do something; but he is as far removed from these negotiations as he is given up to pictures and statues, around which he would like us to pass all our time...." (BL, Add. Mss. 15390: 5 Jan. 1637, Conn to Barberini; quoted in Hervey, 398).

¹²⁰Edmund Lodge, *Portraits of Illustrious Personages of Great Britain...with Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Their Lives and Actions* (London: London Printing and Publishing Company, s.d.), vol. 3, 57.

For instance, she closed a letter to him in 1634 thus: "... the true affection you have ever borne me, which makes me write this freebie to you and assure you how constant I am, in my love to my oulde frend" ¹²¹ Although Arundel long had supported the King's policy of retrieving the Palatinate through negotiations with the Habsburgs, a policy that she openly opposed, Elizabeth never doubted his constancy to her cause. This is reflected in the pleasure she expressed when hearing the news that Arundel had been chosen to conduct the negotiations with the Emperor Ferdinand II in 1636. ¹²²

Arundel was identified with the "Hispanophile" party at court precisely because he favored dealing with the Habsburgs to regain Palatinate. However this tag was a misnomer, as Elizabeth must have realized. It was applied liberally not only to those councillors who were actually pro-Spanish in sympathy but also to pragmatic conservatives like Arundel who were committed to a peace policy and who saw dealing with the Habsburgs as the surest way to regain the Palatinate. He did not support unconditional friendship with the *Casa d'Austria* but rather believed that negotiations with the Habsburgs offered the best chance for the restitution of the Palatinate, as did the King, and his councillors Weston, Windebank, and Cottington. ¹²³ He also knew that England could not bear the burden of an all-out war with the Habsburgs and their allies to recover it. Finally, it was royal policy – except during Buckingham's "reign" – to pursue the restoration of the Palatinate through negotiations with the Habsburgs; this was another good more reason for Arundel to support it.

¹²¹Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, 90: 22 Feb. 1634, Elizabeth to Arundel.

¹²²*CSPD 1635-6*, 314: 22 Mar. 1636, Sir Thomas Roe to Elizabeth; *ibid.*, 351: 4 Apr. 1636, Elizabeth to Roe; *ibid.*, 373: 19/29 Apr. 1636, same to Laud.

¹²³This did not prevent him from taking pleasure in the Swedish successes in Germany, in the hope they would expedite the restoration of the Prince Palatine (*CSPD 1631-3*, 206: 20 Dec. 1631, Arundel to Vane).

Therefore, Arundel was identified as a Hispanophile even though his support for negotiations with the Habsburgs was based on what he regarded as the best interests of the Stuart dynasty and England.

Although he was a supporter of negotiations with the Habsburgs through much of the 1620s and 1630s, Arundel sympathized with them only so long as he believed that they held out the prospect of the restoration of the Palatinate by peaceful means. This was clear in his reaction to the failure of his negotiations in Vienna, which in his mind shattered all illusions that the Palatinate would be restored by a treaty with the Habsburgs. Upon his return from the Continent, he condemned Habsburg duplicity in the strongest terms and advocated that active measures be taken against them, in league with the French, Dutch, and their allies. In 1637, Laud reported Arundel's new-found opposition to the Habsburgs to Wentworth:

The Earl Marshal being returned have [has] made it appear to us that noe [aid] for the Prince Elector can be hoped for from Spayne & c. And now I verily believe it will in time growe into a war. . . . the Earl marshal are [is] not only now against Spayne for there's cause enough for that certainly, but extremely for the Low Cuntrys. And tis common in Court speech that the Queen of Bohemia is an earnest sutor to the King that the Earl Marshal maye be restored to his antient honnour of the Duke of Norfolk for thiss service.¹²⁴

Despite the failure of his negotiations, Elizabeth was satisfied with Arundel's conduct, stating that he had "carried himself worthily."¹²⁵ She was for full restoration or none at all and was pleased that Arundel had turned back the Emperor's offers to restore only a portion of her son's inheritance. Arundel's unimpeachable loyalty to his sovereign and to the Palatine House was one of the main reasons he was chosen to lead the embassy to the Emperor in the first place. His devotion to their

¹²⁴Laud, vol. 7, 319-20: 11/21 Feb. 1637, Laud to Wentworth.

¹²⁵*CSPD 1636-7*, 76: 27 July/6 Aug. 1636, Elizabeth to Laud.

interests is readily seen in his reaction to the failure of his mission: though he was a long-time adherent of the peace party, he did not hesitate to abandon this position when it became apparent to him that negotiations with the Habsburgs would not result in the restoration of the Palatinate. His penchant to take offense at any perceived slight to his master's honor, as he did to his own or that of his family, is a further reflection of his constancy to the King that surfaced repeatedly in his negotiations with the Habsburgs.¹²⁶ Arundel's allegiance to the House of Stuart without doubt played a large role in his conduct of the negotiations.

In spite of Arundel's dynastic loyalty, there was a period when he did not necessarily agree with "official" royal policies, namely in the years from 1623 to 1628, when Buckingham's will dominated at court. His preponderance was especially marked after the death of the peace-loving James I and the accession of Charles I in 1625. Arundel was in disgrace from the beginning of Charles's reign because he opposed the war with Spain supported by Charles and Buckingham and he worked to undermine Buckingham's influence. From this time there was an open rivalry between Buckingham and Arundel.

Arundel had initially been a Buckingham supporter, when both men supported a Spanish marriage for Prince Charles. In 1621, Arundel won the appreciation of the favorite when he staunchly supported Buckingham in the Lords when the latter was under fire for promoting

¹²⁶ Another example is his irritation with the French ambassador, the Marquis de Cadenet, who failed to observe diplomatic etiquette when Arundel escorted him from Gravesend to London in 1620. The ambassador neglected to advance any further than the head of the staircase when Arundel first came to his lodgings at Gravesend. The next day when they were to set off for London, Arundel met him in the street, and would not go further than the foot of the stairs when they reached their destination, Somerset House. Arundel then informed the ambassador that "the gentleman there would shew him to his lodging." To be fair, Arundel was likely reacting to a slight not only to himself, but to the King he was representing. James, whose pride was injured by the incident, in fact approved of Arundel's retaliatory behavior (Tierney, vol. 3, 442-3 n. a).

monopolies.¹²⁷ But Arundel began to oppose the favorite's policies when, on the heels of Charles and Buckingham's embarrassing trip to Spain (of which Arundel did not approve), Buckingham advocated breaking off the Spanish match and declaring war against Spain. This course openly conflicted with James I's stated foreign policy, and Arundel continued to support the King's policy of friendly relations with Spain even though he was not against defending the Palatinate by military intervention.¹²⁸ Even after Charles's accession, Arundel continued to support this policy, which he believed to be in the best interests of crown and state, and opposed what he saw as Buckingham's bellicose, destructive policies. In addition, Arundel and many others at court felt the need to counter Buckingham's preponderance, particularly due to his machinations to subvert the privy council and the influence of his rivals in Parliament. This was particularly so for Arundel, who as the "self-appointed spokesman of the 'old' aristocracy resented the predominance of the *parvenu* favourite."¹²⁹ Thus an opposition group formed, with Arundel and the earls of Middlesex and Bristol among its leaders.¹³⁰

In addition to disagreements over political issues, personal problems exacerbated the clash between Arundel and Buckingham, particularly when the latter was raised to a dukedom in 1623. The King offered the same honor to Arundel, but as a new creation instead of the restitution of the coveted premier dukedom of Norfolk. Arundel stood uncompromisingly on family pride and refused to accept anything less than the restoration of his ancestral right. Because of his stubbornness, he

¹²⁷See above, p. 234.

¹²⁸At this point the fate of the Palatinate was unclear.

¹²⁹Lockyer, *Early Stuarts*, 333.

¹³⁰Sharpe, "Earl of Arundel," 231-2.

was granted no title, for James would not give Arundel precedence over his favorite. Buckingham was made a duke and became the senior English peer, which Arundel found extremely insulting because he believed the upstart Buckingham had usurped his hereditary right.¹³¹ He also objected to Buckingham's gross sale of honors. The favorite's meteoric rise and disregard for the established social order, combined with his dangerous foreign policy and irresponsible actions, galvanized Arundel's opinion against Buckingham and forced him into open opposition. Unsurprisingly, Buckingham returned Arundel's hostility.¹³² Since Arundel was a leader of the opposition group, Buckingham began to suspect that he and other opposition peers were mobilizing clients in the Commons against him and his policies.¹³³

The enmity that sprang up between them had a frustratingly negative impact upon Arundel's political career, though he was too powerful and capable to be shoved aside completely. Buckingham did everything in his power to exclude Arundel from royal favor and condemn him to a lesser role at court. His tactics were particularly effective with Charles, who preferred the engaging Buckingham to the reserved Arundel. The culmination of the struggle between the two noblemen came in 1626, when Arundel's son Henry Frederick married Lady Elizabeth Stuart, a royal ward, without royal consent. The King was infuriated. Buckingham, on the other hand, was

¹³¹Chamberlain, vol. 2, 443: 1 July 1622, "Chamberlain to Carleton; *ibid.*, 488: 5 Apr. 1623, "same to same; *ibid.*, 498: 17 May 1623, "same to same; Robinson, 102.

¹³²The enmity that existed between Arundel and Buckingham was highlighted by a conflict that Arundel, as Earl Marshal, had with one of Buckingham's clients, Henry St. George, the Richmond Herald. Arundel had made an example of St. George for disregarding his order that the heralds should not dwell in Derby House with their families. Buckingham supported St. George's petition to the King about the incident, asking that Arundel not be allowed to prejudice St. George "out of spleen" to the Duke (CSPD 1627-8, 231: 27 June/7 July 1627, St. George to Charles I, with a message from Buckingham).

¹³³Sharpe, "Earl of Arundel," 195.

delighted with the convenient opportunity to eliminate his rival (and his proxy votes) from the Lords at a time he was under threat of impeachment by Parliament: he convinced the King to remove Arundel from the Lords and imprison him in the Tower on the pretext of the unauthorized marriage. The Lords, however, were outraged at this infringement of their privilege, and they successfully demanded his release soon afterwards. Arundel was allowed to re-occupy his seat in the Upper House, but he was fined heavily and remained under house arrest for nearly two years. This incident made him the symbol of the deep-seated opposition to Buckingham.¹³⁴

Although Arundel's power struggle with the favorite understandably soured the former's relationship with the King, Buckingham's assassination in 1628 opened the way for Arundel's full restoration to his position at court and royal favor.¹³⁵ Arundel's ally Lord Treasurer Weston became the King's chief minister, and Arundel himself re-emerged as a leading figure on the privy council. The years of Charles I's personal rule (1629-40) marked the zenith of Arundel's political influence. The King came to rely increasingly upon him for advice. This is clearly seen in his contribution to the reorientation of English foreign policy from the Habsburgs to France after his return from Vienna.

During the personal rule, Arundel was entrusted with numerous influential government posts. He received a commission as General of the Horse in 1629 and was made the Chief Justice in Eyre of the forests north of the Trent in 1634.¹³⁶ He sat on important committees of the Privy Council,

¹³⁴Snow, 323-49.

¹³⁵Buckingham reconciled with his enemies Arundel, Bristol, and Lord Keeper Williams.

¹³⁶ACA, NC G 1/10: 1629, Commission to Arundel to be General, Earl of Essex to be Lieutenant General, and Earl of Holland to be General of the Horse.

including those for foreign affairs and war.¹³⁷ In 1638, he was given command of the army raised for the First Bishops' War with Scotland. Arundel took this appointment very seriously.¹³⁸ The Earl of Kingston remarked upon it: "It seemes by the report of my Lady of Arundell's taking of an house in York that hir Lord intends to jerk it in these Scottish garboyles, though I expect not to live to heare of a second Flodden feild."¹³⁹ The accuracy of Kingston's prognostication remains a mystery, since Arundel's military skill was never tested against the Scots — peace was made before the fighting ever began.¹⁴⁰ During the time of the Scottish troubles, the King came to rely increasingly on Arundel and Sir Henry Vane, for he felt he "could trust no other."¹⁴¹ Arundel's ascendancy in the King's confidence was not looked upon with favor by his rivals, particularly influential Puritans who were excluded from court at this time; they saw his influence with the King and his support of war

¹³⁷The council of war was was responsible for supplying the army of the North.

¹³⁸"the Earl saw himself as literally stepping into the armor of his ancestors, the 2nd Duke, the 3rd Duke, the Poet Earl, [and] the 4th Duke, who had occupied similar commands before him." (Robinson, 113).

¹³⁹HMC, *Var. Coll. VII*, 420: 1/11 Mar. 1639, Kingston to Sir Gervase Clifton. Clarendon, who calls Arundel "a man who had nothing martial about him but his presence and his looks," explains that Arundel was chosen as general because of "his negative qualities; he did not love the Scots; he did not love the Puritans" (*DNB*, vol. 10, 75). In 1605 he had been, however, in charge of an English volunteer regiment recruited to help Spain fight the Dutch (Patterson, 69). For the rules for the army Arundel was to lead against the Scots, see *Lawes and ordinances of warre, ...in the present expedition for the northern parts under the conduct of...Thomas Earl of Arundel and Surrey, Earl Marshall of England* (Newcastle: R. Barker a. assignes of J. Bill, 1639); an oath to be taken by all of his soldiers is printed in closing. See *The pourtraiture of his excellence Sir Thomas Howard [etc.], as Lord General of the expedition against Scotland* (F. T. Walkley, 1639) for an engraved portrait of Arundel on horseback as commander-in-chief.

¹⁴⁰Arundel was busy issuing orders up until the signing of the Pacification of Berwick. See, for instance, his instructions for the infantry (Strafford, vol. 2, 315: 1/11 Apr. 1639, Arundel to Sir W. Pennyman, Colonel of Regiment), and his instructions for the artillery and fortification at Carlisle (*ibid.*, 349-50: 16/26 May 1639, same to Sir Francis Willoughby).

¹⁴¹Hibbard, 118.

against the Scots as a part of a great popish conspiracy against English liberties and religion, a view that was also reflected in *Rome's Masterpiece* (1640). Arundel's reason for supporting the assertion of royal authority against the Scots was because he characteristically wished to uphold the established order. In spite of this opposition, Arundel continued to enjoy the King's favor, for in 1640 he was appointed to the post of Lord High Steward. As such, he was faced with the unwelcome task of presiding over the trial of the Earl of Strafford in 1641.¹⁴²

The personal rule also marks the apogee of not only Arundel's career in politics but also his career as a collector and patron of the arts, for it was during this time that his collections reached their greatest extent and splendor. Anthony van Dyck, the famous Flemish painter, executed several commissions for Arundel, including a 1635 portrait with his grandson Thomas (later 5th Duke of Norfolk). His art agent William Petty, formerly a don of Jesus College, Cambridge, and tutor to Arundel's children, was scouring the Mediterranean for ancient sculpture that would form the basis of the collection called the "Arundel Marbles," which now resides in the Ashmolean Museum. In September 1635, Arundel enjoyed his best-known triumph as a curiosity-seeker when he presented at court Thomas Parr, an "old, old man" thought to be 152 years old.¹⁴³ During his embassy to the

¹⁴²His "conduct...as President of the proceedings, in a matter so difficult and so momentous in its consequences, won the approbation of even Strafford's warmest friends." (Hervey, 422). Great pressure was placed upon peers and MPs alike to accept the act of attainder against Strafford. Charles himself agreed to it only with great reluctance.

¹⁴³Parr showed that he was no fool. During his visit at court, when conversing with the King, "He claimed to have lived under ten kings and queens, well remembered the monasteries, and, when questioned on religious matters, replied that he held it the safest to be of the religion of the king or queen that was in being, 'for he knew that he came raw into the world, and accounted it no point of wisdom to be broiled out of it.'" (*DNB*, vol. 15, 364). It is dubious that the experience was enjoyable for Parr, for after meeting the King, he was exhibited for some weeks in London. Onlookers had plenty to see, since Parr apparently was not only old, but hairy as well, a fact enshrined in a poem by John Taylor, *The Water Poet*: "From head to heel his body hath all over, A quick-set, thick-set nat'ral hairy cover." (John Taylor,

Imperial court the following year, Arundel acquired the library of the German humanist Willibald Pirckheimer, which included sketches, letters, and books written or illuminated by Albrecht Dürer, as well as a Dürer Madonna painting.¹⁴⁴ In spite of his wife's fortune, Arundel's extravagance in collecting almost bankrupted him.¹⁴⁵ For a brief while he entertained the idea of escaping his creditors by promoting a scheme to colonize Madagascar.¹⁴⁶ Nothing came of the scheme but Van Dyck's magnificent portrait of 1639 showing Arundel and his wife seated on either side of a globe, he pointing at the would-be colony with his marshal's staff.¹⁴⁷ He abandoned the scheme, however, when he discovered the island was crawling with fleas.¹⁴⁸

In addition to his political appointments and achievements as a collector and curiosity-seeker, Arundel was also selected for a range of representative duties during the personal rule. He led an

The Water Poet, *The Olde, Old, Very Olde Man: or The Age and long Life of Thomas Parr, ...who was Borne in the Raigne of King Edward the 4th. and is now living in the Strand, being aged 152. yeares and odd Monethes. His Manner of Life and Conversation in so long a Pilgrimage; his Marriages, and his bringing up to London about the end of September last* [London: [A. Mathewes] for H. Gosson, 1635]). Parr did not long outlive his new-found fame. He promptly died at Arundel House on 14/24 November 1635, which was attributed to his change of lifestyle and rich diet. His fame, however, lived on: as late as 1835, a quack medicine called "Old Parr's Life Pills" was being hawked in Manchester (*DNB*, vol. 15, 365).

¹⁴⁴On the Pirckheimer Library, see Howarth, *Lord Arundel*, 154-6, and Springell, 105-10 n. 60.

¹⁴⁵In the 1630s, Arundel ran up a huge private debt of £121,000; by 1641, it had increased to £124,448 (Stone, 543, 779).

¹⁴⁶Arundel was involved in various other investment, trade, and exploration ventures. He was a fen-drainer and ironmaster as well as a shareholder in the Northwest Passage, Virginia, Amazon, New England, and Fishing companies (Stone, 376).

¹⁴⁷Interestingly, a copy of this portrait hangs today in the *Kunsthistorisches Museum* in Vienna. It is unknown how the picture came to its collection, but it is possible that Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, whose personal collection forms the core of the Museum's collection, acquired it from a pre-Civil War English collection.

¹⁴⁸Robinson, 111-2.

extraordinary embassy to the Hague in 1633 with the King's request that his sister Elizabeth, widowed after the death of Frederick V the previous year, return to England. She refused his offer, however, because she feared that withdrawal to England would be construed as an abandonment of her son's claims to the Palatine lands and dignities. While in the Netherlands, Arundel urged the States General actively to support young Charles Louis in his claims. Charles was quite pleased with Arundel's conduct in the Netherlands.¹⁴⁹

The next and most important of his diplomatic appointments was as ambassador extraordinary to the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II in 1636 to conclude an agreement for the restoration of the Palatinate. This embassy, which reoriented the course of Anglo-Habsburg diplomatic relations, will be discussed in detail in chapter nine. Suffice it to say here that his pride and his loyalty to the House of Stuart, which were very much a part of his public persona, had a great influence on the progress and outcome of the negotiations. His religion, on the other hand, was intensely personal and played little or no role. Arundel occupied such an influential position in England that when he turned against the Habsburgs, his reaction was enough to precipitate the reorientation of English foreign policy, even if for a short time.

As a great peer of the realm, a well-traveled and experienced diplomat, and an authority on protocol, Arundel was a natural choice to act as a royal escort to destinations on the Continent. Thus in 1641, he was chosen to accompany the troublesome Queen Mother Marie de Medici to Cologne.¹⁵⁰ He resigned the lord stewardship before he left, which he was not sorry to do after the

¹⁴⁹Various letters regarding this embassy are to be found in: ACA, AL 1617-32 and AL 1632-1723; and Hervey, 311-34.

¹⁵⁰"A true copy of a letter...from Thomas Earle of Arundell [appointed to escort Marie de Medicis Queen Dowager of France to Holland]...to Mr. Pym...Read before the Committee 18 Sept.

trauma of Strafford's trial. And finally, in the following year, he along with Queen Henrietta Maria escorted the Princess Mary to her new home in Holland after her marriage to William of Orange.

Once Arundel had fulfilled his official duties in Holland, he did not return to England but instead lived out the remainder of his years abroad, in self-imposed exile.¹⁵¹ The brewing Civil War, his failing health, and a desire to spend a quiet retirement in the study of art all contributed to his decision. After some traveling he finally settled in Italy, taking a villa at Padua. There he whiled away his final years re-exploring Italian cities and playing host to his fellow countrymen. These years, however, were not spent in peaceful retirement, as it seemed all that he held dear – king, country, and family – was under attack.

During these final, unhappy years of his life, England was never far from Arundel's thoughts. As he saw its shores recede into the distance for the last time, he was heard to exclaim hopefully: "May it never have need of me."¹⁵² Arundel of course remained a steadfast royalist during the Civil War. Henry Frederick remained behind in England to fight for the King and to try to maintain the family legacy in the ruinous years to come. Arundel himself contributed £54,000 to the royal cause in lieu of personal service to his monarch. This sum was raised only with difficulty, since "he had depleted his coffers even to the extent of reducing himself and his Countess to pawn their jewels and

1641...." (London: Printed for Iohn Thomas, 1641).

¹⁵¹Before leaving for the Continent, Arundel transferred most of his business appointments to his son and heir Henry Frederick, Lord Maltravers. Henry Frederick was called to the House of Lords in his father's barony of Mowbray to protect the family interest there during Arundel's absence (Hervey, 434).

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, 435. It was better that Arundel did go into exile, so he was not forced to witness either the siege of Arundel Castle and its reduction to ruins or the occupation of Arundel House by soldiers who carelessly handled and even broke many of his precious marbles; experiencing this destruction first-hand would have only broken the honest old statesman's heart (Robinson, 116).

plate for their own personal subsistence."¹⁵³ That he was able to raise such a great sum from such slender means reveals Arundel's continued commitment to the Stuart monarchy. Despite his loyalty, he was never successful in regaining the coveted dukedom of Norfolk for his line. After his petition was refused, however, he was created *Earl* of Norfolk in 1644, thus ensuring the honor would not be granted away from his family.¹⁵⁴ Although he was denied his final triumph, he was successful at reassembling the bulk of the inheritance of the 4th Duke and reclaiming most of the lesser titles for his line – indeed many of the ten titles held by the present-day Duke of Norfolk were regained by Arundel.¹⁵⁵

During this time Arundel became estranged from his family, most of whom congregated in the Netherlands, and they from each other. They passed their time in exile "aimless, separated, resentful."¹⁵⁶ When they did communicate, it was often to complain about the bad state of their finances or the unfortunate situation in England, or to respond to a family crisis, such as his grandson Philip's joining the Dominicans. Even Arundel's grandson Thomas, who was with him in Padua, was a disappointment; though Arundel did not realize it, the disturbing behavior exhibited by young Thomas was an early symptom of madness, which was only confirmed later. Arundel complained

¹⁵³Hervey, 438-9. These are hardly the actions of a man "unenthusiastic about either King or Parliament but who realised that they stood as much to lose by : staying and attempting to remain neutral," per Chaney's assessment (Chaney, *Grand Tour*, 53).

¹⁵⁴ACA, Papers relating to Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel (1585-1646), G 1/90: 6/16 June 1644, Letters patent creating Arundel the Earl of Norfolk. He was granted this honor as the lineal descendant of Thomas de Brotherton, Earl of Norfolk, a younger son of Edward IV.

¹⁵⁵Robinson, 116.

¹⁵⁶Howarth, *Lord Arundel*, 212.

to his friend John Evelyn, who was touring Italy in 1646, of his ungrateful grandchildren shortly before his death:

if Tom: or Phillippe shall send for any thinge thither nothinge [shall] be delivered unto them, the one beinge soe ill-natured & frentike as I see him with huge affliction. the other followinge the directione of a base Irish rascall a Dominican, with such obstinacy, as I blotte him out of my memory and from my House, I resolvinge whilst I live only to thinke of his huge unnaturall ingratitude towards me with detestacion.¹⁵⁷

Arundel lamented the misfortunes which had befallen his family and country up until the end. Evelyn gives a touching account of the end of his friend's life: "I took my leave of him in bed, where I left that great and excellent man in teares on some private discourse of crosses that had befallen his illustrious family . . . and the misery of his country now embroiled in Civil War."¹⁵⁸ Arundel died in Padua shortly thereafter at the age of 62.

Despite this unhappy end, Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl of Arundel must be remembered for his achievements rather than his failures. Overall, he was very successful in the areas that mattered most to him – loyal service to his monarch and restoration of the honor of his illustrious family – by securing titles and lost estates, patronizing the arts and scholarship, and playing a role in political and diplomatic affairs. His embassy to the Emperor in 1636 was one of the more visible of his many contributions to English political life in the first half of the seventeenth century.

¹⁵⁷Hervey, 450, in the prelude to Arundel's "Remembrances" for Evelyn, which recommended worthy sights in several Italian cities (particularly Milan).

¹⁵⁸Robinson, 116. It seemed Arundel did not trust his family to mourn his loss respectfully, as he added the following melancholy line to his epitaph concerning their comportment after his death: "As also I could wish (if it might bee) those of my Family might mourne for mee only in Ash Colour, in respect it is the Colour of Ashes into which my flesh is to Dissolve." (Hervey, 461). His will, epitaph, and last wishes are printed in Hervey, app. II.

7

CLEMENT RADOLT (1593-1670)

Background

Clement Radolt was born in 1593 to a bourgeois family, probably in Vienna.¹ His father Ander Radolt held a government post as the chief administrator of the court hospital of Vienna (*Hofspitalmeister alda zu Wien*). After the death of Clement's mother, his father re-married in February 1618, wedding the widow Elisabeth Thenner.² The marriage was short-lived, however, as Ander Radolt died in 1621, with sums from his salary and loans he had made to the hospital still outstanding. His son Clement did not succeed in recovering the money from the government until 1629.³

In 1626, Clement Radolt was married for the first time, to Anna Susanna Grapler. Although at this point he had only been in the Imperial service a short time, the Emperor sent a representative to the wedding with the gift of a silver and gold-gilt wine service.⁴ The marriage, however, did not last long, as Anna died the following year at age 19, presumably in childbirth as the result of one of

¹See fig. 4.

²HKA, FA R-10, ff. 1-6: 10, 15 Feb. 1618. Mrs. Thenner was the daughter of Caspar Schlögl, former riding master (*Rittmeister*).

³Ibid., ff. 34-7: 29 Apr. 1629. The saga of retrieving the money unfolds in ff. 13-48.

⁴Ibid., f. 7: 23 July 1626; *ibid.*, HFB 716 (1626), f. 228.

4 The Radolt Family

Legend: **Bold** = Imperial officials; *Bold Italics* = Religious

the many illnesses associated with it.⁵ Radolt married again in 1628; this time his bride was Helena Constantia von Scholz, daughter of a former Vice Chancellor of Lower Austria.⁶ Radolt also outlived his second wife. In February 1640 he married for the final time Magdalena Bonacini, née Countess of Nieva, the widow of former Imperial treasury councillor Hieronymo Bonacini.⁷ By his several wives, Radolt had three sons – Wolf Franz, Johann Anton, and Franz Galeazzo – and two daughters – Benigna Constantia and Maria Teresia.⁸ Franz Galeazzo, the youngest, was the child of Magdalena Radolt, while Helena Radolt was the mother of others.⁹

Radolt's Catholic religious background is not in any way singular in the way the Catholicism of John Taylor and the Earl of Arundel was in Protestant England. His religion did not impede his career but rather made it possible, as the Emperor had little toleration for Protestants in his country

⁵She was buried in the south aisle of St. Stephan's Cathedral, with Radolt's information engraved on the marker beside hers, though not his death date (*850 Jahre St. Stephan Symbol und Mitte in Wien 1147-1197*: 226. *Sonderausstellung, Historisches Museum der Stadt Wien, Dom- und Metropolitankapitel Wien, 24. April bis 31. August 1997* [Vienna: Museen der Stadt Wien, 1997], 214; Paul Harrer, "Wien, seine Häuser, Menschen und Kultur," typed ms. in Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv, 1951-7, vol. 3, 173).

⁶WStLA, GB 1/14, f. 259. The Emperor again gave the couple a silver and gold-gilt beverage service—apparently this type of gift was standard issue for an Imperial official of Radolt's rank (HKA, FA R-10, ff. 11-2: 19 July 1628).

⁷Pfarrarchiv St. Stephan, Protocollum Copulatorum, vol. 16, f. 152; Anton Koczirz, "Österreichische Lautenmusik zwischen 1650 und 1720," *Studien zur Musikwissenschaft*, 5 (1918): 55 n. 7. She lived until 1662, when she died of obstructed kidneys at age 51 (*ibid.*, n. 5).

⁸Maria Teresia was baptized on 29 May 1636 and Johann Anton on 12 May 1639 (*ibid.*, 54 n. 2).

⁹*Ibid.* Franz Galeazzo was not the only child of Clement and Magdalena Radolt, but he was surely the only one who survived to adulthood, as the others are not mentioned in their father's will. In the birth registers of St. Stephen's several baby girls were baptized who were very likely their daughters, despite some discrepancies in the record (noted in parentheses), including Clara on 4 January 1644 (mother recorded as Catharina), Maria Lucretia on 23 August 1648, Anna on 28 March 1651 (father recorded as Martinus Radoldt) (*ibid.*, 55 n. 6).

let alone in his service.¹⁰ From all indications, he was observant if not devout: both of his daughters became sisters of the Convent of St. Jakob in Vienna; and his will is full of religious references, whether it be to masses to be said for his soul, generous bequests to religious foundations, or personal items of religious significance.¹¹ Counter-Reformation Catholicism informed his attitudes and is fundamental to understanding his conduct in both his private and public life.

Education and Early Career

As a young man Clement Radolt studied law.¹² He may have already been thinking of a career in government service, since university training – particularly in law – was viewed as desirable preparation for employment in the expanding secular bureaucracy.¹³ He likely received his preparatory training at a Latin school or with a private tutor, as was the case with many of the students matriculating in law. Although there were usually no formal requirements for entry into law school, students needed a firm grasp of oral and written Latin to survive since it was the language of instruction.¹⁴

¹⁰Administrative posts were almost exclusively filled by Catholics in this period (Evans, *Habsburg Monarchy*, 76).

¹¹See below, p. 303.

¹²There is no record that Radolt studied law at the University of Vienna, but there are many holes in the matriculation records of the law faculty.

¹³Helmut Coing, "Die juristische Fakultät und ihr Lehrprogramm," in *Neuere Zeit (1500-1800): Das Zeitalter des Gemeinen Rechts*, vol. 2, *Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte*, ed. Helmut Coing, (Munich: Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1977), pt. 1, 68; Olaf Pedersen, "Tradition and Innovation," in *Universities in Early Modern Europe (1500-1800)*, ed. Hilde de Ridder-Symoens, A History of the University in Europe, ed. Walter Rüegg, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

¹⁴Coing, 49, 68-9.

It was likely that by 1621 Radolt had finished his studies and was officially a *Juris utriusque Doctor*, that is, a doctor of canon and civil (Roman) law, because he was taken onto the law faculty of the University of Vienna in that year. The possession of a doctorate in law opened doors for his future career and provided opportunities for social mobility that were eagerly sought by the upper-middling sort: "it [the doctorate in law] could be used to support the aristocratic pretensions of the ever more educated urban patriciate . . . [and] also became an important weapon in the great social reorganization that the rising bourgeoisies were demanding almost everywhere in Europe."¹⁵ Theoretically, this status also brought with it certain privileges, such as exemption from taxation. This was particularly true if the doctor of law was a member of a university like Radolt was.¹⁶

Radolt held various positions at the University of Vienna over the years. He served as the procurator of the Rhenish nation, in 1621, and twice as procurator of the Austrian nation, in 1627 and again in 1629.¹⁷ The procurators were the elected leaders of each of the four nations represented at the University – Austrian, Rhenish, Hungarian, and Saxon. They served as representatives and administrators for their respective nations, and as such they each held a seat on the University consistory. The procurators also elected the rector, with the Austrian procurator being the most

¹⁵Willem Frijhoff, "Graduation and Careers," chap. in *Universities in Early Modern Europe*, 368.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 369.

¹⁷Nothing is worse than a man of low condition when he rises to high estate ("Nil est deterius humili cum surgit in altum"): the motto of Dr. Clemens de Radolt as Rhenish procurator of the University of Vienna in 1621. Nothing good without pain ("Nul bien sans peine"): the motto of the same as Austrian procurator in 1627 (Johann Joseph Locher, *Spekulum Academicum Viennensis, seu Magistratus antiquissimae et celeberrimae Universitatis Viennensis, a primo ejusdem auspicio ad nostra tempora chronologice, historice, et lemmatice* [Vienna: Leopoldi Joannis Kaliwoda, 1773-5], vol. 1, 187, 229).

influential because he held the tie-breaking vote.¹⁸ Radolt must have acquitted his duties satisfactorily, since he was thrice elected to the position of procurator.

By 1631, Clement Radolt had achieved such reputation among his colleagues that he was elected dean of the law faculty.¹⁹ The usual term was one year.²⁰ It perhaps seems surprising that Radolt, while not a professor, was chosen to head the faculty. However, by the seventeenth century it was not unusual for those who were interested in attaining academic honors and were in the position to promote faculty interests to be elected to the University of Vienna law faculty instead of law professors. Indeed, in the years between 1626 and 1740, only twenty professors were chosen as law deans, while the others were high-ranking civil servants like Radolt.²¹

Career in the Imperial Service

At the same time as he was carrying out his duties at the University, Clement Radolt began his long and devoted career in government service in the Imperial court treasury (*Hofkammer*). It was the highest Imperial financial authority and had the main responsibility for managing the revenues used to finance the Imperial court and central government.²² Revenues were derived from two principal

¹⁸Artur Goldmann, "Die Universität, 1529-1740," in *Vom Ausgange des Mittelalters bis zum Regierungsantritt der Kaiserin Maria Theresia, 1740*, ed. Anton Mayer, vol. 6, *Geschichte der Stadt Wien* (Vienna: Verlag des Altertumsvereins zu Wien, 1918), 90-2.

¹⁹Locher, vol. 1, 108, 187-8, 229; *ibid.*, vol. 2, 43.

²⁰Until 1629, the dean usually served a semester; after that date, the term was changed to a year (Goldmann, 88).

²¹*Ibid.*, 89.

²²Fellner, vol. 1, 78-9. The *Hofkammer* consisted of four divisions, or *Expeditionen*: one for Imperial and Hungarian business; one for Bohemian, Silesian, and Moravian; one for Upper and Lower Austrian; and the last for mountain towns (*Bergstädte*), which included matters of the military and its supply (*ibid.*, 86). Its administrative unity was disrupted after 1564, when Inner Austria and the Tyrol

sources: the crown domains and regalia; and the grants made by the estates of the hereditary lands. The *Hofkammer* administered the first as well as the indirect taxes that were not granted by the estates, for instance taxes on certain alcoholic beverages and foodstuffs; these revenues provided primary funding for the court and government. The grants of the estates ("extraordinary" revenues) mainly financed the military, and as such were allotted by the war council (*Hofkriegsrat*) and chancelleries rather than the *Hofkammer*. The *Hofkammer*, however, still acted in consultation with these bodies. Thus, despite its seemingly wide purview over Imperial finances, the *Hofkammer* was not a central treasury in the modern sense, able to survey completely and control all government income and expenses, but rather its functions remained restricted throughout most of the seventeenth century.²³

In the seventeenth century, the *Hofkammer* was run by a hierarchy of specialized personnel. It was overseen by the president (*Präsident*), who usually came from one of the prominent families of the Austrian-Bohemian nobility. Under him were the vice president (*Vizepräsident*), director (*Direktor*), and councillors (*Räte*).²⁴ The *Hofkammer* had its own chancellery consisting of the head secretaries (*Sekretäre*)²⁵ and the necessary clerical personnel (*Konzipisten*) to support them, as well

came under the rule of cadet branches of the Habsburg family. These areas developed their own administrative bodies, including separate treasuries in Graz and Innsbruck, and their revenues therefore no longer fell under the *Hofkammer's* purview.

²³Schwarz, 29.

²⁴In 1637, there were six councillors: Johann Baptist Weber, Jacob Berthold von Ungersdorff, Johann Christoph Schellendorff, Bartholomäus Schöllhardt, Hieronymo Bonacini (husband of Radolt's third wife, Magdalena), and Radolt himself.

²⁵There were three: one responsible for drawing up documents for Bohemia (in German); one for Hungary; and one for the Empire (Friedrich von Hurter, *Friedensbestrebungen Kaiser Ferdinands II.* [Vienna: Braumüller, 1860], 245-6; Eduard Vehse, *Geschichte des österreichischen Hofes und Adels und*

as accounting personnel such as the paymasters (*Hofzahlmeister*) for civil and military expenditures, and a bookkeeper (*Buchhalter*), appraiser (*Taxator*), registrar (*Registrator*), and dispatching clerk (*Expeditor*).

The *Hofkammer* council was a collegial body – every councillor voted on the issues brought before it, and the majority carried the decision. In many ways this system was slow and cumbersome, but it had the advantages that each councillor was informed of its proceedings and that the president alone was not held accountable for failed policies.²⁶ The council met frequently to vote on current financial business brought before it by the secretaries and to discuss ways to increase revenues, minimize expenditures, secure loans on favorable terms, and redeem mortgaged sources of revenue. The most important financial issues were to be brought weekly before the privy council, and if necessary by the president before the Emperor, who was in any case to approve large payments.²⁷

Radolt's work in the *Hofkammer* laid the basis for the rest of his career, for he held posts of increasing importance there over a period of 45 years. He certainly had good reason to seek a position there. Opportunities for advancement were abundant in the Imperial service at this time, and jurists in particular were in demand in the expanding Imperial administration. Also, when he was growing up, the archive of the *Hofkammer* was located in the hospital overseen by his father –

der österreichischen Diplomatie, Geschichte der deutschen Höfe seit der Reformation [Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe, 1851-3], vol. 4, 120-2).

²⁶I am grateful to Dr. Christian Sapper of the Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv for this information.

²⁷Fellner, vol. 1, 68-77; Christoph Link, "Die Verwaltung in den einzelnen Territorien," in *Vom Spätmittelalter bis zum Ende des Reiches*, vol. 1, *Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte*, ed. Kurt G. A. Jeserich, Hans Pohl, and Georg-Christoph von Unruh (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt), 499-500.

perhaps young Radolt first developed an interest in government finances there. In any event, he was first appointed as a *Hofkammer* secretary in November 1625, four years after he was taken onto the University faculty.²⁸ By 1632, he was promoted to the position of councillor.²⁹ This was the next logical step for Radolt. Councillors were promoted almost exclusively from the ranks of the *Hofkammer* secretaries or the Lower Austrian administration. Also, they were required to have legal training, political experience, and a knowledge of military matters, since important financial issues were often discussed with the aulic council, chancellery, and war council.³⁰ After many years of devoted service as a *Hofkammer* councillor, Radolt was finally appointed director in October 1656.³¹ It was a position of great responsibility, for he presumably frequently represented the president in his absence, taking on such responsibilities as leading council meetings and casting the determining vote in the case of a tie.³² Radolt continued to serve as director up until his death in 1670.

²⁸HKA, HFB 714 (1625), f. 368: 13 Nov. 1625, "Intimations Dekret an Doktor Clemens Radolt daß er zum Hof Camer Secretario angenommen worden iß."

²⁹His salary was then raised to 1300 gulden (1000 gulden ordinary salary plus 300 additional annually, = 867 thalers), a level commensurate with the aulic councillors, i.e., members of the Emperor's aulic council (HKA, FA R-10, ff. 51-2: 9 Nov. 1632; *ibid.*, f. 53: 19 Nov. 1632; Fellner, vol. I, 86 n. 1). *Hofkammer* councillors were considered of the same rank as aulic and war councillors under Leopold I. Only age gave precedence among them (Adam Wolf, "Die Hofkammer unter Leopold I," *Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse* 11 [1853]: 445).

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹AVA, Hofadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 13 Aug. 1656, f. 4; HKA, FA R-10, ff. 60-7: 13, 15, 26 Aug. 1656.

³²Although no instructions exist for the *Hofkammer* director, it is apparent from his title and salary (1800 gulden annually [1200 thalers], as opposed to the 1300 paid to a councillor and 2600 to the president) that he occupied a position above the rest of the councillors (I am again grateful to Dr. Christian Sapper for this information).

In addition to his regular duties, over the years Radolt took up several special appointments that were also associated with the *Hofkammer*. For instance, he acted as inspector of the Lower Austrian bookkeeping department in 1637 and as principal commissioner for the visitation of Gmunden in 1654.³³ He made trips to Innsbruck, Pressburg (Bratislava), and places in Hungary, presumably in connection with financial matters. Radolt also took part in the administration of the Imperial army beginning in 1639, when he served as councillor of the Lower Austrian Regiment.³⁴ Throughout the 1640s and 1650s he was involved with provisioning the army, first as sergeant provisioning-master (*Obrist Proviantmeister*) from 1646 to 1648 and then as general field provisioning-master (*General Feldproviantmeister*).³⁵ The council of war, in cooperation with the *Hofkammer*, appointed the provisioning commissioners, who were responsible for buying, distributing, and accounting for provisions for the army. At this time, however, the system of provisioning was not reliable due to money flow and supply problems.³⁶

The work of the *Hofkammer* in the early modern period, particularly during the Thirty Years' War, was extremely challenging. As Henry Frederick Schwarz pointed out:

³³HKA, FA R-10, ff. 54-5: 31 Aug. 1637; *ibid.*, HZAB 100 (1654), f. 452.

³⁴*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Niederösterreichischen Statthalterei: Die Landeschefts und Räte dieser Behörde von 1501 bis 1896* (Vienna: Niederösterreichischen Statthalterei, 1897), 439.

³⁵WStLA, GB 1/15, f. 273; KA, Hofkriegsrat, Protokolle, Registratur and Expedit, 1646-59, vols. 294-320. In 1670, after his death, Radolt's family received a monthly payment of 50 gulden (= 33 thalers) from the army (*ibid.*, vols. 337-8).

³⁶Christoph Tepperberg, "Das kaiserliche Heer nach dem Prager Frieden 1635-1650," in *Der Schwed ist im Land!: Das Ende des Dreißigjährigen Krieges in Niederösterreich, Ausstellung der Stadt Horn im Höbartmuseum 22 Juni bis 2 November 1995* (Horn, Lower Austria: Museumsverein in Horn, 1995), 129.

Of all the manifold problems which faced the House of Habsburg, that of finances was one of the most serious. It is almost impossible to overemphasize the financial difficulties under which the administration labored in the seventeenth century. Lack of money was a constant problem; the Turkish wars of the sixteenth century were a tremendous drain only exceeded during the period of extraordinary expenses resulting from the Thirty Years' War. . . . Unable to pay its armies, its diplomats, or its officials, dependent in large measure on subsidies from Spain or the mortgaging of its territory, the House of Austria came close to bankruptcy . . .³⁷

The war's impact on Imperial finances was immense. As previously mentioned, the income of Upper Austria was lost until 1628 as it was mortgaged to Maximilian of Bavaria to cover his costs for the Bohemian war. The assumed debt of four million gulden doubled in the years from 1619 to 1624.³⁸ The financial burden on the Imperial government only became worse as the Emperor was forced to alienate long-term sources of revenue, for instance by mortgaging crown properties, in favor of "quick-fix" sums often borrowed on unfavorable terms. He was continually seeking loans from foreign princes and from his own councillors, including Radolt.³⁹ Under these circumstances the

³⁷Schwarz, 28-9. For the attempts of Anton Wolfradt, Abbot of Kremsmünster and Bishop of Vienna, and president of the *Hofkammer* from 1623 to 1630, to rationalize and improve the state of Imperial finances by creating a central treasury, see Schwarz, 120-1, 386, and Fellner, vol. 1, 83-5. To this end the Inner Austrian treasury was unified for a time with the *Hofkammer* (Ferdinand II was ruler of both the main crown lands and Inner Austria).

³⁸*Ibid.*, 83. This sum equaled about 2,666,667 thalers.

³⁹For instance, when Ferdinand was desperately seeking money to pay the army in 1634, he not only tried to secure subsidies from the Archbishop of Salzburg and Italian princes, but also required that almost all of his ministers contribute as well: Eggenberg was to pay 10,000 florins; the Prince-Bishop of Vienna, 5,000; the other privy councillors, the *Hofkammer* president, and the *Statthalter* each 3,000; the *Hofkammer* councillors each 800; the *Hofkammer* secretaries and the aulic councillors each 200, and so on down to the last civil official (*BA*, n.s., pt. 2, vol. 8, *Januar 1633-Mai 1634*, ed. Kathrin Bierther [Munich: Oldenbourg, 1982], 653: 15 Mar. 1634, Stücklin to Maximilian I). The *Hofzahlamtsbücher*, or court treasury books, show clearly that Radolt lent generously—over the years he received payments from various incoming sources of revenue to pay off loans he had made to the government.

Imperial government had a difficult time paying the salaries of the many officials who kept it running.⁴⁰

Radolt's appointments were not restricted to those directly associated with the *Hofkammer*. He filled many other positions in the Imperial government throughout his career. Perhaps the most prominent were those as an Imperial representative. He traveled on the Emperor's behalf to Italy (Florence) in 1632, and the following year to the royal court in Poland. In 1634, Radolt journeyed first to the cadet Habsburg court at Salzburg (where he represented the Emperor numerous times over the years) and then to several Italian residence cities (including Turin, Genoa, Parma, Modena, and Florence) to raise subsidies and loans for the Imperial army.⁴¹ Perhaps his most illustrious appointment was as extraordinary ambassador to the court of Charles I in 1636-7. This mission, which will be discussed in detail below, played a prominent role in Anglo-Imperial diplomatic relations of the 1630s, not least because Radolt was the first ambassador to represent the Emperor in England since Count Schwarzenberg's embassy in 1622. After his return from England, Radolt continued his diplomatic activities, for instance as the Imperial representative in Transylvania in 1659-60.

Radolt's service as an Imperial representative played an important role in his continued promotion through the social and political ranks. It was certainly influential in his elevation to the

⁴⁰Wolf, 473.

⁴¹G. Gliubich, ed., "Gli ultimi successi di Alberto di Waldstein narrati degli Ambasciatori veneti," *Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichtsquellen* 28 (1863), 428: 25 Feb. 1634, Relation of Antonio Antelmi; *BA*, n.s., pt. 2, vol. 8, 540: 1 Mar. 1634, Richel to Maximilian I. Instructions for this mission are in HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 107, f. 143. In the wake of Wallenstein's murder, the Emperor was looking for money to pay and supply the army, in order to ensure its loyalty to the new Imperial military leadership. In Venice, Radolt was to look for 4,000,000 florins supposedly hidden by Wallenstein (*BA*, n.s., pt. 2, vol. 8, 653: 15 Mar. 1634, Stücklin to Maximilian I).

rank of baron (*Freiherr*) in 1656. In the official grant, the Emperor Ferdinand III specifically stated that Radolt was being raised to a barony for his more than thirty years of loyal and efficient service in many capacities to him and to his father Ferdinand II,

the foremost among them [his missions] to the various royal courts in England and Poland, also many times to Italy, and other countries to various respective Arch- and Grand Dukes, also [to] other princes and republics and other potentates' courts, important commissions, missions, and duties entrusted to him.⁴²

In addition to these political and diplomatic duties, Radolt's artistic talents brought him some rather creative Imperial commissions. At some point, he had become a skilled draftsman with a particular knack for drawing architectural structures. Whether he had any formal education in this way, however, is uncertain. The first evidence of his talent surfaces during his embassy to Charles I in 1636, when he commissioned an engraving of his rendering of St. Stephan's Cathedral from the south from the Dutchman Cornelius van Dalen in London. He had the piece printed in memory of his homeland, and accordingly dedicated it to Ferdinand II. It was later reprinted in Matthäus Merian's *Topographia Provinciarum Austriacarum*.⁴³ Radolt's skills in architectural draftsmanship, which are immediately apparent in this work, must have been noticed at the Imperial court, for he

⁴²"vorderist aber in denen an die Unterschiedliche Königl. höff in Engelandt unndt Poln, auch zu mehrmahl in Italia, unndt andren ländern bey und [er]schiedlichen respektive Erz: unndt großherzogen, auch andern fürstn unndt Republichen und anderer Potentatn höffe, Ihme aufgetragenen wichtigen Commission, absandungen und Verrichtungen." (AVA, Hofadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 13 Aug. 1656, f. 4).

⁴³850 Jahre St. Stephan, 213-4, 450. This information was kindly supplied by Prof. Dr. Richard Perger. A reproduction of the engraving "Turris S. Stephani Viennae Austriae" is printed in the exhibition catalog, on p. 213. A cartouche in the upper left-hand corner gives a brief history of the Cathedral and information about the creator of the drawing. It was originally printed, without the cartouche, in Martin Zeiller, *Topographia Provinciarum Austriacarum, Austriae, Styriae, Carinthiae, Carniolae, Tyrolis, etc.: das ist Beschreibung und Abbildung der furnembsten Statt und Platz in den österreichischen Länden Under und Ober Österreich, Steyer, Kärndten, Crain und Tyrol* (Frankfurt a. M.: Matthäus Merian, 1649).

was involved with the renovation of the portals and gates of the Imperial palace in Vienna (the *Hofburg*) in 1654. By 1660, he was entrusted with the direction of a construction project to expand the *Hofburg*, a duty he fulfilled until Johann Ludwig, Count Starhemberg was named as his successor in April 1663.⁴⁴

Given the crown's notorious shortage of cash through much of the seventeenth century, financial rewards for its dependents, such as Radolt, were modest – they were lucky to be paid at all, let alone in a timely fashion. One might ask, then, how the Austrian Habsburgs succeeded in retaining the service and loyalty of their officials, for succeed they did. The answer is found in the calculated conferral of a coveted resource that the crown held an inexhaustible supply – privilege.⁴⁵ In the absence of adequate material compensation, the Habsburgs relied heavily on titles of nobility to reward and retain loyal servants.

This system of rewards for service ensured a high level of social mobility in the Austrian-Bohemian nobility. For a successful upper-level bureaucrat like Radolt, it meant the conferral upon him of increasingly high degrees of rank and status as his career progressed. Therefore, he must be counted among the "*Briefadel*," a group of nobles who had earned their titles through careers in the Imperial service.⁴⁶ In April 1628, while still a *Hofkammer* secretary, he made the leap from

⁴⁴HKA, Niederösterreichische Herrschaftsakten, 1527-1660, Fasz. W-61/A/2/2, ff. 833-4: 15 Apr. 1654, Radolt to Vicedom Carl Constantin Ulrich von Genghoven; *ibid.*, ff. 841-2, 850: 5 July 1660, Hinterlassene Hofkammer to Radolt; *ibid.*, f. 877: 4 Apr. 1663, Hofkammer to Johann Ludwig, Count Starhemberg.

⁴⁵John P. Spielman, *The City & The Crown: Vienna and the Imperial Court 1600-1740* (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1993), 70-1.

⁴⁶Rudolf Endres, *Adel in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Enzyklopädie Deutscher Geschichte, vol. 18 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 22. In the Austrian crown lands, there were five levels of nobility in the early modern period, listed from the top down: 1) *Fürstenstand* (prince); 2) *Grafenstand* (count); 3)

commoner to nobleman when he was raised to the lowest level of nobility, the *einfache Adelstand*. At this time, he was already known personally to the Emperor.⁴⁷ The next month, Ferdinand II conferred the honorary title of *Hofrat*, or councillor, upon Radolt.⁴⁸ These titles paved the way for his promotion to *Hofkammer* councillor in 1632.⁴⁹ In 1652, after many years of distinguished service as a councillor and representative in the Imperial service, Radolt was raised to the rank of knight (*Ritter*) in the Austrian-Bohemian nobility and honored with the noble title Clement Edler von Radolt. This title was a personal rather than a hereditary award.⁵⁰ Four years later, however, under the grant of the *großes Palatinat*, he and his son Franz Galeazzo were elevated to the rank of hereditary baron in the Imperial and Austrian-Bohemian nobility and his coat of arms was

Herrenstand (baron); 4) *Ritterstand* (knight); and 5) *einfache Adelstand* ("simple" nobleman). The first three made up the high nobility, and the last two the lesser nobility (*ibid.*, 18-9).

⁴⁷AVA, Reichsadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 24 Apr. 1628, ff. 1-7. A description and colored sketch of the new coat of arms is on f. 4 (see fig. 5). A description and sketch are also printed in Johann Siebmacher, *Niederösterreichischer Adel*, ed. Johann Kimbauer von Erzstätt, vol. 4, sect. 4, *Großes und allgemeines Wappenbuch*, ed. Otto Titan von Hefner, new rev. ed. (Nuremberg: Bauer und Raspe, 1909), vol. 26, pt. 1, 371, pl. 203 (Radolt I). It is apparent that his family already possessed a coat of arms. When the Imperial privy council was considering raising Radolt to the nobility, Ferdinand, King of Hungary, remarked that his father, the Emperor, knew Radolt personally (AVA, Reichsadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 24 Apr. 1628, f. 4).

⁴⁸HKA, FA R-10, f. 9: 27 May 1628. *Hofrat* was (and still is) an honorary title often conferred upon higher civil servants and prominent private citizens.

⁴⁹This position was considered to be equal in status to an aulic councillor when Radolt was promoted (*ibid.*, ff. 51-2: 9 Nov. 1632; *ibid.*, f. 53: 19 Nov. 1632; Fellner, vol. 1, 86 n. 1). Most *Hofkammer* councillors were either knights or barons in the 1660s, though there were always capable, ambitious commoners among their number (Wolf, 444; Evans, *Habsburg Monarchy*, 148).

⁵⁰AVA, Hofadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 1652, ff. 1-8: 18 Sept. 1652, *Prädikatsverleihung*. However, as early as 1621 he was referred to as Clement de Radolt.

5 The Coat of Arms of Clement Radolt (1628)

In April 1628, Radolt made the leap from commoner to nobleman when Ferdinand II raised him to the lowest level of nobility, the *einfache Adelstand*. His family's existing coat of arms was improved to reflect his new status. With a successful career in the Imperial service, Radolt continued to rise through the social ranks. In 1652, Ferdinand III raised him to the rank of knight, and in 1656, to the rank of hereditary baron in the Imperial and Austrian-Bohemian nobility.

From Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Reichsadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 24 Apr. 1628, f. 4.

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Radolt.

improved;⁵¹ at the same time, he was promoted from councillor to director of the *Hofkammer*. Wolf Franz and Johann Anton, Radolt's two sons from his previous marriage, were both eligible to receive the honor at their father's discretion.⁵² The rewards of social privilege that the Emperor bestowed upon Radolt over his long and loyal career attest to the value placed on his service and perhaps also to the penury of the crown.

In addition to the titles and privileges he accumulated, Radolt managed to do quite well for himself financially in the Imperial service. Although salaries for Imperial officials were neither overly generous nor regularly paid, an official was commonly allowed to augment his earnings by collecting a fee or honorarium for services rendered to those who were not his own superiors. This system of collecting "user fees" for government service worked well under the circumstances and was an accepted practice that was clearly distinguished from bribery.⁵³ A high-ranking treasury official like Radolt surely would be presented with plenty of opportunities to serve the needs of appreciative clients and accumulate the accompanying rewards.

⁵¹The *großes Palatinat*, a prerogative often accompanying the elevation to the rank of count and almost always pertaining to the status of prince, conferred both honorary and financial benefits. The privileges varied, but usually included the right to legitimize, confer elevations in rank upon those lower down on the social scale, appoint notaries, and mint money (Schwarz, 396). Radolt's new coat of arms is described on AVA, Hofadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 1652, f. 8: 18 Sept. 1652, Prädikatsverleihung Hofadelsakten.

⁵²Ibid., Konv. 13 Aug. 1656, ff. 1-53; HKA, FA R-10, ff. 64-7: 13 Aug. 1656. For a sketch and description of the arms, see Siebmacher, vol. 26, pt. 1, 371, pl. 203 (Radolt II). It is likely that Franz Galeazzo was given special consideration due to the noble background of his mother. According to Radolt's wishes, Wolf Franz and Johann Anton could be elevated to the *Freiherrnstand* during their father's lifetime, after his death, or not at all; if the latter had been the case, they would have still been eligible to use the title "Edle von Radolt."

⁵³Spielman, 71.

Another way Radolt could profit from his office was through manipulation of the system of court quartering (*Hofquartierung*) that was instituted by Ferdinand I in Vienna and carried on by his successors. Under this system, Imperial officials – and their horses – were effectively billeted in the homes of the Viennese populace. By the seventeenth century, court quartering effectively provided rent-controlled housing for the underpaid servants and officials of the court. The occupant of the court quarter paid a fee, or *Tax*, to the landlord compelled to extend his hospitality. This biennial contribution amounted to less than the market rental value of the quarter, but still compensated the landlord in some way (when he could collect it) for the unsolicited invasion of his home.

With this system in operation, court officials like Radolt could and did reap tidy profits by investing in Viennese real estate. An Imperial official who was eligible for a court quarter and owned his own home could request, and was usually granted, quarter in his own house. This was exactly what Radolt did.⁵⁴ This meant that he not only had the best rooms in the house plus any remaining rooms not subject to court quarter for his own use (as the owner), but also that he had control over the second-best rooms in the house (as his own court quarter) for either the use of his family or to rent out at market value. The higher an official stood in the government hierarchy, the more spacious his grant of quarter. Thus an owner of a large house, particularly if he were a court official who held the privilege of court quarter, could make a lucrative living simply by managing his own property.⁵⁵

⁵⁴HKA, HQ QB 51 (1638-51), f. 6. In 1643, Radolt requested a visitation of his two houses, probably to secure more favorable quartering terms for himself (*ibid.*, f. 208).

⁵⁵Spielman, 75-7, 88.

Home ownership apparently proved a worthwhile investment for Radolt. He owned two properties in the heart of Vienna, both of which remained in his possession until his death and were passed on to his heirs. The first was a house near St. Peter's cemetery at Bauernmarkt 1, in a prime location within eyeshot of St. Stephan's Cathedral. It was a very large house (as can be seen by the enumeration of its rooms in the court quartering books, or *Hofquartierungsbücher*), a grand patrician's home in medieval times, with a courtyard and fountain.⁵⁶ In 1631, Radolt bought a second, newer but smaller house at Annagasse 16/18, also centrally located in the present-day first district of Vienna.⁵⁷

It is clear that Radolt was able to make a very comfortable living in the Imperial service. The successful marriages and careers of his children were a further indication of his financial and social success. His eldest son Wolf Franz served as a *Hofkammer* councillor like his father. In 1661 he married Jacobina Barbara, daughter of the Imperial councillor and regent of Lower Austria Martin Hafner and his wife Helena, née Teüblin.⁵⁸ Sadly, Wolf Franz did not survive his father – he died in the house on Annagasse on 10 February 1663, at the age of 29.⁵⁹ He left behind two daughters,

⁵⁶HKA, HQ QB 19 (1664), ff. 129-31. In the *Hofquartierungsbücher* each room, chamber, and stall in the private houses within city walls is enumerated for the purpose of assignment of living space to officials of the Imperial court.

⁵⁷Ibid., f. 343. The house on Annagasse is an early sixteenth century structure (Harrer, vol. 5, 355-6). It was apparently only large enough for the assignment of court quarters for some *Hofkammer* clerical personnel (who would not have claim to much space), in addition to the rooms reserved for the owner (HKA, HQ QB 65 [1671], ff. 16-7).

⁵⁸Koczirz, 54 n. 2. They were married on 21 February 1661 in the Chapel of St. Barbara by the prelate of *Heiligen Kreuz*.

⁵⁹HKA, FA R-10, ff. 72-3: 29 Apr. 1659; *ibid.*, HZAB 106 (1660-1), f. 6; *ibid.*, HZAB 107 (1662), f. 129; *ibid.*, HZAB 108 (1663), f. 5. Wolf Franz died of a catarrh, an illness akin to a cold or the flu that is characterized by a raw cough and flowing phlegm. He was a councillor from 1659 to 1663. This implies not only that he had legal training, but also that he had previous experience in government.

Maria Anna and Maria Franziska, who was born posthumously.⁶⁰ Franz Galeazzo, Radolt's youngest son, also proved quite successful, joining the Imperial service and making a very good match to boot. In 1667 he married Maria Polixena, Baroness Schwarzenhorn, daughter of the famed Imperial ambassador to the Ottoman Porte, Johann Rudolf, Baron Schwarzenhorn and his wife Helena, née Fellner von Feldegg.⁶¹ Their first son, Wenzel Ludwig, was born later that year; he became a man of independent means and would go on to become a musician and composer of some importance.⁶²

⁶⁰Koczirz, 54-5 n. 2. Maria Anna was baptized on 18 August 1662 and her sister Maria Franziska on 6 August 1663.

⁶¹Peter Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn als kaiserlicher Resident in Konstantinopel in den Jahren 1629-1643: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Österreich und der Türkei in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Geist und Werk der Zeiten, Arbeiten aus dem Historischen Seminar der Universität Zürich, ed. Rudolf von Albertini, vol. 37 (Bern: Herbert Lang; Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1973), 141. The couple was married on 30 January 1667 at the *Schottenkirche* by the Altenburger prelate (Koczirz, 55). The fate of the Radolt family through the mid-eighteenth century may be traced in Friedrich von Haan, "Genealogische Auszüge aus den beim bestandenem Niederösterreichischen Landmarschall'schen Gerichte publicierten Testamenten," *Jahrbuch der k. k. Gesellschaft "Adler"*, n.s. 10 (1900): 80-319.

⁶²Koczirz, 56. Wenzel Ludwig was baptized at the *Michaelerkirche* on 18 December 1667, with Prince Lobkowitz, Count Sinzendorf (president of the aulic council), and Dorothea Elisabetha Princess of Holstein as sponsors (ibid.). He became an amateur lutenist and composer, his only publication being *Die aller treueste, verschwigneste und nach so wohl fröhlichen als traurigen Humor sich richtende Freindin* (Vienna, 1701), which was dedicated to Emperor Joseph I. "In Austrian and Bohemian court circles around 1700 Radolt was...the most important composer of delicately balanced ensemble writing with the lute prominently featured." (Stanley Sadie, ed., *New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians* [London: Grove's Dictionaries of Music, 1980], s.v. "Baron Wenzel Ludwig von Radolt," by Wolfgang Boetticher). For more on Wenzel Ludwig's musical career, see: Anton Koczirz, "Klosterneuburger Lautenbücher," *Musica Divina* (Aug.-Sept. 1913): 176-7; Bill Samson and Martyn Hodgson, "Von Radolt's Instructions to Lute Players (Vienna 1701)," *FoMRHI Quarterly* 45 (Oct. 1986): 48-55; and Tim Crawford, "The Historical Importance of François Dufault and His Influence on Musicians Outside France," paper given at the colloquium "Le luth en l'Occident" at the Musée de la Musique, Paris, May 1998, accessed at <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/kis/schools/hums/music/ttc/DufaultWP.html>, 8 Aug. 2000). As a young man Wenzel Ludwig dedicated himself to music, and he was subsequently married late in life, on 16 January 1708 to Maria Susanna Francisca, Baroness Grundeman, daughter of Ernst Constantin, Baron Grundeman, Hofkammer councillor and/or councillor of the Lower Austrian regiment and provincial commissioner (according to different sources), and Maria Eleonora, née Countess Schallenberg. Their distinguished witnesses were Prince Auersperg, Christoph Georg, Count Schallenberg, and Carl, Baron Häckelberg. The marriage only lasted for eight years, for on 10 March 1716, Wenzel Ludwig died of a

He was followed by a daughter, Maria Barbara, and another son, Joseph Anton.⁶³ Franz Galeazzo took up a position in the Imperial government in 1671, when he requested exemption from court quartering (*Quartiersfreiheit*) for his newly inherited house on Annagasse.⁶⁴ Four years later, he was serving as Imperial Lord High Steward.⁶⁵ In 1694, he petitioned to be made a member (through his wife) of the Lower Austrian landholding nobility.⁶⁶ The fact that two of Radolt's three sons followed their father into the expanding Imperial administration reinforces the tendency towards establishment of family groupings in certain government branches. The career and fate of Johann Anton is unknown, and there is no mention of him in his father's will. Both of Radolt's daughters became sisters of the Convent of St. Jakob in Vienna; only Benigna Constantia survived him.

Unfortunately not all of Radolt's children were around to see him laid to rest or to benefit from his estate. By the time of his death, he had managed to accumulate a very respectable estate.

stroke at 49 years of age. His wife outlived him by 32 years, dying in 1748 of internal gangrene (*innerlicher Brand*) at age 59 (Koczirz, 57). Four children of the marriage survived: Franz Karl, Leopold, Wenzel, and Philipp.

⁶³Maria Barbara and Joseph Anton were baptized at St. Stephen's on 19 September 1670 and 26 December 1671 respectively. Joseph Anton went on to become a Jesuit in Italy. Maria Barbara, also quite pious, never married. An additional sister and brother died early on—Francisca in 1669 at a half year old, and Karl Albert in 1675 at two-and-a-half years (*ibid.*, 56).

⁶⁴HKA, HQ QB 65 (1671), ff. 16-7; *ibid.*, HQ Resolutionen, Kart. 6, 22 Dec. 1671; Karl August Schimmer, *Ausführliche Häuser-Chronik der innern Stadt Wien, mit einer geschichtlichen Uebersicht sämtlicher Vorstädte und ihrer merkwürdigsten Gebäude* (Vienna: Kuppitsch, 1849), 191. Franz Galeazzo succeeded in obtaining six years' exemption from housing assignments. Now that he was the owner of the house and was also a court official, he could claim the court quarter in this house for himself and retain its entire use for his own family.

⁶⁵Koczirz, 56.

⁶⁶Siebmacher, vol. 26, pt. 1, 371. According to this source, shortly after the petition for the new title was granted, Franz Galeazzo went mad, and it was bestowed instead upon his son, Wenzel Ludwig. Franz Galeazzo lived until the age of 68, dying on 14 December 1716 of hectic fever, or *Hectica*. He was followed in 1727 by his wife Maria Polixena, who died of a stroke at age 75 (Koczirz, 57).

On 8 December 1670, Clement Freiherr von Radolt, *Hofkammer* director, died in his house on Annagasse at the age of 77.⁶⁷ His body was interred not with his first wife in St. Stephan's Cathedral, as recorded on the marker there, but in the family vault in the newly built Dominican Church.⁶⁸

Radolt's will offers insight into the financial status of the family in 1670. It is apparent that he succeeded in building a substantial fortune. By the end of his life, Radolt owned the two houses in Vienna as well as other properties, various items made of precious materials, debts owed him, and cash – enough to leave generous bequests not only to his family members, friends, and servants, but also to many charities, churches, and other religious foundations as well.⁶⁹ Most important were the two major properties in Vienna. Radolt left his large house on Bauernmarkt and its contents to his granddaughters, Wolf Franz's daughters Maria Andl (Maria Anna) and Maria Fränzl (Maria

⁶⁷Pfarrarchiv St. Stephan, Barleibuch 1670, f. 146. His doctor determined the cause of death to be a catarrh, specifically a *Stöckh Catharr* (*Stück Katarrh*).

⁶⁸Ibid. The vault is located in the right side aisle of the church, turned sideways in front of the altar of St. Dominick. There is a red marble plate in the floor, on it inscribed: BURIAL VAULT OF THE FAMILY B. RADOLT 1649, in this grave rests Clement von Radolt, Imperial Royal *Hofkammer* Director, who in 1656 was raised with his three sons to the *Freiherrnstand* by Emperor Ferdinand III. He died in 1659. ("Eine rothe Marmorplatte im Boden, darauf: SEPULTURA|FAMILIAE|B. RADOLT|1649 In diesem Begräbnisse ruhet Clemens von Radolt, k. k. Hof-Kammerdirektor, welcher mit seinem 3 Söhnen 1656 von Kaiser Ferdinand III in den Freiherrnstand erhoben wurde. Er starb 1659." ["Grabmale und Grabinschriften in der Dominikaner-Kirche zu Wien," *Berichte des Alterthums Vereines zu Wien* 26 (1890): 211]). Church records, however, belie both this death date and that given in *850 Jahre St. Stephan*, 1668.

⁶⁹HHStA, Oberstmarschallamt, Kart. 625: original will of 5 Nov. 1668, revised and corrected on 5 Sept. 1670, published on 7 Dec. 1670. This document includes an inventory of specific bequests of 6 November 1668, instructions for burial of 31 December 1666, and a benevolent agreement with the Convent of St. Jakob in Vienna of December 1659 (an agreement which provided for the support of his daughters there). Radolt wished for a Christian burial in the family vault, without pomp, display of arms, or anything else of worldly familiarity ("ohn einige pomp, oder fürstellung der Wappen, oder was sonst von weltlicher gewohnheit").

Franziska).⁷⁰ To his heir Franz Galeazzo, he left all his other properties – his garden and several residences⁷¹ – and their contents, with the exception of the house on Annagasse. This along with all the contents of his living room, his books, etc., he left to Franz Galeazzo's son Wenzel Ludwig, who must have been a special favorite of his grandfather; however, Franz Galeazzo had care of the boy's inheritance, at least while he was a minor.⁷²

Apart from these properties, Radolt made many specific bequests, disposing of cash, plate, and a wide range of jewelry and other artifacts made of precious metals and stones. In the latter category, for instance, he left to Franz Galeazzo his mother's diamond wedding ring⁷³ as well as a beautiful sapphire ring; to Maria Andl, a hanging pearl and a band, long strip (*Streissel*) decorated with diamonds; to Maria Fränzl, a golden chain, various rings set with precious and semi-precious stones,⁷⁴ and a golden vessel (*Schüfflein*) containing "almonds" of amber; and to Wenzel Ludwig, a large diamond lozenge, a neck chain with hanging *Agnus Dei*, and an honorary medal granted by the King of England as a token of favor (*Gnaden Pfennig*).⁷⁵

⁷⁰WStLA, GB 1/15, f. 273; Harrer, vol. 1, 689.

⁷¹The garden is in "Unden Werth" and the residences in "Meyrhoft, Rothes Haus, Pläch Aloflekh."

⁷²As previously noted, Franz Galeazzo requested exemption from court quarter for his newly acquired house on Annagasse in 1671. I have never found any reference to Wenzel Ludwig actually taking possession of his inheritance. The house was still in Franz Galeazzo's name in 1684, but by 1700 it belonged instead to the heirs of Ferdinand Emrich, Count Kollonitsch (Schimmer, 191).

⁷³"ein Ring mit einer diemet tafl di paragone, mit welchen mich sein fraw Muetter seel verehliget."

⁷⁴One ring was set with a small diamond, another with a ruby, and another with a large emerald.

⁷⁵For Radolt's mission to England, see chaps. 8-10.

Radolt's will underlines the importance of the Catholic faith in his life and death. In it he specifies the many masses to be said for his soul at several churches and monasteries. He left to these religious foundations not only generous monetary contributions but also rich artwork, such as various silver and gold-gilt vessels and images carved of ivory (St. Salvador and the cross and Madonna and child). Radolt also bequeathed to his daughter Benigna Constantia in the Convent of St. Jakob a image of Mary in gold; for Maria Teresia, he designated his crucifix, had she lived. Finally, he left sums of money to benefit charities and the poor. Thus, ironically though not unexpectedly, it is Radolt's last will and testament that provides the most vivid illustration of his commitment to the Church.

Radolt's long and successful career in the Imperial service are a testament to his ability to deliver when given tasks ranging from the day-to-day management of finances to extraordinary missions to foreign powers. The trust placed in him to closely follow the Emperor's commands combined with his legal training, which would be useful for explaining the justice of the Emperor's actions against Frederick V, made him a qualified representative of the Emperor's interests at the English court.

PART III: ANGLO-IMPERIAL NEGOTIATIONS

8

JOHN TAYLOR AT THE IMPERIAL COURT, 1635-6

The Emperor alone held the authority to restore Charles I's nephew, Charles Louis, Prince Palatine, yet there had been no substantial English representation at the Imperial court since the extraordinary embassy of Sir Robert Anstruther in 1630-2.¹ For several years, the only link between Charles and the Emperor was Necolalde, the Spanish agent in London, who instead of facilitating communications between the two sides, did what he could to obstruct them.² The King's apparent indifference to advancing actively the Palatine cause with the Emperor, however, was quickly reversed when the news of the Peace of Prague reached London in the summer of 1635.

By 1635, the violence and devastation that the Continental war had wrought, not to mention the costs of waging it, had convinced many in the Empire of the virtues of peace. In that year, the Emperor took advantage of his military successes and concluded the Peace of Prague with Lutheran Saxony. The Emperor offered its terms to the other Protestant states and cities of the Empire, and most of them quickly accepted them. In return for their support in the Empire against foreign armies, the Emperor made concessions to Protestants by retreating from the stringent demands of the Edict of Restitution. However, he excluded Charles Louis from the amnesty granted to the Protestant

¹There had been no permanent English representation in Vienna since the end of Simon Digby's mission in late 1622. Anstruther was joined to Lord Digby's 1621 mission, but remained in Vienna after the latter returned to England in September of that year. He embarked, however, upon several extraordinary missions to the Emperor and Imperial Diet while ambassador in Denmark (Bell, 61-2).

²Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 6, ff. 201-2: 3 Feb. 1635, Windebank to Hopton; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 34: 9 Aug. 1635, Instructions for Taylor; CSP, vol. 1, 310: 25 Aug. 1635: Secret instructions for Taylor.

states accepting the agreement, and Calvinism remained outlawed. Whether the Emperor would grant a pardon was left to his own judgment, and it became painfully clear that "Whatever might be accorded the children of the late Elector would be only after humble submission, and then out of charity rather than as a right."³ Not only was no provision made for the restoration of the Palatinate, but even worse for the Palatine cause, the terms of the Peace confirmed Maximilian I, Duke of Bavaria, in his possession of the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity.

When news of the terms of the Peace of Prague reached England in late July, it appalled the English court and prompted the King to action, albeit belated.⁴ Since the King and some of his councillors had promoted negotiation with Spain as the surest route to the restoration of the Palatinate, they felt betrayed, particularly Secretary Windebank, who had been conducting secret negotiations with the Spanish envoy Necolalde for a maritime treaty with Spain.⁵ They believed, and rightly so, that the Emperor had concluded the settlement with the knowledge and approval of Spain.⁶ Their resentment deepened in mid-August when news reached London of Maximilian's

³Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 348.

⁴Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, sent a memorial and the articles of the peace to England, hoping they would open her brother's eyes to the intentions of the Emperor (PRO, State Papers Foreign, Holland [SP 84], vol. 150, f. 43: 9 Aug. 1635, Coke to Boswell; *CSPD* 1635, 241: 12 July 1635, Elizabeth to Laud; *ibid.*, 63: 12 July 1635, same to Roe).

⁵"His Majesty hath wondered all this while and hath not forborne to express it to me in plain terms that the Spaniards had lost their wits or that they were asleep that they were so cold in joining with him expressing a great inclination in himself to it. But now the cause is evident and if it be true there can be no hope of good by any treaty between us hereafter...." (BL, Egerton 1820, f. 518: 3 Aug. 1635, Windebank to Hopton). For more on the maritime treaty, see chap. 4, p. 188.

⁶See chap. 3, p. 144.

marriage to the Emperor's daughter, the Archduchess Maria Anna, Maximilian's own niece.⁷ This union could produce an heir who would secure the Bavarian succession to the Palatinate and electoral dignity.⁸ It therefore was a serious threat to Palatine restoration, for as long as the Bavarian succession was not secured, there was still hope that the Palatine lands and electoral title would revert to the Palatine line.

The Peace of Prague and Maximilian's union with his niece were thus both serious setbacks to Charles I's policy of achieving the restoration of his nephew by peaceful means. As Windebank made clear to Lord Feilding, the English ambassador in Venice, this news understandably aggravated the King and his councillors:

[The King] hath reason to apprehend that the conjunction between [the] Duke of Bavaria and the Emperor his daughter may have caused some alienation in [the] King from [the] Emperor and the House of Austria, especially if such advertisements as daily come to his Majesty from forain partes, together with the copies of articles published in print of the Peace betwene Emperor and [the] Elector of Saxe, be true, by which the House of [the] Elector Palatin appears to be absolutely excluded from any hope of restitution either of territories or dignities, and all settled upon the House of Bavaria.⁹

They feared that the electors, who would soon assemble at Regensburg, would ratify the terms of the Peace of Prague. Official sanction of its terms, including those touching the Palatinate, would deal a damaging blow to the Palatine cause.

⁷On the close blood relationship between the Austrian Habsburgs and Bavarian Wittelsbachs, see chap. 2, n. 37.

⁸Maximilian's previous marriage to Elizabeth of Lorraine had failed to produce offspring. He did not lose any time in remarrying after her death in January 1635: he wed Maria Anna that summer.

⁹HMC, *Sixth Report*, vol. 1, 277: 10 Aug. 1635, Windebank to Feilding. Windebank wrote to Aston: "But the more I consider that Petra scandal, the business of the Palatinate, the more I am lost and in despair of any tolerable issue, especially since the alliance of marriage with the Duke of Bavaria and the articles exclusive to the Prince Palatine...." (BL, Egerton 1820, 527: Aug. 1635?, same to Aston).

As England's resentment against Spain for its apparent failure to mitigate the negative terms of the Peace for the Prince Palatine grew, France seized the opportunity to drive a wedge between them. The French ambassador extraordinary, the Marquis of Senecterre, proposed an alliance against the Habsburgs to recover the Palatine inheritance by military rather than diplomatic means. The Spaniards, for their part, were determined to win Charles back and defended themselves by denying any responsibility for the outcome at Prague. They encouraged the King instead to solicit an explanation of its terms directly from the Emperor.¹⁰

Debate raged at court over whether to pursue the Palatine interest by way of France or the Habsburgs. Protestant supporters of the Palatine cause, among them the Queen of Bohemia, Prince Palatine, and Sir Thomas Roe, argued that negotiations with the Habsburgs were a waste of time.¹¹ They pushed for decisive military action on Charles Louis's behalf, thus striking a blow for the Protestant cause in the Empire. They resoundingly preferred an alliance with the United Provinces and Sweden, but some were also willing to consider an alliance with France, as a powerful confederate of these Protestant states. The French party, spearheaded by Queen Henrietta Maria, the Marquis of Hamilton, and the Earl of Holland, promoted an alliance with France.¹² Windebank, on the other hand, warned against French and Dutch aggrandizement, and reminded the council of France's dealings with the Duke of Bavaria. In short, he argued, France had no real interest in the

¹⁰Gardiner, vol. 8, 83.

¹¹For instance, *CSPD 1635*, 267: 20 July 1635, Elizabeth to Laud, and *ibid.*, 368: 15 Sept. 1635, same to same.

¹²R. Malcolm Smuts, "The Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria in the 1630s," *EHR* 93 (Jan. 1978): 36-7; Gardiner, vol. 8, 85.

restoration of the Prince Palatine, only in turning England against Spain.¹³ Laud withheld judgment but recommended, on the suggestion of the Palatine party, that the King send an envoy to Vienna formally to request the restoration of the Prince Palatine, who would soon achieve his majority. This move would prevent the Emperor from refusing the Palatine's suit on the basis that he had neglected this legal formality necessary for restoration and would lead to speedier exposure of the Emperor's true intentions toward him.¹⁴

Between the duplicity exhibited by Spain and concerns about the ultimate aims of the French and Dutch, the decision was hardly an easy one for the King.¹⁵ Characteristically, Charles avoided coming down decisively on one side or the other and instead chose to keep his options open.¹⁶ He still believed that he could regain the Palatinate for his nephew by treaty rather than arms, and he decided to take advantage of the hostilities between France and Spain by making overtures to both sides and seeing which held better prospects for success.¹⁷ He therefore continued to consider the alliance with France offered by Senecterre while at the same time sounding out the Habsburgs on

¹³*CSPD 1635*, 402: 29 Sept. 1635, Windebank's notes of propositions submitted to the foreign committee of the privy council.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 415: 6 Oct. 1635, "Laud to Elizabeth; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 514-5.

¹⁵In February 1634, the French and Dutch had made a secret agreement to partition Flanders, which was exposed to the English in April.

¹⁶Roe later grumbled to Elizabeth that conflicts of interest with France and Holland and their secret treaty "have, I fear, cooled that brave warmth which appeared in his Majesty's heart.... The study to get money is the business of these times. They have an easy theme and a specious who declaim against war, whose expense hath no bounds and success no certainty." (*ibid.*, 441: 22 Oct. 1635, "Roe to Elizabeth").

¹⁷BL, Egerton 1820, f. 518: 3 Aug. 1635, Windebank to Hopton.

the restoration of the Palatinate. To the latter end, Charles decided to send envoys to the Habsburg courts in Madrid and Vienna.¹⁸

The King selected Sir Walter Aston as his ambassador to the Spanish court. Aston had served in the post before, from 1620 until relations between England and Spain were broken off in 1625, and had gained Charles's confidence during his fateful visit to Spain with Buckingham. On this mission, Aston was to resurrect negotiations for a maritime treaty and protest the terms of the Peace of Prague. He was also to investigate Spain's earlier proposal for an Austrian marriage for Charles Louis, his restoration after Maximilian's death, and the satisfaction of claims of the latter's heirs with the Bohemian electorate. Finally, he was to offer a straight league with the House of Austria if the Emperor removed the ban and he and his allies gave probable grounds for the restoration of the Palatine lands and dignities.¹⁹

Taylor's Appointment and Early Negotiations in Vienna

Charles had still to select a representative for the Vienna post, and by the end of July he settled upon John Taylor – a solid, if uninspired, choice.²⁰ Although Taylor was of a minor gentry background

¹⁸PRO, SP 84/150, f. 43: 9 Aug. 1635, Coke to Boswell. "That which now importeth most is to make the best advantage of the present revolutions, to draw in that assistance [from the Habsburgs] which hitherto we have expected without fruit." (ibid.).

¹⁹CSP, vol. 1, 306-9: 25 Aug. 1635, Secret instructions for Aston; cf. BL, Egerton 1820, f. 531: 11 Aug. 1635, [Hopton] to Windebank; ibid., f. 528: Aug. 1635?, Windebank to Aston.

²⁰Ibid., f. 518: 3 Aug. 1635, Windebank to Hopton. "His Majesty is dispatching your friend here to the Emperor with instructions concerning the Palatinate, and to discuss whether there be any hope yet of one accommodation, his Majesty being still willing to believe it will be had by treaty rather than by arms." (ibid.). Taylor's credentials to the Emperor were composed at the beginning of August (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 2, ff. 135-6: 9 Aug. 1635, Charles I to Ferdinand II). The Spanish resident Necolalde made the following unflattering comment about Taylor: "No es hombre de fondo o de buenos deseos y el mayor es tener ocupacion para comer." (PRO, SP 94/37, f. 221: 10 Aug. 1635, Necolalde to Oñate, the

that would be considered relatively humble in diplomatic circles, he had connections to the English court through Wentworth and the Earl of Cumberland. He also had experience dealing with the Habsburgs on various issues including the Palatinate question, having previously served as a diplomatic agent in Brussels, Vienna, and most recently Madrid.²¹ Many of his missions, like this one to Vienna, were connected to the secret Habsburg negotiations that the King and Windebank were conducting. In addition, Taylor was well acquainted with the Imperial court and the operation of electoral meetings, as he had promoted the peaceful settlement of the Palatinate question at the electoral meeting held at Regensburg in 1630 and afterward at the Imperial court from 1630 to 1632. Finally, Taylor and the majority of his family were Catholics and known to support friendly relations with the Habsburgs, which Charles must have felt would put the negotiations on a more cordial footing.²²

According to his official instructions, Taylor's main responsibility was to persuade the Emperor to reverse or modify the decisions made at Prague that were detrimental to the Palatine cause. He was directed to remind the Emperor of his previous promises regarding the Palatinate, to protest the terms of the Peace of Prague, and to find out whether this agreement truly represented

Spanish ambassador to the Emperor). "He is not a man of capacity or good desires. And that which more is, he hath an occupation whereby to live"; the latter statement possibly alluding to the fact that he would not easily be bribed (*ibid.*, SP 80/9, f. 50: 10 Aug. 1635, Necolalde to Oñate, English translation of an intercepted letter). Taylor's recent mission to Spain to request the recall of Necolalde from England surely did not endear him to the Spaniard.

²¹ Arthur Hopton, the English resident agent in Spain when Taylor was there, made positive comments about Taylor's good intentions and diplomatic experience, particularly in reference to his negotiations with the Habsburgs (*CSP*, vol. 1, 116: 7 Aug. 1634, Hopton to Windebank; *ibid.*, 118: 13 Aug. 1634, same to same).

²² Indeed, Taylor's uncle Robert and cousin Henry both had served the Archdukes on missions to England. On Taylor's background and career, see chap. 5.

the Emperor's firm intention toward the Prince Palatine.²³ His secret instructions, however, went well beyond his official ones and exposed the King's true priorities. Taylor was to negotiate an agreement with the Emperor for Charles Louis's restoration. If the Emperor revoked the ban and restored the Lower Palatinate to Charles Louis and gave probable grounds for the restoration of the remaining Palatine lands and dignities after the death of the Duke of Bavaria, the King empowered Taylor to offer a provisional alliance and the services of the newly strengthened English fleet. If they agreed to this, Charles Louis would make humble submission to the Emperor and renounce all alliances with the Emperor's enemies, but he would not agree to relinquish his claim to the electoral dignity. To further this negotiation, Windebank instructed Taylor to promote distrust at the Imperial court of Maximilian's ambitions and to stress the advantages of the friendship of the Prince Palatine and English King. In addition, in line with Laud's recommendation, he was directed to remind the Emperor that Charles Louis, who would attain his majority in January, would soon demand his investiture according to the constitution of the Empire.²⁴ Given the influence at the Imperial court of Spain, which despite its claims of friendship had no wish to relinquish the Lower Palatinate without concessions in return, and particularly Bavaria, which was intent on preserving as much of its Palatine gains as possible, Taylor's negotiation to affect the restoration of the Prince Palatine would be challenging.

²³PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 34-6: 9 Aug. 1635, Instructions for Taylor.

²⁴CSP, vol. 1, 310-3: 25 Aug. 1635, Secret instructions for Taylor. The two sets of instructions serve to illustrate Windebank's deeper involvement in Habsburg affairs than Coke (cf. PRO, SP 80/9, f. 86: 14 Jan. 1636, Coke to Taylor, addendum). Charles Louis himself wrote to the Emperor requesting that he be formally invested with the Palatine lands and titles upon reaching his majority; Charles I supported his nephew's demand in a personal letter to the Emperor (CSP, vol. 1, 402: 1636, Charles I to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, 402-3: 1636, Charles Louis to same).

The bulk of Taylor's correspondence during his mission was to be with Windebank, who was unofficially responsible for coordinating secret negotiations with the Habsburgs. Windebank conspired constantly to withhold information about the secret negotiations from Coke, who was officially responsible for diplomatic missions to the Empire. This led to a system where prominent members of the peace party, who were in on the King's secret Habsburg foreign policy, established direct lines of communication with the diplomats who carried it out on the ground, at times bypassing the official reporting channels. This was true of Taylor who, as a representative to a German ruler, was officially supposed to report to Coke. Windebank reminded Taylor during his mission: "You must not forget to write more frequently to Mr. Secretary Coke, and, especially if you have anything good, you may communicate it to him; otherwise you are to keep your distance, and the most secret you are still to impart to myself only."²⁵

Taylor began his journey to Vienna with three men and five horses on 7 September 1635, after a brief delay due to financial issues.²⁶ He reached Ostend on 11 September and spent some time in Flanders before proceeding into Germany.²⁷ In late September and early October he spent

²⁵Ibid., 431: 26 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Taylor. Much of Taylor's correspondence with Windebank is contained in BL, Clar. Mss. They are summarized in *CCSP*, vol. 1. A selection of the papers are published in *CSP*, vols. 1-2. What is preserved of Taylor's correspondence with Coke can be found in PRO, SP 80/9-10.

²⁶PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 103-6: 26 Jan. 1638, Taylor's accounts, Sept.-Mar. 1638; *CSPV* 1632-6, 435: 16 Aug. 1635, Anzolo Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England, to D&S; *ibid.*, 439: 24 Aug. 1635, same to same; *ibid.*, 445: 7 Sept. 1635, same to same. Taylor was unwilling to set out without the entire initial sum promised to him because he understood "the wayes are difficult and chargeable." (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 52: 21 Aug. 1635, Taylor to [Coke]). Given his personal financial situation, it is not surprising that money was to be a constant theme in his dispatches.

²⁷PRO, SP 16/298, f. 154: 30 Sept. 1635, Journal by Capt. William Smith, of the Tenth Lion's Whelp; cf. *ibid.*, SP 16/264, f. 164: 6 Sept. 1635, Lords of the Admiralty to Robert, Earl of Lindsey; *CCSP*, vol. 1, 70: 11 Sept. 1635, Taylor to Windebank. Windebank relates in succession the places where Taylor stopped on his way to Vienna (*CSP*, vol. 1, 400: 12 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Taylor).

time in Antwerp and Diest before proceeding on to the Cardinal Infante's camp at Gennep, where the Cardinal Infante and Count Piccolomini, a senior officer in the Imperial army, hospitably received him.²⁸ After taking his leave, Taylor made the dangerous journey across the war-torn and plague-ridden Empire toward Vienna, via Cologne, Frankfurt, and Donauwörth.²⁹ At some point he found his surroundings threatening enough to invest in four pairs of pistols, one pair for each man in his party.³⁰ During the journey, he learned of the sad state of the Palatinate, which he reported to Windebank: "In the Palatinate they are all dead, through misery and of the plague. In Heidelberg, as I am told, there are not fifty Burghers left, the plague being so extreme great, through the stench and filthiness in the town and castle."³¹ In mid-November, he had an audience with the King of Hungary at Nördlingen; there he heard the ominous rumor that the Duchess of Bavaria was with child and that the Lower Palatinate was to return to its previous state, that is, under Spanish and Bavarian occupation.³²

After nearly two months on the road, Taylor finally reached Vienna on 22 November 1635.³³ He explained his tardiness to Coke: "I arrived here . . . after a long and a very dangerous iourny the Countrys being utterly ruined through which I past and a number of people made desperate by want

²⁸Ibid., 398: 18 Oct. 1635, Cardinal Infante to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, 339: 20 Oct. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; *CCSP*, vol. 1, 71-2: 16 Oct. 1635, same to same; *ibid.*, 73: 21 Oct. 1635, same to Cottington.

²⁹He left Gennep on 22 October and had reached Cologne by 29 October and Frankfurt by 3 November (*ibid.*, 73: 22 Oct. 1635, Capt. Shaw to Windebank; *CSP*, vol. 1, 346: 29 Oct. 1635, Taylor to same; *ibid.*, 351: 3 Nov. 1635: same to same).

³⁰*PRO*, SP 80/10, ff. 103-6: 26 Jan. 1638, Taylor's accounts, Sept.-Mar. 1638.

³¹*CSP*, vol. 1, 351: 3 Nov. 1635: Taylor to Windebank.

³²*Ibid.*, 358: 11 Nov. 1635, same to same.

³³*Ibid.*, 368: 28 Nov. 1635, same to same.

and misery that live only on spoils and robbery. I was forced in regard of this to goe with great convoys or else to stay some tymes two or three dayes for company."³⁴ To Windebank, Taylor described Germany's miseries thus: "Germany, the greatest and whilom the fairest country of Europe, is now the most miserable, and looks hideous to the eye, through divers mortal wounds which it hath received even in every member, and gasps for life like a body whose veins are quite exhaust of blood."³⁵

While Taylor made his way to Vienna, the French and Spanish envoys in London continued their efforts to lure Charles I to their respective sides. Soon after Taylor's departure, France made another offer. If Charles allowed France to levy troops in his territories for the Continental war, put the ship money fleet under Charles Louis's command, and – most importantly – agreed not to aid Spain as he had, France would sign no peace that did not provide for the restoration of the Palatinate lands. However, because of its correspondence with Bavaria, it could not make similar promises about the electorate. Charles responded with a counterproposal for an exchange which, he argued, would solve the Palatinate problem and bring peace to Europe: France should restore Lorraine to its dispossessed Duke, and in return the Emperor would restore the Palatinate to Charles Louis.³⁶ This was the type of agreement that the King preferred, namely one which would achieve the restoration of the Palatinate without requiring him to make any significant concessions. He informed

³⁴PRO, SP 80/9, f. 56: 11 Dec. 1635, same to Coke.

³⁵CSP, vol. 1, 372: 15 Dec. 1635, same to Windebank.

³⁶This arrangement had been suggested by the Spaniards before. France had annexed Lorraine in 1632 after its Duke's unsuccessful rebellion. The loss of Lorraine was a great blow to Spain, as it disrupted movement along the Spanish Road (for a description of the Spanish Road, see chap. 2, p. 100). Charles supported the exchange plan, because he was asked to give up nothing in return.

Viscount Scudamore, his ambassador in Paris, that he would throw in his lot with France if the Emperor would not agree to the swap.³⁷ Although Richelieu did not respond to this proposal, it would continue to resurface in English negotiations with both France and the Habsburgs.³⁸

While these negotiations were underway, the Prince Palatine Charles Louis arrived in England in late November. He would achieve his majority in January and hoped that his presence at the English court would spur his uncle to greater efforts on his behalf. His presence was uncomfortable for the French envoys Senecterre and Pougny, as they were unable to address the young Prince as "Electoral Highness" because of France's treaty with Bavaria. The Spanish envoy Necolalde, however, made it a point to use the title freely.³⁹ Unlike the Emperor, Spain had no real commitment to Bavaria, which not only continually caused problems for Spain but had also secretly allied with France.⁴⁰ By the end of the year, Spain had managed to win the advantage at the English

³⁷CSP, vol. 1, 392: 19 Nov. 1635, Instructions for Scudamore. Elizabeth later related to Roe that the French had found this proposal ridiculous because they thought "Lorraine cost too much blood and money to give it up for nothing to be rendered them but a stranger Prince's restitution." (CSPD 1635-6, 148: 14 Jan. 1636, Elizabeth to Roe).

³⁸Gardiner, vol. 8, 97-8.

³⁹CSP, vol. 1, 389: 30 Dec. 1635, Windebank to Hopton; *ibid.*, 400: 12 Jan. 1636, same to Taylor; Sir John Finet, *Ceremonies of Charles I: The Note Books of John Finet, 1628-1641*, ed. Albert J. Loomie (New York: Fordham University, 1987), 188-90; Gardiner, vol. 8, 99-100. However, the Imperial envoy Clement Radolt, who was sent to England the following year was not free to use the title (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. 32: 9 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II). The Savoyard envoy also did not want to give the title because the English failed to give his master that of *real alteza* (*ibid.*, f. 89: 16 May 1636, same to same).

⁴⁰Oñate had always opposed the ambitions of Maximilian (CSP, vol. 1, 385: 21 Dec. 1635, Hopton to Windebank).

court, and its position further improved when John Taylor's reports of the Emperor's intentions toward the Palatinate reached London.⁴¹ The French negotiations stagnated accordingly.

Soon after his arrival in Vienna in late November 1635, Taylor set about making his master's demands known to the Emperor and, over time, he became increasingly convinced that Ferdinand would meet these demands. In his reports, he stressed the good intentions of the Emperor toward the Prince Palatine and England and often inflated Charles's authority in a ridiculous manner. The Emperor, who was anxious because he was under the impression that the King had sent Taylor to demand full restitution, was away from Vienna when Taylor arrived. At the beginning of December he returned and the next day accorded Taylor his first audience.⁴² As instructed, Taylor protested against the Peace of Prague and offered the Emperor an alliance between England and the Habsburgs in return for Charles Louis's restitution.⁴³ He also made it known that Charles did not expect a full restoration immediately, but would retaliate if deprived completely.⁴⁴ The Emperor, who was relieved that the English demands were not as great as he had supposed, reassured Taylor that he

⁴¹Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 516-7.

⁴²*CSPV 1632-6*, 472: 3 Nov. 1635, Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Venetian Secretary in Germany, to D&S; *ibid.*, 482: 1 Dec. 1635, same to same; *CSP*, vol. 1, 369: 6 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 56: 11 Dec. 1635, same to Coke. According to Ballarino, the Emperor wanted to avoid offending either England or Bavaria, which he surely would if Charles demanded the full restitution of his nephew. The Emperor also wanted to consult with Maximilian before making offers to England.

⁴³*CSP*, vol. 1, 369: 6 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; cf. PRO, SP 80/9, f. 56: 11 Dec. 1635, same to Coke. The alliance was for the peace and quiet of the Empire, defense of hereditary countries, and the restoration of the Duke of Lorraine (*CSP*, vol. 1, 369: 6 Dec. 1635, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 401: 12 Jan. 1636: Windebank to Taylor).

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 375: 29 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; *CSPV 1632-6*, 485: 8 Dec. 1635, Ballarino to D&S. Taylor's proposals from his first audience are contained in his memorial to the Emperor of 16 December (*CSP*, vol. 1, 377: 16 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Ferdinand II; PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 60-1, 73-4: 16 Dec. 1635, same to same).

would do all that he could to satisfy the King. He pointed out, however, that he could not remove the ban as the King wished without the consent of the Imperial Diet.⁴⁵ Despite the evasiveness of the Emperor's response, Taylor seemed satisfied for the moment, though he did remark that he thought the Emperor was attempting to "use up time" by referring the matter to the Diet.⁴⁶ Immediately after the audience, the Emperor again left Vienna, this time to hunt at a castle at Ort.⁴⁷

In late December, soon after the Emperor returned to Vienna from Ort, Taylor had his second audience. He wrote that the Emperor had agreed to the return of the Spanish-occupied Lower Palatinate (west of the Rhine) and that he had pressed further for the Bavarian-occupied portion as well as the removal of the ban. He also had insisted that any acceptable agreement would include no clause that might prejudice Charles Louis's right to the electorate and remaining Palatine lands. Taylor assured the Emperor that if this were done, the King would enter into a straight league with the Habsburgs.⁴⁸ The Emperor then asked for his demands in writing, but Taylor refused and left.

This move on Taylor's part caused the Emperor and his ministers much anxiety, and, to show his earnest in the negotiations, he decided to appoint a commission of leading privy councillors to treat with Taylor, consisting of the Prince-Bishop of Vienna Anton Wolfrath, Lord High Steward Leonard Hellfried, Count Meggau, the King of Hungary's Lord High Steward Maximilian, Count

⁴⁵*CSP*, vol. 1, 369: 6 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; *CSPV 1632-6*, 485: 8 Dec. 1635, Ballarino to D&S; *ibid.*, 506: 25 Jan. 1636, Correr to same.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

⁴⁷*CSP*, vol. 1, 369: 6 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank. The hunt was one of the Emperor's great passions. This is evident in the daily tallies of his captures and kills that he recorded in his calendar (HHStA, Familienarchiv, Familienakten, Kart. 88).

⁴⁸*CSP*, vol. 1, 375: 29 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank. Taylor offered them the assistance of the fleet (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 24 Jan. 1636, Ferdinand II to Taylor).

Trauttmansdorff, and Imperial Vice Chancellor Peter Heinrich, Baron Stralendorf. Upon the request of the commission, Taylor presented a statement of the King's requirements. In writing he demanded only the restoration of the Lower Palatinate. In addition, however, he orally stated that if the Emperor restored the Upper Palatinate, Charles would ally with the Habsburgs.⁴⁹ Taylor did this because the King wished his diplomats to restrict any sensitive proposals to oral rather than written forms. Moreover, they were to express these proposals in the most general terms possible, in order to leave the King the option to wriggle out of them at will. He was very concerned with avoiding definite commitments to the foreign powers he dealt with before obtaining a commitment from them.⁵⁰

Taylor's proposals, though the most important of them were oral, prompted the Emperor to solicit the Duke of Bavaria's opinion about them. To do so, the Emperor sent his aulic councillor and steward Ferdinand Sigmund, Baron Kurz, one of his most trusted and influential ministers, to Munich in early January.⁵¹ Kurz's brother Maximilian, as a privy councillor and later Lord High Steward to Maximilian of Bavaria, was one of the Duke's most important ministers. When

⁴⁹*CSPV* 1632-6, 501-2: 12 Jan. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

⁵⁰So much so that he often made it difficult for his diplomats to get a clear idea of what terms he would accept for the Prince Palatine or what he was willing to do in return.

⁵¹HHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 433-4: 5 Jan. 1636, Ferdinand II to Maximilian I; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 11 Jan. 1636, Imperial Secretary Walderode to Kurz; *CSP*, vol. 1, 406: 9 Jan. 1636, Taylor to Windebank. The aulic council, or *Hofrat*, was the Emperor's council of state. It handled major policy in the Empire and hereditary lands. Kurz was made Imperial Vice Chancellor in the following year, and he was raised to the *Reichsgrafenstand* in 1637.

representing their rulers, however, their close relationship did not prevent them from holding contrary opinions about important issues of Imperial-Bavarian relations.⁵²

The Emperor's seeming commitment to reaching a compromise settlement with England heartened both Taylor and Windebank, and this in turn lifted their hopes that they could successfully negotiate a solution to the Palatinate question with the Habsburgs.⁵³ Taylor wrote to Windebank that he believed that the Emperor would be willing to remove the ban and restore the Lower Palatinate, with prospects of negotiations for the restoration of the electorate and Upper Palatinate as well.⁵⁴ When Windebank received these reports, he was hopeful but not without skepticism. He forwarded Taylor's dispatch to the King and, despite Charles's concern that Taylor would have the ban removed by grace rather than right, Windebank expressed the opinion that it appeared that Taylor had been successful thus far in light of his instructions and what they could reasonably expect:

For the business itself, it is in no ill condition, and if the Lower Palatinate be really intended to be restored, it is as much as his Majesty requires Taylor to insist upon. Taylor's pressing the taking off the ban is warranted by his first instruction; and though this present Prince Elector cannot, indeed with any colour of equity, be judged within the Ban, yet if he be held to be so by them, the first work must be to clear it.⁵⁵

⁵²Albrecht, *Maximilian I*, 162.

⁵³CSP, vol. 1, 447: 15 Feb. 1636, Windebank to Taylor.

⁵⁴PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 66-7: 2 Jan. 1636, Ferdinand II to same, and the latter's reply; CSP, vol. 1, 394: 2 Jan. 1636, Taylor to Windebank (cf. PRO, SP 80/9, f. 64: 2 Jan. 1636, same to Coke); CSP, vol. 1, 405: 9 Jan. 1636, same to Windebank.

⁵⁵CSPD 1635-6, 179: 2 Feb. 1636, Windebank to Charles I.

In his judgment, these were "no ill beginnings if they be real."⁵⁶ At the time, the pragmatic diplomat Aston in Spain was also hopeful of a solution to the Palatinate question via the Habsburgs.⁵⁷ At the beginning of January, he wrote that he believed that the Spaniards would give as much satisfaction as possible in the Palatinate, though they would still drive a bargain. Furthermore, he thought the Emperor would comply and Bavaria's influence would not be as considerable as it previously had been.⁵⁸

Their optimism that they might reach an agreement with the Emperor on the Palatinate question was not unjustified. On 24 January 1636, Ferdinand declared himself ready to conclude an agreement with England if the King sent an ambassador with plenipotentiary powers to Vienna.⁵⁹ He had taken Taylor's proposals quite seriously, because he also decided to send an envoy to England to promote an agreement. The Emperor attached great importance to this mission, and he chose Matthias von Werdemann, an aulic councillor (and thus legal expert) who had previously served as a diplomatic agent to France, to lead it.⁶⁰ In addition, Taylor reported that communication

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷He had presented a memorial to the King of Spain on 6 December asking him to support English negotiations on the Palatinate with the Emperor; Philip assured him that he would do what he could to achieve English satisfaction on this point (CSP, vol. 1, 382: 6 Dec. 1635, Aston to Philip IV).

⁵⁸BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 7: 9 Jan. 1636, same to Charles I.

⁵⁹HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 24 Jan. 1636, Ferdinand II to Taylor; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 24 Jan. 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 434: 24 Jan. 1636, same to same.

⁶⁰HHStA, StA Dänemark, Kart. 2, Konv. H, f. 1: 24 Jan. 1636, same to Hofkammer; *ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 5-6: 24 Jan. 1636, Instructions for envoy to England; *ibid.*, f. 13: 28 Feb. 1636, Decree for Werdemann; *ibid.*, Kart. 2, f. 51: 4 Feb. 1636, Credentials for same. Ballarino believed that this decision was taken with the encouragement of Oñate, who wished to remove the business from Taylor's hands (CSPV 1632-6, 514: 9 Feb. 1636, Ballarino to D&S). Taylor noted that Werdemann was not to go in the quality of ambassador (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 89: 26 Jan. 1636, Taylor to [?]).

from Kurz arrived in Vienna indicating Maximilian would agree to the removal of the ban, investiture of Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire, and return Heidelberg and the Bavarian-occupied Lower Palatinate.⁶¹ According to Windebank's calculations and the new instructions of 30 December that Taylor would receive shortly, this would be enough to satisfy the King's original demands.

In the middle of February, England brought additional pressure to bear on the Emperor to come to a satisfactory agreement on the Palatinate question. A courier from England arrived in Vienna with fresh instructions for Taylor indicating that the King was even more flexible on what terms he would accept for the restitution of the Palatinate.⁶² Windebank directed Taylor to insist upon the restoration of the Lower Palatinate – or at least its sequestration by a neutral prince – but not necessarily the Upper Palatinate. Also, he was to deliver Charles Louis's demand for investiture.⁶³ At the same time, Taylor should make clear to the Emperor that if he delayed in answering these demands, the King would interpret it as a sign that Ferdinand was reluctant to give satisfaction. If this were the case, the Emperor should know that the King would take appropriate

⁶¹HHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 442-3: 25 Jan. 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand II. Taylor was under the impression that he also agreed to leave the way open for Charles Louis to plead his case to the rest in the future (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 88: 26 Jan. 1636, Taylor to [?]; CSP, vol. 1, 432: 30 Jan. 1636, same to Cottingham). This may very well be what the Emperor had conveyed to Taylor, as this was a point the Emperor had pressed with Maximilian, but to which the latter would not agree (HHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, f. 443: 25 Jan. 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand II).

⁶²The courier's name was Pierre Peaget.

⁶³CSP, vol. 1, 403: 9 Jan. 1636, Instructions for Taylor (cf. PRO, SP 80/9, f. 86: 14 Jan. 1636, Coke to same); CSP, vol. 1, 400: 12 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Taylor; *ibid.*, 402: [9 Jan.] 1636, Charles I to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*: [1 Jan.] 1636, Charles Louis to same; HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 1 Jan. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*: 9 Jan. 1636, Charles I to same. He was also sent a copy of the propositions Charles had made to the French King (to which he had not yet received an answer), with orders to share this information with those he saw fit in order to further the negotiation.

action upon the courier's return to England. As planned, the arrival of the courier and Taylor's subsequent demands awakened anxiety in the Emperor and his ministers.⁶⁴

Soon afterwards a second courier arrived in Vienna with copies of the documents from the previous packet and a letter from Windebank.⁶⁵ In the letter, Windebank pointed out to Taylor that from the King's perspective it would be acceptable if the Emperor sequestered the Lower Palatinate instead of restoring it only if Taylor could procure no better terms; however, if he had hopes of better terms, he should pursue them vigorously.⁶⁶ Windebank also strongly encouraged Taylor to convince the Austrians of what he himself propounded in his letters home, namely that the power of the King of England could make or break their designs: "so you must really speak the same language and make these your own principles good in your negotiation there: and so carry it as to beget in them a belief, that upon the answer you shall receive from them will depend their good or ruin."⁶⁷ Taylor believed he could get better terms: "finding they [the latest instructions] contained less than what I knew they had here resolved to give his Majesty, boldly bore from them, and resolved to put them roundly to it."⁶⁸ On 16 February, after delivering the letters of the King and Charles Louis to the

⁶⁴*CSPV* 1632-6, 525: 2 Mar. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

⁶⁵Sending duplicates of diplomatic correspondence was a widely employed safety measure. The second courier was Germain Marsham.

⁶⁶*CSP*, vol. 1, 428: 26 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Taylor.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 429: 26 Jan. 1636, same to same.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 451: 3 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank.

hands of the Emperor and King of Hungary, he presented a memorial in response to the Emperor's of 24 January demanding the Prince Palatine's investiture to all of the Palatine lands and dignities.⁶⁹

The same day that Taylor presented this paper, the arrival of the second courier precipitated new alarm at the Imperial court and inquiries after what Charles required.⁷⁰ Taylor let the Emperor and his ministers stew for a while, and on 20 February, he demanded an audience of the Emperor and King of Hungary and presented yet another paper.⁷¹ The following day, Stralendorf, the Prince-Bishop of Vienna, and Baron Reck sent for Taylor. In answer to his previous two memorials, they said that the Emperor could not make a decision without consulting the other princes with an interest in the Palatinate, to whom he would quickly dispatch couriers.⁷² To this Taylor replied that he had already gone as far as his commission extended, that he awaited a definite answer as to what Palatine lands and titles the Emperor was willing to restore, and that if he got none, Taylor would take it as a refusal, and he would return to England with the news.⁷³

Taylor's resolute carriage elicited a promising reaction from the Emperor. After some persistence on Taylor's part, on 24 February 1636 the Emperor finally issued a written statement

⁶⁹HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1: 16 Feb. 1636, same to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 16 Feb. 1636, same to same.

⁷⁰CSP, vol. 1, 451: 3 Mar. 1636, same to Windebank.

⁷¹HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1: 20 Feb. 1636, same to Ferdinand II.

⁷²HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, f. 39: 18 Feb. 1636, Opinion of privy council.

⁷³CSP, vol. 1, 451-2: 3 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank. Taylor was offended that Windebank would think that he would aim so low as sequestration. Pointing to the strong line he took with the Emperor, he wrote: "so your Honour sees that John Taylor hath not failed the good opinion you have of him, who could not possibly be guilty of such a baseness; and of whom you may be still assured, that the will not only carry things only positively, but in a most superlative way of braveness, for his Majesty's honour." (*ibid.*, 454).

agreeing to remove the ban, grant investiture, and restore a portion of the Palatinate to Charles Louis if he made humble submission to the Emperor and renounced all treaties made with Imperial foes.⁷⁴ As soon as an English plenipotentiary arrived, they could conclude an agreement to this effect.⁷⁵ In a paper he delivered of 2 March, Taylor accepted the offer *ad referendum*.⁷⁶ The Emperor also promised that negotiations would be carried on about the return of the electorate.⁷⁷ As Taylor had indicated, the situation seemed to offer some real hope of improving the Prince Palatine's situation and more than met the King's demands as laid out in Taylor's most recent instructions. Before the end of the month, the Emperor had decided to send Kurz to Munich to solicit Maximilian's input on the negotiations with England, most particularly those touching the electorate. Kurz was to urge the benefits of such an accommodation, namely peace in the Empire and an alliance with England, and convince Maximilian that the Emperor was forced to it. At this point the Emperor was considering limitation of the electorate to Maximilian's lifetime and even creating an eighth electorate to satisfy

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 459: 16 Feb. 1636, same to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, 460: 20 Feb. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 461: 24 Feb. 1636, Ferdinand II to Taylor; PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 91-2: 24 Feb. 1636, same to same; HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 116, f. 149: 20 Feb. 1636, Taylor to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 24 Feb. 1636, Ferdinand II to Taylor (cf. Bodl. Lib., Rawlinson Mss. D 867, f. 121: 24 Feb. 1636, Ferdinand II to Charles I and Charles Louis).

⁷⁵Taylor's lack of plenipotentiary powers had long been an issue. Oñate emphasized this problem, and pointed out to the Imperial councillors that Taylor was of too low of a rank for his mission to be of real meaning. He also argued to the Imperial privy councillors that England could not be trusted (HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 40-2: 20 Feb. 1636, Opinion of privy council). It was apparent that Oñate did what he could to draw out the negotiations at Vienna to win time, and at the same time preserve good correspondence with England. Once Taylor's negotiations showed some promise of moving forward, Oñate attempted to retard them (CSP, vol. 1, 447: 15 Feb. 1636, Windebank to Taylor).

⁷⁶HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1: 2 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Ferdinand II; CSP, vol. 1, 453: 3 Mar. 1636, same to Windebank.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 496: 9 Apr. 1636, same to same.

the King.⁷⁸ The Emperor's consideration of this option at this point was significant, because the electorate would prove to be the major sticking point in future negotiations for a settlement, and the creation of an eighth electorate was the solution that the delegates at Westphalia ultimately adopted. Giovanni Ballarino, the Venetian secretary in Vienna, was also optimistic that the Emperor would grant the Prince Palatine his dominions.⁷⁹ In the meantime, Taylor continued to press for a more particular answer.

These concessions on the part of the Emperor only fueled Taylor's optimism about the negotiations' success. They persuaded him that the Emperor was ready to go beyond his declaration and offer full restoration, albeit in time. He downplayed Maximilian's opposition and the obstructive effect it could have on the negotiations. By the end of January 1636, Taylor told Lord Cottington that Maximilian would be willing for the Emperor to remove the ban, restore the Lower Palatinate, and allow Charles Louis to plead his right to the electorate.⁸⁰ In February and March, Taylor sent word to England that he believed that the King could recover more than the Spanish-occupied Palatinate for Charles Louis through the Emperor's agency. He boldly stated that Ferdinand would not only agree to the King's terms to revoke the ban and restore or sequester the Lower Palatinate immediately, but also to return the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity upon the death of Maximilian:

⁷⁸HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 55-6: 25, 26 Feb. 1636, Opinion of privy council; *ibid.*, RK KrA, Fasz. 116, ff. 179-86: 28 Feb. 1636, Instructions for Kurz; *CSP*, vol. 1, 475: 12 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank.

⁷⁹*CSPV* 1632-6, 525: 2 Mar. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

⁸⁰*CSP*, vol. 1, 432: 30 Jan. 1636, Taylor to Cottington; cf. PRO, SP 80/9, f. 97: 3 Mar. 1636, same to Coke.

His Majesty doth come too low unto them, to be content that the Lower Palatinate, which is beyond the Rhine, should be put into sequestration. For our negotiation, I know that they will give us all the Palatinate . . . if his Majesty stand upon it. To enable the Prince Palatine to possess this, they will take off the ban, and free him from all censures whatsoever: that, concerning the Electorate, both to him, as also the Duke of Bavaria shall remain their full rights to plead their title unto it, so that neither shall win or lose by this act. They would content his Majesty with this, if his Majesty would be contented: but, if he will not, his Majesty shall have both the Emperor and King of Spain's hands and promises, that the Electorate shall return to the Prince Elector after Bavaria's death.⁸¹

Taylor also continued to hold out the hope that the Emperor was seriously considering a match between his daughter and the Prince Palatine.⁸²

Taylor continued to downplay the obstacle that Maximilian's opposition would pose to the Prince Palatine's restoration. Despite Maximilian's curious attempts to beget a child and prolong his own life, which he believed could be accomplished by consuming poultry fed with Calabrian vipers,⁸³ Taylor believed that the Prince Palatine would not have to wait long for Maximilian's death, which an astrologer had predicted for August.⁸⁴ Even once it was apparent that the Duchess of

⁸¹CSP, vol. 1, 446-7: 13 Feb. 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 454: 3 Mar. 1636, same to same. Taylor gave the same information in a letter to Lord Feilding, but added: "Because the cheife difficulty is concerning the Electorat, which at the longest must remaine in the house of Bavaria for the tyme only of this Duke's life, they have sent one Curtius [Kurz], a great counsellor of this Court unto him, to induce him thereunto, since there is no other way left under heaven to compasse a general peace but by his Majestyes intervention. That Duke was reasonable well disposed heereunto before...." (HMC, *Denbigh V*, 21: 15 Mar. 1636, same to Feilding).

⁸²Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 8, f. 255: 27 Mar. 1636, same to Windebank; CSP, vol. 1, 432: 30 Jan. 1636, same to Cottingham. Taylor said that the Archduchess had requested through a third party a full-length portrait of the Prince Palatine by Van Dyck.

⁸³PRO, SP 80/9, f. 70: 5 Jan. 1636, Taylor to [?]; HMC, *Denbigh V*, 21: 15 Mar. 1636, same to Feilding. He wrote earlier that "The Duke of Bavaria since his marriage feeds on nothing but capons and chicken fed with the flesh of vipers.... What a child would he beget to infect the world?" (CSP, vol. 1, 375: 15 Dec. 1635, same to Windebank).

⁸⁴Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 8, f. 163: 2 Mar. 1636, same to Windebank; CSP, vol. 1, 451: 3 Mar. 1636, same to same. However, Taylor felt that the prediction should pass as a marginal note of which

Bavaria really was with child, Taylor reported that the disposition of the Imperial court remained good and that Maximilian would not oppose restoration, as he knew there could be no peace in the Empire without it. Given this favorable conjunction of circumstances, Taylor urged the King to send a plenipotentiary quickly to conclude the agreement.⁸⁵

Kurz, who had departed on 12 March, returned to Vienna on 6 April with Maximilian's resolution. The Emperor might return the Lower Palatinate on the condition that Maximilian would retain the Upper Palatinate and receive a sum of money for his war expenses. In addition, he might restore the electorate after the Bavarian line died out. Maximilian flatly refused the alternation of the electorate or the creation of an eighth.⁸⁶ The Imperial ministers, however, gave Taylor the impression that the electorate could return to the Palatine line after Maximilian's death.⁸⁷ Taylor reported that Kurz was only able with great difficulty to bring Maximilian around to relinquishing enough of the Palatine inheritance to assuage the King. Despite Taylor's pressing for a more specific answer, the Emperor was determined to make no further declaration until a plenipotentiary arrived from England. This was because Oñate had informed the Emperor that he had it from Necolalde that Charles would be content with less than Taylor had demanded. Right when it seemed that Taylor

little reflection should be made (*ibid.*, 454).

⁸⁵PRO, SP 80/9, f. 103: 9 Apr. 1636, same to Coke; *ibid.*, f. 135: 3 May 1636, same to [?].

⁸⁶HHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 469-73: 27 Mar. 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, ff. 475-80: Apr. 1636, Kurz to same; *ibid.*, ff. 606-10: Apr. 1636, same to same.

⁸⁷CSP, vol. 1, 498: 9 Apr. 1636, Taylor to Windebank.

had convinced the Emperor to relinquish more, the King's inability to keep his policy secret hurt his chances for an advantageous settlement.⁸⁸

Radolt's Appointment and Journey to England

In the meantime, the Emperor's plans for sending an envoy to England had hit a snag because Werdemann, the intended envoy, had delayed his departure while wrangling over his diplomatic status and financial allowance.⁸⁹ This delay so annoyed the Emperor, who considered the mission a matter of great importance and urgency, that at the end of March he sent for Clement Radolt, a councillor of the *Hofkammer*, and instead offered him the appointment as Imperial diplomatic agent to Charles I on the condition that he would leave for England within two days. Radolt accepted the charge.⁹⁰ The haste with which the Emperor made this decision confirms that he considered the mission urgent. His choice of Radolt, however, was not haphazard. The combination of the Emperor's trust in Radolt to follow his instructions closely and his legal training, which would be useful for explaining the justice of the Emperor's actions against Frederick V, made him a qualified representative of Imperial interests at the English court.⁹¹

From Taylor's perspective, Radolt's appointment was a change for the better. He recommended the new Imperial envoy to Windebank, remarking that he considered Radolt favorably

⁸⁸Ibid., 496-7: 9 Apr. 1636, same to same.

⁸⁹Part of the problem was that Werdemann wished for higher status than that of resident agent.

⁹⁰HHStA, StA England, Kart. 21, f. 13: 28 Feb. 1636, Ferdinand II to Werdemann; *ibid.*, f. 22: 22 Mar. 1636, same to Dhaem; *ibid.*, Kart. 2, ff. 53-4: 25 Mar. 1636, same to Charles I. For biographical information on Radolt, see chap. 7.

⁹¹The fact that both Werdemann and Radolt had legal training showed that this was likely a consideration in the Emperor's selection of them for the post.

inclined to the Palatine cause because he had close ties to the Prince-Bishop of Vienna, whom Taylor believed was partial to it: "This gentleman [Radolt] is the Bishop's creature, and I conceive we have not lost much in the change they made of Monsieur Werdeman, but rather gained."⁹² Taylor also believed that the Spaniards in England, particularly the venomous Necolalde, were unlikely to influence Radolt. Taylor encouraged Windebank to make good use of Radolt and emphasized the need to impress the envoy with a show of English wealth and power, particularly sea power, as he believed this was the most effective way to win the Emperor away from Bavaria.⁹³

Due to the perceived urgency of his business, the Imperial Secretary Walderode immediately gave Radolt his instructions and directed him to proceed to England with all haste.⁹⁴ On his way there, he was to stop in Brussels and confer about his mission with the Cardinal Infante, who had had a hand in securing his appointment.⁹⁵ Once Radolt had arrived at the English court, he was to deliver the Emperor's declaration of 24 February 1636 to the King.⁹⁶ In addition, the Emperor charged him with explaining the legal legitimacy of his application of the ban to the Palatines, who should recognize its removal through the Emperor's clemency rather than demanding it as a right.⁹⁷

⁹²Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 8, f. 251: 26 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank. Radolt had served under the Bishop when the latter was *Hofkammer* President from 1624 to 1630.

⁹³*Ibid.*; *ibid.*, f. 255: 27 Mar. 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 476: 12 Mar. 1636, same to same.

⁹⁴The instructions had originally been prepared for Werdemann.

⁹⁵HHStA, Belgische Korrespondenz, Kart. 18, no. 746: 28 Feb. 1636, Ferdinand II to Cardinal Infante.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 9-12: 28 Feb. 1636, Instructions for Werdemann/Radolt.

⁹⁷In particular he was to point out that the Palatine's proscription was supported by a decree of the Diet (CSPV 1632-6, 536-7: 29 Mar. 1636, Ballarino to D&S).

One of Radolt's major tasks while at the English court was to collect information about the King's requirements for the restoration of his nephew. Thus Radolt was to do his utmost to determine whether the King would be willing to accept the Lower Palatinate and a compromise solution for the electorate, as Taylor had claimed, and if not, whether he intended to reclaim his nephew's inheritance by force. If the King would consider a compromise on the electorate, Radolt was to discover what arrangement he would be willing accept. However, if he were pressed for particulars himself, or if the King would not be satisfied with the offer embodied in the Imperial decree and a rupture seemed imminent, he should play for time and await further directions from home. In the meantime, the Emperor would continue to consult with Bavarian and Spanish ministers regarding future steps for the restitution of the Palatinate.⁹⁸ At the same time, the Imperial envoy was to do his utmost to avoid offending England, which under the circumstances was a seemingly impossible task. Ballarino noted that the Austrians in no way wished to alienate the favorable inclination of the English crown, and that Radolt's instructions left the way open to settle the Palatine's claims.⁹⁹ They also showed the Emperor offering less than Taylor had hoped, but enough to satisfy Charles according to Taylor's most recent instructions: a portion of the Palatine lands and the way left open to settle the claims of the Palatines to the remaining lands and titles in the future. It was evident, however, that the Emperor hoped for an alliance in return.

In addition to exploring the viability of a compromise solution on the Palatinate, the Emperor wished to discover what the King would be willing and able to offer in return. The Emperor was

⁹⁸HHStA, StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 9-12: 28 Feb. 1636, Instructions for Werdemann/Radolt.

⁹⁹CSPV 1632-6, 536-7: 29 Mar. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

very interested in exploring the possibilities for an alliance with England, particularly one that would bring the English fleet to the Habsburg side. Therefore, Radolt was to encourage the King to join with the Emperor in a league. If there were a chance that they might conclude one on honorable terms, they would exchange ambassadors extraordinary. Radolt was not to conclude any agreement himself unless the King made a very advantageous proposal that would likely be lost through delay. The Emperor, who himself had not called an Imperial Diet in more than twenty years, was sensible to the possibility that the conclusion of such a treaty might require the consent of the English ruling classes as well as that of the King to be viable. Therefore Radolt was to determine whether the King required the consent of others, namely his ministers or Parliament, in order to enter into an alliance, and if so, what obstacles they might pose to this work.¹⁰⁰

In terms of an alliance, the Emperor was primarily interested in the English fleet. He thus directed Radolt to determine its size and quality, including the weapons, personnel, and supplies which with it was outfitted. Furthermore, he was to exercise all diligence to learn how much and how long the King would contribute to the maintenance and further expansion of the fleet. If the Habsburgs did not succeed in striking an alliance with England, the Emperor hoped at least to persuade the King not to aid their enemies. Accordingly Radolt was to discover if the King was aiding the Swedes, or other enemies of the Habsburgs for that matter, by allowing them to levy troops in his territories, as reports had indicated. If so, Radolt was to persuade the King to rescind this aid. Throughout the negotiation, Radolt should encourage the King to send a plenipotentiary

¹⁰⁰HHStA, StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 9-12: 28 Feb. 1636, Instructions for Werdemann/Radolt.

to Vienna for the conclusion of a settlement. And as a general rule, he should write home for guidance on more detailed points or issues that came up unexpectedly.¹⁰¹

After receiving his instructions, Radolt left immediately for England. On 26 March 1636, he departed from Vienna, accompanied only by two servants.¹⁰² On his journey through the Empire to Flanders, Radolt encountered much the same scene of deprivation, disease, depopulation, and destruction that the Earl of Arundel, whom Charles had appointed as his ambassador extraordinary to the Emperor less than a week after Radolt set out, would experience traveling in the opposite direction.¹⁰³ Under the circumstances, the going was extremely dangerous. Radolt traveled both by land and by water, depending on which seemed safest and most expedient. He reported that the route between Cologne and Brussels was extremely perilous because of attacks by the Dutch. To protect himself and his belongings, he purchased a pair of muskets and engaged convoys of armed men to escort him through particularly hazardous areas. This proved a wise move, for at one point during his trip 30 dragoons attacked his party, but they escaped safely through the valiant defense staged by his convoy of 15 musketeers. Everywhere prices were high, and Radolt paid dearly for food and other supplies, transportation, armed convoys, and the posts. He reported that citizens of formerly prosperous communities were forced to eat grass for nourishment.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ibid., RK KrA, Fasz. 116, f. 283: 16 Apr. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II; *CSPV* 1632-6, 536: 29 Mar. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

¹⁰³HHStA, StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 9-12: 28 Feb. 1636, Instructions for Werdemann/Radolt; *ibid.*, RK KrA, Fasz. 116, ff. 282-7: 16 Apr. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., ff. 283-6: 16 Apr. 1636, same to same.

When Radolt reached Brussels on 11 April, he stopped to confer about his mission with the Cardinal Infante as instructed.¹⁰⁵ In order to promote the settlement of the Palatinate question and the conclusion of an alliance with England, as the Emperor desired, Spain had promised to invest the Cardinal Infante with plenipotentiary powers so that he would be prepared to do so if the opportunity presented itself during Radolt's mission. However, Radolt soon discovered that the Cardinal Infante indeed had none, but he was assured that the newly appointed Spanish ambassador to England, the young Count Oñate, son of the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, would bring them with him. Radolt, who was under the impression that Spain was not as committed to coming to a settlement with England as his master, was skeptical. He therefore recommended that the Emperor remonstrate again with the Cardinal Infante on the matter, and that he enjoin Count Schönberg, the Imperial ambassador in Spain, to solicit Spain's cooperation in the business.¹⁰⁶ Radolt himself wrote to Schönberg and asked him to press the Spaniards to send their powers to the venues where they were treating the Palatinate question with England. By this time, Radolt had discovered that the King was sending Arundel to Vienna for this very purpose. Under the circumstances, Radolt believed that the King would not put up with the usual hedging, and that the Habsburgs should be ready with their powers to treat. He therefore urged that Spain should send its plenipotency,

¹⁰⁵Ibid., f. 287: 17 Apr. 1636, same to same.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.; *ibid.*, f. 278: 17 Apr. 1636, same to Schönberg; *ibid.*, f. 277: s.d., Stralendorf to Ferdinand II. For instance, Radolt believed that the Infante did not necessarily want the Emperor to lift the ban from the Palatine house, and further that he wanted Radolt to hold his business in England in suspense until Bavaria had made a declaration on the electorate (*ibid.*, f. 287: 17 Apr. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II).

particularly to Vienna, where Arundel would have corresponding powers to negotiate. Given these various difficulties, Radolt felt that the business had a strange outlook.¹⁰⁷

After his meeting with the Cardinal Infante, Radolt departed from Brussels and arrived on 22 April at Dunkirk, where he was to be picked up by a ship of the royal fleet and transported across the Channel to England. The English ship, however, had encountered contrary winds and was unable to fetch him as expected. Radolt waited for three days at Dunkirk, and, unwilling to wait any longer, he boarded another English ship which carried him safely to England on 27 April.¹⁰⁸ Two days later – less than a fortnight after the Earl of Arundel's departure – Radolt arrived in London. Wishing to remain incognito, he made no immediate announcement of his arrival. Radolt found himself in an ambiguous position since Arundel had full powers to treat in Vienna, and it is likely that he wished to take some time to contemplate his next steps before he introduced himself at court. The Spanish resident Necolalde, however, soon became aware of his presence. Even he had a difficult time persuading Radolt to accept his hospitality, but he was ultimately successful, for Radolt lodged with him during his first few days in London.¹⁰⁹ Radolt remained determined not yet to make his presence in London known to the English court, and he therefore sought to conceal this fact from the King's Master of Ceremonies, John Finet, who was responsible for arranging for the visits of foreign diplomats at court.¹¹⁰ However Radolt soon took a house in Drury Lane, and by 2

¹⁰⁷Ibid.; *ibid.*, f. 278: 17 Apr. 1636, same to Schönberg.

¹⁰⁸Radolt wrote that if he had waited any longer, he would have almost certainly boarded an English ship that was subsequently seized by the French (*ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. 40: 9 May 1636, same to Ferdinand II).

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, f. 1: 2 May 1636, same to same.

¹¹⁰*CSPV 1632-6*, 554: 2 May 1636, Correr to D&S.

May he officially notified Finet of his arrival through Necolalde and Henry Taylor, the Cardinal Infante's diplomatic agent in England and cousin of John Taylor.¹¹¹

Taylor's Negotiations at the Imperial Court, Spring 1636

Back in Vienna, Taylor remained sanguine about Radolt's mission and the outlook of Anglo-Habsburg relations more generally. His rosy reports illustrate his weakness as a diplomat, namely that he too readily accepted Habsburg overtures because he was so eager for his mission to succeed. Although at the beginning of his mission he was more critical, shrewd Habsburg politicians soon won him over. Taylor soon became convinced that his negotiations had many influential supporters at the Imperial court, among them the King and Queen of Hungary, the Empress, Count Oñate, Trauttmansdorff, Vice Chancellor Stralendorf, and Walter Leslie, a Scotsman who had risen to prominence in the Imperial army.¹¹² Ballarino, the Venetian ambassador in Vienna, noted Taylor's increasing complacency as the negotiation progressed:

Although this gentleman dilates upon the forces of his king and the serious hurt which he could inflict upon the emperor . . . yet he is seen to insinuate himself into the closest confidence, associates with the ministers, generally eats at Court and to all appearance gets further and further from the object which was supposed to be his special concern, to support his demands with the zeal and fervour which he showed at the beginning.¹¹³

¹¹¹HHSIA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. 1: 2 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II.

¹¹²CSP, vol. 1, 455: 3 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank. Taylor was particularly pleased with the intelligence he obtained from Leslie, who was privy to the Imperialists' secret councils. Leslie corresponded with Windebank and was likely receiving an allowance from him as well (*ibid.*, 447: 15 Feb. 1636, Windebank to Taylor; *ibid.*, 450: 29 Feb. 1636, Leslie to Windebank).

¹¹³CSPV 1632-6, 502: 12 Jan. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

It is true that in his reports he exaggerated England's leverage with Continental powers and flattered Charles excessively.¹¹⁴ This is due, at least in part, to the fact that Taylor believed his master had a greater role to play as the arbiter of peace in Europe. Consequently, he viewed his own mission as an important step in that direction and had invested much in its success.¹¹⁵

Taylor's misplaced optimism is particularly apparent in reference to Bavaria, as Maximilian was a more formidable opponent than Taylor had come to believe. Taylor seems to have taken the Bavarian threat more seriously in the first months of his mission, but gradually convinced himself that the Emperor might value the friendship of England and allegiance of a restored Elector Palatine more highly than that of Bavaria.¹¹⁶ By March he was more than convinced: "I laugh at the Duke of Bavaria, and scorn all he can do for them: and I know that they are resolved to leave the Duke of Bavaria for the King of England, if his Majesty will come bravely up unto him."¹¹⁷

Despite his bravado and willingness to believe what tended to the success of his mission, it is important to note that Taylor was not bereft of critical powers. Alongside the exaggerations of his sovereign's power and optimism about his negotiations, Taylor also made some perceptive

¹¹⁴The following are just two examples of many: "[The Palatinate lands] are...not worthy to be putt in ballance with those great obligations which the house of Austria and the whole Christian world must receave from his Majesties powerfull arme." (HMC, *Denbigh V*, 20: 8 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Feilding); "It is not possible that the affaires in Germany can have or receive any accommodation without his Majestie, and unlesse he be associated I shall laugh at any league or confederacy they can make" (ibid., 23: 19 Apr. 1636, same to same). See also: CSP, vol. 1, 374: 15 Dec. 1635, same to Windebank; ibid., 376: 29 Dec. 1635, same to same.

¹¹⁵Frances Haskell aptly explains that "His vision embraced a wider sense of his own mission and a more exalted role for Charles I, whom he saw as the saviour of Europe against the sinister expansion of the French, and as the bringer of peace to a war-torn world." (Haskell, 212).

¹¹⁶CSP, vol. 2, 375: 15 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 426: 26 Jan. 1636, same to same.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 454: 3 Mar. 1636, same to same.

observations and astute recommendations in his reports home. His immediate appraisal of the influence of Bavaria at the Imperial court was accurate: it was a powerful force to be reckoned with. He warned Windebank, as did Hopton and Aston, that the Emperor was wont to offend Maximilian before the election of his son, the King of Hungary, as King of the Romans.¹¹⁸ At this time Taylor realized that until the election was over, Bavaria's ambitions presented a real obstacle to the restoration of Charles Louis, as Maximilian would almost certainly use his vote to fend off any threat to Bavarian control of the Upper Palatinate and electorate. And, though he may have eventually come to believe that the restoration of the Palatinate was an attainable goal, Taylor never intimated that it would come without a price. On the contrary, from the beginning he, like Aston, emphasized that full satisfaction was contingent upon conditions, namely a league between Charles and the Habsburgs. He warned that those involved would expect compensation and likely would ask for much more than the Palatinate was worth.¹¹⁹ The real question was what the Habsburgs would be willing to accept in return for partial restitution, and what the King would be willing to offer. Finally, for all his confidence in the power of his sovereign to influence the course of European affairs, he was sensible of the need to convince the Continental powers of this and therefore continually encouraged Charles to exhibit his military might and his resolve to see his nephew restored:

¹¹⁸Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 8, f. 7: 26 Dec. 1635, same to same. Spain was as well, to some extent (*CSP*, vol. 1, 464: 5 Mar. 1636: Aston to same). Still, Aston's opinion regarding the Palatinate was that the Spaniards intended to enter into a treaty with England for its accommodation and would give as much satisfaction as they could, but would still drive a bargain. Aston believed that the Emperor would fall in with this agreement and Bavaria's influence would wane. However, he thought it would take some time and require that Spain be trusted (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 7: 9 Jan. 1636, same to Charles I).

¹¹⁹*CSP*, vol. 1, 475: 12 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 479: 19 Mar. 1636, same to same.

I am of the opinion, that, with his only authority, he [Charles I] shall be able to settle the affairs of Christendom. In all cases, let his Majesty continue to show himself to prepare bravely for war; for here, though they have heard much of his greatness, yet they do not believe it to be so great as indeed it is; and it must be the opinion only of his power and strength, that must make them break a treaty and peace so lately concluded with the Duke of Saxony, and the whole Empire; which unless they do, they cannot give the King of England satisfaction.¹²⁰

As these comments show, a healthy dose of realism often balanced Taylor's idealism.

Regardless, the King and Windebank clearly did not accept Taylor's appraisals uncritically.¹²¹

In fact, Windebank upbraided Taylor several times for his lack of discretion in conducting the negotiations. Their main objection concerned Taylor's indiscreet offers of a league with the Emperor before he had extracted assurances of the Prince Palatine's restoration. Windebank warned him against giving the Emperor the wrong impression: "you must take heed of engaging his Majesty too positively in a promise of a league, which his Majesty will never give hopes of, but upon assurance of restitution of his nephew: in this too you must be exceeding wary, leaving still a latitude and

¹²⁰Ibid., 376: 29 Dec. 1635, same to same; see also *ibid.*, 405: 9 Jan. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 475: 12 Mar. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 479: 19 Mar. 1636, same to same. "I am more afraid of the least loss of reputation of his Majesty's arms, than of any other difficulty whatsoever I can possibly meet with in my negotiation; without this, his Majesty will be neither esteemed for a friend nor enemy." (*ibid.*, 475: 12 Mar. 1636, same to same).

¹²¹It must be remembered that they had access to information from other sources, including the reports of Hopton and Aston in Madrid, to help set Taylor's reports in context. Windebank did notice differences between them, for he remarked to Taylor that he feared the envoy was being too optimistic in light of Hopton's reports (*CSP*, vol. 1, 478: 14 Mar. 1636, Windebank to Taylor). For instance, the King and Windebank knew of the Franco-Bavarian treaty of 1631 and must have realized that the Emperor would be more concerned with retaining Bavarian support than Taylor reported (Haskell, 211). Also, Aston wrote on 19 March that the Emperor's ambassador in Spain "found the Emperor, this [Spanish] King and all his Ministers so well inclined, to give his Majesty satisfaction, that certainly what was in the Emperor's power to do would be done [i.e., the removal of the ban, and restoration of the Spanish-occupied Palatinate]...upon equal terms." This was echoed by the young Oñate, who was preparing for his embassy to England. He told Aston that upon a treaty of equal conditions, the King would have satisfaction from the Emperor. However, Aston warned that Spain would be obliged to break with England rather than Bavaria if Charles pressed for full restoration (*CSP*, vol. 1, 482-3: 19 Mar. 1636, Aston to Windebank).

reservation for his Majesty's final resolution."¹²² The Secretary reminded Taylor that the offer of a league was contingent on the eventual full restoration of Charles Louis to the Palatine lands and titles, even if the King would accept a partial restoration for the time being.¹²³ By the same token, Windebank and the King felt that Taylor was too forward with other proposals. When he propounded the relinquishing of the electoral dignity during Maximilian's lifetime, for instance, Windebank pointed out that the Austrians should have first made this proposal, which the King then could have considered on good conditions. He cautioned Taylor to "take heed you stoop not too low."¹²⁴ The Secretary also reproved Taylor for the deferential manner in which he addressed the issue of the removal of the ban, namely as a matter of grace than right. Rather than pressing to have the ban removed, which admitted the legality of its application, Taylor should convince the Emperor to declare that it did not and never had applied to Charles Louis. If the King were to agree to the removal of the ban by grace rather than right, the Imperialists would then view it as a concession rather than a necessity on his part.¹²⁵ When Taylor defended himself against these accusations,

¹²²Ibid., 430: 26 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Taylor; *ibid.*, 478: 14 Mar. 1636, same to same. For offers of a league see, for instance, p. 318 above.

¹²³Ibid., 400: 12 Jan. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 428: 26 Jan. 1636, same to same. Regarding a league, the Habsburgs expected Charles to ally with them to maintain peace in Germany, recover Lorraine, make a grant for Flanders' defense, and force the Dutch to come to terms with Spain (*ibid.*, 475: 12 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank).

¹²⁴Ibid., 448: 15 Feb. 1636, Windebank to Taylor.

¹²⁵Ibid., 428: 26 Jan. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 447: 15 Feb. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 478: 14 Mar. 1636, same to same. In January, Windebank did point out to Charles that Taylor's pressing for the removal of the ban was warranted by his first instructions, and that if the Emperor considered Charles Louis as falling under the ban that it must first be cleared if he was to be restored. The King, however, did not agree: "If they make vs yeld that the Ban is of validety against my Nepueu, wee shall never haue good of this treatie; but wee must haue them declare it of no validety, & so not be taken off." (*CSPD 1635-6*, 179: 2 Feb. 1636: same to Charles I, with latter's notation).

maintaining that he never pressed for less than all of the Palatinate and had not engaged the King in anything.¹²⁶ In fact, outside of the league and grace, they were generally happy with Taylor's negotiations.¹²⁷

Charles and Windebank were not the only ones at the English court to question Taylor's optimistic reports of the Emperor's intentions regarding the Palatinate. Both the French party and the Palatines and their supporters continued to argue that negotiations with the Habsburgs were futile, despite the Emperor's reassurances, and promoted an alliance with the French and Dutch to recover the Palatinate by force. The princes Charles Louis and Rupert, who meanwhile had joined his brother in London, represented the Palatine viewpoint at court.¹²⁸ Their mother, who sent a barrage of letters to her brother and supporters, chief among them Sir Thomas Roe, reinforced this view.¹²⁹

¹²⁶PRO, SP 80/9, f. 119: 14 Apr. 1636, Coke to Taylor; CSP, vol. 1, 451: 3 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank.

¹²⁷[*ibid.*, 478: 14 Mar. 1636, Windebank to Taylor.

¹²⁸Elizabeth wished for Charles Louis to remain in England until the outcome of the missions to the Emperor were known. By April 1636, however, she wanted Rupert return to the Netherlands to go into the field with the Prince of Orange because "He [Rupert] spends his time but idly in England, and she desires to make him a soldier to serve his uncle and his brother." (PRO, SP 16/318, f. 30: 4 Apr. 1636, Elizabeth to Roe). Ultimately she was quite successful in this endeavor.

¹²⁹Sir Thomas Roe, English ambassador and confidant of Elizabeth of Bohemia, attempted to dissuade Charles from wasting any more time haggling with the Habsburgs. To this end, he addressed two memorials to the King. The first was entitled "Considerations upon the hope given by Taylor of restitution of the Palatinat, and the ground thereof, as it appeares to his Majestie and the universall dangers if it prove illusorye." Roe immediately questioned Taylor's effectiveness in this role and characterized him as a "Catholic and to their cause affected." (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 101: 30 Mar. 1636, Roe to Charles I). Roe's next comments further reveal his perception that the Taylors were puppets of the Habsburgs and his confusion about Taylor's lineage, for he continues, "his education was in Spain by the Jesuits, and his whole dependence on that crown; being brother to Taylor the Flanders agent, and nephew to old Taylor the instrument of Gondomar." (*ibid.*). Roe may be referring to Taylor's cousin Anthony, who did study at the English colleges in Madrid and Valladolid; however, the latter statement, that Taylor

Despite their arguments, it was not apparent that an alliance with France would offer greater potential for achieving the restoration of the Palatinate than negotiations with the Habsburgs. Arthur Hopton, one of Charles's most perceptive diplomats, pointed out that while the recovery of the Palatinate through the agency of the Habsburgs was uncertain, England's chances were no better with the French. An alliance with France would entail recovering it by force, which was always a risky proposition. Also, France had an interest in supporting Bavarian retention of the electorate, to gratify Maximilian and weaken his support for the Habsburg cause.¹³⁰ Although Charles had not forgiven the Habsburgs for their duplicity, he decided that negotiations with them had more potential for success than those with France and that the best policy would be to keep his options open. Given the recent competition for his favor generated by the outbreak of war between France and Spain and the lure of the Ship Money fleet, he did have some reason to believe that he could improve his nephew's prospects through negotiation rather than force of arms.¹³¹ In the end, the arguments of the

was nephew to Dr. Robert Taylor [Anthony's father] is indeed correct. The same month, Roe addressed a second memorial to the King, "A second discourse [by Sir Thomas Roe] given to his Majesty, how the Prince Elector may be made considerable in a war, or in a treaty in Germany," in which he reviewed the difficulties of the Prince Palatine's position and recommends that a treaty should immediately be opened with Holland, Sweden, France, and the German Protestant states (*CSPD* 1635-6, 342-3: Mar. 1636, Roe to Charles I). The same year, an anonymous English gentleman, and "sometimes pensioner of Habsburgs," suggested that England plot with the French, Dutch, and Moriscos to recover the Palatinate (BL, Harleian Mss. 6209: 1636, "An infallible means for the recovery of the Palatinate with small charge: as also for the King of France to recover those territories which are kept from him and other distressed princes, nobles and natives, by the King of Spain and House of Austria; and also a means to weaken the said house").

¹³⁰For an earlier French attempt to separate Maximilian from the Emperor, see chap. 3, p. 130.

¹³¹"Yesterday Mons. Seneterre pronounced to the King, that war was declared with Spain, which leads to the inference that the league is concluded, and the announcement made to discover how we would stand in this neutrality, especially the King's fleet being ready to sail, and an expectation of Spanish ships to convey men and money into Flanders. What his Majesty will resolve is too deep a sea for Roe, but the opinion of wise men is that we may look on a while and let these elephants waste their strength. In the meantime all parties will look upon his Majesty, and he may take his opportunity to

Habsburgs' critics did not deter Charles from pursuing the course upon which his heart was set, namely the restoration of the Palatinate by peaceful means.

In light of Taylor's encouraging reports, Charles thus resolved to send an ambassador extraordinary with plenipotentiary powers to the Imperial court to conclude a treaty for the final settlement of the Palatinate question.¹³² The Emperor and his ministers, who had repeatedly alluded to Taylor's lack of powers to conclude the agreement, refused to publish the terms they had offered him until the King sent a plenipotentiary.¹³³ Taylor hoped that he would receive the necessary powers, but Charles did not trust him to handle a matter of such great importance.¹³⁴ Taylor therefore waited for the powers in vain.¹³⁵ Once the English had decided to send an ambassador, they still doubted the veracity of Taylor's assessment of the political and diplomatic situation in Vienna. Coke warned Taylor that he had better not have given the King false hopes for an accommodation: "The hopes you had given of a full restitution and of relinquishing the Bavarian for us have occasioned the employment of this great person to whom you must make good the grounds

throw a little weight into the scale which may best profit him, and when both parties are out of breath, sway the end, and reap the benefit of the war (*CSPD 1635*, 41: 23 Apr. 1635, [Roe] to Elizabeth); Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 518-9). War with France had given new impetus to Olivares's schemes for drawing England into Spain's orbit. Indeed, the Spanish council of state agreed in 1636 that if Spain's naval resources could be supplemented by those of England, "we shall be masters of the sea." (Elliott, Olivares, 508).

¹³²Springell, 2-3.

¹³³*CSP*, vol. 1, 451-3: 3 Mar. 1636: Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 488: 27 Mar. 1636, same to same.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, 447: 15 Feb. 1636, Windebank to Taylor.

¹³⁵Taylor's commission was *ad referendum*, meaning that he could only accept proposals subject to the assent of his principals (*ibid.*, 447: 13 Feb. 1636, Taylor to Windebank).

of the hopes that hee may not find him selfe dishonored by vaine apparences: but that hee cumeth on solid grounds."¹³⁶ These ominous words would take on new meaning in the months ahead.

The first phase of Anglo-Imperial negotiation in the latter years of the 1630s encompassed first the political and diplomatic upheaval that greeted the news of the Peace of Prague at the English court and then the dispatch of John Taylor to Vienna and his negotiations from November 1635 through April 1636. This development not only shows Charles I's continued commitment to his major foreign policy aim, the restoration of his nephew to the Palatinate, but also demonstrates his commitment to achieving this objective by peaceful means. Although he was courted by both the Habsburgs and their opponents at this time, as the outbreak of war between France and Spain and the reinforced fleet intensified the competition for his favor, he did not come down decisively on one side or the other. Instead, he decided to listen to the overtures from both sides to see which held better prospects for restitution. That having been said, the King still believed he would best achieve this through negotiations with Habsburgs, in spite of their apparent duplicity, because they were in the best position to effect his nephew's restoration. He had therefore dispatched John Taylor to the Emperor's court in Vienna and Lord Aston to the King of Spain's court in Madrid. Over the next few years, both envoys conducted secret negotiations with the Habsburgs for the restoration of the Palatinate. In both cases, the King dangled the possibility of a league in front of the Habsburg rulers to persuade them to make an advantageous offer.

The first phase of Taylor's negotiation in Vienna seemed to offer real hope for improving the Prince Palatine's situation and meeting the King's demands for his restoration. Although he hoped

¹³⁶PRO, SP 80/9, f. 119: 14 Apr. 1636, Coke to Taylor.

for full restoration in time and made this demand requisite to a league, he was willing to settle for less (though it was not apparent what, if anything, he was prepared to offer in return). The Emperor, for his part, was committed to reaching a compromise settlement with England. In the interests of peace he wished to mediate an agreement between his allies on the one hand and the English King on the other that would be satisfactory to all involved. The demands of Spain and especially Bavaria, however, limited what he could realistically offer to England. Still, a promising start was made when the Emperor agreed to restore an undetermined portion of the Palatine lands to Charles Louis in return for his formal submission to the Emperor, an offer which would meet the King's minimum demands. It was also encouraging that the Emperor took Taylor's proposals seriously enough to send Clement Radolt as his envoy to England to promote an agreement.

While it was apparent that the Emperor hoped for a league, during this stage of Taylor's negotiation he did not make his offers of restoration contingent upon one. Therefore both the King and the Emperor were trying to inch toward that elusive point where they could gain the maximum advantage for the minimum sacrifice, but there was still plenty of gray area in between. The compromises that both sides slowly but surely made and Taylor's optimistic dispatches strengthened the hopes of the King and Windebank that they could indeed negotiate a solution to the Palatinate question with the Habsburgs. This optimism motivated the dispatch of the Earl of Arundel, one of the greatest noblemen of the realm, as ambassador extraordinary to conclude an agreement.

9

**THE EARL OF ARUNDEL AT THE IMPERIAL COURT AND
CLEMENT RADOLT AT THE ENGLISH COURT, 1636**

Preparations for the Embassy

Upon Taylor's assurance that plenary restitution was within reach, Charles I decided to send an embassy of such importance to the Emperor that he could not fail to give a definite answer about his intentions regarding the Palatinate. Therefore, on 1 April 1636, the King resolved to send Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl of Arundel, to Vienna as ambassador extraordinary to determine whether the Emperor actually meant to deliver on his promises (see fig. 6).¹ Windebank immediately wrote to Taylor to notify him of the decision that the King had taken based upon his positive reports:

I pray God bless the business; whereof I cannot but hope very well, if your grounds hold: which you must look to considering that, upon those frequent and often reiterated assurances, which you have given his Majesty, of full and entire satisfaction, his Majesty hath make choice of this great person, the greatest of his subjects, to labour in this employment²

The King had many reasons, in addition to Arundel's political and social status, to select him for this important post. Charles believed that Arundel possessed additional qualities that would increase his chances to bring the negotiations with the Emperor to a successful conclusion:

¹*Illustrissimus & excellentissimus Dominus Thomas Howardus Comes Arundeliæ, & Surriæ primus Comes, & Comes Marescallus Angliæ . . . ad sacram Cæsar. Ma. Ferdinandum secundum, & ad reliquos Imperii Electores, Principes et Ordines, Legatus extraordinarius* (London: s.n., 1636).

²CSP, vol. 1, 502-3: 10 Apr. 1636, Windebank to Taylor. Roe also wrote excitedly to Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, that "an advice is come from Taylor that has arrested all, and it is this day resolved to send the Earl of Arundel to Vienna to approve the truth." (CSPD 1635-6, 314: 22 Mar. 1636, Roe to Elizabeth).

6 *Illustrissimus & excellentissimus Dominus Thomas Howardus* (1636)

Soon after the King selected Arundel as ambassador extraordinary to the Emperor, this broadside declaration of Arundel's style and title in this capacity was published and distributed.

From Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Ashmolean Manuscripts 845, f. 153.

Illustrissimus & excellentissimus Dominus Thomas Howardus,
 Comes Arundeliae, & Surria primus Comes, & Comes Ma-
 rescallus Angliae: Baro Howard, Mowbray, Segrave,
 Brewes de Gower, Fitz-Alan, Clun, Oswaldestre, Maltra-
 vers & Graystock: Iusticiarius omnium Forestarum Regis vl-
 tra Trentam: locum tenens Regis in Provinciis de Norfol-
 cia, Suffexia, Surria, Northumbria, Cumberlania, & West-
 merlania, Nobilissimi Ordinis Garterij Eques: Serenissimi
 potentissimiq; Principis, Caroli, Magnae Britanniae, Franciae
 & Hiberniae Regis Fidei Defensoris, &c. in Anglia, Scotia, &
 Hibernia a secretioribus Concilijs: & ejusdem Regis ad sa-
 cram Caesar^{am}. Ma^{tem}: Ferdinandum secundum, & ad reliquos
 Imperij Electores, Principes et Ordines, Legatus extraor-
 dinarius. Anno Dom. M.DC.XXXVI.

Arundel's loyalty to the House of Stuart, his high moral standards, his political and diplomatic experience, and even "his very pride and stubbornness would stand him in good stead at the Emperor's court, where fair words, flattery, and procrastination were certain to be used."³ His "Italianate manners, dignified bearing, command of foreign languages and wide-ranging interest in continental culture" also made him well-suited to ambassadorial duties.⁴ Moreover, he was well acquainted with the Palatine House. After the wedding of Frederick V and Princess Elizabeth in 1613, Arundel and his wife accompanied their entourage to Germany.⁵ Later, in 1633, the King dispatched Arundel to the Hague to persuade Elizabeth to return to England after her husband's death.⁶ His experience with the Palatine family and his familiarity with their affairs, coupled with his high standing in England, made him a natural choice to serve as ambassador extraordinary to the Emperor three years later.⁷ The King's confidence in his choice is neatly expressed in a summary of Arundel's instructions: "His Majestie considering what the great interests both of the Prince his nephew & his own honor & general peace hath thought fit to imploy such a considerable person as the Erle Marshal uppon whose wisdom & fidelitie an[d] good affection both to his sister & nephew Hee doth intierly relie."⁸

³Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 357.

⁴Robinson, 103.

⁵Springell, 6.

⁶Elizabeth, however, would not budge because she feared that her return to England would be construed as a retreat, thus endangering her son's prospects for restitution (Robinson, 103).

⁷Arundel was the Earl Marshal and premier earl of the realm. In 1636, the sole marquiss, the Marquis of Winchester, rarely attended court since he had to pay off his father's debts, and the only duke, the Duke of Buckingham, was eight years of age.

⁸PRO, SP 80/9, f. 115: 11 Apr. 1636, Instructions for Arundel, with abstract.

Although his appointment to the post was a great honor and would afford him the opportunity to travel abroad in ducal style, Arundel was not entirely pleased with it.⁹ From the beginning he realized that his mission would be a difficult one and that it did not necessarily enjoy widespread support at court or elsewhere, not even among his colleagues on the foreign committee. Shortly before his departure from England, he expressed his reservations to Sir Thomas Wentworth: "And I hope your Lordship will notwithstanding assist me with your best Wishes and Prayers in this so desperate a Business, which would not want Enemies enough in our own Country and Court, if it wanted in *Germany*."¹⁰ Although he hoped that the parties involved could settle the Palatinate question by peaceful means, Arundel saw clearly that, despite the Emperor's assurances of his desire to give the King satisfaction, it would be difficult to persuade him to restore Charles Louis fully to the Palatine lands and dignities. The influence of the Emperor's allies Spain and Bavaria would make the task more challenging, as Spain wished to retain its foothold along the Spanish Road and Maximilian was set on keeping as many of the lands and dignities so recently accrued to his house as he could.¹¹ According to the King, Arundel's negotiations were intended to be England's last attempt to restore the Prince Palatine and settle the Continental conflict by peaceful means. Arundel,

⁹Many at court believed Arundel would exert himself in his mission because he hoped to regain the title of Duke of Norfolk as his reward (*CSPV* 1632-6, 558: 9 May 1636, Correr to D&S). Arundel paid the greater part of the expenses for his splendid train out of his own pocket; see below, n. 30.

¹⁰*Strafford*, vol. 2, 3: 17 Apr. 1636, Arundel to Wentworth.

¹¹Maximilian noted that Arundel had doubted the outcome of the negotiation from the beginning: "Gleichwol ist auß obbedeiten avisen auch dies abzunemen, daß der graf von Arundel selbst die sachen nit so gar für richtig hält, sondern sehr zweifelt, ob er, was sein könig bei Iherer Kayserlichen Mayestät suechen und begehren laßt, werde erhalten können." (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kastenschwarz 101E: 14 June 1636, Maximilian I to Prince-Bishop of Vienna; quoted in Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 107-8 n. 76).

who had consistently supported this approach in the King's counsels in the past, regarded his mission a worthwhile effort.¹² If the Habsburgs remained recalcitrant despite his attempts at a peaceful solution, the King vowed that this would finally convince him of the futility of negotiation with the House of Austria and would instead take more active measures to regain the Palatine lands and dignities for his nephew.¹³

Despite his misgivings about his mission, Arundel did not take the fatalistic attitude of the Queen of Bohemia, Prince Palatine, and their supporters that any attempt to come to a satisfactory agreement on the Palatinate question with the Habsburgs was bound to fail.¹⁴ Elizabeth diametrically opposed any course which for expediency's sake might result in the partial restitution of the Palatinate.¹⁵ Although she opposed negotiations with the Habsburgs because she doubted that they would conclude an honorable settlement and believed that they would only serve to damage the reputation of England and the Palatine House, if her brother must send a mission, she was glad that Arundel was the one chosen to lead it. To Roe she wrote:

You may easily believe the news of the ambassador to Vienna did a little surprise me, but, as you say, since there is no remedy, we must make the best of it that we can. I am glad my lord of Arundel is chosen, for he being the greatest, I hope he will be

¹²Springell, 1.

¹³*CSPV 1636-9*, 4: 12 June 1636, Francesco Michiel, Venetian ambassador at the Hague, to D&S; *ibid.*, 16: 3 July 1636, same to same.

¹⁴Correr describes an outburst by the Prince Palatine when word came to his ears that the King had no intention of going further with his business than in the past, and that this decision was taken on Arundel's advice. The Palatine's harsh words were directed at Arundel, who, greatly offended, asked the King to excuse him from his mission. Needless to say, the King did not consent to this (*CSPV 1632-6*, 541-2: 11 Apr. 1636, Correr to D&S).

¹⁵When she raised this worry to Archbishop Laud, he informed her that a compromise solution might be the best that she could hope for (Laud, vol. 7, 254: [Apr.] 1636, Laud to Elizabeth).

the last sent, and that another lesser man will not be fit to be sent after so great a one hath failed; for I am confident he will do nothing, but have such another delaying answer as Taylor had.¹⁶

Elizabeth hoped that Arundel's commission would be to accept "tout ou rien," that is, all or nothing. If his mission were unsuccessful, by her reasoning, it would plainly expose the Emperor's true intentions toward her house. Then her brother would no longer accept the Emperor's delaying answers, but instead would take decisive action as he had vowed to do.¹⁷ Roe buttressed this belief when he reported that "If it fail . . . the King has protested he will do that which his honour, his interest, and nature require. . . . It was but a lengthening of the patience she had so long had for a companion, and this mask (if it be one) being taken off, the King will put on armour to revenge it"¹⁸

As soon as Arundel was chosen to lead the embassy, Coke drafted the instructions that would guide Arundel in his negotiations with the Emperor. The King gave him plenipotentiary powers to treat on his behalf. In the first instance he was to insist that the Emperor remove the ban and fully restore Charles Louis to the Palatine lands and dignities. Only once they had agreed upon this could the time and manner of restitution be treated. Not only the Emperor, but also the electors and the King of Hungary had to consent to any agreement that they made. If it became apparent that the Habsburgs were not responding to these demands and they were treating simply to gain time, Arundel was to leave immediately and make it plain that England would negotiate instead with their

¹⁶PRO, SP 16/318, f. 29: 4 Apr. 1636, Elizabeth to Roe.

¹⁷CSPV 1636-9, 4: 12 June 1636, Michiel to D&S; *ibid.*, 16: 3 July 1636, same to same.

¹⁸CSPD 1635-6, 314: 22 Mar. 1636, Roe to Elizabeth.

enemies — particularly France.¹⁹ However, if they granted these terms, the King empowered him to offer a "strict league for the common peace" by which England promised to mediate a peace in the Empire advantageous to the Emperor and to bring the Dutch and French to an agreement with Spain. The assistance that the King would offer the Habsburgs if the belligerents did not comply was stated only in vague terms: "[I]f any of these [the renegade German states, Sweden, the United Provinces, France, and various Italian states] shall refuse just and reasonable conditions and disturb the peace, we will assist the Emperor and his House as far as without breach of treaties we may be able, and to this end will maintain a powerful fleet at sea, and will suffer our people to serve him where we see cause"²⁰ While the King was willing to join in a league for the common peace, he had no intention of entering the war on the Habsburg side in return for the partial restoration of the Palatine lands and dignities, even with the promise of the rest to come, as Windebank had made abundantly clear to Taylor in March: "His Majesty, upon restitution of that which is presently in their power, and promise of the rest, as well dignities as territories, will really join with them in a league for the peace of Christendom: but, if they expect he shall break his treaties with any of his neighbors, or enter into a war for their sakes, they will find themselves deceived."²¹ These were the same type of vague offers that Charles had made in the past, and were hardly motivation for the Habsburg party

¹⁹PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 105-14: 11 Apr. 1636, Instructions for Arundel, with abstract. In return for a league with England, the French would be expected to agree to the Palatinate-Lorraine swap previously suggested by Charles.

²⁰Ibid., f. 105: 11 Apr. 1636, Instructions for Arundel, with abstract.

²¹CSP, vol. 1, 503: Mar. 1636, Windebank to Taylor; CSPV 1632-6, 544: 11 Apr. 1636, Correr to D&S.

to agree to the full restitution of the Prince Palatine.²² The King's reluctance to commit to a straight league would prove the major sticking point for Arundel and Taylor in their negotiations with the Habsburgs.²³

The perceptible hardening of England's stance on the restitution of the Palatinate was readily apparent in Arundel's instructions. The terms set forth were far more uncompromising than those embodied in Taylor's instructions of December 1635, a mere three months earlier.²⁴ His optimistic dispatches relating promises of full restitution obviously affected the King, who seemed determined once and for all to discover the Emperor's position on the Palatinate. Arundel's instructions called for promises of full restitution, even if they were only fulfilled in time. Taylor's, on the other hand, called for the restoration of the Lower Palatinate (or at least its sequestration by a neutral prince, though the King backpedaled on this) and probable grounds of the rest later. He was specifically directed not to press too insistently for the Upper Palatinate, for the King and Windebank recognized that the chances of regaining it were slim given Maximilian's determination to maintain his hold on it. In addition, they empowered Taylor to offer the Habsburgs a provisional alliance and the services

²²This despite the fact that Aston in Madrid had warned the King that he could not expect to get something for nothing, nor achieve the quick result he obviously desired (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, ff. 7-8: 9 Jan. 1636, Aston to Charles I; *CSP*, vol. 1, 466: 5 Mar. 1636, same to Windebank).

²³In May, not long after Arundel had departed from England, Hopton advised Aston that the King was no longer as open to a league with the Habsburgs as he had been when Aston received his instructions. The common opinion at court was that if Arundel should receive an unfavorable answer from the Emperor, the King was poised to turn to France instead, a notion which Hopton believed the King was more than willing to perpetuate to appease the critics of his foreign policy at home and pressure the Habsburgs to yield more to his negotiators abroad. Hopton's measured opinion, however, was that the King "intends only to make a home trial, but not to fall off from the House of Austria." (BL, Add. Mss. 36448, f. 52: 11 May 1636, Hopton to Aston). Time would show the accuracy of his prediction.

²⁴See above, p. 322.

of the fleet in return for these terms. Arundel, on the other hand, had to demand more stringent terms from the Habsburgs and could only offer them a league for the common peace in return. In comparison to Arundel's instructions, Taylor's were much more flexible and encouraged the exploration of alternative routes to a settlement.²⁵

However, secret instructions – whether written or verbal – often tempered official ones.²⁶ The Venetian Correr claimed that Arundel told him that the King intended to discover the true intentions of the Emperor toward his nephew, and then subsequently to reduce his demands to fair limits. He would insist upon the restitution of the Lower Palatinate and investiture of Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire, and then upon the death of the Duke of Bavaria treat about the rest, exchanging the electoral vote for the Upper Palatinate. The King would compensate the Spaniards for their share of the Lower Palatinate with a general peace, so his nephew could enjoy the possession of his dominions and he himself would be relieved of the burden of this obligation.²⁷ Arundel's unofficial negotiations at the end of his embassy bear out these assertions. Also, it was considered that Arundel should offer the Emperor, if he should press, assistance by sea, the present offer of aid and confederation being considered senselessly low ("groll").²⁸

Before his departure, Coke furnished Arundel with the usual commissions and letters which, along with his instructions, in effect formed a diplomatic packet. Besides his instructions, the packet

²⁵*CSP*, vol. 1, 403-4: 9 Jan. 1636, Instructions for Taylor; Haskell, 213.

²⁶Although secret instructions have not been found, they almost certainly existed, as Coke's list of considerations relating to Arundel's mission attests (*PRO*, SP 80/9, f. 285: [Mar. 1636], Coke's notes).

²⁷*CSPV* 1632-6, 544: 11 Apr. 1636, Correr to D&S.

²⁸*PRO*, SP 80/9, f. 285: [Mar. 1636], Coke's notes.

included the following: credentials to the Emperor and the electors, princes, and free cities of the Empire, the Prince of Orange, and the States General; official letters to the Emperor, King of Hungary, and various Imperial officials; a safe conduct; copies of Taylor's instructions, his propositions to the Emperor, and the Emperor's replies; copies of correspondence between the King and the Emperor; and personal letters that Arundel should deliver to various persons, among them a letter from the King to his sister at the Hague.²⁹

While his official papers were being prepared, Arundel was busy selecting the members of his entourage. He carefully assembled a party of distinguished men to accompany him on his journey – an entourage befitting a premier duke. Arundel was intent on gathering the most "exclusive, efficient, and brilliant company" possible.³⁰ Edward Rossingham wrote of the entourage

²⁹Ibid., f. 121: 15 Apr. 1636, Commissions and letters given to Arundel; HHStA, StA England, Kart. 2, ff. 138-9: 10 Apr. 1636, Charles I to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, ff. 78-9: 15 Apr. 1636, Henrietta Maria to same; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 13 Apr. 1636, Charles Louis to same; BL, Add. Mss. 33596, f. 3: 1 Apr. 1636, Charles I to Stralendorf. Arundel's commission to treat with the Emperor is a beautifully illustrated document on vellum, signed by both Charles I and Charles Louis. It is wonderfully preserved at Arundel Castle, with a perfect great seal (ACA, Papers relating to Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel (1585-1646), G 1/88: 28 Mar. 1636, Commission empowering Arundel to treat with Ferdinand II). The privy council ordered English mayors and officers to allow Arundel and his entourage to embark on ship without search and to supply him with horses, carts, and watercraft as required (*CSPD 1635-6*, 341: 10 Apr. 1636, Privy council to all mayors and other officers).

³⁰With such an entourage, Arundel's private expenses greatly outran his official ones. He spent his private funds on things that would bring his retinue to the near-royal level that he felt would do justice to his family's ancient status. It has been stated that upwards of £70,000 was spent on the embassy (Springell, 16 n. 34). If this figure is accurate, Arundel spent nearly £50,000 of his personal fortune on the embassy. He was also compelled to use his own funds to cover official expenses while he was abroad, hoping that they would be reimbursed upon the submission of bills of extraordinaries. Records for two payments to Arundel exist: the first accounts a reimbursement of £12,000 for expenses incurred from the beginning of the embassy in April through mid-August 1636, including his living allowance of £6 per day; the second was a warrant for £7,262, the balance remaining of £19,262 that was due to him beyond his allowance (HMC, *Cowper II*, 79: Apr.-Aug. 1635 [sic], Arundel's accounts Apr.-Aug. 1636; PRO, SP 16/346, f. 79: 14 Feb. 1637, Warrant to pay Arundel; Bodl. Lib., Add. Mss. C 303, f. 161: Warrants to pay expenses of English ambassadors). Since the second sum ties in perfectly with the first, one may assume that together they form the complete account of Arundel's official extraordinary expenses. It can

that "Many gentlemen of quality make all possible means to go this journey; but my lord marshal is very choice of his company."³¹

Among his administrative staff, Arundel brought along Sir Edward Walker, his personal secretary and future biographer, to carry out various duties.³² Sir John Borough, an authority on international law, was engaged as his official diplomatic secretary. Arundel expected Walker and Borough to take on a great deal of responsibility in their administrative duties.³³ Arundel also employed William Crowne, a member of his household, as a private diarist to record the events of the journey. In keeping with his commitment to recording family history, Arundel wished to preserve this great moment for posterity.³⁴ In addition to Arundel's secretarial contingent, Johann Joachim, Count Rusdorf was chosen to accompany the embassy, not only by the Queen of Bohemia to act as her personal representative during the upcoming negotiations but also by express wish of

thus be concluded that he was compensated for most, if not all, of the payment due him, as these warrants authorize all his extraordinaries plus about half of his allowance. Since Springell did not consult the first of the two documents mentioned, he mistakenly claims that "about £25,000 was spent and accounted for," a sum he obviously calculated by adding together the two figures in the warrant (Springell, 14). The funds Arundel had at his disposal may point to an additional reason for his selection for the post, though it was not likely a central one. His finances were not as healthy as one might expect. The burden of debt that the embassy and his craze for collecting, among other factors, placed upon him contributed to the wild plan he floated in the late 1630s to colonize Madagascar and escape his creditors.

³¹Arundel attempted to convince his friend John Selden, lawyer and author of many learned treatises, to accompany him. Selden excused himself on the plea of ill health (Birch, vol. 2, 238: 9 Apr. 1636, Edward Rossingham to Sir Thomas Puckering).

³²For Walker's short biography of Arundel, see his *Historical Discourses*.

³³Arundel had helped both of these men to positions in the College of Arms; at the time, Borough was Garter Principal King of Arms, and Walker Blanch-Lion Pursuivant-at-Arms Extraordinary (Springell, 9-10).

³⁴*Ibid.*, 13-4.

the King.³⁵ Having previously represented Frederick V as an unofficial ambassador to the Imperial court, the Emperor, his councillors, and other influential persons of the Catholic camp personally knew Rusdorf. Among Arundel's entourage he was the most closely acquainted with the problems of the Palatinate. However, it is likely that the King sent Rusdorf in large part to satisfy Elizabeth, since he did not take an active role in the negotiations *per se*.

Besides those attending to the administrative and diplomatic work of the embassy, both official and unofficial, various gentlemen and young relatives of Arundel and some of his colleagues attended the embassy for the purposes of leisure. Among these men were Arundel's cousin William Howard, a Catholic who was in close contact with the Jesuits and papal representatives; William Harvey, the King's physician and the discoverer of circulation of the blood; Arundel's son, William Howard, later Viscount Stafford; Secretary Windebank's son, Francis; and Borough's son, Caisho. All except his cousin William planned to visit Italy while on the Continent. The retinue was rounded out by numerous cavaliers and officers acting as escorts, officials, messengers, and servants. And the multitude grew as the journey progressed.³⁶ Perhaps the most significant addition was the artist Wenceslaus Hollar, who joined the entourage at Cologne. Arundel commissioned Hollar, later famous for his drawings and particularly his engravings, to make watercolors and drawings of the towns and landscapes along the route. With such an entourage, Arundel "traveled in great state and almost royal fashion," which was almost certainly his intention.³⁷

³⁵CSPD 1635-6, 349: 12 Apr. 1636, Warrant to pay Rusdorf.

³⁶According to the *Theatrum Europeum*, he brought 97 people with him (Arthur Bechtold, "Eine Reise durch Franken im Dreißigjährigen Krieg," *Archiv des Historischen Vereins von Unterfranken und Aschaffenburg* 67 [1928]: 21 n. 6).

³⁷Springell, 13-4, 44.

The Progress of the Retinue to the Imperial Court

On 17 April 1636, Arundel and his party set out from Greenwich and on the following day embarked on His Majesty's ship *Happy Entrance*, bound for the Netherlands.³⁸ Three days later, on 20 April, they reached the Hague. Arundel related that at Ryswick, the coaches of the Queen of Bohemia and Sir William Boswell, the English ambassador at the Hague, met him. His first night there he and some members of the entourage went to the court of Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, where Arundel presented them to her. The next day he had an audience with the Estates General, the Prince of Orange, and – most importantly – Elizabeth.³⁹ During their meeting, she objected to the vagueness of his instructions, because she believed they left room for a compromise settlement of the Palatinate question. She was against any attempt to bargain with the Habsburgs and any scheme to negotiate a partial restoration of the lands and titles, even if they promised full restoration in time, which under the circumstances was bound to be the best solution available. She told Arundel that she did not believe there would be an honorable way to recover the Palatinate by treaty, to which he replied that "he was as little confident of it as she was, but he would do his best."⁴⁰ In the end, however, he

³⁸CSPD 1635-6, 356: 16 Apr. 1636, Lords of the Admiralty to Sir John Pennington.

³⁹PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 123-4: 22 Apr. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; *ibid.*, SP 16/318, f. 152: 22 Apr. 1636, Francis Windebank to his father. According to Arundel's report to the Secretary, he took a private house to avoid ceremony. However in a separate account of his reception at the Hague, Arundel related that at Ryswick the Prince of Orange and some of the representatives of the Estates General met him with a fleet of coaches belonging to several ambassadors and conducted him to a house appointed for the entertainment of ambassadors, where he was defrayed during his stay (ACA, AL 1632-1723, no. 359: Apr. 1636, Arundel's account of his reception at the Hague).

⁴⁰CSPD 1635-6, 367: 24 Apr. 1636, Elizabeth to Roe. She also objected to any request for the ban to be removed, as opposed to simply having it declared void, as this would indirectly recognize its lawfulness.

found her "willing to apply herself wholly to his Majesty's order and direction" where negotiations for the restitution of the Palatinate were concerned.⁴¹ He thus assumed her approval of his mission, if with reservations.⁴² After receiving her letters for delivery at the Imperial court, he left her "in settled satisfaction" on 25 April and continued his journey through the United Provinces and into Germany.⁴³

Contrary to Arundel's belief, however, his assurances did not assuage Elizabeth's fears. Although he believed that she was satisfied with, or at least resigned to, his mission, she continued

⁴¹PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 123-4: 22 Apr. 1636, Arundel to Secretary. He later added that "The matter she most blanced at was the marriage [proposed] with the Emperor's daughter, as being many years older than the Prince, and of no comely person. To which I replied that princes in marriages did rather respect states than persons, and that in this, the Prince Elector married the Palatinate rather than the Emperor's daughter, and therefore should more endeavour to advance his estate than to please his eye or fancy." (ibid., ff. 125-8: 24 Apr. 1636, same to same). The marriage of the Prince Palatine to the Archduchess was just one of the many schemes advanced to help settle the question of the Palatinate. The Imperialists saw it as a way to keep Charles Louis under their control, while his supporters saw it as a way to obtain a more favorable settlement.

⁴²This is significant, because in Coke's list of considerations relating to Arundel's mission, one of the main ones was whether Arundel should turn back if Elizabeth objected too heftily to his negotiation. It is unclear whether this was actually incorporated into his secret instructions (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 285: [Mar. 1636], Coke's notes).

⁴³ACA, NC G 1/10: 22 Apr. 1636, Elizabeth to the Emperor, Empress, and King and Queen of Hungary. Shortly after his departure from the Hague, Arundel's wife sent him a tender letter which gives a glimpse into their family life. She asks for news of him and relates news of home: "My deereste harte, I can not chuse but write though I have lettell hope this will com to your handes, I never harde from you sence you embarked, which makes us thinke some letters of you[rs] have miscared, heere is a gentelman, that told my cousen William Howardes wife that you went from the Hagge on tuesday last, but how to beleve it, I know not, because I heare not from your selfe, all heere are God be prayesd vere well, and just as you lefte us, our deere little babes wishe often for your good and speddy returne, which I most humbly beseech Almighty God to send with all his good blessings and send us all an hapye meeting, which shall be they daly prayres of your most faythfull loving wife Alatheia Arundell and Surrey." (ibid., Howard Letters and Papers 1636-1822, Various Letters, vol. 1: 15 Apr. 1636, Alatheia, Countess of Arundel, to Arundel).

to voice her objections to her supporters in strong words.⁴⁴ She still dreaded the acceptance of a compromise based upon the restitution of a portion of her son's inheritance, with the fate of the remainder to be settled at a future date, and remained convinced that military intervention would be the only way to bring about a full and honorable restoration.⁴⁵ She expressed her fears openly to her old friend Sir Thomas Roe:

She has seen Lord Arundel and his instructions, and to her judgment finds that on Roe's side [of] the seas they are resolved to make an end of the Queen's business, well or ill; it is no matter so they be not put to a war; for he has in commission if he cannot get all, to be contented with one part and assurance of the rest to follow; what assurance that can be God knows! and fifteen years experience shows what their promises are.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Roe brought the matter to a point with Elizabeth when he wrote, "What he hears is, that her letters and Lord Arundel's differ.... He writes that she was so content with his ambassage and instructions, that he left her in settled satisfaction; on the other part she has expressed to some a full dislike...of dividing her son's inheritance and deserting the dignity of the Electorate to courtesy, and consequently to desperation, and of involving him in the ban by taking the investiture as a new grant of favour and not of right. Roe has interpreted these doubts that seeing the King was resolved to make trials of a treaty, she submitted to his wisdom and was satisfied with the election of a person of quality, (especially concluding it would be the last, and that she trusted the Prince should be restored or the vizard be taken off)," (*CSPD 1635-6*, 401: 1 May 1636, Roe to Elizabeth). Elizabeth denied that she had led Arundel to believe that she had accepted his mission and claimed that he not only misinterpreted her position but also the Prince of Orange's support (*ibid.*, 533: 4 June 1636, Elizabeth to Roe; *ibid.*, 525: 11 June 1636, same to Laud).

⁴⁵The words of Edward Rossingham echo Elizabeth's fears about Arundel's mission: "The emperor does offer the Lower presently, and the Higher with the electoral dignity, after the Duke of Bavaria's decease, who is an aged man, [and] therefore cannot live long. If this offer of the emperor should be accepted, and that after the Duke of Bavaria's death the other two were prolonged, and not forthwith delivered, (and many other accidents might happen before that time) the young elector, who is now innocent, may be engaged in some business that the emperor may cavil at; so all former promises may be rendered void." (*Birch*, vol. 2, 238: 9 Apr. 1636, Rossingham to Puckering).

⁴⁶*CSPD 1635-6*, 367: 24 Apr. 1636, Elizabeth to Roe. She continued by begging Roe, "if it be possible, to draw her brother from accepting any such thing, and also of thinking of a match between Charles [Louis] and the Emperor's daughter, who is both old and unhandsome, besides all other reasons of dislike." Her tone was quite different with Archbishop Laud five days later, when she said that she would not dispute the King in anything, and that if he wished to send an ambassador, "she is glad he made so good a choice as of the Lord Marshal, of whose affection she is most confident, and that he will agree to nothing that shall be dishonourable." (*ibid.*, 373: 29 Apr. 1636, same to Laud). She goes on to ask him to head off any thoughts the King might have of accepting partial restoration and points out the

If the King had resolved to make trial of a treaty, Elizabeth had no choice but to submit to him, but she would continue to promote her own agenda where possible.⁴⁷ As far as the King's choice of an ambassador was concerned, though she could not doubt Arundel's friendship and constancy to her cause, and "she thinks the Lord Marshal loves her person and children well, yet she sees he is no enemy to the house of Austria, and she knows he loves not the Dutch, neither high nor low, and would have the honour to end this business any way so it be pleasantly, for though he be Marshal, he is not martially given in this business."⁴⁸ Elizabeth would later see the error of her prognostication upon Arundel's return.

After leaving the Hague, Arundel made his way into Germany. Eighteen years of war had left the German landscape devastated, and the ambassador and his entourage encountered terrible scenes of war, famine, and plague on their journey to Vienna. The diary kept by William Crowne reveals the devastation wrought by the war in the Empire. Crowne gives a detailed description of

damage it would do his reputation. Laud, who attempted to act as a mediator between the King and his sister, tried persuade her to adopt a more rational stance toward the negotiations. To assuage her fears, he pointed out that Charles never thought of less than the Lower Palatinate, with the rest to come, and that she could not hope for more. He attempted to persuade her to forget about restoring her son by force when there was still a chance to do so by treaty (Laud, vol. 7, 253-4: [May] 1636, Laud to Elizabeth; *ibid.*, 260-1: 26 June 1636, "same to same; *CSPD* 1635-6, 391: [30 Apr.?] 1636, "same to same). Once Arundel's complaints of the inconclusive nature of negotiations with the Emperor reached England, she became more pliable and declared herself well pleased with his conduct and willing to follow the counsels of her brother, who maintained he was determined to lose no more time (*CSPD* 1636-7, 76: 6 Aug. 1636, Elizabeth to Laud).

⁴⁷*CSPD* 1635-6, 401-3: 1 May 1636, "Roe to Elizabeth; *ibid.*, 406-7: 5 May 1636, "same to same. Roe and Elizabeth continued their attempts to influence the King to a harder line via Laud. Their discussions on the subject of the negotiations can be traced in the *CSPD*.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 367: 24 Apr. 1636, Elizabeth to Roe.

the condition of the lands through which they crossed and the places of interest they visited. The diary remains a valuable record of the desolate condition of Germany during the war.⁴⁹

Accounts of the journey given in the letters of individual members of the retinue reinforce the dismal picture presented by Crowne. At various points along the way, Arundel felt compelled to employ escorts of musketeers or cavalry for their protection. When traveling by boat, members of the party often chose to sleep on board rather than expose themselves to attack by land.⁵⁰ Arundel was in constant fear for the safety of his friend Dr. Harvey, who "making of excursions into the woods, making observations of strange trees and plants, earths etc. and [was] sometimes like to be lost. So that My Lord Ambassador would be really angry with him, for there was not only danger of thieves but also of wild beasts."⁵¹ The devastation was widespread, and it quickly became apparent to Arundel that the journey across the Empire would be very costly, as prices were at three times their usual level; thus he asked the Secretary to send his bills of exchange as quickly as possible.⁵²

Arundel hastened toward Regensburg to wait upon the Emperor before the opening of the Diet, which was set for 7 June.⁵³ The retinue wound its way to the southwest, traveling sometimes

⁴⁹However, he does not record observations of the diplomatic maneuvering that went on.

⁵⁰Wise precautions given the fate that befell two of Arundel's entourage and their local guide (see chap. 10, p. 439).

⁵¹John Aubrey, *Brief Lives*, ed. A. Clark (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), vol. 1, 301; quoted in Springell, 12. Arundel's fears were not unfounded; see the incident in chap. 10, p. 441.

⁵²PRO, SP 80/9, f. 140: 8 May 1636, Arundel to Secretary.

⁵³*Ibid.*, SP 16/321, f. 40: 24 May 1636, Francis Windebank to his father; CSP, vol. 1, 519: 6 May 1636, Arundel to same.

by land and sometimes by water.⁵⁴ Soon after leaving the Netherlands, they encountered the first ravages of war so vividly described in their letters and in Crowne's diary: fighting at the fortress of Schenkenschanz, where the Dutch were besieging the Spaniards, blocked their progress. The Spanish governor refused to grant safe passage to Arundel's party. Thus they were compelled to wait at a distance and observe the fighting for some days, until the Dutch took the fortress and allowed them to pass.⁵⁵ They continued to Wesel, where they hired eighteen wagons; their train, along with a cavalry escort, was so impressive that the citizens of Duisberg took their approach as an enemy attack and closed the city's doors against them.

Despite these obstacles, the party arrived safely at Cologne on 2 May, where they remained a week to make further preparations for the journey.⁵⁶ From the relative safety of this city, young Francis Windebank wrote to his father:

My Lord Ambassador and all his company are safe and well arrived at Cullin [Cologne], this being the only town we have yet come to that is free from sickness [thus far], for we have lain in some towns, that we have been scarce secure, of the house we have lain in hath been free [from sickness] . . . we are now past all those infected places, for between this [Cologne] and Frankford [Frankfurt], there are scarce any people left so that my Lord carries all his provisions of victuals from here with him.⁵⁷

Four days after their arrival, Arundel took the opportunity to send a letter to John Taylor in Vienna, informing him that he was making haste to reach the Imperial court. Arundel asked Taylor to

⁵⁴Crowne recorded that the entourage changed modes of transport no less than thirty times during the mission (Springell, 46).

⁵⁵*CSPV* 1632-6, 562: 16 May 1636, Correr to D&S; Bechtold, 21-2.

⁵⁶*CSP*, vol. 1, 576: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

⁵⁷*PRO*, SP 16/319, f. 83: 4 May 1636, Francis Windebank to his father.

determine what place would be the most convenient for him to meet with the Emperor and present his credentials and letters. Taylor should then forward this information to Arundel at Nuremberg.⁵⁸ The ambassador also wrote to Windebank and requested a copy of Leicester's commission and instructions for France as well as additional letters of credence. While in Cologne, Arundel visited the cathedral and the Jesuits' new church and college.⁵⁹

Arundel hoped while there to meet Maximilian of Bavaria's brother, the elector of Cologne, whom he hoped would exert his influence with Maximilian for a peaceful solution to the Palatinate question. But the elector had left for Bonn, a move Arundel took as evasion.⁶⁰ He did, however, manage to meet with the elector of Mainz, who expressed a keen desire for peace in Germany and promised his good offices for Arundel's negotiations. In fact, Arundel encountered a general "vehement inclination to peace" in Germany generally and noted that "his Majestie is by all men here exceedingly magnified & honored for his pious endeavors in that way."⁶¹ This was unsurprising considering the devastation that worsened daily as the war dragged on.

After leaving Cologne on 8 May, teams of horses towed the entourage up the Rhine on boats (pictured in Hollar's drawings).⁶² Travel was quite hazardous because they were obliged to move through some areas of skirmish, notably at the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein at Koblenz, where the

⁵⁸CSP, vol. 1, 576: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

⁵⁹There he encountered "little Dr. Harvey, who means to convert them [the Jesuits]." (ibid., 519: 6 May 1636, same to same).

⁶⁰Springell, 19.

⁶¹PRO, SP 80/9, f. 140: 8 May 1636, Arundel to Secretary.

⁶²HMC, *Denbigh V*, 27: 17 May 1636, Taylor to Feilding; Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 361.

combatants momentarily suspended the siege to allow Arundel's barges to pass upstream.⁶³ It was not unusual for shots to ring around them, and sometimes they were directly shot at. Rampant plague contributed to the unsafe conditions, and often they thought it wiser to sleep and eat on the boat rather than disembark.

The company next passed into the Lower Palatinate, which was badly devastated. The populace of the once-prosperous territory was famished. What he saw there grieved Arundel:

what miserable effects of war appeared . . . especially in the Palatinate. The tenth man (as they report) not left alive. Most of the country [was] desolate and unmanned. Many towns upon the river-side [were] ruined and without inhabitants. In the best towns most peopled [there was] not so much bread to be bought as would suffice one man for one day. Not only the townsmen, but the soldiers [were] starved for want of meat.⁶⁴

Crowne reported that the conditions there were so bad "that the poore people are found dead with grasse in their mouthes." Arundel distributed food to the deprived inhabitants regularly during the journey. Conditions did not improve when the entourage reached Mainz. They remained on the boats, because no food was available in that city. The local people were near starvation, and the crowd that gathered on shore struggled wildly for the leftover food Arundel distributed: "heere likewise the poore people were almost starved, and those that could relieve others before, now humbly begged to bee relieved, and after supper all had reliefe, sent from the ship ashore, at the sight of which they strove so violently, that some of them fell into the *Rhine* and were like to have bin drowned."⁶⁵

⁶³Parker, *TYW*, 146.

⁶⁴PRO, SP 80/9, f. 154: 24 May 1636, Arundel to Secretary; quoted in Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 363.

⁶⁵Crowne, 8-9.

From Mainz they continued to Frankfurt, and along the way "all the Townes, Villages, and Castles bee battered, pillaged or burnt."⁶⁶ Francis Windebank wrote again to his father of the deprived state of the German territories: "My Lord was forced to carry all his provision of victuals with him, for by the way there was not any thing to be gotten for money, the people almost all starved, and do daily die with grass in their mouths. The chieftest men of the towns told the us that horseflesh would be a great feast if they could get it."⁶⁷ The sorry state of the country caused travel expenses to skyrocket. After his arrival in Frankfurt, on 13 May, Arundel wrote that the high cost of the journey by boat and of provisions was regrettable but unavoidable.⁶⁸ The letters of credence and bills of exchange that Arundel had requested earlier were not waiting there, and he was forced to buy a letter of credit from a Frankfurt citizen for the trip to Nuremberg.⁶⁹ Due to the outrageous cost of the journey, he again asked Coke to send him bills of exchange, this time to Nuremberg.⁷⁰ During the retinue's four-day stay in Frankfurt, its members visited the cathedral, cemetery, and synagogue.⁷¹

From Frankfurt the company traveled overland to Nuremberg, and from there it continued through the Upper Palatinate to the Danube River. Arundel had no choice but to spend some nights

⁶⁶Ibid., 9.

⁶⁷PRO, SP 16/320, f. 42: 15 May 1636, Francis Windebank to his father.

⁶⁸Boat hire on the Rhine was £60 a day for two boats (Springell, 20).

⁶⁹CSP, vol. 1, 537: 31 May 1636, Borough to Windebank.

⁷⁰PRO, SP 80/9, f. 149: 15 May 1636, Arundel to Secretary; *ibid.*, f. 151: 16 May 1636, same to same.

⁷¹Crowne, 9-10.

in his coach because whole towns were laid waste, "where neither bread nor bed was to be found."⁷² It was a wise move to bring provisions along with them, for they encountered several places along the journey where not a soul remained. One of these villages was Neunkirchen, where the travelers found a burning house but little else. They remained the night with carbines in their hands for protection, as they periodically heard gunfire in the woods around them. They took advantage of what they could there by roasting the meat for Arundel's supper over the coals of the burning house.⁷³ This was not the first time the party was compelled to camp among the wreckage of a formerly prosperous settlement and subsist on the supplies they had prudently packed.⁷⁴

The party reached Nuremberg on 21 May and remained there for eleven days.⁷⁵ Once again, no bills of exchange were waiting for Arundel. He complained to the secretaries of state that he needed more money and letters of credence and was ill-informed of events in England. He requested

⁷²PRO, SP 80/9, f. 154: 24 May 1636, Arundel to Secretary.

⁷³Crowne, 10-11. They learned later that the inhabitants of Neunkirchen had fled because of the plague and had set the house in question on fire to prevent travelers from becoming infected.

⁷⁴They were, however, determined to make the best of the situation, as Francis Windebank reported to his cousin: "all our provisions of victuals, we carried with us, otherwise we must have fasted, for almost all places we came into, the people are starved and dead. One night we came to a village where we lay, which we had wholly to our selves for there was not one living creature left in it. By good fortune there was one barn full of good straw, which we laid under a hedge, and slept as well on it as ever I did in my life. My Lord had a very good lodging which was his coach. Thus we have passed through a very brave country, but all spoiled and depopulated. Divers poor souls we have offered bread unto, that hath been so far famished they were past eating." (PRO, SP 16/321, f. 115: 29 May 1636, Francis Windebank to Robert Reade; *ibid.*, f. 40: 24 May 1636, same to his father).

⁷⁵CSP, vol. 1, 576: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

"frequent weekly notice" in the future so that the Emperor's and Spanish ambassador's intelligence of developments in England would not be better than his own.⁷⁶

During his embassy, Arundel corresponded regularly with Secretaries Coke and Windebank, passing on essentially the same information to both. Unlike Taylor's negotiations, Arundel's were not of a secret nature and thus did not lead to clandestine lines of communication between him and leading members of the peace party at court. Greater contact with Coke was to be expected, since he was the Secretary responsible for missions to the Empire, and as such had prepared Arundel's instructions and provided him with his "diplomatic packet";⁷⁷ it was to Coke that he directed his requests for revocation, his bills of extraordinaries, and most of his appeals for money while he was abroad. Windebank was a personal friend of Arundel, and an ally at court, which might help explain the frequency of Arundel's contact with him. Arundel obviously wrote to both to keep himself as informed as possible about the views of the government on his negotiations. He also felt a duty to keep both Secretaries informed of his negotiations.⁷⁸

⁷⁶PRO, SP 80/9, f. 154: 24 May 1636, same to Secretary; *ibid.*, f. 160: 28 May 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 529: 24 May 1636, same to Windebank. When Arundel's complaints reached the King's ears, he told Sir Henry Vane that it was necessary for the government to hold strict correspondence with Arundel. Vane replied that Arundel was sent letters weekly, but that in time of war their timely delivery could not be accounted for. The King accepted this explanation, but desired that in the future miscarriage be prevented with the same vigilance as the Spanish ministers practiced (CSPD 1635-6, 532: 13 June 1636, Vane to Windebank).

⁷⁷PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 105-16: 11 Apr. 1636, Instructions for Arundel, with abstract; *ibid.*, ff. 121-2: 15 Apr. 1636, Commissions and letters given to Arundel.

⁷⁸He sent dispatches especially to Windebank when he knew that Coke would not be able to share his: "I send you just what I send to Mr. Secretary Coke, because I make account he will be absent in the progress." (CSP, vol. 1, 615: 20 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Windebank).

Arundel spent much of his time in Nuremberg taking in the sights and viewing works of art. It was at this time that he purchased for the low price of 350 thalers the valuable library of humanist Willibald Pirckheimer from his great-grandson, who had to sell "in consideration of the hard times and the difficulty of obtaining food."⁷⁹ Before Arundel left, he received his first post from England, which significantly improved his humor.⁸⁰

As Arundel made his way toward Austria, Taylor journeyed from Vienna to Nuremberg to meet him, as Arundel had previously instructed, to give him the latest tidings from the Imperial court and discuss the prospects for the negotiations; Arundel arrived on 23 May.⁸¹ From this point on, Arundel took control of the negotiations as ambassador extraordinary, while Taylor, as resident agent, served in a subordinate capacity.⁸² Upon their first meeting, Arundel seems to have formed a good opinion of Taylor and his negotiations thus far, writing "Mr. Taylor seems to me an honest and clear-hearted man, and to have done the King our master very good service: he hopes well."⁸³ Taylor informed Arundel that he need not rush to meet the Emperor before the Diet convened, as Ferdinand II was currently at Linz waiting for the electors to assemble in Regensburg, and they

⁷⁹Springell, 107 n. 60; Albert Gumbel, "Die englische Mission des Grafen von Arundels in Nürnberg, Mai und November 1636," *Archivalische Zeitschrift* 11 (1904): 100-17. Pirckheimer was a close friend of the artist Albrecht Dürer, and Arundel's purchase included manuscripts illustrated by Dürer and other masters. A number of the printed volumes also had original illuminations by Dürer.

⁸⁰CSP, vol. 1, 536: May 1636, Arundel to Windebank; CSPV 1632-6, 563: 17 May 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

⁸¹Taylor had received Arundel's instruction on 15 May and had acquainted the Emperor, King of Hungary, and Oñate with the news of his coming (CSP, vol. 1, 576: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank).

⁸²PRO, SP 80/10, f. 35: 25 Nov. 1636, Taylor to [?]; HMC, *Denbigh V*, 41: 25 Nov. 1636, same to Feilding.

⁸³CSP, vol. 1, 535: May 1636, Arundel to Windebank. He also added: "in truth he appears to me an hearty, well-affected servant to the King, and to have done this business well."

seemed in no hurry to do so. The Emperor therefore desired that the ambassador first meet the King of Hungary at Nördlingen, where he was waiting until the electors called him to Regensburg, and then journey on to wait on him at Linz.⁸⁴ Taylor also bore unwelcome news that would further complicate the negotiations – the Duchess of Bavaria was expecting a child, whom Maximilian hoped would prove an heir to his estates.⁸⁵ However, this did not significantly dampen Taylor's hopes for a positive outcome to the negotiations; he was willing to believe the Duchess's declaration that she did not intend for her child to hinder a peaceful resolution to the Palatinate question.⁸⁶ Arundel, though disheartened, did not lose all hope for a full restitution after the Duke's death: "the point will be, that the King our master's friendship may be valued before the Duke of Bavaria's; which I shall endeavor to make them see. In the mean time, I hope, in England the reputation of our fleet . . . will help well what I shall say here."⁸⁷

Arundel remained in Nuremberg several days in expectation of his meeting with the King of Hungary at Nördlingen. Weary of waiting, on 1 June Arundel left for Regensburg, which was nearly as close to Nördlingen as Nuremberg, but was two days' journey closer to Linz. He arrived

⁸⁴Ibid.; *ibid.*, 576: 2 July 1636, same to same.

⁸⁵It appears that Maximilian's consumption of viper-fed capons and chickens to increase his virility, at which Taylor had scoffed, may have indeed been effective.

⁸⁶The Duke of Bavaria might have an heir, but Taylor believed the report that "his Dutchesse, though certainly now (as they say) with child, *hath given the Emperor assurance...that she would wish, rather then to hinder so great good by what was in her womb, that she had never bene borne.*" (HMC, *Denbigh V*, 25: 26 Apr. 1636, Taylor to Feilding). He also wrote, regarding the impediment Maximilian might present to the election of the King of the Romans, that the Habsburgs felt assured of victory. He added, "the Duke of Bavaria must not...stand betweene the peace of Christendome, which they assuredly doe hold this treaty doth bring along with it, and that his Majesty will bee the gloriousest King the world hath." (*ibid.*, 26: 3 May 1636, same to same). Taylor expressed the same opinion to Coke (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 103: 9 Apr. 1636, same to [Coke]).

⁸⁷CSP, vol. 1, 529: 24 May 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

there on 3 June, but discovered to his dismay four days later that his meeting with the King of Hungary was cancelled.⁸⁸ Arundel believed the King avoided him "for fear of offending the old vulpone his uncle and brother of Bavaria."⁸⁹ To avoid further delay, Arundel promptly dispatched Taylor ahead to Linz to request an audience with the Emperor. The next day, Arundel and his party followed, traveling down the Danube via Passau to Linz.⁹⁰

Radolt's Early Audiences at the English Court

While Arundel was making his way across the Empire, Radolt, accompanied by Henry Taylor and Necolalde, had his first audience with the King on 8 May, at which he delivered his compliments.⁹¹ Given the optimism of Taylor's dispatches, the King and his ministers hoped for good issue from Radolt's mission, and they looked forward to a substantive explanation of the Emperor's intentions where the Palatinate was concerned. In his address, however, Radolt held himself to generalities, in spite of the King's prodding for further information, because he reasoned that the Emperor would soon be engaged in negotiations with Arundel in Vienna.⁹² The papal agent Gregorio Panzani

⁸⁸Ibid., 538: 8 June 1636, same to same; ibid., 576: 2 July 1636, same to same. In Regensburg, the monks of the *Schottenkirche* (the church and monastery of St. James, founded by Scottish Benedictines) presented Arundel with a petition. They reported that they had suffered terribly during the war and therefore requested Arundel to ask the King to assist them in rebuilding, as their house was descended from the Scottish royal house and had received support from Scottish monarchs in the past (BL, Add. Mss. 15970, f. 45: [1636], Brother Silvanus Mainus to Arundel).

⁸⁹CSP, vol. 1, 561: 23 June 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

⁹⁰Ibid., 576: 2 July 1636, same to same.

⁹¹HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. 32: 9 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II; Finet, 198-9. The Queen, Prince Palatine, and royal ministers were also present at the audience. Finet noted that neither Henry Taylor nor Necolalde presented Radolt to the King.

⁹²HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, ff. 32-3: 9 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II. Correr was not far off base when he speculated that Radolt was waiting to receive news of Arundel's first

reported that the Queen, who favored a French alliance, did her best to undermine Radolt.⁹³ At his second audience five days later, Radolt again spoke in generalities, much to the dissatisfaction of the English, giving a long oration on the miseries visited upon the Empire by war and the desirability of a general peace.⁹⁴ He again avoided the issue of the Palatinate, but to stave off their discontent, he intimated that he had a more particular charge that would be better presented in writing.⁹⁵

The situation worsened at Radolt's third audience, on 27 May at Somerset House, because he still had not delivered any written proposals and again avoided making reference to the Palatinate. When asked by the King himself about the special charge he had mentioned at his previous audience, Radolt again gave only a vague answer, whereupon the King lost his patience.⁹⁶ Charles Louis, who was also present at the audience, declared openly that these were the usual tricks employed by the Habsburgs, and that they would continue to delay until armed force compelled them to do otherwise. Several courtiers apparently found this interchange amusing, for Hopton reported that while the audience was going on, "Goring, Percy and Jermayn stood in a door and laughed at him so openly

audience with the Emperor (*CSPV 1632-6*, 554: 2 May 1636, Correr to D&S). On 19 May, in response to Radolt's audience, the King wrote the Emperor a letter sending his compliments and expressing his hopes for the good outcome of Arundel's negotiations for the restitution of the Palatinate (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 2: ff. 140-1: 19 May 1636, Charles I to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 19 May 1636, same to same).

⁹³Smuts, "Puritan Followers," 38.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. 87: 16 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II.

⁹⁵*CSPV 1632-6*, 562: 16 May 1636, Correr to D&S.

⁹⁶PRO, SP 80/9, f. 169: 2 June 1636, Coke to Arundel.

as he saw it and hath complained thereof to Secretary Windebank and hath written of it into Germany."⁹⁷

At this point, many at court were unsure of what to make of Radolt and his mission. Soon after his third audience, Hopton wrote to Aston in Spain about the divided opinion on the subject:

By what concerns this gentleman I find a strange difference in the opinions, the one making him a messenger to mock us, the other esteeming of him and his message well, which although it came not so home to the business of the Palatinate as was hoped save a very good intimation of the Emperor his disposition to an accommodation, which is not to be despised considering the condition of the Lord Marshall's embassy.⁹⁸

However, Radolt's evasive conduct at these and subsequent audiences increasingly raised suspicions at court that the main goal of his mission was to gain time, and thus preserve English neutrality.⁹⁹ Correr noted the dissatisfaction at court, but also pointed out that Radolt's field of movement was necessarily limited because Arundel held full powers to negotiate at Vienna: "The slowness of this minister [Radolt] about opening the business of the Palatine is noted with some jealousy, because they think his proposal to negotiate by writing is only a device to gain time; although in any case he cannot do much here because the Earl of Arundel on the other side holds absolute powers."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷BL, Add. Mss. 36448, f. 52: 11 May 1636, Hopton to Aston. Radolt also was a source of amusement for the court ladies when he paid a ceremonial visit to the Queen on 25 May and made an hour-and-a-half long speech in Latin that she did not understand and Secretary Windebank could not interpret, "possibly because he was tired of listening." (ibid.).

⁹⁸Ibid., ff. 52-3: 11 May 1636, same to same. Radolt wrote that Hopton had lately arrived from Spain, and he was to go to Brussels in Gerbier's place (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. 41: 9 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II).

⁹⁹PRO, SP 80/9, f. 238: 14 Sept. 1636, Coke to Arundel.

¹⁰⁰CSPV 1632-6, 562: 16 May 1636, Correr to D&S. He further observed: "Some think that the councillor [Radolt] may be awaiting news of Lord Arundel's negotiations, but the general opinion is that the real object of the Austrians [Habsburgs] is to gain time with regard to granting the satisfaction which England claims; employing mild inducements in order not to compel her to have recourse to force, as

Correr's observation was later confirmed, because when the Emperor discovered Arundel was on his way to the Imperial court, he duly informed Radolt to confine his negotiation to generalities and await further instructions.¹⁰¹ Thus, the theater of negotiations had effectively moved to Germany.

Radolt's omission to attend the King when he retired for the summer to the country generated more bad feeling. At the end of May, soon after his third audience, the King left London for Hampton Court, earlier than usual due to the plague. The French, Dutch, and Venetian ambassadors and the Savoyard and Florentine residents followed suit, but Radolt and Necolalde did not. Radolt thus allowed the King to leave for the country before declaring the objects of his mission or opening negotiations with the King and his ministers.¹⁰² Furthermore, the fact that neither the Imperial nor the Spanish envoy followed the court gave the impression of an inattentive Habsburg front.

While those at the English court were forming opinions about Radolt's mission, the Imperial envoy was doing the same concerning the intentions of King and his subjects. In May, Radolt carefully investigated and reported on the topics given in his instructions. On the subject of the

that, in any case, could not fail to be most harmful to their interests and aims, unless they succeeded in arriving at a solid alliance." (ibid., 565: 2 June 1636, same to same). Correr believed that Charles was unlikely to purchase satisfaction for the Palatines at the price of a league that would require him to become involved in the war, which was on the mark where the provision of land forces was concerned. He also noted that Radolt did not offer Charles Louis territory in Flanders in compensation for his lost Palatine lands; in any case both the King and his nephew were against the idea (ibid.).

¹⁰¹*CSPV 1636-9*, 17: 5 July 1636, Ballarino to same; ibid., 35: 1 Aug. 1636, same to same.

¹⁰²*CSPV 1632-6*, 570-2: 30 May 1636, Correr to same. Radolt himself eventually left London to escape the plague, spending a leisurely summer walking and riding in the country and making no appearance at court. He reported that in any case the King was on progress and that his ministers had dispersed due to the plague, thus allowing little opportunity for him to negotiate or gather intelligence (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 17: 1 Aug. 1636, Radolt to [Imperial Secretary Walderode]). During Radolt's retirement in the country, the King ordered his subjects to assist him by providing accommodation and entertainment as the occasion might require and to allow him to practice his religion, or "answer the contrary at their perils." (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 177: [May] 1636, Royal order for Radolt's reception).

chances that the King would break with the Habsburgs and ally with their enemies if not satisfied in the Palatinate, Radolt wrote that he did not doubt that the King and Parliament desired the restitution of the Prince Palatine.¹⁰³ However, he did not think an open rupture would develop between England and the Habsburgs if they did not fully restore the Palatine, because the King would then have to ally with the French and Dutch to effect his nephew's restoration. He was not inclined to join with either of them, because the former were untrustworthy and the latter maritime competitors. Most importantly, however, he would not ally with the French and Dutch because it would almost surely involve him in a land war. To support this war would require calling Parliament, which the King was unwilling to do.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, war would disrupt freedom of trade, the revenues derived from which were the mainstay of his income. Radolt concluded, therefore, that the King highly esteemed his friendship with the Habsburgs not only because he hoped to effect the restoration of his nephew through them, but also because of the benefits he gleaned from trade, particularly with Spain. In fact, Radolt believed that the King intended the fleet for the security of the realm and fostering trade rather than waging war.¹⁰⁵

As instructed, Radolt moved to discover more about the size and quality of the English fleet. He sent the Emperor a list detailing the financial contributions raised from cities and counties in 1636 for six months' support of the fleet (including munitions and provisions), the number and

¹⁰³One of the reasons that the King would not abandon the restoration of his nephew was because it was costly for him to help support the Palatines in exile (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. 34: 9 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II).

¹⁰⁴Ibid., ff. 1-2: 2 May 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, ff. 33-4: 9 May 1636, same to same. However, the fact that the Earl of Leicester had been sent to France to negotiate an alliance did give Radolt pause.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., ff. 1-2: 2 May 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, ff. 33-4: 9 May 1636, same to same.

capacity of the ships supported, and the number of personnel manning them. These ships each boasted between 30 and 40 pieces of artillery.¹⁰⁶ Radolt believed, however, that only 35 of the 45 warships reported existed, 25 of which were either deficient or still being prepared for service. He noted that the young and inexperienced Earl of Northumberland was currently Admiral of the fleet; however, the experienced and formidable Pennington supported Northumberland as Vice Admiral (see fig. 7).¹⁰⁷ Despite the fleet's perceived deficiencies, Radolt still believed that one English ship could combat three or four of its French counterparts.¹⁰⁸

Radolt also addressed the question of whether the King would be willing and able to enter into an alliance with the Habsburgs. The envoy had no doubt that Habsburg opponents would attempt to obstruct it by arguing that the Emperor's intention in these negotiations was to draw out time and preserve English neutrality, as the King of Spain had been doing for so many years. However, Radolt believed that these critics would not hold the King back from an alliance if he were persuaded that the Emperor sincerely wished to settle the Palatinate question. The envoy thought that an alliance of some sort would be struck eventually, depending upon whether the young Oñate

¹⁰⁶In all, it was reported that the English fleet consisted of 45 ships capable of carrying 20,350 combined tons and was manned by 10,660 sailors, and that £218,500 (which Radolt converted to 1,556,666 florins) was collected in 1636 for six months' support, including provisions and munitions (ibid., f. 81: 1636, List of contributions to fleet, broken down by county and city).

¹⁰⁷*List of his Maiesties Ships, with others of the Merchants that are now set forth under the Command of the Right Honourable, Algernon Percy, Earle of Northumberland, ...Generall and Admirall of his Majesties Fleet for this Expedition; with the names of the Captaines and Llieutenants that are employed in this Action; with the names of the Ships of his Majesties, that are making ready for a supply* (London: Printed for Thomas Walkley, 1636).

¹⁰⁸Ibid., f. 42: 9 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II.

7 *A List of his Maiesties Ships . . . that are now set forth under the Command of the Right Honourable, Algernon Percy, Earle of Northumberland (1636)*

This broadside lists the English ships under the command of the Earl of Northumberland, Admiral of the Fleet. In addition to a portrait of Northumberland, with the fleet waiting ready behind him, it bears the names of the ships as well as the captains and lieutenants employed upon them. In total, 35 royal ships and three London merchantmen are listed. A similar broadside was published with the likeness of Sir John Pennington, Vice Admiral of the Fleet, and the names of many of the same ships with their masters, masters-mates, boatswaines, pursers, and gunners. Radolt, who was instructed to discover all he could about the size and quality of the English fleet, sent both of these broadsides back to Vienna, along with other information. He noted that Northumberland was young and inexperienced, but Pennington, who supported him, was experienced and formidable. Despite the fleet's perceived deficiencies, Radolt believed that one English ship could engage in combat with three or four of its French counterparts.

From Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilung England, Konv. 1818, f. 84.

List of his Majesties Ships, with others of the Merchants that are now set forth under the Command of the Right Honourable, ALGERNON PERCY, Earle of Northumberland, Lord Ponning, Fitz-paine, Brian and Latimer, Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter, Generall and Admirall of his Majesties Fleet for this Expedition; with the names of the Captains and Lieutenants that are employed in this Action, with the names of the Ships of his Majesties, that are making ready for a Supply.

The names of Ships, Captains, and Lieutenants.

His Majesties Royall Ship called the *Triumph*, *Algermon*, Earle of Northumberland, Generall and Admirall; Captain *William Rainesborough* his Lordships Captain, and Master *Robert Rouse* his Lieutenant.

Nobility in his Lordships Ship.
Edward, Lord Viscount Conway.
The Lord Lile, Sonne of the Earle of Leicester.

Gentlemen Volunteers.
Master *Edward Douse*,
Captain *Thomas Badby*.

His Majesties Ship called the *Saint Andrew*, Sir *John Pennington* Vice Admirall, and Captain *Robert Fox* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties Ship called the *James*, Sir *Henry Mervin* Rear Admirall, and Master *Andrew Menner* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties Ship called the *Victory*, Captain *Walter Stewart* Captain; and Captain *Thomas Badby* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties Ship called the *Unicorn*, Sir *Henry Maymaring*.

His Majesties Ship called the *Garland*, Captain *Richard Fodge* Captain, and Master *Walter Moyle* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties Ship called the *Bonaventure*, Captain *Henry Stradling* Captain, and Master *Rice Butten* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties Ship called the *Happy Entrance*, Captain *George Cartwright* Captain, and Captain *Browne* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties Ship called the *Swallow*, Captain *Thomas Kirke* Captain, and Master *Thomas Wynd* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties Ship called the *Adventure*, Captain *Thomas Price* Captain.

His Majesties Ship called the *Mary Rose*, Captain *John Fletcher* Captain.

His Majesties Ship called the *Blacke George*, Captain *William Smith* Captain.

His Majesties Pinace called the *Lions second Whelpe*, Captain *Philip Hill* Captain.

The right Honourable and most noble, ALGERNON PERCY, Earle of Northumberland, Lord Ponning, Fitz-paine, Brian and Latimer, Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter, Admirall and Generall of his Majesties Fleet for this Expedition.

His Majesties Pinace called the *Lions fourth Whelpe*, Sir *Ellis Hicky* Captain.

His Majesties Pinace called the *Lions fifth Whelpe*, Captain *John Butley* Captain.

His Majesties Pinace called the *Lions tenth Whelpe*, Captain *Francis Smith* Captain.

His Majesties Pinace called the *Greyhound*, Captain *Robert Turner* Captain.

His Majesties Pinace called the *Roe Buck*, Captain *Robert Slingsby* Captain.

Merchants Ships provided by the Londoners.

The good ship called the *Jonas*, Captain *Richard Fielding* Captain, and Master *Robert Appelen* his Lieutenant.

The good ship called the *great Neptune*, Captain *Beast Johnson* Captain, and Master *Edward Powell* his Lieutenant.

The good ship called the *Truelove*, Captain *Peter Lindley* Captain.

Landed: Printed by Thomas Kellie.

Captain, and Captain *Richard Owen* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties ship called the *Defiance*, Captain *David Murray* Captain, and Captain *Henry Keyes* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties ship called the *Charles*, Captain *Thomas Kettleby* Captain, and Master *Thomas Kettleby* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties ship called the *Henretta Maria*, Captain *Thomas Porter* Captain, and Master *Edward Popham* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties ship called the *Repulse*, Captain *Lewis Kirk* Captain, and Captain *Christopher Lowe* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties ship called the *Nonfuch*, Captain *John Perry* Captain, and Master *Lionel* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties ship called the *Conventine*, Captain *John Manner* Captain, and Captain *Barrgrave* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties ship called the *Affluence*, Lieutenant Colonel *Jerome Brett* Captain, and Master *John Berry* his Lieutenant.

Ships of his Majesty upon the Irish Sea.

His Majesties ship called the *Leopard*, Sir *Richard Plumley* Admirall, and Master *Richard Buller* his Lieutenant.

His Majesties Pinace called the *Lions ninth Whelpe*, Sir *Beverly Rousmes* Captain.

Ships of his Majesties making ready for a second supply.

His Majesties ship called the *Saint George*.
His Majesties ship called the *Swiftsure*.
His Majesties ship called the *Rainbow*.
His Majesties ship called the *Reformation*.
His Majesties ship called the *Dreadnought*.
His Majesties ship called the *Antelope*.
His Majesties Pinace called the *Lions first Whelpe*.
His Majesties Pinace called the *Lions third Whelpe*.

brought the promised plenipotentiary powers to England, of which Radolt remained doubtful.¹⁰⁹ Given Leicester's mission to France, Radolt reasoned that the friendship of the King was not to be disdained, and that the negotiations in Vienna would shed some light on what concessions in the Palatinate would satisfy the King and draw him to the Habsburg side. Still, Radolt maintained that such an alliance, if it indeed came about, would not offer the Emperor himself much advantage. The King might be strong at sea, but he did not have the financial means to make a decisive difference in the land war.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, Radolt believed that the Habsburgs' enemies were not profiting in the current situation – the King was giving them little financial support and was not presently allowing them to levy troops in Britain.¹¹¹

At this point, less than two weeks after his arrival in England, Radolt requested leave to return home. Although he had originally been instructed to remain for three months, he did not see any great need to do so given that he had already reported on most of the matters required by his instructions and that Arundel was on his way to Vienna with plenipotentiary powers to treat with the Emperor on the Palatinate question. Throughout the rest of his mission, Radolt continued to ask for his recall, complaining that his limited understanding of English and French, which were the primary

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, ff. 87-9: 16 May 1636, same to same. Radolt seemed generally suspicious of the Spaniards' intentions. He reminded the Emperor that he should not declare what concessions he was willing to make in the Palatinate until Spain had finally declared its intentions in the Lower Palatinate. If the Emperor were to make a resolution without this assurance, Spain would then reach its goal of ensuring English neutrality without making any concomitant commitment to restore its holdings in the Lower Palatinate (*ibid.*, f. 35: 9 May 1636, same to same).

¹¹⁰By the same token, if there were a break in Anglo-Habsburg relations, Spain would be most affected (*ibid.*, f. 88: 16 May 1636, same to same).

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, ff. 33-5: 9 May 1636, same to same. The exception was the English regiments that had been in the Low Countries since Elizabeth's reign, which were still allowed to recruit in Britain.

languages spoken at court, limited his effectiveness. He also objected to the strange and ultimately hostile way of proceeding in England. Finally, he yearned to practice his religion openly, and in familiar and comfortable surroundings in Vienna.¹¹²

By the beginning of June, Radolt had reconsidered some of his previous opinions after delving further into the question of whether the King needed Parliamentary consent to enter into a league with the Habsburgs. What the envoy discovered was that Parliamentary supporters wished to use the issue of the Prince Palatine's restoration to force the King to call Parliament. It was apparent to Radolt that Parliamentary supporters would very much like to see the Prince Palatine restored, but not through a league with the Habsburgs. Instead, they wished to effect the restoration by arms, through an alliance with the French and Dutch. They reasoned that this alliance would require a greater military commitment to the Continental war than one with the Habsburgs, and would thus oblige the King to call Parliament for financial support. An alliance with the Habsburgs, on the other hand, would not require the same commitment of resources, which the King might raise without calling Parliament. This league, therefore, represented a way for the King to restore his nephew and continue to rule without Parliament. It follows, then, that Parliamentary supporters would do their utmost to prevent the conclusion of an Anglo-Habsburg league. They would much rather go to war on the anti-Habsburg side, than to continue to put up with the King's absolute rule and to pay what they considered illegal taxes to support an alliance with the Habsburgs. In the end,

¹¹²Ibid., ff. 41-2: 9 May 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, f. 87: 16 May 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, Konv. 1819, f. 5: 1 Aug. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, ff. 58-9: 9 Oct. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, Konv. 1820, f. 12: 16 Jan. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, f. 22: 30 Jan. 1636, same to same. While in England, Radolt took up the cause of a Jesuit tutor, who was punished for instructing the sons of the principal lords of the realm in his house (*CSPV 1636-9*, 126: 16 Jan. 1637, Ballarino to D&S).

Radolt concluded that the King did not require the consent of Parliament to enter into the alliance, though doing so might bring great odium upon him and provoke resistance to his extra-Parliamentary financial exactions.¹¹³

Given Parliament's determination to ally with the anti-Habsburg side, Radolt strongly recommended that the Habsburgs accept the restoration of the Prince Palatine in exchange for a league, not because they could expect England to make a great contribution to the Habsburg war effort, but in order to keep it from contributing its resources to the anti-Habsburg side. He reasoned that if the King should be pressed to other alliances and accordingly seek the help of Parliament, the Habsburgs would be facing a strong adversary, because he believed that between its fleet and land forces, England possibly commanded more men, money, and war preparations than any other state in Europe. He thus advised the Emperor to take Arundel's negotiations for Palatine restoration seriously and hoped that opportunities had not been lost in the negotiation because of his early reports.¹¹⁴

Arundel's Negotiations at Linz

[My Lord Marshal] has found many difficultyes by the waye in regard of the desolation of Germanie, and it is to bee feared will find more when hee comes to [the Imperial Court].¹¹⁵

Gervase Clifton to his father, Sir Gervase Clifton

¹¹³HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, ff. 132-3: 6 June 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹¹⁵HMC, *Var. Coll.*² VII, 413: 23 May 1636, Gervase Clifton to his father.

While Radolt struggled to grasp the King's intentions and the value of English friendship for the Habsburg side, Arundel's negotiation with the Emperor was about to commence at Linz. On 15 June 1636, Arundel and his entourage reached Linz and received a very cordial reception from the Emperor. The Emperor immediately sent out important officials, coaches, and servants to escort them through the city with great pomp to their quarters:

The English Envoy, the Earl of ARANDAL (sic) and his stately entourage arrived by water at Linz and His Imperial Majesty sent his Chamberlain, Count Leonhard Harrach, to welcome him and to bring him in the Imperial coach attended by the Court Stewards to his prepared quarters, where he would be entertained during his stay as the Emperor's personal guest. At this residence the envoy was welcomed by the Comptroler of the Household Count Megau and by a Gentleman in Waiting Mallart, who was chosen to attend the envoy permanently.¹¹⁶

The Emperor ordered that the expenses of Arundel and his entire suite be defrayed while in Linz. This was unusual and thus was regarded as a special mark of favor. Indeed, the Emperor showed the ambassador remarkable courtesies, which Ballarino believed reflected his propensity toward accommodation.¹¹⁷

The following day, Arundel had his first audience. The Emperor and Empress ceremoniously received him, and he delivered his compliments along with his credentials and various letters.¹¹⁸ Two days later, on 18 June, he had his second audience at which he delivered a memorial to the Emperor detailing his master's demands regarding the Palatinate. This document made it absolutely clear that the King would not be satisfied with less than a full restoration of his nephew to the

¹¹⁶Khevenhüller, vol. 12, 1879-80; quoted in Springell, 23.

¹¹⁷*CSPV 1636-9*, 10: 22 June 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

¹¹⁸PRO, SP 80/9, f. 178: 16 June 1636, Arundel to Secretary. Including a letter from Charles Louis; see Khevenhüller, vol. 12, 2096.

Palatine lands and dignities.¹¹⁹ As instructed, Arundel demanded the Emperor's firm assurance of plenary restitution as a first step, before there could be any discussion of means and conditions. If these demands went unsatisfied, he cautioned, the King would be forced to take more vigorous steps to reinstate his nephew. Arundel pressed the Emperor for a speedy reply, reminding him that there was no need for drawn-out negotiation since he had already made promises of full restitution to Taylor. Ferdinand, however, was evasive, speaking in courteous generalities and refusing to give the ambassador a straightforward reply to his demands.¹²⁰ Characteristically, he wished to avoid declaring his position on the Palatinate question until he knew that of Maximilian. To Arundel's requirements for plenary restitution, therefore, the Emperor carefully replied that he must consult Bavaria if he hoped for complete restitution.¹²¹

The truth was that the Emperor and his ministers were taken aback by Arundel's insistence, because they interpreted the sending of an ambassador as an indication that England had no intention to resort to force. Ballarino expressed this when he noted that "The high tone of the ambassador has surprised them, and they may now have to do something in earnest, though they are not sure what or how."¹²² In an attempt to meet the challenge this presented, the Emperor decided not only to appoint a commission to negotiate with the ambassador, but also moved quickly to consult his allies

¹¹⁹HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 18 June 1636, Arundel to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 18 June 1636, same to same.

¹²⁰PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 178-9: 16 June 1636, same to Secretary; *ibid.*, ff. 181-8: 23 June 1636, same to same.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, f. 190: 30 June 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 572: 30 June 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 576: 2 July 1636, same to same; CSPV 1636-9, 17: 5 July 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

¹²²*Ibid.*

about giving satisfaction to the English King. On the one hand, he sent his aulic councillor Tobias, Baron Haubitz to Munich with Radolt's relations to determine Maximilian's stance on restoration and convince him that they should strive not only to garner Charles's goodwill but also to draw England into the Imperialist camp.¹²³ On the other hand, the Emperor asked the Spanish ambassador Oñate, who was convalescing in Vienna, to set out at once to take part in the discussions on a matter so closely concerning Spain.¹²⁴ In fact, one of the Emperor's major aims in attempting to settle the Palatinate question and conclude an alliance with the English King was to assist the Spanish war effort by preserving the sea route as the most viable way for Spanish troops and money to reach Flanders. In May, Radolt had observed the same when he pointed out that Spain would be the power most affected by a break in Anglo-Habsburg relations: "so würdts niemants mehr alß der König in Spanien empfinden dan wan man der Zeit durch Engelandt in Niderlandt nit khomben khan, so ist aller Paaß zu mehr gestört."¹²⁵ The Emperor, for his part, earnestly wished to come to an agreement with England on the Palatinate question, and Radolt's reports played a significant role in convincing him to make the added effort required to find a compromise settlement acceptable to all involved.¹²⁶

¹²³Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 238 n. 61.

¹²⁴HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 20 June 1636, Ferdinand II to Maximilian I; *ibid.*: 20 June 1636, same to Oñate; *CSPV 1636-9*, 10: 22 June 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

¹²⁵HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. 88: 16 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II. "No one would feel it more than the King of Spain if the Netherlands presently could not be reached through England's agency [i.e., with England's assistance], thus all passage [through the Channel] would be interrupted all the more."

¹²⁶*CSPV 1632-6*, 551: 26 Apr. 1636, Ballarino to D&S; Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 238.

Arundel, who was sensible of these delays, welcomed the Emperor's request six days later to see his plenipotency. He sent Taylor to deliver it to Stralendorf that very day.¹²⁷ What concerned the Imperial councillors most, of course, was what the English King was prepared to offer in return for any concessions the Emperor might make in the Palatinate. They were hoping for active engagement on the Habsburg side. Upon inspection of Arundel's powers, the Imperial councillors noted that in return for full restitution of the Prince Palatine, Charles was ready to offer "a permanent friendship and peace" to the Habsburgs.¹²⁸ Despite the vague offers of interposition for the common peace offered by the English King, the Imperial councillors still believed that they could interpret a league from this declaration.¹²⁹

On 26 June, Arundel had his third audience with the Emperor. He again stressed that the King insisted upon the promise of his nephew's full restoration as prerequisite for further talks and pressed for a plain answer on this point. He would be disappointed, for Haubitz had not yet returned to Vienna with an answer from Maximilian.¹³⁰ Although Arundel did not receive an answer as he had hoped, the Emperor assured him that he would not depart unsatisfied. Ferdinand informed the ambassador that he would appoint a commission to treat with him on these matters.¹³¹

¹²⁷HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 23 Mar. 1636, Charles I to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*: 23 June 1636, Ferdinand II to Arundel; CSP, vol. 1, 561: 23 June 1636, Arundel to Windebank; *ibid.*, 577: 2 July 1636, same to same; Khevenhüller, vol. 12, 2097.

¹²⁸"einer beständigen freundschaft und fried."

¹²⁹HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 74-9: 25 June 1636, Opinion of privy council; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 25 June 1636, same.

¹³⁰Khevenhüller, vol. 12, 2099.

¹³¹PRO, SP 80/9, f. 190: 30 June 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 572: 30 June 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 577: 2 July 1636, same to same.

That same day the Emperor appointed his commissioners, the Prince-Bishop of Vienna and Dr. Justus Gebhardt.¹³² Vice Chancellor Stralendorf was also active in the negotiations of the commission. They lost no time in arranging their first meeting with Arundel, which took place the following morning, 28 June, at Vice Chancellor Stralendorf's house. The commissioners first offered Arundel their own plenipotency, but Arundel, who did not doubt the validity of their commission and did not wish to waste time reading it, merely requested that they send a copy to him the next morning. From there, the negotiations quickly ran aground, mainly because of the opposing viewpoints held by Arundel and the commissioners about the prospects for a league.¹³³ The commissioners informed Arundel that Taylor had led the Emperor to expect that the negotiations would not only encompass the Prince Palatine's restitution but also a reciprocal treaty. Arundel did not address this statement but instead insisted that the Emperor should declare if he was willing or able to restore the Prince Palatine fully or not.¹³⁴ In reply, the commissioners maintained that they would not reach an agreement if either side insisted upon extreme terms. Instead of immediately committing to full restitution, without a concrete offer of a league on the table, they wished Arundel to outline several acceptable options for restoration. In an attempt to overcome their caution, Arundel replied that the King would not require full restitution immediately; their declaration that they would fully restore the Prince Palatine in time would suffice to move on to the next stage of the

¹³²HHSStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 26 June 1636, Plenipotency for Imperial commissioners. Gebhardt was undoubtedly appointed for his legal expertise, so he could explain the justice of the Emperor's actions to the English ambassador.

¹³³Ibid.: 28 June 1636, Relation of Imperial commissioners.

¹³⁴PRO, SP 80/9, f. 190: 30 June 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 573: 30 June 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 577: 2 July 1636, same to same.

negotiation.¹³⁵ After several volleys made it clear they were making little progress, they adjourned the meeting.

An even more unwelcome surprise awaited Arundel the following morning. When Taylor delivered the commissioners' plenipotentiary powers to his quarters, he found within them that not only was the restitution to be treated of, but also an offensive and defensive league against the common enemies (*foedus tum offensivum quam defensivum . . . contra communes hostes*), which the Imperial ministers claimed that Taylor had offered.¹³⁶ Arundel took this to mean a league against the enemies of the House of Habsburg. Since he was ignorant of the verbal offers of a league that Taylor had made to the Emperor and Aston to the King of Spain, this claim understandably upset Arundel as the King had only authorized him to offer a league for the common peace. A commotion thus ensued. Arundel moved immediately to discover if Taylor had made such a promise, which he deemed a great injury to the King indeed, or if the Imperialists had inserted the offensive clause of their own accord. Arundel immediately sent Borough to Stralendorf for an answer. Taylor, who flatly denied having made such an offer, accompanied Borough in an attempt to clear his name. When confronted with the plenipotency, Stralendorf was forced to admit that the Imperial secretary who drafted the commission from Taylor's memorials had wrongly inserted the clause. Once the

¹³⁵Khevenhüller, vol. 12, 2109-21.

¹³⁶PRO, SP 80/9, f. 190: 30 June 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 573: 30 June 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 577: 2 July 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 575: 26 June 1636, Plenipotency for Imperial commissioners. In his report to Windebank, Arundel enclosed a copy of the councillors' powers. Taylor had indeed offered an offensive and defensive league, but one against the enemies of the common peace. He suspected that the Imperialists may have inserted the clause to play for time so they could consult Bavaria and Spain (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 77: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston).

Imperialists inspected these papers, they discovered the strongest words that Taylor had used in the written record were strictest league (*arctissimum foedus*).

Therefore, Arundel immediately demanded an audience with the Emperor and on 30 June presented him with a memorial to clear the record, which adamantly denied any offers of an offensive and defensive league. The Emperor, however, maintained that Taylor had indeed offered an offensive and defensive league, though not in writing.¹³⁷ Arundel's claim that England had never suggested an alliance with the House of Habsburg surprised the Emperor and his councillors as well as the Spaniards at the Imperial court. In an attempt to prove otherwise, they gathered together the documents that they believed showed England had indeed proposed such an alliance in return for restitution, and they exhibited them to Arundel.¹³⁸ The Emperor also presented him with a memorial to that effect.¹³⁹ Taylor, however, continued to deny that he had made the proposals that the Imperialists claimed. In truth he had made *verbal* offers of a league to the Emperor authorized by his secret instructions, but this information seems to have been deliberately withheld from Arundel

¹³⁷HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 30 June 1636, Arundel to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 30 June 1636, same to same; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 191: 30 June 1636, same to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 573: 30 June 1636, same to Windebank.

¹³⁸HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 74-8: 25 June 1636, Opinion of privy council; *ibid.*, ff. 80-4: 28 June 1636, same; *ibid.*, ff. 89-96: 30 June 1636, same. Arundel was given a "paper long and tedious" intended to prove that Taylor in Vienna and Hopton and Aston in Spain had indeed treated of an offensive and defensive league against the enemies of the common peace and that James I had earlier promised one to the Emperor. Arundel remained unconvinced (PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 77-8: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston).

¹³⁹HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 2 July 1636, Ferdinand II to Arundel; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 2 July 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 577-8: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

by Windebank and the King.¹⁴⁰ Although Charles most likely never actually intended to enter into the contentious league, he had directed Taylor to use it as a means to tantalize the Habsburgs into restoring the Palatinate.

Because the King and Windebank had not informed him of the negotiations that had led up to his mission, Arundel understandably became very frustrated with his treatment and his inability to procure an answer from the Emperor and thus requested his recall.¹⁴¹ According to Arundel, he had received no message or compliment either from the Spanish ministers Oñate and Castañeda, whom he had expected to support his negotiation, or from the King of Hungary, which he interpreted as a slight.¹⁴² On top of this Ferdinand continued to delay, because he still had received no reply from Maximilian, and attempted to divert Arundel's attention by entertaining him and his company with feasts, hunting parties, and other festivities.¹⁴³ The ambassador protested to Windebank that the King had sent him to Germany only to treat of the manner, time, and conditions for a full

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 310-3: 25 Aug. 1635, Secret instructions for Taylor. Far from hiding his offers of a league from the government, Taylor repeatedly corresponded with Windebank about this very subject (ibid., 369-71: 6 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 400: 12 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Taylor; ibid., 429-30: 26 Jan. 1636, same to same; ibid., 476: 12 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 478: 14 Mar. 1636, Windebank to Taylor). All of Taylor's correspondence concerning this league was with Windebank; Coke was excluded from these secret negotiations with the Habsburgs.

¹⁴¹For example, *CSP*, vol. 1, 578: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

¹⁴²*PRO*, SP 80/10, f. 79: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston; *CSP*, vol. 1, 578: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

¹⁴³*PRO*, SP 80/9, ff. 181-8: 23 June 1636, Arundel to Secretary; *CSP*, vol. 1, 578: 2 July 1636, same to Windebank; *HMC*, *Denbigh V*, 28: 19 June 1636, Harvey to Feilding; ibid., 29: 26 June 1636, same to same; *CSPV* 1636-9, 10: 22 June 1636, Ballarino to D&S. "Yesterday my lord was feasted by the nobility att the house of the Count of Melan, the cheife major-domo of his Majestie. We drunke hard, and had many expressions and many good wishes." (*HMC*, *Denbigh V*, 29: 26 June 1636, Harvey to Feilding). On June 20, they also witnessed a horrific public execution of seven leaders of an armed peasant revolt against the Emperor. This event was captured by both Crowne and Hollar. Crowne's description and Hollar's drawing are both reproduced in Springell, 65 and pl. 39.

restitution of the Palatinate, which the Emperor had already agreed to beforehand.¹⁴⁴ Later Taylor wrote that the reason for the delay was that the Imperialists were not prepared to negotiate a treaty, not thinking that the King would so quickly send a plenipotentiary of Arundel's stature – this is the reason they dallied and did not give an answer that would please him without first consulting Bavaria and the Spanish ambassador.¹⁴⁵ Arundel noted darkly yet perceptively that "Nothing can be expected from hence, but what the extremity of their affairs shall compel them unto."¹⁴⁶

Like Aston, Hopton, and Taylor, Arundel realized that the most effective way to achieve the restoration of the Palatinate would be to accept a partial settlement for the present, with the hope of gaining the rest in the future even if the Emperor did not make explicit promises to that effect.¹⁴⁷ He asked Windebank to represent the advantages of accepting such a settlement to the King: "I do guess by appearances, that, if we get any thing, it must be by degrees, and not by leaps; and that a promise after Bavaria will not be had, but a going on in part, and leaving the rest to treaty. This, I doubt, will prove the best."¹⁴⁸ Arundel thought it wise to accept a partial settlement, as long as the

¹⁴⁴Arundel was greatly incensed when the Prince-Bishop told him the King ought to be satisfied, for the present, if the Emperor removed the ban, declared that the Palatine a prince of the Empire, and restored a part of the Lower Palatinate. In any case, Arundel did not have a high opinion of the Prince-Bishop's political acumen (*CSPV 1636-9*, 18: 5 July 1636, Ballarino to D&S; *ibid.*, 35: 1 Aug. 1636, same to same).

¹⁴⁵PRO, SP 80/10, f. 77: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston.

¹⁴⁶*CSP*, vol. 1, 578: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank. In this dispatch, he includes a journal of his proceedings from the beginning of his negotiations.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 484: 19 Mar. 1636, Aston to same; *ibid.*, 707: 3 Dec. 1636, same to same. Aston pointed out that if the King insisted on plenary restitution and gave no indication that he might accept less, when it came down to the wire the Spaniards would likely break with England rather than Bavaria.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 583: 9 July 1636, Arundel to same.

Emperor made an open declaration that he would neither bar the Prince Palatine from claiming more in the future nor expect England to ally with the Habsburgs against the Dutch and French.¹⁴⁹

Despite the softening in his position, the Imperialists' manner of treating still disgusted Arundel. Thus, to express his displeasure, he dispatched the greater part of his entourage to Regensburg and departed from Linz with a reduced party on 3 July to make excursions to various Austrian, Bohemian, and Bavarian cities.¹⁵⁰ He planned to meet the Emperor again in Regensburg for the upcoming electoral meeting, to which the latter had referred the deliberations on the question of the Palatinate, in the hope of procuring a more definite answer at that time.

As he had hoped, the Imperial ministers were taken aback by the manner of his sudden departure. The Prince-Bishop of Vienna reported to Maximilian that without any further negotiation, Arundel had informed the Emperor of his departure through his assigned gentleman-in-waiting, von Molart, without saying where he was bound. According to the Prince-Bishop, Arundel gave out that this was his custom as he could not stay too long in one place, and he let it be known that he would reappear in good time, according to his humor. The Imperialists were unsure, however, whether he would return to Linz or Regensburg, or would stay out altogether.¹⁵¹ Their worries were not

¹⁴⁹CSPV 1636-9, 35: 1 Aug. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

¹⁵⁰Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kastenschwarz 101A: 7 July 1636, Prince-Bishop of Vienna to Maximilian I; quoted in Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 234-5 n. 44. This move was not favorably regarded by some at the English court, the Prince Palatine in particular (CSPV 1636-9, 33: 30 July 1636, Correr to D&S; *ibid.*, 47: 19 Aug. 1636, same to same).

¹⁵¹"Hat der gesanter ohne ainige vernere negotiation des anderen tages frue den mehrern thail seiner leuth und roß nach Regenspurg abgefertigt. Er aber für sein persohn ist mit wenig leuthen und rossen die Donau hinunter gefahren und Ihre Kayserliche Mayestät nur durch seinen verordneten commissarium, den von Molart, doch ohne benennung ainiges orthes, wohin die raß angesehen, von seiner abfarth erinnern lassen, mit vorgeben, das dises also sein brauch sey; er bediene sich auch dieser freyheit bey seinem könig; er könne nit solang ahn ainem orth verbleiben; er wolte schon zu rechter zeit

completely ungrounded, because after his first encounter with the commission, Arundel did ask for his recall.¹⁵² The Emperor and his ministers were not sure what to make of Arundel: they were not used to his insistent and plain way of treating and regarded him as a man of quick humor.

When Elizabeth heard of Arundel's carriage and his proceedings with the Imperialists thus far, she was also unsure what to make of them. Her letters speak to her conflicting feelings and continued fears regarding the negotiations, but her confidence in Arundel remained firm. She wrote to Laud that the Earl "carried himself worthily" and to Roe that "Arundel has done well hitherto, yet she fears an afterclap."¹⁵³ Roe, for his part, felt uninformed of Arundel's progress, grumbling that he "hopes the Earl of Arundel works better than he writes."¹⁵⁴

Despite Arundel's request for a recall, Coke ordered him to remain in Germany at least to keep up the appearance that a positive outcome for the negotiations with the Emperor was possible. The English hoped that this pressure would make the French more willing to conclude a treaty favorable to England. Coke wrote: "it is not thought counsellable to make any open breach which may be a disadvantage to any other treaty that may be thought of for putting this business in any other way."¹⁵⁵ The King had sent the Earl of Leicester to Paris in May to muster support for the

sich wider einstellen. Darüber mahn ihm seinen humor gelassen. Niemandt aber weiß, ob er wider hirher oder nach Regenspurg kommen oder gahr außbleiben werde." (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kastenschwarz 101A: 7 July 1636, Prince-Bishop of Vienna to Maximilian I; quoted in Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 234-5 n. 44).

¹⁵²Gardiner, vol. 8, 160.

¹⁵³*CSPD 1636-7*, 61: 24 July 1636, Elizabeth to Roe; *ibid.*, 76: 6 Aug. 1636, same to Laud.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 70: 20 July 1636, Roe to Elizabeth.

¹⁵⁵PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 201-2: 30 July 1636, [Coke] to Arundel.

restoration of the Palatinate and Lorraine at the same time that he had dispatched Arundel to Germany.¹⁵⁶ Just as the English hoped that Arundel's negotiations would apply pressure to France, in turn they designed Leicester's to do the same to the Emperor.¹⁵⁷ In true Caroline fashion, the King would grant English aid to whichever side was most likely to advance the cause of the Prince Palatine. Therefore, he instructed Arundel to take a more conciliatory tone at the Imperial court in the future.

Taylor, for his part, remained with the Imperial court and attempted to keep the negotiations on track by calming the agitation caused by Arundel's brusque manner of negotiating, his denials of offers of a league, and his abrupt departure from the Imperial court. In an attempt to smooth Arundel's ruffled feathers as well, Taylor sent letters to him in Vienna and Prague conveying the Emperor's hope and expectation of his return to the bargaining table at Regensburg.¹⁵⁸ In his weekly reports to Windebank, even the ever-optimistic Taylor began to express some apprehension regarding the eventual outcome of the negotiations. His cousin's manner of treating with the Imperialists and his hasty departure from Linz also alarmed William Howard. He wrote a letter to Windebank suggesting that Arundel should show more patience in his dealings with the Imperial councillors:

¹⁵⁶Arthur Collins, ed., *Letters and Memorials of State in the Reigns of Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, King James, King Charles the First, Part of the Reign of King Charles the Second, and Oliver's Usurpation* (London: Printed for T. Osborne, 1746), vol. 2, 374-7: 19 May 1636, Instructions for Leicester. For more on Leicester's negotiations, see Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 525-36. Interestingly, it seems that the King considered not sending an ambassador to France because it might have a negative impact on the Emperor's trust that a settlement could be reached with England (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 285: [Mar. 1636], Coke's notes).

¹⁵⁷Gardiner, vol. 8, 160.

¹⁵⁸CSP, vol. 1, 587: 21 July 1636, Taylor to Windebank.

I thought it not amiss to let your Honour know, that I fear my Lord Ambassador is too impatient of delay: if it would therefore please your Honour to write a word or two to him, that may put him in mind of a little sufferance against they meet next upon their treaty, I am persuaded it may do a great deal of good. Your Honour will easily believe, that they will part with as little as they may, and get as good conditions for it as they can; but I am so confidently assured, from Father Lammerman [Lamormaini], that the Emperor intends to do all that lies in his power to give content, and that with all expedition may be, as I make no doubt but the business will be happily concluded, if, as I say, my Lord come a little better prepared with patience. He naturally hates delay in any thing; and I cannot blame him if he have a mind homeward¹⁵⁹

As indicated by William Howard, the Catholic clergy expressed support for England's attempts to resolve the Palatinate question by diplomacy, as its settlement was widely regarded as a prerequisite for peace in the Empire. It seemed that confessional politics had fallen victim to war weariness in the Empire, even among the Jesuits. Before Arundel had left England, Taylor reported that both former militant leader Lamormaini and the Queen of Hungary's Capuchin confessor Quiroga were among those who had "advanced this business."¹⁶⁰ Everywhere Arundel encountered the Catholic religious in his travels, they showed an intense desire for peace.¹⁶¹ As Borough related to Windebank, Lamormaini was particularly friendly to the embassy and arranged for lavish entertainments to be presented to Arundel when he visited Vienna and Prague:

Father Lammerman [Lamormaini] the Jesuit, Confessor to the Emperor, and of great power, hath in all places way-layed his Excellency, and caused the Fathers of that Society to present him with sundry entertainments of honour; all of them tending to

¹⁵⁹Ibid., 581: 3 July 1636, William Howard to same; *ibid.*, 594: 30 July 1636, same to same.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., 455: 3 Mar. 1636, Taylor to same. Jesuits were increasingly involved in attempts to make peace after the Peace of Prague (Steinberger, 24). Robert Bireley maintains that both the confessors and their rulers followed a more moderate course after the Peace of Prague, resulting in a substantial reduction of the role of confession in politics (Bireley, "Religious War," 103).

¹⁶¹For instance Brother Trifoni wrote Arundel a flattering letter (ACA, AL 1632-1723, no. 363: [1636], Trifoni to Arundel).

manifest the assurance here conceived, that his Excellency is come to restore peace to the Christian world, and more particularly to this deplored Germany¹⁶²

One of the reasons these clergymen paid Arundel special attention was surely because he was the head of the most powerful traditionally Catholic family in England. The Howards had made many sacrifices for the faith, among them Arundel's own father, a martyr, and his mother, the foundress of the Jesuit college at Ghent. They also believed Arundel was secretly inclined toward Catholicism, and they wanted to encourage him to help improve the situation of English Catholics. The Catholic religious, and the Jesuits in particular, had many reasons to seek the ambassador's favor, the foremost of which was peace. On his journeys, Arundel visited many monasteries, churches, and Jesuit houses, and at these places they "all regarded him at this time as the emissary of peace, and their welcome was proportionate to their desire for the cessation of war."¹⁶³

At the beginning of July Arundel and the remainder of his entourage took a boat from Linz down the Danube to Vienna, where they arrived after two days' travel on 5 July.¹⁶⁴ He had an audience there the following day with the Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, who like the Earl was a great collector of art, and the Queen of Hungary, the same Spanish Infanta who nearly became the bride of Charles I. He also conferred with her confessor Quiroga, who, as William Howard reported, had shown himself a supporter of Arundel's business: "My Lord had a great deal of conference at Vienna with Chiroga, a Capuchin and Confessarius to the Queen of Hungary; a man well affected to our

¹⁶²CSP, vol. 1, 595: 30 July 1636, Borough to Windebank.

¹⁶³Hervey, 371.

¹⁶⁴CSP, vol. 1, 583: 9 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

King's State and this particular business, or else I am much deceived: he also seemed to me to be very confident that my Lord's business would succeed"¹⁶⁵

During his stay in Vienna, Arundel visited several Jesuit houses. At the Jesuit-run University (the *Alte Universität* complex near *Seipel Platz* in modern Vienna),¹⁶⁶ the students performed a masque in his honor, followed by a musical performance and banquet. He then viewed the *Probation Haus* – also a part of the University complex – the occupants of which aspired to holy orders. Afterwards Arundel visited the *Profes Haus* on the ancient square called *am Hof*, where a distinguished senior scholar delivered an oration to welcome him. He took a tour of this building and concluded his visit at the adjoining church, where they listened to a beautiful hymn accompanied by an organ rumored to have five thousand pipes.¹⁶⁷

After one week in Vienna, and a final audience with the Queen of Hungary, Arundel and his party set out for Prague, which they reached on 16 July.¹⁶⁸ Once there, Arundel made a bittersweet visit to Hradcany Castle, where the Winter King had once lived, to see the famous collections of

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 595: 30 July 1636, William Howard to same.

¹⁶⁶In 1623, the Jesuits took over the philosophical and theological professorships at the University with Ferdinand II's promise that he would integrate their own college into the University and remodel its buildings, as well as build a new administration building (the *Domus Universitatis*, today at Sonnenfelsgasse 19) and a stately, imposing church for the entire University. The cornerstone for the expanded complex was laid in 1624, and in 1631 the church (*Universitätskirche*, also known as the *Jesuitenkirche*), which in keeping with the time was decorated in an austere early baroque style with simple appointments, was consecrated.

¹⁶⁷Crowne, 23; see also Springell, 115 n. 112-3. This church, now called *Neun Chöre der Engel* ("Nine Choirs of the Angels"), still stands today on *am Hof*.

¹⁶⁸Arundel had intended to leave for Prague on 9 July decided against it, being "something troubled with a catarrh"; he resolved to take his journey the next day, but did not leave until the following. Arundel was not in the best of health during his mission (CSP, vol. 1, 587: 14 July 1636, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 587: 21 July 1636, same to same).

Rudolf II. There he encountered a room where the portraits of the English nobility still hung as a reminder of the short reign of Frederick V and Elizabeth. He viewed the room where the defenestration had taken place and the three gilt crosses erected to mark the location where the Imperial councillors and their secretary had miraculously survived their fall.¹⁶⁹ After leaving the Castle, Arundel visited Waldstein (Wallenstein) Palace, which the King of Hungary had inhabited since the general's untimely death in 1634.

The entertainments prepared by the Jesuits for the English visitors in Prague were even more lavish than in Vienna. Arundel enjoyed a banquet and a humanistic play performed by the students at the Jesuit College, "Pax in Anglia, diu exul in Germaniam postliminio reditura," the theme of which was the restoration of peace in the Empire by the English King and his ambassador.¹⁷⁰ The support shown for his mission pleased Arundel, and he once again began to express optimism about the outcome of his negotiations:

The Jesuits make great demonstration of their affections to the business; and in a little comedy, which they made me at Prague, did our King great honour, in making him the restorer of the publick peace. . . . many think it a *bonum omen* to the business, that they who are so powerful here own it so much; which they would not do if they did not hope for good success.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 366.

¹⁷⁰In a letter to Windebank, Borough enclosed "the subject of the interlude presented at Prague to the Earl Marshal by the Jesuits" (CSP, vol. 1, 595-7: 30 July 1636, Borough to Windebank). See also Crowne's account of the play (Crowne, 33-7). As the play they staged indicated, the Jesuits in Prague had ingeniously adapted to the prevailing humanistic tendencies of the time. Their curriculum included Latin and Greek, and they often organized splendid performances in the courtyard of their college to attract the populace. By this indirect method they sought to convert people to their teachings (Springell, 123-4 n. 155).

¹⁷¹CSP, vol. 1, 597: 30 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

To Windebank Arundel wrote that he believed that the world inclined to putting the interests of the Prince Palatine into general account, and that he hoped that the Emperor and his family would recognize how useful the King's help could be.¹⁷²

After a week's stay in Prague, Arundel and his company left on 23 July for Regensburg, where the Imperial Diet was scheduled to meet. On their way out of the great Bohemian city, they passed the battlefield of White Mountain, where Frederick and his allies had made their fateful last stand against the Catholic League army. After fifteen years, human remains still littered it.¹⁷³ When the party reached Regensburg four days later, the Emperor and many of the electors had not yet arrived. Considering it undignified to wait there alone and in any case wishing to avoid diplomatic competition ("*puntoes*") with the Spanish ambassador, Arundel instead struck out with a reduced company on 31 July for the Fugger city of Augsburg.¹⁷⁴

Meanwhile, Taylor continued discussions about the meaning of the proposed league with Oñate and the Prince-Bishop of Vienna. They assured him that they only intended the league to be directed against enemies of the common peace, and not (necessarily) those of the House of Habsburg and that "They yeeld that a restitution in integram is practicable but not to be hoped for at once."¹⁷⁵ Upon receiving these reassurances, Taylor regained his former optimism about the outlook for the negotiations. He lionized his King by maintaining that there could be no accommodation of affairs

¹⁷²Ibid., 599: 7 Aug. 1636, same to same.

¹⁷³Crowne, 37.

¹⁷⁴PRO, SP 80/9, f. 209: 6 Aug. 1636, Borough to [?]; CSP, vol. 1, 599: 7 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Windebank; Crowne, 39.

¹⁷⁵HMC, *Denbigh V*, 30: 6 Aug. 1636, Taylor to Feilding.

in Germany without his involvement.¹⁷⁶ Taylor, apparently unaware that Arundel's negotiation had brought Radolt's to an effective halt, continued to have good hopes for his negotiation in England as well. Taylor wrote home in July that the King and his ministers should soon discover the Emperor's expectations for an Anglo-Habsburg league from his envoy. However, he did have an inkling that Radolt was not completely satisfied with the progress of his mission, for Taylor also wrote, "Radolt doth write something disgustedly," but added "it is good to keep him in good blood and be constant in your resolutions; wherein I am confident you will have satisfaction."¹⁷⁷

Indeed, Radolt had little to be happy about. In late July, news of Arundel's negotiation at Linz and his strong reaction to the suggestion of the offensive and defensive league with the Habsburgs reached the English court. The Habsburgs' presumption greatly offended the English. After reading Arundel's account of what had passed, the King deliberated many hours with his council. As a sign of his displeasure, he sent orders to one of his captains carrying Spanish silver to unload his cargo at Dover; however, the ship had already sailed for Dunkirk. In an attempt to minimize the damage done by Arundel's report, Radolt met with Windebank, one of the few English ministers who would receive him, to discuss the issue. The Imperial envoy related to the Secretary that it would surprise the Emperor if the King indeed objected to the idea of an offensive and

¹⁷⁶CSP, vol. 1, 586: 14 July 1636, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 592: 28 July 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 597: 30 July 1636, Borough to same; *ibid.*, 616: 20 Aug. 1636, Taylor to same. Taylor stated in a letter to Lord Feilding: "In the full powers which the Emperor granted his commissioners, they say that 'by me the King had offered a league offensive and defensive with them and their house *contra communes hostes*,' but by this they mean not enemies of the house of Austria, but of the common peace. 'I hope the conclusion of this business will bee to his Majesties immortal glory, and that Christendome shall owe his peace unto his Majestie, for though I see the Princes generally do desire peace, yet they will not bee able to obtaine it but through the King's power and assistance....'" (HMC, *Denbigh V*, 30: 6 Aug. 1636, same to Feilding).

¹⁷⁷CSP, vol. 1, 593-4: 28 July 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 582: 7 July 1636, same to same.

defensive league, as it was first suggested by Taylor and not the Imperialists. Windebank answered that if Taylor had promised such a league, he had done so against his instructions, for the King had no intention of making enemies of other states.¹⁷⁸

Back in the Empire, Maximilian in the meantime had made his reply to the Emperor's inquiries regarding the restoration of the Palatinate. The Emperor wished to compromise with England on this issue in the interests of a general peace, but only with the concurrence of his allies, Maximilian in particular. At this time, the belief circulated freely that peace should be made before Germany was completely desolated and enveloped by anarchy. This fact made Dr. Harvey hopeful of the success of the embassy:

Our greatest certenty groweth from the necessity they have heare of making peace on any condition, wheare ther is noe more meanes of making warr or scarce of subsistence; and this warfare in Germany without pay is rather a licence to prey and of oppression, and threateneth in the ende anarchy and confusion, then a just and laudable warr to establish peace and justice."¹⁷⁹

It has already been shown that Lamormaini and other clerics supported the negotiations in the hope that they would bring peace, and his opinion still counted in the Emperor's counsels. For these reasons, the Emperor was willing as far as he could to meet English demands, but consideration of his allies limited the concessions he could viably make. Maximilian's vote in the upcoming election at Regensburg would be crucial to the election of the King of Hungary as King of the Romans; achieving this election at Regensburg was even more pressing in light of the Emperor's declining

¹⁷⁸HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 6: 1 Aug. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II.

¹⁷⁹HMC, *Denbigh V*, 29: 26 June 1636, Harvey to Feilding. Later he stated that "wee finde heare greate expressions and many wishes for the success of my lord his embassadg; how the effects will prove we hope well, butt cannot certeynly assure our selves. I thinke the miserable condition of Germany doth more then requier it [peace]." (ibid., 30: 9 July 1636, same to same).

health.¹⁸⁰ The Emperor was not prepared to dislodge the Duke from his electoral seat if the cost for doing so was the loss of the Imperial crown.¹⁸¹ For the same reason, the King of Hungary avoided vexing the "old vulpone" Maximilian, even though peace would have been even more desirable to him as the future Emperor than it was to his father. With so much at stake, Haubitz remonstrated with Maximilian in the hope that he would take a more flexible attitude to the restitution of the Palatine lands and titles.

Although Maximilian defended the interests of Catholicism in the Thirty Years' War, his main concern was to raise the House of Wittelsbach to undisputed prominence in Central Europe, and part of this design was to cement his hold on his Palatine gains. Through the relentless determination with which he pursued this goal, Bavaria became a power of consequence, whose interests other European states had to take into consideration. Maximilian and his wife, Maria Anna, were expecting a child, which – if it proved male – would become his long-awaited heir to the Bavarian titles and estates. It was unlikely that Maximilian would willingly dissipate the patrimony he could leave by sacrificing the gains that he had so recently acquired.¹⁸² The Prince Palatine's situation, however, was not hopeless. Maximilian also did not want these gains to remain perpetually in dispute either; he wanted to pass on a secure inheritance to his heir. To achieve this security, it was important for him to garner the acceptance of the major states of the Imperial and

¹⁸⁰CSP, vol. 1, 599: 7 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Windebank. The Habsburgs could not count on the vote of the Elector of Trier, who had placed himself under French protection. This made Maximilian's potentially the swing vote.

¹⁸¹CCSP, vol. 1, 80: 26 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank. Nor was Spain ready to countenance this (CSP, vol. 1, 622: 30 Aug. 1636, Aston to Charles I; *ibid.*, 666: 25 Oct. 1636, same to Windebank).

¹⁸²HMC, *Denbigh V*, 26: [Apr.?] 1636, Leslie to Feilding.

international community that still disputed the legality of his acquisitions, among them Sweden and England. When the Emperor sent Kurz to convince Maximilian to consent to the restoration of the electorate and lands in March, Kurz persuaded the Duke to agree to the return of the Lower Palatinate, on the condition that he would retain the Upper Palatinate and a sum of money for his war expenses.¹⁸³ The Emperor also gave Taylor hope that he might restore the electorate after Maximilian's death. This was not total restitution, but it provided some hope that the two sides might reach a compromise. Taylor reported that the King of Hungary went shortly thereafter to Munich to "induce the Duke of Bavaria as much as he can, *to what is treated with England*. Hee [Maximilian] makes heere faire shews to a better disposition unto it then was conceived hee would," to which he cautiously added, "which doth awaken some little suspition that it is for ends of his owne, and that when they [the Diet] shall bee assembled hee will doe as formerly."¹⁸⁴

In response to the pressure applied by Haubitz for an answer on the question of the Palatine lands and dignities, Maximilian drafted a memorandum to the Emperor which offered a perceptive assessment of the political situation surrounding them. He brushed aside the threat of English military intervention and pointed out that the value of Charles's promised assistance was questionable, since he could hardly finance his fleet and could not expect a large infusion of revenue,

¹⁸³CSP, vol. 1, 498: 9 Apr. 1636, Taylor to Windebank. See chap. 8, p. 328.

¹⁸⁴HMC, *Denbigh V*, 25: 26 Apr. 1636, same to Feilding. Taylor continued to underrate the Duke as an obstacle to the negotiations. A month later he wrote that the King of Hungary had gone to Munich "to dispose him [Maximilian] to our business, which certainly hee will hinder what hee can, but hee that will not bend must break, and we have no way but *fortiter et suaviter*." (ibid., 27: 17 May 1636, same to same).

as he was on bad terms with Parliament.¹⁸⁵ However, in the interests of a general peace, he was willing to give up his share of the Lower Palatinate in return for payment of his war expenses if Spain would do the same. If the Emperor felt compelled to restore the Upper Palatinate, he must again relinquish Upper Austria to Maximilian until he received payment of his war expenses; this was as good as a denial, because Maximilian knew full well the Emperor would never assent to Bavarian re-occupation of this province. Finally, by no means would Maximilian relinquish the electorate.¹⁸⁶ That he showed himself willing, under certain circumstances, to give up the Lower Palatinate was a significant concession given his previous hard line on any kind of restoration. His continued recalcitrance on the point of the Upper Palatinate and particularly the electorate, however,

¹⁸⁵HHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 507-16: 30 June 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, ff. 518-27: 30 June 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 101-2: 5 July 1636, Protocol of privy council. The Duke reasoned that "[s]hould England try to attack by land, it was known from the examples of 'Vere and Hamilton' what kind of 'Miracles' they were able to perform. Agreed, the fleet was considerable, but the many ships had too few soldiers on board, no ammunition and insufficient provisions. Even if these ships were equipped with men and material for six months, it was of little use to rely on them, as the cost would first have to be approved by Parliament. King Charles had fallen out completely with his Parliament and never intended to summon it again. Even if the King of England were able to keep up the fleet for a longer period at his own expense, and without approval of Parliament, where could England attack the German Empire with her ships? There were no common frontiers....The 'status belli' would therefore not be influenced at all." (HHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 518-27: 30 June 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand II; Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Dreißigjähriger Kriegsakten, no. 225, ff. 1-35; quoted in Springell, 28-9). It is apparent from this statement that Maximilian was not overly concerned about what the consequences of arousing England might be for Spain. In 1640, however, he took the threat of English intervention in the war much more seriously because of Parliament's expressions of support for this course (Kathrin Bierther, *Der Regensburger Reichstag von 1640/1641*, Regensburger Historische Forschungen, vol. 1 [Kallmünz: Lassleben, 1971], 79; see below, p. 544).

¹⁸⁶HHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 507-16: 30 June 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 101-2: 5 July 1636, Protocol of privy council; Bodl. Lib., Rawlinson D 867, f. 120: s.d., Maximilian I to Haubitz; *CSPV 1636-9*, 18: s.d., same to same.

and the King's insistence on some kind of accommodation regarding it ensured that it would remain one of the greatest obstacles that the English diplomats would have to tackle.¹⁸⁷

Maximilian responded in much the same way a month later in his response to Radolt's June dispatch, which had been forwarded to him by the King of Hungary in the hope of persuading him to make further concessions in the Palatinate. It was apparent that while Radolt's reports may have influenced the Emperor's policy toward England, Maximilian did not allow them to sway Bavarian policy substantially. His dismissal of the King was clear. He again pointed out that the English alliance was not necessarily worth having, because the King would have little to offer without the financial support of Parliament. Furthermore, Maximilian was convinced that the King would not aid the French and Dutch if he were not satisfied in the Palatinate. He wished to rule absolutely and would do whatever was necessary to prevent calling Parliament, including forgoing an alliance with the anti-Habsburg powers for the recovery of his nephew's patrimony. The real question, then, was whether Charles would rather rule absolutely or restore his nephew as an elector of the Empire at the cost of submitting himself to Parliamentary prescription.¹⁸⁸ In Maximilian's opinion, the English

¹⁸⁷Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Dreißigjähriger Kriegsakten, no. 225, ff. 1-35; quoted in Springell, 29. Maximilian recommended that the Emperor temper Arundel's discontent with the delays in his negotiation by pointing out to him that the decision about restoration was not to be made by the Emperor alone—he would have to consult representatives of the Diet as well.

¹⁸⁸HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 117, ff. 252-3: 28 July 1636, Bartholomäus Richel, Bavarian Vice Chancellor, to Trauttmansdorff. "Mich bedunckt, die Englische schlauche ministri probieren den guten herrn Radolt auf allerley prob. Erstens haben sie erforschen wollen, ob er ein soldat abgeben möchte. Darumb haben sie ihme einen teufel ins gelaß gewisen, ob er nit zu schreckhen wer, und haben bald in consequenz darauf fondiert, man werde am Kayserlichen hof gewiß darüber erzüttern, wann nur der Arundel such wild stellen werde. Jetzt versuechen sie ihne auf ein ander weiß und wollensehen, was er für ein politicum abgebe, und ob von den vorigen schröckhen er sich erholt, und sagen, der khönig hab das ganze scepter absolute in der hand, möge seines gefallens ohnersuoht oder ohngehindert des parlaments handeln, wie er wolle, und wann er mit Österreich coniungiert, so khönde er sich und consequenter seine plenitudinem potestatis dem parlament zu drutz manteniern. Hergegen khinde das

ministers were simply inflating England's power and the King's ability to direct his policy at will in order to advance Arundel's negotiation with the Emperor. The Duke, therefore, declared his intention to discover more about the designs of the English Calvinists, and report his findings to the Emperor.¹⁸⁹

Thus while Radolt believed that the Emperor should take seriously English threats of alliance of with the anti-Habsburg side, Maximilian effectively downplayed them in order to protect his own position in the Palatinate. He tried to persuade Ferdinand that England was more likely to turn against France over Lorraine than against Austria over the Palatinate. He therefore counseled the Emperor not to be "in any violent hurry to give satisfaction by a prejudicial and disadvantageous adjustment," because the Palatine would surely be satisfied with less.¹⁹⁰ Maximilian also advised the Emperor to conceal his apprehension that England might retaliate against the Habsburgs, because the Palatine would accordingly raise his expectations for what could be regained. Ballarino believed

parlament dise des khönigs so grat absolut regierung nit comportieren. Herauf wolt ich den Radolt mit seiner politica gern hören, was er thet, wann er an des khönigs statt were, ob er lieber das hefft und den sigl über seine underthanen in der hand behaldten und alß rechter absolutus rex sein wolte, und den Pfaltzgraf Carl hinfüran so wol alß bishero und wie sein vatter als anherr gethan wolle laßen fahren und allein litteris et intercißionibus favorisiern, oder aber ob er sich lieber seines parlaments titel und praescriptis underwerffen wolte, damit er sich mit andern congiern und krieg fieren khönde. Und ob der Khönig lieber den Pfaltzgrafen zu einem churfürsten als sich zu einem rechten herrn und khönig sehen werde." (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kastenschwarz 101A: Maximilian I's commentary on Radolt's dispatch of 6 June 1636; quoted in Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 243 n. 86).

¹⁸⁹HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 117, ff. 253-4: 28 July 1636, Richel to Trauttmansdorff. When Maximilian and his ministers made allusions to religion relating to the negotiations with England, it was usually with a pointed political end. In this case, he invokes the image of the English Calvinism to create a them-vs.-us mentality conducive to retaining the greatest possible portion of his Palatine gains'. Although he was pious, the interests of the Bavarian state and Wittelsbach dynasty determined his policy in the first line and at critical points took precedence over all other interests, including those of the Church (Albrecht, "Konfessionelle Zeitalter," 366-8). For more on Maximilian's commitment to dynastic interests, see chap. 2, p. 79.

¹⁹⁰CSPV 1632-6, 551: 26 Apr. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

that Maximilian's arguments may have convinced the Emperor to instruct Radolt to proceed with more reserve in his offices, but at the same time to avoid offending Charles and promote the advantages of maintaining good relations with the Habsburgs, particularly in trade.¹⁹¹

It seems that Taylor greatly underestimated Maximilian in the months leading up to Arundel's arrival at the Imperial court when he wrote: "Prepare yourselves bravely, and do not fear the Duke of Bavaria. I scorn that he should be put in balance with his Majesty, for he and his whole House is too light."¹⁹² It appears that the English negotiators had more to fear from Maximilian than Taylor had supposed.¹⁹³ Arundel obviously would have his work cut out for him.

¹⁹¹Ibid.

¹⁹²*CSP*, vol. 1, 499: 9 Apr. 1636, Taylor to Windebank.

¹⁹³By this point, Arundel had noticed Taylor's propensity to optimism where the negotiations were concerned. He wrote to Windebank in early September: "Indeed I think Mr. Taylor an honest well-affected man; but, I must confess, I find him so extremely affected to his business, as he is so continually confident of good success daily, when all things to my understanding run cross, as I desire him to put me in the way; for, in truth, I do as much desire a good end this way as he, but I must not be fed with general words when the effects are contrary." (*CSP*, vol. 1, 629: 8 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Windebank). This was mild in comparison to what Ballarino had reported, namely that Arundel had complained about Taylor negotiating one way in Vienna and writing home about it in another, a situation which prematurely precipitated his embassy. The Emperor and his ministers told Arundel that Taylor had offered a league in return for the Lower Palatinate, for which Arundel claimed he had no such order and deserved severe punishment (*CSPV 1636-9*, 35: 1 Aug. 1636, Ballarino to D&S). Of course Arundel knew nothing of Taylor's secret instructions.

10

**THE EARL OF ARUNDEL AT THE REGENSBURG ELECTORAL MEETING AND
CLEMENT RADOLT AT THE ENGLISH COURT, 1636**

Negotiations in Regensburg

For the errant your lordship goes for, I doe most heartilie wishe itt well...and yett I cannot be bee verie doubtful of the event, in regarde of my former knowledge of Germany. If your lordship can prevaile soe farr as to make the Interests of our master with the Emperor wey downe those of Bavaria when they shal bee putt into the scale, I confess your lordship shal have done a greate woorke. Butt you will have to do with a craftie, subtile and wise Prince; and one that hath great power not only in Germany but in Italy, and with the Jesuits noe prince in Europe more.

Sir Henry Vane to Arundel

As delegates began to descend on Regensburg in expectation of the electoral meeting in late August, a communication arrived from Radolt describing the reaction at the English court to Arundel's report of his negotiations at Linz. In an attempt to salvage the negotiations, Imperial ministers recommended that the Emperor should finally make his intentions known to Arundel, as the ambassador had been requesting since his arrival.¹ To this end, they advised that the Emperor should again consult Spain and Bavaria regarding what to offer the King of England in return for his friendship and alliance. They still advised that the Emperor should lift the ban from Charles Louis, reinstate him as a prince of the Empire, and restore him to a portion of the Palatine lands in return

¹Also, they observed with chagrin that the Spanish ambassador in England had no plenipotency for this work, as the Spaniards had promised (HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, f. 109: 26 Aug. 1636, Opinion of privy council).

for his humble submission.² How much to restore, however, would depend upon the declarations of Spain and Bavaria. Concerning the electorate, they noted that it was unlikely that the Emperor could restore it until after the expiry of the Wilhelmine line because of Maximilian's resistance. In return for the Emperor's declaration, they would expect Arundel to declare his master's intentions where an Anglo-Habsburg alliance was concerned. In any case, the councillors directed Radolt to protest to the King and his ministers that they could not blame the Emperor for the delay in the negotiations. He was also to continue promoting good relations between the two crowns. Finally, since the business was at a crucial juncture, he was not to leave England despite his repeated requests for a recall.³

Oblivious to the developments in his absence, Arundel returned to Regensburg on 13 August 1636, just in time to witness the Emperor's state entry into the city.⁴ Since he had received so many expressions of goodwill on his journeys and encountered a real desire for peace in the Empire, he had a more positive opinion of his business than when he left Linz. Still, he was not overly confident of a favorable outcome of his negotiations. He expressed his uncertainty in a letter to Lord Feilding: "What the progres or end of this long intended and expected Diet will be is altogether incertaine."⁵

²Though under certain conditions, one of them being religious concessions. The Imperial side, however, was pitching its opening offer high, intending for it to be negotiable.

³HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 109-12: 26 Aug. 1636, Opinion of privy council.

⁴Crowne, 42-3.

⁵HMC, *Denbigh V*, 35: 19 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Feilding.

Habsburg military successes over the summer months influenced the dynamic of Arundel's negotiations once he returned to Regensburg. Habsburg armies had done particularly well in the field against the French.⁶ The military situation made the Habsburgs progressively more confident, a fact which Arundel conveyed to Lord Feilding:

They say the King of Hungaria proceeds with great successe in Burgundie, and that the French have not onely left the seige of Dôle but are with much Losse retyred out of those parts, which with the Cardinall Infants prevaylings in France and the expulsion of the French out of the State of Milan makes them heer looke high and think better of themselves then of late they did.⁷

The result was that the Habsburgs, and Spain in particular, demanded greater concessions from England – namely provision of land forces and greater access to the fleet – in return for any Palatine lands or titles that they might restore. In addition to Spain's more confident posture, Bavaria continued to be a major obstacle to restoration after Arundel's return to Regensburg; he wrote wryly to Feilding, "P.S. – The Duke of Bavaria's interests in this courte, and the Spaniardes more insistinge upon thayre share then was expected may perhappes hasten my retourne."⁸ These developments did not make Arundel's task any easier. In his first interviews with the Emperor and Oñate in Regensburg, the former lapsed into taciturnity and the latter demanded war against the enemies of Spain.⁹

⁶CSP, vol. 1, 593: 28 July 1636, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 626: 2 Sept. 1636, Arundel to same.

⁷HMC, *Sixth Report*, vol. 1, 280: 3 Sept. 1636, same to Feilding.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹CSP, vol. 1, 612-3: 20 Aug. 1636, same to Windebank. Arundel was dissatisfied with their unwillingness to come to an accommodation, and he told Ballarino bitterly that "they make a great mistake here if they build on their present success, as nothing is more inconstant than the fortune of war." (CSPV 1636-9, 65: 16 Sept. 1636, Ballarino to D&S). He was right; just a few weeks later, fear of new difficulties with the Turks made the Emperor more willing to listen to Arundel's overtures (*ibid.*, 78: 7

Once settled in, Arundel again turned to the task of obtaining a clear declaration of the Emperor's intentions regarding Palatine restoration. Two days after his arrival, on 15 August, the Emperor accorded him an audience, at which they exchanged the usual courtesies. In an attempt to move the Emperor to a decision, Arundel delivered a memorial to him on 18 August which outlined the English position. As previously, he denied in it that the King had offered an offensive and defensive league and insisted upon the promise of eventual total restitution as preliminary. He also refused to negotiate on the ground of mercy instead of justice, and again asked for an explicit answer to the King's demands as represented in the memorial.¹⁰ On 20 August, the Emperor again received Arundel, and this time the ambassador pressed even more insistently for a decision. The Emperor, however, only assured him yet again of his determination to bring the matter to a satisfactory conclusion.¹¹

While waiting for a more definite answer from the Emperor, Arundel exchanged formal calls with the representatives of powers attending the electoral meeting. He passed the time in ceremonial visits, and he made little progress in the negotiations. Arundel partly attributed this to the Imperialists' practice of negotiation by papers, which he saw as conducive to delay. Although he was obliged to conform to this custom, it was apparent to him that the renewed exchange of written proposals was not moving the negotiations forward any further than previously. He believed that

Oct. 1636, same to same).

¹⁰HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 18 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Ferdinand II; PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 213-4: 28 Aug. 1636, same to same. These were in answer to the Imperial decrees of 30 June and 2 July, in which the Emperor maintained that Taylor had indeed made offers of an offensive and defensive league (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 2 July 1636, Ferdinand II to Arundel; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 2 July 1636, same to same).

¹¹CSP, vol. 1, 611-5: 20 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

"business of this nature, were rather to be negotiated privately in confidence; for that many things on both sides might perhaps be spoken and proposed which were not fitt to be committed to publique paper."¹² Therefore, on Arundel's suggestion, the Imperial ministers agreed to treat by conference as Arundel desired.¹³

During this time Arundel exchanged visits with Oñate, with whom the question of a league remained a point of conflict. The Spanish ambassador still refused to accept Arundel's claim that England had never suggested an offensive and defensive alliance with the House of Habsburg because he could not believe that Arundel had not been briefed on the secret agreement made by Cottington in Spain and the league lately proposed by both Taylor and Aston, all with the full knowledge of the King.¹⁴ He continued to stand upon what he termed Spain's *convenientias* – an English rupture with France and Holland – which he claimed was consistent with a paper that had passed between Cottington and Olivares during their secret negotiations in 1631.¹⁵ However, England could join with Spain by degrees. The best way to start, he suggested, was for England and Spain to enter into the "fit" league lately proposed by Taylor and Aston. In return, Spain would

¹²PRO, SP 80/9, f. 240: 14 Sept. 1636, same to Secretary.

¹³Ibid., f. 227: 3 Sept. [sic] 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 619: 25 Aug. 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 626: 2 Sept. 1636, same to same. Arundel was having further problems. He protested to Windebank that he could not make out the cipher in a letter he had received: "but for my life [I] cannot make out three words of it in three hours, it being so laborious to find out the figures so out of order, and my eyes so weak, and I dare trust no other body withal." Meant to confound enemies, in this case the cipher baffled the recipient as well (*ibid.*, 618: 25 Aug. 1636, same to same).

¹⁴But not the other members of the foreign committee.

¹⁵PRO, SP 80/9, f. 229: 9 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary. For more on the Cottington Treaty, see chap. 4, p. 181. The paper proposed that the restoration of the Palatinate would be contingent upon England bringing the Dutch to satisfactory terms (Gardiner, vol. 7, 187; L. J. Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper," 919).

restore the part of the Lower Palatinate it occupied to Charles Louis. Oñate also cautioned Arundel against relying wholly on the Emperor for restitution. Because one share of the Lower Palatinate was under Spain's control, and the other under Bavaria's, he declared that they alone had the power to restore it. Only the removal of the ban and the restoration of the electorate were in the Emperor's power.¹⁶

Annoyed, Arundel replied that he had come to Germany to negotiate only with the Emperor, who had promised full restitution to Taylor, and not to address the so-called *convenientias* of Spain. According to Arundel, the Emperor claimed the right to restore the Lower Palatinate and had given assurances that Spain's only share in the restitution would be by way of mediation.¹⁷ Arundel pointed out that he had no instructions to negotiate with either Spain or Bavaria, much less to promise them compensation for concessions made in the Lower Palatinate. Besides, he retorted, the Habsburgs could not expect anything, much less a league, from the King of England unless his nephew was first restored. Arundel also denied that the King had assented to the aforementioned paper of Cottington, which he declared was Olivares's own fancy.¹⁸ Arundel acknowledged that Taylor and Aston had offered a "fit" league, but pointed out that such a league was in any case

¹⁶Ibid.; CCSP, vol. 1, 108: 9 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank.

¹⁷PRO, SP 80/9, f. 230: 9 Sept. 1636, same to Secretary.

¹⁸PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 229-30: 9 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary. Oñate actually sent Arundel copies of correspondence that had passed between Aston and the Count-Duke (ibid., SP 80/10, ff. 77-8: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston). Arundel wrote home asking for information about the question and answer exchange between Aston and Olivares that Oñate had referred to, but Windebank obviously chose to ignore the ambassador's request. The King, who claimed he did not remember the exchange, asked Windebank to check into it, noting "If ther had been Arondell should have had the Copies of them for I command to both you Secretaries." (CSP, vol. 1, 636: 12 Sept. 1636, Windebank to Charles I, with latter's notation; ibid., 618: 25 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Windebank).

subject to interpretation.¹⁹ Unbeknownst to Arundel, England had already given assurances of a closer alliance with Spain in its secret negotiations with the Habsburgs, though there had never been a consensus between the two sides about what form this league would take.²⁰

Arundel was appalled by Oñate's insistent behavior (and vice-versa), since he had been under the impression upon leaving for Germany that the Spaniards would do all they could to further his negotiations.²¹ He was mistaken on this point: Spain intended to milk the Palatinate for all it was worth by using it to enlist English help against the Dutch and French.²² Charles would not get something for nothing as he had hoped.²³ However, it was not clear that they would not reduce their demands to a level that the King would consider reasonable, such as the active assistance of the fleet, upon which the Spaniards relied to keep their lines of communication with Flanders open.

¹⁹Ashamed that he was so badly informed about Aston's proceedings in Spain, Arundel actually pretended he had seen Aston's papers but did not presently have them, and he took Oñate's copies so he would have some idea of what had passed there. "By this I saw with what disadvantages I treat hear in this businesse, when I am not made acquainted with the particulars of their proceeding in Spaine, that so neerly concerne my Ambassage." (PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 222: 26 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 613: 20 Aug. 1636, same to Windebank).

²⁰Spain expected England to enter the war against Holland and now France, while England saw the active assistance of the fleet and mediation of the Continental conflict as fulfilling its requirements.

²¹PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 222-4: 26 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.

²²The reports and advice that the King had been receiving from Hopton and Aston in Madrid pointed out that Spanish concessions in the Palatinate relied heavily upon the prospect of a treaty with England and that even then partial restitution might be the most that could be hoped for. Spain, though no great friend of Maximilian, could not afford to alienate him completely by promoting England's interests in the Palatinate considering the impending election of the King of the Romans (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 7: 9 Jan. 1636, Aston to Charles I; *ibid.*, ff. 101-3: Dec. 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, ff. 111-2: 7 Feb. 1637, same to Arundel; CSP, vol. 1, 622: 30 Aug. 1636, same to Charles I; *ibid.*, 655-6: 24 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 666: 25 Oct. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 687: 12 Nov. 1636, same to same).

²³BL, Add. Mss. 36450, ff. 7-8: 9 Jan. 1636, Aston to Charles I; CSP, vol. 1, 466: 5 Mar. 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 637: 13 Sept. 1636, same to same.

Oñate's son, who was then serving as ambassador in England, echoed his father's frustration with England. The young Oñate wrote of the arrogant English attitude to his negotiations there. The councillors at Whitehall, he complained, "assume the right to ask for a lot, and to hand over the Palatinate politely to them is a little thing considering our king's need of them."²⁴ Aston also professed his shock at Arundel's refusal to treat of any league at all and his lack of knowledge of his and Taylor's previous negotiations.²⁵

Charles, however, obviously did not regard the services offered by the fleet in exchange for the Palatinate as nothing. During his conversation with Oñate, Arundel pointed out the benefits that the Spaniards had reaped over the last two years through the agency of the English fleet.²⁶ A few months later, Aston also reminded Olivares of the advantages they had enjoyed over the previous two years with the help of the fleet, which the Spaniards should take into account when they considered the restitution of the Palatinate: "I thought it fit to tell him . . . That they had now a fair opportunity offered them in that business to repay the courtesies and obligations which they had received from his Majesty in these two years; whereby there may be happy beginnings laid of further friendships and stricter correspondencies"²⁷ In spite of their reliance on the assistance of the fleet to preserve their supply route to Flanders, the Spaniards maintained their poker faces with impressive *sang-froid*. If the fleet were to become an effective bargaining counter, however, the

²⁴Loomie, "Spanish Faction," 46-7.

²⁵CSP, vol. 1, 636: 13 Sept. 1636, Aston to Windebank; *ibid.*, 665-6: 12 Nov. 1636, same to same.

²⁶PRO, SP 80/9, f. 229: 9 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 614: 20 Aug. 1636, same to Windebank.

²⁷CSP, vol. 1, 706: 3 Dec. 1636: Aston to Windebank.

King would have to test the Spaniards by withdrawing or at least cutting back on the assistance it was already providing to Spain. Oñate's reply to Arundel's reference to the fleet was to acknowledge that courtesies had been done, but that its main task was to defend English sovereignty of the seas, not protect Spanish shipping.²⁸ What it came down to was that Charles I claimed that the Lower Palatinate alone was not worth consent to a league, and the Spaniards maintained that the protective services of the fleet alone were not valuable enough to relinquish their hold on the Lower Palatinate.²⁹ Their tune, however, would likely have been quite different if they had not been freely enjoying the services of the fleet and England offered these to their enemies instead. The failure to do this was one of the major failures of the King's foreign policy during the personal rule.

On 30 August, the Emperor finally responded to Arundel's most recent memorial, once again essentially offering the terms of 24 February. He disavowed that he had ever promised to restore the Prince Palatine fully to his patrimony and refused to consider it as a matter of justice, maintaining that any concessions made to him would spring purely from the Emperor's grace.³⁰ In return, he wished to know what the King was willing to do regarding a league with the House of

²⁸PRO, SP 80/9, f. 229: 9 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.

²⁹CSP, vol. 1, 706: 3 Dec. 1636: Aston to Windebank.

³⁰FHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 2: 29 Aug. 1636, Ferdinand II to Arundel; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 30 Aug. 1636, same to King of Hungary; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 247: 29 Aug. 1636, same to Arundel; CSP, vol. 1, 627: 29 Aug. 1636, same to same.

Austria.³¹ For what he regarded as a paltry offering, Arundel was rankled that the Emperor asked him to do so.³²

Not surprisingly, after his discussions with Oñate and the Emperor's answer, Arundel again began to despair of a favorable outcome for the negotiations. He identified the difficulty precluding agreement to be Oñate's insistence on Spain's *convenientias*: "without Spain," he wrote, "I find the Emperor will never do anything."³³ Seeing no real prospect for success, he hinted that he wished for a swift recall.³⁴

Meanwhile, the Emperor continued to labor to bring his allies to reason where the restoration of the Palatinate was concerned. In the interests of achieving peace, he wished to find a compromise that both England on the one hand, and Spain and Bavaria on the other, could accept. Ferdinand feared that Arundel, being of quick humor, would walk out on the talks if he did not receive a definite answer soon, thus resulting in a rupture between England and the Habsburg states. Besides allowing a chance for peace to slip away, this would cause Spain serious difficulties in its conflict with the Dutch and French and prolong the war in the Empire.

³¹This response was set out by the Imperial privy council on 19 August. Like the Spaniards, the councillors seemed baffled that Arundel denied a league when one was being treated in Spain by Aston and had been broached verbally by Taylor. They were eager to discover what the King actually required for his nephew and what type of confederation he would be willing to enter into in return (HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 103-7: 19 Aug. 1636, Opinion of privy council).

³²PRO, SP 80/9, f. 227: 3 Sept. [sic] 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 626: 2 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank.

³³Ibid., 611: 20 Aug. 1636, same to same.

³⁴PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 227-8: 3 Sept. [sic] 1636, same to Secretary; *ibid.*, f. 230: 9 Sept. 1636, same to same.

The Emperor therefore convened a secret conference between Bavarian, Spanish, and Imperial representatives at the beginning of September for the allies to decide upon the offer they would make to the English ambassador. Throughout these proceedings, the Imperial commissioners tried to mediate between the opposing views of its allies on the one hand and England on the other. The following were present at the meeting: Vice Chancellor Stralendorf and the Prince-Bishop of Vienna representing the Emperor; Count Oñate representing the King of Spain; and the Bavarian councillor Kurz and Chancellor Richel representing Maximilian. The Emperor expected each power to give a categorical reply on the question of Palatine restitution so that the Emperor could finally give an answer to Arundel, whom they had kept waiting though Charles had sent him with full powers to negotiate a final settlement. The Prince-Bishop of Vienna declared that "It would be essential to give 'the child a name' and to announce – after four months of waiting – which territory and how much of it one was prepared to restore. It was not enough to give ambiguous terms, because the English ambassador would then answer in the same uncertain way about the alliance, and things would not go forward."³⁵ He stressed the advantages of an English alliance for Spain and the disadvantages for all involved if they raised English ire against them. The Prince-Bishop also cautioned against offending Arundel to the point that he would pick up and return to England before the negotiations had reached a logical conclusion. The Emperor and his allies clearly expected Arundel to abandon his initial demands and bargain for a less ambitious but advantageous

³⁵Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Geheimes Staats-Archiv, Kastenschwarz 4366, and Kgl. bayr. Reichs-Archiv allgemeines, 30-jähr. Krieg; quoted in Springell, 41 n. 28.

accommodation for the Prince Palatine. However, he had stuck to his instructions and refused to do so thus far.³⁶

In keeping with Maximilian's previous declaration on this question, Richel replied that in the interests of peace Bavaria would surrender its portion of the Lower Palatinate if Spain would do the same, on the condition that the electoral dignity remained in the Wilhelmine line until its extinction.³⁷ That Maximilian showed himself ready, under certain circumstances, to give up the Lower Palatinate showed a significant softening of the Bavarian stance on restoration. His aim, most likely, was to relinquish the Lower Palatinate with the intention of securing the electorate and Upper Palatinate for his line.³⁸ Oñate in turn agreed to surrender Spanish-occupied areas of the Lower Palatinate, which Spain held to offset its war expenses, but only if England compensated his King with either an alliance or payment.³⁹ Since in his earlier memorial to the Emperor Arundel had flatly denied the offer of an offensive and defensive league to the Habsburgs, they should not press this issue with him but should ask him what form an Anglo-Habsburg league might take, and under what conditions. This showed that Spain was willing to consider a scenario where the league was not an

³⁶Ibid., 40-1 n. 28.

³⁷Bodl. Lib., Rawlinson Mss. D 867, f. 120: s.d., Maximilian I to Haubitz; *CSPV 1636-9*, 18: s.d., same to same. Further conditions included that all fortresses in the Lower Palatinate be razed, toleration would be accorded to Catholics in all restored territories, and the line of the Palsgrave of Neuburg should be preferred to inherit over that of the Prince Palatine if the Bavarian Wittelsbachs died out.

³⁸Albrecht, "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 264.

³⁹HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: [Sept.] 1636, Oñate's statement.

official offensive and defensive arrangement.⁴⁰ Both Spain and Bavaria agreed that the Emperor should remove the ban after Charles Louis made humble submission.⁴¹

The proceedings of this conference determined the basic form of the Emperor's resolution on Palatine restoration, which the Prince-Bishop of Vienna, Gebhardt, and Imperial Secretary Johannes Walderode von Eckhausen delivered to the interested parties on 11 September.⁴² The electoral dignity and Upper Palatinate were to remain with the Bavarian Wittelsbachs, as granted by investiture and confirmed by the Peace of Prague.⁴³ However, the Emperor wished to restore the Lower Palatinate to Charles Louis if the English would offer adequate compensation, that is, a league with the Habsburgs and financial compensation for Maximilian. The Emperor would then remove

⁴⁰There was a wide spectrum of available options between a league for the common peace on the one hand and an offensive and defensive league on the other. A league of general cooperation, for instance, would require the King to engage himself, though not on the same scale as a straight alliance. A league of amity and alliance or a league of aid and assistance "would not break the peace or give offense to any"; financial assistance and the aid of the fleet would fall into these categories (Gardiner, vol. 7, 196). Common ground, therefore, could have been found in the last two options.

⁴¹Springell, 41 n. 28.

⁴²HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 119-22: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, Relation of Imperial commissioners; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, same; *ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, ff. 65-7: [9 Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; *ibid.*, ff. 68-71: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 241: 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 646-7: 14 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank.

⁴³No treaty for their restoration would be made until the Wilhelmine line expired. This was the same as saying never, Arundel commented, because at least five males of the line were then living (Maximilian and his brothers Ferdinand, Elector of Cologne, and Albert, and the latter's sons) and the Duchess was expecting a child (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 244: 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 646-7: 14 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank).

the ban (as an act of grace not justice) and invest Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire.⁴⁴ He also implied that toleration for Catholics in the Lower Palatinate was a condition for its restoration.

Arundel was insulted by these unfavorable terms since Taylor had led the King to expect much more. Indeed, Arundel pointed out, the Emperor had given express hope in his February decree that he would make some accommodation regarding the electorate and Radolt had further confirmed this in a public speech made to the King.⁴⁵ In exchange for such a paltry return, he refused to accept the offer, which would have amounted to committing England to war on the Habsburg side. He retorted acidly to the Imperial delegates that "he wished gratefully to acknowledge the Emperor's efforts to enlighten him as to 'what could and what could not be done,'" and that this answer would have saved him three months and a trip to the Continent if they had given it to Taylor earlier.⁴⁶ In reply to Arundel's caustic comments, the Prince-Bishop of Vienna maintained that the offer was neither trivial nor out of line with what the Emperor had led the English to expect, as he had promised to do all that he could to restore the Prince Palatine while still being fair to his allies. Arundel made a swift comeback by pointing out that the Emperor had restored the lands and titles of other princes who had taken up arms against him, of which the present

⁴⁴HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 119-22: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, Relation of Imperial commissioners; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, same; *ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, ff. 65-7: [9 Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; *ibid.*, ff. 68-71: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same; PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 240-1: 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.

⁴⁵At this point, Arundel read aloud both the decree of 24 February and one of Radolt's propositions (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, ff. 65-7: [9 Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; *ibid.*, ff. 68-71: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same).

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 119-22: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, Relation of Imperial commissioners; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, same; *ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, ff. 65-7: [9 Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; *ibid.*, ff. 68-71: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same; PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 240-1: 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.

Prince Palatine was guiltless.⁴⁷ Furthermore, if the King accepted the Emperor's offer, the Prince Palatine might have to wait until the world ended to receive his inheritance.⁴⁸ The Prince-Bishop, attempting to restrain his indignation at Arundel's sarcastic reply, asked him to propose a way to accommodate the business, most particularly the electorate. Arundel responded that there might still be grounds for an agreement if the Emperor restricted the transfer of the electorate to Maximilian's lifetime and then allowed it to revert to the Palatine line afterwards.⁴⁹

Under the circumstances, Arundel felt his negotiation was at an end. He was convinced that the Imperialists had no intention of restoring the Upper Palatinate, let alone the electorate, on acceptable terms: "After the extinction of the Bavarian dynasty of the Wittelsbach (*linea Wilhelmica*) he [Arundel] proposed to meet again for further negotiations and examine, what chances the Prince Palatine then had"⁵⁰ With this Arundel rose and left, and the conference ended.

In short, the Emperor had offered nothing more than the terms of 24 February 1636, except that he specifically named the Lower Palatinate as the portion of the Palatinate lands that he would

⁴⁷To this Gebhardt, the lawyer, attempted to explain the justice of the Emperor's actions towards the Palatines.

⁴⁸"*mente durerà il mondo*" (HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, f. 122: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, Relation of Imperial commissioners; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, same; *ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 66: [9 Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I).

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 119-22: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, Relation of Imperial commissioners; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, same; *ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, ff. 65-7: [9 Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; *ibid.*, ff. 68-71: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 241: 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.

⁵⁰HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, f. 122: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, Relation of Imperial commissioners; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, same; *ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, ff. 65-7: [9 Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; *ibid.*, ff. 68-71: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 240: 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; *ibid.*, SP 80/10, ff. 78-9: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston.

restore to Charles Louis. Having said this, it should be noted it was due to the exertions of the Emperor, who sincerely wished to come to an agreement with England on the Palatinate question, that Bavaria and Spain stepped back from their extreme positions and the Emperor was able to offer the entire Lower Palatinate to Arundel. However, the Emperor could not afford to alienate his allies to please England.⁵¹ It should also be kept in mind that they intended this as a negotiable offer. The Prince-Bishop of Vienna had told Arundel two weeks earlier that the Emperor would not stand upon an offensive and defensive league and that in turn the King would not stand upon his demands of plenary restitution.⁵² Apparently, Arundel did not understand the Habsburgs' way of treating, as it was likely that they saw this as an opening rather than a final offer.

Arundel had an audience with the Emperor the next day and made his formal answer to what he regarded as the Emperor's inadequate offer. He informed the Emperor that he would relate the offer to his King, who he did not doubt would not be pleased, as the Emperor had led him to expect a very different outcome from the negotiations.⁵³ The Emperor responded by saying that the terms offered were the most generous thus far, and that he was confident that this would not be the case. Also, he would of course notify Radolt of what had passed, as Arundel requested.⁵⁴

Given Taylor's earlier representations, the vehemence of Arundel's reaction to their offer surprised and concerned the Imperialists. They intended to continue deliberation on the question of

⁵¹Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 238.

⁵²PRO, SP 80/9, f. 223: 26 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.

⁵³*Ibid.*, ff. 240-1: 14 Sept. 1636, same to same; Bodl. Lib., Rawlinson Mss. D 867, f. 113: 12 Sept. 1636, same to Ferdinand II; CSP, vol. 1, 643-4: 14 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank.

⁵⁴HHStA, StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 27-8: 13 Sept. 1636, Ferdinand II to Radolt.

restoration, and they feared the repercussions that his negative reports to the King and his withdrawal from Regensburg in a dissatisfied state might bring. The day after they communicated the Emperor's offer to Arundel, Imperial ministers met with their Bavarian counterparts to discuss whether they might further accommodate England.⁵⁵ The Bavarians, however, only sought to calm their fears by arguing that neither would Arundel abruptly break off the negotiation, for he would wait to hear the opinion of the electoral college on Palatine restitution which the Emperor would request, nor would England immediately turn to France given their mutual suspicion. The Imperialists, however, remained unconvinced by their arguments and recognized that Arundel could in fact raise England's ire against them. The privy council therefore decided to move to retain his goodwill and prevent his departure as long as possible while they attempted to discover England's true requirements for restoration and deliberate on what further offers they could make. In any case they held it advisable that the Emperor lay the question before the electoral college for its opinion as a matter nearly touching the Empire.⁵⁶ Further, the Imperialists sought to cushion the blow of Arundel's report and head off any misrepresentations he might make about what had passed. They therefore immediately informed Radolt of the events leading up to and following the Emperor's declaration and instructed him to discover whether Arundel had reported the story otherwise. If so, Radolt should inform the King what had really passed and assure him of the Emperor's sincere intention that they settle the business with fair conditions for all sides.⁵⁷

⁵⁵The Prince-Bishop of Vienna believed that they might be more likely to make concessions in a conference with Imperial ministers than in one where all of the interested parties were present (ibid., StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, f. 123: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, Opinion of privy council).

⁵⁶Ibid., ff. 123-5: 11, 12 Sept. 1636, same.

⁵⁷Ibid., StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 28-9: 13 Sept. 1636, Ferdinand II to Radolt.

The Emperor's declaration that plenary restitution, which was to be the basis of Arundel's negotiations, was not an option convinced the ambassador that his negotiation was at an end. From his perspective, the Habsburgs had finally openly shown their duplicity where the negotiations with England were concerned. Arundel could well agree with Roe's evaluation that "Such a proposal seals the assurance of a long abuse [to the Prince Palatine]."⁵⁸ Seeing that there was nothing further for him to do, he again requested his recall.⁵⁹ He wrote of the doubtfulness of his negotiation and his desire to return home to Sir William Hamilton:

for myself, the account I can yet give, is that according to my instructions I have solicited this business, but to deal truly with you, I have not procured either so quick a dispatch or so favorable an one as I conceived, the interest of the King my master's desires tending so much to the public tranquility does deserve the Spaniards holding up their own interests and this Court perhaps looking more on near ends than those at further distance though more useful for them. I have given account unto his Majesty of the present state of the affairs here, and the winter drawing on accompanied with my own infirmity of body make me desire to draw homewards, hoping that a good end of this business will cooperate with the General Peace which moves from your part, here we conceive the appearance of this Diet is not answerable to expectation and the events very uncertain.⁶⁰

When Arundel's report of the Emperor's offer reached England, the King began making serious approaches to France about a treaty, and he also went about strengthening his sea power.⁶¹ Coke

⁵⁸*CSPD 1636-7*, 133: 20 Sept. 1636, Roe to Elizabeth.

⁵⁹*PRO*, SP 80/9, f. 243: 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; *ibid.*, ff. 269-70: 23 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank; *ACA*, AL 1632-1723, no. 368: 16 Sept. 1636, same to Sir William Hamilton; *CSP*, vol. 1, 640: 14 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank. The state of his health made him desirous to journey home before winter: "my discourse and preparations rather tend towards an inclining homewards than otherwise, by reason of the winter's approach...." (*ibid.*).

⁶⁰*ACA*, AL 1632-1723, no. 368: 16 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Hamilton.

⁶¹*CSPD 1636-7*, 162: 13 Oct. 1636, Laud to Elizabeth.

duly dispatched Arundel's revocation.⁶² However, until he had it in hand and could present it to the Emperor, he could not leave for home.

Taylor, on the other hand, remained hopeful of the success of the negotiations with the Emperor. He encouraged the King to accept the proffered terms in the hope that a way to further restitution would be found in the future. He reported that the resolution given Arundel was not the Emperor's last and final offer, but a basis for further negotiation. Once the Habsburgs had an idea of what the King was prepared to offer in exchange, Taylor argued, they would modify their demands and the concessions they were prepared to offer. The Emperor had already offered the Lower Palatinate, and he believed he still wished to find a way to satisfy the King on the point of the electorate. He urged the King to accept the terms offered and vie for the rest later: "when the Prince Elector shall be in possession of his right, you may open or shut that flood-gate as you please."⁶³ As for what England would offer in return, though the Habsburgs wished for a straight league, Taylor thought they might reduce their demands to lessening the Dutch and securing Flanders, which the King could meet with the fleet alone.⁶⁴

While Arundel waited for his recall in the weeks following the Imperial proposal, the two sides continued to meet about the business of the Palatinate, though they achieved little. During this time, Arundel repeatedly alluded to his departure.⁶⁵ He felt reproached for rejecting an offer he

⁶²PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 277-81: 7 Oct. 1636, [Coke] to Arundel, revocation with copy addressed to Ferdinand II; HHStA, StA England, Kart. 2, f. 144: 7 Oct. 1636, Charles I to Ferdinand II.

⁶³CSP, vol. 1, 663: 15 Oct. 1636, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 647-8: 14 Sept. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 652-3: 23 Sept. 1636, same to same.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 663: 15 Oct. 1636, same to same.

⁶⁵CSPV 1636-9, 78-9: 7 Oct. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

deemed wholly inadequate: "I hear daily they censure me freely, that I must either like the Emperor's offer better than I make shew, or want wit or good intention."⁶⁶ Arundel was humiliated by rumors that the King would send Sir Robert Anstruther to negotiate in his place, and he lamented "yet I have been enforced to swallow all in silence."⁶⁷ Father Lamormaini actually congratulated him on the outcome of the negotiations, which Arundel related to Windebank: "He vowed to God he was in earnest, and thought I also took it as a grace dropped from heaven. I then could not choose but to tell him, that indeed I took it as a grace from heaven, that I had so plain an answer; which I had as plainly reported to the King my master: but I should interpret it as such grace I could not understand"⁶⁸

Despite the admonitions of others and blows to his pride, Arundel would not accept an offer he deemed inadequate. At this point his suggestions for recovering the Palatinate and reducing the influence of the House of Austria consisted of England sending a representative, perhaps himself, to lay the Palatinate question before the general peace conference planned for Cologne and/or doing what it could diplomatically to prevent France and the Habsburgs from reaching an agreement.⁶⁹ He

⁶⁶CSP, vol. 1, 661: 8 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

⁶⁷PRO, SP 80/9, f. 230: 9 Sept. 1636, same to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 677: 29 Oct. 1636, same to Windebank.

⁶⁸Ibid., 649-50: 18 Sept. 1636, same to same; PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 267-8: 17 Sept. 1636, same to Secretary.

⁶⁹Ibid., f. 244: 14 Sept. 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 646: 14 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 649-50: 18 Sept. 1636, same to same. Sending Arundel to Cologne was actually considered, first on his return journey to England, and then as an extra mission (CSPV 1636-9, 76: 2 Oct. 1636, Correr to D&S; *ibid.*, 109: 12 Dec. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 156: 6 Mar. 1637, same to same).

explained to Windebank that he had done his utmost to bring the negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion, and that he could "do no other than I have, and be true to what I was commanded."⁷⁰

Soon after Arundel received the Emperor's answer, on 18 September, the electoral college met and set out the major issues they planned to tackle during the session. These included the negotiation of peace in the Empire (particularly with the foreign powers involved), the reform of the Imperial army, proceedings against the elector of Trier, and – of course – the election of the King of the Romans.⁷¹ Moreover, the Emperor, who was still looking for a way to accommodate England on the question of the Palatinate, asked the electoral college to give its opinion on the matter.

Meanwhile, back in England the events of September were set to spark a diplomatic eruption. In any case, the Habsburg diplomats were not in high favor at the English court. Radolt had made no appearance at court over the summer. Coupled with the similar inaction of the young Oñate, who had lately arrived in England and quickly adopted a contemptuous attitude toward his hosts, the English suspected that the aim of the Habsburg diplomats was to create artificial delays and prevent England from taking decisive action.⁷² The new Spanish ambassador arrived in July but did not have his first audience until October.⁷³ When he finally did, he greatly offended the King by using an English Jesuit as his interpreter. At the time, Correr remarked that:

⁷⁰CSP, vol. 1, 665: 22 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

⁷¹Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 114-21.

⁷²CSPV 1636-9, 33: 30 July 1636, Correr to D&S; *ibid.*, 46: 19 Aug. 1636, same to same; *ibid.*, 80: 10 Oct. 1636, same to same.

⁷³Oñate was in any case insulted by his reception, or lack of one. No naval salute greeted him, no ministers visited him, and he did not see the King, who was absent on progress (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 5: 1 Aug. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II).

This hanging back, in addition to the prolonged incognito and the scandal of the Jesuit will have not only utterly discredited this minister but will serve to increase the bitterness against the House of Austria because of the Palatinate, which increases daily. They feel perfectly sure that in Spain as in Germany the Austrians merely aim at diverting England by compliments from those vigorous resolutions which they recognise she ought to take against them.⁷⁴

Radolt had his own reasons to be discontented with the young Oñate, and the Spaniards more generally. When Radolt asked him about his plenipotentiary powers – a copy of which the Spaniards had already exhibited to the Emperor – the Spanish ambassador admitted that he did not have them. His King first wanted to know what conditions Arundel would offer, and then he might send Oñate or his father further powers.⁷⁵ To Radolt, this was yet another example of Spain's lack of commitment to the business at hand.

When news of the Emperor's offer of 11 September reached the English court in early October, this made matters even worse. A courier arrived with Arundel's report and his request for his recall, and Radolt received the news plus further instructions from the Emperor. As Arundel had warned the Emperor, the English greeted the offer with a burst of indignation, finding it much less favorable than the Emperor had led the King to expect. As a result, the King began to lend a fresh ear to French overtures.⁷⁶ This spurred Radolt to action. He immediately requested an audience with the King. Moreover, he asked that this audience take place before the King sent the courier back to Germany.⁷⁷

⁷⁴CSPV 1636-9, 80: 10 Oct. 1636, Correr to D&S.

⁷⁵HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, ff. 5-7: 1 Aug. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II.

⁷⁶PRO, SP 80/9, f. 238: 14 Sept. 1636, Coke to Arundel.

⁷⁷HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 55: 17 Oct. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 10, f. 115: 5 Oct. 1636, same to [Windebank].

The King granted Radolt an audience on 9 October, at which the envoy raised questions about the accuracy of Arundel's relation and complained about his strange manner of proceeding at the Imperial court. Radolt then read the relation that the Emperor had sent to him detailing what had transpired during the conference between Arundel and the Imperial commissioners, in Latin as well as in English to ensure that the King would understand its content and that the interpreter would not change its meaning.⁷⁸ At the end, he added a few points of his own, particularly that he wondered that Arundel would slight the Emperor's ample offer, particularly as he himself had not yet declared what benefit the Habsburgs might hope for in return from the King.⁷⁹ The King and Coke, who was also present at the audience, assured Radolt that what he had read was not materially different from what Arundel had reported. However, the King promised to read through Radolt's relation himself and verify that no discrepancies existed between the two.⁸⁰ Despite these assurances, Radolt apparently still suspected that Arundel might have acted contrary to the King's direction. But when he discussed the matter with Coke later that day, Coke informed him that Arundel had indeed held to his instructions, as the King had commanded him not to join in a treaty without the restitution of

⁷⁸Ibid., ff. 65-7: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to Charles I; *ibid.*, ff. 68-71: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same.

⁷⁹Ibid., f. 67: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same. Radolt also complained of propositions made by Joseph Avery, the King's agent at Hamburg, to the Swedish Chancellor Oxenstierna, which openly contradicted the King's intentions as declared by Arundel and were now openly spread abroad in print (*ibid.*; *ibid.*, Kart. 21, f. 29: 13 Sept. 1636, Ferdinand II to Radolt).

⁸⁰Ibid., ff. 55-6: 17 Oct. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II. Further, they complained that Radolt himself had led them to expect a better offer than had materialized, just as Arundel had in his meeting with the Imperial commissioners.

the electorate. The secretary ominously added that if Arundel's mission was not successful, the King would have to look elsewhere to restore his nephew.⁸¹

By this point, Radolt had apparently changed his mind about the intentions of the English, because his reaction was to brush off this threat. In Radolt's opinion, the English were simply using scare tactics in an attempt to obtain full restoration from the Habsburgs in exchange for assisting Spain in the Channel. He believed that the King would neither openly break with the Habsburgs if he were not completely satisfied in the Palatinate nor enter into a league with them if he were. If the Emperor would not consent to offer more, Radolt suspected that the King might reconsider his answer and accept the current offer.⁸²

By the time Radolt received a response to his relation of 9 October, he was convinced that the negotiations had effectively broken down. He reported that he was no longer received with respect, and that the few people with whom he earlier had contact at court had withdrawn from him out of fear of offending the King and his ministers.⁸³ On 16 October, Radolt returned to court to receive a written answer to his relation. Coke's letter assured him that there was no material difference between Arundel's report and his own.⁸⁴ After receiving this answer, Radolt requested an audience with the King, at which he announced his intention to take his leave and requested his

⁸¹Ibid., f. 56: 17 Oct. 1636, same to same.

⁸²Ibid., ff. 56-7: 17 Oct. 1636, same to same.

⁸³Furthermore, he felt his effectiveness was hampered by his meager understanding of English. In any case, he was eager to return home and had repeatedly requested his recall.

⁸⁴HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 83: 13 Oct. 1636, Coke to Radolt. According to Correr, Radolt also delivered a letter from the Emperor to the King promising satisfaction in the Palatinate, and the convenience of its appearance prompted speculation at court that the Imperial envoys had composed it in England as an expedient (CSPV 1636-9, 84: 17 Oct. 1636, Correr to D&S).

passports. He did this in an attempt to discover whether the King considered the negotiations broken off or not, reasoning that the King would grant the passports if this were the case. Some at court believed that Radolt was doing this merely for effect.⁸⁵ As it turned out, Radolt indeed received his dismissal from the King and his passports (but no departing gift), and then retired once more to await his recall from the Emperor.⁸⁶ However, as Radolt would soon discover, the Emperor was not yet prepared to grant it.

As Radolt waited for his revocation, Arundel's finally arrived in Regensburg on 25 October. To his dismay, along with his recall he received not his own instructions, but those intended for Leicester.⁸⁷ At the same time, Windebank instructed Taylor to remain to continue the negotiations

⁸⁵Finet, 212. This was an attempt to sound out rather than alarm the English. It was apparent that Radolt had every intention of leaving if the Emperor gave him leave to do so, though even at this point he did not rule out that the Emperor might send another envoy in his place. Finet wrote that Radolt "pretended and gave out" that he would leave England. Finet related that Radolt had an audience at the end of the summer to take his leave of the King; however he also mentions that Radolt emerged in January, after three months, so it is likely that these events took place in October, when Radolt reappeared at court.

⁸⁶HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 82: [Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; *ibid.*, f. 59: 17 Oct. 1636, same to Ferdinand II.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, Kart. 2, f. 144: 7 Oct. 1636, Charles I to same; PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 277-81: 7 Oct. 1636, [Coke] to Arundel, revocation with copy addressed to Ferdinand II. Arundel's replies to the secretaries are: PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 7-8: 29 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; and CSP, vol. 1, 677: 29 Oct. 1636, same to Windebank. Coke acknowledged in a letter to Arundel that he had received his numerous complaints that his instructions were not sent with the revocation and that no duplicates had been received. Coke maintained that he had sent Arundel's instructions and that they could not have been mixed up with Leicester's since no packet was sent to Leicester at that time. He suspected someone had tampered with his letters: "I am...jealous of some miscarriage by the way: And desire your Lordship to examine whether the packet which Saddler brought, came to your hands under my ordinarie seal and without any breach or change...in Sadlers packet I sent also his Majesties letters to the Grand Duke of Florence and to the Cavaleere of Malta his Ambassador with the Emperor: Yet your Lordship doth not mention in any letters the receipt of either of them which maketh me doubt of more then mischance...it must needs bee presumed, that my packets have bene intercepted and stopped upon the way." (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 39: 11 Dec. 1636, [Coke] to Arundel).

after Arundel's departure.⁸⁸ The arrival of the ambassador's recall took the Imperialists by surprise. The Emperor and his councillors had expected Arundel to continue bargaining with them on the terms of restoration and the matter of a league. Wishing to avoid a complete rupture in the negotiations and the consequences of England's antipathy, they quickly moved to delay his departure. Arundel made it clear that they should not trifle with him and that they could not withhold most of what he demanded for the Prince Palatine and remain on good terms with England.⁸⁹ Whereas the Imperialists before had been aloof, they now oozed goodwill toward Arundel, who reported "For whereas before I remayned in a manner neglected with out so much as receaving any visite or civile respect from any one of them; now there passeth not a day wherein they expresse not some evident argument of their desire to give me contentment."⁹⁰ The Emperor, who was aware of Arundel's interest in art "sent him eleven books of most exquisite ones [drawings], which he doth above all things esteem, and which he carrieth still about with him."⁹¹

The King of Hungary, who arrived in Regensburg at about the same time that Arundel received his recall, was particularly gracious to him and urged him to remain and conduct the

⁸⁸*CSP*, vol. 1, 662: [9] Oct. 1636, Windebank to Taylor. Taylor's letter of 14 September provided the basis of this decision. He was told that, notwithstanding Arundel's revocation, "yourself shall remain there in that quality which you held before my Lord's coming thither, and shall still continue the treaty." (*ibid.*).

⁸⁹*PRO*, SP 80/10, ff. 7-8: 29 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; *ibid.*, ff. 11-2: 4 Nov. 1636, same to same; *CSP*, vol. 1, 677: 29 Oct. 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 681-2: 4 Nov. 1636, same to same.

⁹⁰*PRO*, SP 80/10, f. 11: 4 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; *CSP*, vol. 1, 681: 4 Nov. 1636, same to Windebank.

⁹¹Quoted in Hervey, 388.

negotiations further.⁹² This was a promising sign. A moderate and pragmatic prince, the King of Hungary was willing to satisfy the English King as far as he possibly could. He was soon expected to ascend the Imperial throne, and as Emperor he would prefer his realm to be at peace and to have England as a friend rather than an enemy.⁹³ Still, he could not realistically trade the time-tested league with Spain and Bavaria for a new friendship with England.⁹⁴ As always, any agreement would have to come with the concurrence of his allies; therefore he, like his father, endeavored to moderate their demands on the question of the restitution of the Palatinate. Also promising was the Emperor's request that the electors give their opinion on how to accommodate the electorate.⁹⁵ This turn of events gave Arundel hope that they could still find a compromise solution to the Palatinate question, as Windebank reported to Lord Feilding:

My Lo. Marshall whome we expected to have bene upon his way homeward hath given advice of better inclination in the good successe of his negotiations than have appeared since his employment there, and it seems he holdes them reall and worth his stay, otherwise, he wold not have bene amused just upon his departure, especially now in the depth of winter⁹⁶

⁹²PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 5-7: 29 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; *ibid.*, f. 79: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston; HMC, *Sixth Report*, vol. 1, 281: 11 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Feilding; *ibid.*: 18 Nov. 1636, same to same.

⁹³Ferdinand II, whose health was declining, let his son deal with many of the problems arising at the electoral meeting. Well before Leslie had remarked that the Emperor "is somewhat sicklie and beginith to be werie old, I feare he s[h]al not live long." (HMC, *Denbigh V*, 26: [Apr.?] 1636, Leslie to Feilding). Arundel wrote in September that "Want of exercise and cold coming on with these slow proceedings are thought to be very prejudicial to the Emperor's body, which is very infirm." (ACA, AL 1632-1723, no. 368: 16 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Hamilton). Then, on 8 November, the Emperor lost consciousness for two hours (Franzl, 284).

⁹⁴Khevenhüller, vol. 12, 2121.

⁹⁵PRO, SP 80/10, f. 79: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston.

⁹⁶HMC, *Sixth Report*, vol. 1, 281: 5 Dec. 1636, Windebank to Feilding.

Aston also believed that a good conclusion of his negotiation was possible, but he would have to bargain with the Spaniards.⁹⁷

Given new hope that they could arrange an acceptable solution for the Palatinate question, Arundel was convinced to delay his departure and resume negotiation with the Imperialists in unofficial, private discussions.⁹⁸ He was absolutely determined to discover "the uttermost they will do."⁹⁹ These discussions were important because they revealed that not only the Emperor, but to all to all appearances Maximilian as well, was open to reevaluating his position on this problem.¹⁰⁰ Ballarino noted that the Emperor, King of Hungary, and even Oñate showed an exceptional desire to settle it.¹⁰¹ Arundel also took a more moderate stance. He made this insightful comment to Windebank: "if they will do well, though short of our expectation, we must give them good conditions, though short of their expectation."¹⁰² He recognized the goodwill of the Emperor and King of Hungary, but also understood that under the circumstances they must necessarily limit their concessions.

⁹⁷BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 63: s.d., Aston to Arundel.

⁹⁸Since he had his revocation in hand, he must have done this out of renewed hope for the success of his negotiations, or, at the very least, so as to have made every attempt to bring them to a satisfactory conclusion.

⁹⁹PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 6-7: 29 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; *ibid.*, f. 11: 4 Nov. 1636, same to same.

¹⁰⁰*CSPV* 1636-9, 93: 4 Nov. 1636, Ballarino to D&S. Springell brushes aside these unofficial talks as of no importance (Springell, 35; Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 236 n. 51).

¹⁰¹*CSPV* 1636-9, 102: 25 Nov. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

¹⁰²*CSP*, vol. 1, 682: 4 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

Arundel was authorized to negotiate a compromise, and in the unofficial talks he began to make use of the powers granted him by attempting to negotiate a deal by which the Emperor would restrict the electorate to Maximilian or to his immediate line. At the beginning of November he suggested to Trauttmansdorff that the electorate alternate between the two Wittelsbach lines after Maximilian's death rather than after the expiry of the Bavarian line. At the same time, Arundel asked the Prince-Bishop of Vienna if they could agree that the electorate would only be perpetuated in Maximilian's direct line.¹⁰³ When news of the birth of Maximilian's son, Ferdinand Maria, reached Regensburg, Arundel further modified his suggestions.¹⁰⁴ He still believed that the "*linea Gulielmi* may be brought to *linea Maximiliani*," and accordingly communicated to the King of Hungary that Charles would be satisfied if the Emperor transferred the electorate to the Palatine line after the death of both Maximilian and Ferdinand Maria.¹⁰⁵ Finally, as a last effort, Arundel suggested the creation of an eighth electorate, though for whom is unclear.¹⁰⁶ Arundel's proposals were seriously considered by the Emperor and King of Hungary, who earnestly wished to find a solution to the Palatinate question and make a treaty with England. In consequence, Trauttmansdorff asked Vice Chancellor Richel to reexamine the Bavarian attitude to the Palatinate question.

However, in spite of the sincerity and goodwill of the Emperor and King of Hungary, which Arundel was inclined to believe, it soon became apparent that it was not enough to overcome the

¹⁰³"ob es nit dahin zu richten, daß die chur allain auff die Maximilianische lini perpetuiert werden könne."

¹⁰⁴HHStA, Hausarchiv, Familienkorrespondenz A, Kart. 10: 31 Oct. 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand II. Ferdinand Maria was born on 31 October 1636.

¹⁰⁵CSP, vol. 1, 682: 4 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

¹⁰⁶Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 236-7.

opposition of Spain and Bavaria.¹⁰⁷ In early November, the Prince-Bishop of Vienna, Walderode, and Gebhardt came to Arundel, and "Gepart made a long speech distinguid with a hundred hems and haws, and was in substance wors then in the manner in which itt had bene deliverd," telling the ambassador that the Emperor would restore the entire Lower Palatinate in return for compensation to Spain and Bavaria, the latter by financial means. The Upper Palatinate would remain with Maximilian in return for the expenses he had incurred in his service to the Emperor; likewise the electorate was confirmed to Bavaria, and the Palatines should succeed to it only when the Wilhelmine line should fail.¹⁰⁸ Arundel's efforts to limit the duration of the electoral transfer to the Bavarian Wittelsbachs had come to naught. He knew that the King would not be satisfied with any agreement that did not include some provision for the electorate for his nephew, and it did not appear this was forthcoming; thus, when this became obvious, he made his formal response to the Emperor and made plans for his journey homeward.¹⁰⁹

Arundel determined to leave Regensburg, in spite of requests by the King of Hungary to remain and await the opinion of the electoral college that the Emperor had requested. He took his formal leave of the Emperor and of the King and Queen of Hungary amid demonstrations of good understanding, and, after leaving Taylor instructions, he departed Regensburg on 18 November.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷*CSP*, vol. 1, 701: 23 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

¹⁰⁸*PRO*, SP 80/10, f. 80: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston; *CSPV 1636-9*, 93: 4 Nov. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

¹⁰⁹*HHStA*, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 4 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Ferdinand II; *CSPV 1636-9*, 102: 25 Nov. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

¹¹⁰The King of Hungary sent with him a letter for Charles I, which expressed his desire for peace and continued hopes for an agreement, and further letters to both the King and Queen expressing his goodwill (*ACA*, NC G 1/10: 12 Nov. 1636, King of Hungary to Charles I; *HHStA*, StA England, Kart. 2,

Taylor wrote of his departure: "His lordship tooke his journey hence on Tuisday last, the 18th of this, and though these Princes much indeavoured to have stayed him here, yet being commanded to returne, [he found] itt not fitting to have attended longer their resolutions."¹¹¹ Arundel believed that he had not omitted any attempt to bring his mission to a good conclusion.¹¹² Taylor also related that Arundel had "omitted nothing that was possible for the advancement of this businesse."¹¹³ After Arundel's departure, the Imperialists expressed satisfaction with his conduct, and even the Pope's nuncio said "for his Excellency's person, I never knew any Ambassador give so general a satisfaction in this court as he does; they hold him a wise counsellor, a diligent servant to his master, a fair honest dealer, and a stout cavalier."¹¹⁴ These were precisely the qualities that had prompted Charles to appoint Arundel to the post in the first place.

Later on, however, Taylor wrote that the Spaniards demanding too much and Arundel granting too little had hampered the negotiations. Most particularly he pointed to Arundel's refusal to contemplate a league when one was already on the table: "The Conde of Oñate demanded too much, and my Lord Marshall granted too little, but for anything I could ever learn from him, he could entend him selfe to nothing further, and had no order to grant them any particular convenientias (whereat I much wondere) more then whatt they should have received by the league

f. 46: 16 Nov. 1636, same to Henrietta Maria; *ibid.*, f. 55: 16 Nov. 1636, same to Charles I).

¹¹¹HMC, *Denbigh V*, 41: 25 Nov. 1636, Taylor to Feilding.

¹¹²CSP, vol. 1, 701: 23 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.

¹¹³PRO, SP 80/10, f. 81: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston.

¹¹⁴CSP, vol. 1, 702: 23 Nov. 1636, William Howard to Windebank.

in generall."¹¹⁵ Arundel's ignorance of Aston's and Taylor's proposals and his refusal to treat of a league – or even hear of one beyond a league for the common peace – also surprised Aston.¹¹⁶

One can hardly blame Arundel for the outcome of his negotiations. He conducted them as directed in his instructions and in letters from the secretaries. Much of the problem can be attributed instead to the King and Windebank's manner of conducting foreign policy. Their secrecy about the developments of the various missions was obstructive to their success. It often handicapped his diplomats in their negotiations, Arundel and Taylor included, because they were unaware or ill-informed of developments regarding the Palatinate at other courts. The problems created by the King and Windebank's subterfuge was highlighted, for example, by the complaint of the Earl of Leicester, the English ambassador in France, that he had no intelligence of Arundel's negotiation with the Emperor:

It is constantly reported, and beleev'd here, that my Lord Marshall [E. of *Arundel*] retired unsatisfy'd from the Emperours Court; and because I have bin divers Time asked of it, both by the Ministers of this State, and forrein Princes, I am a little ashamed I could give none, but ignorant Answers; which I perceived makes many thinke, that my Intelligence, or my Memorie, is very ill; and perhaps they may imagine, that I am not trusted, nor though worthie to know any Thing, but by the Way of vulgar Breath.¹¹⁷

If that were not bad enough, the King also kept information about his secret negotiations at one Habsburg court from his diplomats conducting secret negotiations at another. Hence the complaint of Aston in Spain, who grumbled that everything was hidden from him about Arundel's negotiation

¹¹⁵PRO, SP 80/10, f. 80: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston.

¹¹⁶CSP, vol. 1, 636: 13 Sept. 1636, Aston to Windebank; *ibid.*, 665-6: 12 Nov. 1636, same to same.

¹¹⁷Collins, vol. 2, 451: 26 Dec. 1636, Leicester to Coke.

except that Arundel was to demand full restitution and that the only notice he received was from the Spaniards themselves. Aston believed that he could have helped Arundel's negotiation if the government had better informed him about the ambassador's proceedings in Germany.¹¹⁸

By advancing offers in secret negotiations at Habsburg courts and refraining from informing Arundel and other diplomats of them, one must wonder what their goals were for his mission. It is likely that they harbored hopes, given Taylor's rosy reports, that they finally had enough leverage to move the Habsburgs to restore the Prince Palatine without commitment to an offensive and defensive league, to which they knew the loyal Arundel would never assent, particularly if he were uninformed of the King's previous machinations on this point. Also, the King may have hoped further that the presence of a grand ambassador extraordinary might move the Emperor to agree to an acceptable arrangement and thus prevent the electoral college from confirming the terms of the Peace of Prague and Maximilian from recording his vote as an elector of the Empire. Once this had taken place, it would be even more difficult to extract the Palatine lands and titles from the clutches of the Bavarian Wittelsbachs as opposed to just Maximilian himself. It is an understatement to say that the King did not always make astute policy, and these hopes like many others proved illusory. In addition, the King and Windebank may have hoped that a compromise agreement negotiated by Arundel, who had been a faithful friend to Elizabeth in the past, would be more palatable to her and her supporters than one negotiated by Taylor, whom they widely regarded as a papist and a Habsburg sympathizer.¹¹⁹ Arundel's loyalty to the House of Stuart was beyond reproach, and since he had no

¹¹⁸BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 104: 13 Dec. 1636,* Aston to Arundel.

¹¹⁹Her opinion obviously carried some weight, because Arundel had been instructed to turn back if she objected too heftily to his mission.

knowledge of the secret negotiations, the King could trust his ambassador not to commit him further than he was willing to go. This was important, because the King could not denounce Arundel's negotiations at will, as he later did Taylor's. Finally, as Coke pointed out when Arundel asked for his recall, a high-profile embassy like Arundel's served to apply pressure to the French, with whom Leicester was currently negotiating.

The Aftermath of the Embassy

With Taylor firmly installed in his old position, Arundel and his retinue ventured back to England. They returned for the most part along the same route they had followed into Germany. Their first stop was in Nuremberg, where the city magistrates presented Arundel with two Dürer portraits, one of the artist himself and one of his father, and amused him with lavish entertainments.¹²⁰ They may have staged this extravagant display to express the city's regret for the misfortune that had befallen two of Arundel's servants while they were on an errand to Nuremberg in late August: his gentleman Lampleigh and trumpeter William Smith, having completed their task, were returning to Vienna by post horse when a gang of marauders attacked and violently murdered them and their local guide in the forest just outside the city, and then tied their corpses to trees.¹²¹ Arundel, whom this occurrence

¹²⁰The latter portrait is almost surely "The Painter's Father," which is attributed to Dürer and now hangs in National Gallery, London. Interestingly enough, Arundel's inclination to Dürer's work was rivaled by that of Maximilian I (Albrecht, "Maximilian I," 366). In addition to the paintings, the city gifted Arundel forty bottles of wine and three baskets of fish, delivered by thirty men in livery (Bechtold, 29).

¹²¹BL, Add. Mss. 15970, f. 36: 8 Sept. 1636, Arundel to William Petty; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 231: 9 Sept. 1636, same to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 629: 8 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 633: 10 Sept. 1636, Borough to same; Gumbel, 107-9. Borough described the barbarity of the murders: "Mr. Lamplugh having all his body beaten black and blue, was shot through the head with a pistol; Mr. Smith had one of his eyes beaten out, and his head cut off, save that it hung by a little part of skin; the guide had his head cleft almost to his ears." (CSP, vol. 1, 633: 10 Sept. 1636, Borough to Windebank).

greatly grieved, suspected that Nuremberg soldiers were the offenders.¹²² Besides the Dürer paintings, Arundel received another gift while in Nuremberg. Colonel Leslie had followed him there to present him with a gift from the Emperor – a diamond worth two thousand crowns – and to try to persuade him to resume the negotiations, the latter to no avail.¹²³ The Emperor and his ministers still feared a rupture with England, even though the Spaniards tried to rationalize it away by astutely pointing out that England would not commit to war, much less to the loss of trade with Spain, given not only the strained relations between the King and his subjects but also those between England and France.¹²⁴ Sadly, the Spaniards knew the motivations of the King only too well and were able to use this to their own advantage.

From Nuremberg the ambassadorial party traveled with an escort of a hundred musketeers through the woods to Würzburg, where the Bishop presented Arundel with yet another Dürer painting, a Madonna.¹²⁵ The ambassador was so enamored of this work that, as he revealed to his art agent William Petty, it traveled with him in his carriage for the remainder of the trip: "I wish you sawe the Picture of a Madonna of AD [Albrecht Dürer] which the Bishoppe of Wirtzberge gave me

¹²²This because the English victims' boots were stripped off, probably in a search for jewels, but their clothes were left on; in addition, it was suspected that the guide was killed because he may have recognized the attackers (ibid.). Arundel asked that the King consider Smith's widow in some way (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 231: 9 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary).

¹²³In the records of the Imperial treasury, a diamond ring worth 2,850 gulden (1,900 thalers, or = £400) was given the English ambassador (HKA, HZAB 83 [1636-7], f. 105).

¹²⁴CSPV 1636-9, 102: 25 Nov. 1636, Ballarino to D&S; ibid., 132: 27 Jan. 1636, same to same. Purportedly the Emperor sent a further express after Arundel indicating his willingness to come to an agreement and suggesting that Maximilian and Charles Louis should hold the electorate jointly (ibid., 117: 29 Dec. 1636, same to same).

¹²⁵During the war, rulers offered such an armed escort to distinguished travelers as a mark of respect and hospitality, much as a gift of wine or food would be given (Antoni Maczak, *Travel in Early Modern Europe*, trans. Ursula Phillips [Oxford: Blackwell, 1995], 169).

last weeke as I passed by that way; and though it were painted at first upon an uneven board, and is vernished, yet it is more worth then all the toyes I have gotten in Germanye, and for such I esteeme it, havinge ever carried it in my owne Coach since I had it."¹²⁶

The German countryside was just as desolate as when Arundel's company had passed through it six months before. They encountered ruined villages, a starving and disease-ridden populace, and gangs of marauders, the Croats being particularly feared. At Hanau, 22,000 people had died of the plague in the first seven weeks of an Imperial siege that had started in September 1635 and had only recently been raised.¹²⁷ Wild animals were starving for want of prey; the propaganda piece *Lamentations of Germany* recounted such an incident involving Arundel's party:

My Lord, the Earle of Arundel, travelling homewards, towards Frankefort on the Maine, a Boore or Peasant of the Countrey, being their guide, and having his legs bare, a Foxe pursued him, among my Lords followers, and would not forbear snatching and biting his bare heeles, (such was his hunger) till they gave him a blow to the necke, and so tooke him alive. His eyes were sunke, his bones stucke out, and hee was so extreme leane, that his sides almost met together. They carried him alive with them in the Coach, and after a few daies he died.¹²⁸

People fared little better than animals. Crowne recorded that at Mainz "his Excellence went on shore, to see if it were any way enriched since our being there, but alas, wee found it as miserable

¹²⁶BL, Add. Mss. 15970, f. 60: 5 Dec. 1636, Arundel to Petty. In Würzburg, he received a further gift of 32 bottles of wine, fish, and fodder for his horses (Bechtold, 31).

¹²⁷Crowne, 59. Also, at Hanau a woman was attacked because she had "killed many Dogs & sold their flesh at a great rate to many people." (ibid., 60).

¹²⁸Philip Vincent, *The Lamentations of Germany, wherein, as in a glasse, we may behold her miserable condition, and reade the woefull effects of sinne* (London: Printed by E.G. for Iohn Rothwell, 1638), 53. This story is not confirmed by Crowne. If the coach in question was Arundel's, one might ask if he would really allow an animal, no matter how feeble, anywhere near his cherished Madonna.

as before, with divers poore people lying on Dunghills almost starved, being scarce able to cawle for to receive his Excellencies almes."¹²⁹

Again an obstacle barred the company from continuing its journey, despite the safe conduct the Emperor had issued to Arundel. At Koblenz, the new Imperial governor was not only rude, but downright hostile. He would not immediately grant Arundel safe passage, and some of his men fired on members of the entourage. The treatment they received at his hands greatly offended Arundel:

On Thursday last the 11/1 of this December I arrived heer at Colen: where I should have been much sooner, had it not been for the most insolent & barbarous usage of the Governor of Coblens towards me & my people who not onely caused me to stay one whole day & part of another, before I could gett leave to passe, notwithstanding my qualitie of an Ambassador, the Emperors speciall letters [of] recomendation & his safe conduct under seale: but my Trumpeter retourning towards me from the Fort of Erbretestein (whether with his knowledge & good liking, & with an open letter I had sent him for obtayning like libertie of the French Governor there) was taken & made prisoner called shelve [rascal] & traytor, had his hat slash't with a sword by [the Spanish Governor's] Lieutenant (his hed [b]ayrely scaping) was bound with a peece of match to the principall skipper that guided the boat, who had his finger cutt off & so with two other skippers likewise bound together led prisoners to the Governors house in the Towne where after much ado I at last procured their liberty of which barbarous act I am now framing an authentique narration therein relating all the particulars & circumstances¹³⁰

Conversely, the nearby French commander was courteous to the travelers and let them proceed without any further trouble.¹³¹ Arundel and his entourage passed without significant incident through

¹²⁹Crowne, 60-1.

¹³⁰PRO, SP 80/10, f. 40: 14 Dec. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; HMC, *Denbigh V*, 44: 30 Dec. 1636, Taylor to Feilding. Crowne relates that Arundel sent his steward after the missing men, "who found them tyed by the Armes together, the Skippers finger cut off, and the Trumpeters head escaped very narrowly from being cloven in two had not his strong Hat defended it." The lieutenant "also had threatened to hang them up the next day together, but with much adoe [the steward] brought them away with him." (Crowne, 63).

¹³¹"hearing by the Trumpeter [of] the [Imperial] Governours base usage towards His Excellencie, presently plac'd their canons against his [the Governor's] house, and vowed his Sonne should give fire to

the rest of the Empire and into the Netherlands, where they traveled by sleigh to make a final stop at the Hague before crossing the Channel to England.

Arundel again had an audience with Elizabeth, but this time he clearly showed his disillusionment with the duplicity of the Habsburgs, and Spain in particular. He made it clear to her that he had become convinced that a peaceful solution to the Palatinate question could not be found, at least not through negotiations with them. Still loyal to the Prince Palatine's cause, Arundel advocated immediate military intervention by the King as the only way to recover his nephew's rightful inheritance, and he vowed to bare the truth of the situation to all at the Stuart court. Elizabeth was of course quite pleased with this turn of events. She had opposed the mission from the start because she feared Arundel might reach a compromise agreement on her son's restoration without her approval. To be sure, she had expected the embassy to fail, but she did not suspect that it would bring such a strong anti-Habsburg advocate as Arundel now was to the Palatine cause. Arundel's status at court was such that he was in a position to expose the Habsburgs as the hypocrites they were and to convince those who mattered, including the King, that England could expect nothing from them by diplomacy and that war was the only realistic means to her son's restoration.¹³² Elizabeth wrote gleefully to Roe:

them the next morning, and would send him such a breakfast, as that hee should need no dinner...." (ibid., 62).

¹³²CSPD 1625-49, 539: 30 Dec. 1636, Elizabeth to Laud.

The Lord Marshal is come from Ratisbon full of discontent. He has spoken very freely that there is nothing to be gotten from there, and that the King must make her son considerable in putting him into action, and that speedily, else all will be spoiled. He has promised to deal freely with the King in it. . . . The mind he is in is much adverse to the Spanish faction.¹³³

Although the embassy was not successful, Elizabeth was very satisfied with Arundel's conduct of the negotiations. The ignominious compromise settlement she had feared had not materialized, and this she attributed at least in part to Arundel's resolute conduct of the negotiations. Both Elizabeth and her friend Roe applauded Arundel's comportment and showered praise upon him.¹³⁴ Even Rusdorf, who was unable to influence Arundel's behavior in the way he would have liked in Regensburg, had to admit that he carried out his instructions with enthusiasm and skill.¹³⁵ Like Elizabeth, Roe was convinced that Arundel's new-found opposition to the Habsburgs would have a great effect at court. He wrote to Charles Louis that "In his embassy he has performed towards the Elector all offices of honour and sincerity, and if he do not change in our cold and watery air, it is in his way to be the author of a turn of all affairs."¹³⁶ Change his opinion he would not. Once Arundel reached England he showed his constancy to the Palatine cause: he advocated war to support the dynastic interests of the House of Stuart.

Arundel and his retinue departed from the Hague and arrived back in England by 6 January 1637. Once there, they journeyed up the Thames from Gravesend. On their way up the river Lady

¹³³CSPD 1636-7, 239: 31 Dec. 1636, same to Roe.

¹³⁴Ibid.

¹³⁵Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 108. While in Regensburg, Rusdorf made few friends and had little communication with the other representatives there.

¹³⁶CSPD 1636-7, 249: 10 Jan. 1636, Roe to Charles Louis.

Arundel met them, and she offered her husband a rich feast aboard her barge to welcome him home. They then proceeded to Hampton Court, where the King eagerly awaited Arundel's report of his negotiations with the Emperor.¹³⁷ The King warmly received Arundel on 8 January, and during a long audience the ambassador expressed his dissatisfaction with the outcome of his negotiations with the Emperor (see figs. 8 and 9).

Arundel's return in tandem with the arrival of the first reports of the election of the King of Hungary as King of the Romans spurred the Habsburg diplomats at the English court to action.¹³⁸ Radolt reemerged in early January, so suspicions that he had not left England proved correct.¹³⁹ Based on his observations, he reported that the news of the election had delivered an unexpected jolt and caused great indignation at the English court.¹⁴⁰ For his part, the young Count Oñate, who had been insultingly dormant since his arrival in July, had the audacity to request an audience the same day that Arundel's first audience was scheduled.¹⁴¹ Oñate began his audience by announcing the

¹³⁷Hervey, 393.

¹³⁸These reports were followed by letters from the King of Hungary and Ferdinand II announcing the former's election as King of the Romans and promising friendship between their two nations (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 44: [22] Dec. 1636, King of Hungary to Charles I; *ibid.*, f. 46: 22 Dec. 1636, Ferdinand II to same). Taylor reported from Regensburg that the King of Hungary was crowned King of the Romans on 30 December (HMC, *Denbigh V*, 44: 30 Dec. 1636, Taylor to Feilding). Radolt immediately sent letters of congratulation back to Vienna (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 9 Jan. 1637, Radolt to King of Hungary; *ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1820, ff. 3-4: 9 Jan. 1637, same to same).

¹³⁹Though this was due more to the fact that he had not yet received his recall than a backfired attempt to alarm the English.

¹⁴⁰HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 1819, f. 3: 9 Jan. 1637, Radolt to King of Hungary.

¹⁴¹He was actually insulted when Arundel was received before he was.

8 *The Kingly Cock, Crispin de Passe (1637)*

This Dutch broadside satirizing Caroline foreign policy was likely intended for an English audience. The English King is shown asleep on his throne, with his sword unbuckled. Through the window, his fleet lies anchored, ready for action. On his right, the Spanish ambassador (the young Oñate) pacifies him with soothing music, a chest of riches, and a basket of playthings. On his left, the King of France, sword in hand, and the princes Charles Louis and Rupert attempt to rouse Charles, while the rest of the Palatine children offer him victors' laurels. Louis attempts to open Charles's eyes to the duplicity of Spain: "Looke on your owne deare blood, these breaches faire / Who this tirants rage as exiles are, / And never more shal repossess their land / By peace, as you doe dreame, but by strong hand." The "hispaniolized courtier" (perhaps Cottington) intervenes to stop Louis and responds: "'Tis better to dance, be merrie, joviall still, / With Spanish Pistolets our purses fill, / Better with pictures gaie to feed our sight / Than naked corpses gor'd with blood in fight." At this point Arundel returns from his embassy to the Emperor, unsuccessful but not empty-handed. Expressing his indignation and disillusionment with the Habsburgs, Arundel advocates that England take active measures to restore the Prince Palatine: "It is our Cannon and the martiall wight / that exercis'd in warre is . . . that must get / Better content than any Legate yet. / Take out of every towne one man of ten / And with those well train'd well arm'd English men / Invade we Flanders, this is the way I tender / To make them on good termes the Paltz surrender."

Courtesy of His Grace, the Duke of Norfolk

9 ***Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel's Return from his Embassy in 1636 (s.d.)***

Close-up view of the Earl of Arundel returning to the English court from his embassy to the Emperor, after *The Kingly Cock* (fig. 8). Arundel is shown carrying a basket full of prizes he acquired during his stay on the Continent (likely representing the Dürer paintings and Pirkheimer Library, among other gifts and acquisitions), but with nothing to report.

Courtesy of His Grace, the Duke of Norfolk

Tho^s Howard Earl of Arundel's
 return from his Embassy in 1636.
 From an extra rare print in the Collection of
 S^r Mark Sykes Bar^t.
 Pub. by J. Thane.

"happy issue" of the election and coronation of the King of Hungary as King of the Romans.¹⁴² He then attempted to divert the King's displeasure away from the Habsburgs by blaming Arundel for the failure of his mission and loudly declaring Habsburg goodwill, much to the King's discontentment.¹⁴³ When asked pointedly by the King what Spain's requirements were to reach an agreement on the Palatinate question, Oñate gave a singularly noncommittal reply and again withdrew from court.¹⁴⁴

Oñate's criticism of Arundel's comportment, however, did not influence the King in the least. Like his sister, the King was well contented with his ambassador's conduct and his attempts to bring the negotiations to the best possible conclusion under difficult circumstances. Shortly after Arundel's return to England, Laud wrote that "The Earl of Arundel has done the business he was trusted with very honourably and clearly, and his Majesty ever had and declared to him a very good opinion of his service, so that there is nothing left for the Archbishop [Laud] to do but to honour him

¹⁴²*CSPV* 1636-9, 127: 8 Jan. 1637, Correr to D&S. Sir Thomas Roe reported this news to William, Earl of Exeter, in the following manner: "On Thursday last, to welcome my Lord of Arundel, the Spanish Ambassador demanded an audience, to declare to the King the election of the King of Hungary to the crown of the Romans, which he jeeringly said must be very acceptable news to his Majesty: when indeed it is a ratification and dernier coup against the Prince Elector and, as it were, the seal set to his utter banishment: for if that election be allowed...then he [the Duke of Bavaria] is ratified an Elector, and the other proscribed." He added hopefully, "Your Lordship knows that to the Duke of Bavaria is born a son and heir, which is another block, but some report him dead." (PRO, SP 16/343: f. 4: 12 Jan. 1637, [Roe] to Exeter).

¹⁴³*CSP*, vol. 1, 669: 1636, Charles I's questions for Oñate; *ibid.*, 670: 1636, Oñate's replies; *CSPV* 1636-9, 126-8: 8 Jan. 1637, Correr to D&S. Oñate complained that Arundel "had not brought back satisfaction from Cæsar because he did not wish to. If he had chosen to treat upon the offers that had been made to him the affair would have been settled by now, but this time he had allowed his natural impetuosity to overcome his reason." (*ibid.*).

¹⁴⁴*CSP*, vol. 1, 716: 15 Jan. 1637, Windebank to Aston.

for his noble carriage within."¹⁴⁵ Anzolo Correr, the Venetian ambassador, remarked that "His Majesty cannot praise enough the prudence and sincerity with which the Earl conducted his last embassy to Caesar."¹⁴⁶ Windebank also commended Arundel to Lord Feilding: "My Lord Marshall is returned home with little satisfaction in his negotiation though himself used all the prudence and dexterity that could be expected from so grave a counsellor to have brought the Austrian party to reason."¹⁴⁷ For a time it seemed as if Arundel's performance might even prove enough for him to regain the coveted dukedom. Laud relayed to Wentworth that "'tis common in Court speech that the Earl Marshal maye be restored to his antient honnour of the Duke of Norfolk for thiss service," meaning his resolute carriage during the embassy.¹⁴⁸

Even though the King and his ministers were apparently more than satisfied with Arundel's conduct of the negotiations, the ambassador could not forget the failure of his embassy or the role that the Spaniards in particular had played in it. The Habsburgs had "in effect, refused all manner of justice, or hope of restitution, either of dignity or territory, except a few villages, which would scarcely find a prince bread. He hath in all his Ambassage carried himself very nobly, and like a right English Earl, and is not insensible of the loss of his labour and other falsehoods of the Austrian [Habsburg] deceit."¹⁴⁹ In Arundel the Habsburgs, and Spain in particular, had made an influential enemy. Whereas before he had been an advocate of a peaceful solution to the Palatinate question

¹⁴⁵CSPD 1636-7, 411: [Jan.?] 1637, Laud to Elizabeth.

¹⁴⁶CSPV 1636-9, 156: 6 Mar. 1637, Correr to D&S.

¹⁴⁷HMC, *Sixth Report*, vol. 1, 281: 15 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Feilding.

¹⁴⁸Laud, vol. 7, 320: 21 Feb. 1637, Laud to Wentworth.

¹⁴⁹PRO, SP 16/343, f. 4: 12 Jan. 1637, [Roe] to Exeter.

negotiated with the Habsburgs, he now became their outspoken opponent and favored an alliance with the French, even if the result were war.¹⁵⁰ "The time had come, he felt, to heal the wounds inflicted on his master not with the salve of diplomacy, but with iron and fire."¹⁵¹

Arundel vehemently denounced the Spaniards for obstructing rather than facilitating his negotiations, as they had given the English cause to expect. "I am very sorry," Arundel wrote, "to be a witness of the offices of Spain coming so short which I have so much heretofore defended to their evil willers."¹⁵² He scathingly remarked to Lord Aston, who was still carrying on his negotiations in Spain:

I beseech your lordship agayne to comend my service to the Conde Duke, and let him be assured that never any man found him self more deceived, in the proceedings of all the Spanish ministers in Germany, then I did; for I was most prompte to have, with all sincerity, layed groundes of the frendshippe betwixte the twoe Crownes, as the King my master comanded; but I confesse I was as little in love with the old Conde Ognata [Oñate] there, as most have bin where he hath treated. If they dislike our proceedings heere, or our Prince Electors protestation, they must stoppe it in time, with reall effectes, and not make this the second parte of our Kinges beinge in Spayne.¹⁵³

Arundel returned the visits of the younger Oñate "merely as a ceremony." The fact that he was quicker to lay the blame at the door of Spain rather than the Emperor is a testament to the willingness the latter had shown to accommodate England.

¹⁵⁰Gardiner, vol. 8, 202.

¹⁵¹Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 522.

¹⁵²PRO, SP 80/10, f. 29: 18 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, SP 16/344, f. 174: 24 Jan. 1637, same to Aston. Arundel complained about Spain to anyone who would listen, including Radolt (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1820, f. 10: 16 Jan. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand II).

Arundel's clarification of the diplomatic situation and his weight in English counsels drove home his opinion that there was no point in continuing diplomatic negotiations with the Habsburgs to regain the Palatine lands and dignities.¹⁵⁴ As the Venetian ambassador to England noted, "He really has become a partisan in this cause, pretending that his reputation is concerned, and one can really believe that his representations and persuasions will ultimately produce considerable results."¹⁵⁵

Despite growing support at the English court for war against the Habsburgs and an alliance with France, Radolt continued to downplay this threat. He reasoned that the King had a strong financial incentive not to break with the Habsburgs because he derived substantial income from Spain, not only from direct payments for the services of the fleet in the Channel and the coining of Spanish bullion in England, but also from customs revenue derived from trade with Spain. Radolt thus maintained that England would remain neutral and continue to reap these rewards. Further, he believed that England would not join with France in an alliance because of the underlying tension between these two powers. Nor did he think the King would provide financial support to the Swedes, though he might allow them to levy troops in Britain, an eventuality the Emperor feared.¹⁵⁶

On 25 January 1637, Radolt officially announced the election of the King of the Romans to Charles.¹⁵⁷ The King's humor where the Habsburgs were concerned, however, was not conducive

¹⁵⁴Laud, vol. 7, 319-20: 21 Feb. 1637, Laud to Wentworth; HMC, *Denbigh V*, 47: 25 Feb. 1637, Rudolf Weckherlin to Feilding.

¹⁵⁵*CSPV 1636-9*, 147: 20 Feb. 1637, Correr to D&S.

¹⁵⁶HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1820, ff. 10-2: 16 Jan. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand II.

¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*, ff. 23-4: 25 Jan. 1637, same to Charles I; *ibid.*, f. 22: 30 Jan. 1637, same to Ferdinand II; Finet, 212.

to a favorable reception to this news. On the contrary, he found it exceedingly offensive that the Duke of Bavaria had recorded his vote as an elector of the Empire, thus effectively stepping into the Prince Palatine's shoes. Therefore, when Radolt expressed his hope to the King that he would be glad to hear the news of the election, the King attacked the envoy so vehemently that the latter was too stunned to reply:

The King replied that if the King of Hungary would signalise his present fortune by showing just and right intentions towards the public weal and the liberty of Germany in particular, restoring those princes who are oppressed to their legitimate authority, he would be as glad as the rest. . . . He then entered upon the merits of his nephew's claims, showing with every sign of anger, how little pleased he was with Caesar's recent behaviour, and how he felt compelled to abandon his previous mildness and proceed to use force Alarmed or confused by these words, Radolti either would not answer, or had none ready. He tried as well as he could to justify the intentions of the emperor and his son towards the interests of this crown, and so concluded his office, without entering into further particulars.¹⁵⁸

This response grieved Radolt, but under the circumstances, it was surprising that he would hope for a different reaction. He reported disappointedly that Charles had no intention of answering in writing his official announcement of the election. Further, the King told Radolt that he found it unnecessary to answer the letters from the Emperor and King of Hungary because the satisfaction they had promised to Arundel did not materialize; however once they had granted it, he would be happy to do so.¹⁵⁹ To make matters worse, the Emperor had sent a gentleman messenger with an announcement of the election to the English court. The King refused to admit the messenger to his presence and only sent word to him that he might return to Germany whenever he pleased. In the end, the messenger only received an insulting verbal answer, prepared by Coke, before he returned

¹⁵⁸*CSPV 1636-9*, 133: 30 Jan. 1637, Correr to D&S.

¹⁵⁹*HHStA*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 30 Jan. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand II.

home.¹⁶⁰ Radolt wrote that these slights so injured his "German heart" that he did not dare air his opinion publicly on the subject.¹⁶¹

The day after Radolt's announcement, Arundel gave a full account of his mission to an attentive King and council.¹⁶² As he had promised the Queen of Bohemia, he did not mince words: he clearly expressed his opinion that the Habsburgs had no intention of settling the Palatinate question and that continuing negotiations with them was futile. He now declared himself in favor of an alliance with France and entreated Charles to arm his nephew promptly for fear that the King be "despised by his enemies for inactivity and remain exposed to scorn, whereas he should rather be an object of dread."¹⁶³ Arundel's report elicited the applause of all present. His calls for the King to take decisive action on his nephew's behalf, backed by the Queen, Holland, and others favoring alliance with the anti-Habsburg side proved decisive.¹⁶⁴

The King and his ministers openly expressed their resentment at the Habsburgs' offensive carriage in the matter of the Palatinate and decided that taking action against them was indeed necessary. On the same day that Arundel made his report to the council, they decided that England

¹⁶⁰Ibid.: 27 Feb. 1637, same to Ferdinand III; BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 123: 22 Mar. 1637, * Aston to Windebank.

¹⁶¹HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 30 Jan. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand II.

¹⁶²Borough, Arundel's official secretary, prepared a written report of the chief occurrences of the embassy in which he restates many of the arguments made by the ambassador in his dispatches to Windebank and Coke (PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 55-69: 1636, Summary of Arundel's negotiations).

¹⁶³Rusdorf, *Consilia et Negotia Politica* (Frankfurt a. M.: J. Maximilian, 1725), 183-4; quoted in Springell, 37; CSPD 1636-7, 383: 3 Feb. 1637 Arundel to Aston; CSPV 1636-9, 133-4: 30 Jan. 1637, Correr to D&S.

¹⁶⁴The war lobby rose to new prominence in the King's counsels when the duplicity of the Habsburgs became apparent and greatly dissipated the influence of the peace party, which would not recover until the Scottish rebellion was underway (see chap. 11, p. 521).

should take steps to secure an alliance with France, which now appeared to be the only viable diplomatic option for regaining the Palatinate.¹⁶⁵ Also, England was to make preparations at sea, and – on the suggestion of Arundel and Holland – the King resolved to lend his nephew vessels from the newly equipped ship money fleet to harass Spanish shipping.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, the King instructed Charles Louis to issue a formal protestation against the election of the King of the Romans without his participation.¹⁶⁷

The hostility toward the Habsburgs and clamor for war at court grew daily, and by the end of February, Radolt began to take these threats more seriously. He informed the Emperor that Arundel had become one of the most zealous supporters of England's alliance with the anti-Habsburg powers, libeling the House of Austria to the applause of the English people.¹⁶⁸ As plans for an Anglo-French alliance and the loan of the fleet to the Palatine circulated at court, both Radolt and Necolalde, who had earlier brushed aside the possibility of English hostilities against the Habsburgs,

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 130: 23 Jan. 1637, same to same. Roe could hardly contain his glee. He wrote to John Dury, a Protestant ecumenicist and supporter of the Prince Palatine, "It is resolved that the Prince Elector shall have a good fleet, fitted and paid, to concur with the whole league in any design for the common good. He shall have free levies for men and open passage; munition both for himself and his friends, and there will be means found to put him in arms and to join him with the troops in Germany that still stand for the common cause, and all this in conjunction with France." (*CSPD 1636-7*, 400: 28 Jan. 1637, Roe to Dury).

¹⁶⁶*HMC, Denbigh V*, 47: 25 Feb. 1637, Weckherlin to Feilding; *CSPV 1636-9*, 141: 13 Feb. 1637, Correr to D&S; *CSPD 1636-7*, 479: 11 Mar. 1637, List of ships lent to Charles Louis; *CSPD 1637*, 252: 29 June 1637, Newsletter of C. Rossingham; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 525-9. He was put in charge of fourteen ships.

¹⁶⁷*CSPV 1636-9*, 133: 30 Jan. 1637, Correr to D&S; Gardiner, vol. 8, 203-4. This course had been advocated earlier by Roe (*CSPD 1636-7*, 216: Nov. 1636, Roe to Charles Louis; *ibid.*, 250: 10 Jan. 1636, same to same).

¹⁶⁸*HHStA, StA Palatina*, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 27 Feb. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III. In his report he acknowledged the receipt of the Emperor's letter of 1 February and decree of 29 January, and included Charles Louis's protestation.

remonstrated heftily against these plans. They also complained about the publication and circulation of the Palatine's protestation.¹⁶⁹

With the Habsburg diplomats on the defensive and plans for a French alliance moving forward, Arundel was certain that the Spaniards would quickly become cognizant of the benefits of English friendship, as he explained to Aston:

As they [the Spaniards] have been the main impediment to all our proceedings, the King finds himself obliged to join with his other friends, and try if in their company he may have better fortune to obtain his so just demands for the Prince Elector As their ambitions and dominion are vast, so is the enemy contracted against them, and their pieces lying so divided, and to be nourished from so remote parts, may let them see that the king is as much to be sought by them as they by him, and the experience of his power may gain that value in the world which their pride desires to eclipse, and that our nation shall hold that ancient and just attribute, the balance.¹⁷⁰

Arundel had apparently discovered the need to call Spain's bluff. In the end, the Earl Marshal had certainly shown himself to be more martial than the Queen of Bohemia had originally estimated.

In the end, the failure of Arundel's mission was a disappointment to both the Emperor and Charles. However, signs of hope remained that future Anglo-Imperial negotiations could be successful. The Emperor, for his part, earnestly wished to come to an agreement with England. He had made sincere attempts to modify the demands of his allies and find a middle way that all sides

¹⁶⁹Ibid., RK KrA, Fasz. 119, ff. 63-6: 27 Jan. 1637, Charles Louis's protestation; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 27 Jan. 1637, same; *ibid.*: 27 Feb. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III; Khevenhüller, vol. 12, 2302-7; *CSPV 1636-9*, 153: 27 Feb. 1637, Correr to D&S. The protestation, by its very nature, omitted referring to the King of Hungary as King of the Romans or as King of Bohemia, which was sure to irritate the Emperor as it did Radolt (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 123: 22 Mar. 1637, Aston to Windebank). Charles Louis also issued a manifest dated 12 January 1637, which included documents relevant to the Palatinate question, in attempt to convince the Emperor, princes of the Empire, and foreign rulers that he should be fully restored to his lands and titles (Khevenhüller, vol. 12, 2199-302). He disseminated a further document regarding the restitution of the Palatinate dated 2 February (*ibid.*, 2307-22).

¹⁷⁰*CSPD 1637*, 246-7: 27 June 1637, Arundel to Aston.

could accept. For instance, he had used Radolt's reports from England to try to extract greater concessions in the Palatinate from Bavaria.¹⁷¹ Maximilian's influence was strong at this point, and though he was not as alarmed as the Emperor about the possibility of England allying with their enemies, he was beginning to find reasons to reconsider his previously obdurate stance. Spain, which was less tractable, continued to insist upon a league against its enemies in return for its share of the Lower Palatinate. However, evidence exists that not only the Emperor but also the Spaniards would have been willing to consider less than a straight league if Charles had given them reason to do so. The English showed an inclination to compromise as well – Arundel modified English demands for the restitution of the Palatinate toward the end of his negotiations. The unofficial talks that took place subsequent to his departure did not result in an acceptable or even a better offer of restitution, but they gave hope for future negotiations because all sides showed some willingness to compromise.¹⁷²

Having said this, there was no question that the King sent Arundel into a difficult negotiating situation, one that the machinations of his own government made even more difficult. The King and Windebank deliberately withheld information from him about the secret negotiations with the Habsburgs – including offers of a league in exchange for the restoration of the Palatinate – that had been taking place on and off since the Treaty of Madrid in 1630. Since Arundel was not negotiating from the same knowledge base as the Habsburgs, this limitation greatly impaired his ability to

¹⁷¹Particularly the point that England would be a powerful adversary at sea.

¹⁷²Under these circumstances, the English diplomats at Habsburg courts agreed that the King's best tactic would be to accept the part of the Palatinate currently offered and attempt to gain more in the future.

negotiate an acceptable settlement. The conduct of the King in this case was unforgivable and injurious to the success of his own foreign policy.

While Arundel was in Germany, Clement Radolt was facing challenges of his own as he sought to represent the Emperor at the English court under less than optimal circumstances. The fact that Arundel had full powers to negotiate at the Imperial court essentially preempted Radolt's mission before it had even begun and moved the theater of negotiation to Germany. At this point, the Imperial envoy was left with the unenviable task of doing damage control at the English court when either Arundel or the Emperor sent distasteful news back to England. With little to do but gather intelligence and deliver the Emperor's announcements and decrees, it is unsurprising that Radolt had little desire to remain in England — particularly as his lack of language skills and alienation from English ministers presented considerable challenges to the first activity, and the King's hostility provided him with little reward for his pains in the second. The Emperor, however, was not yet prepared to recall his envoy, as he hoped that Radolt's presence might help to move the negotiations with England forward, or at least keep them from slipping to the point that they were irrecoverable.

With Arundel's return to England and the turning of English opinion against the Habsburgs, John Taylor was left to continue the negotiations on the Palatinate question with the Emperor. The King wished him to do so in case an opportunity materialized to improve his nephew's lot. However this time Taylor no longer had the same support for his negotiations, not only because of the failure of Arundel's embassy and the subsequent unpopularity of the policy of negotiation with the Habsburgs, but also because the King refused to recognize the new Emperor, Ferdinand III. Taylor's task, therefore, would be a challenging one.

11

**JOHN TAYLOR AT THE REGENSBURG ELECTORAL MEETING AND
THE IMPERIAL COURT, 1636-9**

the business of the Palatinate had been so long sick, that it was presently to be cured,
or there was no means to keep it longer alive.

Aston to Windebank

Negotiations in Regensburg

After Arundel's departure from Regensburg, Taylor remained behind to continue his negotiations with the Emperor on the Palatinate question and to await the forthcoming declaration of the electoral college and a further declaration from the Emperor on this subject. While he was waiting, Windebank instructed him to protect the interests of the Prince Palatine and encourage the Emperor and electors to a more favorable resolution on his restoration.¹ Given Arundel's experience, Charles was not particularly hopeful that Taylor could move the Emperor and his allies to a quick decision. Still, because of Taylor's optimism that they could reach an acceptable settlement, the King wished to continue the negotiations. Besides, the Emperor was the only one who could legally lift the ban, invest Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire, and confirm him the possession of any restored lands and dignities. Finally, the appearance of a healthy diplomatic relationship with the Emperor had strategic value for England. This was particularly true in the winter of 1636-37, when an Anglo-

¹*CSP*, vol. I, 662: [9] Oct. 1636, Windebank to Taylor; *ibid.*, 701-2: 1636, Arundel's remembrances for Taylor upon his departure from Regensburg.

French treaty seemed likely, and England could use the possibility of an agreement with the Habsburgs to increase its leverage with France.²

Taylor therefore picked up the negotiations where he had left off when Arundel had arrived on the scene in May 1636. Soon after Arundel's departure, he wrote hopefully to Windebank that good news of the negotiations would overtake Arundel on his homeward journey.³ This was not to be, in spite of several compromise solutions advanced by both Taylor and the Emperor in the waning days of the electoral meeting and a newfound willingness on the part of Maximilian of Bavaria to consider them.

Taylor's optimism about the negotiations for the restitution of the Palatinate was not entirely ungrounded. Although Arundel had negotiated with the Emperor for almost a half year and they still had reached no agreement, the English ambassador's conduct of the negotiations influenced the Emperor considerably. Ferdinand's commitment to coming to an understanding with England coupled with Maximilian's reevaluation of his stance on the Palatinate question offered real hope that they could indeed achieve a compromise settlement.⁴ Despite the obstacles to be overcome, the Emperor had long believed this was possible. However, he could not afford to alienate his allies, Spain and Bavaria, in the process. In order to offer a settlement that would be acceptable to England,

²Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 237.

³*CSP*, vol. 1, 699: 19 Nov. 1636, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 704: 25 Nov. 1636, same to same; *HMC, Denbigh V*, 41: 15 Nov. 1636, same to Feilding. Taylor reported that the Emperor was willing to return the Lower Palatinate, with the consent of Spain and Bavaria, and further that he would treat afterwards about the Upper Palatinate if England offered satisfaction. Taylor also related that Ferdinand was considering an alternation of the electorate between the Palatine and Bavarian lines after the death of Maximilian's son (*CSP*, vol. 1, 699: 19 Nov. 1636, same to Windebank).

⁴Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 233.

he needed the buy-in of his two allies, both of which had reasons for compromise and intransigence on this question. Under the circumstances, the Emperor faced an uphill battle. Yet he had already achieved some success in this area: it was due to his efforts that Spain and Bavaria had retreated from the extreme stance they had taken earlier and the Emperor had offered the immediate restoration of the Lower Palatinate to the Prince Palatine. In doing so, the Emperor was hoping not only to lay a basis for peace in the Empire, but also to conclude an alliance with England. At the very least, this would keep England from the arms of France and secure its naval assistance for Spain. Thus when Arundel rejected his offer, the Emperor sought other means to satisfy the King.⁵

In September the Emperor had called upon the electors to give their opinion on the issue of restitution in an effort to win the support of the electors for a compromise agreement with England and at the same time to press Maximilian to greater flexibility.⁶ The electors were split on the question whether or not England should be granted satisfaction, and the balance was not necessarily tipped in its favor, as Taylor observed: "Some of them are certainly for us, but the greater partie against us; of Bavaria and Colen [Cologne] there is no doubt, and Saxony, which I would have hoped should not have bine, is an enemy into our b[usiness]."⁷

⁵Ibid., 238.

⁶HHStA, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, Fasz. 138, Konv. 3: 4 Dec. 1636, Imperial declaration; CSP, vol. 1, 700: 21 Nov. 1636, Leslie to Windebank; HMC, *Denbigh V*, 41: 15 Nov. 1636, Taylor to Feilding.

⁷Ibid., 42: 2 Dec. 1636, same to same. The Duke of Saxony's antagonism toward England was due to some unpleasant remarks that Joseph Avery, the English envoy in Sweden, had made about him to the Swedish Chancellor Oxenstierna. Avery charged that Saxony had forsaken the Prince Palatine by entering into the Peace of Prague. His comments were published and thus came to the attention of the Duke, who was greatly offended and thereafter uninclined to support English interests. For more details on Avery's comments and the diplomatic fallout that occurred as the result of them, see Dässler, "Diplomatischer Zusammenstoß."

Despite the Emperor's efforts, his plans were frustrated. Maximilian had no desire for the electoral college to dictate what concessions he should make to England; if he would make them, it would be at his own behest and not that of the electoral college. The electors saw reason for reserve, and the opinion they eventually gave was accordingly noncommittal.⁸ On the one hand, they acknowledged that the Peace of Prague committed the Emperor and Empire to support Bavaria in its possession of the Palatine lands and electorate. They had no such commitment to Spain, however, and would have sooner seen Spanish troops out of the Palatinate, which to them constituted a foreign force of occupation on German soil. On the other hand, they recognized the importance of the settlement of the Palatinate question to the peace of the Empire and that they must consider England's interests to achieve it. Since the Empire was already at war with two powerful states, the electors wished to avoid adding the enmity of yet another. In the end, however, the electors' only decision was that the interested parties should negotiate the specific points of a settlement, particularly the point of the electorate, among themselves. If the Emperor wished to satisfy England, therefore, he would have to do so by coming to an understanding with Spain and Bavaria.⁹ The Emperor, worried that the English negotiations would break over this reply, asked for a further

⁸It was obvious that the spiritual electors, one of whom was Maximilian's own brother, would take his side where the electorate was concerned in order to preserve the Catholic majority in the electoral college. Saxony felt bound by the decision made at Prague and in any case believed that the restoration of the Lower Palatinate would be adequate compensation for the Palatines. Only the Elector of Brandenburg believed the Prince Palatine should be fully restored to his lands and—after Maximilian's death—the electoral dignity; even so, at this point he did not feel comfortable sharing this opinion in the electoral college (Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 239).

⁹HHStA, RK Reichstagsakten, Fasz. 101b: 12 Dec. 1636, Opinion of electoral college; PRO, SP 80/10, f. 81: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston.

opinion on what should be done if the King decided to restore his nephew by force.¹⁰ However, Bavaria successfully hindered the question being taken up again.¹¹ At the end of December, Taylor wrote apprehensively to Lord Feilding that "They [of the Diet] are still busy about our business, 'but Bavaria's ambition hindereth their resolution, who cannot be drawne yet to any reason, and the Emperor and King of Spaine having bound themselves unto him to mayntaine him in the Electorate . . . have bound their hands, and can do nothing without his consent.'"¹² Without the clear support of the electoral college, the Emperor had lost a potent tool that he could have used to motivate his allies, Maximilian in particular, to further concessions.

In an effort to move the negotiations forward, both the Emperor and Taylor put forth compromise proposals during the last months of the electoral meeting. Taylor, who recognized that the main obstacle remained the electorate, made proposals regarding it that went beyond those made by Arundel before he left Regensburg. Taylor intimated to the Emperor that the electorate need not return permanently to the Palatine line after Maximilian's direct line had ceased, as Arundel had proposed. Instead Taylor suggested that his master would be content with the alternation of the electorate after Maximilian's line died out.¹³ As a further concession Taylor suggested that they might exclude the question of the electorate from the negotiations in the short term; however, they

¹⁰HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 134-7: 12 Dec. 1636, Opinion of privy council; *ibid.*, ff. 138-9: 13 Dec. 1636, same; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 13 Dec. 1636, Ferdinand II to electoral college.

¹¹Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 239-40.

¹²HMC, *Denbigh V*, 46: 27 Dec. 1636, Taylor to Feilding.

¹³Albrecht, *Maximilian I*, 959; Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 237, 241.

must address its fate in the future if they were to achieve a lasting settlement. Although Taylor's proposals were of an unofficial nature, the Imperial party seriously considered them.¹⁴

The Emperor, who believed that an agreement with England would bring Germany closer to lasting peace, attempted to persuade his allies to make further concessions in the Palatinate. On the one hand, he asked Maximilian to consider the restitution of both the Upper and Lower Palatinate in return for financial compensation if the Prince Palatine agreed to forgo the electorate.¹⁵ On the other, he reminded the Spaniards of the advantages of an agreement with England since the success of their war with the Dutch was reliant upon the safe passage of their military supplies through the English Channel to Flanders. English hostility would endanger these transports as well as those of American silver to Seville.¹⁶

Spain, however, was intent upon obtaining an active commitment from England before it ceded any of its lands in the Palatinate. The Spanish ministers in Regensburg made it clear that Spain would restore them only if England would join in a league with the Habsburgs. Since Charles was not inclined to make this commitment without his nephew's restoration up front and a larger share of his inheritance than part of the Lower Palatinate, Spain's insistence upon an offensive and defensive league made the Emperor's work even more difficult. The Emperor approached Oñate several times in an attempt to persuade him to offer more liberal conditions on the Palatinate, which

¹⁴Ibid., 237.

¹⁵See below, p. 469.

¹⁶There were those in England interested in the profits of privateering who supported this course, among them the Earl of Warwick.

the latter persistently resisted.¹⁷ This intransigence, however, belied Spain's willingness – if pushed – to consider an alignment with England that amounted to less than a commitment of war against the French and Dutch. To effect this, however, it would be necessary for Charles to withdraw English naval assistance from Spain for a time and accept the loss of revenue that this action would bring.

Indeed, the negotiations between Spanish and Imperial ministers in Regensburg show that the Spaniards stubbornly insisted upon the right to reoccupy the Lower Palatinate, which Imperial troops had reconquered in 1635, as they were unwilling to forfeit this valuable bargaining counter with England. As early as March 1635, in a secret decree, the Emperor had promised that he would restore the left bank of the Lower Palatinate to Spain. However, despite this agreement, the Emperor resisted openly returning this area. One of his reasons was that he believed this might imperil the English negotiations.¹⁸ Taylor had made it clear to the Imperial councillors that Charles would rather have the Lower Palatinate from the hands of the Emperor than those of Spain.¹⁹ The Emperor also feared that restoring it to Spain would motivate France to attack the Empire openly and endanger the

¹⁷*CSPV 1636-9*, 117: 29 Dec. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.

¹⁸*HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 34-5*: 18 Feb. 1636, Opinion of privy council; *ibid.*, f. 44: 25, 26 Feb. 1636, same. Ferdinand issued the secret decree in the expectation of continued payments from Spain and on the understanding that the Spaniards would not insist upon its immediate execution, in case this caused difficulties.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, ff. 61-4: 18 Apr. 1636, same. The English negotiations were also a consideration for the aulic council when it voted against allowing Spanish troops to move back into the Lower Palatinate in December 1635 (*ibid.*, *Reichshofrat, Resolutionsprotokolle*, vol. 106, ff. 82-3: 19 Dec. 1635, Resolution of aulic council). During the next year the Emperor did, however, eventually let the Spaniards back into select locations, including Frankenthal. This move aroused English ire because the fortress city was settled upon Elizabeth as a part of her marriage agreement. During his embassy, Arundel complained repeatedly of their treatment of the population there (*PRO, SP 80/9*, f. 229: 9 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary).

Peace of Prague, a basic tenet of which was to drive foreign armies from the Empire. Most importantly, however, he did not want to alienate the electors, who wished him to promote Imperial rather than dynastic interests, by preferring Spain's interests in the Lower Palatinate. This point was of particular concern to the Emperor before the election of his son as King of the Romans. Publicly, therefore, Ferdinand continued to withhold his permission for Spain to reoccupy the Lower Palatinate.²⁰ The Spanish ministers Oñate and Castañeda were unsuccessful in pressing their case until the end of December 1636, after the election.²¹ In spite of the Emperor's long-standing refusal to grant their request, he conducted his negotiations with England as if Spain maintained full power in the Lower Palatinate because of the promise he had made to Spain.²² Thus it was apparent that the Emperor was not in a position to withhold these lands from Spain indefinitely, despite his initial wish to consider England's interests, as Spain still regarded them as a payoff for its support against his enemies.

By this point, Spain's recalcitrance where restoring the Lower Palatinate was concerned was also unwelcome to Maximilian, who had become more interested in reaching a tenable agreement with England on the Palatinate question, though for very different reasons. The Emperor wished to avoid Charles's enmity and thus was ready to make relatively significant concessions to satisfy him. Maximilian, on the other hand, wished to reach an agreement on the Palatinate question because he

²⁰The Spanish ministers Oñate and Castañeda did not give up easily. In February 1636, they delivered a memorial on this subject, but Imperial councillors continued to reject the idea (HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. I, Konv. F, ff. 34-5: 18, 25, 26 Feb. 1636, Opinion of privy council).

²¹At the end of December 1636, the King of Hungary allowed Spanish troops to reoccupy the Lower Palatinate (ibid., RK KrA, Fasz. 118, ff. 251-60: 29 Dec. 1636, King of Hungary to Imperial commissioners).

²²Ernst, 238-40.

knew that until he did, he could not feel secure in his possession of his newly won acquisitions, in spite of terms of the Peace of Prague. With France's entry into the war to buttress Sweden, he feared that military events might determine the ultimate fate of his Palatine gains. Maximilian realized that if Imperial forces were defeated, he could lose them all.²³ The concessions he was willing to make, however, were understandably limited. Under the circumstances, he believed that from his side the sacrifice of the Lower Palatinate should be adequate to affect a settlement; he had no intention of relinquishing the Upper Palatinate and disliked Taylor's compromise proposals regarding the electorate. He would not assent to the creation of an eighth electorate, which the Emperor had earlier suggested, and was critical of the suggestion that the electorate alternate between the two lines as the Palatine line had not honored this same arrangement, which the Treaty of Pavia had established in 1329.²⁴

The real question Maximilian had to consider was whether Bavaria possessed the political influence and military power to maintain sole possession of the electorate in the face of long-term opposition. Even Maximilian recognized the difficulty of this situation. Behind the scenes, he thus began to reevaluate his hard line on this subject and at the end of December 1636 he asked his council to give an opinion on Taylor's proposal that the electorate alternate between the two Wittelsbach lines after the cessation of his direct line. This was an important step, because for the first time Maximilian joined the Emperor in acknowledging that an adjustment to the settlement of

²³ Albrecht, "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 263.

²⁴ HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: 21 Jan. 1638, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III; Albrecht, "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 263; Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 242-4. Maximilian's brother, the Elector of Cologne, was also convinced that this arrangement was not to be relied upon (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 16 Feb. 1637, Ferdinand, Elector of Cologne, to Maximilian I).

the Palatinate question made at Prague might be necessary. At the end of December, the Bavarian council issued its opinion: Maximilian should accept Taylor's proposal if the situation warranted it.²⁵

Maximilian again asked his councillors to review the question in light of his *rationes pro et contra*, a memorial detailing reasons for and against his insistence upon strict adherence to the provisions accepted at Prague regarding the Palatinate. On the one hand, he pointed out reasons for holding to the provisions, including that they obligated the Imperial estates to support the Emperor's investiture of the electorate in the Bavarian line. On the other hand, Maximilian iterated reasons that spoke for a compromise with England on the Palatinate question. The foremost among them was that he could not feel secure in his possession of the electorate as long as no agreement was reached with the English King and the Palatine family, whose cause continued to garner the support of anti-Habsburg powers. He could not rely upon the terms of Prague while the Palatines and their allies refused to accept it: this was the main reason that Maximilian, despite his claims that he did not fear English retaliation, dared not break off the diplomatic dialog with England on this question. Also, if England allied with France and Sweden, as it would likely do, his attempts to exclude the Palatinate question from general peace negotiations would certainly fail. Once the question was taken up there, Maximilian's ability to influence the outcome would be limited. For this very reason Maximilian was becoming very interested in the idea of settling the Palatinate question through special negotiations of the affected parties, independent of a general peace congress.²⁶ He acceded

²⁵Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 244.

²⁶Albrecht, "Krieg- und Friedensziele," 264.

that it was unreasonable to think that the electorate could be kept in the Bavarian line by military force, and that it made much more sense to participate in negotiations for a compromise settlement.

Upon careful consideration of the *rationes*, the Bavarian council judged on every point against principled adherence to the terms of Prague, if circumstances required it. They argued that Maximilian could depend on neither the other German princes nor the Emperor to defend his Palatine gains in an emergency, and that if he did not modify his extreme stance, the negative attention of Palatine supporters would be directed solely at Bavaria. The council therefore again strongly recommended that Maximilian accept Taylor's proposal for the alternation of the electorate after his direct line died out.²⁷

While the Bavarian council was debating the fine points associated with Taylor's proposal, the Emperor continued his quest for a viable compromise and again asked Maximilian to reconsider his stance on the Palatinate question. The Emperor's commitment to a compromise solution was evident. On 31 December 1636, Ferdinand proposed yet another option for settling the problem, namely that Charles Louis forgo the electorate in return for the restoration of the Upper and Lower Palatinate, for which Maximilian would be financially compensated.²⁸ When Imperial ministers met with Bavarian councillors to discuss this proposal on 17 January 1637, the latter, however, fell back on the opinion of the Elector of Mainz, which the Duke had solicited in the interim, rather than their previous recommendations. The Elector had counseled against an alternation of the electorate or the restoration of the Upper Palatinate, but had recommended that Maximilian continue the negotiations

²⁷Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 246-7.

²⁸The exaction of payment for the Upper Palatinate was necessary for Ferdinand to redeem Upper Austria, which he had pledged to Maximilian as security for the repayment of his war expenses and in lieu of which he now held the Upper Palatinate.

with England to prevent it from joining the enemy camp.²⁹ The Imperial ministers, however, informed the Bavarians that they would not get much further toward reaching an enduring settlement with England with this tactic.³⁰ They warned that even if the King would be satisfied with the return of the Lower Palatinate for the time being, they could not rely on this settlement, for as soon as Charles Louis reestablished himself in the Empire, he would look for allies to support his pretensions to the electorate and Upper Palatinate. These arguments again persuaded the Bavarian ministers that the best course under the circumstances was to accept the proposal for the alternation of the electorate. Maximilian was urged from several sides to resign himself to this eventuality.³¹

The fact that Maximilian asked for these opinions at all confirmed that he was willing to consider compromises in favor of a lasting settlement on the Palatinate question. He was seriously considering a compromise solution for the regulation of the electorate, which remained the greatest obstacle in the negotiations with England. To achieve an enduring settlement Maximilian recognized that he would need to deal with England, and he therefore wished to establish a more positive relationship with that nation. An episode of late December 1636 reflected his concern. At that time

²⁹Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 247. At the beginning of February 1637, Maximilian also requested the opinion of his brother Ferdinand, Elector of Cologne, on four questions regarding the Palatinate: whether the resolution presented to the Earl of Arundel should be upheld; whether financial compensation should be accepted for the Upper and Lower Palatinate; or alternatively, whether an alternating solution for the electorate after the cessation of his line should be accepted; and finally, whether discussion on the Palatinate question should be renewed in the electoral college. Ferdinand, in consultation with their brother Albrecht, answered that he saw no reason to retreat from the resolution presented to Arundel, though under certain circumstances the alternation of the electorate might be considered after Maximilian's direct line died out, plus three further descendants of the Bavarian line (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 1637, Elector of Cologne to Maximilian I; *ibid.*: 16 Feb. 1637, same to same).

³⁰Indeed, one of the reasons Arundel had broken off his negotiations and left Regensburg was because the Emperor had tried to exclude the electorate from the negotiations.

³¹Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 247-8.

it came to the Emperor's ears that Arundel had informed Elizabeth that both the Emperor and the King of Hungary had shown readiness to give England satisfaction, and that all the difficulties in settling the affairs of the Palatinate emanated from the Duke of Bavaria. When Maximilian heard this, he was concerned enough to send for Taylor and protest to him that he had indeed shown a sincere desire to settle the dispute, but that Arundel's harshness had stood in the way of an agreement. Taylor's only response was to point out that he had no orders to treat with Maximilian.³² This incident, however, illustrates Maximilian's concern to defend his reputation to England on this point.

By the time the electoral meeting concluded on 23 February 1637, the many conferences held between Imperial and Bavarian councillors at Regensburg had laid the basis for Maximilian's strategy for any further negotiations undertaken with England. He conceived of three different levels of concessions that they might make to England, each of which they might successively offer if the previous proposal did not satisfy the King. The first line was to hold to the Peace of Prague and insist that the Palatine lands and titles remain with Bavarian line in perpetuity. When they had used all diligence to press this arrangement and England still would not acquiesce, they should offer level two concessions, that is, the restoration of the Lower Palatinate to the Prince Palatine, but the electorate remaining with the Bavarian line until it died out. This was the official offer made to Arundel in September 1636. However, if the King still refused this offer and threatened to break off the negotiation, as a last resort they might offer third level concessions, namely the alternation of the electorate after the expiry of Maximilian's direct line plus three further descendants of the Bavarian

³²*CSPV 1636-9*, 132: 27 Jan. 1637, Ballarino to D&S.

line. The Upper Palatinate would remain with the Bavarian line and was not to be subject to negotiation.³³

In the end, however, the outcome of the electoral meeting at Regensburg left England with little to be pleased about, at least on the surface. The King of Hungary had been elected as King of the Romans, and the stipulations of the Peace of Prague regarding the Upper Palatinate and the electoral dignity had been confirmed. Furthermore, the Duke of Bavaria had recorded his vote as an elector of the Empire, thereby effectually stepping into the shoes of the Prince Palatine. The setbacks that the Imperial army had suffered at the hands of the Swedes and French since September and Imperial fears that England would join with them did not sufficiently strengthen Taylor's bargaining position.³⁴ The answer the Emperor had finally given Taylor regarding the Palatinate on 29 January only confirmed what he had earlier offered to Arundel.³⁵ With the closing of the electoral meeting, Anglo-Imperial negotiations had reached nearly the same point they had been a year previously, with the Imperial decree of 24 February. Despite the Emperor's efforts, a settlement on the Palatinate had eluded him at the electoral meeting.³⁶ Further, while Maximilian was privately considering concessions on the electorate, he publicly continued to maintain his hard line. And the

³³HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: 21 Jan. 1638, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III. Maximilian justified the electorate remaining with three further descendants of the Bavarian line by pointing out that the Palatines had not honored this same arrangement, which the Treaty of Pavia had established in 1329, and instead kept it for themselves for almost 300 years.

³⁴HMC, *Denbigh V*, 42: 2 Dec. 1636, Taylor to Feilding; *ibid.*, 43: 29 Nov. 1636, same to same. The Imperialists suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the Swedes at Wittstock in October 1636.

³⁵HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 29 Jan. 1637, Ferdinand II to Taylor; *ibid.*: 30 Jan. 1637, Taylor to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 29 Jan. 1637, Ferdinand II to Taylor; PRO, SP 80/10, f. 75: 29 Jan. 1637, same to same.

³⁶Haan, *Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 250.

Spaniards, for their part, continued to demand their *convenientias* in return for their share of the Lower Palatinate.

Still, there were grounds for hope. Even though the Spaniards had successfully insisted upon the return of the Lower Palatinate, this did not mean that they were against restoring it to Charles Louis. On the contrary, Olivares wanted to use it as a bargaining chip to secure England's assistance: in late 1636, he instructed Oñate to handle the Elector of Mainz's claims to areas of the Lower Palatinate skillfully and to satisfy him without actually giving up any of the disputed territory, for Spain needed it to win England's friendship. Thus he was willing to restore the Lower Palatinate to the Prince Palatine, but naturally with a corresponding concession from England. Likewise, in the course of the negotiations with England during the electoral meeting, Imperial ministers did not doubt Spain's readiness to restore the Lower Palatinate in the interests of a settlement.³⁷ Furthermore, the Emperor continued to labor for a settlement, and Maximilian showed a new willingness to compromise, born of self interest.³⁸ They further resolved the business, though the Emperor's memorial of 29 January did not reflect this, with Oñate and Maximilian agreeing to the restoration of the Lower Palatinate, the alternation of the electorate, and the way left open for negotiations for the Upper Palatinate in the future. Maximilian's new-found flexibility even caught

³⁷Ernst, 242.

³⁸Imperial ministers assured Taylor that the King of Hungary had persuaded Maximilian to restore the Lower Palatinate and perhaps the Upper (the latter in return for financial compensation), and accept the alternation of the electorate after the cessation of his direct line. According to Taylor, the Emperor declared that he had consulted with the electors and those with an interest in the Palatinate (i.e., Spain and Bavaria), and determined that the greatest obstacle to an agreement was the point of the electorate. However, Ferdinand believed this problem could be overcome *stante linea Guilielmiana*, or before the Bavarian line died out (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 81: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston; *ibid.*; *ibid.*, f. 90: 16 May 1637: same to [?]).

Oñate off-guard, who believed he could rely on the Duke's recalcitrance to divert the blame away from Spain for being the main obstruction to a settlement that would contribute to peace.³⁹ Ominously, however, the wily Spaniard would not subscribe to this secret resolution unless they put the negotiations for the restoration of the Palatinate solely into the hands of his son, who was currently serving as the Spanish ambassador in England.⁴⁰ Thus after the electoral meeting at Regensburg, the Palatinate question remained an important issue in European politics, and an Anglo-Imperial solution to this problem, while certainly challenging, remained a possibility. As Taylor was preparing to leave for Vienna to reassume his post there, the Emperor took the opportunity again to declare to Taylor his readiness to reach a final settlement on the Palatinate.⁴¹

English Negotiations for an Alliance with France: A Brief Flirtation

While the electoral meeting was winding down, a disgruntled Arundel had returned to England and informed the court that the Habsburgs were not willing to yield what England demanded for the

³⁹Ibid.; *ibid.*, f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, same to same; *CSP*, vol. 1, 787: 8 July 1637, same to Windebank.

⁴⁰PRO, SP 80/10, f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, Taylor to [?]; *CSP*, vol. 1, 771: 27 June 1637, same to Windebank. In Taylor's opinion, this was a ruse to prevent the negotiation from moving forward, and Oñate proposed it to maintain the illusion that Spain was not the main obstacle to an agreement. Oñate felt compelled to take some action as Maximilian had shown himself to be more flexible than the Spaniards ever thought he would (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 90: 16 May 1637, same to [?]; *ibid.*, f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, same to same). As time would tell, Taylor hit close to the mark with this assessment. As long as the young Oñate was in control of the negotiations with England, chances that a settlement would be reached were slim, as he insisted upon Spain's *convenientias* as a prerequisite. Taylor reported that when he later informed Radolt of Spain's proceedings in Regensburg, the latter was indignant (*ibid.*, f. 9: 16 May 1637, same to [?]). This is illustrative of Habsburg disunity on this question.

⁴¹HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 8 Feb. 1637, Opinion of privy council. Ferdinand also requested that another plenipotentiary be sent to Vienna to continue the negotiations for a league. Charles, however, was not willing to send yet another ambassador, particularly after the return of Arundel, who had become one of the most zealous supporters of an alliance with the anti-Habsburg powers.

Prince Palatine. As a result, the King turned away from the Habsburgs and instead toward France and its allies. In January 1637, the privy council decided that Charles should lend ships to his nephew with the aim of striking at Spanish shipping, and the King began seriously to entertain French overtures for an alliance. French diplomats had been angling for this alliance since 1634, due to the impending conflict between Spain and France, but they had only received a lukewarm response while the Habsburg negotiations were underway and the peace party was ascendant at court. The pro-French party, which included Queen Henrietta Maria, the Marquis of Hamilton, and the earls of Holland, Leicester, and Northumberland, as well as the Protestant supporters of the Palatine cause, including Elizabeth, Charles Louis, Roe, Coke, and his secretary Georg Rudolf Weckherlin, strongly supported the prospective alliance with France.⁴² These groups were united on this issue and rising in the King's counsels. The peace party, which fragmented with the collapse of the Spanish maritime treaty and Arundel's return from Regensburg, was unable or unwilling to mount any meaningful resistance, though a few powerful figures at court such as Laud and Windebank continued to express opposition to war, into which a French alliance would surely draw England.⁴³ Windebank declared war a "remedy worse than the disease."⁴⁴ The continued duplicity of the Habsburgs, however, angered the King, and he decided that a league with the anti-Habsburg powers was the surest way to recover the Palatinate, even if it meant war.⁴⁵ Under these circumstances, a French treaty seemed imminent, and for a time it seemed possible that England would enter the Thirty Years' War.

⁴²CSPD 1637, 144-5: 24 May 1637, Roe to Elizabeth.

⁴³Laud, vol. 7, 367: [Sept.] 1637, Laud to Wentworth; Smuts, "Puritan Followers," 36-9.

⁴⁴HMC, *Sixth Report*, vol. 1, 281: 20 Feb. 1637, Windebank to Feilding.

⁴⁵Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 541.

On 27 February 1637, Charles signed the French treaty with some emendations. By its terms he promised to declare war on the Habsburgs, authorized the recruitment of 6,000 men for the French service, and agreed to lend France thirty ships for a new campaign against the Emperor. In return, France promised to sign no peace treaty with the Emperor, Spain, or Bavaria without the full restitution of Charles Louis to the Palatine lands and dignities. They also made provision to invite Sweden and the United Provinces to join the alliance at a conference to be held at either Hamburg or the Hague.⁴⁶ The King quickly vested the Earl of Leicester with powers to conclude the treaty. It only required France's ratification to take effect.

These events heralded the departure of Clement Radolt, the Imperial envoy to the English court. Radolt had become increasingly uncomfortable as the hostility toward the Habsburgs mounted. Convinced of the fruitlessness of the Emperor's attempts to come to an agreement with the English King, he again requested his recall. The Imperial privy council, however, decided that he should remain in England and deliver the Emperor's 29 January declaration on the Palatinate.⁴⁷ By the end of February, the combativeness of the English had reached such a level that Radolt thought it inadvisable to deliver the decree. If the King's reaction to the announcement of the election of the King of the Romans was any indication of the reception it would receive, all Radolt

⁴⁶Elmer A. Beller, "The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg, 1638-40," *EHR* 41 (Jan. 1926): 61-2.

⁴⁷HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 2, Konv. 2, f. 2: 4 Feb. 1637, Opinion of privy council.

could expect for his pains was another insulting answer.⁴⁸ In any event, Radolt reasoned, Taylor would communicate the decree to his King.⁴⁹

In spite of the uproar at the English court about the bad offices of the Habsburgs, Radolt continued to state confidently that it was unlikely that England would openly break with the Habsburgs or enter into an alliance with France, because of the climate of suspicion between England and France and the difficulty of raising money for war without Parliament.⁵⁰ Although the will to ally against the Habsburgs was not lacking, Radolt had hopes that England would continue to be locked into safe neutrality. And, though most at court regarded the offer made in the decree as wholly inadequate and saw the decrees simply as a device to win time, Radolt believed that in the end the King would be satisfied with what the Emperor had offered in the Palatinate. The envoy cautioned the Emperor, however, that he would gain little from England in exchange for these concessions – neither a treaty, nor good friendship, nor even ill will.⁵¹

Radolt finally received his long-awaited recall at the beginning of March and left England with as little ceremony as when he had arrived. He reported that neither the King nor his ministers

⁴⁸ For the King's response to the election, see p. 452. Moreover, Arundel had criticized the 29 January decree, which Radolt took as an indication of how the King would react to it.

⁴⁹ HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 27 Feb. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*: 28 Mar. 1637, Opinion of privy council.

⁵⁰ CSPV 1636-9, 132: 27 Jan. 1637, Ballarino to D&S.

⁵¹ HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 27 Feb. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*: 28 Mar. 1637, Opinion of privy council; *ibid.*: 26 Apr. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III. He also reported that Taylor did not have the requisite powers to continue the negotiation at the Imperial court, and thus he could not understand why the ministers there continued to negotiate with him. Radolt mentioned the same to the *Hofkammer* President (*ibid.*: 27 Feb. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*: 9 Jan. 1637, same to Hofkammer President).

took much notice of his leave-taking, due to the bad feeling that the recent Imperial declarations had elicited in England. The English, in turn, complained of the "sudden and dry" manner in which the envoy took his leave. Eager to return home, Radolt immediately requested his passports without soliciting an answer to the decree of 29 January, as he had been directed to do.⁵² In response to his request, "the king wished him a pleasant journey and in his presence directed one of the Secretaries of state to give him the passport he required."⁵³ The King speedily granted the passports, but Radolt was displeased because they were the same as those given to even "the most ordinary persons."⁵⁴ The King's failure to give him letters in reply to those he had presented upon his arrival at court also offended him. The King declined to do so in order to avoid addressing Ferdinand as Emperor, as Charles refused to acknowledge an election from which his nephew had been excluded.⁵⁵ On top of this, when Radolt requested that an English ship convey him to Flanders, he was told that none was available. The English authorities finally granted his request, however, after he wrote to Arundel

⁵²He did not do so for the reasons given above. Ibid., StA England, Kart. 21, Konv. 2, f. 3: 5 Feb. 1637, Ferdinand II to Radolt; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 26 Apr. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III; *CSPV 1636-9*, 155: 6 Mar. 1637, Correr to D&S; *ibid.*, 168: 20 Mar. 1637, same to same.

⁵³*CSPV 1636-9*, 155: 6 Mar. 1637, Correr to D&S; HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 26 Apr. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 5, f. 77: 5 Mar. 1637, Passport for Radolt; *CSPV 1636-9*, 168: 20 Mar. 1637, Correr to D&S. Radolt complained about a clause in his passports that instructed customs officials to take care that he did not pass with prohibited goods, pointing out that this order ran counter to the liberties of transport granted him in the passports. However, when it became apparent that they would not be reissued, Radolt accepted the situation without further fuss (Finet, 213).

⁵⁵*CSPV 1636-9*, 168: 20 Mar. 1636, Correr to D&S. Or from which the Elector of Trier, whom the Emperor had under arrest, had been excluded (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 9 Jan. 1637, Radolt to King of Hungary).

soliciting this favor.⁵⁶ Despite all of this, the King offered Radolt the parting gift of a gold chain worth £210, which he sent to the envoy at Dover, "by which it is thought his displeasure will be in great measure dissipated."⁵⁷

As Radolt journeyed home in the spring of 1637, the French negotiations, which at first had seemed so promising, began to flounder. France's ratification of the treaty proved slow in coming. In March, Richelieu referred its approval – and not just the addition of French allies as confederates, as originally agreed – to the conference planned for Hamburg on the pretense that France must first consult with its allies. In addition, the French complained about the minor amendments that the King had made to the treaty. These developments greatly annoyed him, and Charles Louis complained to his mother that "tis true the King propounded the meeting at the Hague, or Hambourg, to draw in the States and the Swedes, after the league was ratified between the two kings alone; which the French will not do without the approbation of all the confederates."⁵⁸ It seemed to the

⁵⁶Ibid., StA England, Kart. 5, f. 79: 13 Mar. 1637, Arundel to Radolt; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 26 Apr. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III; Finet, 213. Radolt was obliged to wait at Dover 16 days before the ship arrived. He finally landed at Dunkirk on 23 March (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 26 Apr. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III).

⁵⁷CSPV 1636-9, 168: 20 Mar. 1637, Correr to D&S; Finet, 212. When Arundel heard about the chain that the King intended for Radolt, he remarked, smiling, "it is more by 40 £ than I had from the emperor." Finet observed, "It was most true, though strange, that the emperors present to that great lord sent ambassador to him his majesty, having been but a small diamond ring of 160 £, which was sought to be excused by some tender of Austrian honour, with saying that the emperor gave it him as a regale of his love and not of his acknowledgement. It was made a question by others whether it had not been better refused then accepted." (*ibid.*, 213). Their remarks are interesting, for Imperial treasury records say the Emperor gifted Arundel a diamond ring worth 2,850 gulden, or about £400 (HKA, HZAB 83 [1636-7], f. 105). Radolt left a golden chain to his granddaughter Maria Fränzl, but did not indicate that it was the chain in question. He did, however, leave to his grandson Wenzel Ludwig an honorary medal the King of England had given him (HHStA, Oberstmarschallamt, Kart. 625: original will of 5 Nov. 1668, revised and corrected on 5 Sept. 1670, published on 7 Dec. 1670).

⁵⁸George Bromley, ed., *A Collection of Original Royal Letters, Written by King Charles the First and Second, King James the Second, and the King and Queen of Bohemia; Together with Original*

English that France was merely playing for time to ensure their neutrality, just as Spain had.⁵⁹ Windebank noted in April that, in the negotiations with France, the King "is hetherto very ill used, and Car. Richelieu plays his prize excellently." However the Secretary still believed that they would conclude a treaty, and he continued his thought with the remark that "though if he [Richelieu] refuses the King now he deserves rather a fool's cap than that of a Cardinal."⁶⁰

Given the delays of the French in ratifying the treaty that they had formerly so eagerly pursued, the King once again began to consider Habsburg overtures. The King's acceptance of the Anglo-French treaty roused the Spanish ambassador, the young Oñate, from his complacency, and he briefly revived discussions about the Palatinate in the late spring of 1637. The English ministers struggled to ascertain the meaning of Spain's elusive *convenientias*. When they discovered that Spain expected discussions for the return of the Lower Palatinate to be based upon the secret Cottington treaty of 1631 – which would require no less than an English declaration of war against the Dutch and little less with France, as the elder Oñate had informed Arundel in Regensburg – the talks came to an abrupt halt.⁶¹ Far from winning Charles away from France, the young Oñate's

Letters, Written by Prince Rupert, Charles Louis Count Palatine, the Duchess of Hanover, And several other distinguished Persons; From the Year 1619, to 1665 (London: Printed for John Stockdale, 1737), 86.

⁵⁹Gardiner, vol. 8, 218.

⁶⁰HMC, *Sixth Report*, vol. 1, 282: 11 Apr. 1637, Windebank to Feilding.

⁶¹CSP, vol. 1, 779: 4 July 1637, same to Aston; *ibid.*, 782: 30 Mar. 1637, Oñate's answer; *ibid.*: 13 Apr. 1637, same to Charles I; *ibid.*, 784: 15 Apr. 1637, Charles I to Oñate; *ibid.*: 22 May 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 785: 22 May 1637, Annotations to previous; *ibid.*, 786: 23 May 1637, Oñate's articles; CSPV 1636-9, 181: 10 Apr. 1637, Correr to D&S; *ibid.*, 198: 8 May 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 209: 15 May 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 215: 29 May 1637, same to same. This exchange was yet another example of the conflicting expectations of the two powers working to prevent any meaningful negotiation between them. England's understanding was that the entire Palatinate would be restored up front in exchange for a declaration of war against the Dutch, though this was not specifically mentioned in the

manner of treating created even more ill will against him at the English court. This lends credence to Taylor's assertion that the elder Oñate had referred the negotiations on the Palatinate into his son's hands with the aim of drawing them out to gain time and ensure English neutrality. Taylor also claimed, not without reason, that Spain's fear that the Emperor and Bavaria might actually offer England an acceptable compromise settlement motivated this move.

Although these negotiations were fruitless, they served to shake France from its inactivity. Unwilling to lose the English alliance to the Habsburgs, Richelieu quickly dropped his previous demands and again proposed concluding an Anglo-French league which they would invite the Dutch and Swedes to join at Hamburg, as originally suggested. England would then make its demands known to the Habsburgs, and if they refused to meet them, France and England would strike an offensive and defensive league and enter the war against the Habsburgs together.⁶² Charles was favorably inclined to this reconditioned proposal, and he quickly dispatched envoys to the Netherlands and Sweden to encourage their participation in the projected league.⁶³

In the summer of 1637, the treaty appeared to be back on track. Many at the English court fully expected its conclusion before the end of the year. Richelieu, however, again showed himself to be in no hurry to ratify the treaty, much to the chagrin of its English supporters.⁶⁴ While Charles

Cottington treaty. If the Habsburgs were only willing to return the Lower Palatinate, England would correspondingly restrict its concessions to providing naval assistance and allowing them to levy troops in Britain. The English, for their part, preferred the draft agreement that had been negotiated with Necolalde in 1634 to the Cottington treaty.

⁶²Collins, vol. 2, 497-9: 16 June 1637, Leicester to Coke.

⁶³Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 534.

⁶⁴CSPD 1637, 321: 22 July 1637, [Roe] to Ferentz.

waited, France's allies pursued their own interests, which were not necessarily congruous with those expressed in the Anglo-French compact: Sweden and the Emperor attempted to negotiate a separate peace; and the Dutch, who had enough enemies without antagonizing the Emperor, continued to assert their sea power at England's expense. It was apparent that political agendas of the would-be allies would be difficult to reconcile.⁶⁵

The slow progress of the negotiations in Paris and the King's subsequent embroilment in domestic affairs eventually conspired to block the alliance and precipitated a dramatic change in the direction of English foreign policy. In July 1637, Charles was forced to turn his attention inward when riots broke out in Scotland over the introduction of a new, "high-church" prayer book. With this crisis brewing north of the English border, he again became more amenable to achieving the restoration of his nephew by diplomatic means. Consequently, as in 1635, negotiations with the Habsburgs became a more attractive option than pursuing the treaty with France. In November 1637, Sir Thomas Roe – that indefatigable Protestant supporter of the Palatine cause and enemy of Spain – lamented at the deterioration of relations between England and France:

though there be nothing more safe than to put a bridle in the teeth of the House of Austria, nothing more honourable, no time so opportune, no work more easy and profitable, yet this action must be left to more generous times, and another age, who will wonder at our blindness and want of courage.⁶⁶

In many ways the French treaty was the first casualty of the Scots troubles, as Kevin Sharpe has observed. In any case, the rebellion made it increasingly doubtful whether the King would be able to make the military contributions that the treaty with France would require. Not surprisingly, the

⁶⁵Ibid., 554-5: 20 Nov. 1637, * Roe to same; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 534-5.

⁶⁶CSPD 1637, 554-5: 20 Nov. 1637, * Roe to Ferentz.

relations between the would-be allies continued to deteriorate as time went on. The French predictably kept drawing out the negotiations in the hope of profiting from the domestic tensions in England. On top of this, the King and some of his ministers suspected that France may have encouraged its "auld" allies, the Scots, to rebellion, and further that France and its allies were covertly supporting the rebels.⁶⁷ By the end of the year, both Roe and Elizabeth became convinced that the treaty would not come to fruition.⁶⁸ When the conference at Hamburg finally convened in 1638, the breakdown of the Anglo-French treaty was practically a foregone conclusion.⁶⁹ By this time, Richelieu's only concession regarding the Palatinate was his promise to incorporate its restoration into any peace settlement France made with the Habsburgs. In return, he expected England immediately to enter the war on the anti-Habsburg side.⁷⁰ To the King and his ministers, these terms hardly seemed more attractive than those of the Habsburgs, who actually had control of the Palatine lands and dignities.

⁶⁷Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 826-7.

⁶⁸*CSPD 1637-8*, 7: 14 Dec. 1637, Elizabeth to Roe. Roe represented England at the Hamburg talks, a post for which both Elizabeth and Charles Louis supported his appointment (*CSPD 1637*, 201: 17 June 1637, same to same; *CSPD 1637-8*, 7: 14 Dec. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 47: Dec. 1637, Charles Louis to same).

⁶⁹Perhaps if the treaty had been concluded before the onset of the Scots troubles, as Kevin Sharpe has argued, Charles may have gone to war against the Habsburgs. Plans for a French treaty, the decision to put Charles Louis to sea and license privateering in the West Indies, and other preparatory steps for war put this in the realm of possibility (Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 536). Arundel and Holland both supported the King's "send[ing] out ships to annoy the Spaniards in the West Indies." (*CSPD 1637*, 252: 9 July 1637, Newsletter of C. Rossingham; *ibid.*, 336: 29 July 1637, "Roe to Charles Louis). In June, the King appointed them to his council of war (*ibid.*, 224: 27 June 1637, Charles I to Arundel, et al.). Still, in spite of his bellicose moves, the King would have wished to avoid the military commitment that the treaty with France would entail.

⁷⁰Gardiner, vol. 8, 375-6.

Negotiations at the Imperial Court, 1637

In spite of (or perhaps because of) the King's negotiations for a French treaty, his discussions with the Habsburgs never came to a halt. Lord Aston continued to represent English interests at the court of Spain, as did Gerbier at that of the Cardinal Infante. After the closing of the electoral meeting at Regensburg, Taylor did his best to continue his negotiations at the Imperial court in Vienna, where he had returned by late February 1637.⁷¹ However, this turned out to be a greater challenge than he had bargained for. After the death of Ferdinand II⁷² on 15 February 1637, Charles I's refusal to recognize the King of Hungary as the Emperor Ferdinand III severely limited Taylor's role. This was because the King considered the election invalid on the grounds that his nephew had not taken part. Taylor therefore found himself in a very uncomfortable position since the King would neither reply to the Emperor's letters announcing his election or his father's death, nor send Taylor fresh credentials to treat with the Emperor.⁷³ The King would not allow Taylor publicly to give Ferdinand the Imperial title, only that of Majesty, in recognition of his status as King of Hungary. If Taylor felt compelled to use the Imperial title, he should do so only as a private person and not as a representative of the King of England.⁷⁴

⁷¹On 10 February he was still in Regensburg and planned to leave in few days; he had returned to Vienna by 4 March (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 81: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston; *ibid.*, f. 88: 4 Mar. 1637, same to Secretary).

⁷²Lamormaini extolled the late Emperor's Catholic virtues in *Virtutes Ferdinandi II*, which laid the foundation for the dynastic myth of the *pietas Austriaca*. Ferdinand II had long been experiencing health problems (see chap. 10, n. 93).

⁷³CSP, vol. 1, 769-70: 20 June 1637, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 773: 27 June 1637, same to same.

⁷⁴Aston was directed to do the same in April 1638 (*ibid.*, vol. 2, 9: 31 Apr. 1638, Secret instructions for Aston).

In spite of these difficulties, during the following two years Taylor doggedly continued to represent English interests at the Imperial court the best he knew how. He repeatedly requested recognition of the new Emperor and official authority to negotiate, and encouraged serious consideration of an alliance with the Habsburgs. He grew increasingly aggravated the longer these requests went unheeded and did not omit to point out the injury this inflicted on the Palatine cause.⁷⁵ In a characteristic put-off in April 1638, over a year after Ferdinand II's death, Windebank brusquely replied to Taylor's repeated requests for credentials: "For [the] powers which you so earnestly desire, his Majesty will enable you with such as shall be fit in his own best time, and in the mean time you must quiet yourself and submit to his wisdom."⁷⁶ Taylor would wait in vain. Until his departure from Vienna in the spring of 1639, the King and Windebank used his services only unofficially, mainly for news gathering, gauging the political climate at the Imperial court, and exploiting any opportunity to advance Palatine cause that might present itself. As before, his optimism and particularly his lack of full powers to negotiate a settlement limited his effectiveness in this role.

The result was that Taylor was no longer accredited as an envoy to the Emperor. At the Imperial court he gave out that he was only staying on in Vienna in a private capacity – a perception

⁷⁵PRO, SP 80/10, f. 93: 23 May 1637, Taylor to [?]; *ibid.*, f. 98: 17 Oct. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, ff. 100-1: 22 Jan. 1638, same to same; Cambridge University Library, Dd. 8. 35, f. 93: 1639, Taylor's relation of his negotiation, Nov. 1636-Apr. 1639; Bodl. Lib., Clarendon Mss. 14, f. 61: 12 May 1638, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, f. 113: 15 July 1637, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 769: 20 June 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 771: 27 June 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 787: 8 July 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 790: 15 July 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 795: 22 July 1637, same to same; CCSP, vol. 1, 140: 16 Sept. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*: 23 Sept. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*: 7 Oct. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 145: 16 Dec. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*: 29 Dec. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 149: 9 Mar. 1638, same to same; *ibid.*, 152: 5 May 1638, same to same; *ibid.*, 154: 29 June 1638, same to same; *ibid.*: 7 July 1638, same to same; *ibid.*, 155: 7 Aug. 1638, same to same; *ibid.*, 156: 21 Aug. 1638, same to same.

⁷⁶Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 22: 9 Apr. 1638, Windebank to Taylor.

that the English government wished to perpetuate given its negotiations for a French treaty. In spite of Taylor's attempts to uphold this artifice, however, neither the Imperial court nor the foreign ministers in residence there believed it, as they knew that he continued to receive letters and instructions from England.⁷⁷ Francesco Zonca, the Venetian Secretary in London, hit the closest to the mark when he stated that while Taylor did not receive fresh credentials, with the King's connivance some of his councillors sent letters directing him to stay in Vienna with the intention of sending him instructions and credentials once he made a promising opening.⁷⁸ Also, Taylor sent regular weekly dispatches back to England and was practically paid in full by the time he left Vienna.⁷⁹ A man of modest means, Taylor could not afford to stay in Vienna without financial support. The fact that the financially strapped government of Charles I, which was notoriously

⁷⁷For instance, Taylor often delivered his memorials to Count Trauttmansdorff instead of directly to the Emperor (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 8 Apr. 1637, Taylor to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*: 13 Apr. 1637, same to same; and *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 1: 25 Jan. 1639, same to same).

⁷⁸*CSPV 1636-9*, 385: 12 Mar. 1638, Francesco Zonca, Venetian Secretary in England, to D&S.

⁷⁹A warrant to the Exchequer of May 1637 to pay Taylor £1,000, for instance. This document referred to him as the "English agent at Vienna" and indicated that of the allotted amount, part was for sums already disbursed by Taylor, but "the rest he is to disburse in our further service." In 1638, he was paid for his exertions in the King's "secret service." (PRO, SP 16/355, f. 47: 13 May 1637, Warrant to pay Taylor; *ibid.*, Treasury 56, Various Warrants, vol. 12, f. 1: 13 May 1637, Privy seal to pay same; *ibid.*, f. 12: 3 May 1638, same; *ibid.*, Treasury 56/4, f. 54: 24 Oct. 1637, Warrant to pay same the remaining £500; PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 103-6: 26 Jan. 1638, Taylor's accounts, Sept. 1635-Mar. 1638; *ibid.*, SP 16/393, f. 67: 2 July 1638, Notes of various payments made to Taylor upon privy seals dated 10 Dec. 1633-3 May 1638). By January 1639, three months before he left Vienna, Taylor had received all but £66 of the £3,566 he claimed during his three-and-a-half-year stay there (*ibid.*, SP 80/10, f. 119: 5 Jan. 1639, Taylor's accounts, Mar. 1638-Mar. 1639). Despite this, Taylor complained constantly of lack of funds. In June 1638, he lamented "I have served now his Majesty these 10 years, where of I have not lived one year at home, in continual journeys and dangers, without any reward at all; and am thereby become a great deal poorer than I was, when first I came to his royal service. I see this business will be drawn again out at length, which hitherto, like Sisypheus' stone, rolleth to the bottom of the hill, when it hath been brought up. I do not refuse to serve, so long as I may be of any use, but my continual absence from my wife and children is to me and them much a discomfort...." (Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 120: 21 July 1638, Taylor to Windebank).

delinquent in paying its representatives, came through with Taylor's showed that maintaining his presence there was considered a priority. As Zonca further observed: "He [Taylor] is paid from the king's purse, he writes to Court, they write to him and he exercises every function of a minister of the state, although they will not admit that he is one."⁸⁰ The Imperial ministers therefore continued to consider Taylor's offers and regard him as the King's representative.⁸¹ Their willingness to do so can be attributed at least in part to the Emperor's desire to reach an agreement on the Palatinate question. Even when the young Oñate's negotiation in England strained relations between England and the Habsburgs, Taylor went about "fostering confidential relations with the [Imperial] ministers here. . . . he has been observed, with great astonishment, to be negotiating at length with Count Slich [Schlick], and in the midst of all the existing ill feeling he is well received and treated amicably."⁸²

Although it was apparent to all at the Imperial court that Taylor remained there by the King's command and in his pay, the English ministers continued to uphold the artifice that he did so of his own volition. This was done in part for the benefit of the French, who did not appreciate the presence of an English envoy at the court of one of the very powers against which England and France were ostensibly attempting to ally. If Taylor were conducting any negotiations on Palatine affairs in Vienna, the English ministers maintained, he was doing so in a private capacity without sanction from London. The English government went to great lengths to emphasize this point, and

⁸⁰*CSPV 1636-9*, 385: 12 Mar. 1638, Zonca to D&S.

⁸¹*CSPV 1636-9*, 320: 14 Nov. 1637, Ballarino to same; *ibid.*, 486: 8 Jan. 1639, Giovanni Grimani, Venetian ambassador in Germany, to same.

⁸²*Ibid.*, 268: 12 Sept. 1637, Ballarino to same.

Charles even went as far as to claim that if Taylor were negotiating in his name, he would have him hanged.⁸³

Although his government's refusal to acknowledge the true nature of his activities was troublesome, Taylor loyally remained in Vienna for the following two years and continued to work toward the realization of an Anglo-Imperial agreement on the Palatinate. He continued to try to persuade the Emperor and his ministers that finding a compromise solution to the Palatinate question was necessary and achievable. While Taylor retained his faith of the good intentions of the Emperor and Maximilian toward the business, he was a good deal less sanguine about those of the Spaniards.⁸⁴ He declared their denial of the resolution taken at Regensburg and their stubborn insistence on their *convenientias* before they made any restoration as the greatest impediment to an agreement in these years.⁸⁵ From Taylor's perspective, this behavior was particularly egregious after their earlier professions of willingness to come to an agreement. The Spaniards in fact later admitted to having

⁸³Ibid., 191: 25 Apr. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 228: 19 June 1637, Correr to same; *ibid.*, 261: 4 Sept. 1637, same to same.

⁸⁴Taylor was sure that the Emperor, who desired peace and was bent on settling the Palatinate question, would readily assent to an agreement. Because of his willingness to treat and the Spaniards' obstructionism, Taylor urged the Emperor to send an envoy of his own to England to remove the business from the young Oñate's hands. Taylor also maintained his confidence in Maximilian, who had shown an inclination to compromise as well (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 97: 22 Sept. 1637, Taylor to [?]; *ibid.*, f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, same to same). According to Taylor, at Regensburg Maximilian had agreed to greater concessions than the Spaniards ever thought he would, thus putting them in the difficult position of being the main obstruction to a settlement that would contribute to peace (*ibid.*, f. 90: 16 May 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 787: 8 July 1637, same to Windebank).

⁸⁵PRO, SP 80/10, f. 90: 16 May 1637, Taylor to [?]; *ibid.*, ff. 92-3: 23 May 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, f. 94: 15 Aug. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, f. 97: 22 Sept. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, same to same; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 29: 31 Mar. 1638, same to Windebank; CSP, vol. 1, 771-2: 27 June 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 787: 8 July 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 790: 15 July 1637, same to same; CCSP, vol. 1, 139: 2 Sept. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 143: 18 Nov. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 145: 16 Dec. 1637, same to same; HMC, *Denbigh V*, 57: 29 May 1638, same to Feilding.

supported the Regensburg resolution, but declared it was secret.⁸⁶ Taylor wrote darkly in September that "it is certaine that Spain and none butt Spain doth now hinder this business."⁸⁷ He accused the Spanish ambassadors Oñate and Castañeda in Vienna and particularly the young Oñate in London of impeding rather than promoting the settlement of the Palatinate question.⁸⁸ Regardless, Taylor had finally reconciled himself to the fact that there was no chance of obtaining full restoration for Charles Louis, "notwithstanding all their [the Spaniards'] promises in black and white."⁸⁹ Despite the obstacles posed by Spain's demands, Taylor still believed that the negotiations with the Habsburgs presented the best opportunity for achieving a satisfactory compromise settlement.⁹⁰ He thought that an agreement with the Spaniards was possible, but that they currently were asking too much in return for the satisfaction they would provide.

⁸⁶PRO, SP 80/10, f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, Taylor to [?].

⁸⁷Ibid., f. 97: 22 Sept. 1637, same to same.

⁸⁸Ibid., f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 771: 27 June 1637, same to Windebank.

⁸⁹Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 12, f. 99: 5 Aug. 1637, same to same; ibid., f. 162: 23 Sept. 1637, same to same; ibid., ff. 192-3: 21 Oct. 1637, same to same.

⁹⁰Taylor made it clear that did not see the universal peace conference planned for Cologne as a workable alternative to negotiating with the Habsburgs (CSP, vol. 1, 769-70: 20 June 1637, Windebank to Taylor; ibid., 792: 15 July 1637, same to same; cf. CSPD 1637, 370: 24 Aug. 1637, Coke to Edward, Viscount Conway and Killultagh). So long as the King did not ally with one side or the other, Leicester did not believe he would receive satisfaction at the Cologne conference either (Collins, vol. 2, 434-5: 2 Nov. 1636, Leicester to Coke). The papal legate, Cardinal Genetti, arrived in Cologne in October 1636, but none of the powers that had earlier professed (or feigned) interest in participating sent representatives to meet him there. France and Spain did not trust in the Pope's impartiality, while the Protestant powers rejected his mediation outright. For more on the Pope's promotion of a general peace in the 1630s and the conference planned for Cologne, see: Konrad Repgen, *Römische Kurie*, vol. 1; Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972), 77-90; and Auguste Leman, "Origines du Congrès de Cologne," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 19 (1923): 370-83. The conference never really got off the ground because of the diplomatic conflicts around the question of passports for the allies of Sweden and France (see below, n. 179).

Taylor was not the only one whom the Spaniards' behavior disappointed. The Emperor and his ministers also began to resent their moves to obstruct a settlement and denials of the Regensburg resolution.⁹¹ It was true that the Imperialists wished for Spain to profit from an agreement on the Palatinate question, but they did not want the business to break over Spain's demands.⁹² For example in June 1637, Count Schlick, the president of the Imperial council of war (*Hofkriegsrat*), complained bitterly to Taylor of Spain's extravagance in prolonging the war and the young Oñate's proceedings in England.⁹³ The Austrians, who were still looking for a way to a reasonable and acceptable agreement, moved to breathe new life into the negotiation "because they conceived that the Spaniards had proceeded herein, much to the ostentation of their owne Greatnes and to the disesteeme and lessning that of the Empire. This made them desirous to take more Authority unto themselves then before they had."⁹⁴ The Emperor was "unwilling that these warrs should by that means [Spain's demands for *convenientias*] be continued and the whole empire for the quarrells of Spain kept in continuall trouble and conbustion."⁹⁵ Taylor took advantage of the situation to encourage the Imperialists to "make themselves more Masters of the business then before they were, which they had (and were sorry for it) too much putt over to others."⁹⁶ To this end, he spoke out

⁹¹PRO, SP 80/10, f. 97: 22 Sept. 1637, Taylor to [?]; CSP, vol. 1, 770: 20 June 1637, same to Windebank; *ibid.*, 772: 27 June, same to same; *ibid.*, 787: 8 July 1637, same to same.

⁹²PRO, SP 80/10, f. 92: 23 May 1637, same to [?].

⁹³CSP, vol. 1, 772: 27 June 1637, same to Windebank.

⁹⁴Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 52: 1639, Taylor's relation of his negotiation, Nov. 1636–Apr. 1639.

⁹⁵PRO, SP 80/10, f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, Taylor to [?].

⁹⁶Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 52: 1639, Taylor's relation.

against the ill offices of the elder Oñate in Germany and his son in England, which had brought the business to "great distemper."⁹⁷

Ferdinand III did not require much encouragement from Taylor. From the beginning of his reign, he intended to be more independent of his allies than his father had been. Count Schlick told Taylor that "the Emperor did much love and honour them [the Spaniards]; but as they could not turn and twine him at their pleasure as they had done his father; and when he was once resolved he held on his way whatsoever they said or did." The Emperor was encouraged to this by his closest advisors, counts Stadion and Trauttmansdorff. Just as Trauttmansdorff and other moderates wished the Emperor to place the interests of the Empire before those of religion where the two came into conflict, they also wished him to do the same where dynastic interests were concerned. This was not lost on Olivares, who resented the Imperial councillors who, as he saw it, were always diverting their master from the dynastic line of duty.⁹⁸ Olivares complained that under Trauttmansdorff's direction, the Emperor's policy was becoming too Imperial: "His [Trauttmansdorff's] first maxim is that the Emperor should not be a partisan of ours, but merely Imperial, and neutral in everything else."⁹⁹ Thus while Ferdinand III was always happy to take Spanish money, he had no wish to let his pocketbook dictate his policy. Peace was his priority. He had more than enough difficulties of his

⁹⁷According to Taylor, Castañeda was also suspect. The English envoy complained that the Spaniard resented his interference and "began to cunningly putt stayes and hindrances upon my designes, and as much as he could, went about also to discredit my person." (ibid.).

⁹⁸Albrecht, *Maximilian I*, 960. The Emperor's desire to break free of Spain's influence was soon noted in England: "The new Emperor is very well spoken of, he is reported to be of a gentle and placate disposition, hath removed many of his father's Counsellors, banished the Jesuits out of his Court, made new ones of his own friends." (Strafford, vol. 2, 73: 8 May 1637, R. G. Garrard to Wentworth).

⁹⁹Quoted in Elliott, *Olivares*, 544.

own in Germany, particularly after the fall of Breisach in 1638, and the closer he drew to Spain, the harder it would be for him to reach a peace settlement with France and Sweden.¹⁰⁰ Political consideration of his own dominions and branch of the House of Habsburg reached its height when, against his inclination, Ferdinand accepted the clauses pertaining to Spain in the Westphalian peace treaty.¹⁰¹ His desire for an independent policy and wish for peace boded well for the English negotiations. He continued to make attempts to move negotiations on the Palatinate question forward, despite Spanish reticence, because he understood that its settlement would help lay the groundwork for a durable peace.

Because he desired peace, the news of England's plans to join with the anti-Habsburg side was most unwelcome to the Emperor. When he heard of the King's agitation against the Habsburgs and his negotiations for an alliance with the French and the Dutch reached Vienna, the Emperor and his ministers became quite apprehensive of an open breach.¹⁰² The Emperor received many reports of the dangerous machinations of England, France, the Dutch, Sweden, and their preparations for war against the Habsburgs in the Empire and the Low Countries.¹⁰³ Maximilian related that England had struck an offensive alliance with France, and that the King was supplying the Prince Palatine with

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Konrad Repgen, "Ferdinand III., 1637-1657," in *Kaiser der Neuzeit*, 160-1. This move clouded relations between the Emperor and Spain, though not permanently.

¹⁰²HHStA, StK Vorträge, Kart. 2, Konv. 2, ff. 9-10: 4 May 1637, Opinion of privy council regarding the King of England's agitation regarding the Palatinate; *ibid.*, f. 11: 12 May 1637, Opinion of privy council; *ibid.*, RK KrA, Fasz. 121, Konv. 2, ff. 74-8: 19 Oct. 1637, same.

¹⁰³HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 119, Konv. 1, f. 113: 11 Feb. 1637, Elizabeth to Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel; *ibid.*, f. 160: 6 Mar. 1637, Michael von Mentzel to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*, ff. 185-6: 28 Mar. 1637, Elector of Cologne to same; *ibid.*, ff. 272-3: 11 May 1637, Mentzel to same; *ibid.*, ff. 380-1: 30 June 1637, Ferdinand III to Elector of Saxony.

eight warships, 10,000 men, and £10,000. Further, he reported that England, France, Sweden, Holland, and Hesse-Kassel were planning to meet in August in Hamburg to discuss their peace terms.¹⁰⁴ Michael Mentzel, the Imperial resident in Hamburg, related that England would lend forty ships to France, both France and Sweden had permission to levy troops in England and Scotland, and the allies would blockade Flemish seaports and provide the Prince Palatine with 20,000 men.¹⁰⁵ There were even more fanciful reports that the anti-Habsburg confederates would join with the Ottomans, Tartars, and the Prince of Transylvania in an alliance against the Emperor and attack Hungary and the crown lands.¹⁰⁶

On top of these reports, Radolt had returned to the Imperial court, and in early May he made a final relation describing the English court and government, including the King and Queen and their courts, the privy council, leading ministers and noblemen, the military establishment, and sources of revenue.¹⁰⁷ He reported that the King took many important decisions himself, without the advice of his councillors. Only a very tight circle of councillors was involved in foreign affairs, and Radolt thus had difficulty discovering their deliberations. Among them were Laud, Arundel, Holland, and the two secretaries; sometimes the King consulted only one or two of them and many times none

¹⁰⁴Ibid., Fasz. 119, Konv. 2, ff. 82-4: 16 July 1637, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., f. 103: 22 July 1637, Mentzel to same.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., Fasz. 120, ff. 135-6: 28 Aug. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, ff. 172-3: 5 Sept. 1637, Report about diplomatic negotiations; *ibid.*, Fasz. 121, Konv. 3, ff. 73-6: 25 Nov. 1637, Report from a "trusted person" in Stockholm; *ibid.*, ff. 133-4: 12 Dec. 1637, same.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1820, ff. 35-41: 5 May 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III. To this relation Radolt appended documents on the King's annual income, royal palaces, the counties, the status of Catholics, and epitaphs from St. Peter's (*ibid.*, Kart. 5, ff. 88-91: 6 May 1636, Epitaphs from St. Peter's; *ibid.*, ff. 104-5: 1637, King of England's annual income; *ibid.*, ff. 106-8: 1637, List of royal residences and parks; *ibid.*, ff. 109-12: 1637, English counties and their characteristics).

except a secretary. Windebank, who was generally well-affected to the Habsburg cause, was one of the few English ministers who deigned to receive Radolt, and even he did not do so often. Since Arundel's return to England, the King and most of his ministers had turned away from the Habsburgs and toward France. Given the din of voices raised against the Habsburgs at the English court, even Windebank was no longer openly advocating a Habsburg alliance. Regarding England's military establishment, Radolt remained unimpressed by the land forces at its disposal. However, he confirmed that the King commanded the most formidable navy in Europe, amounting to nearly 40 warships, which when supplemented by the merchant fleet totaled 100 armed vessels ranging from five to 600 tons and outfitted with twenty to thirty or more pieces of artillery.¹⁰⁸ If England and France concluded an alliance, as at this point it seemed they would, these resources would be brought to bear against the House of Austria.

Taking advantage of the Emperor's worries that England would join France if the Habsburgs did not take action, Taylor encouraged the Emperor to circumvent the young Oñate by sending another envoy to England to discuss the question of the Palatinate and a possible alliance. He recommended the Emperor send Count Leslie, the Scottish soldier who had made a name for himself in the Emperor's service, but in a private capacity in order to avoid the uncomfortable issues that arose from the King's refusal to recognize the Emperor officially. Once the King had received some satisfaction, Taylor believed, he would then recognize the Emperor and receive his ministers publicly. He emphasized the urgency of the situation, as the French treaty was near conclusion, but

¹⁰⁸Ibid., Kart. 18, Konv. 1820, ff. 38-9: 5 May 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III. Radolt estimated the King's annual income at 6,975,200 florins or £1,162,533, from which the fleet was maintained, but still suspected he was overspending (ibid., Kart. 5, ff. 104-5: 1637, King of England's annual income).

assured the Emperor that if he acted quickly the situation could still be salvaged.¹⁰⁹ The Emperor, however, decided against this idea, giving as his reason the King's refusal to answer his letters.¹¹⁰

If the negotiation on the Palatinate question was to progress, another way would have to be found. The King adamantly refused to send another plenipotentiary to Vienna, as the Emperor had requested, and he himself had decided against dispatching an envoy to England.¹¹¹ The Emperor therefore suggested to Taylor a conference of English, Bavarian, and Habsburg ambassadors at Brussels to deal with the problem. While in Prague, where the Imperial court had moved in early June, Kurz, who had become Vice Chancellor after the death of Stralendorf earlier in the year, extended in the Emperor's name an invitation for England to participate in a conference at Brussels, where the powers with an interest in the Palatinate would send ambassadors with plenipotentiary powers finally to conclude a settlement on this question. Kurz declared to Taylor:

First that the King his Master [the Emperor] had proceeded really and sincerely with his Majesty in the business of the Palatinate, and that he desired nothing more than to see a good and happy end of it: That it was certain, that at Ratisbone, a Resolution was taken what to doe and how farr to proceed in it: That for the effecting of this, he found that the best meanes wold be to meete at some place againe about it, and because the King would not send to him, he thought Bruxels the most convenient.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 13 Apr. 1637, Taylor to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*: 8 June 1637, same to same; *ibid.*: 17 June 1637, same to same. He told the Emperor that France was making very enticing promises and was willing to settle for a defensive league if the King would not enter into an offensive one. Also, Radolt said that troops were being levied in England and Scotland, which the Swedes were angling to obtain for their war effort. Finally, he pointed out that the fleet would set sail any day.

¹¹⁰CSP, vol. 1, 771: 27 June 1637, Taylor to Windebank; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 52: 1639, Taylor's relation.

¹¹¹HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 4: 21 Jan. 1638, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III.

¹¹²Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 52: 1639, Taylor's relation. This was not the first Taylor had heard of the proposed meeting at Brussels. Walderode had mentioned it before the court left Vienna in June: "because this was a business which concerned divers, the Emperor, having often consulted it, found, nothing more convenient than (what formerly at Vienna he said unto me by the Secretary Walderode) that

The Emperor promised that if Spain or Bavaria insisted upon unreasonable terms, he would use his authority to moderate their demands. He declared that he and Maximilian were ready to send their plenipotentiaries "as soon as they understood the King's liking unto it."¹¹³

The plan for a conference at Brussels to address the Palatinate question was first promoted by the Habsburg side.¹¹⁴ It was a joint effort, for at the same time that the Emperor made an approach to Taylor, the young Oñate made one in England as well.¹¹⁵ Taylor claimed that at the time, he voiced dislike for the idea, particularly because of the Spaniards' excessive demands. Instead he continued to recommend that the Emperor send an envoy, preferably Leslie, to London

his Majesty would be pleased to send his Ambassador to Brussels, whither the Emperor also and Duke of Bavaria would send...." (CSP, vol. 1, 771: 27 June 1637, Taylor to Windebank).

¹¹³Ibid. In fact, at this time the Emperor already intended to send the representative he designated for Cologne to Brussels as well. Taylor believed that Leslie, whom he had continually supported to lead an Imperial mission to England, was designed for this post (ibid., 773).

¹¹⁴There has been some debate about from which side this suggestion originated. Erhard Blesch believes it came from the Princess Phalzburg (Erhard Blesch, *Restitution der Pfalz und Beziehungen Karl Ludwigs zu England* [Heidelberg: Hörning, 1891], 14). M. Koch, on the other hand, writes that Taylor was the originator of the plan and that he approached the Emperor about it for the first time on 24 December 1637 (M. Koch, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches unter der Regierung Ferdinands III* [Vienna: Carl Gerold's Sohn, 1865-6], vol. 1, 93-4). Karl Schweinesbein, who relies on Koch, takes this view as well (Schweinesbein, 41). The first approach to Taylor, however, was made by the Emperor. It should be noted more generally that Koch's work is not always reliable and should be used with care. Gardiner merely states that Taylor "put forward" the project without the authority to do so (Gardiner, vol. 8, 377). The editors of the *Calendars of State Papers Venetian* maintain that Maximilian suggested the referral of the Palatine's affairs to a conference at Brussels, after the latter's exclusion from the Cologne conference (CSPV 1636-9, xxxii). This may be so, but the idea for the conference did not emanate from Maximilian.

¹¹⁵In July 1637, Aston reported that the young Oñate had informed the Spanish court that the King had consented to treat at Brussels (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 142: 1 July 1637, Aston to Windebank). Windebank wrote in June 1639 that the young Oñate had first put the proposition forward (CSP, vol. 2, 48: 10 June 1639, Windebank to Charles I). Grimani later reported that Taylor's downfall resulted from the fact that "he [Taylor] hath been too busy in the treaty at Brussels, taking it upon trust from the Spanish ministers, from whom originally and not from him it had beginning." (CSPV 1636-9, 523: 9 Apr. 1639, Grimani to D&S).

to remove the negotiation there from the young Oñate's hands. Still, he promised that he would advertise their proposal to the King.¹¹⁶

After the Imperial court returned to Vienna later that summer, the Imperialists continued to lobby for a conference at Brussels, but Taylor also continued to avoid giving an answer, quite possibly because he had not received instructions from England on how to handle the situation.¹¹⁷ In October, the Emperor again renewed his invitation and reiterated his promise to hold to the resolutions taken at Regensburg and moderate the demands of Spain and Bavaria.¹¹⁸ He also made it known to Taylor that he would no longer entrust the negotiations with England to the Spaniards. Thus he refused to send the Cardinal Infante the powers that he would need to negotiate on the Emperor's behalf at Brussels.¹¹⁹ Despite the Emperor's declarations, Taylor remained skeptical about the proposed conference. The Venetian Ballarino observed that "he [Taylor] no longer listens to their cajoleries having been deluded so many times in the past."¹²⁰

Although Taylor was unsure about the proposed conference at Brussels, he still considered negotiations with the Habsburgs to be the most promising of the King's options for regaining the Palatinate. Thus at the same time that Taylor was temporizing about the conference, he was

¹¹⁶HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 8 June 1637, Taylor to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*: 17 June 1637, same to same; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, ff. 52-3: 1639, Taylor's relation.

¹¹⁷PRO, SP 80/10, f. 94: 15 Aug. 1637, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, f. 96: 22 Sept. 1637, same to [?].

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, f. 98: 17 Oct. 1637, same to same.

¹¹⁹CCSP, vol. 1, 142: 28 Oct. 1638, same to Windebank. The Spaniards were apparently hoping he would do so. Aston reported to Windebank in February 1638 that the Cardinal Infante was empowered to negotiate and conclude a treaty for the Emperor as well as Spain (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 179: 1 Feb. 1638, Aston to same). The Spaniards' claims were later exposed as false.

¹²⁰CSPV 1636-9, 320: 14 Nov. 1637, Ballarino to D&S.

attempting to steer the King away from the alliance with France. Despite the failure of Arundel's mission, Taylor remained optimistic that England could indeed reach a settlement with the Habsburgs, and he lobbied vigorously against the impending alliance with the French and warned repeatedly against their ambitions.¹²¹ He maintained that even if they managed to secure the area west of the Rhine and restored Charles Louis to the Palatine lands there, he would become their vassal rather than the powerful Imperial prince he should be, just as Frederick had become subordinate to Sweden in 1632.¹²² If the French made peace with the Habsburgs, Taylor cautioned, the former would be much more concerned with securing their own gains than the restoration of the Prince Palatine. He pointed out that French troops tended to remain in the areas that they were sent to protect and that they would not readily give up territory they had conquered. Taylor also pointed out that if the King hoped to regain the Palatinate with French assistance, he would have to contribute substantial military forces to the effort. At the same time he gave these perceptive evaluations of French intentions, the envoy also encouraged his master to cease negotiating with both sides in the hope of pressuring one of them to offer him satisfaction. If the King's demands were to be taken seriously, he needed to come down firmly on one side or the other.¹²³ Taylor recommended the Habsburg side as the most promising, in spite of the Spaniards' obstructionism, and he urged the King to resume negotiations with the Emperor, who professed his good intentions toward the Prince

¹²¹CSP, vol. 1, 792: 15 July 1637, Taylor to Windebank.

¹²²Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 15, f. 59: 15 Dec. 1638, same to same; CCSP, vol. 1, 135: 26 July 1636, same to same.

¹²³Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 15, f. 59: 15 Dec. 1638, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 772: 27 June 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, 787: 8 July 1637, same to same; CCSP, vol. 1, 163: 22 Dec. 1638, same to same; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 531.

Palatine and promised to moderate the demands of his allies. If the King would be content with the Regensburg resolution – that is, the Lower Palatinate, an alternating electorate, and the Upper Palatinate to be treated of – and Spain would be content with less than a war with the Dutch, Taylor believed that reaching an agreement acceptable to both sides would be possible.¹²⁴

By the summer of 1637, with palpable signs of French reluctance to conclude the treaty with England and the troubles in Scotland in any case impeding any English military action, the King was reconsidering the diplomatic option for receiving his nephew's restoration. At this time Hopton reported the King's improved disposition toward the Habsburgs. Ballarino also believed that "England was developing a disposition to determine the present controversies by way of negotiation rather than that of arms." He took a cordial letter sent to the Prince-Bishop of Vienna from Arundel, who had recently been so truculent toward the Habsburgs, as a sign of the thawing relations between their masters.¹²⁵

In spite of the improved relations between the two sides and Taylor's own belief that the Habsburg option was preferable to the alternative, Taylor still avoided accepting the Emperor's invitation to participate in the Brussels conference. In the winter of 1637, Don Francisco de Melo came from Flanders to promote it, but Taylor remained unpersuaded. Responding to de Melo's overtures, Taylor replied: "I told him I found many difficultyes in this, not only because the King would not be drawne to new Treatyes, but because indeed their uniust and unreasonable Conveniencias (which was the fattall word they used) kept us at this distance in which we were; and

¹²⁴CSP, vol. 1, 791: 15 July 1637, Taylor to Windebank.

¹²⁵CSPV 1636-9, 253: 8 Aug. 1637, Ballarino to D&S.

till they were removed, it was in vaine to meete any where, or in any manner to Treate."¹²⁶ The familiar squabble ensued, in which de Melo claimed that in return for Palatine restoration England had promised a break with France and Holland, and Taylor accused the Spaniards of inferring too much from the King's offer of an alliance for the peace of Christendom.¹²⁷ De Melo, however, maintained that Spain might reduce its demands.¹²⁸ Taylor laid the blame for the continuance of the war at Spain's door, and that of its former ambassador to England, the young Oñate.¹²⁹ De Melo departed from Vienna soon afterwards for Italy.¹³⁰

Not long after de Melo's departure, however, Taylor finally responded to the overtures for a conference at Brussels. In late December, not long after his truculent interchange with de Melo, Taylor accepted in writing the Emperor's invitation to send a representative to the Brussels conference, that is if the Emperor and his allies gave the King good grounds to believe that they would provide satisfaction on the point of the Palatinate.¹³¹ At the same time, therefore, Taylor inquired what terms the Emperor would offer to England and what concessions he would require in return. Further, he strongly recommended that an Imperial envoy be sent to England to make the

¹²⁶Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 53: 1639, Taylor's relation.

¹²⁷Taylor explained the irrationality of the Spaniards' demands to de Melo: "What an abominable thing this [demand for *convenientias*] was, iniuriou:s even to be propounded; and how contrary to all sense, since they could never obtaine it from those of their owne Howse in Germany." (ibid.).

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹CCSP, vol. 1, 144: 2 Dec. 1637, Taylor to Windebank.

¹³⁰Cambridge University Library, Dd. 8. 35, f. 95: 1639, Taylor's relation.

¹³¹On 24 January 1638, Spain and Bavaria supposedly declared their willingness to participate and to discuss the restoration of the Lower Palatinate (Koch, 94).

Emperor's intentions known to the King, who would then decide whether there was a satisfactory basis for him to send an English representative to Brussels. A few days afterward, Taylor wrote to Windebank of the Emperor's goodwill in the Palatine business, and that Charles should acknowledge the Emperor at once and send a representative to Brussels.¹³²

The fact that Taylor changed his opinion about the Brussels conference so quickly suggests that he was directed to do so. Also, soon after his acceptance of the invitation, he reported to one of his correspondents that though the idea was at first "entertayned coldly" by the King, it was communicated to Taylor that he was now showing a better disposition toward it. In fact, if the Habsburgs made an acceptable offer, he had leave to return to England with it.¹³³ The King's change in attitude was likely connected with the troubles in Scotland, for the longer they persisted, the more negotiation with the Habsburgs seemed the most viable course to effect the restitution of the Prince Palatine.

Soon after Taylor delivered his memorial, the Emperor asked Maximilian to give his opinion regarding it. Maximilian approved of holding a conference at Brussels and planned to send his own representative to negotiate there, particularly since the King adamantly refused to send plenipotentiary powers to treat at the Imperial court after Arundel's experience. However, the Duke recommended against the Emperor sending to England beforehand, as Taylor had requested, because he believed that the King would press the Imperial envoy for the specifics about the concessions that the Emperor and his allies were willing to make at Brussels, thus effectively moving the negotiation

¹³²HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 24 Dec. 1637, Taylor to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*, Konv. 4: 21 Jan. 1638, Maximilian I to same; PRO, SP 80/10, f. 107: 24 Dec. 1637, Taylor to same; CCSP, vol. 1, 145: 21 Dec. 1637, same to same.

¹³³PRO, SP 80/10, f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, Taylor to [?].

to the English court and reducing the Brussels meeting to little more than a ceremonial afterthought. Also, with the ball solidly in his court, the King would almost certainly demand more for his nephew and delay declaring whether he would treat at Brussels or not. In any case, Maximilian reminded the Emperor of the three levels of concessions he had outlined that they should observe in further negotiations with England.¹³⁴ Finally, Maximilian advised the Emperor to hold off on reopening the negotiations with England until they knew the result of efforts to mediate a peace between the Emperor and Sweden; if they were successful, he would be at a better advantage in treaties with England and France and thus could procure better terms where the Palatinate was concerned.¹³⁵

While Maximilian pondered the Brussels meeting, the Habsburgs and their allies took advantage of the improved disposition of the King to make a diplomatic overture on yet another front. In December, the Princess Phalzburg, with Spain's encouragement, approached Sir Balthazar Gerbier, the English resident agent in Brussels, with a proposition: she proposed to revive the scheme for the restitution of the Palatinate linked with the similar return of Lorraine, an Imperial fief that the French had annexed in 1632 after the unsuccessful rebellion of her brother, the Duke.¹³⁶ As a means to effect the deal, she offered herself as an intermediary between Charles I and the

¹³⁴The first being the insistence that the Palatine lands and titles remain with Bavarian line permanently, the second being the restoration of the Lower Palatinate, but the electorate remaining with Bavarian line (this was the offer made to Arundel in September 1636 and reconfirmed to Taylor in January 1637), and the third being the return of the Lower Palatinate and the alternation of the electorate after the expiry of Maximilian's direct line plus three further descendants of the Bavarian line. The Upper Palatinate was not to be a subject of negotiation (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: 21 Jan. 1638, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III). See above, p. 471.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*

¹³⁶PRO, SP 77/28, f. 231: [1638], Gerbier's relation of negotiations with Princess Phalzburg, 1637-8; *ibid.*, SP 77/27, f. 558: 6 Dec. 1637, Princess Phalzburg to Gerbier. Gerbier's dispatches relating to these negotiations are found in PRO, SP 77/27-9.

Habsburgs, thus providing a secret channel of communication between them. In doing so, she was attempting to draw England away from its projected league with the French. This would profit both her brother's cause as well as that of the Habsburgs.¹³⁷ Charles, for his part, was not against reopening the negotiations in this way as long as he remained uncommitted, which using the Princess as an intermediary allowed him to do. Thus Windebank instructed Gerbier to encourage her in these activities, and if she made significant progress, the King might then treat openly in the matter, through a representative. They saw these negotiations, therefore, as preliminary to a conference.¹³⁸

Negotiations at the Imperial Court, 1638-9: Plans for a Conference at Brussels

In late 1637, with the French treaty on hold and trouble brewing in Scotland, Charles I again began to consider negotiations with the Habsburgs as the peaceful alternative for the recovery of the Palatinate. As long as he was preoccupied at home and disinclined to stage a military intervention in the Continental war, this was the best option to achieve his ends. In early 1638, therefore, he reestablished amicable relations with the various Habsburg courts. In February, he decided to send the newly knighted Sir Arthur Hopton back to Spain, this time as an ambassador.¹³⁹ In Brussels, the English resident agent Sir Balthazar Gerbier was in contact with the Princess Phalzburg, who was

¹³⁷PRO, SP 77/28, ff. 219-21: 1 Dec. 1637, Extract of Gerbier's audience with Princess Phalzburg; *ibid.*, f. 231: [1638], Gerbier's relation; *ibid.*, f. 15: 20 Jan. 1638, Gerbier to Windebank; *ibid.*, f. 147: 27 Mar. 1638, same to Aston. Treating with her also offered a special advantage in that she allegedly could influence her cousin, Maximilian.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, SP 77/27, f. 561: 7 Dec. 1637, same to same; *ibid.*, SP 77/28, f. 48: 12 Feb. 1638, Windebank to Gerbier; *ibid.*, f. 63: 19 Feb. 1638, same to same; *ibid.*, SP 77/29, ff. 7-8: 14 Jan. 1639, same to same. By late 1637, Olivares himself believed that the scene of Anglo-Habsburg negotiation had been relocated to Flanders (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 172: 28 Dec. 1637, Aston to Windebank).

¹³⁹*CSPV 1636-9*, 374: 19 Feb. 1638, Zonca to D&S.

promoting Anglo-Habsburg negotiations for the exchange of Lorraine and the Palatinate there.¹⁴⁰ Taylor, who had recently accepted the Emperor's invitation to treat at Brussels, welcomed the news of the effective breakdown of the French treaty and the open reestablishment of friendly relations with the Habsburgs.¹⁴¹

With England once again gravitating to the Habsburg option, it seemed as if Taylor's negotiations were back on track. However it soon became apparent that his propensity to move forward more quickly and publicly than the King would have liked presented a problem. In the spring of 1638, Windebank reprimanded Taylor several times for indiscretions in his conduct of the negotiations. When a copy of his memorial of December 1637 reached England, Windebank rebuked him for excusing the Prince Palatine's protestation against the election of the King of the Romans on the grounds that the Palatine had issued it without the King's leave. Moreover, the Secretary admonished him for using the title of Emperor without official sanction to do so.¹⁴² Windebank warned Taylor that the King commanded him "to make a direct answer whether you have carried yourself thus or not, and it will concern you to clear it."¹⁴³ At the same time, however, he informed Taylor that the King was not against the idea of sending a representative to the projected

¹⁴⁰*CSP*, vol. 2, 16: 2 Oct. 1638, Windebank to Charles I.

¹⁴¹Taylor first mentioned this news on 19 January, less than a month after he had accepted the invitation to treat at Brussels (*CCSP*, vol. 1, 148: 19 Jan. 1638, Taylor to Windebank).

¹⁴²When the Prince Palatine heard that Taylor had addressed Ferdinand with the Imperial title and "suppressed" his protestation of the previous year, he made strong objections. His mother Elizabeth also complained (Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 20: 9 Apr. 1638, Windebank to Taylor; *ibid.*, f. 22: 9 Apr. 1638, same to same).

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, f. 20: 9 Apr. 1638, same to same; *ibid.*, f. 22: 9 Apr. 1638, same to same.

conference at Brussels, but he could not acknowledge the way it was achieved, particularly as Taylor had obtained no written promises from the Emperor.¹⁴⁴

The situation worsened after news of Taylor's audience of 27 February and his follow-up paper of 11 March reached England. Taylor had excused his master for not answering the Emperor's letters and affirmed the King's willingness to send a plenipotentiary to Brussels to further the proposed treaty, that is if the Emperor and his allies gave sufficient grounds that he would receive satisfaction. He also avowed his willingness to join in the defense of Flanders if they settled the business of the Palatinate in a satisfactory manner. He also complained of the delays of the Habsburgs in preparing for the conference.¹⁴⁵ When Windebank got wind of this, he again upbraided Taylor for the same reasons as he had earlier.¹⁴⁶ Despite these indiscretions, however, Windebank obviously had no thought of recalling Taylor, for at the end of April, the government issued a privy seal to pay him for his services.¹⁴⁷ Apparently Taylor did not believe the paper would cause offense, because he announced in his dispatches that he had delivered it.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 374-5. This was ironic given Charles I's policy of avoiding any communication that was not oral and couched in the most general of terms. His avoidance of anything specific or enduring confused not only Taylor, but other English diplomats at Habsburg courts as well.

¹⁴⁵HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: 11 Mar. 1638, Taylor to Ferdinand III; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 13, ff. 148-9: 11 Mar. 1638, same to same; PRO, SP 80/10, f. 108: 11 Mar. 1638, same to same.

¹⁴⁶Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 36: 16 Apr. 1638, Windebank to Taylor. It is interesting that later on, when his conduct was being investigated, Taylor claimed that Kurz had given these propositions to him to justify the grounds for a treaty at Brussels to the King, and further that Kurz had asked him to present them as his own (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 108: 11 Mar. 1638, Notation on Taylor's memorial, probably by one of the examiners).

¹⁴⁷Ibid., Treasury 56/12, f. 12: 3 May 1638, Privy seal to pay Taylor.

¹⁴⁸Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 18: 24 Mar. 1638, Taylor to Windebank; CCSP, vol. 1, 149: 9 Mar. 1638, same to same.

Taylor defended himself against these accusations vehemently and at great length, answering that he had only given the Imperial title in an unofficial capacity as instructed, and that he had never uttered a word against the Prince Palatine's protestation.¹⁴⁹ To have denied that the King had sanctioned the protestation, Taylor pointed out, would have been ridiculous; far from intentionally suppressing it, he was unable to deliver it publicly as his commissions had ceased with the death of Ferdinand II:

As for the Manifest, I never spoke of it either one way or other, since I could not deliver it, the Emperor being dead when I received it. And to have said that it was done without the King's knowledge, what could have been more ridiculous? Did not Radolt receive it in England? Was it not published in divers languages? Did not Secretary Coke send me an order to have given it? So that both I and they knew it was with his Majesty's leave and approbation, and I had been senseless to have said any other.¹⁵⁰

Furthermore, he could not have delivered it without appearing to approve Ferdinand III's election.¹⁵¹

Taylor was not the only English diplomat left in the dark about the protestation and other important issues that affected his mission abroad. The conscious decision of the King and Windebank to withhold information caused constant problems for many of them, particularly those at Habsburg courts, and understandably blunted their effectiveness. Aston believed that he could have helped Arundel's negotiation if he had been better informed of the latter's proceedings. He complained that everything was hidden from him except that Arundel was to demand full restitution.

¹⁴⁹However, Taylor did give the Imperial title in his memorials. It may be that he technically delivered them as a private person.

¹⁵⁰Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, ff. 62-4: 12 May 1638, Taylor to Windebank.

¹⁵¹PRO, SP 80/10, f. 88: 4 Mar. 1637, same to Secretary.

Embarrassingly, the only notice he received of it was from the Spaniards themselves.¹⁵² In the case of the protestation, Aston had to refuse comment on the issue when Olivares inquired whether the King had approved it. In a letter to Arundel, who could wholly sympathize after his experience in Germany, Aston remarked acidly that he knew nothing about the matter of the protestation except what he heard from the Spaniards.¹⁵³

Likewise, Taylor was not the only English diplomat engaged in secret negotiations with the Habsburgs who received a tongue-lashing from Windebank. He rebuked all of them at some point for discussing issues with ministers at the courts they served in less general terms than the King would have liked. The King also discouraged his diplomats at Habsburg courts from giving their propositions in writing, which posed a significant impediment to fruitful negotiation, particularly for Taylor given the Imperial ministers' penchant for negotiation by papers. Windebank closely monitored and summarily reprimanded them if they seemed to move toward involving Charles in "undesirable commitments," which for the King was almost any obligation at all. Even the most general expressions of commitment on his part could arouse his ire. Finally, Charles gave his representatives no clear idea of what terms he would be willing to accept for his nephew or what he would be willing to offer in return.

As spring wore on into summer, new obstacles to Taylor's negotiations introduced themselves. The first was the negative impact of the Scots rebellion on the Habsburg negotiations. By the summer of 1638, Taylor discovered that news of it had reached the Imperial court and was

¹⁵²BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 104: 13 Dec. 1636,* Aston to Arundel.

¹⁵³Ibid., f. 127: 25 Apr. 1637, same to same.

presenting a new impediment to his negotiation. Frustrated, Taylor wrote to Windebank that "There are evil reports of Scotland . . . which do much hurt."¹⁵⁴ Taylor's negotiations were not the only ones affected by the troubles in Scotland. Hopton reported encountering the same difficulties in Madrid.¹⁵⁵ Spain was still quite interested in recruiting troops in Britain and securing the assistance of the fleet in the Channel, but it soon became apparent that the King would not be able to spare either. With his resources engaged against the Scots, he had little to offer in return for concessions in the Palatinate. Although the Habsburgs still wished to secure England's friendship, or at least its neutrality, they believed they could have it without making great sacrifices.¹⁵⁶

The Prince Palatine's unsuccessful moves to arm himself, which excited apprehension and bad feelings at the Imperial court, presented another obstacle to Taylor's negotiation.¹⁵⁷ Elizabeth had long favored her son asserting his rights in the Empire by military means. Prodded by his mother, he first tried to secure the troops of Landgrave William of Hesse Kassel, but negotiations with the latter's widow fell through.¹⁵⁸ Charles Louis actually bought Meppen in Westphalia as a magazine and base of operations, and guns and supplies purchased with English money were forwarded there. By the summer of 1637, the army had grown to 5,000 soldiers. In May 1638, however, the Imperialists took Meppen and its military stores, and the Prince Palatine's financial

¹⁵⁴CCSP, vol. 1, 156: 28 Aug. 1638, Taylor to Windebank.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., 154: 15 June 1638, Hopton to same.

¹⁵⁶Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 828.

¹⁵⁷CCSP, vol. 1, 153: 12 May 1638, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*: 19 May 1638, same to same.

¹⁵⁸Elizabeth pushed her brother continually to help her son secure this force (CSPD 1636-7, 131-2: 29 Sept. 1636, Elizabeth to Laud; *ibid.*, 199-200: 28 Nov. 1636, same to Roe; *ibid.*, 204-5: 21 Nov. 1636, same to Laud).

resources dwindled rapidly.¹⁵⁹ When the news reached Vienna, Taylor expressed disappointment: "it hath made me madd, for they begunne to be very apprehensive of him."¹⁶⁰ Despite the misfortune at Meppen, Charles Louis continued to levy troops for his army. In October he finally launched his campaign, but it ended in disaster: as he made his way toward the Palatinate, Imperial troops defeated him at Vlotho on the Weser, and they took his brother Prince Rupert and supporter Lord Craven as prisoners. Charles Louis himself barely made an escape.¹⁶¹ Consequently he had little to show for his pains, and his bellicose yet ineffective moves only made the Emperor and his ministers question his commitment to a peaceful settlement of his affairs and his trustworthiness if he were restored.

With his negotiation slowing and his continued lack of credentials and money, Taylor appeared only infrequently at the Imperial court and actually went as far as to request his recall several times in the late summer of 1638.¹⁶² He complained of the delays to the Imperial ministers, who laid the blame on Spain and continued to assure him of the desire of the Emperor and Bavaria

¹⁵⁹HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 122, Konv. 2, ff. 132-3: 15 May 1638, Albrecht to Schröder von Eschweiler; *CSPV 1636-9*, 461: 15 Oct. 1638, Giustinian to D&S.

¹⁶⁰HMC, *Denbigh V*, 57: 29 May 1638, Taylor to Feilding.

¹⁶¹*CCSP*, vol. 1, 160: 3 Nov. 1638, same to Windebank; *CSPV 1636-9*, 467: 28 Oct. 1638, Giustinian to D&S; *ibid.*, 469-70: 5 Nov. 1638, Correr to same. Rupert was in the custody of Count Starhemberg at the Imperial palace at Linz. Taylor stopped to visit the prisoner on his way back to England (Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 60: 1639, Taylor's relation; *CSPV 1636-9*, 488: 15 Jan. 1639, Giustinian to D&S). The death of Bernard of Saxe-Weimar in July 1639 offered Charles Louis new opportunities to take control of an army. After much temporizing, the King managed to scrape together a sum of money for his nephew to do so. However, Charles Louis was taken prisoner traveling incognito through France, and he was not released until March 1640 (HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 127, ff. 166-8: 2 Dec. 1639, Haussner to Trauttmansdorff; *ibid.*, ff. 179-80: 9 Dec. 1639, same to same). By this time, the army was firmly under French control (Hibbard, 132-5).

¹⁶²*CCSP*, vol. 1, 155-6: 7 Aug. 1638, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 156: 21 Aug. 1638, same to same; *ibid.*: 28 Aug. 1638, same to same; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 56: 1639, Taylor's relation.

to reach a settlement. They in turn complained of the conduct of the Prince Palatine, Taylor's lack of credentials, and King's refusal to recognize the Emperor. Taylor believed the Imperialists were sincere, but adversely influenced by Spain.¹⁶³

Taylor thus continued to denounce Spain for the failure for the negotiations on the Palatinate question to move forward in any meaningful way, and retained his faith in the willingness of the Emperor and Bavaria to come to terms. He believed that it was the Spaniards' express intention to prevent the Emperor and England from coming to an agreement on the Palatinate question. He therefore was highly insulted when they tried to lay the blame for the continuation of the war at England's doorstep because the King had not yet assented to the Brussels conference. In response, he attempted to expose the impostures of Spain and continued to encourage the Emperor to bypass the young Oñate by sending his own envoy to England to treat.¹⁶⁴

In late 1638, however, Spain found new reasons to step up the pace of its negotiations with England. In spite of the Scots rebellion, over the course of the year the Spaniards were rediscovering the need to secure England's friendship. Although Olivares's attempts to negotiate an alliance with England had thus far been unsuccessful, he continued to covet an agreement that would bring England's power – particularly its sea power – to bear against the French and Dutch. This scenario was much more palatable to Olivares than one in which the King joined Spain's enemies to further

¹⁶³CCSP, vol. 1, 159: 25 Sept. 1638, Taylor to Windebank. For instance, he considered Trauttmansdorff, who was one of the Emperor's most influential councillors, to be well-meaning to his business but too cautious: "he is as I have said a too saving man, dry, slow, dull, irresolute, apprehensive, fearful...howsoever his virtues are many especially his true and upright dealing but I only [assess] those parts of his mind which I observed for my own designs." (Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 15, f. 59: 15 Dec. 1638, same to same).

¹⁶⁴Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, ff. 54-62: 1639, Taylor's relation.

the Palatine cause, as it seemed he would do in 1637.¹⁶⁵ In addition, he sought permission to recruit fresh troops from the King's dominions to serve in the Spanish army, which would be a great asset to the Spanish war effort. To encourage better relations with England, he recalled the young Oñate, to whom both Taylor and the Imperialists had ascribed so much of the blame for the souring of Anglo-Habsburg relations. Oñate left England in May 1638, shortly after his replacement Don Alonso de Cárdenas arrived there, accompanied by Marie de Rohan, the Duchess of Chevreuse. She was an opponent of Richelieu and intriguer for Spain, and as a close friend and relative of the Queen, she was in a convenient position to advance Spanish interests at the English court.¹⁶⁶

In addition, the military defeats suffered by Habsburg arms in 1638 made English friendship even more attractive to Spain. In February, Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who was leading a combined army of German Protestants and French, initiated a campaign on the Upper Rhine. The next month he dealt the Imperialists a decisive blow at Rheinfelden, in Swabia, and by May he had defeated them in the Breisgau. He then proceeded to besiege the pivotal bridgehead of Breisach, which commanded the only bridge over the Rhine between Strasbourg and Basel and guarded the vital military corridors into the Empire and Flanders. In December, Breisach finally fell to Weimarian forces. This was significant, for it resulted in the definitive closure of Spain's last overland route to the Low Countries. France now entirely controlled the pivotal Alsace-Lorraine corridor.¹⁶⁷ The fall

¹⁶⁵Elliott, "Three Ambassadors," 167-8.

¹⁶⁶Hibbard, 85.

¹⁶⁷Parker, *Army of Flanders*, 55-6. France had taken Lorraine in 1633, and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar had re-taken Alsace in 1637. Habsburg arms had not fared well in the preceding year either. In September 1637, the French took Leucate, in Catalonia, and in the following month, the Dutch recaptured Breda, in Brabant (Parker, *TYW*, 152-63).

of Breisach left the English Channel as the only available route for Spanish reinforcements to reach Flanders. And this lifeline was increasingly under attack from the Dutch navy under Admiral Van Tromp. Thus, with Spanish reliance on the sea route, England's stance vis-à-vis Spain became all the more critical, as J. H. Elliott has observed: "Only a fragile maritime route now linked Spain to the Netherlands, and its very fragility drove home the critical importance of England for the outcome of the international conflict."¹⁶⁸ The importance of England to Spain's top foreign policy priority, the Dutch war, was apparent, as Elliott has explicitly stated: "The active support of England, or at least of the English fleet, was regarded by Olivares as indispensable for the retention of those maritime lifelines whose loss or conservation would determine the fate of his policy for reaching an honorable settlement with the Dutch."¹⁶⁹ In a March paper presented to the council of state, Olivares himself pointed out the importance of England to Spain in the current political situation: "our own forces and those of our enemies are almost equally balanced . . . so that one can clearly appreciate

¹⁶⁸Elliott, "Three Ambassadors," 168. After 1635, all Spanish troops were sent by sea to the Low Countries. From 1621 to 1630, by contrast, only 17.1% were moved by sea; from 1630 to 1640, this percentage jumped to 55.4%. Approximately 27,000 men were moved by sea between 1631 and 1639 (Parker, *Army of Flanders*, 77, 279; R. A. Stradling, *The Armada of Flanders: Spanish Maritime Policy and European War, 1568-1668*, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History, ed. J. H. Elliott, Olwen Hufton, and H. G. Koenigsberger [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 241). Spain had been using this route to transport men and materiel since the Treaty of Madrid was signed in 1630 and to transport money since 1632. This was the case particularly after the outbreak of war with France in 1635, when Spain became even more reliant on England's goodwill. Spanish troops were landed at Dover to be ferried to Flanders in English ships. The English merchants and government profited considerably from this arrangement (Taylor, "Trade," 240-52; Kepler, 262, 277; Alcalá-Zamora, 352-7, 396).

¹⁶⁹Elliott, *Olivares*, 535. Indeed the Marquis of Villafranca and other Spanish ministers held that England's intervention would likely prove more decisive than that of the Emperor (*ibid.*, 543).

the enormous disequilibrium capable of being produced by the power of the King of England, so formidable on the sea."¹⁷⁰

Spain therefore once again began to make overtures to England on the Palatinate question. In July 1638, after months of circuitous negotiation after her initial approach to Gerbier, the Princess Phalzburg finally presented him with a proposal for a league between England and the Habsburgs against France, and the concurrent restitution of Lorraine, the Palatinate, and certain territories in Italy.¹⁷¹ This league would be directed against Bavaria as well if Maximilian refused to concede the Upper Palatinate. To address the problem of the electorate, two more would be created: the first to compensate Maximilian for the loss of the Palatine electorate, which would be returned to Charles Louis, and the second to maintain the odd number of electors.¹⁷² In late September, Gerbier traveled to England with these proposals, and presented them to the King, who made a cautious reply to them.¹⁷³ He would enter into the league with the Habsburgs only if they first restored the parts of

¹⁷⁰ Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 2053: [Mar.] 1638, Olivares on the Palatinate; quoted in Elliott, "Three Ambassadors," 167.

¹⁷¹ PRO, SP 77/28, ff. 223-30: [Apr.] 1638, Register of letters between Gerbier and Princess Phalzburg, Dec. 1637-Apr. 1638; *ibid.*, f. 202: 30 Apr. 1638, Windebank to Gerbier. Gerbier was skeptical of success from the beginning, for he knew, like the other English diplomats at Habsburg courts, that England would not recover the Palatinate for nothing (*ibid.*, f. 20: 22 Jan. 1638, Gerbier to Windebank). By April, he was demanding some confirmation that the Princess had entered into the negotiations by order of the Cardinal Infante, as she had claimed. She produced a letter of credence and the talks continued (*ibid.*, ff. 167-8: 12 Apr. 1638, Princess Phalzburg's memorial).

¹⁷² HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: 23 July 1638, Propositions for treaty with England; CSP, vol. 2, 16-7: 23 July 1638, 16 Oct. 1638, Princess Phalzburg's propositions and Charles I's response; Bohumil Bad'ura, et al., eds., *Der große Kampf um die Vormacht in Europa: Die Rolle Schwedens und Frankreichs. Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, 1635-1643*, vol. 6, Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale Illustrantia, ed. Josef Janáček, Gabriela Cechová, and Josef Koci (Prague: Academia, 1979), 253-4: 23 July 1638, same.

¹⁷³ CSPV 1636-9, 457: 1 Oct. 1638, Giustinian to D&S.

the Palatinate that they held.¹⁷⁴ The King authorized Gerbier to give his "modified assent" to the proposals, but warned him not to give the Princess anything in writing or let his instructions out of his hands. Charles would only agree to the proposal verbally, so he could repudiate it at will.¹⁷⁵

Like Spain, Bavaria was inclining further toward coming to an accommodation with England on the Palatinate question, though for quite different reasons. Maximilian sought a negotiated solution to end the war in the Empire, an effort that was principally motivated by his desire to secure the Upper Palatinate and electorate for his line. As long as the war continued and his gains were not anchored in a widely accepted and recognized general peace settlement, military fortunes might dictate which of his Palatine gains he kept and which he must relinquish.¹⁷⁶ Only peace would guarantee the long-term possession of these gains to himself and his house. This was even more pressing because he was nearing seventy and feared he would perish before he had attained this goal, thus leaving his young sons an insecure inheritance that they would be in a difficult position to maintain. He did not want their inheritance to be a constant source of contention.¹⁷⁷ The Bavarian ambassadors in Vienna clearly conveyed Maximilian's motivation to Taylor as well as to the Emperor and his ministers: "the Duke was an old Prince and of great experience, and knew well

¹⁷⁴CSP, vol. 2, 16-7: 23 July, 16 Oct. 1638, Princess Phalzburg's propositions and Charles I's response.

¹⁷⁵CCSP, vol. 1, 160: 16 Oct. 1638, Windebank to Gerbier.

¹⁷⁶In March, France and Sweden had renewed their treaty of alliance for three years, thus insuring the continuation of the war in the Empire.

¹⁷⁷Albrecht, *Maximilian I*, 961-3; Bierther, 79; Blesch, 33. His second son, Maximilian Philipp, was born on 30 September 1638.

what danger it was to leave Children in the Cradle with the inheritance of a Warr, with so potent and powerful Enemyes."¹⁷⁸

Maximilian recognized that finding an acceptable solution to the Palatinate question before it was decided at a general peace conference, which might degenerate into a free-for-all, would not only promote the speedier conclusion of peace but also would serve to secure Bavarian interests in the Palatinate. After the electoral meeting at Regensburg, he had thus become very interested in settling this question through negotiations of the affected parties, independent of a general peace congress such as the one planned for Cologne.¹⁷⁹ At a general peace congress, he would have to reckon with the opposition of Sweden and the unpredictability of France on this issue, whereas at special negotiations under Imperial leadership, like the proposed conference at Brussels, he would have more control over the final settlement. He was successful in persuading the Emperor to his

¹⁷⁸Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss 16, f. 57: 1639, Taylor's relation.

¹⁷⁹Albrecht, "Krieg- und Friedensziele," 264. In any case, the Cologne conference never really got off the ground due to the diplomatic conflicts surrounding the question of passports for the plenipotentiaries (CSP, vol. 1, 792: 15 July 1636, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 795: 22 July 1637, same to same; CSPV 1636-9, 493: 1 Feb. 1639, Correr to D&S). France wished to build a strong anti-Habsburg party at the conference and therefore requested passports for the plenipotentiaries of its allies to attend. At first the Emperor refused, but he finally gave way and agreed to issue them for Sweden and the United Provinces. France, however, continued to insist on passports for its German allies as well. The Emperor then agreed to issue passports for the German princes who were "not yet reconciled" by the Peace of Prague (*nondum reconciliati*), but he continued to exclude the Prince Palatine and the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel. In the late summer of 1639, the Emperor finally granted Charles Louis a passport, a move which was urged by Maximilian after the breakdown of the Brussels conference. By this time, however, it was apparent that little would be achieved at Cologne. The papal legate, Cardinal Genetti, was finally recalled in October 1640 (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 3: 18 Aug. 1639, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*, RK FrA, Fasz. 21, ff. 80-1: 31 Aug. 1639, Imperial declaration granting Prince Palatine passports; *ibid.*, ff. 89-90: 6 Oct. 1639, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*, KrA, Fasz. 126, Konv. 3, f. 5: 7 Sept. 1639, Passport for Prince Palatine; CSPV 1636-9, 583: 15 Oct. 1639, Alvise Contarini, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to D&S). On the long-fought question of the passports, see Repgen, *Römische Kurie*, vol. 1, 394.

view, for Ferdinand told his diplomats that the Palatinate question should not be drawn into the Cologne conference and refused to grant passports for the Prince Palatine to attend.¹⁸⁰

Therefore, contrary to what one might expect, Maximilian was more than willing to discuss the Palatinate question with England at the Brussels conference. He even sought to secure Spain's agreement to the restitution of the Lower Palatinate beforehand, to increase the chances that England would participate.¹⁸¹ While he supported the idea of the Brussels conference, however, he was against addressing the restitution of the Palatinate and Lorraine together in this negotiation, because it not only would cost more time but also would involve France. Maximilian thus believed that the question of Lorraine was better addressed at the general peace conference at Cologne.¹⁸²

Given the pressure from Maximilian, the Habsburgs' precarious military situation, and the destruction in the Empire in 1638, the Emperor was prompted once again to seek a compromise solution to the Palatinate question with England. This may be attributed in large part to the catastrophic effect the war was having on the German population and economy and to the increasing moral and financial exhaustion of the integrated Imperial army. The loss of Breisach was a great embarrassment not to mention an enormous military setback for the Imperialists. Even the Emperor's own clergy criticized the way the Imperialists had handled its defense: Taylor reported that a priest delivered a sermon at court likening the loss of the Savior by his parents to the loss of

¹⁸⁰HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: 5 Aug. 1638, Kurz to Count Penzen.

¹⁸¹Schweinesbein, 40-1. In March, he complained that Spain had not yet committed to restoring its share and requested the Emperor's intercession (*ibid.*, Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 18 Mar. 1639, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III).

¹⁸²*Ibid.*, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: Sept. 1638, Maximilian I's reasons why Lorraine should not be drawn into the negotiation with England on the Palatinate.

Breisach and the ignorant doctors of the Temple to Imperial ministers. Taylor was certain that the fall of Breisach and the rising military power of the French would increase the chances that the King would obtain satisfaction in the Palatinate.¹⁸³ In addition, the Emperor was sensible of the heightened importance of English sea power to Spain's war effort. It was in his interests for Spain to continue to engage the French along the Flemish border, to keep them from turning their full fury on the Empire. All of these motives fueled the Emperor's interest in negotiating a settlement with England.

The result of the renewed interest of the Habsburgs and Bavaria in negotiations with England was that plans for a conference in Brussels finally began to move forward again in late 1638. They intensified when Grimani, the Venetian ambassador in Vienna, pushed for passports for the Prince Palatine to attend the Cologne conference. In order to avoid it being treated there, Maximilian acted quickly and sent commissioners with plenipotentiary powers to Vienna to discuss the proposed treaty in Brussels with Taylor.¹⁸⁴ They thrashed out the details of a settlement in Vienna with the help of Prince Tomaso of Savoy, and meanwhile the Emperor took measures to secure the cooperation of Spain.¹⁸⁵ According to Grimani, they conducted this negotiation very secretly, and it eventually yielded the following agreement: Maximilian would retain Upper Palatinate, as he had planned; the Prince Palatine would be restored to the Lower Palatinate including Heidelberg, and Maximilian would be financially compensated for his sacrifice; and the electorate would only be restored to the

¹⁸³HMC, *Denbigh V*, 65: 1 Jan. 1639, Taylor to Feilding.

¹⁸⁴Venice, which was acting as an intermediary between the Protestant and Catholic states to promote the Cologne conference, was attempting to obtain passports for France's allies to attend.

¹⁸⁵In 1634, Prince Tomaso had been involved in fruitless discussions with Gerbier about the restitution of the Palatinate (PRO, SP 77/24, f. 421: 2 Nov. 1634, Gerbier to [?]).

Palatine line upon the extinction of Maximilian's direct line. In return for these concessions, the Habsburg side expected England to help them drive French forces from Germany, restore Piedmont, Montferrat, Alsace, and Lorraine, and promote a general peace.¹⁸⁶ Taylor purportedly told Grimani that he believed that Maximilian and the Emperor had already settled the essential points of the agreement, and that at this point they only required Spain's acceptance. The Emperor dispatched an envoy, Don Hannibal Gonzaga, to solicit Spain's approval for the plan.¹⁸⁷ Taylor, for his part, believed that the negotiations might finally move forward now that all parties were interested in pursuing them.¹⁸⁸ The King, however, withheld his consent until some of the Palatine's dominions were restored and an agreement was made on the succession to the electoral vote.¹⁸⁹

Spain, desirous of protection in the Channel and permission to levy troops in England, was also making further moves toward reconciliation with England on the question of the Palatinate. In February 1639, the Cardinal Infante discussed the matter with Philip IV. The former believed that they could persuade Maximilian to relinquish his Palatine lands, though not the electorate, in return for compensation, and that England might be willing to accept this compromise given its entanglement in Scotland. The Cardinal Infante also pointed out to his brother that an English

¹⁸⁶*CSPV 1636-9*, 503: 5 Mar. 1639, Grimani to D&S. By this agreement, Maximilian was apparently successful in his aim to exclude Lorraine from negotiations on the Palatinate question in Brussels (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: Sept. 1638, Maximilian I's reasons why Lorraine should not be drawn into the negotiation with England on the Palatinate).

¹⁸⁷*Ibid.*, RK FrA, Fasz. 43d, ff. 6-7: 9 Jan. 1639, Ferdinand III to Gonzaga; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 1: 9 Jan. 1639, same to same; *ibid.*, Konv. 2: 19 Mar. 1639, Gonzaga to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*: 10 Apr. 1639, Philip IV to Gonzaga; *ibid.*, Konv. 3: 1639, Gonzaga to Ferdinand III. Gonzaga encountered many delays at the Spanish court.

¹⁸⁸*Ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 25 Jan. 1639, Taylor to same.

¹⁸⁹*CSPV 1636-9*, 517: 2 Apr. 1639, Grimani to D&S; *ibid.*, 523: 9 Apr. 1639, same to same.

alliance would give Spain valuable leverage in obtaining an acceptable peace settlement with the Dutch and French, despite the King's problems with his obstreperous Scottish subjects.¹⁹⁰ These propositions were not unattractive to the King, particularly as the Cardinal Infante had indicated to Sir Henry Gage, an English colonel in his service, that Habsburg troops might be found to aid England against the Scots in exchange for Irish levies for service in Flanders.¹⁹¹

At the same time that the King was becoming more willing to listen to Habsburg overtures, the Scottish rebellion and the suspicion that French aid was underwriting it prompted a political reshuffling at the English court that was more favorable to Spain. The peace party, which had imploded with Arundel's return from Vienna, reconstituted itself. Further, the French faction changed its character. In an atmosphere in which Puritan sympathies were associated with disloyalty, Henrietta Maria's party divested itself of its Protestant adherents and became more clearly associated with Catholicism. Finally, the exiled Duchess of Chevreuse and Spanish envoy Cárdenas enjoyed some success in advancing Spanish interests at the English court, and thus helped to frustrate the ambitions of the French party as well as those who favored the calling of Parliament.¹⁹²

Meanwhile, the Emperor and Maximilian were making arrangements to send their representatives to Brussels. In fact, as early as November 1638 the Emperor had appointed Hubert Dhaem as his resident at Brussels in order to further the negotiations. Dhaem arrived there in early

¹⁹⁰Elliott, "Three Ambassadors," 168; idem, *Olivares*, 543.

¹⁹¹Hibbard, 105-7. Nothing came of this scheme to secure foreign troops, but it continued to be discussed secretly in the years leading up to the Civil War.

¹⁹²Sharpe, 838-9; Hibbard, 85-6.

December.¹⁹³ In March the Emperor appointed Johann Ludwig, Count of Nassau, as his plenipotentiary for the Brussels conference. Nassau was also designated as the Imperial representative to the Cologne conference.¹⁹⁴ The fact that the Emperor named two representatives underscored his commitment to the Brussels meeting and his hope that all the parties involved could finally achieve an agreement. Maximilian also appointed a deputation under the leadership of Vice Chancellor Richel. The Bavarian plenipotentiary waited at Mainz in March and April for word that an English representative was indeed coming to Brussels before striking out.¹⁹⁵ Given the willingness of the Emperor and Maximilian to send powers to Brussels, an agreement did not look unpromising.

¹⁹³HHStA, RK FrA, Fasz. 20, ff. 203-4: 26 Nov. 1638, Instructions for Dhaem; *ibid.*, ff. 212-15: 25 Dec. 1638, Dhaem to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*, KrA, Fasz. 125, ff. 1-2: 1 Jan. 1639, same to same; *ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 9 Apr. 1639, same to same; *ibid.*, Konv. 3: 23 July 1639, same to same. Dhaem had served in Flanders earlier and had been in contact with Radolt about the English negotiations during the latter's mission (*ibid.*, Belgische Korrespondenz, Kart. 18: 7 Jan. 1636, Cardinal Infante to Ferdinand II; *ibid.*, StA England, Kart. 21, Konv. 1, f. 22: 22 Mar. 1636, Ferdinand II to Dhaem).

¹⁹⁴*Ibid.*, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 7 Mar. 1639, Ferdinand III to Nassau; *ibid.*: 23 Mar. 1639, Instructions, credentials, and powers for Nassau; *ibid.*: 23 Mar. 1636, Ferdinand III to Maximilian I; *CSPV* 1636-9, 517: 2 Apr. 1639, Grimani to D&S.

¹⁹⁵HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 3: 18 Mar. 1639, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III. He was back in Munich on 20 April 1639. In July, Maximilian assured the Emperor that the Bavarian representative still stood ready to make the trip to Brussels (Schweinesbein, 42).

In February 1639, Taylor had received his recall and was preparing to return to England.¹⁹⁶ With the plans in place for a summit of the interested parties at Brussels and the Imperial and Bavarian plenipotentiaries appointed, Taylor finally left in March.¹⁹⁷ In one of his last dispatches from Vienna, he announced to Windebank that he had never had better hopes of the business as now, when all agree to advance it.¹⁹⁸ He was to return via Brussels where he was to stop to ensure that the Cardinal Infante really did have powers from Spain to treat and generally "see what is on the carpet there about the Prince Palatine."¹⁹⁹ Upon his assurance that the Habsburgs and Duke of Bavaria were ready to treat the Palatinate question in earnest, they hoped that Charles would immediately dispatch

¹⁹⁶Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 15, f. 88: 21 Jan. 1639, Windebank to Taylor. Taylor's letters to Windebank do not indicate that he viewed his recall negatively. In fact, in the summer of 1638, Taylor had requested his own recall (*CCSP*, vol. 1, 155-6: 7 Aug. 1638, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 156: 21 Aug. 1638, same to same; *ibid.*: 28 Aug. 1638, same to same). It may have been due, at least in part, to the capture of Cárdenas's letter and the King's attempts to throw France off the scent of his secret negotiations with the Habsburgs (see below, p. 524). The Emperor moved to detain Taylor in Vienna by insisting that he remain for the Shrovetide entertainments. Taylor enjoyed a ballet performance, the Emperor's galleries, and his rarity and jewel cabinets. The Emperor had drawings made of himself, the Empress, and their children. He gave these drawings and a chain to Taylor as parting gifts (Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, ff. 59-60: 1639, Taylor's relation).

¹⁹⁷*CCSP*, vol. 1, 170: 9 Mar. 1639, Taylor to Windebank; *CSPV* 1636-9, 503: 5 Mar. 1639, Grimani to D&S.

¹⁹⁸*CCSP*, vol. 1, 169: 2 Mar. 1639, Taylor to Windebank; Bad'ura, 289: 8 Mar. 1639, Ottavio Piccolomini to Prince Tomaso of Savoy. Although Taylor had hopes for the conference, he remained skeptical of Spain's commitment to reaching an agreement with England on the Palatinate question, believing that the Spaniards wished to play for time to keep the Emperor from an agreement. According to Taylor, one of their methods was to propagate reports that important negotiations were taking place in other venues. The fact that he was ill informed of the King's proceedings elsewhere probably made this seem all the more egregious. Because of this, Taylor continued to hope that the Emperor would instead send Leslie to England to treat directly with the King (*CCSP*, vol. 1, 164: 12 Jan. 1639, Taylor to Windebank; *ibid.*, 165: 19 Jan. 1639, same to same *ibid.*, 167: 9 Feb. 1639, same to same).

¹⁹⁹Taylor suspected that the Cardinal Infante did not have powers to treat at Brussels, though he claimed he did (*ibid.*, 166: 26 Jan. 1639, same to same).

a representative to Brussels.²⁰⁰ Taylor arrived there at the beginning of April, and he immediately moved to discover whether the Cardinal Infante actually had powers to treat with the King.²⁰¹ His ministers protested he did, but Taylor claimed that he remained unconvinced of this. Under the circumstances, he told them that he doubted that the King would treat publicly at the conference.²⁰²

Taylor's Return to England and his Disgrace

Shortly after Taylor's departure from Vienna, the treaty at Brussels was already encountering difficulties due to unwelcome allegations that Charles I was secretly negotiating with the Habsburgs in Brussels. Although they had conducted the preliminary negotiations with the utmost secrecy, news of the plans to hold a meeting became known and was discussed at European courts throughout the spring and summer of 1639.²⁰³ This added to the embarrassment of late 1638, when the Swedes intercepted letters written by Cárdenas, the Spanish envoy in London, to Castañeda, and Count Kurz, the Spanish ambassador in Vienna and the Imperial plenipotentiary in Hamburg respectively, which mentioned Anglo-Habsburg negotiations on the Palatinate question at Brussels and alluded to concurrent discussions undertaken by Cárdenas in England.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁰*CSPV 1636-9*, 517: 2 Apr. 1639, Grimani to D&S

²⁰¹*CCSP*, vol. 1, 172: 2 Apr. 1639, Taylor to Windebank.

²⁰²Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 60: 1639, Taylor's relation.

²⁰³*Ibid.*, ff. 141-2: 10 June 1639, Windebank to Charles I; *CSP*, vol. 2, 43: 28 May 1639, same to same; *CSPV 1636-9*, 461: 15 Oct. 1638, Gieronimo Giustinian, Venetian Ambassador at the Hague, to D&S; *ibid.*, 493-4: 1 Feb. 1639, Correr to same; *ibid.*, 502: 1 Mar. 1639, same to same; *ibid.*, 517: 2 Apr. 1639, Grimani to same; *ibid.*, 522: 8 Apr. 1639, Papal nuncio to Collegio; *ibid.*, 538-9: 11 May 1639, Correr to D&S; *ibid.*, 561: 4 Aug. 1639, same to same.

²⁰⁴*PRO*, SP 94/40, f. 94: 25 June 1638, Cárdenas to Castañeda; *CSPV 1636-9*, 477: 10 Dec. 1638, Giustinian to D&S; Gardiner, vol. 8, 377.

The King was furious at Cárdenas's indiscretion, because he had promised the French he would not treat with the Spaniards as long as the negotiations for an Anglo-French treaty at Hamburg continued.²⁰⁵ The French for their part were not pleased when they learned of his double dealing. Pomponne de Bellièvre, the French ambassador extraordinary, had repeatedly voiced his suspicions of the secret negotiations at Brussels, which worked to the detriment of the Hamburg negotiations, and the transport of men and money to Flanders in English ships.²⁰⁶ The King and his ministers adamantly denied any such involvement with the Habsburgs and quickly suspended Cárdenas from activity at court.²⁰⁷ Windebank summarized the King's policy of distance and disavowal regarding the Habsburg negotiations and his strict adherence to the letter of the truth when making denials to the French in a letter to Gerbier, who had been treating with the Spaniards secretly through the Princess Phalzburg in Brussels:

you know there is no direct treaty at all between His Majesty and them, and that all that has been done hath been by way of proposition moving from that side and managed by second hands, His Majesty neither appearing nor being engaged nor obliged to anything; and to this purpose His Majesty hath answered the French Ambassador; namely, that some propositions have been made to him from that side; but hath absolutely disavowed any formal or direct treaty at all, or that ever any letters to this purpose have passed between himself and them; and this, besides that it is a truth, His Majesty had reason to do, unless he were more sure of the success that which hath been proposed from your parts, for by avowing that to be a treaty his is sure to dissolve that with France, and so he may run hazard to lose both.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵*CSPV* 1636-9, 498: 18 Feb. 1639, Giustinian to D&S.

²⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 525: 15 Apr. 1639, same to same; *ibid.*, 539-40: 13 May 1639, same to same; *ibid.*, 559-60: 29 July 1639, same to same. Bellièvre arrived in England in December 1637.

²⁰⁷When the French ambassador mentioned the treaty to Windebank in May 1639, the latter replied "Upon the faith of a Christian there is no such treaty on foot." (*CSP*, vol. 2, 43: 28 May 1639, Windebank to Charles I). Only in August did the King reinstate Cárdenas.

²⁰⁸*PRO*, SP 77/29, f. 7: 14 Jan. 1639, Windebank to Gerbier.

The King's underhandedness in disavowing Cárdenas's statements did not escape the Venetian ambassador Giustinian, who noted: "It is a lesson for those who have to deal with his Majesty in the future to employ the pen rather than the tongue, in order to escape such heartbreaking incidents."²⁰⁹

Thus it was with good cause that no one believed Windebank's loud protests that Charles was not carrying on negotiations with the Habsburgs at Brussels and that if Taylor had agreed to any such negotiations he had acted in defiance of his instructions. Since Leicester himself believed that arrangements for the Brussels conference had been made with Charles's knowledge and encouragement, it comes as no surprise that the French met his insistence that he was not negotiating with the Imperialists with polite disbelief.²¹⁰ The truth was that with the rebellion in Scotland, the King could not afford to alienate either France, which he suspected of covertly supporting the rebels, or the Habsburgs. Accordingly he made every effort to keep his options open with both sides so he would be able to pick up his negotiations on his nephew's behalf without too much difficulty when he was in a better position to do so.

While in March the King was considering participating in the Brussels conference, by May, when his armies were marching north toward Scotland, he was retreating from this option. Windebank counseled the King to avoid casting his lot with either France or the Habsburgs and at the same time to avoid alienating either side until the Scottish troubles had subsided.²¹¹ In any case, neither side was trustworthy. If he declined the negotiations at Brussels, the King would be at the

²⁰⁹*CSPV* 1636-9, 481: 24 Dec. 1638, Giustinian to D&S.

²¹⁰*Ibid.*, 489: 21 Jan. 1639, same to same; *ibid.*, 493-4: 1 Feb. 1639, Correr to same; *ibid.*, 526: 13 Apr. 1639, Grimani to same; *ibid.*, 548: 17 June 1639, Giustinian to same.

²¹¹*CSP*, vol. 2, 48-50: 10 June 1639, Windebank to Charles I.

mercy of the French, who had been evading a treaty with England for more than two years. But if he accepted the Brussels propositions, it would be the death knell of the negotiations at Hamburg, which would result in the King being wholly cast upon the Spaniards, who had likewise led him on with amusing treaties.²¹²

If your Majesty shall absolutely refuse the treaty at Brussels, your Majesty will be wholly cast upon the French; and what sure foundation you can have there, considering how you have been used in a treaty now above two years Nevertheless, I am humbly of opinion, that it is equally dangerous, in this conjuncture, to accept the treaty at Brussels, which must put an end to that at Hamburg: Whereof though there be little good to be expected, yet if it be once known your Majesty hath deserted it, besides your being on the other side cast wholly upon the Spaniard, (and what sure foundation can be expected there so many years experience of their amusing treaties sufficiently shews) your Majesty will bring yourself into jealousy with the French and Hollanders and most of the Protestant party: Whereof, as your business now stands in Scotland, you have little need.²¹³

He advised the King to come up with a "handsome put-off" for Spain, and neither to accept nor reject the conference. This advice played into the King's propensity to keep open as many options as possible.

Caught red-handed by the French, Charles was forced to proceed more cautiously in his proceedings with the Habsburgs in the future. He decided against sending a minister to Brussels for the time being, as Windebank suggested.²¹⁴ Regardless, he could not do so without acknowledging the Emperor. Until the King settled his affairs in Scotland, Windebank suggested that he limit his

²¹²Like Taylor, Windebank was skeptical of the Spaniards' intentions, and not without reason. He wrote to Hopton in late April that the Cardinal Infante had disavowed the Phalzburg propositions. His view at this point was that Spain's chief goal with the treaty was to separate Charles Louis from his allies and gain time (CCSP, vol. 1, 174: 29 Apr. 1639, same to Hopton).

²¹³CSP, vol. 2, 49: 10 June 1639, same to Charles I.

²¹⁴CSPV 1636-9, 541: 20 May 1639, Giustinian to D&S; *ibid.*, 543: 27 May 1639, same to same; *ibid.*, 545: 3 June 1639, same to same.

action to secret negotiations in Madrid, which he had authorized Hopton to open in March on the basis of the Princess Phalzburg's proposals.²¹⁵ The King also continued secretly to lend an ear to Cárdenas's proposals, despite his banishment from court.²¹⁶

The French were not the only ones to question England's motives. The King's denials and delays led the Emperor and Bavaria to do so as well. The Imperial ambassador Nassau was kept waiting for the appearance of his English counterpart for months. Moreover, the Emperor was surprised to learn that Leicester had asked the French to obtain passports for Charles Louis to attend the Cologne conference at the same time Charles was purportedly considering sending an ambassador to Brussels.²¹⁷ Ferdinand thus decided to postpone his decision whether to grant the passports or not until he could ascertain Charles's intentions.²¹⁸ The Venetians, who were acting as

²¹⁵"And besides, your Majesty hath put this business into another way in Spain; and until, by the result of that private conference, there may be a surer foundation for some solid treaty, and some better appearance of the cleanness and reality of their intentions to the Prince Elector, it can be no way counsellable that your Majesty should run hazard again of being amused with more treaties [at Brussels]." (CSP, vol. 2, 33: 10 Apr. 1639, Windebank to Charles I). From 1632 to 1636, Hopton had no powers to negotiate about the Palatinate, and from 1635 to 1638, Aston was only able to conduct very limited exploratory discussions (ibid., 9: 31 Apr. 1638, Secret instructions for Aston). In late 1638, however, Charles decided that Hopton should offer to conduct unofficial negotiations with the Spaniards in Madrid on the basis of the Princess Phalzburg's propositions, and in March 1639 he was empowered to do so. As with Taylor, Hopton was instructed to act in a private capacity, and he was to make it clear to the Spaniards that the discussions were not binding. The rational diplomat was skeptical of success from the beginning. In June the talks began, but they soon ran aground because of the perpetual tension created by Spain's expectation for an alliance before it gave any satisfaction in the Palatinate and England's for the restoration of the Palatinate before it would discuss a treaty. As usual, both sides were simply attempting to wrest advantages from the other (CCSP, vol. 1, 163: 6 Jan. 1639, Windebank to Hopton; ibid., 166: 29 Jan. 1639, Hopton to Windebank; ibid., 171: 5 Apr. 1639, Instructions for Hopton).

²¹⁶CSPV 1636-9, 541: 20 May 1639, Giustinian to D&S; ibid., 543: 27 May 1639, same to same; ibid., 545: 3 June 1639, same to same.

²¹⁷Ibid., 465: 26 Oct. 1638, Correr to same.

²¹⁸Ibid., 526: 13 Apr. 1639, Grimani to same. Grimani believed this move was intended in part to expose England's duplicity.

mediators between the Protestant and Catholic states and were thus seeking passports for France's allies, sought clarification from the King. Charles assured them that he had never agreed to the Brussels conference and that Taylor had acted of his own accord, without commissions, and would be duly punished when he returned to England.²¹⁹

Maximilian was also having doubts about England's commitment to finding an agreement at Brussels. He suspected that the King's aim there was to determine what concessions he could extract for his nephew and that he still intended for the Palatinate question to be treated at Cologne.²²⁰ By July, the English had kept the Imperialists waiting so long at Brussels that Maximilian became persuaded that Charles had no intention of sending an ambassador and that his aim was to amuse them long enough to win advantages for himself.²²¹ These suspicions seemed substantiated because the King not only had kept them waiting two years for his answer whether he wished to participate or not, but also had continued his requests for passports to the Cologne conference for his nephew.²²² By the middle of July, Maximilian became convinced that the Brussels conference would not take place, and he therefore advised the Emperor to wait no longer for the King's reply. At this point, the Imperial envoy Dhaem, who was still waiting at Brussels to see if

²¹⁹Ibid., 538-9: 11 May 1639, Correr to same; *ibid.*, 553: 1 July 1639, Giustinian to same.

²²⁰HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 18 Mar. 1639, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III; *ibid.*: 24 Mar. 1639, same to same.

²²¹Ibid., Konv. 3: 14 July 1639, same to same; Schweinesbein, 41-2; Koch, 98-100. Koch actually sees Charles's temporizing as an Anglo-French conspiracy.

²²²HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 3: 14 July 1639, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III. He also warned the Emperor that France had threatened that if the Palatinate question was treated at Brussels, the issue of Lorraine would be regulated in Paris.

the King would send a representative, was inclined to agree that the conference would not come off. He informed his master that the King was not interested in a public treaty.²²³

In any case, Maximilian no longer believed that England's participation in the Brussels conference would hinder the Palatine interest from being represented at Cologne, which had been his main motivation for promoting the Brussels meeting to begin with.²²⁴ He concluded that the consideration of Palatinate question at a general peace congress was unavoidable because the foreign powers involved in the German war – France in particular – lately had shown too great a commitment to the resolution of the Palatinate question to allow the Habsburg side to settle it in separate negotiations with England.²²⁵ He thus determined that the option of confining the Palatinate question to special negotiations was no longer practical. Moreover, if Bavaria continued to oppose Palatine participation in the Cologne conference, it would be seen as an obstruction to peace and would attract the displeasure of other states. For all of these reasons, by July 1639 Maximilian had become one of the most zealous supporters of Palatine participation at the Cologne peace conference. He wanted to settle the Palatinate question once and for all, as this was the only way he could leave a secure inheritance to his sons.²²⁶

²²³Ibid.: 23 July 1639, Dhaem to same.

²²⁴Ibid.: 14 July 1639, Maximilian I to same.

²²⁵Ibid., Konv. 2: 24 Mar. 1639, same to same. In the past, Maximilian had believed that France was not altogether serious about its demands to include the Palatine in the Cologne congress. The Elector of Mainz had played a key role in convincing him that this route would best serve his interests. Chief among the Elector's arguments was that Cardinal Genetti had promised not to allow a decision that would disadvantage Bavaria, and further that Genetti would press for Bavaria's retention of the electorate (Schweinesbein, 43-5).

²²⁶As lately as March, Maximilian would not give a positive answer to this question when approached by the Emperor (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 24 Mar. 1639, Maximilian I to

The result of the King's policy of duplicity and delay, therefore, was that both France and the Habsburgs became suspicious of his motives and any fruitful negotiation on the question of the Palatinate was obstructed. The King, however, was not the only one to blame. The Spaniards had done little to foster the success of the negotiations. They delayed sending plenipotentiary powers to Brussels, upon which England had insisted prior to sending its own representative. They also persisted in making exorbitant demands for the restitution of their share of the Lower Palatinate. In April, Dhaem reported that Spanish ministers said their master would agree to cede it if Bavaria would in turn agree to cede the Upper, to which they knew that Maximilian would never agree.²²⁷ Spain's obstinacy, therefore, continued to be a major obstacle to an agreement. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Brussels conference came to nought. Because of its failure to get off the ground and the King's denials of English involvement, it also comes as no surprise that John Taylor found himself in quite an uncomfortable position.

In spite of Windebank's previous reprimands to Taylor, it seems that he was recalled at his own request and no real blame was attached to his activities at the Imperial court until after his

Ferdinand III). In April 1639, the Emperor still declined to grant the passports. However they both changed their minds. At Maximilian's urging, the Emperor finally gave way and granted Charles Louis a passport in the late summer of 1639 (*ibid.*, Konv. 3: 18 Aug. 1639, same to same; *ibid.*, RK FrA, Fasz. 21, ff. 80-1: 31 Aug. 1639, Imperial declaration granting Charles Louis passports; *ibid.*, KrA, Fasz. 126, Konv. 3, f. 5: 7 Sept. 1639, Passport for Charles Louis; *CSPV 1636-9*, 583: 15 Oct. 1639, Contarini to D&S). Still, this decision was not an easy one for the Duke, because he still feared that France and Sweden might bring forward at Cologne demands on the Prince Palatine's behalf that he would find unacceptable. Further, he still wished to resolve the problem as quickly as possible and was worried that it would become entangled in lengthy discussions for a general peace agreement (Schweinsbein, 48-50).

²²⁷HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 9 Apr. 1639, Dhaem to Ferdinand III.

arrival back in England in late April 1639.²²⁸ Although the news from Paris and London regarding the envoy's recall was mixed, Grimani firmly believed that Taylor had left Vienna not in disgrace, but to set on foot the new treaty at Brussels. He did not rule out, however, that the King may have recalled Taylor to quell French suspicions. He also noted the discrepancy between Taylor's secret activities in Vienna and official English representations in London and Paris:

Thus if England is speaking here in one way, by deeds and at London and Paris in quite another, by words, I do not know what I can say on the subject, except that a few weeks should clear away these fogs from the sky. I will say this much, however, Teller [Taylor] has spoken here very unreservedly and in conversation with all his friends he has expressed views and opinions far removed and utterly divergent from those which issue from the mouths of all the other English ministers and from the king himself as well.²²⁹

Thus the Venetians were wise to the King's underhanded tactics, and it is telling that Grimani did not necessarily chalk up the inconsistency to wrongdoing on Taylor's part.

Still, there were ominous signs that Taylor had spoken too freely about aspects of the negotiations that would best have been kept secret. Cardinal Genetti wrote from Cologne in mid-April to the French ambassador in Vienna that Taylor had declared the King's consent to the Emperor's overture regarding the Palatinate to the Count of Nassau, the Imperial diplomat designated for the Brussels conference. According to Genetti, Taylor had also reported that the ambassadors of England and Bavaria were expected shortly at Brussels. Windebank, into whose hands a copy of the letter had made its way, commented in the margin: "If this be true and sincere, Mr. Taylor is a brave man, and I shall have no more to do here. But if it be false or feigned, only to propose a

²²⁸Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 15, f. 88: 21 Jan. 1639, Windebank to Taylor, CCSP, vol. 1, 174: 29 Apr. 1639, same to Hopton.

²²⁹CSPV 1636-9, 523: 9 Apr. 1639, Grimani to D&S.

specious excuse to exclude us from the general treaty, I leave it to my Master. Never was a greater impudence on Taylor's part, nor more suffering of mine, that protests here the contrary. I hope you will resent it."²³⁰ Thus it seemed that the King was still considering the Brussels meeting if the other participants were prepared to treat, but if their intention was to exclude the Palatinate question from a general peace treaty or was otherwise ill-meaning, Taylor would be held accountable. Unfortunately for Taylor, he discovered that the Spaniards had not sent powers to the Cardinal Infante to treat as they had claimed, the Imperial and Bavarian plenipotentiaries were still waiting in Cologne for an English ambassador to arrive at Brussels, and the French continued to protest against the King's treating with the Habsburgs and the resulting injury to the treaty at Hamburg.

By May, therefore, the King had found ample cause to distance himself from the Brussels negotiations. In addition to suspending Cárdenas from activity at court, the King felt obliged to launch an investigation against Taylor to clear his name. The King instructed Coke to examine Taylor about his role in promoting the conference, a command which Coke communicated to Windebank:

[The King] understands as formerly, so now again, from the French Ambassador, that Mr. Taylor is at London, and that both the King of Hungary and other Princes make use of his letter to his dishonour for the treaty thereby set forward at Brussels. You are therefore to call Taylor to account for it, and to examine him about that letter or proposition, or whatsoever it is, that was delivered under his hand concerning the said treaty, and upon what he shall acknowledge or produce to that effect you are to send to his Majesty with convenient speed, that he may take further course to satisfy the world of his royal and just proceeding, and remove the scandal which is everywhere cast upon him.²³¹

²³⁰CCSP, vol. 1, 173: 14 Apr. 1639, Genetti to Monsieur D'Avaux.

²³¹PRO, SP 16/421, f. 62: 26 May 1639, Coke to Windebank; BL, Add. Mss. 64919: 23 May 1639, Coke's comments on Windebank's letter of same date.

It was significant that the King launched the investigation through Coke, who was uninformed of Taylor's secret negotiations in Vienna. Both the King and Windebank, however, had been informed of his proceeding all along. It is true that at times they did not approve of Taylor's actions at the Imperial court, and duly reprimanded the envoy. However, their complaints were directed not so much toward his promotion of the conference as to the way it was achieved, most particularly the act of delivering papers to the Emperor when not officially accredited to do so. It is revealing that despite their reprimands they did not recall him, not even when Taylor himself requested them to do so.

It was also clear that, despite the King's public protestations to the contrary, Windebank was not entirely disappointed with the way Taylor had carried himself at the Imperial court. In response to the King's command to investigate the envoy's conduct, therefore, Windebank reminded him of the good offices Taylor had performed during his tenure there. In a letter to the King of 10 June, he pointed to Taylor's efforts to maintain England's contacts with the Habsburgs, so that if an opportunity presented itself it could be more easily exploited. Moreover, Taylor had sought to entertain them with the prospect of a special conference to keep them from making peace with their enemies, which would result in the belligerents settling the fate of the Palatinate, perhaps without reference to England or the Prince Palatine:

Certainly his endeavors to keep alive your Majesty's interests and intelligence with the House of Austria and not to suffer them so to fall but that you might still have power to take them up again, when you should find it for your advantage. And the amusing them with a treaty at Brussels who had so long amused your Majesty, and by that means the keeping them from making a peace with France, was no ill service
²³²

²³²Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, ff. 141-2: 10 June 1639, Windebank to Charles I.

Windebank also praised Taylor for exposing Spain's disinclination to conclude a treaty with England at Brussels:

One service I am sure he did your Majesty which was to discover by the Imperialists (upon whom the Spaniards had cast the fault of not restoring of the Palatinate) that the Infante Cardinal had no powers to treat, when the Conde d'Onate advowed to your Majesty he had, and therupon invited you to the treaty, which raised such a difference between the Spaniards and Imperialists, that they charged each other with hindering the restitution²³³

Windebank, however, duly summarized Taylor's misfortune in the following qualification to these statements. Although Windebank acknowledged that Taylor had undoubtedly done the King good service by entertaining the prospect of the Brussels meeting, he also believed it "most unfit to be advowed by your Majesty considering your treaty at Hamburg. But he [Taylor] was the fitter for it, having no powers, and so to be justly disavowed at pleasure."²³⁴ The King, however, withheld judgment until he had seen Taylor's account of his negotiations.²³⁵

In the end, to satisfy the French, the King called Taylor to account for promoting the conference with the Habsburgs at Brussels without the commission to do so. Taylor appeared before the King and the foreign affairs committee, and they confronted him with copies of proposals that

²³³Ibid. At the same time, he sent an account of Taylor's negotiations in Vienna to Coke, and asked him to acquaint the King with it (BL, Add. Mss. 64919, f. 128: 10 June 1639, same to Coke).

²³⁴Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 141: 10 June 1639, same to Charles I.

²³⁵On 14 June he noted in the margin of this letter, "When I have seene it I shall send you my pleasur concerning him." (ibid.). For Taylor's account of his negotiation, see: Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, ff. 52-63: 1639, "A Relation of John Taylor his Negotiation in Germany, from the second time of the Earl Marshall's departure thence till this present 1639, April the 4th, that by his Majesty's Order hee is returned home, wherein will appear his care, zeal and faithfulness towards his Majesty's service"; and Cambridge University Library, Dd. 8. 35, ff. 93-5, same, which is a fragment of the former. From all appearances, Taylor wrote this relation, probably at Windebank's behest, with the aim of minimizing his involvement in promoting the Brussels conference.

he had presented to the Emperor. Taylor was obliged to concede that he had not received fresh credentials to negotiate with Ferdinand III. This was a situation that the King and Windebank had been careful to maintain, so if necessary they could disavow him at will. Windebank, who knew full well that Taylor had been encouraged to pursue discussions with the Emperor on this question, wrote that Taylor, "ingeniously acknowledging that wherewith he was charged, and that he had delivered papers in the pretended Emperor's Court concerning a treaty at Brussels without commission or order from hence."²³⁶ Taylor avoided implicating the King and Windebank in his activities. Coke reported to Roe that Taylor did little to defend himself: "he made no other defence but that he did it out of his own head, out of a good intention to discover the impostures of the Spaniards, who he said had never used any sincerity in their treaties with us."²³⁷

As a sign he never consented to the proposals, the King committed Taylor to the Tower in early September.²³⁸ Windebank apparently felt quite guilty that Taylor took the fall for their secret foreign policy, for Weckherlin reported to Coke in early September:

The french ambassador told me, that Mr. Secretary Windebanks owne sonne sayd to One, His father had taken a certaine matter so to hart, that it made him sick. Yet doth the ambassador not beleeeve that it is Mr. Taylor's businesse, which is by him very

²³⁶*CSP*, vol. 2, 75: 9 Oct. 1639, Windebank to Hopton.

²³⁷*PRO*, SP 81/48, f. 43: 25 Sept. 1639, Coke to Roe; quoted in Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 377. The Habsburgs, however, were the first proponents of the conference. Taylor also claimed that Kurz had given him the propositions embodied in his paper of 11 March 1638 in order to justify the grounds for a treaty at Brussels to the King, and further that Kurz had asked him to present them as his own. At the same time, Kurz reassured him that the Brussels negotiations could proceed in conjunction with the general treaty, which Taylor comprehended as "a Contrediction & a most apparant juggling." (*ibid.*, SP 80/10, f. 108: 11 Mar. 1638, Notation on Taylor's memorial, probably by one of the examiners). It seems the King indeed hoped that the Palatinate question would be satisfactorily settled at Cologne.

²³⁸*CSP*, vol. 2, 75: 9 Oct. 1639, Windebank to Hopton.

much . . . pressed and urged to be brought to light, Whether or no he made his propositions to the Emperor of himself or by commandment.²³⁹

It is not without reason, therefore, that the Venetian ambassador doubted the genuineness of Taylor's punishment: "Everyone recognises that this severity is designed to uphold the veracity of their original declarations, and so people believe that the matter will end with a reward for that minister instead of punishment."²⁴⁰ Taylor remained in the Tower for at least seven months. In dire financial straights, he repeatedly petitioned Windebank for his release, which the King probably granted sometime before the outbreak of the Civil War.²⁴¹

Taylor therefore became the unwitting scapegoat for the King's double-dealing foreign policy. Although Taylor did conduct negotiations with the Emperor without official sanction to do so, overwhelming evidence points to the fact that the crown covertly encouraged his actions. He was in regular correspondence with Windebank and regularly received payment for his services. Although Windebank periodically reprimanded him for stepping beyond the bounds of the King's comfort zone, his offenses were apparently not serious enough to warrant his recall. Windebank's own comments bear out that he believed Taylor had performed valuable services during his tenure at the Imperial court. However, the King's plan all along was to use the envoy's services for what could be gotten and to maintain his unofficial status so he could be discredited at will. Thus the real cause of Taylor's disgrace was not his undertakings with the Habsburgs, but rather that their exposure

²³⁹BL, Add. Mss. 64921, f. 19: 4 Sept. 1636, Weckherlin to Coke.

²⁴⁰*CSPV* 1636-9, 576: 30 Sept. 1639, Giustinian to D&S.

²⁴¹The next year, after Taylor had spent several months in the Tower, Windebank forwarded to the King a petition from Taylor's wife pleading for her husband's release, and the Secretary urged the King to show him compassion (PRO, SP 16/470, f. 164: [Oct.?] 1640, Windebank to Charles I). For Taylor's fate, see chap. 5, p. 214.

prejudiced the King's relations with France, and more particularly Roe's negotiations for the French treaty underway at Hamburg.²⁴² In the end, his sacrifice did not matter, as Roe was unable to accomplish anything of note at the Hamburg conference.

Taylor was not the only one who took the fall for the exposure of the King's involvement at Brussels. The King was insistent that "some way bee found that my Honnor be cleered, that I gave no way for the treatie of Brussels."²⁴³ In the summer of 1639, he persuaded Cárdenas to confess publicly that he was in error when he wrote to Kurz and Castañeda that Anglo-Habsburg negotiations on the Palatinate question were underway at Brussels and London. The Spanish envoy made a statement that the English had never given him reason to assert that the King had given way to the Brussels treaty.²⁴⁴ To allay French suspicions, the King and Windebank adamantly maintained that the proposal for the Brussels conference was first brought forward by the Habsburgs, and that the King had never consented to it. Windebank said that he suspected Spanish ministers of propagating the perception that he had consented in order to cause problems between the King and the anti-Habsburg party.²⁴⁵ Still, at the same time as they were making these protestations to the contrary, they continued to consider the conference as a way to address the question of the Palatinate.²⁴⁶

²⁴²CCSP, vol. 1, 174: 29 Apr. 1639, same to Hopton. Charles continued to press for France and Sweden to make no peace with the Habsburgs without the restoration of Charles Louis. They refused unless England would commit to war against the Habsburgs on both land and sea. The Hamburg protocol was signed only by Denmark and England, in April 1639.

²⁴³CSP, vol. 2, 62: 19 July 1639, same to Charles I, with latter's notation.

²⁴⁴CCSP, vol. 1, 182: 26 Aug. 1639, same to Hopton.

²⁴⁵CSP, vol. 2, 48: 10 June 1639, same to Charles I.

²⁴⁶PRO, SP 77/29, f. 7: 14 Jan. 1639, same to Gerbier; CSPV 1636-9, 548: 17 June 1639, Giustinian to D&S; *ibid.*, 552: 1 July 1639, same to same.

In spite of the discovery of plans for the Brussels conference and the King's subsequent moves to reassure the French that he was not undertaking secret negotiations with the Habsburgs, Charles clearly had no intention of abandoning them completely. In May, he had given Windebank leave to pursue discussions with Cárdenas on the Palatinate.²⁴⁷ The following month, with Taylor already under scrutiny, the King was perusing his diplomatic options for addressing the Palatinate question, which included treating with Habsburgs in various forums.²⁴⁸ True to form, the King kept open simultaneous negotiations with France and Spain, hoping to gain the advantage with one or the other or at least to avoid alienating either one of them.²⁴⁹

The King's secret negotiations and his double dealing foreign policy, while perhaps unpalatable to modern sensibilities, were not unusual for the time. However, his proclivity to leave his own council and diplomats – even those involved in conducting the secret negotiations – in the dark about these negotiations was detrimental to the success of his own foreign policy. This approach, however, is what permitted Charles to shunt the blame off on Taylor when plans for the Brussels conference were discovered, in a clumsy attempt to save face with not only the foreign

²⁴⁷*CSP*, vol. 2, 48: 10 June 1639, Windebank to Charles I.

²⁴⁸The negotiating options enumerated were with the French and Dutch in Cologne, through Hopton in Madrid, and through Gerbier in Brussels. The latter two were with the Habsburgs, so the King apparently had not given up on that score. At this point both he and Windebank preferred to treat through Hopton in Madrid (see n. 215), perhaps in an attempt to keep a lower profile. Despite this preference, Windebank recommended that the Princess Phalzburg be encouraged to continue her good offices to see whether she could draw Spain to a resolution on the Palatinate question. The negotiations in Brussels, however, did not look promising since neither side would show its powers—or expose its lack of them—to the other (*CSP*, vol. 2, 59-60: 16 July 1639, Windebank to Charles I; *ibid.*, 61-2: 19 July 1639, same to same). In October, however, Gerbier was still negotiating a settlement with Spain in Brussels (Bad'ura, 334: 22 Oct. 1639, Piccolomini to Ferdinand III).

²⁴⁹Richelieu had more on his mind than a treaty, namely health problems. Weckherlin told Coke that the Cardinal had experienced a convulsion after taking an elixir for his hemorrhoids (BL, Add. Mss. 64921, f. 2: 18 Aug. 1639, Weckherlin to Coke).

powers with which he was dealing, but also his own ministers, opinion leaders in England, and advocates of the Palatine cause. The King's true intentions, however, were revealed by the fact that he continued his secret negotiations with the Habsburgs.

This is not to say that the secret negotiations were in principle incapable of producing positive results. Taylor remained behind after Arundel's departure from Regensburg, and prospects for the settlement of the Palatinate question through Anglo-Imperial negotiation continued. The Emperor continued to desire peace, and both he and Taylor put forward compromise proposals in an attempt to persuade Spain and Bavaria to make greater concessions in the Palatinate. Maximilian, who realized that his young sons' inheritance could not be secure until the Palatinate question was settled, was more open to making concessions than ever before. However, there was no corresponding adjustment on the side of Spain. If anything, the Spaniards became more recalcitrant about demanding high rewards (their *convenientias*) in return for their share of the Lower Palatinate, because they no longer could depend on Maximilian to obstruct a compromise settlement. Without a convenient scapegoat, the Spaniards were forced to rely more heavily on the device of conducting secret negotiations with England at various courts in order to give the impression that they were willing to compromise in the Palatinate. In this way, they aimed to encourage the King's hopes that they could settle the Palatinate question without resort to war – or a Parliament – and lock England into a safe, pro-Spanish neutrality. This was imperative as the closure of Spain's overland routes made it even more dependent upon English help in the Channel to supply its army in Flanders. In spite of the potential leverage that England had with Spain on this point, there was no incentive for the Spaniards to discontinue their delaying diplomatic policies or to relinquish the Lower Palatinate unless England gave it reason to do so. On the ground in Vienna, even Taylor was painfully aware

of the bad offices of the Spaniards, and he complained bitterly of the obstacles that they raised to an agreement, particularly the elder and younger counts Oñate.

During Taylor's last two years in Vienna, his negotiations progressed in fits and starts, with short periods of intense diplomatic activity, often prompted by the fortunes of war, and long lapses into inaction. The new Emperor Ferdinand III maintained his father's commitment to peace, and therefore to the settlement of the Palatinate question. He relied on the cooperation of his allies but was determined to be more independent of Spain. In an attempt to move the negotiation on the Palatinate question forward, the Emperor proposed to Taylor that it be treated at a special conference in Brussels. Although they did not immediately take up the proposal, in late 1638 the Habsburg side found new motivation to negotiate with England in Brussels. In short order both the Emperor and Maximilian appointed plenipotentiaries, and the King was seriously considering sending a representative himself if the Spaniards also showed good faith. The Spaniards, however, continued to play for time in secret negotiations and did not send the requisite powers to Brussels.

In any case, whether an agreement in Brussels was a possibility or not under the existing circumstances quickly became a non-issue. By the time the conference broke down in the late spring of 1639, the King was in the north of England preparing for war with the Scots, and he was more concerned with reimposing his own authority in Edinburgh than he was in reinstalling his nephew in Heidelberg. His embroilment in domestic affairs made it increasingly improbable that he would reach an agreement on the Palatinate question with the Habsburg powers. With his resources – particularly the fleet – committed to the Scots conflict, he could offer the Habsburgs little in return for concessions in the Palatinate. With England's attention focused inward, and foreign affairs

slipping down the King's scale of priorities, the Habsburgs had less to expect – or to fear – from England than ever before.

EPILOGUE

Even after Taylor's departure from Vienna in 1639 and his subsequent disgrace, Anglo-Imperial diplomatic contact on the Palatinate question continued. In 1641 and 1642, Sir Thomas Roe represented Anglo-Palatine interests at the Imperial Diet (*Reichstag*) held at Regensburg and then in separate negotiations held at Vienna. The King instructed Roe, like Arundel, to insist upon the full restoration of the Palatine lands and dignities. But if he met with firm resistance, he was to scale back his demands to the Lower Palatinate and leave the questions of the Upper Palatinate and electorate for a future settlement.¹ From 1640 to 1645, Franz Paul, Baron Lisola represented Imperial interests in England, but he limited his activities mainly to obstructing Richelieu's designs.² The obstacles to an agreement on the Palatinate question in this period were even greater than they had been previously. Spain was as unwilling as ever to yield its Palatine gains, and the Emperor showed less of an interest in accommodating England because its mounting internal difficulties rendered it increasingly incapable of providing assistance to the Habsburg cause. Maximilian, however, continued to desire a settlement and thus to consider compromise solutions to this thorny problem.

¹CSPV 1640-2, 144: 10 May 1641, Giustinian to D&S; Michael J. Brown, *Itinerant Ambassador: The Life of Sir Thomas Roe* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), 243. For Roe's mission, see also: R. B. Mowat, "The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to Vienna, 1641-2," *EHR* 25 (Apr. 1910): 264-75; and Michael Strachan, *Sir Thomas Roe, 1581-1644: A Life* (Salisbury: M. Russell, 1989), 253-64.

²On Lisola's mission, see: Hermile Reynauld, "Le Baron de Lisola, sa jeunesse et sa première ambassade en Angleterre (1613-1645)," *Revue historique* 27 (1885): 300-52; A. F. Pribram, *Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola, 1613-1674, und die Politik seiner Zeit* (Leipzig: Veit, 1894), 11-53; and T. Haller, "Franz von Lisola, ein österreichischer Staatsmann des 17. Jahrhunderts," *Preußische Jahrbücher* 69 (Jan.-June 1892): 518-9.

Maximilian wished to come to an agreement on the Palatinate question as soon as possible.³ By 1640, he no longer felt that he could leave the resolution of the Palatinate question to a general peace conference, as prospects for one in the near future did not look promising.⁴ The war seemed to plod on, with no end in sight.⁵ Maximilian's fears that the war would expand if this question were not settled soon provided further motivation for him to seek an agreement. In the winter of 1640, he had received news that England was planning to enter the war if Sir Thomas Roe's efforts to effect an agreement failed.⁶ Maximilian took the threat of English intervention in the war more seriously than he had earlier because the King had issued a manifesto on his nephew's behalf, and it had garnered the support of the Scottish Parliament and the Long Parliament, which the King had to call

³This was even more pressing because of his age. He instructed his ambassador to represent this view to the Emperor: "Wir stienden aber lenger je mer an und weren auch in ansehung unserer posteritet und erben, mit welchen uns der Allmechtig gesegnet, in unserm hohen alter nit unbillich sorgfeltig und perplex, wie doch aus disem labyrinth und gar zu fast vertieften calamiteten endlich zu kommen sein mechte." (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kastenschwarz 3325E: 11 Feb. 1641, Instructions for Herwart; quoted in Bierther, 79 n. 47). Maximilian, however, was committed to retaining the Upper Palatinate and—to a lesser extent—the electorate for his line.

⁴He would also have to reckon with the demands of France at a general conference, and he did not trust Richelieu to support Bavarian over Palatine interests.

⁵Since the late summer of 1639, with the Brussels negotiations on hold, Maximilian came to favor dealing with the Palatinate question at the general peace congress at Cologne. Ferdinand III eventually assented to this and accordingly granted passports to Charles Louis. The Cologne conference, however, fell through.

⁶Maximilian was informed that the King would send 30,000 men into the Empire to attack Bavarian territory (Bierther, 79).

in 1640 to help quell the Scottish rebellion.⁷ The English military threat was even more troubling to Maximilian because he did not trust in the Emperor's ability to defend Bavaria from attack.⁸

For all these reasons, Maximilian was willing to make considerable compromises on the point of the electorate in the interests of resolving Palatinate question. By 1640, he had drawn up a plan by which both the Duke of Bavaria and the Prince Palatine would be invested with the existing electorate and would take part in the consultations of the electoral college. When it came time to cast their vote for the King of the Romans, they would either agree upon a candidate or take turns selecting one if agreement were impossible.⁹

The Emperor convened the Imperial Diet in September 1640, with the goal of promoting general peace. However, little progress made in this direction or in addressing the Palatinate question. By this time, Maximilian again favored separate negotiations among the powers with a stake in the Palatinate to address this issue, and he accordingly promoted this agenda at the Diet. The Emperor, however, only agreed to this plan reluctantly, in order to please the electors, who

⁷*His Majesties manifest touching the Palatine cause, and the votes of both Houses of Parliament concerning the same* (London: Printed by Robert Barker by the assignes of John Bill, 1641); *Newes from Scotland, his Majesties manifest touching the Palatine cause, and Act of Parliament concerning the same, read, voiced and past in the Parliament of Scotland, the 6. day of September 1641* ([London]: T. Favvett for T. Bates, 1641); Bierther, 79; Blesch, 33; Hibbard, 207. In July, both houses of the English Parliament passed votes of support for Roe's mission, and the King's manifesto on his nephew's behalf, in which he declared that the restoration of the Palatinate was his primary goal. In truth, Maximilian's fears were largely unsubstantiated as Britain's internal struggles made aggressive moves regain the Palatinate highly improbable.

⁸This seemed substantiated by his inadequate response to the attack of Baner's allied army on southern Germany in January 1641. Baner actually shelled Regensburg while the Imperial Diet was in session.

⁹Bierther, 81. He still did not support an alternation of the existing electorate or the creation of an eighth.

regarded the resolution of the Palatinate affair as a necessary step toward peace.¹⁰ Therefore, over the protests of Roe, the Diet referred the Prince Palatine's claims to special negotiations planned for Vienna.¹¹

These negotiations between England, the Emperor, Bavaria, and Spain, with representatives of Denmark and the electoral college serving as mediators, finally got underway in November 1641. In the end, however, they made little progress toward achieving a settlement. During his tenure in the Empire, Roe did succeed in securing the release of Prince Rupert, whom the Imperialists had been holding captive since 1638, but to his frustration he accomplished little else. Roe complained, and with reason, that the widening rift between the King and Parliament as well as the infighting in Parliament negatively affected his negotiation.¹² On top of the troubles in Scotland, news came of a violent revolt in Ireland. By this time Britain's internal struggles and its resulting weakness were apparent to all, a fact that accordingly diminished its prestige abroad.¹³

Due to England's increasing inability in this situation to assist the Habsburgs in their continuing wars, they became less willing to accommodate England in the Palatinate. Although the Emperor had agreed to the Vienna negotiations, both he and Spain preferred to treat the Palatinate question at a general peace conference, where they could use any concessions they made as leverage

¹⁰Ibid., 219.

¹¹Charles Louis was excluded from the general amnesty that was extended to most of the remaining "unreconciled" German states. In addition to the Palatines, only Brunswick and Hesse-Kassel kept fighting and refused to recognize Imperial authority (Parker, *TYW*, 150).

¹²The Emperor was aware of events in England, as he received reports from correspondents there (HHStA, StA England, Karts. 5, 18).

¹³Mowat, 271-5.

to obtain a more favorable settlement from their adversaries.¹⁴ Still, Roe remained convinced that the Emperor wished to give the King some satisfaction, and Ferdinand was willing to treat with England as long as he believed some potential for an alliance existed.¹⁵ The Spaniards, however, had no interest in negotiating the restoration of the Lower Palatinate. This was apparent when Roe exposed the fact that the Spanish ambassadors did not have plenipotentiary powers to treat in Vienna as they claimed. Maximilian, for his part, abandoned his compromise plan for the electorate after he learned that England was prepared to accept less than he had originally thought. He thus reconsidered his plan to share the electorate and instead stood upon its remaining longer with the Bavarian line.¹⁶ On 6 May 1641, the Emperor made the following offer to Roe, in return for an English alliance with the Habsburgs: the Lower Palatinate, the Upper Palatinate for 13 million florins (Maximilian's war expenses), and the alternation of the electorate after the expiry of Maximilian's direct line and three male descendants of the Bavarian line.¹⁷ Needless to say, Roe declined the offer. He was recalled in May 1642 and returned to England empty-handed, as Arundel had five years before.

In addition to Roe's unsuccessful foray into Germany, the Imperial envoy Franz Paul, Baron Lisola maintained Anglo-Imperial contacts in England beginning in 1640. However, Lisola mainly

¹⁴Bierther, 221-2.

¹⁵HHSStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 3: 23 Aug. 1639, Kurz to [Trauttmansdorff].

¹⁶Bierther, 81 n. 55, 135, 277.

¹⁷Steiner, 137-8. The Emperor would have to turn over this sum (= 8,666,667 thalers) to Maximilian to release Upper Austria from its mortgage, for which Maximilian was currently holding the Upper Palatinate. Maximilian had no intention of relinquishing this territory, but knew he was safe in making the offer as Charles would never agree to pay such an outrageous sum.

restricted his activities to intriguing against Richelieu in tandem with the Cardinal's French adversaries and various Spanish diplomats in England.¹⁸ Lisola worked to obstruct French efforts to obtain England's support and win it instead for the Habsburgs, or at least to preserve England's neutrality. He even courted the Prince Palatine, whom he hoped the King would put into action against France.¹⁹ Additionally, during Roe's negotiations Lisola worked to convince the King that the Emperor's intentions toward the Prince Palatine were honorable, and thus to prevent any thoughts the King might have of supporting his nephew militarily.²⁰ Ferdinand did not, however, empower his envoy to make a binding agreement with the King beyond negotiating one for the release of Prince Rupert.²¹

Lisola remained in England after Roe's return to England and the outbreak of civil war. During the hostilities, an angry crowd plundered and demolished his house, which had become a sanctuary for Catholics.²² This apparently unnerved the envoy, who in his own words no longer felt safe living among people who were so hostile to Catholics and thought of nothing else but decimating each other.²³ The Emperor eventually granted Lisola's recall, and he gladly departed from England in 1645.

¹⁸HHStA, StA England, Kart. 5, ff. 124-39: 1642, Lisola's response to Duke of Velada. In 1640, these included the agent Cárdenas and the ambassadors extraordinary Velada and Marquis Virgilio Malvezzi.

¹⁹Reynauld, 322-6, 331-6.

²⁰*CSPV 1640-2*, 226: 18 Oct. 1641, Giustinian to D&S; *ibid.*, 273: 10 Jan. 1641, same to same; *ibid.*, 282: 24 Jan. 1642, same to same.

²¹Pribram, 22-3.

²²Haller, 519.

²³Pribram, 52-3.

Charles's diplomatic attempts to regain the Palatinate and his threats of intervention in the Continental war had once again come to nothing. The failure of his foreign policy in this respect was now complete. The settlement of the Palatinate question would have to wait until the conclusion of the general peace settlement at Westphalia in 1648. Finding a solution to the problem of the electoral dignity proved the chief impediment to the treaty. The war-weary parties finally decided to create an eighth electorate. Though this step was contrary to the Golden Bull of 1365 and meant a fundamental change in the constitution of the Empire, it had the support of the great powers and the Emperor.²⁴ As for the Palatine lands, the Emperor reinstated Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire and restored him in the Lower Palatinate. The Upper Palatinate and electorate remained in the hands of the Bavarian Wittelsbachs. Charles Louis accepted the loss of these lands as the final solution to the Palatinate question. England, involved in its own internecine struggles, did not send a representative to Westphalia and thus had no part in shaping the final agreement.

²⁴From 1642, the creation of an eighth electorate for the Prince Palatine was on the Bavarian agenda. In December 1645 Maximilian was successful in persuading the Emperor back to this view (Albrecht, "Bayern und die pfälzische Frage," 464).

CONCLUSION

English foreign policy in the later 1630s did have some potential for success. During this period, Charles I consistently pursued his primary objective, the restoration of the Palatine house to prominence in the Empire. Although he was willing to do what he could to recover the Palatinate, Charles's antipathy to calling Parliament limited his options. Without Parliamentary funding, it would have been impractical for him to commit England to full-scale military intervention on the Continent, the option favored by his sister Elizabeth of Bohemia and many committed English Protestants. In any case, it is unclear that this tactic would have brought him any closer to his foreign policy goal. Even if he called Parliament and succeeded in extracting the outlay of resources needed to support such an intervention (which was doubtful in light of their previous quarrels over the aims to be pursued), there was no guarantee it would produce the desired result. Given his financial limitations and the realities of European politics, Charles chose a more pragmatic approach. Instead of calling Parliament and joining the anti-Habsburg alliance in a risky attempt to win back the Palatinate by force, he resolved to negotiate with the Habsburgs, since they were in the best position to restore the Palatine lands and dignities peacefully. In any case, their ultimate buy-in was essential if the Prince Palatine were to enjoy his restored lands and titles securely.

England's negotiations with the Emperor were an integral part of his Habsburg strategy, as the Emperor alone possessed the authority to remove the ban and reinstate Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire. In theory it was also within his power to restore the Palatine lands and dignities, but in practice he needed to win the support of his allies, Bavaria and Spain, who held these prizes.

Although this put the Emperor in a difficult position, he was the best placed to modify their demands for the advantage of all involved. While the King and his closest advisors saw the Habsburg option as the most promising, they did not confine their diplomatic dealings to the Habsburgs. Instead, they chose to keep their diplomatic options open by carrying on concurrent negotiations with the anti-Habsburg powers in the hope they would make a more enticing offer. If not, these negotiations, particularly those with France, would at least serve to pressure the Habsburgs to reach a satisfactory agreement with England.

By the mid-1630s, prospects for the King's Habsburg foreign policy had improved significantly due to the decline of the influence of confessional politics in Europe, war-weariness in the Empire, and England's elevated status in the eyes of various Continental powers. The gradual decline of religion's impact on international politics made it easier for the Catholic powers with a stake in the Palatinate – the Emperor, Bavaria, and Spain – to negotiate with Anglican England for the restoration of the Calvinist Prince Palatine. As the 1630s wore on, it became increasingly apparent that European politics were headed in a more secular direction. Obvious signs of the recession of confessional politics emerged during this period, such as the conclusion of the Peace of Prague between the Emperor and the Protestant German states and of the anti-Habsburg alliance between Catholic France and Protestant Sweden. Religion, of course, continued to be politically important, but it no longer governed international relations as it had a half century earlier or even at the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War.

Where England was concerned, religion had never played more than a minor role in Charles's diplomatic strategy. The Stuarts had long conducted an undisputably secular foreign policy, one overwhelmingly motivated by dynastic interests rather than confessional aims. In the 1630s, much

to the chagrin of those who supported the calling of Parliament, many of them with Puritan leanings, Charles limited the object of English foreign policy to the restoration of his nephew in the Palatinate and adamantly refused to embark on a war to defend Continental Protestantism from Catholic encroachment. Moreover, he was prepared to deal with whichever powers were in the best position to help him achieve his goal, whether Protestant or Catholic.

Although the King did not allow the confessional interests to intrude upon his foreign policy strategy, he did use religion strategically to promote his dynastic objectives. He was certainly not above appealing to the religious sympathies of others to achieve his political and diplomatic goals. A prime example of this was his encouragement of Christian IV's intervention in the war in 1625. Moreover, he sometimes employed this tactic when selecting diplomats, in order to increase their chances for success. For instance, one reason Charles named Arundel as ambassador extraordinary to the Emperor was that he realized that Arundel, as the head of one of the most prominent Catholic families in England, would be more readily accepted as a negotiating partner at the Imperial court and would better understand its milieu. Likewise, Charles selected diplomats with Catholic sympathies, Taylor among them, to conduct his secret Habsburg negotiations.²⁵

The secular nature of English foreign policy, while it enabled the Anglo-Habsburg dialogue, was the constant in the diplomatic equation. Much more influential in improving the outlook for the Anglo-Habsburg negotiations in the later 1630s was the declining influence of confessional politics on the foreign policy of the Emperor and his allies. Since the beginning of the war, religious interests had been much more important to them than to the Stuarts, but it became less of an issue

²⁵Because of their religious leanings, these men were also likely to be adherents of the peace party.

in their foreign policy as time went on. However, even while the Emperor and Maximilian sought to advance the cause of Catholicism, considerations of state came first for them. By the latter half of the 1630s, both Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III were willing to compromise with Protestants in the interest of peace, which the greater good of the Empire demanded. Ferdinand II, with the encouragement of his moderate ministers, had rejected the militant policy of confessional absolutism at the Peace of Prague, thus marking a decided shift to more pragmatic, secular policies in Vienna. Ferdinand III's outlook was even more practical than that of his father. He put the interests of the Empire ahead of those of religion or the house of Habsburg as a whole. This would readily become apparent during the negotiations for the peace of Westphalia, when he abandoned Spanish and papal interests in favor of concluding a lasting peace in the Empire.

By the mid-1630s, Maximilian had also moderated his confessional policies. Despite his commitment to the Catholic cause, dynastic interests had always determined his foreign policy in the first line. His principal goal was the consolidation of his position in the Palatinate, which he pursued mainly to aggrandize the Bavarian state. Maximilian's acceptance of the Peace of Prague showed that he was ready to compromise with Protestant princes in order to cement his hold on his Palatine acquisitions and achieve a peace that would benefit the Empire. However, when it became apparent that the Peace had failed to secure his gains, he showed a willingness to restore a portion of the Palatine inheritance to the Calvinist Prince Palatine in order to consolidate his hold on the rest.

The Spaniards, for their part, had always been more concerned with pursuing their main foreign policy objective – winning their war with the Dutch, and later the French – than furthering the cause of Catholicism. Philip constantly abandoned confessional goals in the Empire in favor of his dynastic ambitions. Evidence of this can be seen in the continual pressure Olivares applied to

the Emperor to retreat from the stringent demands of the Edict and negotiate a compromise peace settlement with the Protestant states of the Empire in the hope that Imperial and League troops would be released to support Spain's war against the Dutch.

The decline of confessional politics in international relations increased the chances that the Anglo-Imperial negotiations of the later 1630s would succeed, and in turn the course of these negotiations reveals evidence about the extent to which this process had affected the foreign policy of the Emperor and his allies. The Emperor seemed more concerned with the state of Empire than whether or not the Palatinate remained Catholic. Spain's negotiations with England in these years revolved around garnering English assistance for its wars, and religious demands figured only peripherally in their diplomatic dealings. Even Maximilian, the party who occasionally raised the issue of religion during the negotiations, made his arguments against restoring certain of the Palatine lands and dignities mainly on political grounds. Moreover, when he did raise them, they always served to underline a course of action that benefitted Bavarian dynastic interests, namely retention of the electorate and Upper Palatinate for his immediate line. Behind the scenes, religious considerations infrequently entered into the allies' discussions on the Palatinate question. Their offers to England included few religious demands, and even these were negotiable.

Surprisingly, the Catholic clergy – even some Jesuits – supported the Emperor and Maximilian's retreat from confessional politics. Their Jesuit confessors, who had earlier encouraged these rulers to pursue the militant Catholic policies most clearly manifested in the Edict, began to moderate their advice in the mid-1630s. Surveying the widespread distress the war had caused without yielding a decisive victory for Catholicism, many Catholic clergy decided the cause would best be served by consolidating their gains in a peace settlement. Lamormaini and Quiroga's

expressed support for England's attempts to resolve the Palatinate question by diplomacy in the later 1630s revealed the clergy's modified attitude.

The war weariness that had led even some Jesuits to back away from militant confessional politics permeated the Empire and contributed to the improved climate for negotiation between England and the Imperial camp. After eighteen years of destructive war, Germany was desolated. As the princes of the Empire surveyed their devastated territories, their appetite for continuing a confessional war dissipated. By 1635, the desire for peace was overwhelming. That year, they attempted to end the hostilities in the Empire by signing the Peace of Prague. On a practical level, however, peace would not come without the satisfaction of the interests of foreign powers, many of which did not accept the solution for the Palatinate outlined at Prague. Finding a way to peace in the Empire became a top priority at Imperial diets and electoral meetings. By extension, those who favored peace focused on finding a settlement to the Palatinate question, because they realized that a secure and lasting peace would not be possible otherwise.

In addition to their growing receptiveness to negotiation with England because of the influence of deconfessionalization and war weariness, the Emperor and his allies began to value England's favor more highly in 1635. In May, Charles increased his leverage in European diplomatic circles when the first ship money fleet appeared in the Channel. Financed without Parliamentary subsidies, the strengthened fleet – while it was of little use in recovering the landlocked Palatinate by force – did raise England's military status in the eyes of the other European powers. Moreover, France's declaration of war against Spain in May 1635, and the Emperor's against France in March 1636, enhanced England's desirability as an ally for both sides. With England's improved bargaining

position, the outlook for Charles's Habsburg foreign policy was more promising than it had been in a long while.

Just as the King's policy had potential for success, so did the spate of missions he sent to the Continent in the later 1630s. By this time, all the players with a stake in the Palatinate were willing to make some concessions in the interests of finally settling this nettlesome issue. Most importantly, the Emperor and his allies were willing to yield more than most English historians have previously supposed.

The Emperor was keen to come to an agreement on the question of the Palatinate. He earnestly desired peace and knew that settlement of the Palatinate question was necessary to achieve it. Further, he wanted to prevent England's entry into the war on the anti-Habsburg side, whether by direct military intervention or by the provision of naval and financial support. The Emperor was therefore motivated to find a compromise agreement that would satisfy both England and his allies. The importance of this issue to the Emperor was demonstrated in the many representatives he sent to Munich to persuade Maximilian to take a more flexible position and the fact that the English negotiations were a major topic of discussion at almost every Imperial privy council meeting in 1636.²⁶ Perhaps even more telling, the Emperor's desire to settle the Palatinate question resulted in the most extensive diplomatic exchange with England since the reign of Henry VIII.

Maximilian of Bavaria, who had long been a staunch opponent of restoration of any sort, also took a more conciliatory stance toward the settlement of the Palatinate question after 1635.

²⁶For this year, 22 of the 26 extant privy council meeting minutes focus on England. The other four are dated mid-February or earlier, before England brought increased pressure to bear on the Emperor.

Soon after the signing of the Peace of Prague, it became evident that the Peace would neither secure his Palatine gains nor bring peace to the Empire, mainly because outside powers, including England, remained dissatisfied. From this point, settling the Palatinate question and securing certain of his acquisitions became the focus of Bavarian foreign policy. Maximilian shrewdly decided that making some measured concessions that would satisfy Charles and ward off future claims to the appropriated lands and dignities would be the most effective way to retain his hold on the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity for his immediate line. Settling the Palatinate question once and for all was particularly pressing for the aging Maximilian, who was keenly aware of his mortality and wished to secure his legacy for his two young sons. On top of these dynastic motivations, the Emperor and other war-weary princes of the Empire pressured Maximilian to reach a compromise agreement with England on the Palatinate question. He was certainly not insensitive to these feelings, as war had ravaged his lands as well as theirs.

Spain, which occupied the Lower Palatinate west of the Rhine, also had good reason to reach an agreement with England, particularly after the outbreak of its war with France in 1635. The French occupation of the key territories of Alsace and Lorraine in the mid-1630s closed Spain's overland military supply routes to Flanders, leaving it reliant on the sea route and the assistance – or at least the benevolent neutrality – of England to maintain its war effort against the Dutch. In 1638, the importance of the sea route redoubled when the Habsburgs lost the bridgehead fortress of Breisach. Under these circumstances, England had a great deal of leverage with Spain in principle. Although the Spaniards preferred England's active support against their enemies (the *convenientias* of the secret Cottington Treaty), they regarded the fleet's protection in the Channel as a key factor in the maintenance of their supply route to the Netherlands. If Charles threatened to cut Spain's

lifeline to Flanders by withdrawing this privilege and transferring it to France, the Spaniards could not afford to ignore it.

In addition to the motivations the Emperor and his allies had to compromise on the question of the Palatinate, Charles's own flexibility for the terms of restoration further increased the likelihood that Anglo-Imperial negotiations would prove successful. Despite what the King projected at times for the benefit of the critics of his Habsburg policy – chief among them his sister – he was willing to accept less than the plenary restoration of his nephew. He realized that the Habsburgs would not fully restore Charles Louis based on the assistance of the fleet, and he was not willing to take the necessary steps to launch a full-scale intervention in the war. The King's willingness to accept a compromise settlement is readily apparent in Taylor's instruction and Arundel's unofficial negotiations at the end of his embassy.

The Anglo-Imperial diplomatic missions in the later 1630s, while they held out promise, also faced some significant obstacles. Although the Emperor and his allies had reason to negotiate with England, their interests were divergent and thus quite difficult to balance. The Emperor and Maximilian both favored peace in the Empire, but for different reasons: the former wished to end the devastation in the Empire, the latter to consolidate his wartime gains. Spain presented an even greater problem, for it would derive little direct benefit from the settlement of the Palatinate question. Since the fighting in Germany diverted French attention from the Netherlands, and it was becoming increasingly apparent that no real help was forthcoming from the Emperor, the Spaniards had little reason to promote peace in the Empire by relinquishing their hold on the strategically situated Lower Palatinate. The Spaniards' resistance, however, was not insurmountable, for they had reasons to mollify England. Not only did they look to the English fleet to keep open their vital

supply route to the Netherlands, but also they sought permission to recruit British troops to replenish their depleted army. Thus, Charles had significant bargaining power with Spain, at little cost to himself, if he chose to exercise it. When it came right down to it, the Spaniards would choose the option that would afford the greatest benefit in their war against the Dutch and French, and in this case the Channel supply route was of greater value than the retention the Lower Palatinate. Charles simply needed to convince Olivares that he must make a choice.

In addition to the impediments presented by the conflicting interests of the Emperor and his allies, the recalcitrant attitude of the Palatines also hampered a diplomatic settlement. Just as Frederick's intrigues had played a part in thwarting James's Spanish negotiations in the 1620s, so too did Elizabeth's insistence upon restitution by right rather than grace hinder Charles's negotiations with the Emperor. Charles Louis's refusal to make humble submission to the Emperor unless he granted this demand further obstructed Charles's efforts to reach a settlement. By the late 1630s, however, the Palatines had become quite reliant on Charles to win back their patrimony, and they would not have been in the position to reject whatever settlement he could have negotiated.

Thus, while the King undoubtedly faced a difficult political and diplomatic situation, the obstacles to his foreign policy did not preclude an agreement with the Habsburgs on the Palatinate question. It was feasible that an English monarch in the same situation and with the same foreign policy goals – but with more foresight and fortitude – could have brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion. The real problem was Charles himself and the way he made and conducted his foreign policy. Unfortunately but characteristically, he failed to make the most of the opportunities available to him and instead took steps that undermined the effectiveness of his own foreign policy. The Habsburg states saw the advantages of English friendship, but the King did not

give them the necessary incentive to make concessions in the Palatinate in exchange. This circumstance is most obvious in the case of Spain and the fleet. While English assistance in the Channel was of the utmost importance to the Spaniards, Charles was unsuccessful at transforming this need into concessions in the Palatinate for two reasons. The first was that he was too willing to help them transport men and supplies to Flanders in return for financial benefits. He only tried to extract concessions in return after the fact, without making any real threat to withdraw the aid of the fleet.²⁷ The second reason was that the Spaniards were able to maintain an astounding "poker face" about the value of the English fleet to their war enterprise. While they acknowledged that the fleet's assistance was helpful, they claimed that its protective services alone were not enough of an incentive to relinquish the Lower Palatinate. If the King were to change their minds, he needed to convince them that England's help would be of greater value to winning their war with the Dutch and French than the retention of the Lower Palatinate. However, the King did not take the steps required to maximize his leverage – namely withdrawing the assistance of the fleet and offering its services to the French and Dutch – and instead allowed the Spaniards to draw out their negotiations with him. He thus offered them no further inducement to make the concessions he sought and frittered away the advantages he could have used to strengthen his bargaining position.

A further problem sprang from the way the King conducted his foreign policy with regard to his own government. Through Windebank and a stable of diplomats – Taylor, Aston, and Hopton included – he carried on with the Habsburgs secret negotiations that were hidden from the view of

²⁷A similar situation was presented by the Treaty of Madrid (1630). The King was in a good position to incorporate Spanish concessions into the Palatinate as part of the peace treaty, but he allowed himself to be swayed by Spanish professions of goodwill and promises that the problem would be dealt with at the next electoral meeting in the Empire.

most courtiers, diplomats, and members of the foreign committee of the privy council (which was charged with advising the King in matters of foreign policy), including Secretary Coke. While keeping one's adversary guessing can be a good tactic in diplomacy, Charles often kept his own representatives in the dark. From his perspective, this strategy alleviated some of the criticism of his policies emanating from the war lobby, which included supporters of the Protestant cause and an alliance with France, and allowed them time to bear fruit.

If leaving most of his councillors and diplomats in the dark about his secret negotiations with the Habsburgs were not bad enough, Charles also kept vital information from the very envoys conducting them. This seriously hampered the effectiveness of their negotiations. To make matters worse, it was patently unclear to these diplomats how far the King was prepared to go to recover the Palatinate. Other than the fact that he would not enter into an alliance that would commit him to a land war, they could not get a clear idea of what terms he would accept or offer the Habsburgs in return. The King's double dealing often impeded his diplomats' negotiations because they were unaware or ill-informed about negotiations on the Palatinate being conducted at other European courts. Charles's conduct of foreign policy, therefore, undermined rather than strengthened his chances for diplomatic success.

One can only speculate about the King's motivations for his double-blind diplomacy. It is possible that he was attempting to keep the diplomats conducting his secret Habsburg negotiations on a short tether so they could not over commit him. This suggestion is linked with the similar idea that he wished to keep all decisions where they were concerned in his own hands. Under the circumstances, it was also quite likely that Charles was attempting to conceal his secret foreign policy from domestic and international critics. He took great pains to do so, as can be seen in the

public disgrace of Taylor and Cárdenas after the exposure of plans for a conference at Brussels. By limiting the number of people who knew of the true extent of his secret Habsburg negotiations to himself and Windebank, they could more easily do damage control if word leaked out about one negotiation or the other. Unfortunately for Taylor, this manner of conducting foreign policy almost invariably required a "fall guy," and the statesmen who were directing his efforts clearly saw his reputation as expendable.

In the end, Caroline foreign policy did prove to be "futile diplomacy," as Gardiner declared. Although it is certainly easy to criticize and difficult to avoid the conclusion that much of the criticism is warranted, failure was not its necessary outcome. The King had more foreign policy options in the later 1630s than historians have commonly assumed, and he could indeed have achieved his main objective – the restoration of the Palatinate – through negotiations with the Habsburgs, and therefore without active intervention in the war. If he had exploited his advantages, particularly given the military setbacks faced by the Habsburgs in the later 1630s, they could have agreed upon a compromise solution to the Palatinate question similar to that eventually accepted at Westphalia. Bringing this foreign policy to a successful conclusion, however, would have required more artful and resolute direction than Charles Stuart could provide. The fact that many of his subjects strongly disapproved of his negotiations with these Catholic powers, and some of them eventually took up arms against the King, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that his foreign policy held prospects for success.

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