

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL-TERRITORIAL IDENTIFICATION

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Psychology of Political-Territorial Identification

Thesis directed by Associate Professors Jennifer Fitzgerald and Joseph Jupille

A superordinate identity encompassing ‘us’ and ‘them’ under the umbrella of ‘we’ improves intergroup relations and bolsters support for the political system. But given humans’ innate preference for the familiar and their subconscious, cognitive biases against anything different, why would anyone identify with the superordinate group in the first place? I argue that personality is an important determinant of identification.

Chapter 2 reviews existing literature on political-territorial identity alternatives, superordinate identification, and personality. It then justifies theoretical expectations regarding when and how the ‘Big Five’ personality traits should operate for one’s sense of self.

Chapter 3 underscores the importance of studying the determinants of superordinate identification by demonstrating its effect on outgroup attitudes. Using cross-national *Eurobarometer* data from all 27 European Union (EU) member states, I find those identifying as European are significantly more friendly towards immigrants—an effect that is amplified under conditions of cross-cutting cleavages and where country length of EU membership is greatest.

Chapter 4 tests the basic relationship between personality and identification using original survey data from the United Kingdom, where EU integration has increased the salience and feasibility of the superordinate ‘European’ identity option in addition to a subordinate national one. As predicted, openness and extraversion increase identification with Europe while agreeableness decreases it. This suggests certain predispositions prompt some to be more open than others to seeing themselves in superordinate terms.

Chapter 5 delves into deeper tests of personality’s causal impact. I find that risk aversion, objective political knowledge, and ideology mediate much of personality’s effect. No moderating effect emerges between the Big Five traits and the perceived influence of EU institutions, suggesting that the EU is capable of increasing superordinate identification equally across all personality types.

Chapter 6 offers concluding remarks and extensions for future work. Altogether, my results speak to the general psychological processes underlying superordinate political-territorial identification. A major implication is that some individuals inherently experience cognitive difficulty extending their sense of self because particular traits—which develop early in life and persist relatively unchanged over time—may affect the extent to which a superordinate identity is perceived to conflict with preexisting attachments.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated with so much love to my incredible husband, Corey, without whose endless support and encouragement it never would have happened. The world is ours together, and I could not be more blessed than to share every moment of forever with you. Thank you!

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Abstract: A superordinate identity—getting people to see themselves as a common ‘we’ as opposed to ‘us versus them’—has long been championed for improving intergroup relations and increasing political legitimacy. Yet as unification efforts worldwide attest, constructing a collective ‘we-feeling’ is no small task. Knowing how strongly individuals prefer the familiar, and that humans are cognitively biased *against* internalizing information that conflicts with what they know and love, why would anyone identify with the superordinate group in the first place? In this introduction, I expand on this puzzle, argue that personality may hold the answer, and discuss why the European context offers a fruitful test of my expectations. I then outline how the dissertation proceeds and highlight the most important findings from each subsequent chapter.

Keywords: European Union, personality, superordinate identification

How people see themselves affects not only their psychological wellbeing, but also how they interact with others and engage with the larger sociopolitical system. A collective identity that encompasses multiple distinct subgroups under a superordinate umbrella is often viewed as desirable—if not outright necessary—for peaceful intergroup relations, political legitimacy, and democratic success. In short, “People’s self-concepts are probably their most important cognitive structures, for who and what they think they are affects almost every aspect of their political decision-making and action...” (Winter 2003, 125-6). Understanding how people see themselves and why individuals identify a certain way will enhance scholars’ and policymakers’ ability to achieve these various outcomes. Yet existing work focuses heavily on identity’s consequences without sufficiently determining *why* some self-identify differently than others in the first place.

Citizens have more choices for political-territorial identification than ever. Today, globalization, localization, and multilevel governance pull individuals in potentially conflicting directions while simultaneously offering subnational, national, and supranational opportunities for identification. More than ever before, citizens must assess the degree to which each political-territorial identity is compatible with their preexisting attachments, and they differ quite broadly in the extent to which they identify with each particular group. This dissertation employs a social-psychological approach to understand how individuals identify themselves in the presence of multiple identity alternatives, with the specific aim of elucidating why someone would identify with the superordinate group in the first place. After briefly highlighting superordinate identity’s purported benefits, I list the many psychological barriers that conceivably hinder most individuals’ willingness to identify at the superordinate level, making those who then do puzzling. I then ground this discussion in the context of the European Union (EU), where policymakers pine for commonality to undergird the European project and many citizens exhibit

some form of identification with Europe even though strong national identity remains the norm. What explains this anomaly? Why are some more likely than others to identify superordinately? I argue that personality provides the answer: certain predispositions make people more amenable to seeing themselves in inclusive terms. Thus, this dissertation supplies a micro-level perspective investigating the psychological factors that help or hinder an individual develop ties to the superordinate political-territorial level.

CAN'T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG: WHY SUPERORDINATE IDENTITY IS DESIRABLE

One need not look very far to see that identity clashes are common: civil rights struggles in the United States, genocide in Rwanda, and 'Jihad vs. McWorld' to name a few. And yet not all identities incentivize conflict; in fact, one specific type of identity may actually hold the key to solving the others' problems. A superordinate (aka 'common ingroup') identity allows formerly-separate subgroups to see themselves as part of a new, overarching group, turning 'us' versus 'them' into a united 'we'. According to many, this kind of identity is a panacea for several problems plaguing modern-day society.

Repeated studies show that a superordinate identity reduces intergroup antagonism. It not only lowers bias but also increases tolerance, thereby improving relations among individuals of different ethnic or racial backgrounds (e.g., Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006). These effects transfer to the policy sphere by making members of the majority subgroup more supportive of redistributive policies for minority citizens (Transue 2007).

A superordinate identity also greases the wheels of democracy by helping people feel a sense of shared fate with one another, which makes them more willing to participate and

sacrifice for the benefit of all (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Kritzinger 2003). Unsurprisingly, individuals are more supportive of the political system and more compliant with institutional rules when they identify with the polity (Gibson and Caldeira 1995; McDonough 1995). Some even assert that collective identity is vital for political cohesion (Huddy 2003)—an argument empirically supported by the national identity ‘deficit’ in post-apartheid South Africa (Lane and Ersson 1997; Ramutsindela 1997); by the fact that Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish separation obstructs democratic success in present-day Iraq (Byman 2003); and by the cry for a coherent national identity to combat the chaos of the Arab Spring in Libya (Anderson 2011).

While Chapter 3 will expound upon each of these aspects, we can for now appreciate why scholars and policymakers seem so keen on getting citizens to see themselves in superordinate terms—something clearly easier said than done. Achieving the common good necessitates overcoming parochial interests (Shils 1991), and yet many ‘nativist’ identity conflicts have reared their heads in the post-Cold War world (Katerberg 1995). Should we be surprised?

BIASED BELONGERS: WHY SUPERORDINATE IDENTIFICATION IS STRANGE

Despite its appeal, I submit that superordinate identification is actually quite counterintuitive. Humans have an innate psychological need for order and understanding, which they achieve through categorization and comparison. To make sense of a disorderly world, people engage in ‘prejudicial thinking’ and attempt to fit everything new into their existing mental framework (Allport 1954; Festinger 1957; Sears, Huddy, and Jervis 2003). Discrimination, then, may be the most natural reaction to difference: “...man has a propensity to prejudice. This propensity lies in his normal and natural tendency to form generalizations, concepts, categories, whose content represents an oversimplification of his world of experiences”

(Allport 1957, 27). All this translates into an understandable preference for whatever is most familiar, and need not imply hostility at heart.

Though people may have multiple identities and more ‘complex selves’ in large societies, homophily—love of one’s own—still predominates. The old adage, “birds of a feather flock together,” is based on the enduring observation that similarity connects people more quickly and easily than almost anything else (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Smith-Lovin 2003). This ‘general social law’ is supported by myriad evidence¹ and, again, is quite normal—even psychologically justifiable. “We need not ascribe this tendency to a gregarious instinct, to a ‘consciousness of kind’, or to prejudice. The fact is adequately explained by the principles of ease, least effort, congeniality, and pride in one’s own culture” (Allport 1957, 19). So how does this tendency come about?

Cognitive development starts early in life as children emulate what they observe in their family setting. This enables them to construct a bubble of what they know and interpret the rest of the world in relation to it (Piaget 1972). Once this schema is in place, people selectively perceive new information and rationalize away anything that contradicts their existing beliefs (Aronson 1969; Kinder and Sears 1985). Dissonant information is physically and psychologically uncomfortable, so individuals go to great lengths to minimize—or altogether ignore—inconsistencies (Festinger 1957). This produces two important, complementary inclinations. The first, *disconfirmation bias*, captures the fact that people actively disregard arguments that challenge their priors. Here, counterarguments are “...scrutinized longer, subjected to more extensive refutational analysis, and consequently are judged to be weaker than

¹ For example, in a study of newcomer groups, attendees immediately formed homophilous networks with those of their same race; these ties persisted over time despite the promotion of diversity by group leaders (Mollica, Gray, and Treviño 2003). And homophily even governs economics: analyses of financial portfolios shows that investors prefer companies that are geographically local; upon moving, they sell off old investments and buy new, closer ones in accordance with a clear ‘home bias’ (Bodnaruk 2009).

arguments compatible with prior beliefs” (Edwards and Smith 1996, 5). The second, *confirmation bias*, establishes that individuals purposely seek out information that conforms to their expectations (Nickerson 1998). As creatures of habit, people justify their behavior by continuing their normal routine—even when new information suggests deviation from it would be beneficial (Betsch et al. 2001).

These two cognitive proclivities—disconfirmation bias and confirmation bias—are reinforced by affective, emotional memories tied to past experience (Taber and Lodge 2006). This means individuals are naturally motivated to be skeptical of anything different, and often do not even realize the strength of their convictions. While minds can be changed, persuasion is difficult because these powerful subconscious biases make us reject anything that does not easily align with our preconceptions. Altogether, the established tenets of homophily, cognitive dissonance, and (dis)confirmation bias suggest that people are inherently wired to love who and what is most similar to them while resisting or rejecting those things that are new, contradictory, or unfamiliar.

In the modern world, political-territorial identification is dominated by attachment to the nation-state (Gellner 1983; Ruggie 1993) and most children quickly develop a sense of national belonging (Allport 1957; Piaget 1972). Though territorial borders are rarely synonymous with a single ethnic, racial, or religious group, civic values often help instill a sense of patriotism and national unity among those within them (Smith 1992).² This implies that where a collective national identity is well-established, familiar, and deeply ingrained in society, citizens should be

² As Chapter 2 discusses, national identity may itself be considered superordinate because it, too, encompasses many subgroups within its domain. While this dissertation focuses exclusively on supranational attachment as an instance of superordinate identification, my assertions and findings should transfer to other types of superordinate identities as well. I dwell on this more in the conclusion.

hesitant to branch out and identify with a superordinate political-territorial level beyond the nation-state. And yet, as the case of Europe illustrates, a substantial portion do.

SUPERORDINATE IDENTITY IN CONTEXT: THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

European integration is but the latest in a long history of elite attempts to form communal (aka “superordinate”) identities. For centuries, national unification projects have sought to fuse disparate populations into single political-territorial bodies. Transferring this to a higher scalar level, the EU now stands as the world’s foremost example of supranational governance. Begun as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 to achieve the economic ambitions and peace aspirations of six founding countries, the EU has gradually morphed into its present-day form with over 500 million citizens in 270 subnational regions across 27 national member states.³ Since expanding its jurisdiction with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EU has undergone a series of treaty reforms to delineate its policy competences in relation to national governments, and has significant authority over citizens’ daily lives.

As Chapter 2 elaborates, an interesting question becomes how citizens see themselves in relation to this overarching institutional structure. Integration has made ‘Europe’ a salient category for self-identification (in addition to preexisting national and subnational ones). The EU’s motto, ‘United in Diversity’, proclaims its desire to build a sense of community—what Karl Deutsch (1957) calls ‘we-feeling’—among all those within it. EU officials have echoed this sentiment for decades (Tugendhat 1977). Similarly, scholars have prescribed a common European identity to help reduce the EU’s democratic deficit (Rohrschneider 2002), overcome strong national identity’s association with opposition to European integration (Carey 2002; Kritzing 2003), and combat nationalistic anti-immigrant sentiment (E. Green 2007; Sides and

³ Membership will increase to 28 states upon the entry of Croatia on July 1, 2013.

Citrin 2007). Many hope that helping individuals identify with the superordinate group—in other words, to see themselves as collectively European—will boost support for the EU and curtail prejudice among those within it. Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, national identification remains the norm among most citizens (Citrin and Sides 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2004). This makes sense in light of what we know of human psychology from above. What is less instinctive is why many citizens *have* adopted the European identity alternative.

Given the EU's abstract nature and relative distance from the average person's mind, it is intriguing that citizens would identify with Europe at all—yet quite a few do. Using a compilation of public opinion data from the *Interactive Eurobarometer*, Figure 1.1 tracks aggregate identification with Europe across all member states over the last couple decades. Here, I combine responses to two different questions that have both been used to tap identification with Europe.⁴ The first asks respondents, “Do you ever think of yourself as not only (nationality), but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?” From this, I created a dichotomous variable equal to one for values of often and sometimes, and zero for never. Similarly, the second queries, “In the near future do you see yourself as...nationality only, nationality and European, European and nationality, or European only?” Again, I generated a dummy equal to one for those who sees themselves as at least partly European versus zero for those who identify exclusively with their nation.⁵ The first version appeared in six surveys;⁶ the second (known as the ‘Moreno’


⁴ The *Eurobarometer* has surveyed roughly 1,000 respondents per country, face to face, biannually for decades. However, a common critique is that it has rarely used identical question wording, making it difficult to see consistent patterns across time. This is especially true for identification (Bruter 2003, 2005). Nevertheless, I follow others' lead in tracking these two questions together (e.g., see the *Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 1970-2002* compiled by Schmitt and Scholz 2005).

⁵ My coding here emulates others' (Citrin and Sides 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005), who argue the conceptually important distinction is between those with any form of ‘inclusive’ identity (holding attachments to both the nation and Europe—in any order) and those with ‘exclusive’ loyalty to the nation only. Where applicable, I leave as missing anyone who answered ‘don't know’, ‘none’, or ‘refuse’.

⁶ April 1990, March 1991, October 1991, April 1992, October 2005, and September 2006.

question) has been asked much more frequently.⁷ Despite these discrepancies, the two questions produce very similar means (0.507, s.d. = 0.039 and 0.554, s.d. = 0.033, respectively) and a paired t-test confirms there is no significant difference ($t = -1.500$; $p = 0.374$).⁸

Figure 1.1: Inclusive Identification with Europe, 1990-2010



As Figure 1.1 shows, roughly half of European citizens identify with Europe in some capacity. The average across all sample years is 54%. And, though there are slight fluctuations over time, it appears mean levels are relatively stable. This consistency is suggestive of indeed measuring an *identity*, as opposed to the more volatile trends typically observed in measures of government approval or support (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007: 129; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002: 95).


Next, Figure 1.2 breaks down the various categories of identification associated with the Moreno question. Here we see some evidence of bipolarization: a good number of citizens

⁷ April 1992, November 1993, December 1994, June 1995, December 1995, November 1996, April 1997, May 1998, November 1998, November 1999, June 2000, January 2001, November 2001, November 2003, April 2004, October 2004, October 2005, and June 2010.

⁸ This t-test is based on observations from 1992 and 2005, the only occasions in which both question versions were asked in the same year. In 1992, two different surveys were conducted one month apart while in 2005, both indicators were included in the same survey.

inclusively identify with both their nation and Europe, yet a near equal percent still feel exclusively national. Arguably more interesting for our purposes is the fact that an average of 11% of citizens declare that they identify with Europe first or only. Who are these people? What is it that appears to make it relatively easy for them to see themselves in superordinate terms while so many others—such as the average 41% proclaiming to be nationality only—do not?


Figure 1.2: Breakdown of Inclusive v. Exclusive Identity, 1992-2010



Finally, Figure 1.3 looks at one of the most recent *Eurobarometer* survey years (2010) to show how much cross-national variation exists in citizens' mean levels of inclusive identification. Looking at a combined measure of those who see themselves as European to any extent (be it nationality and European, European and nationality, or European only), it is clear that a large portion of citizens have incorporated Europe into their sense of self. An average of 51% report being somewhat European, though this shifts substantially across EU member states. Mean levels range from 74% in Luxembourg to only 28% in the United Kingdom (UK). Though these country differences are intriguing, explaining them is not the task at hand. Instead, I am more interested in the individual-level determinants beneath these national aggregates that make

someone more or less likely to identify with Europe. Why is it that these people have apparently overcome the cognitive barriers to superordinate identification we might expect? Could it be that certain individuals are more predisposed to a superordinate identity than others?

Figure 1.3: Inclusive Identification with Europe by Country, 2010



IS PERSONALITY THE ANSWER?

Why are some more likely to identify with the superordinate group than others? I argue that personality is an important, underexplored determinant of an individual's level of identification with a superordinate political-territorial polity. In his seminal study, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Allport (1954) speculated that marked mental differences might explain the tendencies he bundled as a 'prejudiced personality' (of which he thought we already knew quite a bit) and its opposite: a 'tolerant personality' (of which he claimed we knew little).⁹ Those who were prejudiced seemed to view the world in Manichean, 'two-valued' terms where everything different than oneself was automatically categorized as a negative. "Those who tend to dichotomize in their cognitive operations are the very people who accentuate the distinction between in-group and out-group" (Allport 1954, 400). Prejudiced individuals appeared to hold

⁹ These stereotypes harken back to Adorno et al.'s (1950) study: *The Authoritarian Personality*.

steadfast beliefs and immediately reject anything that did not conform to their rigid worldview. Interestingly, they also tended to be inherently insecure (396). In contrast, there were clearly others with an innate tolerance for ambiguity and a higher empathic ability. Why?

Allport optimistically believed that prejudice, so much a part of basic human nature, could be overcome if individuals saw themselves as part of a broader in-group:

Habit-breaking is unpleasant. We prefer the familiar. We cannot help but feel a bit on guard when other people seem to threaten or even question our habits. Attitudes partial to the in-group, or to the reference group, do not necessarily require that attitudes towards other groups be antagonistic—even though hostility often helps to intensify the in-group cohesion. Narrow circles can, without conflict, be supplemented by larger circles of loyalty. This happy condition is not often achieved, but it remains from the psychological point of view a hopeful possibility (1954, 46).

This is precisely what a superordinate identity aims to do (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). Yet, as mentioned, the factors that lead someone to identify this way remain relatively unknown. Allport volunteered two untested possibilities: open-mindedness and self-interest. However, later identity work has deviated from a personality perspective, focusing instead on the consequences of politicization and relative group size (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Horowitz 1985; Posner 2004); the constructive influence of institutions, symbols, and the media (Bruter 2003, 2005, 2009; Díez Medrano 2003; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992; Risse 2006; Smith 1992); the perceptions of cultural threat members of one group feel from another (de Master and Le Roy 2000; McLaren 2001, 2006; Quillian 1995); the demographic correlates of those who identify a certain way (D. Green 2007; Pichler 2008b); or a handful of macro-level economic and political conditions (Bellucci, Sanders, and Serricchio 2012).

In this dissertation, I return to the social-psychological underpinnings of identification while controlling for alternative explanations. Drawing on the canonical ‘Big Five’ personality traits of openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional

stability, I generate hypotheses about how these latent dimensions should be linked to identifying with the superordinate group. I then posit several potential mechanisms through which personality's effects should operate and test for moderating conditions. Altogether, my results speak to the general psychological processes underlying political-territorial identification. A major implication of my findings is that some individuals inherently experience cognitive difficulty extending their sense of self because particular traits—which extant literature shows are developed early in life and persist relatively unchanged over time—affect the extent to which a superordinate identity is perceived to conflict with preexisting attachments.¹⁰

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2, “Social Identity, Personality, and Identification with Europe”, reviews existing literature on identity in general, political-territorial identity in particular, and the relationship between personality and politics. It then develops greater justification for how and why personality should matter for superordinate identification with Europe.

Before empirically testing personality's effects, I first assess whether identification with Europe qualifies as a superordinate identity based on the consequences it has for attitudes towards the former outgroup. To do this, Chapter 3, “Confirming a Superordinate Effect on Outgroup Attitudes”, uses cross-national *Eurobarometer* data from all 27 EU member states to show that those who see themselves as European also exhibit a more pro-immigrant orientation. The same cannot be said for national identity (which has a negative effect) or regional

¹⁰ Despite their intuitive contribution, personality studies are sometimes criticized for the negative outlook they imply: if a given outcome is affected by personality, then are people predetermined to be or act one way or the other? If so, how is change possible? I argue that personality's role need not be feared. As I show in Chapters 4 and 5, other elements affect superordinate identification as well. Most importantly, the EU itself appears capable of drastically increasing identification with Europe across all personality types; this institutional effect is not conditional on holding any given trait and matters substantively more than many of the psychological determinants.

attachment (which is insignificant). These results underscore the importance of better isolating the determinants of superordinate identification in the first place so that scholars and policymakers can maximize the benefits of a common ingroup identity.

Chapter 4, “The Personality Determinants of Superordinate Identification with Europe”, is a first step in that direction. Here, I present a baseline empirical test of personality’s effects on superordinate identification using a nationally representative *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey* I designed and deployed in the United Kingdom (UK). Consistent with expectations, I find that the traits of openness to experience and extraversion appear crucial for helping individuals identify superordinately; agreeableness exerts a relatively strong negative effect while conscientiousness and emotional stability are insignificant. Breaking each trait down by its component items, I establish that some of the most important characteristics for identifying with Europe include being creative, curious, spontaneous, outgoing, and calm; being careful, responsible, gentle, kind, and polite work in the opposite direction. Personality aside, I also find that the most important predictor of whether one identifies with Europe is the extent to which s/he feels personally affected by EU institutions.

Chapter 5, “Effects Mediating and Moderating the Relationship between Personality and Identification”, expands upon Chapter 4 with a series of additional tests. I justify three causal mechanisms (risk aversion, knowledge, and ideology) that should transfer personality’s effect forward. First, I confirm that risk aversion significantly mediates all five traits’ effects (to the point that little direct impact is left once this indirect pathway is accounted for). This hints that European identification may be more of an instrumental calculation than a deep emotional attachment like its national counterpart, and helps explain why many citizens might be hesitant to adopt a superordinate identity in addition to their existing ties. Second, in keeping with extant

findings, openness to experience causes someone to seek out additional information during a decision making (or, here, the identification) process: objective political knowledge mediates the effect of openness on Europeanness. Third, the effects of conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional stability run through ideological orientation, insinuating that personality leads individuals to sort themselves into party affiliations and media preferences that reinforce their prior identity attachments. Lastly, I test whether personality interacts with how affected one feels by the EU. While a conditional relationship might be expected, none emerges. This suggests the EU has room to help citizens of *all* personalities perceive its impact, which positively increases superordinate identification on its own.

Chapter 6, “A ‘Superordinate’ Personality?”, summarizes my findings, discusses important implications, and proposes extensions for future research. After outlining how these personality results contribute to a greater understanding of individual self-identification at large, I engage ongoing debates in political psychology before analyzing specific consequences for the EU. Finally, I suggest a number of ways in which this project should be expanded and improved. Altogether, this dissertation attempts to reconcile our expectations for what a superordinate identity can do with the psychological facets behind its emergence in citizens’ minds.

CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL IDENTITY, PERSONALITY, AND IDENTIFICATION WITH EUROPE

Abstract: This chapter defines important concepts and reviews literature on identity in general, political-territorial identification in particular, identity alternatives in Europe, and extant explanations of individual variation in identification. Drawing on the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000), it briefly discusses the empirically-verified benefits of a superordinate identity. It then posits a new and heretofore underexplored possibility: that personality affects how people see themselves. After summarizing existing findings on the ‘Big Five’ personality traits, I justify my expectations for why and how personality should matter for superordinate identification. I conclude by detailing one additional consideration that should have an impact: institutional influence.

Keywords: ‘Big Five’ personality traits, political-territorial identification, superordinate identity

IDENTITY: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Social Identity Theory asserts that individuals ascribe themselves to a particular identity through the twin psychological processes of social comparison and self-categorization (Brewer 2001; Reicher 2004; Stets and Burke 2000; Tajfel 1982; Turner et al. 1987). Though individuals have numerous ways in which to identify themselves, the particular identities that are most salient to any given person vary significantly (Bouché 2011; Kuo and Margalit 2012).

Identification reflects the degree to which someone subjectively believes s/he possesses a certain identity. It indicates how personally relevant any particular identity alternative is (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Posner 2005).¹ “Identification refers to the centrality of a particular social group membership to the individual’s sense of self and the meaning that is derived from that identity” (Brewer 2001, 118). It is this aspect in which I am substantively interested: why do people vary in the extent to which they internalize the identity associated with a particular group—namely, a superordinate one?


SUBORDINATE VERSUS SUPERORDINATE GROUPS

Ingroups naturally form around a contrasting outgroup—what they are *not*. Each ingroup comprises a cluster of members who all identify a similar way, and this preference to be surrounded by similar peers typically evokes hostility toward dissimilar others (Huddy 2001; Oakes 2002). A superordinate identity may resolve all this, as it is purported to reduce the psychological distance one perceives between himself and outgroup members (Dovidio, Pearson, and Orr 2008). In this way, a ‘sufficiently high’ level of superordinate identification strengthens social cohesion within a diverse society (Huo et al. 1996).

¹ Focusing on identification allows for the scientific study of the *process* behind the emotional weight one places on association with a given category. This avoids reifying politicized identities that may not be salient to a particular individual (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). It also facilitates analysis of how groups of individuals co-construct a collective identity through dialogue with one another (Haste 2004).

The Common Ingroup Identity Model (drawn primarily from race relations in the United States but now widely supported by empirical studies worldwide) discusses the potential for a collective, superordinate identity to reduce intergroup conflict by superseding lower attachments (Gaertner et al. 1993).² “Because categorization is fundamental to intergroup bias, social psychologists have targeted this basic process as a place to begin to improve intergroup relations” (Gaertner et al. 1999, 178). If different groups can recognize their commonalities, members may begin to weaken attachments to the old identity and coalesce around the formation of a broader new one. When two or more subgroups merge—whether voluntarily or through forced interaction—the potential arises for a new, superordinate group to form, encompassing members of both previous subordinate groups under one new broader identity (Gaertner et al. 1993). Figure 2.1 portrays this process: superordinate group C subsumes subgroups A and B.

Figure 2.1: Subordinate v. Superordinate Identity



Importantly, identification with the superordinate group need not erase attachment to the subordinate group; it simply requires that individuals recognize the larger commonalities between themselves and former outgroup members. In many cases, holding a dual identity can be

² Chapter 3 describes this process, its effects, and supporting evidence in much greater detail.

just as—if not more—effective at reducing intergroup hostility (Eller and Abrams 2004; González and Brown 2003; Hornsey and Hogg 2000). And, since individuals have a psychological need to feel they are part of highly-esteemed social groups, the perceived continuation—rather than abandonment—of their old subgroup identity can actually help strengthen identification with the superordinate group (Barreto and Ellemers 2002; Van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, and Ellemers 2003). I now apply these basic social-psychological understandings to political-territorial identification.

POLITICAL-TERRITORIAL IDENTIFICATION

Though there are many types of social identities (e.g., ethnic, racial, religious, gender, or partisan identities), this dissertation is specifically concerned with *political-territorial* ones, for which the qualifications and boundaries of group membership are so often contested.³ I use the term ‘political-territorial identification’ to connote how much people associate themselves with the identity alternative stemming from a specified geographic unit governed by a common set of meaningful political institutions.

In the modern era governed predominantly by sovereign nation-states, national identification often serves as the primary basis of political-territorial attachment (Ruggie 1993).⁴ Despite the fact that the composition and constitutive cultural requirements of these so-called ‘national’ identities are hotly debated (e.g., Huntington 2004), citizens commonly rally around patriotic values and a sense of shared history or fate—despite distinct ethnic, linguistic, racial, religious, or other backgrounds (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Theiss-Morse 2009). In simple terms, then, a national political-territorial identity is itself a type of superordinate identity

³ Identification is conceptually and empirically distinct from an individual’s level of *support* for the government of that political-territorial unit (Bellucci, Sanders, and Serricchio 2012).

⁴ In keeping with other scholars, my use of the term ‘national’ refers to the overarching nation-state—*not* a ‘nation’ based on a specific ethnolinguistic, racial, or religious group (Connor 1978). In this way, we can speak of a single national political-territorial identity even within a multinational state.

encompassing multiple subgroups within its borders. “A strong national identity makes it possible for people to look at sub-groups in a different way and to accept that sub-groups in a society are treated differently” (Roefs 2006, 80). It develops as members within a nation-state’s political-territorial borders appreciate what they share with an ‘imagined community’ at large (Anderson 1991).⁵

Yet the national level is not the only political-territorial option for identification. Subnational alternatives like one’s city, county, or provincial region often garner feelings of attachment, especially among those with longstanding ancestral ties to an area or who feel relatively isolated from national politics (Fitjar 2010; Paasi 2002). And, thanks to increased interdependence and integration through globalization, many citizens now have a *supranational* identity alternative available to them as well. Regional integration associations like the EU, the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—among others—all represent relatively recent efforts to bring multiple countries in a similar geographic area together under a unified institutional framework. Though these new entities form primarily around economic and security pacts (Baldwin and Venables 1995), they may expand to encompass more sociopolitical dimensions as well, which then increases their salience for citizens of the various member states and opens up the possibility for identification with the superordinate political-territorial group. This is precisely what has transpired in Europe: a superordinate European identity encompassing the various national subgroups of the 27 EU member states is now a viable option for identification. But, as discussed in Chapter 1, a supranational collectivity that supersedes familiar national ties should encounter a cognitive obstacle making most people wary of identifying with it.


⁵ This is often the result of explicit nation-building efforts, such as through the conscious construction of national myths and symbols (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992).

IDENTITY ALTERNATIVES IN EUROPE

While applicable everywhere, political-territorial identity alternatives are especially pronounced in Europe, where EU integration has increased the salience and feasibility of the superordinate ‘European’ identity option in addition to preexisting subordinate local and national ones. Identity need not be a zero-sum game, but some people seem to have trouble incorporating multiple identities and give exclusive preference to a particular one (Citrin and Sides 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2004). In contrast, others profess nested or ‘hyphenated’ identities; these individuals have a wider concentric circle of identification (Delanty 1997; Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Weiner 1997).

Figure 2.2 offers a visual representation of the various options for political-territorial identification available to Europeans. Moving away from the individual and toward more geographically-encompassing groups, individuals may identify with the local, regional, national, and/or supranational level; for example, citizens in the United Kingdom might hold varying degrees of attachment to London, England, the UK, and Europe, respectively. It is natural for identification to lessen with distance: the family is the first ingroup one ever knows and attachment typically gets weaker and weaker as one’s ‘circle of inclusion’ grows larger (Allport 1957). “Thus, the farther away we move from the immediate community, the more loose and less organic will be the identity” (Garcia 1993, 12). But what leads individuals to identify more or less with each option—particularly the superordinate, supranational one? Why is some people’s sphere of identification so much more inclusive than others?

Figure 2.2: Political-Territorial Identity Alternatives in Europe⁶




Looking, for now, merely at differences in national and supranational identification, cross-national data from all 27 EU member states confirm intriguing variation how many feel [nationality] and/or European. *Eurobarometer 71.3* (Papacosta 2009) taps identification by asking respondents:

I would like you to think about the idea of geographical identity. Different people think of this in different ways. People might think of themselves as being European, (NATIONALITY) or from a specific region to different extents. Some people say that with globalization, people are becoming closer to each other as ‘citizens of the world’. Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are...European?... (NATIONALITY)? [Not at all, not really, somewhat, to a great extent]

Based on this measurement, the mean level of feeling European (2.083 on a scale of 0-3) is much lower than that of feeling national (2.783); there is also greater variation in identification with Europe than with the national level (s.d. = 0.858 and 0.545, respectively). Figure 2.3 displays the distribution of these responses in greater detail.

⁶ Adapted from Allport (1954, 43).

Figure 2.3: Strength of National v. European Identification in 27 EU Member States



Note: n = 29,888

As shown, identification with the superordinate (European) category is much less coherent and uniform than for the subordinate (national) one. This is unsurprising given how well-entrenched national identities are in Europe (more than, say, in the United States) (Diez Medrano 2003). But what *is* surprising, given humans' natural desire for the familiar (Allport 1954; Smith-Lovin 2003) and cognitive biases against anything new or different (Edwards and Smith 1996; Festinger 1957; Taber and Lodge 2006), are the percentages of those who *do* identify with Europe. What psychological characteristics might help explain the 31% of citizens who feel European 'to a great extent'?

EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR SUPERORDINATE IDENTIFICATION WITH EUROPE

Numerous theoretical factors are linked to identifying with the superordinate group—in this case, Europe. However, at this point, more seems known about the basic sociodemographic correlates of holding a supranational European identity than about the various *causes* of identification per se.

First, identification could reflect rational calculations of the material costs and benefits associated with a particular identity; people categorize themselves as a members of that group which stands to benefit him most economically and perceives a threat from other groups over competition for scarce resources (Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998; Monroe, Hankin, and Van Vechten 2000; Sherif 1998). In this account, individuals identify with the option they subjectively perceive as most instrumentally beneficial. Lending credence to this, those employed in high socioeconomic status jobs tend to report feeling more European than those employed in less prestigious sectors (Fligstein 2009; Pichler 2008b). Similarly, those who see the EU as having benefitted themselves and/or their country, along with those with more positive retrospective economic evaluations, identify more with Europe (Bellucci, Sanders, and Serricchio 2012).

Second, a cultural view of identity would expect those who meet the ethnic, linguistic, or religious prerequisites necessary for group membership to identify strongly with that group (Smith 1992; Theiss-Morse 2009). Identification would thus require an individual to possess a necessary physical attribute or civic value.⁷ Here, evidence comes primarily from the known consequences of holding an exclusive national identity, since highly nationalistic individuals seem to perceive a greater cultural threat from anyone different (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002; McLaren 2001, 2006). Thus far, cultural considerations better explain identification with the nation more than they do identification with Europe (Ruiz Jimenez et al. 2004).

⁷ Citizens, scholars, and policymakers all disagree about the specific *content* of what it means to be ‘European.’ The common tendency is to differentiate between ‘civic’ and ‘cultural’ dimensions of European identity (Bruter 2003, 2005, 2009; Pichler 2008a; Smith 1992). There is little consensus about the exact cultural markers required to possess a European identity. While holding a Judeo-Christian faith, speaking a ‘European’ language, and referencing the Ancient Greek and Roman empires have been proposed (Delanty 2005), there is much more certainty that holding civic values like tolerance and solidarity unifies citizens across nationalities (Meier-Pesti and Kirchler 2003). It is thus this civic component that most scholars—including myself—intend when analyzing European identity.

Third, socialization effects may produce generational differences in identification such that variation in exposure to certain information determines who adheres to a particular identity (Sapiro 2004). In line with this expectation, younger citizens often identify with Europe significantly more than their older counterparts (Citrin and Sides 2004; D. Green 2007; Pichler 2008b).

Fourth, education and cognitive mobilization are associated with greater Europeanness, largely because they are believed to help make a complex, abstract, and distant political-territorial entity like the EU feel more comprehensible (Bellucci, Sanders, and Serricchio 2012; Inglehart 1970; Spanning, Wallace, and Datler 2008). And international travel and study abroad programs can help increase citizen—particularly student—attachment to Europe (Mitchell 2012; Sigalas 2010).

Fifth, ideological orientation produces patterns in identification such that those with right-leaning ideologies may be more swayed by nationalist rhetoric while those on the left may subscribe to more liberal, postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1997). In Europe, conservatism is typically associated with more exclusive national attachment and a greater propensity to support the radical right (Citrin and Sides 2004; Givens 2005), though ideology is not always significant for identification with Europe (Bellucci, Sanders, and Serricchio 2012).

Sixth, political symbols and elite messages can affect identification. Media framing affects how European one feels; favorable exposure to European news and symbols has long-lasting effects (Bruter 2003, 2005, 2009). And, at least in the aggregate, use of a common currency, the euro, is associated with greater Europeanness (Risse 2006).

Seventh, certain demographic attributes are known to matter, including gender and rural versus urban residence. Males often report feeling more European than females (Citrin and Sides

2004; Fligstein 2009; D. Green 2007) while living in an urban cosmopolitan area has been linked to stronger identification with Europe (Pichler 2008b, 2009).

And finally, contextual conditions (e.g., macroeconomic circumstances, a post-communist legacy, or the politicization of a particular identity) theoretically influence cross- and sub-national variation in identity across time and place (Bellucci, Sanders, and Serricchio 2012; Oliver and Wong 2003).⁸

Above all, what appears most important is ‘entitativity’: that the EU—or at least ‘Europe’—has a “psychological existence” in citizens’ minds such that they recognize the political-territorial entity and their own place in it (Castano 2004: 41; Spanring, Wallace, and Datler 2008). While these findings help provide a basic understanding, much theoretical and empirical work is still needed to better explain individual variation in superordinate identification.

PERSONALITY

Scholars long ago recognized that variation in individual predispositions could have a profound effect on political outcomes (Allport 1937, 1954; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lasswell 1930). Indeed, common wisdom at the time concluded that, “There is a great deal of political activity which can be explained adequately only by taking account of the personal characteristics of the actors involved...” (Greenstein 1967, 629). Though the study of innate differences in psychological orientation then fell out of favor (Greenstein 1992), its resurgence is once again apparent—particularly in political science (Gerber et al. 2011b; Ozer and Benet-Martínez 2006). In keeping with this renewed emphasis on exposing the psychological

⁸ However, they cannot explain variation between individuals within the same context.

foundations of individual attitudes and behavior, I contend that personality can help explain how likely people are to extend their sense of self to include the superordinate category.

Personality is defined as “a multi-faceted and enduring internal, or psychological, structure that influences behavior” (Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011, 603).⁹ It consists of the many public, observable patterns of individuality that not only affect our own perceptions, decisions, and emotional expressions, but which also form others’ impressions of us (Winter 2003). In contrast to fleeting ‘states’ of emotion, personality traits are stable and predictable internal systems that determine affective, cognitive, and motivational responses to the world around us (Caprara et al. 2006; John and Srivastava 1999). Particularly relevant, then, is the fact that personality traits are developed early in life and then persist relatively unchanged over time (Caprara et al. 2006; Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011; Mondak et al. 2010). This affords unparalleled causal leverage over their specific effects by making personality exogenous to almost any subsequent attitude or behavior under scrutiny.¹⁰ Before detailing personality’s established effects, I first review the predominant way in which personality traits are conceived.

THE ‘BIG FIVE’ PERSONALITY TRAITS

An individual’s personality is made up of thousands of unique characteristics which can be aggregated into various ‘facets’ that then comprise different ‘domains’ known as traits. Using

⁹ Studies typically differentiate between *traits*, which reflect “habitual patterns of perceiving reality and behaving”, and *values*, which represent cognitive beliefs about what is or is not important out of life (Caprara et al. 2006, 3-4). Schwartz (1994, 21) defines the latter as, “...desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity.” Examples include power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. Because values are often considered part of the *content* of a particular identity (e.g., Pichler 2008a), I set them aside and focus here on traits as an exogenous explanation for identification.

¹⁰ Conclusions of temporal stability come from several studies that find high correlation in the reported scores of the same individuals across time (see, for example, Caprara et al. 2006: 14). Interestingly, some recent work questions how much of personality is simply inherited, and speculates that personality acts as mechanism mediating biology’s genetic influence (Mondak et al. 2010; Verhulst, Eaves, and Hatemi 2012). For instance, Gallego and Oberski report that “...at least half of the individual variance in personality traits is heritable...” (2012, 427). I argue that, even if only an expression of predetermined genetics, personality is significant and holds great potential to affect countless dimensions of an individual’s life.

this hierarchical taxonomy, the primary test of personality comes from the ‘Big Five’ dimensions of openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability (Goldberg 1993; John and Srivastava 1999; McCrae and Costa 1992).¹¹ Though alternative concepts of personality abound, the Big Five traits have garnered immense popularity and near-uniform agreement on their utility in recent years not only for their value as descriptive dimensions, but also for their explanatory power as causal predispositions (Costa and McCrae 1992; Schmitt et al. 2007; Schoen and Schumann 2007). Thus, after extensive investigations in a host of scholarly disciplines, these traits are widely recognized as the most appropriate test of personality’s effects (e.g., Mondak et al. 2010; Schoen and Schumann 2007).¹² Each trait and its polar opposite—closed-mindedness, carelessness, introversion, uncooperativeness, and neuroticism, respectively—is typically assessed in terms of high versus low scores on various batteries of survey items.¹³

Openness to experience is demonstrated by intellectual curiosity, creativity, wide interests, and appreciation for aesthetics, in contrast to those who are more cautious, conventional, and prefer concrete experience over abstraction. “High-O individuals are imaginative and sensitive to art and beauty and have a rich and complex emotional life; they are

¹¹ The Big Five traits are commonly expressed with the acronym, OCEAN, where the N stands for neuroticism (John and Srivastava 1999; Mondak et al. 2010). Like many, however, I use emotional stability instead to maintain a more ‘positive’ framing of the ‘desirable’ characteristics associated with this trait. As discussed in Chapter 4, it is measured the same way, just recoded so that higher values reflect greater emotional stability as opposed to neuroticism.

¹² As Schmitt et al. note, “The idea that five dimensions can provide a useful framework for describing higher-order differences between individuals has, according to many, reached something of a consensus among personality trait psychologists” (2007, 176). Importantly, proponents of the Big Five recognize that these are by no means the only personality aspects that may matter. “Thus, the Big Five structure does not imply that personality differences can be reduced to only five traits. Rather, these five dimensions represent personality at the broadest level of abstraction, and each dimension summarizes a large number of distinct, more specific personality characteristics” (John and Srivastava 1999, 105). What has propelled their popularity, then, is the fact that vastly different studies and measures consistently replicate five underlying, overall traits.

¹³ There is, however, some debate over the most appropriate way(s) to measure the Big Five traits; these measurement differences are discussed in Chapter 4. Additionally, Appendix E shows that a variety of measures all attain pretty high reliability, underscoring their validity for assessing the same underlying personality concepts.

intellectually curious, behaviorally flexible, and nondogmatic in their attitudes and values” (Costa and McCrae 1992, 6). Once the most disputed factor, it is now recognized as a measure of ‘culture’ or ‘imagination’, not intelligence (John and Srivastava 1999). It has been associated with cognitive flexibility (Carney et al. 2008), greater need for intellectual stimulation (Gerber et al. 2011a), and unconventionality (Lewis and Bates 2011; Mondak and Halperin 2008).

Conscientiousness reflects self-discipline, organization, reliability, and adherence to social norms as opposed to unreliability, easy-goingness, and spontaneity. This factor “contrasts scrupulous, well-organized, and diligent people with lax, disorganized, and lackadaisical individuals” (Costa and McCrae 1992, 6). Consisting of both dispositional (e.g., dependable) and volitional (e.g., hardworking) components (Mondak et al. 2010), it is linked to greater conformity (Roccas et al. 2002) and higher academic achievement (Cooper, Golden, and Socha 2013).

Extraversion measures how energetic, assertive, self-confident, talkative, and socially-oriented one is; introversion suggests someone is quiet and less socially involved—though not necessarily shy or depressed. This trait describes those who are sociable, active, and optimistic (Costa and McCrae 1992) and is associated with higher personal accomplishment (Bakker et al. 2006) as well as larger and more diverse social networks (Gallego and Oberski 2011).

Agreeableness captures those who are compassionate, sympathetic, kind, gentle, and generous as opposed to those who are suspicious, antagonistic, and place self-interest above group welfare. Like extraversion, agreeableness inherently refers to someone’s interpersonal behavior (Costa and McCrae 1992). While those who are highly agreeable tend to possess more traditional values (Roccas et al. 2002) and like engaging in group activities (Mondak and

Halperin 2008), agreeableness is also associated with conflict-avoidance and a distaste for disagreement (Gallego and Oberski 2011; Gerber et al. 2011a).

Finally, emotional stability is portrayed as being calm, confident, and relaxed as opposed to anxious, angry, depressed, irritable, and sensitive. In contrast to its commonly-investigated antonym (neuroticism), emotional stability reflects the absence of psychological distress. Individuals with low scores on this trait “typically have a heightened need for social reassurance” (Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011) and are thus particularly sensitive to the threat of social exclusion (Gallego and Oberski 2011).

The cross-cultural validity and equivalence of the Big Five—both conceptually and methodologically—has been underscored by numerous studies (Goldberg 1993; McCrae and Costa 1994; Schmitt et al. 2007). This suggests, then, that there are ‘cultural universals’ that congruently depict aspects of human personality across time, place, and language (John and Srivastava 1999, 106). The most extensive analysis examined how well the Big Five traveled to 56 countries and confirmed that they can be confidently translated, employed, and compared because the mean levels of each measure are highly correlated across multiple geographic regions (Schmitt et al. 2007). Of particular relevance here, that study examined eight countries in Western Europe, eleven in Eastern Europe, and six in Southern Europe, most commonly sampling students but at times ‘general community members’ as well. The various individual personality items used in their survey¹⁴ all produced the same five-trait structure when subjected to factor analysis, confirming their overall reliability and comparability.¹⁵

¹⁴ Based off Benet-Martínez and John’s (1998) Big Five Inventory (BFI), this test had respondents self-report on how strongly they agree or disagree with 44 different statements on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

¹⁵ Reliability was slightly higher in Western Europe than in other European regions, which provides confirmatory evidence of their validity for my tests in the United Kingdom conducted in Chapter 4.

PERSONALITY'S KNOWN EFFECTS

Myriad studies explore the ways in which personality matters for all kinds of political outcomes.¹⁶ To briefly summarize, we now know personality affects ideological orientation;¹⁷ voter turnout, protest, and other participatory acts;¹⁸ involvement in voluntary associations;¹⁹ political discussion;²⁰ political interest and efficacy;²¹ the consumption of political information,²² and politicians' decision making.²³ More relevant to the larger question at hand in this dissertation, personality has been found to play a profound role in several different types of social identification. Individual predispositions substantially affect partisan attachment. Party preference in adolescence already reflects one's early political personality (Wolak 2009). As an adult, high openness is associated with *declining* to identify with a major party (Gerber et al. 2011b); extraversion and agreeableness increase partisanship (Gerber et al. 2012b). In terms of specific partisan affiliation, high openness, low conscientiousness, and high emotional stability predict favoring the Democratic party while their opposites correspond with Republican identification (Cooper, Golden, and Socha 2013; Gerber et al. 2012b). Cross-nationally, openness is the most generalizable predictor of party preference and is associated with more leftist party membership (Vecchione et al. 2011).

¹⁶ See Ozer and Benet-Martínez (2006) and Gerber et al. (2011b) for a more comprehensive review. Note that while not all of these analyses employ the Big Five structure per se, most include at least a few of the well-known Big Five dimensions (i.e., extraversion and neuroticism). I do not focus on other concepts like the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950), right-wing authoritarianism (Altemayer 1981; Hetherington and Weiler 2009), or social dominance orientation (Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell 1994) here.

¹⁷ Block and Block (2006); Caprara et al. (2006); Carney et al. (2008); Cooper, Colden, and Socha (2013); Gerber et al. (2010); Lewis and Bates (2011); Verhulst, Hatemi, and Martin (2010).

¹⁸ Blais and St-Vincent (2011); Denny and Doyle (2008); Gallego and Oberski (2012); Ha, Kim, and Jo (2013); Mattila et al. (2011); Mondak and Halperin (2008); Mondak et al. (2010).

¹⁹ Bekkers (2005).

²⁰ Cooper, Golden, and Socha (2013); Gerber et al. (2012a); Hibbing et al. (2011); Mondak and Halperin (2008).

²¹ Cooper, Golden, and Socha (2013); Gallego and Oberski (2011); Gerber et al. (2011a); Vecchione and Caprara (2009).

²² Gerber et al. (2011a).

²³ Walker (2000); Winter (2003).

In terms of cultural identification, conscientiousness and agreeableness predict immigrants' retention of the ethnic identity from their homeland while openness and extraversion predict adoption of the dominant host culture's identity (Ozer and Benet-Martínez 2006). And twin studies show that ethnic, racial, and religious identification is predicted by "genetically induced variation in personality traits" (Weber, Johnson, and Arcenaux 2011, 1320; see also Lewis and Bates 2010). Though some would categorize identity as *part* of an individual's personality (e.g., Winter 2003), others are adamant that this is not the case:

While many psychologists would understand self-concept and identity to be an integral part of personality, how one characterizes oneself, the groups one belongs to, and the goals and values one possesses may be understood as outcomes as well. The structure of social and personal identifications, goals, and priorities that constitute self and identity may be understood not only as a function of life experience and cultural context, but also as a domain where personality dispositions play a part (Ozer and Benet-Martínez 2006, 407).

Thus, one's level of identification with any social group—or, in this case, political-territorial category—should be the *outcome* of his or her underlying personality.

PERSONALITY'S ROLE IN IDENTIFICATION WITH EUROPE

Linking personality to superordinate identification is, to my knowledge, a new endeavor. Given the well-established characteristics associated with each of the Big Five traits, I generate hypotheses about which dimensions are most prevalent for superordinate identification.

OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE

Openness has already been suggested as "the most important personality trait in terms of impact on identity development" (Ozer and Benet-Martínez 2006, 408). In reference to identification with Europe, this trait should have a large effect on the extent to which people see themselves as European for several reasons. First, citizens who score highly on the openness dimension should be more open—quite literally—to seeing themselves as part of an inclusive,

superordinate group (e.g., that associated with a wider political-territorial community like Europe). Those who are closed-minded may be less willing or able to affectively identify with the superordinate European group—even if they cognitively recognize its existence. Second, openness is often associated with being more accepting of non-traditional things (Lewis and Bates 2011). As discussed in Chapter 1, the EU—affectively nicknamed the European ‘experiment’ (e.g., Hill and Smith 2011)—is anything but traditional, both in terms of organizational structure and in terms of geographic scope. Not only is European integration a relatively young process (especially when compared to national unification efforts), but adopting a European identity is somewhat of an unknown since national identity is the norm for most people (Citrin and Sides 2004; Diéz Medrano 2003). Thus, citizens must be open to expanding their horizons to superordinate identification beyond the national level. Thirdly, open individuals tend to seek out new information and opportunities for engagement (Gallego and Oberski 2011; Gerber et al. 2011a; Mondak et al. 2010),²⁴ which may make them more cognizant of the superordinate identity alternative and willing to engage with it. Openness may help individuals acquire knowledge to better comprehend the complex nature of the EU and its ambitions, thereby increasing familiarity with Europe and decreasing any perception of threat otherwise associated with seeing oneself in such supranational terms. Based on all this, I expect openness to experience to be positively associated with greater superordinate identification.²⁵

H₁: The more open one is to new experiences, the more s/he will identify with the superordinate group.

²⁴ Experimental findings suggest this information-seeking may occur because those who are most open tend to become slightly more anxious when confronted by something that does not fully comport with their preexisting beliefs (Wolak and Marcus 2007).

²⁵ Gallego and Oberski (2011) confirm this expectation in the larger process of demonstrating that openness to experience increases turnout in European Parliament (EP) elections via one’s level of identification with Europe.

CONSCIENTIOUSNESS

Conscientious individuals often do things out of a sense of duty or obligation and to conform with societal expectations (Gallego and Oberski 2011; Roccas et al. 2002). Given that patriotism and allegiance to the nation-state are the typical qualities—perhaps even requirements—of good citizenship (Blank 2003; Sidanius et al. 1997; Theiss-Morse 2009), those who are more conscientious likely identify strongly with the nation-state. While this need not preclude them from also seeing themselves as part of the superordinate category, those high in conscientiousness may be more hesitant to identify as European. Furthermore, conscientiousness is associated with the psychological need for structure and order (Costa and McCrae 1992), so the seemingly disorganized, abstract nature of the EU may be off-putting to these types of citizens, making them unlikely to identify with the superordinate level.

H₂: The more conscientious one is, the less s/he will identify with the superordinate group.

EXTRAVERSION

Extraverts tend to be highly active and involved with larger social networks (Gallego and Oberski 2011; Mondak et al. 2010; Wolak and Marcus 2007). They may thus be more likely to interact with people from other subgroups (here, citizens of other EU member states), which should—per the ‘Contact Hypothesis’ (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998)—reduce any bias or prejudice they might have previously felt toward these subgroups at large. In this way, extraverts should be much more open to superordinate identification as they see what they have in common with other nationalities via the superordinate identity alternative. Additionally, extraversion is associated with greater self-esteem (Mondak et al. 2010), making it reasonable that extraverted individuals, being more confident in their preexisting identities, would extend their sense of self even further. Lastly, extraversion is linked to greater success in one’s career (Bakker et al. 2006).

Knowing that those with high occupational prestige exhibit higher levels of European identification (e.g., Pichler 2008b), I predict that extraversion will increase superordinate identification in general.

H₃: The more extraverted one is, the more s/he will identify with the superordinate group.

AGREEABLENESS

Agreeableness may be a double-edged sword and has been shown to have a contradictory impact on several political phenomena (Denny and Doyle 2008; Mondak et al. 2010). While agreeable people are usually seen as friendly and compassionate, they also go to great lengths to maintain social cohesion (Gerber et al. 2011a). “Agreeable people may be happy to participate in common affairs that enhance the well-being of the community but they may want to avoid conflictual situations” (Gallego and Oberski 2011,430). Thus, when it comes to identification, the impact of agreeableness on superordinate identification likely depends on the dominant, socially-desirable and acceptable identity in a particular country or context. Where strong national identity prevails, agreeable individuals may be more hesitant to profess identification with the superordinate, supranational level.

H₄: The more agreeable one is, the less s/he will identify with the superordinate group.

EMOTIONAL STABILITY

Finally, though emotional stability is one of the most difficult traits for which to develop *a priori* expectations (Mondak et al. 2010), it may correlate with greater superordinate identification because highly stable individuals (characterized by calm, relaxed demeanors) should be less susceptible to social pressure to subscribe to others’ opinions, attitudes, or identities without deliberate intention and reflection on their own. They also exhibit low levels of

anxiety (Gerber et al. 2011a) and so should not perceive as much of a threat from being part of a superordinate group that combines their preferred ingroup with former outgroup members.

H₅: The more emotionally stable one is, the more s/he will identify with the superordinate group.

SUBSIDIARY EXPLANATION: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS

Beyond personality, there is an additional element that is relatively uninvestigated in existing literature but which I suspect may also affect identification—especially in the European case. Though not the primary focus of this dissertation, institutional influence and exposure may affect one’s likelihood of identifying with the superordinate group. By “institutions,” I mean concrete governmental institutions with “rules and procedures that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling actors’ behavior” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006, 5).²⁶ Under certain circumstances, institutional influence and exposure may lessen individuals’ attachment to old identities and increase their willingness to incorporate a broader sense of self.

There are two reasons to expect institutions to matter for identification. First, sociological institutionalism posits that institutions define a ‘logic of appropriateness’ capable of changing individuals’ attitudes and behaviors (March and Olsen 1989). As individuals are socialized into a new institutional setting (such as the EU), they may transform their prior beliefs to conform to the new ‘appropriateness’ dictated by their context. Similarly, the neofunctionalist theory of European integration claims the transfer of political authority will eventually produce a ‘spill over’ effect altering citizens’ attachments:

Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political

²⁶ Elite efforts to construct national myths, symbols, traditions, and currencies do not, I argue, constitute a proper institutional effect.

activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states (Haas 1958, 16).²⁷

This suggests people's willingness to embrace a superordinate attachment may depend on the political institutions they see affecting their everyday lives. Institutional design has been shown to play a key role in exacerbating or downplaying ethnic identification (Penn 2008); similar logic should extend to civic identity as well. As individuals become more habitualized to supranational political institutions, they are likely to internalize shifting norms and values; this should help them categorize themselves as part of a broader superordinate ingroup (Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer 2004; Risse 2005). The more citizens interact with EU institutions, the more those institutions should play a role in how they define themselves. Second, from a social-psychological perspective, individual-level contact increases familiarity, which in turn shapes affect toward the object of interaction (Allport 1954; Forbes 1997; Pettigrew 1998). The more people interact positively with EU institutions, the more they may begin to consider themselves European.

Together, these strands of scholarship imply that greater contact with government institutions helps individuals learn about the wider sociopolitical world, thereby reducing their perception of threat from the outgroup. The more citizens find they have in common with those they previously viewed as different, the more they should extend their sense of self to include a superordinate identity. In the case of Europe, this would entail citizens of one nationality recognizing commonalities with citizens of another. Under the right circumstances, institutions should help stimulate these connections and pave the way for collective identification. In the case of Europe, that means that those who are more exposed to—and positively affected by—

²⁷ While 'political actors' may have included only elites in the past, I argue we can extend the same logic to all citizens today.

supranational institutions should be more likely to incorporate the EU into their self-conceptions.²⁸

H₆: The more one feels personally affected by overarching (e.g., supranational) political institutions, the more s/he will identify with the superordinate group.

The subsequent empirical chapters test all these predictions. Chapter 3 uses *Eurobarometer* data from all 27 EU member states while Chapters 4 and 5 use original survey data from the UK.

²⁸ Interestingly, the few existing works that empirically examine European identity conclude that EU institutions have no direct effect on identification. Otherwise, citizens of all EU member states would feel more European over time—something clearly refuted by cases like the UK, which joined the EU in 1973 yet whose citizens, on average, still feel highly nationalistic and Eurosceptic (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Risse, 2010). This implies a disconnect between institutions' effect on identity when studied from different levels of analysis. Might EU institutions affect individual identification in a way that aggregate statistics disguise? Chapter 6 discusses this more.

CHAPTER 3: CONFIRMING A SUPERORDINATE EFFECT ON OUTGROUP ATTITUDES

Abstract: A superordinate identity reduces bias and facilitates intergroup cooperation. Applied to Europe, this suggests that getting European Union (EU) citizens to identify with Europe will increase tolerance and decrease outgroup hostility. So is European identity a superordinate identity? Using *Eurobarometer* data for all 27 member states, I determine which level of identification is the most inclusive for individual attitudes towards immigration. In support of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, I find that those who feel European do indeed hold more favorable views towards immigrants—an effect that is amplified under conditions of cross-cutting cleavages and where country length of EU membership is greatest. In contrast, strong national identity is associated with more negative immigration attitudes; regional identity has no effect. Given identity's importance for interpersonal interaction, intergroup relations, political legitimacy, and democratic success, these findings underscore the need to better understand how superordinate identification arises in the first place.

Keywords: Common Ingroup Identity Model, European Union, identification with Europe, immigration attitudes, superordinate identity

Social psychologists have long focused on the relationship between identity and conflict, noting an innate human tendency to categorize oneself and others into distinctive groups that are then perceived to be in competition for power, resources, and status. Though ingroup favoritism does not inherently imply outgroup hostility (Brewer 1999), studies continually record a high correlation between affect for one's own group and prejudice against another (Duckitt and Mphuthing 1998; Huddy 2001; Oakes 2002; Sumner 1940)—even under the imposition of relatively simplistic and arbitrary identity labels (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Brewer 1996) and especially under conditions of unequal status or contact (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). In many circumstances, these prejudicial attitudes then set the stage for hostile intergroup behavior—ranging from mild discrimination to violent conflict—through perpetuation of negative stereotypes, denigration of the ‘other’, and a desire to exclude outgroup members from receiving the same rights and rewards as ingroup peers.

Yet certain identities and arrangements may have the potential to mitigate—if not altogether negate—these harmful effects by adjusting the way individuals see themselves. Because individuals have multiple identity alternatives (Huddy 2001), the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) contends that recategorizing members of separate subgroups under one overarching superordinate identity can simultaneously reduce bias and induce tolerance (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). Put simply, turning ‘us versus them’ into a new, all-inclusive ‘we’ should help members of formerly-antagonistic groups evaluate one another more positively, thus facilitating intergroup cooperation. While experimental evidence abounds¹ and empirical tests of this hypothesis are rising,² it remains unclear whether and to what extent these findings travel 1) outside the American context and 2) to political-territorial (as

¹ See, for example, Eggins, Haslam, and Reynolds (2002); Gonzáles and Brown (2003); Hornsey and Hogg (2000).

² E.g., Duckitt and Mphuthing (1998); Eller and Abrams (2004); Huo et al. (1996); Transue (2007); West et al. (2009).

opposed to solely racial or ethnic) identities. Therefore, I ask: To what extent is identification with Europe associated with greater tolerance?

After more than sixty years of institutional cooperation and expansion, “European” has become a viable identity alternative for EU citizens. Given that the EU is the leading model for regional integration efforts worldwide, Europe provides an important test case to determine whether a supranational identity is possible, and whether attachments of this scale actually spawn the consequences indicative of superordinate identities. European integration and international migration are constantly reshaping social landscapes, evoking new identity debates and, in some instances, generating hostile attitudes as group boundaries are in flux (McLaren 2001; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Thus, it is vital to know whether European identity unites or divides: does it render individuals more inclusive by extending positive attitudes to a collective ingroup of multiple nationalities, or steer them toward an exclusionary ‘Fortress Europe’ view that exacerbates outgroup antipathy?

Applied to Europe, the CIIM suggests that a shared European identity should ameliorate this situation by helping citizens of contrasting nationalities become more accepting of one another. To assess this projection, I use *Eurobarometer* data to estimate multilevel models that compare the effects of European, national, and regional identification for individual attitudes towards immigration. As predicted, I find that greater identification with Europe improves assessments of immigrants while the opposite effect is evident among those professing a strong national identity.³ Regional identity appears to have no effect. I also test whether individual identification with Europe interacts with a country’s preexisting linguistic and religious context, and how the effect of European identity varies across a country’s length of EU membership.

³ While the CIIM and its evidence support the causal story told here, the cross-sectional nature of these data limit my ability to *prove* the specified direction of causality (that identification causes immigration attitudes) or fully refute alternative ones (i.e., reverse causality, spuriousness, etc.). I return to this limitation in this chapter’s conclusion.

Where cross-cutting cleavages are high, identification with Europe produces even stronger positive sentiments towards immigrants; residing in an older EU member state also amplifies European identity's positive effect.

I proceed as follows. First, I review social psychological work on identity, bias, and conflict reduction. Second, I expand on theoretical expectations for how identification with Europe should operate, especially under varying conditions of cross-cuttingness and length of EU membership. Third, I detail the data and method used in the subsequent analysis. Fourth, I discuss the results. I conclude by noting the contributions, limitations, and implications of my findings.

IDENTITY: AN OVERVIEW

Salient group memberships carry emotional and affective significance for an individual's conception of self (Reicher 2004; Tajfel 1982). The psychological desire for positive differentiation results in preference for one's own group, often—though not necessarily—at the expense of other groups. And ingroup identity need not be strongly entrenched or relevant; 'mere categorization' can activate discrimination and bias against the outgroup (Brewer 1996). Related, Realistic Conflict Theory contends that conflict erupts over perceptions—regardless of how justified—of intergroup threat (Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998; Monroe, Hankin, and Van Vechten 2000; Sherif 1998). Unaddressed, these inclinations forecast a bleak picture of social exchanges in diverse societies.

THE COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL

Studies in conflict reduction posit three different ways of improving relations by manipulating the salience of particular identities during intergroup contact: decategorization,

subcategorization, and recategorization.⁴ Decategorization attempts to break down stereotypes by personalizing interactions between members of opposing subgroups and shifting the focus down to the individual level rather than group identity (Brewer and Miller 1984). In contrast, subcategorization proposes keeping an emphasis on separate subgroup identities where both are needed to achieve a cooperative task (Hewstone 1996; Hewstone and Brown 1986). Finally, recategorization proposes that getting individuals to adopt or recognize an umbrella identity encompassing multiple subgroups is the answer (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). “Original ingroup-outgroup distinctions become less salient when both groups are included in a new ingroup that encompasses previously separate groups” (Brewer 1996, 294). In this case, subgroup identification is retained while the superordinate identity becomes more psychologically central and salient. As the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) proclaims, when contact among ingroup and outgroup members is structured to help them realize what they have in common, feelings of ingroup favoritism may be extended to outgroup members—positive evaluations which then hopefully generalize to other members of the outgroup at large.

While each strategy has proven effective in various ways, a proliferation of support for CIIM has arisen in recent years. After initial work was criticized for conducting only experimental tests of artificial identities in low-stakes settings (Huddy 2001), later studies confirm a superordinate identity can produce positive effects in the real world. A superordinate identity’s ability to reduce outgroup antagonism has been shown among university students who come into contact with others of a different nationality (Eller and Abrams 2004); employees of different ethnicities within the same company (Eller and Abrams 2004); students of a multi-ethnic high school (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996); corporate executives after a recent merger (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996); diverse ethnicity-based work unions within a

⁴ See Brewer (1996) for a more comprehensive review of each theory.

public-sector organization (Huo et al. 1996); white South Africans' views of blacks (Gibson and Gouws 2003); white Americans deciding whether to support a tax increase for minority benefits (Transue 2007); and college roommates of opposite race (West et al. 2009).

Importantly, a superordinate identity need not eradicate subgroup identification altogether. In fact, it may be that conditions which promote dual identification with both the sub- and the superordinate group yield the most positive effects (González and Brown 2003; Hornsey and Hogg 2000). Emphasis on dual identity may be the best avenue, particularly when dealing with already-extensive subgroups like nationality (Eller and Abrams 2004). The tradeoff is this: “When the dual identity is salient, the superordinate component should be slightly less effective in producing positive attitudes in the immediate contact situation, but the salient categorization component should facilitate the generalization of contact effects” (Eller and Abrams 2004, 231). In other words, maintaining a strong subgroup identity in the midst of superordinate recategorization should be most likely to help subgroup members view those opposing subgroups in a positive light—regardless of whether they have experienced personal contact with the entire outgroup.

OPERATIONALIZING INTERGROUP HOSTILITY

A common indicator of outgroup evaluations is an individual's attitudes towards immigrants. In contrast to alternative explanations (discussed shortly), identity considerations have risen both in popularity and explanatory power over the years (McLaren 2002; Mughan and Paxton 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007). Here, perceptions of cultural (aka ‘symbolic’) threat operate through the mechanisms of prejudice and intergroup hostility to make natives less accepting of foreigners (de Master and Le Roy 2000; E. Green 2007, 2009; Quillian 1995; Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006; Stephan and Stephan 2000). This xenophobia can erupt into profound

social clashes over clearly different ways of life (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007), making the study of remedies to identity conflict all the more important.

EUROPEAN IDENTITY

The European context is an apt location for studying the relationship between identity and immigration for two reasons. First, national and regional ties are more strongly entrenched in Europe than elsewhere (Díez Medrano 2003; Fitjar 2010), bringing identity issues to the fore⁵ and actually making superordinate identification less likely—particularly among those who perceive the EU as a threat to national sovereignty (Smith 1992). Yet despite their historical prevalence, European integration has opened up the potential for greater identification with Europe. The EU’s motto, “United in Diversity,” proclaims its desire to encompass the various economic, cultural, and social heritages of member states within a larger political-institutional framework. And so, perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, European citizens confront multiple options for political-territorial self-identification—including a visible superordinate contender. Second, European integration has intensified exposure to other cultural groups. Immigration has become extremely controversial and politicized among European parties and publics (Fitzgerald, Curtis, and Corliss 2012; Lahav 2004; McLaren 2001) at the same time that national policymakers’ efforts to ramp up the fight against unwanted immigration—like France’s recent deportation of Roma—has left many immigrants feeling helpless and unwelcome (Fraser 2010; Stinson 2008).

Can a superordinate identity offer hope? In many ways, European identity exhibits the desired dual emphasis on both sub- and superordinate group: few expect citizens to completely

⁵ For instance, identity considerations are a highly-explored and enduring determinant of EU support (Carey 2002; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005; Kritzinger 2003; Lubbers and Scheepers 2007).

let go of old allegiances anytime soon (Fossum 2001; Kohli 2000). And in most cases, the very essence of ‘Europe’ is deeply intertwined with national interpretations of it (Pichler 2008a; Risse 2010).

For the present purposes, it matters little *what* individuals may be thinking of when asked about their level of identification with Europe. Though the specific contents of European identity fall into civic versus cultural components (Bruter 2003, 2005, 2009; Pichler 2008a), in theory all that matters is whether seeing oneself as European—whatever that may mean to a person—activates the psychological processes of a common ingroup identity. If this is true, people who identify strongly with Europe should be more accepting of immigrants:

H₁: The more one identifies with the superordinate group, the less hostility s/he will exhibit towards outgroups.


CONTEXTUAL CONDITIONS

As with many sociopolitical phenomena, certain conditions may enhance or exacerbate a given effect. I explore two here: cross-cuttingness and length of exposure to a superordinate identity alternative.

CROSS-CUTTING CLEAVAGES

Ingroup-outgroup animosity appears strongest in societies divided along a single cleavage (generally operationalized in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, and class). Where fractionalization is nested and hierarchical, intergroup interaction only serves to enhance ingroup perception of threat from the outgroup (Brewer 1996). But where social interactions are instead structured by extensive and persistent cross-cutting associations, there is greater propensity for intergroup peace and cooperation (Goodin 1975; Olzak 1992, 2006; Rae and Taylor 1970; Zuckerman 1975)—which may hold the key to sociopolitical stability (Lipset 1959).

Figure 3.1: Low v. High Cross-Cutting Cleavages



Selway (2011, 48) cites Lane and Ersson's (1994) definition of a cleavage: a "division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups, or organizations [between] whom conflict may arise. These criteria can be ascriptive, such as race, caste, ethnicity, language, or attitudinal, that is, ideology, preference, class, or religion." In other words, cleavages reflect the enduring social divisions prominent in any given society. For clarity, Figure 3.1 differentiates between two levels of cross-cutting cleavages (CCC). Let the dotted line represent one cleavage dividing society into two different categories ("A" and "B") while the dashed line represents another cleavage producing two additional affiliations ("C" and "D"). When cross-cutting cleavages are low or nonexistent, there is a much higher probability that the two cleavages overlap, such that members of group A are also extremely likely to also possess the necessary characteristic defining group C; likewise for groups B and D. In this case, the potential for conflict increases because the overlapping cleavages make social divisions so much more salient.⁶ In contrast, conditions of high cross-cutting cleavages offer the opposite: Members of group A or B have almost equal

⁶ A classic example would be that members of the same ethnicity are also almost entirely members of the same religious group, exacerbating the contrasting differences members of one cleavage perceive with those of another.

chances of also belonging to group C *or* D. In this way, the cross-cutting cleavages reduce the probability that prejudice will flare between members of opposing social groups because members of one group can play up their similarity with another social group, recognizing that not all members of their contrasting category are entirely or inherently different from themselves.

The conflict-reducing benefits of cross-cuttingness stem from two complementary mechanisms. At the individual level, cross-cutting cleavages increase the number of identity alternatives available and lessen one's reliance on any single identity for self-definition. "Such cross-cutting ingroup-outgroup distinctions reduce the intensity of the individual's dependence on any particular ingroup for meeting psychological needs for inclusion, thereby reducing the potential for polarizing loyalties along any single cleavage or group distinction and perhaps increasing tolerance for outgroups in general" (Brewer 1999, 438). Simultaneous membership in multiple groups thus increases the chances that individuals will have something in common with other people they encounter and decreases the potential for exclusivist attitudes.⁷ When these individual effects are aggregated, cross-cutting cleavages often generate structural arrangements—such as those associated with consociational governance—that minimize political fragmentation and incentivize compromise (Lijphart 1977; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Altogether, this implies that where cross-cuttingness is high, the positive effects of superordinate identification with Europe on immigration attitudes should be even more pronounced. Conversely, where cross-cuttingness is low, a superordinate identity may be less able to take psychological root during encounters with individuals from opposing subgroups:

⁷ For example, the powerful prejudices associated with religious intolerance (Hobolt et al. 2011) should be less prevalent in contexts where religious cross-cuttingness is high and a country thus not only has more religious affiliations to choose from, but its citizens also have a higher probability of sharing features *besides* religion with one another. In this way, cross-cuttingness should mitigate the bias generated from any one particular affiliation.

H₂: The greater cross-cuttingness in a society, the greater positive impact superordinate identification will have on an individual's attitudes towards outgroups.

LENGTH OF EXPOSURE TO THE SUPERORDINATE IDENTITY ALTERNATIVE

Additionally, the amount of time in which a superordinate identity has been a viable alternative may affect the extent to which its positive effects are realized. Varying degrees of exposure have been shown to affect opinion change in other areas (Festinger 1964), and may play a strong role in identification as well. Prior work confirms that the salience of the EU and, hence, identification with Europe depends on its psychological existence (aka 'entitativity') in the minds of citizens (Castano 2004, 41, 53), which could likely be affected by their country's year of EU entry.

After decades of Soviet influence, several Central and Eastern European countries only recently joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. While the underlying determinants of identification with Europe do not appear to differ across Western and Central/Eastern member states (Gherghina and Chiru 2011), the consequences of doing so may. Identification with Europe should have a weaker positive effect on immigration attitudes among citizens of newer member states who have had less time to adjust to EU membership and perhaps internalize a superordinate European identity.

H₃: The older a superordinate identity alternative, the greater positive impact identification with it will have on an individual's attitudes towards outgroups.

ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

In addition to perceived cultural threat, existing explanations of immigration attitudes fall along three dimensions: economic anxiety, crime concern, and demographics. Along with identity, these factors likely affect whether and to what extent individuals inclusively accept immigrants.

Many oppose immigration because of feared competition over scarce economic resources like jobs or social benefits (Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998; Gang, Riviera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Olzak 1992). The dual threats of labor market competition and fiscal burden negatively affect natives' preference for immigration, though the precise role of individual skill level and income, along with country wealth, is somewhat disputed. Some find that lower-skilled and poor natives are more exclusive than higher-skilled and richer ones (Mayda 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006) while others uncover this exclusionary trend in natives of any skill or wealth level (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Sociotropic assessments of the national economy also affect openness to immigration. In hard economic times, individuals report more negative attitudes towards immigrants (Citrin et al. 1997; Kiewiet 1983; Lahav 2004).

Next, security concerns are a powerful predictor of immigration attitudes (Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, and Halperin 2008; Fitzgerald, Curtis, and Corliss 2012; McLaren and Johnson 2007). Though objective statistics typically show no or even a negative connection between immigration and crime (Aebi 2004; Hiatt 2007; Wadsworth 2010), many individuals cling to the subjective perception of immigrants as criminals and use that as a reason to oppose immigration at large. Finally, hostility towards immigrants is consistently apparent in older males with less educational experience (Fetzer 2000; E. Green 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).

DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND METHOD

To test the above predictions, I use the 2009 *Eurobarometer 71.3* (Papacostas 2009) which surveys nearly 30,000 respondents from all 27 EU member states. The dependent variable, *Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index*, combines respondents' answers to seven questions about whether immigrants enrich 'our' culture, are a cause of insecurity, increase unemployment, fill unwanted jobs, help solve the problem of Europe's ageing population, play an important role in

increasing tolerance and understanding, and contribute more in taxes than they benefit from government services.⁸ In each instance, respondents were asked whether they tended to agree or disagree, resulting in a mean index ranging from zero to one with 19 overall categories.⁹ The mean is 0.472 (s.d. = 0.319), suggesting that citizens have relatively low opinions of immigration in general—though there is substantial variation across countries (Figure 3.2). Immigration attitudes are most favorable in Sweden (mean = 0.694; s.d. = 0.273) and most hostile in Malta (mean = 0.194; s.d. = 0.224), though no immediate pattern is discernible from this visual inspection.

To capture superordinate identification, the key independent variable (*Feel European*) reflects assessments of whether one thinks of him- or herself as European not at all, not really, somewhat, or to a great extent.¹⁰ Likewise, *Feel National* and *Feel Regional* capture the extent to which individuals personally see themselves in terms of these other identity alternatives.¹¹ Replicating other studies, these three levels of political-territorial identification are positively correlated with one another, confirming that most individuals do not view identity in zero-sum terms but instead often hold multiple identities simultaneously (Citrin and Sides 2004; Gherghina and Chiru 2011). Identification with Europe correlates with national and regional identification at 0.132 and 0.134, respectively, while national and regional identification are correlated with

⁸ Where necessary, variables were recoded so that higher values reflect more positive and inclusive attitudes towards immigrants. See Appendix A for additional details on variable construction and descriptive statistics.


⁹ The Cronbach's alpha for these seven indicators is 0.7281. Principal-components factor analysis produces a two-dimension solution with the two negatively-phrased statements loading independently of the other five positively-phrased ones. However, I use all available questions, as they allow exploration into the many facets of opinions towards immigrants. All results hold when an index of only the five positive statements is used.

¹⁰ Alternative operationalizations of superordinate identification (including a -3 to +3 measure of whether one feels more European than national, a dichotomous variable equal to one if a respondent reports feeling European at all, and a summative index of cumulative attachment to all three levels of identity) produce identical results.

¹¹ The ability to measure the strength of these loyalties independently of one another is much preferred to past *Eurobarometer* questions requiring respondents to select the level they identified with 'first and foremost' (Sinnott 2005).

one another at 0.339.¹² The sample mean of each type of identification shows that the average EU citizen feels more national (mean = 2.752; s.d. = 0.593) than regional (mean = 2.658; s.d. = 0.636) than European (mean = 1.951; s.d. = 0.924). While the order of these attachments varies widely across individuals, the aggregate pattern makes clear, first, that superordinate identification is not that common, and, second, that national identities prevail. This—in addition to the cross-country variation observed in Figure 3.2 and confirmed through analysis of variance in Table 1, Model 1—highlights the importance of understanding how each type of identification operates for attitudes towards immigrants.

Figure 3.2: Mean Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index by Country



Note: n = 29,341

¹² Despite this slight collinearity, I retain measures of all three types of identification in the model for two reasons. First, theoretically-speaking, each type of identity may—and indeed does—have a different independent effect on one’s attitudes toward immigration. And second, statistically-speaking, though principal-components factor analysis produces a one-factor solution, identification with Europe loads much less strongly (0.484) than national (0.770) or regional identification (0.772), suggesting it is somewhat distinct from the other two forms of identity. Importantly, all results are identical when any or both other identification indicators are excluded from the analysis.

I operationalize anxiety over crime with a dichotomous variable, *Crime is An Issue*, equal to one if a respondent mentioned crime as one of the ‘two most important issues facing [our country]’. The *Economic Situation Index* taps evaluations of both egocentric (personal) and sociotropic (national) economic matters. Dummies for whether one is *Unemployed* or a *Blue Collar Worker* test the effects of perceived economic threat in terms of job competition. I control for demographics using *L-R Ideology*, *Age*, gender (*Male*), *Education*, residence (*Urban*), and home ownership (*Homeowner*). Finally, I include a dichotomous variable for whether a respondent was *Born Here*. At the country-level, I first employ an index of *Linguistic-Religious Cross-Cuttingness* from Selway’s (2011) “Cross-country Indices of Multidimensional Measures of Social Structure” (CIMMS), such that higher values indicate greater overlapping social ties while lower values reflect more unidimensional fractionalization. Secondly, I include a measure of *Length of EU Membership*, calculated as the survey year minus each country’s year of EU entry.

Multi-level regression controls for the underlying structure of these data (individuals nested within countries) and enhances our ability to explain—rather than simply control for—contextual variance in attitudes towards immigration (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Not only does statistically significant variance exist at the country level (Table 1, Model 1), but it actually comprises 12.38% of the total variance in the dependent variable. In addition to this variance being substantively intriguing, failure to properly account for the clustering of individuals from the same country context would deflate standard errors and increase the likelihood of erroneously finding significance (Snijders and Bosker 1999). To avoid this problem, I first employ random-intercept hierarchical models (allowing baseline immigration attitudes to vary by country) before later turning to random-coefficient models

(allowing the slope of European identity's effect on attitudes towards immigrants to vary by country) that test the predicted cross-level interactions.¹³

INDIVIDUAL, CONTEXTUAL, AND CROSS-LEVEL RESULTS

LINEAR EFFECTS

Table 3.1, Model 2 provides a sense of the basic effect of each individual-level predictor for immigration attitudes—effects that remain robust throughout all analyses and specifications. Providing confirmatory support for Hypothesis 1, superordinate European identification is positively and significantly associated with more inclusive attitudes towards immigrants. This effect is substantively stronger than the negative pull of national identity: a one-unit increase in *Feeling European* results in a 0.061 improvement in immigration attitudes, compared to a -0.042 decrease from a similar shift in *Feeling National*. Regional attachment appears orthogonal to evaluations of immigrant outgroups (as evidenced by its insignificance here).

The other individual-level predictors perform as expected. Fear of crime is negative and significant, underscoring the importance of perceived safety threat. Perceived economic threat is also apparent. The better one feels about his or her personal and the national economic situation, the more positively s/he will view immigration. Though being unemployed does not significantly alter immigration attitudes, individual skill level (*Blue Collar Worker*) does. Consistent with past studies, greater education and more cosmopolitan residence correspond with friendlier attitudes towards immigrants; subscribing to a right-leaning ideology is associated with more negative ones. Contrary to findings established elsewhere, age and gender do not appear to matter (perhaps because immigration attitudes can be equally polarized across males and females of all generations); neither does home ownership.

¹³ All variables are centered at their means, allowing the constant to reflect the average immigration sentiment for the average individual across all groups.


Table 3.1: Multilevel Determinants of Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index

	1: ANOVA			2: Individual-Level			3: Cross-Cuttingness			4: Membership		
	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.
FIXED EFFECTS												
Individual-Level												
Feel European				0.061	0.003	**	0.061	0.003	**	0.061	0.003	**
Feel National				-0.042	0.004	**	-0.042	0.004	**	-0.042	0.004	**
Feel Regional				-0.004	0.004		-0.004	0.004		-0.004	0.004	
Crime is An Issue				-0.049	0.005	**	-0.049	0.005	**	-0.049	0.005	**
Economic Situation Index				0.074	0.004	**	0.074	0.004	**	0.074	0.004	**
L-R Ideology				-0.013	0.001	**	-0.013	0.001	**	-0.013	0.001	**
Age				0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	
Male				0.002	0.004		0.002	0.004		0.002	0.004	
Education				0.044	0.003	**	0.044	0.003	**	0.044	0.003	**
Urban				0.012	0.003	**	0.012	0.003	**	0.012	0.003	**
Born Here				-0.076	0.009	**	-0.076	0.009	**	-0.076	0.009	**
Homeowner				-0.008	0.005		-0.008	0.005		-0.008	0.005	
Unemployed				0.010	0.008		0.010	0.008		0.010	0.008	
Blue Collar Worker				-0.027	0.006	**	-0.027	0.006	**	-0.027	0.006	**
Country-Level												
Ling-Relig Cross-Cuttingness							0.193	0.099	*			
Length of EU Membership										0.001	0.001	
Constant (γ_{00})	0.461	0.022	**	0.361	0.026	**	0.472	0.062	**	-0.014	0.463	
VARIANCE COMPONENTS												
Individual-Level Variance (σ^2)	0.092	0.001	**	0.082	0.001	**	0.082	0.001	**	0.082	0.001	**
Country-Level Variance (τ_{00})	0.013	0.004	**	0.009	0.002	**	0.008	0.002	**	0.008	0.002	**
MODEL FIT												
Number of Individuals	26,048			19,929			19,929			19,929		
Number of Countries	27			27			27			27		
Individual-Level Variance Explained				11.55%			11.55%			11.55%		
Country-Level Variance Explained				33.24%			41.52%			37.51%		
Deviance ($-2 \times \text{Log Likelihood}$)	11,996.31			6,748.73			6,745.14			6,746.94		
<p><i>Note</i> : Table entries are xtmixed, mle var estimates of a two-level random intercept model. For ease of interpretation, all variables are centered at their means. *$\leq .05$; **$\leq .01$</p>												

Turning to contextual effects, Models 3 and 4 add in a country's cross-cuttingness and length of EU membership. Again, none of the individual-level effects changes in either sign or significance. Residing in highly cross-cut linguistic and religious societies appears to improve individuals' assessments of immigrants while coming from a newer EU member state is associated with no less significantly favorable views towards immigration. Though each model helps explain a good portion of the variance in immigration attitudes at both the individual and

country levels, there is still significant variance to be explained after weighing each group of predictors.¹⁴

Figure 3.3: Substantive Effects on Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index



Note: Bars represent the effect of moving from the minimum to the maximum value of each independent variable based on Table 3.1, Models 2 and 3. Only the effects of significant variables shown.

To more thoroughly compare the magnitude of these effects, Figure 3.3 illustrates the change in predicted value on the *Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index* when moving across the full range of each significant variable. Ordered from greatest to least, identification with the superordinate category is the second-strongest substantive effect. Moving from identifying with Europe not at all to a great extent translates to a 0.18 overall increase in predicted value. Essentially, those who feel very European are almost 20% more likely to exhibit positive attitudes toward immigrants than those who do not feel European at all (predicted values of 0.525 versus 0.342). This effect is only slightly trumped by economic evaluations and relatively matched by education.

¹⁴ Model 3 appears the best model fit, as evidenced by both the amount of variance explained and the lowest deviance score.

Comparing contextual effects, Figure 3.3 shows that moving from the lowest to highest degree of linguistic-religious cross-cuttingness (positions occupied by Malta and Spain) increases immigration attitudes by 0.14 (predicted values of 0.364 versus 0.509, respectively). These results support the CIIM hypothesis that a superordinate identity can help improve intergroup attitudes and minimize outgroup animosity. What remains to be seen is whether and how this effect changes under contextual conditions of cross-cuttingness and time in the EU.

MODERATING EFFECTS

As outlined earlier, cross-cutting cleavages may make it easier for individuals to conceive of themselves as members of multiple groups, thereby increasing the chance that an overarching superordinate identity will help subgroup members view one another in a more positive light. If this expectation holds, the coefficient on the interaction term should be positive and significant, indicating that the marginal effect of identification with Europe on immigration attitudes increases as cross-cutting cleavages increase. Table 3.2, Model 5 tests this prediction by including a cross-level interaction between individual strength of Europeaness and country level of linguistic-religious cross-cuttingness.

A positive interaction effect is indeed observed, lending credence to Hypothesis 2. Results indicate that when cross-cuttingness is at its lowest, a one-unit increase in identification with Europe results in a 0.102 improvement in immigration attitudes. Conversely, when superordinate identification is at its lowest, the effect of cross-cuttingness is statistically indistinguishable from zero. To better elucidate the relationship between these two variables, Figure 3.4 displays the predicted value of the *Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index* by combination of European identification and cross-cuttingness; Figure 3.5 then graphs the marginal effect of identification with Europe on the dependent variable across values of the moderating condition.


Table 3.2: Contextual Moderators of Identification with Europe's Effect

	5: Cross-Cuttingness			6: Membership		
	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.
FIXED EFFECTS						
Individual-Level						
Feel European	0.102	0.015	**	0.061	0.003	**
Feel National	-0.042	0.004	**	-0.043	0.004	**
Feel Regional	-0.005	0.004		-0.004	0.004	
Crime is An Issue	-0.048	0.005	**	-0.048	0.005	**
Economic Situation Index	0.074	0.004	**	0.074	0.004	**
L-R Ideology	-0.013	0.001	**	-0.013	0.001	**
Age	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	
Male	0.002	0.004		0.002	0.004	
Education	0.043	0.003	**	0.043	0.003	**
Urban	0.012	0.003	**	0.012	0.003	**
Born Here	-0.074	0.009	**	-0.075	0.009	**
Homeowner	-0.008	0.005		-0.008	0.005	
Unemployed	0.010	0.008		0.010	0.008	
Blue Collar Worker	-0.028	0.006	**	-0.027	0.006	**
Country-Level						
Ling-Relig Cross-Cuttingness	0.101	0.104				
Length of EU Membership				0.011	0.003	**
Constant (γ_{00})	0.418	0.065	**	0.026	0.463	
RANDOM EFFECTS						
Cross-Level Interactions						
Feel European \times Ling-Relig Cross-Cuttingness	0.072	0.024	**			
Feel European \times Length of EU Membership				0.000	0.000	**
VARIANCE COMPONENTS						
Cross-Level Variance						
Ling-Relig Cross-Cuttingness	0.0002	0.0001	**			
Length of EU Membership				0.000	0.000	**
Other						
Individual-Level Variance (σ^2)	0.081	0.001	**	0.082	0.001	**
Country-Level Variance (τ_{00})	0.008	0.002	**	0.008	0.002	**
MODEL FIT						
Number of Individuals	19,929			19,929		
Number of Countries	27			27		
Individual-Level Variance Explained	11.84%			11.61%		
Country-Level Variance Explained	38.56%			36.81%		
Deviance ($-2 \times \text{Log Likelihood}$)	6,702.55			6,733.70		

Table entries are xtmixed, mle var covariance(unstructured) estimates of a two-level random coefficient model with cross-level interactions. For ease of interpretation, all variables are centered at their means. * $\leq .05$; ** $\leq .01$


Of the countries examined here, Malta has the lowest degree of cross-cutting cleavages while Spain has the highest. Therefore, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 can be interpreted as the overall difference between Maltese and Spanish citizens who identify equally as strongly (or weakly) with Europe. The predicted value changes by 0.199 (from 0.392 to 0.591) while the corresponding marginal effect of European identity on immigration attitudes increases from 0.026 in Malta to 0.079 in Spain—a total shift in slope of 0.054. This positive percentage shows that high cross-cuttingness has the ability to boost superordinate identification’s already-positive effect on outgroup evaluations.

Figure 3.4: Predicted Values of Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index Across Levels of Identification with Europe and Cross-Cuttingness



Note: Based on results from Table 5.2, Model 5.

Figure 3.5: Marginal Effect of Identification with Europe across Levels of Cross-Cuttingness




Note: Based on results from Table 5.2, Model 5.

Next, I test for changes in identification with Europe's effect across country length of EU membership. In addition to having been exposed to the European identity alternative for less time, citizens of newer EU member states may hold systematically different views of immigration, which could attenuate a superordinate identity's likelihood of reducing intergroup prejudice. In either case, the interaction between individual superordinate identification superordinate identity and country length of EU membership would be positively signed, as one's residence in an older member state would amplify the already-positive tendencies associated with identifying with Europe.

Table 3.2, Model 6, shows that country length of EU membership exerts a statistically significant (albeit substantively small) positive moderating effect on the relationship between superordinate identification and attitudes towards immigration. This supports Hypothesis 3. As depicted in Figure 3.6, the effect of identification with Europe is moderated by country length of EU membership: moving from minimum to maximum years in the EU produces a 0.08


difference in predicted immigration attitudes (0.489 to 0.573). Similarly, as portrayed in Figure 3.7, the positive marginal effect of identifying with Europe is amplified in the oldest EU member states compared to newer ones, for a total change in slope of 0.023 (from 0.062 to 0.085). Thus, though superordinate identification has an already-positive effect on its own, its ability to ease intergroup tensions appears most prevalent in country contexts where the European identity alternative has been made more salient by longer EU membership.

Figure 3.6: Predicted Values of Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index by Length of EU Membership



Note: Based on results from Table 3.2, Model 6.

Figure 3.7: Marginal Effect of Identification with Europe by Length of EU Membership



Note: Based on results from Table 3.2, Model 6.

CONCLUSION

The above analysis sought to gauge whether expectations about the positive effects of a superordinate identity for intergroup relations generalize to political-territorial identification in the European Union. It also sought to elucidate superordinate identification's effect in different contextual circumstances, namely under conditions of meager versus many cross-cutting cleavages and short versus long exposure to the superordinate identity alternative. Two noteworthy results stand out from this investigation into the real-world relationship between European identity and attitudes towards immigration.

First, the comparison of different levels of identification aimed to satisfy the recommendation that scholars "...focus on understanding the psychology of multiple group identities and its implication for intergroup perceptions and attitudes" (Brewer 1999, 442). Doing so not only allowed for consideration of the strength of individuals' attachment to each identity, but also analysis of the distinct consequences of different identity categories. In every instance,

greater holding a European identity—which theoretically subsumes multiple subgroup nationalities under one superordinate umbrella—was matched by more inclusive views of and positive affect towards immigrants. National identification demonstrated the opposite relationship, once again confirming that exclusive preference for one’s own subgroup elicits greater bias against members of the outgroup (Huddy 2001). Regional identification had no effect, suggesting that subnational affiliations are a less salient dimension of European identity politics.

Second, as with many things, context matters. Psychological features like identity rarely operate on a blank slate, and certain preexisting conditions may augment or undercut the positive effects of superordinate identification. Cross-cutting cleavages, long championed as desirable for political stability and conflict reduction (Lipset 1959; Olzak 2006), enhanced evaluations of immigrants on their own and operated in conjunction with identification with Europe to maximize positive attitudes towards immigration. Similarly, greater country length of EU membership correlated with more favorable views towards immigrants and amplified the strength of superordinate identification’s positive effect.

Altogether, these findings solidify the precepts of the Common Ingroup Identity Model as a method of recategorizing individuals’ self-conceptions in order to minimize intergroup animosity and maximize intergroup cooperation (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). At the same time, they raise some issues worthy of further consideration.

First, further analysis is necessary before concluding that a definitive *causal* relationship exists between the variables under scrutiny. Whether identification causes inclusiveness or favorable views towards immigrants increase an individual’s propensity to view him- or herself as part of the superordinate group in the first place is unresolved. For now, we simply see that

these psychological traits—a superordinate sense of self and tolerance for immigrants—are systematically bundled together. Though past experimental evidence for the CIIM suggests that recategorization comes before improved outgroup evaluations, the cross-sectional nature of the present data, in addition to a reliance on strictly attitudinal measures, curbs any causal certainty. Furthermore, given xenophobia’s high correlation with strong national identity (de Master and Le Roy 2000; McLaren 2001; Quillian 1995), future work should turn to longitudinal analyses or experiments that can parse out the causal relationship between subgroup attachment, willingness to identify superordinately, and outgroup prejudice.

Next, though basic predictions were confirmed here, greater distinctions can—and should—be made to qualify the extent to which a superordinate identity increases favorable views towards immigrants. Immigration attitudes may vary depending on *who* is doing the migrating. Whether a native reacts with prejudice or tolerance can depend on immigrants’ geographical and cultural backgrounds (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004), as well on the particular reason for and circumstances surrounding their emigration (i.e., exchange student versus guest worker versus refugee; legal versus illegal, etc.) (E. Green 2007, 2009; McLaren 2001). Does superordinate identification operate the same way in each instance, prompting blanket acceptance of all types of immigrants? Or might identification with Europe evoke stronger affect for fellow EU nationals while immigrants from other—especially lesser developed—areas of the world instead provoke heightened perceptions of threat? Future work should incorporate reliable measures of both objective migration statistics and subjective survey responses to investigate this possibility.¹⁵

¹⁵ As a step in this direction, Appendix B tests whether the positive effect of identifying with Europe differs in countries known to have high levels of EU versus non-EU immigration. While the magnitude of its impact appears greatest in places receiving predominantly EU immigrants, identification with Europe is still positive and significant where immigration from non-EU countries abounds, I then replicate these results using data from my UK *Political*

Limitations aside, what implications do these findings hold for political psychology and intergroup behavior? For now, they optimistically affirm that identification with the superordinate group helps everybody get along, and empirically demonstrate that identification with Europe produces the intergroup consequences expected of a superordinate identity.¹⁶ Thus, it is critical that scholars better isolate the determinants of superordinate identification in the first place.

Attitudes and Identities Survey, where respondents were asked specifically about their views towards EU versus non-EU immigrants. Once again, I show that identification with Europe makes one more friendly toward *all* immigrants, though its benefit is strongest on attitudes towards immigrants who fall under the same superordinate category (i.e., those from fellow EU member states).

¹⁶ The contextual conditions that incentivize this tendency, however, are clearly less easy to manipulate and replicate, as increasing societal cross-cuttingness or rewriting the past do not happen overnight.

CHAPTER 4: THE PERSONALITY DETERMINANTS OF SUPERORDINATE IDENTIFICATION WITH EUROPE

Abstract: Using original data from a nationally-representative survey conducted in the United Kingdom (UK), this chapter empirically examines the hypothesis that the personality traits of openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability affect superordinate identification. After justifying the UK as an appropriate test case, I describe my survey and its sampling procedures, review existing strategies and debates surrounding the proper measurement of the Big Five traits, and report results of factor analysis and reliability scores of the personality items. Next, I briefly detail the measurement of other important variables and present the ultimate causal model before regressing identification with Europe on the various theoretical explanations posited in Chapter 2. As predicted, several of the Big Five traits matter for identification. I then compare their substantive effects to other significant determinants (perceived institutional effect, education, ethnicity, and religion) before conducting a subsequent analysis of which specific characteristics from each of the overarching traits seem to be driving these results.

Keywords: Big Five personality traits, identification with Europe, *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey*, superordinate identification

What—if any—factors link personality to political-territorial identity? To what extent do the Big Five personality traits (openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability) affect someone’s identification with the superordinate group? Chapter 2 outlined several reasons to suspect that people with certain predispositions may be more or less likely to see themselves in superordinate terms. This chapter reports the results of an original *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey* (PAIS) I designed specifically to test personality’s role in individual identification.

To proceed, I first describe the survey and its sampling techniques, underscoring why the United Kingdom (UK) is an appropriate test case for examining the theoretical relationships at hand. Second, I discuss the measurement and distribution of the dependent variable (superordinate identification), key independent variables (the Big Five traits), and covariates. Third, I report results from a multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of identification with Europe and compare the magnitude of each predictor’s effect. I find that many of the expected traits (particularly openness to experience, extraversion, and agreeableness) affect how strongly one identifies with Europe and matter substantively more than most other predictors. Finally, I deconstruct the Big Five indices and evaluate which underlying characteristics operate for each trait.

THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Finding no existing data that include measures of both the Big Five personality traits and superordinate identification with Europe, I designed a 38-question *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey* (PAIS) to test my hypotheses and gauge public opinion on a variety of other issues.¹ In addition to asking a battery of 25 personality items (more detail below) and inquiring

¹ The complete survey is provided in Appendix C.

as to how strongly respondents identify with a host of different identity alternatives), the survey also probes individuals' attitudes towards the European Union, tests their objective knowledge of and participation in both national and EU affairs, assesses their views toward immigrants, and much more. I then hired the London-based polling firm *Opinium Research, LLP*² to administer the survey online to a nationally-representative sample in the UK between June 28 – July 3, 2012.³ Opinium invited 6,913 members of their standing panel to participate; 2,123 respondents completed the survey for a total response rate of 30.71%. To ensure that the ultimate sample was representative of the UK population at large, final results were weighted to match national targets for age, gender, region, employment status, and social grade based on figures from the Office for National Statistics⁴ and National Readership Survey.⁵ Opinium also eliminated anyone who had not answered all questions, bringing the effective sample size to 2,002 respondents.

WHY THE UK?

The data at hand enable a close analysis of the relationship between personality and identification in a single country: the UK. Several prior studies of identification with Europe necessarily focus on one or a just a handful of countries due to financial constraints, language difficulties, and/or data availability.⁶ Though pragmatic considerations affected my case selection (e.g., in-country contacts, a UK-specific research fellowship, lower total survey cost compared to quotes received for the same study in other countries, no need for language translation, etc.), it is also methodologically justified. Though a larger study of representative

² <http://www.opinium.co.uk/>

³ Appendix D provides some sample webpages to give a better sense of how the survey looked to respondents.

⁴ <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html>

⁵ <http://www.nrs.co.uk/>

⁶ Diéz Medrano and Gutierrez (2001) look only at Spain. Cinnirella (1997) contrasts Italy and the UK. Diéz Medrano (2003) focuses on the UK, Germany, and Spain. Bruter (2003) examines France, Britain, and the Netherlands. Bruter (2009) expands his analysis to six countries: the UK, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, and Sweden. Kennedy (2010) investigates only Moldova—which is not, as of yet, an official member of the EU but has close ties to it through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

samples from each of the 27 EU member states would have been ideal, the fact that I am precluded from this opportunity in the short-term should not be problematic given that others have overcome the same problem in a similar fashion.⁷

The smaller-scale analysis here provides a critical starting point for investigating the hypothesized relationships for two reasons. First, and most importantly, a case is appropriate when it stands for a determinate population (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 306-7). Not only are these data nationally representative of the UK as a whole, but they should accurately represent any case of superordinate political-territorial identification because the underlying psychological processes theorized in Chapter 2 should be uniform across individuals, regardless of (though perhaps interacting with) country context. One of the central premises of all psychological work is that ‘people are people’—in other words, that the same general effects (in terms of sign and significance) should be apparent no matter where a phenomenon is studied, even though contextual circumstances may condition the overall magnitude of those effects (Anderson 2007).

Our ability to draw conclusions from a single location is further bolstered when seeking to make comparisons across a group of countries that share an important characteristic, whether geographical, political, social, or economic (Rose 2007). Those living within the EU area have *all* these things in common.⁸ Thus, at the very least, findings in the UK should generalize to other EU member states where citizens face the same superordinate European identity alternative; as elaborated upon in Chapter 6, I expect my results to apply outside of Europe as well. If, as expected, traits like openness to experience and extraversion increase one’s likelihood

⁷ Though cross-national public opinion surveys like the Eurobarometer (EB), European Social Survey (ESS), International Social Survey Program (ISSP), and others have—at least in theory—made it easier for scholars to analyze a greater number of countries at once, it should again be noted that none of these extant options contained measures of the concept most necessary to the question this dissertation explores: personality.

⁸ As Rose notes, “The European Union provides a politically meaningful context for comparing individual behavior. Its twenty-seven member states are committed to common standards and policies in a variety of fields; government officials are constantly interacting in pan-European meetings; citizens of any country have freedom to travel and study in other countries; and all can vote in elections of the European Parliament” (2007, 291).

of seeing him or herself as part of the superordinate group, their fundamental effect should be identical in every country and it should not necessarily matter *where* the relationship is studied empirically.

Secondly, the UK may actually provide a difficult test of my theory precisely because its aggregate levels of identification with Europe are often far below those of other EU member states. Much about the UK's history (i.e., geographic location, island status, colonial power, transatlantic relations, etc.) has led to the establishment of a strongly entrenched sense of British solidarity, commonly juxtaposed against that of 'the Continent' (Diéz Medrano 2003; Rothì, Lyons, and Chryssochoou 2005). The UK was officially admitted to the European Community (EC) in 1973. Even though it was not one of the original six founding members, forty years of involvement in the integration process, the UK is a major player in EU affairs—despite the accession of numerous subsequent countries into the EU. And yet UK citizens remain, on average, much more Eurosceptic than citizens of other EU member states (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gifford 2008; Spiering 2004).⁹ These implications for identification with Europe are empirically apparent: most individuals in the UK do *not* see themselves as very European;¹⁰ this means it may be harder for variation in personality to explain the few cases of those who do. Knowing that identity is an important determinant of EU support (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Kritzinger 2003), the UK offers an excellent opportunity to assess whether and how predisposition affects citizens' identification preferences.

⁹ The term 'Euroscepticism' refers to a strong distrust or disapproval of European integration and EU affairs, most often driven by individual fear regarding the EU's ambitions in relation to national sovereignty (Harmsen and Spiering 2005).

¹⁰ For example, Pichler (2008a) finds identification with Europe in the UK is the lowest out of nine countries examined. Similarly, Mitchell (2012) reports that British university students—including both those who have and have not studied abroad through ERASMUS—have lower levels of European identity and EU attachment than fellow students elsewhere. In the most comprehensive analysis of European identity to date, Bruter and Harrison (2012) analyze various dimensions of Europeanness among over 30,000 respondents in all 27 EU member states. On a ten-point scale, they find levels of 'spontaneous' European identity are not only lower but also display greater variability in the UK than anywhere else: 4.88 (s.d. = 3.09) compared to the overall EU mean of 7.09 (s.d. = 2.82).

MEASURING THE BIG FIVE

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Big Five traits have become the predominant way to test whether and how personality affects a host of individual attitudes and behavior. Widely exported from psychology, numerous other disciplines (including political science) recognize that this categorical framework systematically captures variation in people's enduring predispositions; it also travels extremely well outside the United States (e.g., Schmitt et al. 2007). Despite its uniform *conceptual* acceptance, scholars continue to debate the most valid instrument(s) with which to measure the Big Five. Several different 'tests' exist, varying in their length of question battery, dimensional approach, use of adjectives or phrases, and number of possible response categories.

A general tradeoff between reliability and parsimony is well-noted in the social sciences. Though longer instruments with many items typically produce greater reliability, shorter tests can be preferable because they are so much less burdensome—in terms of both time and cognitive demand—for survey participants and still maintain basic congruency with the overall five-factor structure (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003; Rammstedt and John 2007; Woods and Hampson 2005). And though large-item batteries like those originally developed in the 1980s were helpful for inductively discovering the underlying structure of personality traits, they are not as—if at all—necessary for deductive work incorporating an agreed-upon taxonomy like the Big Five into to the study of other scholarly questions (Woods and Hampson 2005). Furthermore, many of the original personality tests used to capture the Big Five traits were intended for clinical diagnosis and treatment (e.g., Costa and McCrae 1992), and thus may not be as useful for academic investigations outside psychology. The standard consensus is that using multiple narrow measures is superior to just a few all-encompassing ones (Gosling, Rentfrow,

and Swann 2003; Ozer and Benet-Martínez 2006).¹¹ Reassuringly, however, the sign, significance, and magnitude of effects using different-length batteries all appear to be similar for most of the Big Five traits (see Gerber et al. 2011b).

Unipolar instruments used to measure the Big Five ask respondents to rate the extent to which they agree or disagree that a series of statements describe them. The number of specific characteristics asked ranges dramatically. Costa and McCrae's (1992) original NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) contains 240 items; they later shortened this to only 60 in the NEO-Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI). Benet-Martínez and John (1998) developed a 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI), which Rammstedt and John (2007) condensed to only 10 items. Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003) offered the Five- and Ten-Item Personality Inventories (the FIPI and TIPI, respectively). Likert scale response options typically range from one (disagree strongly) to five or seven (agree strongly) for each single description mentioned.

In contrast to the unipolar options above, Goldberg (1992) developed an alternative, bipolar tactic. Using this technique, respondents place themselves on a spectrum with opposing trait-descriptive adjectives (TDAs) identified at either pole (e.g., timid to bold, angry to calm, etc.). Responses are commonly measured on a scale of one or zero (the absolute epitome of a description) to ten (its complete opposite). "The implicit rationale for using bipolar rather than unipolar rating scales is to specify more precisely the dimension to be measured by the scale, rather than allowing one pole of the scale to be interpreted idiosyncratically" (Goldberg 1992, 28). Additionally, the core factors are themselves bipolar in nature (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003). Thus, since the Big Five structure asserts the existence of contrasting pairs of traits (e.g., extraversion versus introversion), many argue there is a conceptual problem with

¹¹ That being said, Saucier (1994, 507) cautions against using adjectives that are difficult to understand (e.g., 'imperturbable') or imply negation (e.g., 'uncharitable'), as their confusing nature may induce unreliable responses.

measuring them—as the unipolar ones above do—with singular, unidimensional statements that only tap one given side of any given characteristic.¹²

No overarching agreement yet exists as to which measurement strategy is the absolute best. Fortunately, most options have proven to be valid, reliable, and highly correlated with the other major contenders, which confirms they all tap similar things (John and Srivastava 1999). And regardless of instrument employed, it is important that respondents face questions with a mix of positive and negative codings where not all ‘strongly agrees’ correspond to the more socially-desirable characteristic; this should minimize acquiescence bias (Gerber et al. 2011a).

MIDDLE GROUND: A MEDIUM-LENGTH, BIPOLAR APPROACH

Taking all of the above into account, I opted to emulate the question format and response options created by Goldberg (1992) and promoted by several prominent political science analyses.¹³ Respondents were presented with the following text, followed by twenty-five pairs of bipolar adjectives—thus, five items per larger trait:¹⁴

The following section contains pairs of words. On a scale of zero to ten, please indicate which of the words best describes you. For example, the number zero means “relaxed,” the number ten means “tense,” and the number five is exactly in the middle—neither relaxed nor tense. On this scale, what number best describes you? You can use any number from 0 to 10.

I first confirmed the reliability of the different dimensions through principal components factor analysis. The individual items indeed result in five factors with eigenvalue scores of one or

¹² This becomes less of a problem the more items are used to assess each of the five overall traits (Woods and Hampson 2005).

¹³ I employ an intermediate approach in terms of battery length (25 items), which should make my personality measures more reliable than some of the five- or 10-item options but not as cognitively tedious or time consuming as the longer extremes. The exact 25-item question I utilized comes from the 2005 National Jury Survey as cited by Mondak and Halperin (2008, 350). Mondak et al. (2010) and Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson (2011) both use a modified, 10-item version of this bipolar scale; Mondak et al. also present the 25-item version in their appendix (2010, 106).

¹⁴ Each of these statements is described in Appendix C, question 6. Following Gerber et al.’s (2011a) recommendation, I deviate slightly from the exact text of the aforementioned studies by alternating on which of the two poles the more socially-desirable characteristic for each pair of items appears. For instance, one line reads warm (0) to cold (10) while another says uncreative (0) to creative (10).

greater.¹⁵ Having established that these 25 items do largely load as expected, I generated final measures using mean indices for each Big Five dimension based on the reliability of the originally-intended items per trait. The Cronbach's alpha (α) for *Openness* is 0.692 based on the extent to which one is 'imaginative', 'analytical', 'creative', 'curious', and 'intellectual.'¹⁶ For all four other dimensions, reliability is highest using all five items as designed. Thus, *Conscientiousness* reflects being 'systematic', 'hardworking', 'neat', 'careful', and 'responsible' ($\alpha = 0.697$); *Extraversion* consists of those who are 'extraverted', 'talkative', 'bold', 'spontaneous', and 'outgoing' ($\alpha = 0.855$); *Agreeableness* captures people who are most 'warm', 'gentle', 'kind', 'polite', and 'sympathetic' ($\alpha = 0.843$); and *Emotional Stability* indicates that a person is 'calm', 'relaxed', 'at ease', 'steady', and 'content' ($\alpha = 0.816$).¹⁷ Overall, these levels comport well with the reliability statistics produced by others' Big Five instruments, often actually producing a higher alpha than many of the studies listed.¹⁸ The means of each trait are listed in Table 4.1, which presents descriptive statistics for all the variables employed in the regression tests below.

¹⁵ Using the rotated solution, all expected indicators of extraversion and emotional stability load properly on two respective factors; all but one of the openness items ('analytical') load onto a single factor as well. The five characteristics expected for agreeableness load together but are joined, however, by several of the items intended to indicate conscientiousness. The remaining conscientiousness items and the sole remaining openness indicator load onto a fifth factor.

¹⁶ The reliability increases to 0.731 when 'analytical' is excluded so I ultimately use just the remaining four traits. Other scholars note this same difficulty: openness tends to be one of the hardest of the Big Five traits to measure while extraversion is consistently the most reliable (John and Srivastava 1999; Mondak et al. 2010). Agreeableness proves problematic from time to time as well (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003; Rammstedt and John 2007).


¹⁷ Table F.1, Model 2 in Appendix F highlights identical results using an alternative coding: the simplified two-items per trait used by Mondak et al. (2010).

¹⁸ Appendix E compares the internal consistency of the Big Five measures used by other surveys. Results show the reliability of each index from my *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey* is similar to—and often times higher than—other studies using multiple items per trait.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics from PAIS

	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Dependent Variable</i>				
Identification w/ Europe	3.068	1.590	1	7
<i>Personality</i>				
Openness	8.129	1.606	1	11
Conscientiousness	7.826	1.620	1	11
Extraversion	6.080	1.393	1.8	10.6
Agreeableness	8.300	1.783	1	11
Emotional Stability	7.256	1.905	1	11
<i>Institutional Effect</i>				
Perceived EU Influence	3.742	1.422	1	7
<i>Sociodemographic Controls</i>				
Age	47.432	15.174	18	81
Male	0.481	0.500	0	1
Education	2.830	1.388	0	5
Occupational Prestige	3.133	1.062	1	5
Urban	2.357	1.000	1	4
White	0.945	0.229	0	1
Christian	0.511	0.500	0	1

They are also visually depicted in Figure 4.1, aligned in order of highest to lowest. Thus, as far as the distribution of the Big Five personality traits in the UK are concerned, we see that, on the whole, UK citizens tend to be more agreeable and open than extraverted.

Figure 4.1: Mean Levels of the Big Five Traits in the UK

Note: n = 2, 002 respondents

ADDITIONAL MEASUREMENT AND METHODOLOGY

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Superordinate identification is operationalized as an individual's self-professed degree of attachment to Europe using the question,


We are all part of different groups. Some groups are more important to us than others when we think of ourselves. How important are each of the following in describing how you personally see yourself? Please consider the following scale, where 7 means that you identify very strongly with it and 1 means that you do not identify with it at all [1=Do not identify with it at all; 7 = Identify very strongly with it].¹⁹

Respondents were asked about their identification with Europe in general, the EU in particular, the UK, their region, and their town or village. Figure 4.2 displays the overall distribution of responses to these political-territorial identity alternatives. On a scale of 1-7, the overall mean level of *Identification w/ Europe* is only 3.064 (s.d. = 1.600), compared with 4.728 (s.d. = 1.592) for national identification, 4.383 (s.d. = 1.619) for regional identification, and 4.482 (s.d. = 1.577) for local identification.²⁰ With such strongly entrenched national and subnational ties, it is clear that few see themselves as very European to begin with. This, again, is to be expected given people's penchant for homophily (Allport 1954; Smith-Lovin 2003). Nevertheless, explaining why other citizens *do* identify with Europe is of paramount importance.

¹⁹ This wording (but not the exact scale) emulates that of Bruter (2003, 2005, 2009), whose innovative identity indicators—which have helped uncover of what “European identity” consists—are preferred because they measure the strength of an individual's political-territorial loyalties independently of one another, in contrast to past *Eurobarometer* questions demanding that respondents select only one level of identification (Sinnott, 2005).

²⁰ EU identification is lowest of all: 2.665 (s.d. = 1.551). Note that I am ultimately focusing on identification with *Europe*, as it is almost exclusively equated with the EU anyway (Risse 2013). When *EU Identity* is examined instead, agreeableness's effect remains unchanged but openness drops just out of conventional significance ($p=0.075$), extraversion drops out completely, and conscientiousness becomes negative and nearly significant ($p=0.084$).

Figure 4.2: Distribution of Political-Territorial Identification in the UK



COVARIATES

My choice of independent variables beyond the Big Five is informed by the sociodemographic controls prevalent in extant literature (as reviewed in Chapter 2). European identity is known to be stronger among young, well-educated, wealthy citizens (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Fligstein 2008; D. Green 2007; Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer 2004). *Age* therefore measures a respondent's exact age at the time of the survey, ranging from 18 to over 80. *Education* ranges from zero to five depending on the highest level of schooling one has received: none, high school [O- (GCSE/ CSE) or A- (GNVQ) level], some higher education but no degree (e.g. HND/City and guilds), a university undergraduate degree, or an advanced degree. *Occupational Prestige* is based on Opinium's standard measure of social grade: "We would now like you to think about the chief income earner in your household, that is the person with the highest income. This may be you or it might be someone else. Which of the following groups does the chief income earner in your household belong to?" Responses for five categories were recoded to range from low to high, where higher values correspond to jobs with greater prestige:

semi-skilled or unskilled manual worker; skilled manual worker; supervisory, clerical, junior manager, professional, or administrator tasks; intermediate managerial, professional, or administrative positions; and higher managerial, professional, or administrative roles).²¹ Though findings remain mixed on whether or not gender affects identification with Europe, I include a dichotomous variable coded ‘one’ if a respondent is *Male*.

Next, some find that those living in cosmopolitan areas feel more European than their rural counterparts (Pichler 2009). To get at this, I include a respondent’s type of community (*Urban*), which ranges from one to four based on whether someone claims to live in a rural area or village, small or middle-sized town, suburb of a large town or city, or large town or city. Finally, given debate over whether European identity is more civic- or culturally-based (see Bruter 2003, 2005, 2009), I also tap ethnicity and religion with dummies for whether one is *White*²² and *Christian*²³ to differentiate respondents who may associate European identity with cultural markers instead of common sociopolitical values. Those who are of the ‘dominant’ ethnicity may be less likely to identify with Europe because they perceive a higher sense of threat from ‘others’ included in the superordinate European category while those who view Europe as a ‘Christian club’ based around a shared historical experience may be more likely to see themselves as European.

Finally, I include a new item to capture the heretofore under-tested institutional effect hypothesized at the end of Chapter 2. This question read, “People may hold a range of opinions on the European Union, including whether or not they think the EU affects them. Using the

²¹ See Appendix C, question 5 for the specific career examples pertaining to these categories. I leave those who are students, retired, or unemployed as missing.

²² In contrast to those who report being of Black African, Black Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Any other Asian background, Mixed, or an ‘Other’ ethnicity.

²³ This captures those who say they belong to the Roman Catholic, Protestant, Church of England, Presbyterian/Church of Scotland, Methodist, Baptist, and/or Orthodox Greek or Russian faith. Those who report being Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, ‘Other,’ or not religiously inclined are all coded as zero.

following scale, to what extent do you feel the decisions of each of the following institutions influence you personally? [1=not at all; 7=a great deal; 4=neither].” The final measure (*Perceived EU Influence*) is a mean index based on responses to 11 different institutions.²⁴ Both in terms of institutions’ ability to shift citizens’ norms and values (Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer 2004; Risse 2005) and from the contact hypothesis perspective that interaction increases affect (Allport 1954; Forbes 1997; Pettigrew 1998), those who feel more affected by EU institutions may conceivably then identify as more European.²⁵

THE MODEL

Given the range of the dependent variable, the analyses below are conducted using OLS regression.²⁶ Standard errors are clustered by the twelve UK regions sampled by Opinium to control for any underlying contextual differences between individuals nested within the same region.²⁷ I also restrict the sample to only UK citizens (96.1% = 1,924 respondents) because non-citizens could be from non-EU countries where the European identity alternative is not applicable.

Altogether, the final individual-level model to be estimated is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Identification with Europe} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Openness} + \beta_2 \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_3 \text{Extraversion} \\ & + \beta_4 \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_5 \text{Emotional Stability} + \beta_6 \text{Age} + \\ & \beta_7 \text{Male} + \beta_8 \text{Education} + \beta_9 \text{Occupational Prestige} + \\ & \beta_{10} \text{Urban} + \beta_{11} \text{White} + \beta_{12} \text{Christian} + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

²⁴ Alpha = 0.970.

²⁵ As further discussed in Chapter 6, there are important limitations to this indicator because it only captures subjective perceptions and not objective institutional contact. This thus leaves open the possibility of endogeneity: how strongly one identifies with Europe and/or supports the EU could interfere with the extent to which respondents view EU institutions as affecting their daily life. While I cannot directly test that possibility here, future analyses should certainly do so.

²⁶ Table F.1, Model 1 in Appendix F shows that results are robust to ordered logit as well.

²⁷ These are North East, North West, Yorkshire & Humberside, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South West, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. In alternative specifications, I control for the most politically- and administratively-salient regions (England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland) by collapsing the first nine territories into one value for England. Results are unchanged; available upon request. I do not employ multilevel modeling because there is hardly any variance in individual identification with Europe at the regional level, regardless of measurement: only 0.004 when all twelve are accounted for and absolutely none when just the four larger regions are used.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Before testing whether and how the Big Five personality traits affect individual identification with Europe, I first present a baseline model indicating the basic effects of the sociodemographic predictors by themselves (Table 4.2, Model 1). Interestingly, only a handful of measures attain statistical significance. Age and gender do not seem to matter, perhaps because both young and old, male and female are equally (un)likely to identify with Europe. In keeping with others' findings, education is positive and significant. As predicted, being white has a significant negative effect while being Christian has a positive and significant one. These results (with the exception of *Occupational Prestige*, which never crosses the $p < .05$ significance threshold) remain unchanged across subsequent model specifications.

Table 4.2: Determinants of Identification with Europe

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Coef.	SD	Sig.	Coef.	SD	Sig.	Coef.	SD	Sig.
Personality									
Openness				0.064	0.023	*	0.039	0.017	*
Conscientiousness				-0.053	0.043		-0.041	0.042	
Extraversion				0.052	0.015	**	0.050	0.015	**
Agreeableness				-0.064	0.025	*	-0.062	0.023	*
Emotional Stability				0.015	0.031		0.023	0.033	
Institutional Effect									
Perceived EU Influence							0.201	0.036	**
Sociodemographic Controls									
Age	0.002	0.004		0.002	0.003		0.001	0.003	
Male	0.105	0.086		0.052	0.087		0.033	0.080	
Education	0.074	0.022	**	0.059	0.023	*	0.053	0.023	*
Occupational Prestige	0.077	0.037	†	0.066	0.033	†	0.055	0.032	
Urban	0.026	0.054		0.022	0.052		0.022	0.051	
White	-0.369	0.143	*	-0.341	0.129	*	-0.308	0.132	*
Christian	0.217	0.087	*	0.226	0.081	*	0.236	0.075	**
Constant	2.653	0.273	**	2.698	0.238	**	2.111	0.250	**
<i>N</i>	1640			1640			1640		
<i>R-Squared</i>	0.019			0.033			0.065		

Note: Table entries are OLS regression estimates with standard errors clustered by region and restricted to UK citizens. ** = $p < .01$; * = $p < .05$; † = $p < .10$

Table 4.2, Model 2 next adds in the mean indices for each of the Big Five personality traits. Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 from Chapter 2 are immediately confirmed. *Openness* and

Extraversion are both positive and significant, showing that those who are more intellectually curious and outgoing are indeed more likely to see themselves as European. *Agreeableness*'s effect is negative and significant as expected, confirming that despite being 'nice', more agreeable people may here be hesitant to identify beyond the norm of strong national identity. Since these types of individuals have a high need for social acceptance and strongly dislike disagreement (Gallego and Oberski 2011; Gerber et al. 2011a), it is likely that they fear not fitting in with the general UK norm of low identification with Europe. In other words, these citizens (who strive to get along well with others) may in be catering to strong social pressure from co-nationals *not* to identify superordinately.²⁸ Hypotheses 2 and 5 are also supported, as the coefficients on *Conscientiousness* and *Emotional Stability* are in the expected directions; however, they fail to reach conventional levels of significance so certainty surrounding their effects remains speculative at best.²⁹

As a full test of all predicted determinants, Table 4.2, Model 3 lastly adds in *Perceived EU Influence*. In support of Hypothesis 6, this institutional effect proves to have very important implications for identification with Europe: the more one sees the various EU institutions having a presence in his or her personal, everyday life, the more likely s/he is to then feel European. Importantly, none of the personality traits changes in either sign or significance level with its inclusion. Individuals with more open and extraverted predispositions are still also likely to identify with Europe, while those who are more agreeable are not. Thus, Model 3 provides a

²⁸ I will investigate this finding further in future research utilizing a social network battery included in the PAIS. As discussed in Chapter 6, future analyses should clarify how social influences like network size, strength, and composition interact with an ego's predisposition towards superordinate identification.

²⁹ Model 2 nearly doubles the amount of variance explained in Model 1, but it is still extremely low (R-squared = 0.033) overall. I elaborate on personality's total explanatory power in Chapter 6.

more complete picture of the various elements that affect individuals' likelihood of identifying with the superordinate political-territorial alternative.³⁰

The coefficients in Table 4.2 represent the change in the dependent variable for every one-unit increase in each included measure. However, the independent variables are not uniform in range so their substantive effects are not immediately comparable. Therefore, Table 4.3 shows the impact of moving from the minimum to the maximum on each significant determinant. Figure 4.3 ranks these changes from largest to smallest effect on identification with Europe. While perceived EU influence matters most, the three significant personality variables play the next strongest role. Of the three Big Five traits that matter, agreeableness has the strongest impact. Sociodemographic aspects like ethnicity, education, and religion have less of an influence.

Table 4.3: Predicted Values of Identification with Europe


	Pred. Value @ Minimum	Pred. Value @ Maximum	Change in Pred. Value
Openness	2.788	3.180	0.392
Extraversion	2.852	3.296	0.444
Agreeableness	3.522	2.900	-0.622
Perceived EU Influence	2.516	3.724	1.208
Education	2.919	3.182	0.263
White	3.359	3.051	-0.308
Christian	2.947	3.183	0.236

Note: Figures indicate the predicted value of identification with Europe moving from low to high on each independent variable while holding all other variables at their mean.

Only significant variables from Table 4.2, Model 3 included.

³⁰ While this model holds the greatest explanatory power of the three tested so far, the overall variance explained in the dependent variable remains extremely low and suggests that future analyses need to consider many additional determinants in their theories of superordinate identification.

Figure 4.3: Substantive Effects on Identification with Europe



Note: Bars indicate the magnitude of change in identification with Europe (on a scale of 1=do not identify with it at all to 7=identify with it very strongly) while moving from the minimum to maximum on each significant predictor from Table 4.2, Model 3 (holding all other variables at their mean). Calculated using Long and Freese's (2006) '*spost*' commands.

Having established that the Big Five personality traits are an important determinant of superordinate identification, I now turn to a secondary analysis to investigate which—if any—of the 25 items has an individual impact.

WHICH CHARACTERISTICS MATTER MOST?

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Big Five traits encompass several underlying facets, which are then themselves comprised of multiple different characteristics. Thus, I now ratchet-down the unit of measurement to this lowest level by examining separately each of the 25 individual items used to create the larger Big Five indices included in Table 4.2. For ease of display, Table 4.4 presents the coefficient for each characteristic modeled one-at-a-time while also controlling for all sociodemographic predictors³¹.

³¹ Note that all 25 items were never included together in one model

This analysis shows which individual characteristics of the larger Big Five personality dimensions have an independent effect on identification with Europe—in other words, which ones may be driving the results behind openness and extraversion’s positive effects along with agreeableness’s negative one. Of the five *Openness* items, only being creative and curious matter; they are both positive and significant. Though *Conscientiousness* as a whole was insignificant in the analysis above, we here see that two of its component characteristics—being careful and being responsible—make someone less likely to identify with Europe. Three of the five *Extraversion* characteristics matter; only being bold has no effect. Those who are extraverted, spontaneous, and outgoing are all more likely to incorporate a superordinate identity.³² *Agreeableness*’s negative effect is clearly driven by things that might describe more docile or meek people (those who are gentle, kind, and polite) in contrast to the underlying attributes of being warm and sympathetic. Lastly, *Emotional Stability* may have been insignificant because only one of its four aspects (being calm) matters. Moreover, as with the Big Five dimensions overall, not all individual items have the same sign; this suggests their conflicting effects could be hampering that larger trait’s explanatory capability.

³² Being talkative approached conventional significance: $p=0.099$.

Table 4.4: Effects of Individual Personality Characteristics

	Coef.	SD	Sig.
<i>Openness</i>			
Imaginative	0.010	0.017	
Analytical	-0.030	0.020	
Creative	0.046	0.014	**
Curious	0.042	0.012	**
Intellectual	0.002	0.017	
<i>Conscientiousness</i>			
Systematic	-0.025	0.021	
Hardworking	0.002	0.019	
Neat	-0.029	0.019	
Careful	-0.053	0.023	*
Responsible	-0.065	0.026	*
<i>Extraversion</i>			
Extraverted	0.042	0.012	**
Talkative	0.024	0.013	†
Bold	-0.029	0.018	
Spontaneous	0.061	0.011	**
Outgoing	0.026	0.011	*
<i>Agreeableness</i>			
Warm	-0.026	0.019	
Gentle	-0.036	0.016	*
Kind	-0.055	0.024	*
Polite	-0.072	0.018	**
Sympathetic	-0.019	0.022	
<i>Emotional Stability</i>			
Calm	0.039	0.013	*
Relaxed	-0.009	0.022	
At Ease	-0.040	0.026	
Steady	-0.017	0.020	
Content	-0.019	0.019	

Note: Table entries are OLS regression estimates with standard errors clustered by region and restricted to UK citizens. Coefficients represent the individual effect of each particular personality characteristic while controlling for age, gender, education, occupational prestige, place of residence, ethnicity, and religion. ** = $p < .01$; * = $p < .05$; † = $p < .10$

Knowing how each individual item relates to identification with Europe, I now estimate a new model (Table 4.5, Model 4) using mean indices for each of the Big Five traits based solely on which of their individual component characteristics were significant in Table 4.4. Here, the number of items used to generate each larger index varies from three for the traits of extraversion

and agreeableness to only one for emotional stability. Despite this imbalance, several of the results from Table 4.2 are replicated. Openness to experience retains a positive and significant impact, agreeableness is still strongly negative and significant, and conscientiousness still fails to achieve significance. Interestingly, however, extraversion drops out and becomes insignificant while including only the single indicator of emotional stability (being calm) makes that trait have a positive and significant effect as originally predicted in Hypothesis 5.

Table 4.5: Testing the Big Five Using Only Their Significant Component Items

	Model 4		
	Coef.	SD	Sig.
<i>Personality</i>			
Openness (Creative, Curious)	0.045	0.015	*
Conscientiousness (Careful, Responsible)	-0.049	0.031	
Extraversion (Extraverted, Spontaneous, Outgoing)	0.022	0.013	
Agreeableness (Gentle, Kind, Polite)	-0.073	0.023	**
Emotional Stability (Calm)	0.055	0.017	**
<i>Institutional Effect</i>			
Perceived EU Influence	0.197	0.035	**
<i>Sociodemographic Controls</i>			
Age	0.001	0.004	
Male	0.024	0.074	
Education	0.051	0.022	*
Occupational Prestige	0.056	0.034	
Urban	0.027	0.051	
White	-0.283	0.137	†
Christian	0.220	0.077	*
<i>Constant</i>	2.032	0.310	**
<i>N</i>	1640		
<i>R-Squared</i>	0.075		

Note: Table entries are OLS regression estimates with standard errors clustered by region and restricted to UK citizens. ** = $p < .01$; * = $p < .05$; † = $p < .10$

These results are not intended to override those from the fuller analyses in Table 4.2 above. They are, however, meant to show that personality's overall effect on identification with Europe deserves further scrutiny, as several underlying psychological processes may be at work. I expand my analysis to address these possibilities in the next chapter.

CONCLUSION

Altogether, the results here show that certain predispositions indeed allow some citizens to be more open to superordinate identification than others. Interestingly, those whom others might stereotype as curt, rude, and unsympathetic—the features opposite those of a warm, agreeable personality—seem most likely to identify with Europe. These less-agreeable people probably place little weight on conforming to public pressure or popular opinion; this suggests they should be more open to self-categorization with the superordinate identity alternative. On the more ‘socially desirable’ side, the traits of openness to experience and extraversion are also key for an individual to adopt a superordinate identity, and together may help combat the negative pull of an agreeable predisposition. When confronted with a new identity alternative, individuals who possess high values of these two particular traits should find it cognitively easier to see themselves as part of the larger group. In contrast, those who are naturally closed-minded and introverted may be more likely to perceive a conflict between their preexisting attachments and the superordinate category.

These findings also help inform scholars about the cognitive and affective psychological processes that individuals experience when confronted with a superordinate identity alternative. Recalling that the mean level of individual identification with Europe in the UK is already quite low, the positive effects witnessed for openness to experience, extraversion, perceived EU influence, and education also give policymakers a better grasp of some practical policy solutions they might employ to substantially increase it. I now move on to testing more complicated causal pathways to determine the mediating mechanisms and moderating conditions behind personality’s basic effects.

CHAPTER 5: EFFECTS MEDIATING AND MODERATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND IDENTIFICATION

Abstract: Having established that identification with Europe produces the effects we would expect of a superordinate identity (Chapter 3) and that personality plays a role in one's propensity to identify with Europe (Chapter 4), this chapter turns to a deeper analysis of the causal mechanisms linking the Big Five traits to identification. I investigate three proposed mediators that should—and do—play a role: risk aversion, knowledge, and ideology. All three emerge as important pathways through which personality matters. I then test for an interactive effect between personality and the perceived effect of the EU on one's daily life. No conditional relationship exists, suggesting that institutional influence is one way in which citizen identification with Europe may be enhanced across the board—even among those not already predisposed to see themselves as part of the superordinate group.

Keywords: causal mediation analysis, ideology, objective political knowledge, risk aversion

Scholars have increasingly striven to find tools to overcome the ‘black box’ of causality problem. It is no longer sufficient to know *whether* an effect exists; we must also uncover *how*, *why*, and *when* these effects transpire (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010; Imai et al. 2011). Establishing that personality plays a role in one’s propensity to identify superordinately adds a novel explanation to our understanding of collective identities. Yet we must still uncover what about personality might produce this end result, as well as analyze the conditions under which the various traits’ effects are amplified or mitigated. To achieve these ends, this chapter investigates three potential mechanisms that mediate personality’s effect on superordinate identification before testing whether perceived institutional influence plays a moderating role.

INDIRECT EFFECTS: PERSONALITY’S POTENTIAL PATHWAYS

Not only is an understanding of personality’s effect on identification incomplete without an assessment of the causal mechanisms, but recent research suggests personality may actually have a greater indirect than direct effect.¹ There are several potential factors that may mediate personality, either instead of or in addition to the basic relationships uncovered in Chapter 4. I investigate a few mechanisms here: risk aversion, knowledge, and ideology.

THE ROLE OF RISK AVERSION

Significant scholarly attention focuses on how individuals engage in decision making. Behavioral economic models consistently find that people dislike uncertainty and go to great lengths to minimize cost by trying to anticipate how a decision will affect their expected utility.

¹ For example, Schoen and Schumann (2007) confirm that personality traits have an indirect effect on partisan attitudes and voting: openness, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and neuroticism affect which parties people support such that those who are more open to new experiences, less conscientious, and less agreeable favor parties that promote social liberalism while higher levels of neuroticism lead individuals to prefer parties “that offer shelter against material or cultural challenges” (471). While highlighting direct effects as well, Wolak and Marcus (2007) show that personality traits indirectly affect individuals’ emotional responses to policy changes, and emotional engagement is then largely determinant of someone’s desire to learn more about a new issue, interest in political participation, and willingness to compromise.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, most individuals are fearful of choices that could have a perceived negative effect on their future welfare.

Prospect theory takes this one step further by acknowledging that individuals judge a decision by the gains and losses it may incur relative to some inherent reference point. This means that, unlike strict rational choice whereby one always chooses the option that maximizes gains, individuals instead assess the cost/benefit tradeoff asymmetrically depending on what is at stake (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Because people value what they have more than what they do not, they tend to engage in significantly more risky behavior to avert loss than to achieve comparable gain (Camerer 2005; Levy 2003).² This psychological and behavioral expression can be summed up with the adage, “Losses hurt more than gains please” (McDermott 2004). Phrased differently, it implies that citizens will be most risk averse in the domain of gains. Whether issues are framed as gains or losses, then, affects the amount of risk one is willing to take (Mercer 2005).

These considerations should apply to identification—especially when a superordinate identity emerges to rival preexisting, subordinate ones. In the case of Europe (and even more so in the case of the UK), citizens likely view a common European identity encompassing myriad national identities through the lens of risk aversion. Those who are more risk-acceptant should see the superordinate alternative as less of a threat and thus be more likely to self-identify this way.

Most superordinate identities are promoted as additional options for self-categorization rather than something to completely replace preexisting subordinate attachments. Hence, the logic of prospect theory would imply that risk aversion matters greatly for whether one

² Substantial evidence of this comes from the field of marketing (Camerer 2005), but its application to political science is also well supported. For example, Bowler and Donovan (2007) find that electoral winners are more satisfied with democracy and hence more risk averse to electoral reform.

ultimately identifies with Europe or not. Identifying with Europe may easily be perceived as a risk, especially among those for whom national identity is the reference point and in contexts (like the UK) where national identity is so strongly entrenched.³ So long as the superordinate, European alternative is viewed—and framed⁴—as something to be gained, it then makes sense that many people would be risk-averse to it. Since gains do not evoke strong risk-seeking behavior like losses do, risk aversion should be negatively related to identifying with Europe. This translates into the following hypothesis:

H₇: The more risk-averse an individual is, the less s/he will identify with the superordinate group.

But where does personality come in? I argue that the Big Five personality traits should determine one's proclivity toward risk aversion or acceptance. Importantly, risk aversion is not as much of a given as previously assumed; studies show that individuals vary quite substantially in their orientation towards it (Arceneaux 2012; McDermott 2004). So what determines how risk-averse someone is in the first place? As with many things, it seems reasonable to predict that, given its temporal precedence over behavior, personality could be a starting factor: "...people vary in their propensity for risk, [but] our theories of personality are not well developed, which makes it difficult to know who by disposition is risk acceptant or risk averse" (Mercer 2005, 12). Although explaining risk aversion is not the central focus of this dissertation, it is likely that certain traits may increase and/or decrease how risk-averse someone is. Our strongest priors come from openness to experience (which, by nature, should make someone less afraid of new things and therefore more accepting of uncertainty) and conscientiousness (since

³ We also know that loss aversion influences the perceived strength of political arguments, with loss frames being much more powerful than gain ones—particularly among those who are anxious (Arceneaux 2012). This suggests some people may be more biased towards internalizing messages that are critical of the EU.

⁴ Appendix G presents several EU poster campaigns aimed at increasing identification with Europe. These illustrate elites' efforts to frame superordinate identity as something that builds on—not replaces—national attachments.

strongly-disciplined individuals value social conformity and may be hesitant to branch out beyond their normal customs), though other traits could also matter. More generally, since so much of personality seems to stem from genetics (Gallego and Oberski 2011; Mondak et al. 2010), it should be causally prior to risk aversion, which is theoretically a learned reaction from taking past risks and losing. Thus, I posit the following mediational hypothesis:

H₈: Personality determines how risk-averse someone is, which then affects his/her likelihood of identifying with the superordinate group.

THE BENEFITS OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

One of the original explanations for identification with Europe was an individual's level of cognitive mobilization based on the presumption that those who are more politically sophisticated and knowledgeable should be better able to grasp the complex, abstract nature of a multilevel polity like the EU (Inglehart 1970). Recent work confirms this antecedent exerts a 'major influence' on identification with Europe (Bellucci, Sanders, and Serricchio 2012). Extending upon this, I expect that knowledge will facilitate greater superordinate identification by making Europe less threatening to those who are more informed about its actions, intentions, and outcomes:

H₉: The more objectively knowledgeable an individual is, the more s/he will identify with the superordinate group.

But again, there is reason to expect that personality may predate how much people know about politics. In particular, existing studies show that the trait of openness to experience causes individuals to be more intellectually curious and more politically knowledgeable (Gerber et al. 2011a; Mondak et al. 2010).⁵ This translates into a desire to seek out alternative viewpoints and become more fully informed. As evidence of this, one study found that moving from the

⁵ Recall that openness itself is not a measure of intelligence or knowledge, but reflects "the degree to which a person needs intellectual stimulation and variety" (Gerber et al. 2011a).

minimum to maximum values of openness increased an individual's desire to learn more about political issues by 30% (Wolak and Marcus 2007). Thus, a second mediational hypothesis is as follows:

H₁₀: Personality determines how politically knowledgeable an individual is, which then affects his/her likelihood of identifying with the superordinate group.

THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGY

Lastly, scholars have invested a great deal of effort into isolating the determinants of nationalism, xenophobia, and support for the radical right. Since nationalism is so highly correlated with far-right ideology (Druckman 1994; Mummendey, Klink, and Brown 2001) while more 'postmaterialist' values (which give priority to self-expression and group solidarity above physical and economic security) are typical of those on the left (Inglehart 1971; Inglehart and Abramson 1999), I expect ideological orientation to affect how much someone identifies with the superordinate group. Those with a more right-leaning political ideology should be more hesitant to extend their sense of self beyond the national political-territorial level:

H₁₁: The more conservative an individual is, the less s/he will identify with the superordinate group.

Yet ideology is not formed from nothing. Several studies highlight the role that personality plays in determining one's ideological orientation. High conscientiousness is negatively associated with a liberal viewpoint (Caprara et al. 2006; Cooper, Golden, and Socha 2013) and positively related to conservatism (Carney et al. 2008; Gerber et al. 2010). Agreeableness is linked to more progressive economic views (Gerber et al. 2010). And liberals appear to be significantly more open-minded (Caprara et al. 2006; Carney et al. 2008; Gerber et al. 2010). Therefore, I posit that:

H₁₂: Personality determines an individual's ideological orientation, which then affects his/her likelihood of identifying with the superordinate group.

The mediational analyses that follow test these six hypotheses.

MEDIATION ANALYSIS

Causal inference requires four conditions: correlation, temporal plausibility, eliminating alternative causes, and specifying precisely how an effect transpires (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002). To achieve this last prerequisite and better understand the relationship between personality and identity, I turn to mediation analysis to isolate the causal mechanisms at hand (Baron and Kenny 1986; Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010).

To confirm a mediation effect, it must be demonstrated that an explanatory variable significantly affects the mediating variable, which then significantly affects the dependent variable (Malhotra and Krosnick 2007). Importantly, this method allows us to decompose an explanatory variable's direct, indirect, and total effect while testing the extent to which our mediational hypotheses hold.⁶ Analysis consists of three steps: 1) regressing the dependent variable on the key explanatory variable; 2) regressing the mediator on the explanatory variable; and 3) regressing the dependent variable on both the explanatory variable and the mediator together. If a significant mediation effect exists, the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables will be weaker or altogether insignificant in the presence of the mediating variable (Baron and Kenny 1986).

The following analyses employ the 'sgmediation' package in Stata, which provides a Sobel-Goodman test statistic indicating whether a significant mediating relationship is present.

⁶ Note that it is possible to have a significant mediating relationship even where an explanatory variable has no direct effect on the dependent variable; in this case, its entire effect is indirect and runs through the mediating variable (Baron and Kenny 1986).

This linear estimation strategy is valid when both the mediating and dependent variables are continuous (as *Risk Aversion* and *Identification with Europe* are) (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010). Unfortunately, it does not allow for the inclusion of multiple mediators at once, so each of the proposed mechanisms is tested separately for each of the Big Five traits.⁷ While presenting these results independently, I discuss the proportion of each trait that is mediated by the various mediators to give a better sense of the overall causal picture.

MECHANISM 1: RISK AVERSION

I test whether risk aversion mediates personality's effect using an ordinal variable that ranges from one to seven. In the *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey*, respondents were asked to "Please indicate how well each of the following statements describes you personally: I like taking risks." This question was recoded so that higher responses indicate *less* willingness to take risks and thus one's level of *Risk Aversion*. The mean is 4.535 (s.d. = 1.601).⁸

Table 5.1 combines the results of separate mediation analyses conducted for each of the Big Five traits by listing their initial independent effect on identification with Europe (Column 1); their effect on the mediating variable, risk aversion (Column 2); and their ultimate effect in the full model (Column 3). Each model controls for the other four traits and an individual's sociodemographic characteristics as covariates.⁹

⁷ Another important limitation of the '*sgmediation*' method is that it does not allow for a direct test of how sensitive the mediating relationship is to the sequential ignorability assumption, which specifies that both the treatment and mediator are presumed to be exogenous and that there is no omitted variable bias (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010). Appendix H reports the results of these sensitivity analyses using Hicks and Tingley's updated '*mediation*' package for Stata.

⁸ *Risk Aversion* and *Openness to Experience* are correlated at -0.184. To confirm that risk aversion is not itself simply another dimension of personality or an indicator of one of the Big Five traits, I re-ran principal components factor analysis using the 25 personality items plus the measure of risk aversion. Reassuringly, this produced a 6-factor solution.

⁹ I include *Region* and a dummy for whether one is a *Citizen* since '*sgmediation*' does not allow standard errors to be clustered by region and the sample restricted to citizens only.

Table 5.1: The Mediating Role of Risk Aversion

	1: Identification w/ Europe			2: Risk Aversion			3: Identification w/ Europe		
	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.
Personality									
Openness	0.063	0.027	*	-0.188	0.024	**	0.039	0.027	
Conscientiousness	-0.044	0.030		0.119	0.027	**	-0.028	0.030	
Extraversion	0.057	0.030	†	-0.232	0.027	**	0.026	0.030	
Agreeableness	-0.074	0.029	*	0.133	0.027	**	-0.056	0.029	†
Emotional Stability	0.025	0.025		-0.096	0.023	**	0.012	0.025	
Causal Mechanism									
Risk Aversion							-0.131	0.027	**
Sociodemographic Controls									
Age	0.002	0.003		0.021	0.003	**	0.021	0.003	**
Male	0.049	0.080		-0.497	0.072	**	-0.497	0.072	**
Education	0.061	0.032	†	0.022	0.029		0.022	0.029	
Occupational Prestige	0.053	0.041		-0.053	0.037		-0.053	0.037	
Urban	0.019	0.039		0.005	0.035		0.005	0.035	
White	-0.320	0.162	*	0.227	0.146		0.227	0.146	
Christian	0.219	0.079	**	-0.036	0.071		-0.036	0.071	
Region	-0.009	0.013		-0.015	0.011		-0.015	0.011	
Citizen	-0.723	0.209	**	0.231	0.189		0.231	0.189	
Constant	3.447	0.407	**	5.091	0.367	**	5.091	0.367	**
N	1704			1704			1704		
R-Squared	0.044			0.199			0.057		

Note: Table entries are OLS regression estimates calculated using Stata's 'sgmediation' command.


** = p<.01; * = p<.05; † = p<.10

Most immediately apparent (based on Column 2) is that all five personality traits significantly determine one's level of risk aversion. Openness to experience, extraversion, and emotional stability are negatively related while conscientiousness and agreeableness are positively related. Since the Big Five indices are scaled the same way, a comparison of each trait's magnitude of effect is possible based on the size of its coefficient. Extraversion has the strongest impact at -0.232; emotional stability, while still significant, is least determinant at -0.096. Apart from personality, age and gender are the only other significant predictors. Risk aversion increases slightly with age while males are much less likely to be risk-averse than females.¹⁰ This combination of predictors explains roughly 20% of the variance in risk aversion.

¹⁰ Since these variables are scaled differently than the personality measures, the true magnitude of their effects is not directly comparable from the regression output here. However, further analysis of the effect of moving from the

The results in Column 3 support both Hypotheses 7 and 8: not only does risk aversion make someone significantly less likely to identify with Europe, but the Big Five's effects on identification with Europe disappear almost entirely when risk aversion is included in the full model.¹¹ This suggests their ultimate impact is largely indirect. These mediating relationships are confirmed by significant Sobel-Goodman statistics: 0.025 (s.d. = 0.006) for openness to experience, -0.016 (s.d. = 0.005) for conscientiousness, 0.030 (s.d. = 0.007) for extraversion, -0.018 (s.d. = 0.005) for agreeableness, and 0.013 (s.d. = 0.004) for emotional stability. Figures 5.1 through 5.5 graphically depict these various causal pathways by showing the significant relationship between each personality trait and risk aversion, along with the latter's negative effect on the dependent variable. Importantly, a significant mediation effect exists even when the explanatory variable no longer has a direct effect on the dependent variable—as none of the personality variables do here. This simply implies that the mediating pathway captures most of the explanatory variable's power, and is particularly common when the direct and indirect effects are oppositely signed (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010).

Figure 5.1: Openness Mediated by Risk Aversion



minimum to the maximum on each significant predictor confirms that extraversion is the strongest determinant of risk aversion, followed by openness, agreeableness, age, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and, finally, gender.

¹¹ Only agreeableness retains any semblance of significance at $p=0.057$.

Figure 5.2: Conscientiousness Mediated by Risk Aversion




Figure 5.3: Extraversion Mediated by Risk Aversion




Figure 5.4: Agreeableness Mediated by Risk Aversion





Figure 5.5: Emotional Stability Mediated by Risk Aversion



Thus, personality's effect on identification with Europe is strongly and significantly mediated by risk aversion. The specific nature of this attenuation is clarified in Table 5.2, which compares the degree to which each personality trait's effect is mediated by the various causal mechanisms tested in this chapter. The first column shows that a substantial portion of each of the Big Five's effects is captured by risk aversion; for example, 35.7% of conscientiousness's impact on superordinate identification runs through risk aversion—even though this trait was not a significant predictor from Chapter 4. This makes sense since dependable, disciplined people are unlikely to be big risk takers. Similarly, more than half (53.8%) of extraversion's effect is indirect. Extraverted individuals appear more willing to take risks, which attenuates extraversion's otherwise-positive effect on identification with Europe.

Table 5.2: Proportion of the Big Five's Total Effects Mediated by Each Mechanism

	Risk Aversion	Objective Knowledge	L-R Ideology
Openness	0.390	0.172	-
Conscientiousness	0.357	-	0.375
Extraversion	0.538	-0.166	-
Agreeableness	0.238	-	-0.310
Emotional Stability	0.514	-	-0.263

MECHANISM 2: KNOWLEDGE

As just discussed, openness to experience should affect the extent to which one seeks out information to reduce uncertainty about what the European identification alternative entails, and highly politically-knowledgeable individuals should be more likely to identify with the superordinate group. To test this, *Objective Knowledge* reflects a mean index of 10 questions testing respondents' factual correctness regarding both EU and UK affairs.¹² Respondents were asked to indicate whether a series of statements were true or false (see question 19 of the *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey*, Appendix C). The final measure ranges from zero to one with 11 possible values, indicating low to high comprehension. The overall mean is 0.342 (s.d. = 0.244), suggesting that most people are not that well-informed and have relatively little awareness of objective political matters.

Like the analysis of risk aversion above, Table 5.3 reports an '*sgmediation*' model testing whether objective political knowledge is another causal pathway through which the Big Five's effects might travel.¹³ As Column 2 demonstrates, openness is indeed positively and significantly associated with more accurate awareness of EU and national political affairs; extraversion emerges as an unexpected determinant of knowledge as well, although this trait is negatively related to factual correctness.¹⁴ Both openness and extraversion maintain a significant effect on identification with Europe in Column 3, although when objective knowledge is included their impacts are less than what they were in Column 1. This supports Hypothesis 10 and indicates

¹² The Cronbach's alpha of these 10 items is 0.748.

¹³ These models exclude education because it is highly correlated with objective political knowledge ($r = 0.195$). When both education and knowledge are included, education is always insignificant but no substantive results change: a significant mediation effect is still found for both *Openness* and *Extraversion*, though the proportion of total effects mediated through the knowledge pathway drops slightly to 0.145 and -0.135, respectively.

¹⁴ This could be because extraverted individuals are more likely to intake information from those in their social networks, who may or may not themselves be well-informed about political matters.

mediation is taking place. Hypothesis 9 is also substantiated since objective knowledge is significant and positive on its own.¹⁵

Table 5.3: The Mediating Role of Objective Knowledge

	1: Identification w/ Europe			2: Objective Knowledge			3: Identification w/ Europe		
	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.
Personality									
Openness	0.071	0.026	**	0.021	0.004	**	0.059	0.026	*
Conscientiousness	-0.038	0.030		-0.005	0.004		-0.035	0.030	
Extraversion	0.054	0.030	†	-0.016	0.004	**	0.063	0.030	*
Agreeableness	-0.077	0.029	**	-0.003	0.004		-0.076	0.029	**
Emotional Stability	0.021	0.025		0.001	0.004		0.021	0.025	
Causal Mechanism									
Objective Knowledge							0.575	0.170	**
Sociodemographic Controls									
Age	0.001	0.003		0.004	0.000	**	0.004	0.000	**
Male	0.052	0.079		0.116	0.011	**	0.116	0.011	**
Occupational Prestige	0.087	0.036	*	0.034	0.005	**	0.034	0.005	**
Urban	0.025	0.038		0.011	0.005	†	0.011	0.005	†
White	-0.317	0.160	*	-0.050	0.023	*	-0.050	0.023	*
Christian	0.209	0.078	**	0.013	0.011		0.013	0.011	
Region	-0.008	0.012		0.001	0.002		0.001	0.002	
Citizen	-0.758	0.208	**	-0.022	0.030		-0.022	0.030	
Constant	3.543	0.400	**	0.030	0.057		0.030	0.057	
N	1723			1723			1723		
R-Squared	0.040			0.178			0.047		

Note: Table entries are OLS regression estimates calculated using Stata's 'sgmediation' command.

** = p<.01; * = p<.05; † = p<.10

The mediation results of Table 5.3 are corroborated by significant Sobel-Goodman test statistics: 0.012 (s.d. = 0.004) for openness and -0.009 (s.d. = 0.004) for extraversion. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 display their respective pathways. The percentages of total effects mediated by objective knowledge, as indicated in Table 5.2, are not as high as they were for the mechanism of risk aversion (only 0.172 and -0.166, respectively) since these two traits retain stronger direct than indirect effects on identification. Nevertheless, these results help detect an additional mechanism through which personality affects identification.

¹⁵ Further analysis shows that the size of its substantive effect ranks third after agreeableness (whose effect on identification is not mediated by knowledge) and openness; extraversion comes fourth.

Figure 5.6: Openness Mediated by Objective Knowledge





Figure 5.7: Extraversion Mediated by Objective Knowledge



MECHANISM 3: IDEOLOGY

A final path through which personality's effects may run is ideological orientation. *L-R Ideology* is based on respondents' self-placement on the typical 11-point scale of zero (far left) to 10 (far right). The mean is 5.050 (s.d. = 2.135), suggesting that most people fall right in the middle.

In keeping with extant findings, Table 5.4, Column 2 shows that conscientiousness and agreeableness affect one's political ideology. Emotional stability also matters here while, in contrast to other studies, openness does not. These three significant traits have conflicting impacts, however: conscientiousness and emotional stability make someone more likely to be

conservative while agreeableness makes someone more likely to be liberal. Judging from coefficient size, agreeableness has the strongest pull (-0.271 compared to 0.195 for conscientiousness and 0.076 for emotional stability). In the full model (Column 3), the effects of conscientiousness and emotional stability drop out—suggesting their effects on identification are entirely mediated by ideology; interestingly, agreeableness’s effect gets stronger (-0.074 in Column 1 versus -0.097 in Column 3). This supports Hypothesis 12. Openness and extraversion retain their independent, non-mediated positive effects on identification with Europe. Hypothesis 11 is also supported since *L-R Ideology* is negative and significant on its own; the more conservative an individual, the less likely s/he is to identify superordinately.¹⁶

Table 5.4: The Mediating Role of Ideology

	1: Identification w/ Europe			2: L-R Ideology			3: Identification w/ Europe		
	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.
Personality									
Openness	0.063	0.027	*	0.017	0.036		0.065	0.027	*
Conscientiousness	-0.044	0.030		0.195	0.040	**	-0.027	0.030	
Extraversion	0.057	0.030	†	0.063	0.040		0.062	0.030	*
Agreeableness	-0.074	0.029	*	-0.271	0.039	**	-0.097	0.030	**
Emotional Stability	0.025	0.025		0.076	0.034	*	0.031	0.025	
Causal Mechanism									
L-R Ideology							-0.084	0.018	**
Sociodemographic Controls									
Age	0.002	0.003		0.003	0.004		0.002	0.003	
Male	0.049	0.080		0.148	0.106		0.061	0.079	
Education	0.061	0.032	†	-0.124	0.043	**	0.050	0.032	
Occupational Prestige	0.053	0.041		0.089	0.054	†	0.061	0.040	
Urban	0.019	0.039		-0.134	0.051	**	0.008	0.038	
White	-0.320	0.162	*	-0.287	0.215		-0.344	0.161	*
Christian	0.219	0.079	**	0.507	0.105	**	0.262	0.079	**
Region	-0.009	0.013		-0.026	0.017		-0.011	0.012	
Citizen	-0.723	0.209	**	0.024	0.278		-0.721	0.208	**
Constant	3.447	0.407	**	5.052	0.541	**	3.873	0.415	*
N	1704			1704			1704		
R-Squared	0.044			0.066			0.056		

Note: Table entries are OLS regression estimates calculated using Stata’s ‘sgmediation’ command.

** = p<.01; * = p<.05; † = p<.10

¹⁶ This impact is second to that of agreeableness but stronger than the change in magnitude of effects moving from the minimum to the maximum of openness and extraversion.

Once more, the important conclusion is that ideology significantly mediates the impact of several of the Big Five personality traits. Table 5.2 and Figures 5.8 through 5.10 show that the effects of conscientiousness and emotional stability are almost entirely captured by ideological orientation; their total percentage of effects mediated are 0.375 and -0.263, respectively. The effect of agreeableness is only partially mediated (-0.310). Sobel-Goodman test statistics are -0.016 (s.d. = 0.005) for conscientiousness, 0.023 (s.d. = 0.006) for agreeableness, and -0.006 (s.d. = 0.003) for emotional stability.

Figure 5.8: Conscientiousness Mediated by Ideology




Figure 5.9: Agreeableness Mediated by Ideology





Figure 5.10: Emotional Stability Mediated by Ideology



All three mediation analyses suggest important ways in which personality may affect superordinate identification. Much of the Big Five personality traits' effects flow through the intermediate variables of risk aversion, objective political knowledge, and ideology.¹⁷ Future analyses should attempt to parse out which causal mechanism matters most.¹⁸

CONDITIONAL EFFECTS: PERSONALITY AND PERCEIVED EU INFLUENCE

In addition to showing that personality is a significant predictor of superordinate political-territorial identification, Chapter 4 also revealed the presence of a strong institutional effect. The more one reported feeling personally affected by the EU, the more likely s/he was to identify with Europe. Could this effect vary by personality? Does predisposition in any way alter institutions' influence on identification? Or, stated in the reverse, are the positive effects of openness and extraversion (along with the negative one associated with agreeableness)

¹⁷ Importantly, no significant mediating relationships were found in tests that reversed the treatment and mediator. In other words, risk aversion's effect was not significantly mediated by any of the Big Five traits, making the hypothesized causal order more plausible.

¹⁸ Appendix I provides a more complete picture of how the mechanisms identified here affect other types of political-territorial identification in comparison to that with Europe. I show that risk aversion has no effect on national, regional, or local identification, which underscores its unique contribution to the superordinate level.

conditional upon feeling affected by the EU? This potential interactive relationship is summarized by a final hypothesis:

H₁₃: The effects of perceived institutional influence on an individual's likelihood of identifying with the superordinate group vary by personality.

To test this conditional relationship, I interacted each personality measure with *Perceived EU Influence*. The new interaction terms were then entered one-at-a-time in separate models of identification with Europe containing all the standard sociodemographic controls. Table 5.5 presents the results. In no instance is there a significant moderating relationship between any of the Big Five personality traits and one's perception of how much the EU personally affects them.¹⁹ While this means that feeling personally affected by the EU does not increase the already-positive effects of openness and extraversion, it simultaneously means that perceived EU influence maintains a strong, positive, independent effect on the likelihood of identifying with Europe regardless of someone's preexisting disposition. Phrased differently, personality does not in any way appear to detract from *Perceived EU Influence's* positive impact. And since, as established in Chapter 4, the substantive value of this institutional effect is stronger than that of any individual personality trait, it may be that the most feasible way to increase identification with a superordinate group is thus to help individuals recognize the benefits that the overarching polity—here, the EU—has for their daily lives. I return to this implication in Chapter 6.

¹⁹ The interactions for extraversion and agreeableness almost attain significance (Models 3 and 4).

Table 5.5: Testing the Interaction of Personality and Perceived EU Influence

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5		
	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.
Personality															
Openness	0.140	0.068	†	0.036	0.017	†	0.039	0.018	†	0.033	0.017	†	0.039	0.018	*
Conscientiousness	-0.042	0.042		0.084	0.083		-0.043	0.042		-0.041	0.041		-0.041	0.042	
Extraversion	0.051	0.015	**	0.049	0.015	**	0.218	0.070	**	0.047	0.015	**	0.051	0.015	**
Agreeableness	-0.064	0.023	*	-0.061	0.022	*	-0.065	0.023	*	0.098	0.074		-0.062	0.023	*
Emotional Stability	0.023	0.033		0.022	0.033		0.022	0.032		0.022	0.032		0.016	0.057	
Institutional Effect															
Perceived EU Influence	0.429	0.142	*	0.465	0.164	*	0.481	0.125	**	0.548	0.187	*	0.188	0.141	
Conditional Relationship															
Open. X EU Influence	-0.027	0.018													
Consc. X EU Influence				-0.033	0.019										
Extra. X EU Influence							-0.045	0.032	†						
Agree. X EU Influence										-0.042	0.020	†			
Emo. Stab. X EU Influence													0.002	0.017	
Sociodemographic Controls															
Age	0.001	0.003		0.001	0.003		0.001	0.003		0.001	0.003		0.001	0.003	
Male	0.033	0.080		0.036	0.080		0.030	0.080		0.043	0.081		0.033	0.079	
Education	0.054	0.023	*	0.053	0.023	*	0.056	0.022	*	0.053	0.022	*	0.053	0.023	*
Occupational Prestige	0.055	0.033		0.053	0.031		0.054	0.033		0.062	0.033	†	0.055	0.032	
Urban	0.022	0.051		0.023	0.051		0.019	0.049		0.020	0.050		0.022	0.051	
White	-0.300	0.133	*	-0.289	0.133	†	-0.311	0.136	*	-0.272	0.128	†	-0.309	0.132	*
Christian	0.234	0.076	**	0.229	0.074	*	0.234	0.076	*	0.224	0.075	*	0.236	0.075	**
Constant	1.283	0.545	*	1.117	0.564	†	1.100	0.475	*	0.776	0.630		2.161	0.448	**
N	1640			1640			1640			1640			1640		
R-Squared	0.066			0.067			0.068			0.069			0.065		

Note: Table entries are OLS regression estimates with standard errors clustered by region.

** = p<.01; * = p<.05; † = p<.10

CONCLUSION

The analyses in this chapter have attempted to clarify by what mechanisms and under what conditions personality's effects operate for individual identification with Europe. For the former, three potential conduits stood out. Risk aversion strongly mediated the effects of all five traits and was then, as predicted based on prospect theory, negatively related to identifying with the superordinate group. Next, both openness to experience and extraversion were linked to higher objective political knowledge, which then increased identification with Europe. Lastly, ideology was a significant mediator of conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional stability; more conservative views reduce one's likelihood of identifying with Europe. While these mechanisms are undoubtedly not the only pathways through which the Big Five traits may affect the tendency to see oneself as part of the superordinate group, they provide a starting point for better understanding exactly how personality matters.

Likewise, the interactions between each trait and an individual's perception of EU influence was but a preliminary investigation into the types of contextual conditions that might moderate personality's effect on identification. The fact that no moderating relationship arose here suggests that future tests should consider other circumstances where an interactive relationship is possible. At the same time, we for now see that institutions' positive effect on identification appears equal across all personality types.

CHAPTER 6: A ‘SUPERORDINATE’ PERSONALITY?

Abstract: This chapter summarizes results from the above empirical tests, discusses the implications of my findings, and addresses important limitations for future research to overcome. As confirmed in Chapter 3, how people see themselves has important consequences for how they then see others and relate to society as a whole. Understanding those whose sense of self extends to the superordinate level is thus crucial for scholars and policymakers wishing to maximize these sociopolitical benefits. The effects of predisposition uncovered in Chapters 4 and 5 bring us one step closer to accomplishing this task. Though superordinate identification should be unlikely given what we know of human behavior, I show that personality differences—among other things—help explain the puzzling cases of those who *do* identify with a superordinate group like Europe. Despite this contribution, there remain several avenues for further investigation.

Keywords: identification with Europe, personality, superordinate identification

A desire to create “we the people” is something all integration projects across time and space profess, yet we still know little about how these superordinate identities actually form and what causes variation in individuals’ propensity to adopt them. Identification is a complex psychological process, and identification with a superordinate political-territorial group seems improbable since people naturally seek to surround themselves with similar peers (Allport 1954; Bernhard, Fischbacher, and Fehr 2006); Mollica, Gray, and Treviño 2003). Why, then, would anyone see him or herself in superordinate terms? Applied to the case of the EU, how are some citizens apparently able to overcome the cognitive biases that prevent others from seeing themselves as European?

My research informs our understanding of how common ingroup (aka ‘superordinate’) identities develop at the individual level. The central finding of my dissertation is that certain predispositions (measured by the Big Five personality traits) prompt citizens to be more or less amenable to superordinate identification than others. In some ways, this suggests there may be such a thing as a ‘superordinate personality’ to describe the types of individuals that are cognitively capable of conceiving of themselves in such inclusive terms. My results also elucidate the role that government institutions may play in shaping identification when individuals feel personally affected by them. Below, I briefly summarize the main results from each chapter. Next, I dwell on the implications of my findings. Finally, I acknowledge the limitations of the present analyses and suggest numerous ways in which this work should be improved. If, as some argue, “The single biggest question of the 21st century is how to build the bridges of solidarity that enable the emergence of a common citizenship and a cohesive human community” (Habib and Bentley 2008, xi), then it is vital to establish whether, when, and how personality matters for superordinate identification.

SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS

This dissertation aimed to make five contributions. First, it sought to develop a series of testable hypotheses for how personality may determine individual differences in self-categorization (applied here to Europe but theoretically extendable to any context where citizens confront both sub- and superordinate political-territorial identity alternatives). Not only was personality an originally-proposed explanation of differences in prejudice versus tolerance (Allport 1954), but more recent work explicitly calls for increased theory regarding “the possible political significance of personality” for any number of outcomes (Mondak et al. 2010, 103). After reviewing what we know of identification and personality, Chapter 2 drew on extant findings surrounding the Big Five personality traits to generate expectations for how they should matter for one’s willingness to identify with Europe. It also proposed that institutions may help citizens conceive of themselves in broader terms.

Second, this dissertation aimed to empirically test whether identification with Europe operates as a superordinate identity by reducing feelings of outgroup antagonism among formerly-disparate subgroups. Chapter 3 used cross-national survey data from *Eurobarometer 71.3* to show that those who feel more strongly European also exhibit the warmest feelings towards immigrants. This positive effect was not only stronger than the negative one stemming from national identification, but (as shown in Appendix B) it is strongest when citizens are assessing their fellow EU nationals. Together, these results support the predictions of the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) that a superordinate identity improves intergroup relations (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). Knowing, then, that identification with Europe yields this beneficial tendency, it is all the more important to appreciate how citizens come to see themselves in this superordinate light.

Third, this dissertation endeavored to collect new data that would facilitate a test of its personality propositions. As descriptive data throughout the various chapters showed, a decent portion of EU citizens identify with Europe in at least some capacity. These observations stress the need to reconcile the puzzle of why one ever *would* identify superordinately when many psychological theories (i.e., homophily, cognitive dissonance, and disconfirmation bias discussed in Chapter 1) predict otherwise. Chapter 2 posited that personality could provide the answer, but there appeared no available means by which to verify its effect. Thus, I deployed a *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey* (PAIS) in the UK, specifically geared toward measuring the Big Five traits while also gauging superordinate identification.¹ Chapter 4 then presented two basic tests of this relationship, one using indices of each trait and another capturing the effects of the traits' component items. Both of these investigations showed that identification with Europe is (partly) a function of one's openness to experience, extraversion, and agreeableness. Openness and extraversion increased Europeanness; agreeableness had the opposite effect. However, these substantive effects were relatively small in comparison to the perceived influence of the EU on one's daily life.²

Fourth, this dissertation strived to isolate some of the causal mechanisms behind the observed link between personality and superordinate identification. Chapter 5 analyzed whether risk aversion, knowledge, and ideology mediated the Big Five traits' effects; all three did but to different degrees. Risk aversion is an extremely powerful predictor of identification with Europe, and is itself determined by all five personality traits. Upon accounting for one's level of risk

¹ The PAIS not only enables scrutiny of my main hypotheses, but it also employs a relatively-unused measure of the Big Five traits based on five bipolar items per larger trait index. The descriptive statistics from this strategy contribute to a larger dialogue regarding the most proper way to assess the Big Five traits in survey research.

² Interestingly, this institutional effect deviates from other studies of European identity, which find none (e.g., Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Risse 2010). I attribute this disconnect to different levels of analysis: it appears the positive effects of institutions uncovered in my individual-level tests may have been masked in others' more aggregate-level analyses.

aversion, personality has no remaining direct effect. This suggests many individuals are assessing the European identity alternative through an instrumental lens. Those who may not see a direct benefit from identifying with Europe—especially since the European category is not seeking to eradicate national loyalties—might be especially prone to risk aversion in this ‘domain of gains.’ Political knowledge constituted another pathway through which some of personality’s effects travel. Openness and extraversion were significantly mediated by objective knowledge, such that these two traits affect how politically aware one is; those who are more correctly informed about national and EU affairs are more likely to identify with Europe. The final mechanism tested was ideological orientation on a left-right scale. This aspect captured quite a bit of conscientiousness and emotional stability’s effects on superordinate identification, which had not been previously apparent because their independent effects were insignificant. Ideology also partially mediated the effect of agreeableness. Altogether, these results give a better sense of how, precisely, personality affects identification with Europe.

Lastly, this dissertation suspected that the effects of personality may be moderated by the perceived influence one feels from the EU. In addition to the mediation tests just described, Chapter 5 speculated that certain traits may interact with the observed institutional effect. It conjectured that those who are, say, highly open to experience *and* believe the EU to highly affect them should be that much more likely to identify with the superordinate group. Somewhat surprisingly, no interactive relationship held up. This non-finding, however, might be viewed as a silver lining: it suggests that the already-positive effect of perceived institutional influence is not conditional on personality type.

IMPLICATIONS

There are several notable implications to discuss. I break these down in dialogue with a general political science debate versus more EU-specific considerations.

GENERAL CONSEQUENCES FOR POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

While personality was once a forgotten variable, many scholars are once again asserting that institutional forces alone cannot explain political attitudes and behavior (or, in this case, identification) (Dietrich et al. 2012). Yet part of the reason that early personality studies (e.g., that of Adorno et al. 1950) fell out of favor was because any significant findings were taken to mean that outcomes are psychologically—if not genetically—predetermined (Greenstein 1992; Mondak et al. 2010). While I show (in Chapter 4, for instance) that certain individuals—namely, those who are very open to experience, highly extraverted, and not very agreeable—do seem predisposed toward greater identification with Europe, that should not mean that those with the opposite traits are automatically or permanently prevented from it. It is true that personality traits are admittedly less malleable than individual attitudes or contextual arrangements. But individual predispositions rarely operate in isolation; they are instead commonly conditioned by both situational and cultural context (Greenstein 1967).

As others explain, “...personality predispositions increase or decrease the probability of behavior only if the action is appropriate for a specific situation” (Verhulst, Hatemi, and Martin 2010, 306). Superordinate political-territorial identification may not often be something on which citizens consciously dwell, which would minimize the ‘inherent’ consequences of personality predispositions. Furthermore, as the various mechanisms detected in Chapter 5 attest, personality’s pathway is often indirect, leaving much more room for variation in its ultimate effects. Altogether, my results thus add a new micro-level explanation for identification, but are

not so powerful as to imply a one-size-fits-all model where alternative factors are precluded from mattering.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

Beyond EU officials' proclaimed desire to achieve "unity in diversity" (Tugendhat 1977), recent work points out several important consequences of differences in identification. Among other things, strong national identity often hinders support for integration (Carey 2002) and formulates exclusionary anti-immigrant sentiment (E. Green 2007; McLaren 2001). Those who identify as European—either instead of or in addition to their national identity—display just the opposite: they like the EU (Kritzing 2003) and, as shown in Chapter 3, they are more tolerant of immigrants. The addition of a superordinate level of identification onto citizens' preexisting national and subnational attachments has great implications, both for the future of the EU and for other regional governance enterprises emulating it worldwide (e.g., ASEAN, MERCOSUR, the African Union, etc.).

One of the primary implications of my dissertation is that scholars and policymakers who are interested in reaping the empirically-verified benefits of a common superordinate identity might start by helping citizens feel positively affected by the overarching institutions associated with it. This aspect is all the more relevant in the midst of the EU's current financial crisis. Despite difficult economic times, social solidarity among Europeans may actually be increasing; at the very least, identification with Europe has not decreased dramatically (Risse 2013). This insinuates that there is still room for an institutional influence to boost superordinate identification.

Turning especially to the UK, which has often had a rocky relationship with the EU, my results in some ways provide an explanation for its low levels of aggregate superordinate

identification while also offering ways in which individual attachment to Europe may be increased. The negative pull of agreeableness seems to make many individuals afraid of appearing socially odd by professing anything other than an exclusive national identity; yet, again, the positive impact of feeling affected by the EU held among all five personality traits. Additionally, those who are more risk-acceptant, who know more about the EU, and who follow left-leaning elite cues could be incentivized to expand their sense of self beyond national borders. As the UK prepares for a public referendum on its EU membership (“Britain and the European Union”), only time will tell whether identification with Europe makes a difference in its outcome.

LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS

There are several ways in which future research should improve upon the analyses here. I first detail some theoretical recommendations before mentioning ways to enrich this study methodologically. In most instances, I detail future projects I intend to undertake using my *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey* to overcome these issues.

AREAS FOR THEORETICAL IMPROVEMENT

One of the largest limitations of my findings is that, despite playing a significant role, personality alone explains little variance in individual identification (as indicated by the low explanatory power in Chapter 4’s models). On the one hand, as discussed just above, this weak substantive impact is reassuring because it shows that Europeanness is far from predetermined by personality. But on the other, we want to acquire a complete picture of why some identify with the superordinate group so much more than others.³ To achieve this, more theoretical work

³ Attitudinal predictors may be an important missing piece. One of the most recent studies of European identity proposes several beliefs that may matter: trust in national versus EU institutions, perceived personal and/or country benefit from integration, trust in other Europeans, and retrospective economic evaluations (Bellucci, Sanders, and Serrichio 2012). However, as the authors themselves admit, most of these explanations were originally designed to

on the determinants of identification is needed. One fruitful area to start would be to conduct much more exhaustive tests interacting predisposition with situational context. An untested assumption of this dissertation is that "...variation in people's psychological predispositions leads them to respond differently when exposed to common environmental stimuli, and, correspondingly, that the expression of personality traits will vary by situation" (Mondak et al. 2010, 90). Thus, personality's effects may not be very strong on their own, but they could be substantially enhanced under a variety of heretofore unknown contextual conditions. It will be important for future studies to sort this out, and I intend to conduct many more tests after merging objective contextual indicators (e.g., macroeconomic conditions that may affect perceptions of risk or level of political competition based on party fractionalization) with my PAIS data.

Second, while the Big Five traits have been shown to affect a host of political outcomes (Gerber et al. 2011b; Mondak and Halperin 2008), they may not be the most salient dimension of personality to study when trying to understand the psychological determinants of identification. Intergroup relations often revolve around perceptions of threat based on competition over resources or status (Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998). Hence, other personality concepts like Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999) or authoritarianism (Hetherington and Weiler 2009) may have a stronger effect. My PAIS survey contains measures to test each of these theories, and future analyses will investigate how their impact compares to that of the Big Five.

A third theoretical shortcoming is that the hypotheses designed here are tested solely on superordinate identification with Europe. As Appendix I elaborates, scholars should enhance my

explain support for European integration. They also tend to be highly collinear with European identification, which is itself a known determinant of EU support (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005), so I have not included them here.

propositions to develop a comprehensive theory that parsimoniously accounts for identification with *all* political-territorial levels. One of the features of the modern world is that its corresponding scalar identity alternatives can be neatly ordered from lowest (e.g., identification with one's neighborhood or town) to highest (e.g., identification with a supranational entity or even the whole world). If the theoretical story begun in Chapter 2 holds, the various personality traits should have uniform directional effects on the strength of an individual's attachment to each level such that, for instance, openness to experience has a stronger impact on supranational identification than national identification than regional identification, etc. Additionally, studying attachment to more local environments should illuminate whether and how the personality traits that did not attain significance here (like conscientiousness and emotional stability) fit into the bigger picture. These types of analyses are possible using my PAIS survey since it queried respondents on their degree of identification with five different political-territorial identity alternatives (town, region, UK, EU, and Europe).

Next, an important omitted variable for identification could be that of interpersonal influence. To my knowledge, this possibility remains untested and yet holds great potential as it connects the growing recognition of social influence for individual behavior to the realm of identity. Identification may be a product of one's social network, just as political discussion (Gerber et al. 2012a; Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987) and political engagement (Fitzgerald and Curtis 2012; Mutz 2002) are. Parental influence, political discussants, close friends, and/or weak ties may all cause one to imitate or adopt the identity embraced by those around him (Demo and Hughes 1990; Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald

2007). To assess this, I included a social network battery in the PAIS that will allow me to get at how friends' and family members' identification affect one's own.⁴

Once the effects of personality—and other factors like social network—on political-territorial identification have been established, scholars should then test how well they extend to other types of social identities (e.g., ethnicity, race, religion, class, etc.). Though superordinate identification was selected here because of its presumed political import for integration projects like the EU, other identity categories may be more psychologically salient to individuals than political-territorial ones (Boehnke and Fuss 2008). In that case, scholars should isolate personality's effect for identification *in general*. In addition to political-territorial identification, the PAIS survey asked respondents how strongly they identified with a host of other identity categories (occupation, race, gender, age, religion, political party, social class, and marital status). Thus, these data will not only allow me to analyze which identities truly matter most to people, but also to probe the role that the Big Five traits (and other explanations) play in attachment to each of them.

Finally, as Appendix B notes and began to address, superordinate identification's effect on outgroup attitudes requires further scrutiny. The precepts of the CIIM imply that the pacifying benefits of a superordinate identity will extend most clearly to members of the former outgroup(s) that are now contained within the larger overarching category. Thus, additional studies should be conducted to determine whether and how Chapter 3's effects vary with more precise measures of attitudes toward different kinds of immigrants. The PAIS can do this once a more extensive theory and plan for analysis are developed.

⁴ Respondents were asked to report on several features of any five people they knew, including where each person was from, how often they discussed EU matters with them, how warmly they thought each contact felt toward the EU, and how strongly each alter identified with each of the political-territorial identities they themselves had answered earlier. The PAIS also collected information on each person's relation to the respondent and how close the relationship between them was; these latter items will afford further distinctions to be drawn based on how strong of ties exist between each dyad (Granovetter 1973).

METHODOLOGICAL ENHANCEMENTS

The first important methodological shortcoming of my results on personality and identification is that they come from a single country (the UK). Clearly a large-scale, nationally-representative survey of citizens in all 27 EU countries would be preferred, but pragmatic limitations necessitated a smaller-scale analysis to start. Thus, while the theoretical relationship at hand should extend to any superordinate political-territorial identity, and though Chapter 4 provided justification as to why the UK is an appropriate test case, the PAIS should be replicated elsewhere to confirm the generalizability of my findings.

Secondly, the institutional effect proclaimed here relies solely on a subjective measure of how much citizens believe a series of EU institutions affect their daily life. As briefly highlighted in Chapter 4, this measure could be endogenous to one's prior opinions about the EU in general, and thus the concept would be more aptly tested with an objective measure of institutional exposure or contact. Future research would also benefit from detailed analyses of the precise mechanisms linking institutions to identification.

Thirdly, as discussed in Appendix H, more advanced mediation analyses should be conducted to verify the precise causal mechanisms that matter. Chapter 5 acknowledges that the current method used is not capable of conducting tests of multiple mediating relationships at once; nor does it estimate how sensitive the observed indirect effects may be. Structural equation modeling and path analysis may be a step in this direction, allowing for examination of a more complicated causal process.

Finally, the data employed in all the tests above come from cross-sectional snapshots in time. Though the early formation and stability of personality offer strong causal leverage to bolster against claims of endogeneity (Block and Block 2006; Caprara et al. 2006; Costa and McCrae 1992), static analyses cannot assess dynamic trends in identification with Europe over

time (Ruiz Jiménez et al. 2004). Thus, additional methodological approaches should be utilized to ascertain more concrete causal relationships. Both experiments and panel studies would boost our certainty in the proposed causal direction (that personality causes identification and not the other way around). They would also afford an assessment of any individual-level *change* in identification (Chandra and Laitin 2002).

CONCLUSION

Bringing personality into the study of identity adds an important micro-level explanation of why individuals differ in the extent to which they see themselves in superordinate terms. Overall, this dissertation provides tentative evidence for a ‘superordinate personality’, in which those who are most open to experience, extraverted, and unconstrained by social pressures appear most willing and able to recategorize themselves as part of the broadest political-territorial ingroup. These people are also least risk-averse, most objectively knowledgeable about political affairs, and more inclined to a left-leaning ideology. Finally, they seem to recognize supranational institutions’ personal impact upon them.

Continuing to determine which elements best explain superordinate identification will elucidate ways in which scholars and policymakers can increase the positive benefits it produces: increased political legitimacy and stability, enhanced citizen sacrifice for the sake of the common good, and greater intergroup harmony in diverse societies. Each of these facets affects political collectivities’ ability to endure. Therefore, discerning the factors that promote or hinder a cohesive collective identity among citizens is key to achieving democratic peace and prosperity.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: CODING OF *EUROBAROMETER 71.3*

VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION.¹

Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index (0-1): A mean index with 19 categories combining responses to seven statements; Cronbach's alpha = 0.7281. Recoded such that 'one' indicates greater favorability towards immigrants. "For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree:

- *Enrich Culture:* People from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of (OUR COUNTRY). [1=tend to agree; 0=tend to disagree]
- *(No) Security Threat:* The presence of people from other ethnic groups is a cause of insecurity. [0=tend to agree; 1=tend to disagree]
- *(No) Employment Threat:* The presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in (OUR COUNTRY). [0=tend to agree; 1=tend to disagree]
- *Immigrant Labor:* We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of our economy. [1=tend to agree; 0=tend to disagree]
- *Solve Ageing Problem:* The arrival of immigrants in Europe can be effective in solving the problem of Europe's ageing population. [1=tend to agree; 0=tend to disagree]
- *Increase Tolerance:* Immigrants can play an important role in developing greater understanding and tolerance with the rest of the world. [1=tend to agree; 0=tend to disagree]
- *Societal Contribution:* (Legal) Immigrants contribute more in taxes than they benefit from health and welfare services"² [1=tend to agree; 0=tend to disagree]

Feel European (0-3): Higher values indicate greater European identity, as evidenced by responses to the following question:³

- "I would like you to think about the idea of geographical identity. Different people think of this in different ways. People might think of themselves as being European, (NATIONALITY) or from a specific region to different extents. Some people say that with globalization, people are becoming closer to each other as 'citizens of the world'. Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are...European?" [Not at all, not really, somewhat, to a great extent]

Feel National (0-3): Higher values indicate greater national identity, as evidenced by responses to the following question:

- "I would like you to think about the idea of geographical identity. Different people think of this in different ways. People might think of themselves as being European, (NATIONALITY) or from a specific region to different extents. Some people say that

¹ All variables have been recoded to range from low/negative to high/positive values. All 'don't knows' have been recoded as missing.

² Combined responses to this split-sample experiment, where half the respondents were randomly assigned to receive the treatment specifying 'Legal immigrants' while the other half simply heard 'Immigrants'. 39.4% of those who received the experimental treatment agreed, compared to 30.42% of those who received the control treatment.

³ Note that immediately prior to this question, respondents were asked a battery of questions regarding what elements they believe are important for a European identity, the most important characteristics of being (NATIONALITY), and the most important characteristics of being European. This question ordering may have primed respondents to then report greater attachment to Europe.

with globalization, people are becoming closer to each other as ‘citizens of the world’. Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are (NATIONALITY)?” [Not at all, not really, somewhat, to a great extent]

Feel Regional (0-3): Higher values indicate greater regional identity, as evidenced by responses to the following question:

- “I would like you to think about the idea of geographical identity. Different people think of this in different ways. People might think of themselves as being European, (NATIONALITY) or from a specific region to different extents. Some people say that with globalization, people are becoming closer to each other as ‘citizens of the world’. Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are...an inhabitant of your region?” [Not at all, not really, somewhat, to a great extent]

Crime is An Issue (0-1): A dichotomous variable equal to one if a respondent mentioned ‘crime’ in response to the following question:

- “What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?” [Crime, economic situation, rising prices/inflation, taxation, unemployment, terrorism, defense/foreign affairs, housing, immigration, healthcare system, educational system, pensions, the environment, energy]

Economic Situation Index (0-3): A mean index with 19 categories combining responses to the following questions; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7662. “How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? [Very bad, rather bad, rather good, very good]

- Your personal job situation
- The financial situation of your household
- The employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY)
- The situation of the (NATIONALITY) economy

L-R Ideology (1-10): Respondents’ self-placement on a 10-point Left-Right ideological scale where 1=far left and 10=far right.

- “In political matters people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your views on this scale?”

Age (15-98): A continuous variable indicating the exact age of the respondent.

Male (0-1): A dichotomous variable coded ‘one’ for male.

Education (0-4): An ordinal variable indicating the age at which a respondent stopped his/her full-time education. Ranges from zero to four, where higher values indicate the respondent achieved a higher level of education or is still studying. [No full-time education, 15 & under, 16-19, 20+, still studying]

Urban (0-2): An ordinal variable coded as 0=rural area or village, 1=small or middle sized town, and 2=large town.

Born Here (0-1): A dichotomous variable equal to one if the respondent reports that s/he was born in the country in which interviewed.

Homeowner (0-1): A dichotomous variable equal to one if the respondent reports owning an apartment or house that s/he has finished paying for. Based on the question:

- “Which of the following goods do you have? [Television, DVD player, music CD player, computer, internet connection at home, a car, an apartment/house which you have finished paying for, an apartment/house which you are paying for]

Blue Collar Worker (0-1): A dichotomous variable where 1=current employed as a farmer, fisherman, skilled manual worker, or unskilled manual worker, and 0 otherwise. Based on the question:

- “What is your current occupation?” [Responsible for ordinary shopping; student; unemployed or temporarily not working; retired or unable to work through illness; farmer; fisherman; professional; owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed; business proprietors; employed professional; general management; middle management; employed position, working mainly at a desk; employed position, traveling; employed position, in service; supervisor; skilled manual worker; other (unskilled) manual worker]

Unemployed (0-1): A dichotomous variable where 1=unemployed or temporarily not working.

- “What is your current occupation?” [Responsible for ordinary shopping; student; unemployed or temporarily not working; retired or unable to work through illness; farmer; fisherman; professional; owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed; business proprietors; employed professional; general management; middle management; employed position, working mainly at a desk; employed position, traveling; employed position, in service; supervisor; skilled manual worker; other (unskilled) manual worker]

Linguistic-Religious Cross-Cuttingness (0.198-0.947): A country-level variable taken from Selway (2011). Higher values indicate greater cross-cutting linguistic and religious cleavages within a country.

Length of EU Membership (2-58): A country-level measure calculated as the survey year (2009) minus each country’s year of EU entry.

Central/Eastern European (0-1): A country-level variable equal to one for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, or Slovenia.

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics from *Eurobarometer 71.3*¹

Variable (Range)	Frequency	Percent (%)	Mean	Std. Dev.
Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index (0-1; 19 values)			0.483	0.320
Enrich Culture (0-1)			0.595	0.491
(No) Security Threat (0-1)			0.443	0.497
(No) Employment Threat (0-1)			0.418	0.493
Immigrant Labor (0-1)			0.485	0.500
Solve Ageing Problem (0-1)			0.415	0.493
Increase Tolerance (0-1)			0.577	0.494
Societal Contribution (0-1)			0.349	0.477
Feel European (0-3)			2.083	0.858
Not At All	2,784	9.30		
Not Really	5,191	17.34		
Somewhat	12,671	42.32		
To A Great Extent	9,296	31.05		
Feel National (0-3)			2.783	0.545
Not At All	522	1.73		
Not Really	917	3.04		
Somewhat	4,078	13.54		
To A Great Extent	24,608	81.69		
Feel Regional (0-3)			2.669	0.626
Not At All	467	1.56		
Not Really	1,286	4.3		
Somewhat	6,278	20.97		
To A Great Extent	21,905	73.17		
Crime is An Issue (0-1)			0.178	0.382
Economic Situation Index (0-3; 19 values)			1.326	0.587
National Economy (0-3)			0.983	0.737
Household Finances (0-3)			1.624	0.775
National Employment Situation (0-3)			0.810	0.698
Personal Job Situation (0-3)			1.675	0.908
Ideology (Far Left=1, Far Right=10)			5.405	2.246
Age (15-96)			48.975	17.731
Male (0-1)			0.460	0.498
Education (1-4)			2.258	0.848
No Full-Time Education	301	1.01		
15 & Under	6,242	21.04		
16-19	12,723	42.88		
20+	7,951	26.79		
Still Studying	2,457	8.28		
Urban (0-2)			0.907	0.795
Rural Community	11,256	37.29		
Small Town	10,401	34.46		
Large City	8,530	28.26		
Born Here (0-1)			0.944	0.230
Homeowner (0-1)			0.489	0.500
Unemployed (0-1)			0.078	0.268
Blue Collar Worker (0-1)			0.131	0.337
Central/Eastern European (0-1)			0.401	0.490
Linguistic-Religious Cross-Cuttingness (.198-.947)			0.690	0.153

¹ For those in sample

APPENDIX B: WHO IS CONSIDERED THE ‘OUTGROUP’?

Chapter 3 tested whether identification with Europe’s effect on immigration attitudes indeed produced the beneficial consequences one would expect a superordinate identity to have on outgroup attitudes. In general support of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, superordinate identification was positive and significant. However, a superordinate identity should help members of the various subgroups it encompasses feel more friendly towards each other. The measure of outgroup attitudes used in Chapter 3 did not allow for differentiation based on who was doing the immigrating. For the CIIM to be fully supported, identification with Europe should thus have the strongest effect on attitudes towards fellow EU citizens. Thus, I here provide two additional tests confirming this is the case.


ACCOUNTING FOR IMMIGRATION CONTEXT

The first way I assess whether identification with Europe’s effect differs is by taking account of contextual exposure to primarily EU or non-EU immigrants. To do this, I gathered objective migration statistics from *Eurostat* on the percentage of foreign-born population from EU versus non-EU countries residing in each EU member state (Rogers 2010). Figure B.1 aligns these figures by country.

As shown, there is substantial variation in the type of immigration each EU member state is experiencing. Some countries (like Cyprus) receive the bulk of their immigrants from other places in the EU. Others (like Latvia), have a much larger proportion of non-EU residents. These country-level trends should affect who citizens within their borders are thinking of when prompted to report on their attitudes towards immigrants. Hence, when asked their opinions in the *Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index* utilized from *Eurobarometer 71.3*, individuals in Cyprus

are likely responding based on their feelings towards EU immigrants while people in Latvia are answering from the perspective of receiving non-EU immigrants.

Figure B.1: Distribution of EU v. Non-EU Immigrants by Country



Note: Data taken from 2009 Eurostat migration statistics (Rogers 2010).

Though respondents' exact mental reference points are unknown from these data, Table B.1 replicates Chapter 3's analysis on a restricted sample of Cypriot versus Latvian citizens. Importantly, the positive effect of identification with Europe remains robust in both locations. However, judging by its higher coefficient size in the Cyprus case, *Feeling European* indeed has a stronger substantive effect on attitudes towards individuals of another subgroup encompassed within the same overarching superordinate identity (here: Europe). This provides preliminary evidence that the benefits of superordinate identification, while positive overall, operate most strongly in the way the CIIM would predict.

Table B.1: The Effect of Identification with Europe on Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index in Countries with High EU v. Non-EU Immigration

	High EU: CYPRUS			High Non-EU: LATVIA			ALL 27 EU Members		
	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.
Feel European	0.044	0.015	**	0.032	0.010	**	0.061	0.003	**
Feel National	0.023	0.040		-0.031	0.012	*	-0.042	0.004	**
Feel Regional	-0.008	0.029		0.012	0.018		-0.004	0.004	
Crime is An Issue	0.005	0.025		0.011	0.025		-0.049	0.005	**
Economic Situation Index	0.062	0.025	*	0.017	0.021		0.074	0.004	**
L-R Ideology	-0.005	0.004		-0.014	0.004	**	-0.013	0.001	**
Age	0.001	0.001		-0.001	0.001		0.000	0.000	
Male	0.049	0.024	*	-0.027	0.019		0.002	0.004	
Education	0.058	0.019	**	0.015	0.014		0.044	0.003	**
Urban	0.018	0.027		-0.017	0.012		0.012	0.003	**
Born Here	-0.113	0.072		-0.072	0.044	†	-0.076	0.009	**
Homeowner	0.031	0.027		-0.003	0.019		-0.008	0.005	†
Unemployed	0.036	0.070		0.034	0.028		0.010	0.008	
Blue Collar Worker	0.043	0.034		0.011	0.028		-0.027	0.006	**
Constant	6.134	3.256		-0.329	1.930		0.361	0.026	**
Number of Individuals	359			727			19,929		
Number of Countries	1			1			27		
R-squared	0.096			0.046			0.120		

Note: Table entries indicate *xtmixed*, *mle* var models. Columns 1 and 2 restricted to that country sample only.

** = $p < .01$; * = $p < .05$; † = $p < .10$

ACCOUNTING FOR SPECIFIC IMMIGRANT GROUP

The *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey* I conducted in the UK allows for a more refined test of outgroup attitudes because it specifically asked respondents to evaluate how they feel towards several different *kinds* of immigrants: “Please rate your views toward various groups of immigrants on a scale of 0 to 10, where zero means you think that kind of immigrant should be denied entry and/or deported and ten means you think that kind of immigrant should be highly welcomed into our country.” It then listed 20 different types of immigrant groups (depicted in Table B.2) to afford more direct investigation into which types of immigrants citizens feel most favorable towards.

Table B.2: Categories of Immigrant Groups in PAIS

Rich	Poor
Educated	Uneducated
Highly Skilled	Unskilled
Legal	Illegal
From fellow EU member states	From non-EU member states
From Western Europe	From Central or Eastern Europe
From Africa	From Asia
From North America	From South America
From Oceania	From former British colonies
From countries suffering from economic distress or underdevelopment	From countries experiencing civil war or political repression

From this question, I created three new different dependent variables. *Allow All* is a mean index combining a respondent's answers to all immigrant groups. It ranges from 1-11 with well-over 150 values; the mean is 4.680 (s.d. = 2.326). *Allow EU* and *Allow Non-EU* are single-item indicators ranging from 0-10 based on how open a respondent feels towards those 'from fellow EU member states' versus 'from non-EU member states'. Expectedly, the mean for *Allow EU* is higher (5.159; s.d. = 2.933) than that of *Allow Non-EU* (4.222; s.d. = 2.756). Together, these measures allow for a more direct test of whether identification with Europe qualifies as a superordinate identity: do citizens evaluate immigrants from fellow European countries more favorably than those from non-European ones? Again, the CIIM would predict the former.

Table B.3 reports results of tests using the PAIS data to replicate the models conducted earlier with *Eurobarometer 71.3*.¹ Comparing Models 2 and 3, we see yet again that, though the effect of identifying with Europe is positive and significant across all immigrant groups, it has

¹ While the PAIS question wording sometimes differs from that asked by the *Eurobarometer*, I include measures of nearly all the same covariates, with the exception of *Crime is an Issue* and *Homeowner* (for which there is no PAIS equivalent). Since the PAIS was conducted in only one country (the UK), I also exclude any country-level variables, which do not differ across respondents.

the strongest impact on attitudes towards fellow EU citizens (as indicated by a coefficient of 0.542 for EU immigrants compared to 0.383 for non-EU immigrants).

Table B.3: The Effect of Identification with Europe on Pro-Immigration Attitudes towards EU v. Non-EU Immigrants


	1: Allow All			2: Allow EU			3: Allow Non-EU		
	Coef.	SD	Sig.	Coef.	SD	Sig.	Coef.	SD	Sig.
Feel European	0.365	0.028	**	0.542	0.046	**	0.383	0.032	**
Feel National	-0.065	0.032	†	-0.059	0.051		-0.117	0.048	*
Feel Regional	-0.049	0.043		-0.086	0.051		-0.086	0.047	†
Economic Situation Index	0.617	0.123	**	0.508	0.158	**	0.765	0.112	**
L-R Ideology	-0.183	0.023	**	-0.217	0.027	**	-0.188	0.026	**
Age	-0.013	0.004	**	-0.002	0.005		-0.021	0.005	**
Male	-0.042	0.099		0.174	0.087	†	-0.212	0.119	
Education	0.256	0.058	**	0.374	0.067	**	0.232	0.069	**
Urban	0.031	0.051		0.057	0.087		0.051	0.063	
Born Here	-0.561	0.170	**	-0.247	0.233		-0.911	0.307	*
Unemployed	-0.465	0.277		-0.679	0.315	†	-0.482	0.296	
Occupational Prestige	0.194	0.048	**	0.162	0.054	*	0.172	0.068	*
Constant	3.509	0.625	**	2.809	0.752	**	4.023	0.602	**
N	1704			1704			1704		
R-Squared	0.214			0.204			0.190		

Note: Table entries are OLS regression estimates with standard errors clustered by region.

** = $p < .01$; * = $p < .05$; † = $p < .10$

Figure B.2 (next page) visually displays the magnitude of these effects, depicting the substantive change in one's pro-immigration attitudes depending on the immigrant group in question.

Figure B.2: Substantive Effects on Pro-Immigration Attitudes by Immigrant Group



Note: Bars indicate the magnitude of effect moving from the minimum to the maximum of *Identification with Europe* by type of immigrant group.

These results provide additional support for Chapter 3's observation that identification with Europe functions as a superordinate identity by reducing outgroup antagonism among those with a more inclusive sense of self. This ameliorating effect holds up across country immigration context and individual opinions towards specific kinds of immigrants, though in line with the CIIM it seems to have the deepest impact on attitudes towards other subgroup nationalities encompassed within the umbrella of European identity.

APPENDIX C: *POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND IDENTITIES SURVEY*

Finalized: June 28, 2012

By K. Amber Curtis

Ph.D. Candidate

Department of Political Science

University of Colorado at Boulder, USA

Mode: Web

Field Dates: June 28 – July 3, 2012

Administered by *Opinium Research, LLP*

Preliminary Questions for Sampling Selection by Opinium

1. What is your gender?
 - a. Male
 - b. Female
2. Please state your age.
3. Which of these applies to you?
 - a. Working full time (30 or more hours per week)
 - b. Working part time (8-29 hours per week)
 - c. Working part time (less than 8 hours per week)
 - d. Full time student
 - e. Retired
 - f. Unemployed
 - g. Other not working
4. Where do you currently live? (The map below may help you.) I live in:
 - a. North East
 - b. North West
 - c. Yorkshire & Humberside
 - d. East Midlands
 - e. West Midlands
 - f. East of England
 - g. London
 - h. South East
 - i. South West
 - j. Wales
 - k. Scotland
 - l. Northern Ireland
 - m. *Do not live in the UK*
5. We would now like you to think about the chief income earner in your household, that is the person with the highest income. This may be you or it might be someone else. Which of the following groups does the chief income earner in your household belong to? [If the chief income earner is retired with an occupational pension, please enter their former occupation. Please only enter 'retired' if the chief income earner is only receiving the state pension. If the chief income earner has been unemployed for a period of less than 6 months, please answer based on their previous occupation.]

- a. Higher managerial/professional/administrative (e.g., established doctor, solicitor, board director in a large organisation (200+ employees), top level civil servant/public service employee, head teacher, etc.)
- b. Intermediate managerial/professional/administrative (e.g., newly qualified (under 3 years) doctor, solicitor, board director of a small organisation, middle manager in large organization, principal officer in civil service/local government, etc.)
- c. Supervisory or clerical/junior managerial/professional/administrator (e.g., office worker, student doctor, foreman with 25+ employees, sales person, student teacher, etc.)
- d. Skilled manual working (e.g., skilled bricklayer, carpenter, plumber, painter, bus/ambulance driver, HGV driver, unqualified teaching assistant, pub/bar worker, etc.)
- e. Semi-skilled or unskilled manual worker (e.g., manual jobs that require no special training or qualifications, apprentices to be skilled trades, caretaker, cleaner, nursery school assistant, park keeper, non-HGV driver, shop assistant, etc.)
- f. Student
- g. Retired and living on state pension only
- h. Unemployed for over 6 months or not working due to long term sickness

Survey Questions

1. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] Please indicate how well each of the following statements describes you personally. [1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree; 4 = neither]
 - a. I am not at all interested in politics
 - b. I follow the news regularly
 - c. I discuss political matters frequently
 - d. I rarely persuade others to share my political views
 - e. I like taking risks²
 - f. Generally speaking, I believe most people can be trusted
 - g. I tend to feel anxious and worry a lot
 - h. I often feel unhappy or depressed
2. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] In the past year, how well do you think things have been going when it comes to...? [Very poorly, fairly poorly, fairly well, really well]
 - a. Your life in general
 - b. The economic situation in the United Kingdom
 - c. The financial situation of your household
 - d. The employment situation in the United Kingdom
 - e. Your personal job situation
 - f. The economic situation in the European Union
3. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] We are all part of different groups. Some groups are more important to us than others when we think of ourselves. How important are each of the

² Adapted from the British Household Panel Survey, which asks respondents, "On a scale of 1-10, are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?" [1=unwilling to take risks; 10 = fully prepared to take risks].

following in describing how you personally see yourself? Please consider the following scale, where 7 means that you identify very strongly with it and 1 means that you do not identify with it at all. [1=Do not identify with it at all; 7 = Identify very strongly with it]³

- a. Europe
 - b. The European Union
 - c. The United Kingdom
 - d. Your region
 - e. Your town or village
 - f. Your current or previous occupation
 - g. Your race or ethnic background
 - h. Your gender
 - i. Your age group
 - j. Your religion
 - k. Your preferred political party, group, movement
 - l. Your family or marital status (husband/wife, mother/father, son/daughter, grandparent, etc.)
 - m. Your social class
4. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] Focusing specifically on the extent that you do (or do not) feel European, would you say that is because: [1=Not at all; 7=Very much so]
- a. Of where I was born
 - b. Of where I now live
 - c. Of how I look
 - d. Of the language(s) I speak
 - e. Of who I am
 - f. Of who I want to be in the future
 - g. Of my religious beliefs
 - h. Of my ethnic and/or racial background
 - i. Of my civic values
 - j. Of my citizenship in a European Union member state
 - k. Of what politicians and/or the media tell me
5. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] Below are several opinions people may hold when it comes to identity and politics. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. [1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree; 4=neither]
- a. I am **very** proud to be European
 - b. What happens to **Europe** happens to me
 - c. Anyone can be “European” if they simply reside within a member state of the European Union and hold civic values like tolerance, solidarity, etc.
 - d. To be “European”, one must possess a particular cultural heritage such as being born in a European country and holding a Judeo-Christian faith
 - e. The European Union should do everything it can to keep all member states together
 - f. I am **not at all** proud to be British
 - g. What happens to **the United Kingdom** happens to me

³ Adapted from questions appearing in Fitzgerald (forthcoming), Bruter (2009), and Bruter and Harrison (2012).

- h. I would rather be a citizen of the United Kingdom than of any other country in the world
 - i. There are some things about the United Kingdom today that make me ashamed to be British
 - j. The United Kingdom should co-operate with other countries, even if it means giving up some independence
 - k. The United Kingdom is better than any other country in the world
 - l. Prime Minister David Cameron is doing a good job
6. The following section contains pairs of words. On a scale of zero to ten, please indicate which of the words best describes you. For example, the number zero means “relaxed,” the number ten means “tense,” and the number five is exactly in the middle—neither relaxed nor tense. On this scale, what number best describes you? You can use any number from 0 to 10.⁴

{TEXT}										{TEXT}
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

- a. Unimaginative-imaginative
- b. Systematic-unsystematic
- c. Introverted-extraverted
- d. Warm-cold
- e. Angry-Calm
- f. Analytical-unanalytical
- g. Lazy-hard working
- h. Quiet-Talkative
- i. Gentle-harsh
- j. Relaxed-tense
- k. Uncreative-creative
- l. Neat-sloppy
- m. Timid-bold
- n. Kind-unkind
- o. At ease-nervous
- p. Uncurious-curious
- q. Careful-careless
- r. Inhibited-spontaneous
- s. Polite-rude
- t. Steady-moody
- u. Unintellectual-intellectual
- v. Responsible-irresponsible
- w. Shy-outgoing
- x. Sympathetic-unsympathetic
- y. Content-discontent

⁴ Adapted from the 2005 National Jury Survey reported in Mondak and Halperin (2008, 250) and Mondak et al. (2010, 106).

7. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. [1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree; 4=neither]⁵
- Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups
 - In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups
 - It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others
 - To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups
 - If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems
 - It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom
 - Inferior groups should stay in their place
 - Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place
 - It would be good if groups could be equal
 - Group equality should be our ideal
 - All groups should be given an equal chance in life
 - We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups
 - Increased social equality is beneficial to society
 - We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally
 - We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible
 - No group should dominate in society
8. Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. Below are some pairs of desirable qualities. On a scale of zero to ten, please tell us which quality you think is more important for a child to have. For example, the number zero means "independence" and ten means "respect for elders". On this scale, what number best describes the quality you would want a child to have? You can use any number from 0 to 10.⁶

{TEXT}										{TEXT}
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

- Independence v. respect for elders
 - Obedience v. self-reliance
 - Curiosity v. good-manners
 - Being considerate v. being well-behaved
9. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] Now we'd like to get your opinion on some issues regarding British and European politics. Please tell us the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. [1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree; 4=neither]
- Generally speaking, the United Kingdom's membership in the European Union is a good thing
 - Taking everything into consideration, the United Kingdom has on balance benefitted from being a member of the European Union
 - The European Union conjures up a very positive image for me

⁵ Adapted from Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell (1994).

⁶ Adapted from Hetherington and Weiler (2009).

- d. The United Kingdom should give up the Pound and join the Eurozone
 - e. The United Kingdom should leave the European Union altogether
 - f. At the present time, things are going in the **wrong** direction in the **United Kingdom**
 - g. At the present time, things are going in the **right** direction in the **European Union**
 - h. I am **optimistic** about the future of the **United Kingdom**
 - i. I am **pessimistic** about the future of the **European Union**
 - j. The European Central Bank should have full control over Member States' taxation and spending
10. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] In which, if any, of the following activities have you personally taken part? (Please select all that apply)
- a. Voted in the 2009 European Parliament election
 - b. Voted in the 2010 UK general election
 - c. Voted in the 2012 UK local elections
 - d. Contacted your national Member of Parliament
 - e. Contacted your Member of European Parliament
 - f. Contacted or visited a local European Commission representation office
 - g. Visited the European Union's website (<http://europa.eu>)
 - h. Traveled to another European country
 - i. Traveled to a country outside of Europe
 - j. Studied abroad through the ERASMUS program
 - k. Participated in a protest against the European Union
 - l. Been contacted by an interest group (e.g., trade federations, companies, non-governmental organizations, national associations, regional representations, think tanks, etc.) regarding a European-wide issue
 - m. Received mail from a European Union institution (e.g., the Commission, the Parliament, etc.)
 - n. Celebrated 'Europe Day'
 - o. Purchased a European Union flag
 - p. Used the euro currency
 - q. Heard the European Union's national anthem
 - r. None of the above/can't remember
11. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] People may hold a range of opinions on the European Union, including whether or not they think the EU affects them. Using the following scale, to what extent do you feel the decisions of each of the following institutions influence you personally? [1=not at all; 7=a great deal; 4=neither]
- a. The European Union as a whole
 - b. The European Commission
 - c. The Council of the European Union
 - d. The European Parliament
 - e. The European Court of Justice
 - f. The European Central Bank
 - g. The European Court of Auditors

- h. The European External Action Service
- i. The European Ombudsman
- j. The European Economic and Social Committee
- k. The Committee of the Regions

12. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] And would you say the influence of each institution on you personally is... [Very good, somewhat good, neither good nor bad, somewhat bad, really bad, mixed, has no influence on me]

- a. The European Union as a whole
- b. The European Commission
- c. The Council of the European Union
- d. The European Parliament
- e. The European Court of Justice
- f. The European Central Bank
- g. The European Court of Auditors
- h. The European External Action Service
- i. The European Ombudsman
- j. The European Economic and Social Committee
- k. The Committee of the Regions

Now please think of five different people you know and list their first name or initials here: _____. [INSERT ENTRIES INTO SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS IN PLACE OF 'PERSON 1', ETC.] We would like to ask you a few questions about each of these individuals. Thinking about the people you mentioned, please tell us...⁷

13. Which of the following BEST describes each person's relation to you? [Spouse, significant other, parent, sibling, relative, neighbour, close friend, acquaintance, coworker, other]

- a. Person 1
- b. Person 2
- c. Person 3
- d. Person 4
- e. Person 5

14. How close would you say you are to each person? [Not at all close, not very close, somewhat close, extremely close]

- a. Person 1
- b. Person 2
- c. Person 3
- d. Person 4
- e. Person 5

15. Where is each person from? [The United Kingdom, Europe: another European Union member state, Europe: not a European Union member state, Asia, Africa, Latin America, Northern America, Oceania, Don't know]

⁷ Adapted from social network batteries in the American National Election Survey and the British Household Panel Survey.

- d. Croatia is expected to become a member of the European Union in 2013
 - e. The European Union's current High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is from Italy
 - f. The United Kingdom has 72 representatives (MEPs) in the European Parliament
 - g. The next European Parliament elections will take place in 2014
 - h. The United Kingdom's current Chancellor of the Exchequer is Theresa May
 - i. The UK House of Commons consists of 700 members
 - j. The United Kingdom's current Deputy Prime Minister is from the Labour party
20. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] Next we would like you to please rate your views toward various groups of immigrants on a scale of zero to ten, where zero means you think that kind of immigrant should be denied entry and/or deported and ten means you think that kind of immigrant should be highly welcomed into our country. You can choose any number from 0 to 10. [0=Should be denied entry/deported; 10=Should be highly welcomed into our country]
- a. Rich immigrants
 - b. Poor immigrants
 - c. Educated immigrants
 - d. Uneducated immigrants
 - e. Highly skilled immigrants
 - f. Unskilled immigrants
 - g. Legal immigrants
 - h. Illegal immigrants
 - i. Immigrants from fellow European Union member states
 - j. Immigrants from non-European Union member states
 - k. Immigrants from Western Europe
 - l. Immigrants from Central or Eastern Europe
 - m. Immigrants from Africa
 - n. Immigrants from Asia
 - o. Immigrants from Northern America
 - p. Immigrants from Southern America
 - q. Immigrants from Oceania
 - r. Immigrants from former British colonies
 - s. Immigrants from countries suffering from economic distress or underdevelopment
 - t. Immigrants from countries experiencing civil war or political repression
21. When it comes to politics, people often talk of 'left' and 'right'. Please, consider the following scale where 0 means that somebody's ideas are on the far left and 10 means that they are on the far right. Can you please tell us where you would place yourself on this scale?

I am on the left										I am on the right
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

22. [RANDOMIZED ORDER] To which, if any, of the following political parties do you feel closest?

- a. Conservative
- b. Labour
- c. British National Party
- d. UK Independence Party
- e. English Democrats
- f. Liberal-Democrats
- g. Greens
- h. Scottish National Party
- i. Plaid Cymru
- j. Other (please specify)
- k. None

23. What is the highest education you have achieved?

- a. Advanced Degree (incl. Postgraduate, PhD, MSc)
- b. University Undergraduate degree (e.g. BA/BSc)
- c. Higher Education- no degree (e.g. HND/City and guilds)
- d. A-Level/GNVQ
- e. O-Level/ GCSE/ CSE
- f. Other (please specify)
- g. None

24. Would you say you live in a...

- a. Rural area or village
- b. Small or middle-sized town
- c. Suburb of a large town or city
- d. Large town or city

25. Where were you personally born? [The United Kingdom, Europe: another European Union member state, Europe: not in a European Union member state, Asia, Africa, Latin America, Northern America, Oceania, Don't Know]

26. For how many years have you lived in the United Kingdom? (write in: please answer to the nearest whole year)

27. Are you now a UK citizen?

- a. Yes
- b. No

28. Where was your mother born? [The United Kingdom, Europe: another European Union member state, Europe: not in a European Union member state, Asia, Africa, Latin America, Northern America, Oceania, Don't Know]

29. Where was your father born? [The United Kingdom, Europe: another European Union member state, Europe: not in a European Union member state, Asia, Africa, Latin America, Northern America, Oceania, Don't Know]
30. To which of these ethnic groups do you consider you belong?⁸
- a. White
 - b. Black African
 - c. Black Caribbean
 - d. Indian
 - e. Pakistani
 - f. Bangladeshi
 - g. Chinese
 - h. Any other Asian background
 - i. Mixed (please specify)
 - j. Other (please specify)
31. Which, if any, of the following religions or religious denominations do you belong to?
- a. I do not belong to a denomination
 - b. Roman Catholic
 - c. Protestant
 - d. Church of England
 - e. Presbyterian/Church of Scotland
 - f. Methodist
 - g. Baptist
 - h. Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.)
 - i. Jewish
 - j. Muslim
 - k. Hindu
 - l. Buddhist
 - m. Other (please specify)
32. What is the gross household income for your household? [Please note that your responses will be completely confidential and will only be used to help us analyse the results at a total level]
- a. Under £5,000 per year
 - b. £5,000 to £9,999 per year
 - c. £10,000 to £14,999 per year
 - d. £15,000 to £19,999 per year
 - e. £20,000 to £24,999 per year
 - f. £25,000 to £29,999 per year
 - g. £30,000 to £34,999 per year
 - h. £35,000 to £39,999 per year
 - i. £40,000 to £44,999 per year
 - j. £45,000 to £49,999 per year
 - k. £50,000 to £59,999 per year

⁸ Adapted from the British Household Panel Survey.

- l. £60,000 to £69,999 per year
- m. £70,000 to £79,999 per year
- n. £80,000 to £89,999 per year
- o. £90,000 to £99,999 per year
- p. £100,000 to £149,999 per year
- q. Over £150,000 per year
- r. Don't know
- s. Prefer not to answer

Post-Survey Questions by Opinium

Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. As part of our on-going efforts to improve the quality of the surveys we send out we are keen to hear your feedback. How would you rate the survey in terms of: [Very poor, poor, average, good, excellent]

- a. How interesting you found the survey
- b. How relevant the survey was to you
- c. The ease of understanding questions asked
- d. The survey overall

If you have any further comments regarding this survey enter these in the box below.

--

Thank you for participating in this study.

APPENDIX D: SURVEY APPEARANCE

The following screen-shots provide a sample of how the *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey* appeared to online respondents.

Opinium Research Panel

Where do you currently live? The map below may help you.

I live in...

- ☐ North East
- ☐ North West
- ☐ Yorkshire & Humberside
- ☐ East Midlands
- ☐ West Midlands
- ☐ East of England
- ☐ London
- ☐ South East
- ☐ South West
- ☐ Wales
- ☐ Scotland
- ☐ Northern Ireland
- ☐ Do not live in the UK

Opinium Research Panel

The following section contains pairs of words.

On a scale of zero to ten, please indicate which of the words best describes you.

For example, the number zero means "relaxed," the number ten means "tense," and the number five is exactly in the middle —neither relaxed nor tense.

On this scale, what number best describes you? You can use any number from 0 to 10.

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Unimaginative	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Imaginative
Systematic	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Unsystematic
Introverted	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Extraverted
Warm	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Cold
Angry	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Calm
Analytical	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Unanalytical
Lazy	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Hard working
Quiet	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Talkative
Gentle	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Harsh
Relaxed	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Tense
Uncreative	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Creative
Neat	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Sloppy

Let us turn now to your own knowledge of European and British affairs.

For each of the following statements, please tell us whether you think it is true or false:
Please select one response for each item

	True	False	Don't know
The United Kingdom's current Deputy Prime Minister is from the Labour party	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The United Kingdom has 12 representatives (MEPs) in the European Parliament	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The European Union currently consists of 25 member states	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The next European Parliament elections will take place in 2014	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Next we would like you to please rate your views toward various groups of immigrants on a scale of zero to ten, where zero means you think that kind of immigrant should be denied entry and/or deported and ten means you think that kind of immigrant should be highly welcomed into our country.

You can choose any number from 0-10.
Please select one response for each item

	0 = Should be denied entry / deported	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 = Should be highly welcomed into our country
Immigrants from countries experiencing civil war or political repression	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Legal immigrants	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Immigrants from fellow European Union member states	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unskilled immigrants	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Poor immigrants	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Immigrants from Asia	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Immigrants from Southern America	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

APPENDIX E: COMPARING THE RELIABILITY OF ‘BIG FIVE’ MEASURES

Table E1: Reliability of Personality Measures across Various Studies

Author	Data	Location	# of Q's per Trait	Reliability: O	Reliability: C	Reliability: E	Reliability: A	Reliability: ES
Gerber et al. (2011: 62)	2007-8 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project	US	2	0.275	0.382	0.426	0.245	0.485
Gerber et al. (2012b: 663)	2007-8 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project	US	2	0.267	0.395	0.432	0.221	0.467
Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann (2003: 516)	undergraduate sample	US	2	0.450	0.500	0.680	0.400	0.730
Ha et al. (2013: 8)	2009 Korean General Social Survey	South Korea	2	0.280	0.160	0.450	0.040	0.240
Hibbing et al. (2011: 609)	2004 community survey	US	2	0.410	0.520	0.570	0.390	0.570
Hibbing et al. (2011: 609)	2006 Congressional Election Study	US	2	0.280	0.260	0.570	0.500	0.390
Mondak & Halperin (2008: 349)	2004 phone survey	US	2	0.410	0.520	0.570	0.570	0.390
Mondak et al. (2010: 93)	2006 Congressional Election Study	US	2	0.280	0.290	0.530	0.470	0.430
Curtis (2013)	2012 <i>PAIS</i>	UK	5	0.731	0.697	0.855	0.843	0.816
Mondak & Halperin (2008: 349)	1998 phone survey	US	5	0.720	0.750	0.700	0.710	0.670
Mondak & Halperin (2008: 350); Mondak et al. (2010: 106)	2005 National Jury Survey	US	5	0.750	0.760	0.790	0.790	0.790
Cooper et al. (2010: 27)	online survey of university faculty & students	US	10	0.778	0.849	0.863	0.759	0.864
Matilla et al. (2011: 295)	Finnish longitudinal study	Finland	12	0.740	0.780	0.750	0.760	0.860
Schoen & Schumann	2003 representative sample	Germany	12	0.660	0.840	0.730	0.760	0.820
Vecchione & Caprara (2009: 488)	college/community sample	Italy	12	0.900	0.800	0.840	0.860	0.880
Vecchione et al. (2011: 739)	college/community sample	Italy	12	0.800	0.770	0.750	0.830	0.880
Vecchione et al. (2011: 739)	college/community sample	Spain	12	0.680	0.850	0.600	0.750	0.720
Vecchione et al. (2011: 739)	college/community sample	Germany	12	0.810	0.790	0.730	0.710	0.800
Vecchione et al. (2011: 739)	college/community sample	Greece	12	0.590	0.800	0.720	0.710	0.680
Vecchione et al. (2011: 739)	college/community sample	Poland	12	0.700	0.700	0.700	0.670	0.800
Matilla et al. (2011: 295)	Finnish longitudinal study	Finland	48	0.910	0.820	0.880	0.790	0.920
Schmitt et al. (2007: 184)	college/community sample	56 countries	(uneven)	0.760	0.780	0.770	0.700	0.790
Srivastava et al. (2003: 1044)	132,000+ online survey	US & Canada	(uneven)	0.800	0.820	0.860	0.790	0.840
Weber et al. (2011: 1329)	1995-1996 Twin Study	US	(uneven)	0.740	0.590	0.850	0.800	0.720
AVERAGE α FOR STUDIES USING MULTIPLE ITEMS/TRAIT:				0.756	0.780	0.769	0.759	0.802

Note: Reliability statistics indicate Pearson's r for 2-item studies and Cronbach's alpha (α) for multi-item studies. Average alpha calculated using all the latter, excluding my own *Political Attitudes and Identities Survey* (PAIS).

APPENDIX F: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Here, I report the results of a series of different models to verify that the effects of the Big Five personality traits identified in Chapter 4 are robust to alternative method and measurement.

ALTERNATIVE METHOD: ORDERED LOGIT

The tests in Chapter 4 assumed that the dependent variable, *Identification with Europe*, could be treated as a continuous variable given its range from one (do not identify with it at all) to seven (identify very strongly with it). Earlier tests thus used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression clustered by region. However, the numerical distance between each response category may not be perceived equally by all respondents, making OLS inaccurate (Long and Freese 2006). Therefore, Table F.1, Model 1 reports results of an ordered logit analysis; standard errors remain clustered by region to account for sampling technique. All original results are replicated using this alternative method: all the same personality traits and sociodemographic characteristics matter in exactly the same way.

ALTERNATIVE MEASURE: TWO-ITEM TRAIT INDICES

Next, I show that Chapter 4's results are robust to measuring the Big Five traits slightly differently. Here, I emulate Mondak et al. (2010) by using only the two items per trait that they did instead of the multiple ones in Chapter 4. This new operationalization generates mean indices of 'intellectual' and 'curious' for *Openness* ($r = 0.357$); 'neat' and 'hardworking' for *Conscientiousness* ($r = 0.305$); 'outgoing' and 'extraverted' for *Extraversion* ($r = 0.616$); 'sympathetic' and 'kind' for *Agreeableness* ($r = 0.616$); and 'relaxed' and 'calm' for *Emotional Stability* ($r = 0.423$).¹

¹ Note that these correlations are quite higher than those produced by the same two traits in Mondak et al. (2010, 93).

Once again, Table F.1, Model 2 shows that all the same personality effects hold. Openness and extraversion continue to increase identification with Europe while agreeableness decreases it. The only new change is that being *White* drops just out of conventional significance; otherwise, results are identical to 4.2.

Table F.1: The Robustness of Personality's Effects on Identification with Europe across Alternative Method and Measurement

	Model 1: Ordered Logit			Model 2: Two-Item Indices		
	Coef.	SD	Sig.	Coef.	SD	Sig.
<i>Personality</i>						
Openness	0.059	0.026	*	0.018	0.008	*
Conscientiousness	-0.064	0.053		-0.011	0.025	
Extraversion	0.071	0.019	**	0.033	0.011	*
Agreeableness	-0.076	0.028	**	-0.060	0.022	*
Emotional Stability	0.016	0.037		0.039	0.025	
<i>Institutional Effect</i>						
Perceived EU Influence				0.209	0.037	**
<i>Sociodemographic Controls</i>						
Age	0.002	0.004		0.000	0.003	
Male	0.034	0.103		0.024	0.073	
Education	0.066	0.030	*	0.055	0.023	*
Occupational Prestige	0.068	0.037	†	0.058	0.033	
Urban	0.035	0.058		0.025	0.051	
White	-0.427	0.142	**	-0.303	0.147	†
Christian	0.265	0.094	**	0.233	0.075	**
<i>Constant</i>				1.996	0.348	**
<i>N</i>	1640			1640		
<i>(Pseudo) R-Squared</i>	0.009			0.062		
/Cut 1	-1.141	0.240				
/Cut 2	-0.168	0.251				
/Cut 3	0.638	0.272				
/Cut 4	1.785	0.284				
/Cut 5	2.777	0.294				
/Cut 6	3.853	0.321				

Note: Model 1 presents ordered logistic regression estimates with standard errors clustered by region.

Model 2 reflects OLS regression estimates with standard errors clustered by region.

** = $p < .01$; * = $p < .05$; † = $p < .10$

Reassuringly, these two new tests enhance our confidence in the Big Five personality traits' effects on superordinate identification with Europe.

APPENDIX G: SAMPLE EU EFFORTS TO BOOST IDENTIFICATION WITH EUROPE


The following posters were published and promoted by the European Commission for Europe Day (celebrated annually on May 9). Each emphasizes the EU's motto ('United in Diversity') by showing the intermixture of its component member states. These pictures seem designed to help increase citizen identification with Europe.




<http://www.maxfarquar.com/2012/05/europe-day-poster/>



<http://simonesteher.wordpress.com/2009/11/21/i-love-europe/>



<http://blog.templebar.ie/?p=661>



http://ec.europa.eu/archives/publications/archives/posters/index_en.htm

APPENDIX H: SENSITIVITY ANALYSES OF MEDIATION EFFECTS

As specified in Chapter 5, mediation analysis makes an important sequential ignorability assumption based on two important conditions: 1) that the explanatory variable (aka the ‘treatment’) is independent of all potential values of other outcomes and mediators; and 2) that the mediating variable is also exogenous. In other words, mediation models rest on the impossible-to-test assertion that no omitted variables are confounding the results:

The fundamental difficulty in the causal mediation analysis is that there may exist unobserved confounders that causally affect both the mediator and the outcome even after conditioning on the observed treatment and pretreatment covariates. Therefore, assessing the sensitivity of one’s empirical findings to the possible existence of such confounders is required in order to evaluate the validity of any mediation study (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010, 310).

Tests for violations of the sequential ignorability assumption are conducted by estimating the correlation between the errors of the outcome and mediation models (ρ) at which the observed average causal mediation effect (ACME) would become statistically insignificant.¹

Since ‘*sgmediation*’ does not estimate these sensitivity parameters to test how robust the mediation results are, I here report results using Hicks and Tingley’s (2011) ‘*mediation*’ package for Stata.² Table H.1 displays a summary of this output; Figures H.1 through H.10 graph the sensitivity parameters for each mediating relationship. Importantly, identical mediation effects are verified using this alternative method, confirming the Big Five personality traits’ effects on identification with Europe through a variety of pathways. At the same time, ρ values only range from 0.08 to 0.121. This suggests the observed indirect effects are somewhat sensitive, as non-specified confounds with this correlation value or higher could alter their significance.

¹ While there is no set threshold value of ρ that one seeks to achieve, a general rule of thumb is the higher the better.

² This method required the treatment and mediator variables be recoded to range from 0-1. The dependent variable and all covariates were left at their original range.

To gain a better sense of how attentive we should be to rho values, Imai et al. (2010) suggest comparing the level of rho at which the ACME is equal to zero to that obtained by similar studies. As of yet, there are no other directly-related studies with which to compare my results but even the rho level reported in Hicks and Tingley's analysis is not much higher: only 0.235 (2011, 12). This suggests the sequential ignorability assumption may simply be difficult to uphold in real life, which is wrought with complex sociopolitical relationships that are hard to identify completely. For now, scholars might tolerate a relatively low rho-value until more established guidelines emerge.

Table H.1: A Robustness Check of Mediation Analyses

	ACME	Sig.	Direct Effect	Sig.	Total Effect	Sig.	% of Total Effect Mediated	Rho at which ACME=0
Open.-->Risk Aversion	0.210	**	0.258		0.468		0.415	-0.111
Cons.-->Risk Aversion	-0.138	**	-0.301		-0.439		0.278	" "
Extra.-->Risk Aversion	0.250	**	0.337		0.586	**	0.409	" "
Agree.-->Risk Aversion	-0.148	**	-0.509		-0.657	**	0.222	" "
EmoStab.-->Risk Aversion	0.104	**	0.149		0.253		0.281	" "
Open.-->Objective Knowledge	0.081	**	0.382		0.463		0.160	0.083
Extra.-->Objective Knowledge	-0.077	**	0.665	**	0.588		-0.125	" "
Cons.-->L-R Ideology	-0.193	**	-0.240		-0.434		0.391	-0.121
Agree.-->L-R Ideology	0.260	**	-0.917	**	-0.657	**	-0.393	" "
EmoStab.-->L-R Ideology	-0.067	**	0.324		0.257		-0.177	" "

Note: Table entries report results of mediation analysis using Hicks and Tingley's (2011) '*mediation*' package for Stata.

ACME = average causal mediation effect. ** = $p < .05$.

Figure H.1: Sensitivity of Openness Mediated by Risk Aversion




Figure H.2: Sensitivity of Conscientiousness Mediated by Risk Aversion




Figure H.3: Sensitivity of Extraversion Mediated by Risk Aversion




Figure H.4: Sensitivity of Agreeableness Mediated by Risk Aversion




Figure H.5: Sensitivity of Emotional Stability Mediated by Risk Aversion




Figure H.6: Sensitivity of Openness Mediated by Objective Knowledge




Figure H.7: Sensitivity of Extraversion Mediated by Objective Knowledge




Figure H.8: Sensitivity of Conscientiousness Mediated by Ideology




Figure H.9: Sensitivity of Agreeableness Mediated by Ideology





Figure H.10: Sensitivity of Emotional Stability Mediated by Ideology



APPENDIX I: THE EFFECTS OF RISK AVERSION, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, AND IDEOLOGY ON OTHER LEVELS OF POLITICAL-TERRITORIAL IDENTIFICATION

Chapter 5 found that personality's effects on superordinate identification with Europe are mediated by risk aversion, objective political knowledge, and ideological orientation. Table I.1 includes these three mechanisms together as determinants of the other main levels of political-territorial identification: one's nation, region, and town.¹

Models 1 and 2 indicate the baseline using identification with Europe and with the EU, respectively, as dependent variables. In line with results from Chapters 4 and 5, risk aversion and more conservative ideology decrease superordinate identification while objective knowledge increases it.² Importantly, the sign and significance of these three variables' effects are not uniform across other political-territorial levels.

Risk aversion, while negatively signed, has no significant impact on either national, regional, or local identification. Interestingly, this suggests there is indeed something unique about the way the European identity alternative has been framed that makes people more hesitant to identify with it. Objective knowledge increases national identification, but not regional or local attachment. Finally, ideology is also significant for national identification, yet opposite of the way it worked for the superordinate category. A more right-leaning ideological orientation makes one more likely to profess stronger national ties; in contrast, left-leaning individuals exhibit stronger identification with Europe.

¹ Note that these are not mediation analyses but instead report the coefficients produced when all variables are included in a full model. Knowing from Chapter 5 that these three new covariates may capture much of personality's effect on identification, the significance of the individual Big Five traits in these models may not reflect their true impact.

² These two models show that the underlying determinants of European and EU identification are identical (with the exception of extraversion, whose effect may be more mediated by the mechanisms included in Model 2).

Some interesting results emerge in terms of the sociodemographic controls. Age, while insignificant for superordinate identification, is positively and significantly associated with both national and subnational identification. Gender only matters for the subnational level; males are less likely to identify with their region or town. Next, occupational prestige has opposite effects for identification with Europe and the EU versus one's region and town: those employed in more prestigious sectors are more significantly more likely to identify superordinately and significantly *less* likely to profess a parochial attachment. There is no effect of occupational prestige on national identification. Residing in a large, urban community is negatively related only to identifying strongly with one's town. Being part of the dominant 'white' ethnic group makes someone less likely to identify with Europe, but has no effect on the other identification levels. And finally, holding a Christian faith is positive and significant for *all* political-territorial identities.

These tests are but a preliminary foray into the various determinants of political-territorial identification more generally, since the rest of this dissertation was concerned solely with what makes people see themselves as part of the superordinate category. Further tests should spend much more time analyzing the causes behind these—and other—observed patterns of identification. Scholars should develop and test a more comprehensive theory for how each of the determinants included here operates for a singular, ordinal measure of political-territorial identification, ranging from low (e.g., local) to high (e.g., superordinate).

Table I.1: Determinants of Identification with Other Political-Territorial Levels

	Personal Identification with...														
	1: Europe			2: EU			3: Nation			4: Region			5: Town		
	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.	Coef.	SD.	Sig.
Personality															
Openness	0.040	0.022		0.051	0.030		0.086	0.028	**	0.070	0.037	†	0.049	0.036	
Conscientiousness	-0.011	0.041		-0.034	0.042		-0.012	0.029		0.027	0.036		0.035	0.025	
Extraversion	0.038	0.014	*	0.014	0.017		0.020	0.024		0.104	0.036	*	0.131	0.034	**
Agreeableness	-0.074	0.030	*	-0.108	0.036	*	0.031	0.030		-0.004	0.040		0.014	0.030	
Emotional Stability	0.006	0.028		0.034	0.027		0.082	0.024	**	0.038	0.034		0.080	0.025	**
Causal Mechanisms															
Risk Aversion	-0.119	0.023	**	-0.089	0.027	**	-0.011	0.027		-0.022	0.018		-0.009	0.028	
Objective Knowledge	0.509	0.118	**	0.471	0.136	**	0.245	0.092	*	0.292	0.174		-0.104	0.131	
L-R Ideology	-0.093	0.019	**	-0.116	0.018	**	0.114	0.022	**	0.011	0.025		0.018	0.027	
Sociodemographic Controls															
Age	0.002	0.003		-0.002	0.002		0.017	0.002	**	0.017	0.003	**	0.016	0.002	**
Male	-0.051	0.080		-0.072	0.080		-0.028	0.072		-0.219	0.100	*	-0.165	0.061	*
Occupational Prestige	0.077	0.031	*	0.084	0.024	**	-0.027	0.037		-0.079	0.025	**	-0.077	0.041	†
Urban	0.007	0.051		-0.042	0.044		0.062	0.046		-0.059	0.052		-0.127	0.054	*
White	-0.291	0.119	*	-0.571	0.168	**	-0.069	0.243		0.130	0.139		-0.225	0.208	
Christian	0.255	0.083	**	0.340	0.104	**	0.364	0.071	**	0.345	0.075	**	0.358	0.079	**
Constant	3.791	0.293	**	4.261	0.337	**	1.576	0.320	**	2.061	0.490	**	2.195	0.517	**
N	1659			1659			1659			1659			1659		
R-Squared	0.063			0.083			0.125			0.088			0.116		

Note: Table entries report OLS regression results clustered by region and restricted to UK citizens.

** = p<.01; * = p<.05; † = p<.10