

ON ASPECTS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION, A PAIR OF AUTISTIC TWINS,
AND THEIR HUMANNESS

by

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Abstract: This study seeks to illustrate some actions a pair of autistic twins—Cam and Nick—are able to accomplish in social interaction. In order to focus on Cam and Nick’s voices and abilities, this study considers autism as a part of Cam and Nick’s human and social experiences, instead of as a defining “experience of deficit and loss” (Yergeau, 2010). The following discussion, divided into three chapters, is based on Cam and Nick’s social practices as they occurred in naturalistic interaction. First, Chapter 2 investigates how Cam and Nick co-construct identities in interaction by combining conversation analysis with identity analysis. By combining these frameworks, I illustrate Cam and Nick’s abilities to construct their identities intersubjectively through fine-grained sequence and turn design in interaction. Specifically, this analysis looks at how their social practices lead to construction of relational identities of sameness/difference. Next, Chapters 3 and 4 focus on Cam and Nick’s repertoires of practices for accomplishing specific actions in interaction using conversation analysis. Chapter 3 presents an analysis of Cam’s repertoire of practices for initiating interaction based on turn and sequence design. Then, Chapter 4 investigates how Nick attends to the back-and-forth of interaction. I conclude by outlining key conceptual links, and explaining how this thesis contributes to the study of autism in linguistics, as well as its significance on greater academic and social scales. For Cam and Nick are people with many interests, emotions, skills, challenges, and are first and foremost “autistics-as-humans,” not “autistics-as-specimens” (Yergeau, 2010).

Keywords: humanity; social practice; autism; conversation analysis; identity; intersubjectivity

“Whatever else is unsure in this stinking dunghill of a world a mother’s love is not.”
-James Joyce

For Lori.

May your deep love and relentless conviction always fuel my spirit.

Rest in Peace.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

“And now for something completely different.”

-*Monty Python’s Flying Circus*

Who are Cam and Nick?

Cam and Nick are more than research participants. They are people with interests, emotions, skills, and challenges—some concomitants of, well, being a human—of humanness. For this study is only possible because Cam and Nick are who they are—“autistics-as-humans,” not “autistics-as-specimens” (Yergeau, 2010: n.p.).

Cam is a self-proclaimed cinephile who hopes to be a set-designer “like Cecil Beaton” someday. Nick uses a typewriter to write science fiction (and other “specular genres”), and hopes to become a screenwriter someday. They both enjoy the *Monty Python* series, and are quite skilled at performing their favorite sketches by heart—with impeccable British accents. They have a massive collection of books that they read during their free time, and their favorite activity is going to the library. Cam and Nick also have a massive collection of VHS tapes, comprised of mostly the “classics,” like *The Wizard of Oz*, *My Fair Lady*, and *Titanic* (the 50s version, of course). When Cam goes on the computer, he spends his time watching movie trailers on YouTube, or perusing on Rotten Tomatoes. Nick uses Facebook and Google+, speaks French, and likes the classic rock radio station. Cam likes listening to Broadway, and his ideal vacation would be to return to New York to see another Broadway musical. They have also memorized a

significant number of the tweets read by celebrities on the “Celebrities Read Mean Tweets” series on *Jimmy Kimmel Live!*—they think they are hilarious!

Cam and Nick went to public school, graduated from high school, and currently attend a special education transition program. Nick is working on applying to take some college classes, and Cam said he might join the crew of a local musical production. They have a supportive family, and live at home with their father—their mother passed away a few years ago. Finally, as you already know from the title, Cam and Nick are (identical) twins and autistic.

Being twins seems to have its perks and its challenges. On one hand, Cam and Nick can joke around with and bounce ideas off of one another. On the other hand, they sometimes bother/embarrass each other and take each other’s stuff without asking. Typical sibling stuff. According to Cam and Nick, being autistic also has its perks and challenges. When I asked what it was like to be autistic, Nick said, “Being autistic is a blessing and a curse,” and explained that it’s a blessing because he thinks differently from others, and that it’s a curse because sometimes it is difficult to get along with others. And Cam said, “it’s like thinking you can do whatever you want, and then realizing you can’t.”

This brief description cannot convey everything I would like about Cam and Nick, as I see and know them. But, hopefully this brief description gives you an idea of whose voices you are hearing—the people behind the analyses—as this discussion moves forward.

An atypical autism essay

In her essay, “Circle wars: Reshaping the typical autism essay,” Dr. Melanie Yergeau (2010)—an autistic professor of rhetoric—outlines three entailments of a “typical autism essay:” (1) “they’re about autism,” (2) they’re written by “neurologically typical” people and (3)

“they’re not limited to specific fields” (n.p.). Yergeau elaborates that “neurotypical authors” (a) “assume autistic people either cannot represent themselves or cannot represent themselves as effectively as neurotypical people can represent them” and (b) “take most of their cues from pathology” and thus see autism as an “atypical experience of deficit and loss” or as “autistic lack” (Linton, 1998: 5; Yergeau, 2013: n.p.).

I am not autistic. I am what Yergeau would call “neurologically typical,” at least by her definition in (2). However, I do not want to be the type of “neurologically typical” author Yergeau describes. For I do not wish to assume that Cam and Nick cannot represent themselves, nor that I can represent them better than they can represent themselves; I only assume that by writing this thesis, I can use my education and training in linguistics to look at *some things* Cam and Nick can accomplish with and in social interaction to stand against the deep-seated, unjust treatment of autistic people in “typical autism essays.”¹ This means I do not believe autism to be an experience of pathological “deficit and loss.” There are moments when I take “cues from pathology” to highlight some concerns with these generalizations—generalizations that typically support “typical” expectations conveyed through the pathological classifications of autism typically discussed by typical “neurologically typical” academics who write “typical autism essays.”

Methods

Sampling and participants

Before initiating the data collection for this study, I applied and received approval to perform this research on human subjects from the Internal Review Board.

¹ I say ‘some things’ because it would be impossible to look at *everything* they can do in this limited space.

Briefly, I have known Cam and Nick for fifteen years—since they were five, and I was nine. My mother was one of their teachers throughout elementary school, and she introduced me to them there. Once they went to middle school, I started working with them as one of their Personal Care Attendants (PCAs). I worked with them full-time in the summer and part-time during the school year for four years. I have gone on vacation with them and their family, and have been their PCA at summer programs and camps. Thus, while I was their PCA, I spent many hours working with them on school work, chores, practicing life skills (i.e. making lunch, purchasing items at the store, etc.), and we have experienced many fun activities together (i.e. seeing movies, and going to the library). During the 5 years between the last time I worked with Cam and Nick, and collecting the data for this study, I had seen them once or twice a year when I visited home.

The data collection process for this study was casual and unstructured, and occurred in two parts. The first part, during which I collected the majority of the data (about 16 hours), occurred in the summer of 2014 when Cam and Nick were 19 (and 10 months) years old. The second part, when I returned to ask some informal follow-up questions, occurred at the end of March, 2015. For both parts I traveled to Cam and Nick's home.

Part 1: I spent up to 6 hours per day for five days with Cam and Nick in their home, and recorded about 3 hours total per day of naturalistic social interaction in which Cam and Nick were involved. These interactions took place between Cam and Nick, as well as between Cam and/or Nick and other participants. These participants included their father, family friends, and their PCAs. I recorded the majority of interaction with a video camera (about 13-14 hours), and about 3 more hours were recorded on an audio recorder.

For most of the total recorded data (and all of the recorded data in the following analysis) I was present, and both participating in interaction and monitoring the recording process. Due to our friendship and history, this was the most natural approach. It is possible (and likely) that my presence and the presence of a recording device affected the dynamic and naturalness of the interaction.

After collecting the data, I selected about 5 hours of video recordings to transcribe, using transcription practices of conversation analysis adapted from Jefferson (1983) (see Appendix A for notation key). I selected this data based on events and interactions that stood out during data collection. Then, I developed the following investigations based on themes that emerged in observing the data.

Part 2: I returned to Cam and Nick's house in March, 2015 to ask some informal ethnographic questions about being autistic, and other more general questions (e.g., "What is your ideal vacation?"). I also spoke with their father for about an hour about his memories and perspective. In total, I recorded about 2 hours on the audio recorder.

An interactional study

Conversation analysis. This study primarily draws on the method of conversation analysis—the social scientific study of interaction—through a qualitative lens. First described by Sacks (1967a; b), and Schegloff (1968), conversation analysis is a widely studied theoretical enterprise, as well as a highly utilized and practical framework for studying interactional phenomena. Since humans are social beings, (social) interaction is a principal component of navigating daily life. Thus, conversation analysis—the study of interaction—offers a framework for the descriptive analysis of naturalistic social interaction in any field or study where

interaction is a relevant topic of analysis. Such fields include (but are not limited to) linguistics, communications, sociology, anthropology, education, and psychology. Note that within the large body of autism research—especially with regard to social qualities—most of the foundation has emerged within the field of psychology using experimental methods. Thus, conversation analysis is a widely applicable framework and can serve to bridge the gap between fields by providing new perspectives through a naturalistic lens (Sidnell & Stivers, 2013).

Recently, a handful of studies have used conversation analysis to look at social interaction and autism (e.g., Dobbinson, Perkins & Boucher, 1998; Dobbinson, Perkins & Boucher, 2003; Muskett, Perkins, Clegg & Body, 2010; Robbins, Dautenhahn & Dickerson, 2009; Sterponi & Shankey, 2014; Sterponi, de Kirby & Shankey, 2014; and those from the Ethnography of Autism project). The studies by Sterponi and colleagues are the only investigations of those listed, which appear to draw on conversation analysis with the perspective that I take here—the perspective that autistic people *can* and *do* accomplish social action in interaction. In other words, they do not approach their discussions from the perspective of “impairment”—of “deficit and loss”—but instead from the perspective of ability and functionality. Thus, Sterponi et al. (2014) explain that analysis of situated social interaction can “reveal dimensions of intelligibility and purposefulness that would otherwise be missed” in a non-naturalistic (experimental) setting (8).

Identity analysis. In chapter 2, I combine conversation analysis with the framework for analysis of identity outlined by Bucholtz and Hall (2004; 2005). I would like to think of this combination of methodologies as Moerman (1988) described it: “culturally contexted conversation analysis” (6). I will return to this notion after describing the basic theoretical ideas behind this identity analytic framework.

Bucholtz & Hall's framework for identity analysis describes a multi-layered and complex coordination of various yet specific aspects of language use, interactional practices, and socio-cultural territories whose expression is limited by the constraints of the interactional/social environment (see Bucholtz & Hall, 2004; 2005 for further explanation). This complex expression is founded, however, on one basic and arguably simple notion: identity is constructed in and thus a product of interaction. Thus, identity is a social action one can achieve in social interaction (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005). Identity construction is based on five principles outlined by Bucholtz & Hall (2005): emergence, positionality, indexicality, relationality, and partialness. For this analysis, I will look primarily at one of these principles—relationality. The relationality principle states that “identities are intersubjectively constructed through several, often overlapping, complementary relations, including sameness/difference, genuineness/artifice, and authority/delegitimacy” called the *tactics of intersubjectivity* (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005: 598). For the analysis in Chapter 2, I will focus on sameness/difference, which they define as adequation/distinction (described in more detail in Chapter 2).

To the best of my knowledge, there have been a handful of studies that look at identity construction and negotiation in naturalistic interaction involving autistic people (e.g., Bagatell, 2007; Bottema-Beutel & Smith, 2013; Brownlow & O'Dell, 2006). However, none of these studies looked specifically at how autistic people co-construct identity intersubjectively, as I do in Chapter 2. Bottema-Beutel & Smith (2013) looked primarily at the principle of emergence, and Bagatell (2007), looked at how one autistic man navigated identity in the ‘Aspie’ and ‘neurotypical’ social worlds. Thus, Chapter 2 appears to be the first investigation looking at how autistic people construct identity intersubjectively in face-to-face interaction—especially autistic twins.

I chose Bucholtz & Hall's framework because it can be readily combined with conversation analysis, as it "focuses on the details of language" (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005: 586). Thus, this framework can provide a rich basis for a "culturally contexted conversation analysis." Sterponi et al. (2014) provide a theoretical account of what an approach similar to this might look like, describing it as a "multidimensional view of language" that invites "a rethinking of traditional views of language in autism" (1).² However, Sterponi et al. (2014) use a similar combination of methodologies to provide a theoretical account of "autistic language," while I put the combination of methodologies described above to practice in an effort to describe the various ways in which Cam and Nick co-construct their identities, which are not necessarily related to autism.

Literature review

This thesis aims to look at aspects of the practices Cam and Nick utilize in social interaction, asking: What are Cam and Nick able to accomplish with and in social interaction? By focusing on some of the things Cam and Nick are able to do with and in social interaction, I do not wish to minimize any experiences of marginalization or difficulties they have faced as a result of being autistic. Instead, I look to stand up against the negative ideologies and stereotypes that dominate the academic and cultural spaces by demonstrating some of the ways in which Cam and Nick attend to various aspects of social interaction. By studying some of the ways in which Cam and Nick engage in social interaction through a positive frame, I provide a true-to-life perspective on why studying disability and disabled people is "essential to the exploration of humanness," because Cam and Nick are "autistics-as-humans" (Olkin & Pledger, 2003: 297). To

² Sterponi et al.'s (2014) treatment involves conversation analysis and linguistic anthropology, while my treatment specifically involves conversation analysis and identity analysis, a methodology situated, in part, in linguistic anthropology.

understand why the approach I take in this thesis is essential for exploring humanness, I explain how the major experiment-based and interaction-based research initiatives take approaches, which have played a role in accentuating the importance of *autism*, while often minimizing the importance of *autistic people*.

There is an extensive body of research on autism which includes work from many fields in the social and natural sciences. From research on bio-markers and brain imaging, to empirical behavioral studies and theories of cognitive functioning; and from qualitative investigations into naturalistic social interaction, and meta-investigations into how autism is understood in culture and academia, there is no shortage of interest in understanding autism and autistic people's experiences from an academic point of view. Most importantly, there are many autistic people who have documented their experiences, including Temple Grandin, Tito Mukhopadhyay, Owen Suskind, Carly Fleishmann, Melanie Yergeau, and Jim Sinclair, and many more. The large variety of biographies, documentaries, talks, and research created and/or performed by autistic individuals, (a) provides the perspectives we should really care about for understanding individual sociality and (b) reminds us of humanness—an aspect that can be lost in academic research. Thus, I urge you to look up these individuals and learn about and from their experiences and perspectives, as I do not have enough space to review them all here.

I open this brief literature review with Yergeau's (2013) account of the problems, as she sees them, with a set of major theories in autism research. With this discussion as a starting point, I will make reference to the academic research she discusses, which makes up a large majority of the body of autism research in psychological research, and then also discuss the research that supports her argument, that autistic people have agency and identities.

Theory of Mind theories

Dr. Melanie Yergeau (2013) wrote an “autie-ethnographic” essay titled “Clinically Significant Disturbance: On Theorists Who Theorize Theory of Mind.” This essay centered around the philosophical and rhetorical issues with Theory of Mind (ToM) theories. She argues that these theories strip autistic people of their agency by disembodimenting them—by denying their humanity.³

Two basic claims underlie these ToM theories as they are applied to autism, first proposed by Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith (1985): (1) Theory of mind is a “quintessential” human ability and (2) Autistic people do not have (or are at least impaired in) this ability (Baron-Cohen, 1997). Thus these two notions suggest that autistic people are not human—or not *as* human—as non-autistic people.

ToM was first discussed in the field evolutionary psychology as an adaptive tool for engaging in social behavior. ToM—in the most basic sense—is theorizing about what others are thinking and feeling. Thus, having a ToM entails the ability to understand that others have their own mind, and that other people have their own mental states (e.g., beliefs, feelings, desires), and perspectives. Furthermore, according to researchers who theorize about ToM, the ability to theorize about others’ minds warrants an ability to imagine and “attribute beliefs and desires to each other with confidence,” which allows people with ToM to make sense of others’ behavior and social communication (Dennett, 1987: 48). Exercising this ability, which Baron-Cohen (1990) called ‘mind reading’, is thus said to be unconsciously exercised, natural, and “a really good thing to have” for engaging in successful social interaction (Baron-Cohen, 1997: 26).

³ In a basic sense, agency is the “accomplishment of social action” where agents are entities that can do things with and in social interaction (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005: 606). For example, Cam calling himself a “cinophile” is an act of agency, because he is labeling/categorizing himself through referential identity, a direct way to construct identity—one type of social action (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005; McConnell-Ginet, 1989; Murphy, 1997; Sacks, 1995).

What does it mean, then, to lack the ability to theorize about others' minds—to 'mind read'? Baron-Cohen (1990) coined the term 'mindblindness' to describe this lack. He outlines the effects of 'mindblindness' on making sense of social interaction in his essay called *Mindblindness*, framing these effects as "tragic" and "detrimental." Thus, he describes that 'mindblindness' entails an inability to recognize that others' have intentions, and an inability to decode the possible intentions one may have. According to Baron-Cohen (1997), this failure is the result of impaired perspective-taking abilities, which leads to deficits in having or feeling empathy, forming self-other relationships, decoding figurative language, and even simply being aware of oneself and one's own intentions and mental states.

Yergeau examines how ToM theories are regarded as "fact," and how entire research initiatives have been developed around them (Smukler, 2005; Williams, 2010: 483). For example, over the past thirty years, Simon Baron-Cohen has been a named author in hundreds of publications on characterizing ASD, many of which over the past 10 years have been related to the notion that lacking ToM entails lacking or having impaired empathy. These research initiatives have claimed, under the belief that ToM theories are "empirical fact," that autistic people lack empathy (for an overview of this perspective see Baron-Cohen's (1997) essay called *Mindblindness*), lack perspective taking abilities (e.g., Dawson & Fernald, 1987), lack the ability to form intersubjective (self-other) relations (e.g., Hobson & Lee, 1998), and have disordered sociality (Pinker, 2010). These initiatives, and others like them, place all of their focus on experimental, quantitative characterization (generalization) of autism as a disorder—producing typical autism papers.

Unfortunately, when an autistic individual reveals a capacity for empathy, perspective-taking, intersubjectivity, sociality, et cetera in an experimental setting, they are said to be

“hacking” these abilities, meaning they “would not be expected to show insightful behavior in real life” (Frith, Morton & Leslie, 1991; Frith, Happé & Siddons, 1994: 110; also critiqued in Yergeau, 2013). There is one major issue with this claim: “Real life” social interaction provides a naturalistic and representative environment for studying social practices. This means studies that rely on experimental conditions, abstruse questionnaires, and scripted/controlled procedures inherently fail to capture the true extent of one’s social abilities. Thus, instead these researchers should be asking whether the individuals who “fail” to display these ToM-conditional abilities in an experimental setting “would *still be able to* show insightful behavior in real life.”

Yergeau (2013) as an autistic rhetor (with a PhD in rhetoric), approaches this issue from a rhetorical perspective. By “[examining] the role of the body in ToM—or rather the ways in which autistic people are disembodied by theories about ToM,” she demonstrates the deep flaws that underlie ToM theories (n.p.). She summarizes her argument below:

...theories about ToM impact the autistic bodymind in material and violent ways. My argument here is that denying autistic selfhood and denying autistic corporeality and denying autistic rhetoricity reifies systemic abuse and ableism. My argument here is that autistic people have come to represent a tidily bounded limit case that signifies what it means to be inhuman—all in the name of empiricism, all in the name of ToM. (n.p.)

Yergeau also describes a handful of experiences in which she has been denied humanness (and agency), which she describes as occurring *because* she is autistic, including the time a “psychologist... told [her] that [she] didn't really miss [her] deceased friend because autistic people cannot form human attachments” (n.p.). Thus, Yergeau’s approach, in its simplest form, is to reject ToM theories by revealing her obvious humanness and capacity for agency, ToM, etc., and she is rather persuasive in her goal to convey and defend the agency (or agentive potential) of autistic individuals.

In recent years, more and more studies have chosen to take a more qualitative linguistic/discourse analytic approach to supporting autistic people's agency (e.g., Rossetti, Ashby, Arndt, Chadwick & Kasahara, 2008) and/or identities (e.g., Bagatell, 2007; Bottema-Beutel & Smith, 2013). Rossetti et al. (2008) performed a case study which showed that participants, all of whom were autistic and type to communicate, express agency in order to exercise control over their lives. Furthermore, as identity is a social action agency can perform, autistic participants in Bagatell (2007) and Bottema-Beutel & Smith (2013) all of whom demonstrated the ability to construct identity in interaction, uphold the agentive potential of autistic individuals (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005). Specifically, Bagatell (2007) performs an ethnographic case study where she reveals one autistic man's efforts and challenges to construct identities, where she describes that being autistic has "heightened his limited experiences in social worlds and restricted opportunities for participation" due to the perceptions and stigma surrounding autism in society (424). Also, Bottema-Beutel & Smith (2013) use the frameworks of emergence and contextual configuration to highlight how one adolescent male constructs his identity in a group of peers by orienting to "aspects of the social space" (200). In closing, the bottom-line is that these qualitative, non-experimental, descriptive research projects make it clear that many more studies like these should be pursued to build the body of research that supports agency and humanness of autistic people.

The Ethnography of Autism project

Next, I will briefly review the major, over a decade-long, research initiative looking at autism from an interactional perspective. This initiative, called The Ethnography of Autism project is lead by Elinor Ochs at UCLA and looks to describe social capabilities and challenges

autistic people—particularly children—display in social interaction (e.g., Kremer-Sadlick, 2004; Ochs, Kremer-Sadlik, Sirota & Solomon, 2004; Ochs & Solomon, 2004; Ochs & Solomon, 2010; Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 2008; Sterponi, 2004).

Ochs & Solomon (2010) reviewed this project and their findings of what constitutes “autistic sociality” (69). For them, “human sociality consists of a range of possibilities for social coordination with others, and autistic sociality is one of these possible coordinations” (70). Thus, they describe fundamental importance of understanding social aspects of autism, not only on an interpersonal level, but also on a socio-cultural level (see also Ochs & Solomon, 2004).

On one hand, this interactional approach to understanding sociality expressed by autistic people is important, as it has played a fundamental role in looking at the social and interactional challenges in autism from naturalistic interaction. Their approach also rightly acknowledges the greater importance of naturalistic and different social environments on understanding social aspects of social interaction. Finally, by defining “autistic sociality” as a component of “human sociality” they rightly acknowledge the need to understand all varieties of social interaction to understand human sociality. On the other hand, however, this research initiative appears to have shared some of the same perspectives as the experimental findings and theories about autistic “impairments,” including ToM theories critiqued above. For example, Ochs & Solomon (2010) explain that participants’ abilities were assessed based on a series of theory of mind tasks.

At least one study from this initiative has challenged the “findings in cognitive psychological research” with specific regard to ToM abilities, demonstrating that the autistic participants were able to take other’s perspectives in a question-answer task (Kremer-Sadlik, 2004: in abstract). However, the explanation provided for why participants were successful at this task in real life failed to challenge the ToM theories. Instead, Kremer-Sadlik (2004) appears

to justify these abilities as the result of the parents' and other family members' use of "communicative strategies to heighten their children's sociocultural perspective-taking... by highlighting the conventionally expected behavior and psychological dispositions associated with the practice" (195). Thus, in this study, insightful ToM practices by autistic people in real life interaction were also not attributed to the individuals performing them. Thus, even though Kremer-Sadlik's (2004) approach was useful for describing the socio-cultural aspects of social interaction involving autistic individuals, it failed to attribute the autistic participants' abilities to them.

Ochs and colleagues have produced insightful, and important work for understanding human sociality by looking at different socio-cultural environments in which autistic people engage in social interaction. But, in order "to identify the parameters that characterize the *restricted range* of possibilities for autistic sociality," they primarily focused on "social rule *violations*" (Ochs & Solomon, 2010: 74; see www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/ochs/projects.htm). Thus, Ochs and colleagues suggest that a "sense of rule *awareness*" can be understood by when and where autistic participants *violated* social rules, which they look at in an effort to show where autistic individuals are socially *restricted*.

Garfinkel's famous "breaching experiments" demonstrated that studying violations of social norms was effective to find the "limits" of social structure, and analyze the understanding of social rules (Heritage, 2001). This methodology seems to be influential in Ochs and colleagues' approach where autistic people's rule violations provided insight into the relationship between "autistic sociality" and "human sociality." However, where Garfinkel's experiments entailed *purposeful* rule violations to study *reactions* to them, Ochs and colleagues' studies

looked at *autistic* “rule violations” to describe *autistic* “social awareness.”⁴ Although this approach helped them accomplish their goals, many of their findings contributed to the existing perspective of autistic lack, and thus, their approach inadvertently supported the perspective I disagree with.

In summary, most of the major empirical and interactional research put forth to by scholars in the past thirty years has been focused on characterizing “autistic” impairments and restrictions to explain what “humans” are able to do, attributing any of the autistic people’s abilities to other, external factors. These conclusions have served to negatively influence the socio-cultural and clinical views of autistic people, leading to negative ideologies and inaccurate assumptions about autistic people’s social abilities, all of which have contributed to the denial of autistic people’s agency, and humanity.

Plan moving forward

I have divided the following analysis into three chapters. First, in Chapter 2, I look at how Cam and Nick co-construct their identities in interaction with each other by combining conversation analysis and identity analysis. By combining these frameworks, I am able to look at how the intersubjective relations that emerge in fine-grained interaction interact with the construction of relational identities. I will specifically focus on how Cam and Nick design their turns, and contribute to the developing sequence to construct relations of adequation (‘sameness’) and distinction (‘difference’). Since they are twins, this analysis also inadvertently looks at twin intersubjectivity.

⁴ Studying others’ reactions to autistic individuals social practices might have provided insight into the challenges and discrimination autistic individuals face culturally and socially (potentially even in response to practices that would be seen as following “social rules” as we see later in this study).

Then, in Chapters 3 and 4, I look at Cam and Nick's repertoire for accomplishing specific actions in social interaction using conversation analysis. Chapter 3 presents an analysis of Cam's wide-range of practices for initiating interaction by looking at how Cam designs his turns to mobilize response. Then, chapter four investigates how Nick uses discourse markers to attend to the coherence and progressivity of an interaction. Thus, Chapters 3 and 4 each demonstrate Cam and Nick's ability to access and perform a wide-range of interactional practices to accomplish specific actions.

Finally, I will conclude by summarizing the research as it is presented, outline links between key concepts, explain how this thesis significantly contributes to the study of autism in linguistics, as well as on a greater academic and social scale, where I will also suggest some possible areas for future research.

Chapter 2: Co-Constructed Identity

“Je est un autre.”

-Jean Paul Sartre

Knowing Cam and Nick as both individuals and as twins inspired this thesis. So, I developed this chapter to look into how they co-construct their identities in social interaction with each other. For this investigation, I will draw on conversation analytic methodology, to show how sequence organization and turn design can inform our interactional approach to analysis of identity, such that sequence organization and turn design will inform our understanding of intersubjectivity and co-creation of identity using Bucholtz & Hall's (2005) framework. My hope is that combining these two approaches will provide a robust analytic resource for understanding the intersection between Cam and Nick's fine-trained turn-taking work—the building blocks—and components of the identities that they build together. Thus, I will describe Cam and Nick's joint negotiation of macro and micro-level identities in various interactional environments and social spaces (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004).

Agentive potential

Since agency is required to accomplish identity, before delving into how Cam and Nick co-construct their identities, let us first observe a couple expressions of their agency (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005). Recall Bucholtz & Hall's (2005) definition of agency: “the accomplishment of

social action” (606). Thus, in order to construct identity, Cam and Nick must possess the potential to accomplish social action—an agentive potential.

Next, recall how ToM theories minimize autistic individuals to products of disordered neurology—Yergeau’s description of the disembodied “autistic mind” (n.p.). As I discussed, one unfortunate result of this minimization is that autistic individuals are denied agency. However, being denied agency in theory and research does not mean Cam and Nick are not agents; it means that sometimes others do not treat Cam and Nick as agents.⁵ However, in an analysis of interaction, like the examples below, Cam and Nick reveal that they are able to exercise agency—they have agentive potential. These examples also show that, by engaging in interaction—and forming self-other relations—Cam and Nick are also able to exercise distributed agency; the notion that agency can “be distributed among several social actors” (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005: 606). In order to look at Cam and Nick’s agentive potential, I draw on two interactional examples handled in two distinct ways at two different times on the same topic.

Example A occurred at the end of the first day of recording. There was a lull in the conversation before line 1 during which Cam and Nick were reading. The preceding topic of conversation was about Cam and Nick’s dad’s plan to be remarried and they provided minimal response to my inquiry about their feelings about the event. In order to move the conversation forward, I launch a new sequence and topic of conversation in line 1. Note that in line 26, Nick rejects Cam’s request for action, and Cam subsequently sings the “Fish Slapping” song.

⁵ I do not wish to dismiss the notion that Cam and Nick have experienced interactions in which others deny them agency because they are autistic (see Chapter 3 for an example where Cam’s PCA denies his agency by rejecting his efforts to initiate interaction). My intention here is not to suggest this never happens. My intention is to demonstrate that they have agentive potential.

Example A: Day 1

((Both reading on Nick's bed))

1 Ali: hhh what was I gonna a:sk ^you guys (.) I was ^gonna ask you a °question°
2 (0.4)

3 Ali: Oh (0.5) Monty Python
4 (0.4)

5 Nick: yeah.
6 (1.0)

7 Ali: did you see the::: lil skit that they did with the: (.) chees:e.
8 (0.8)

9 Nick: oh yeah. the cheese shop,
10 (.)

11 Ali: the cheese shop.
12 (0.2)

13 Nick: yeah.
14 (0.3)

15 Ali: Cam d'you remember that one?
16 (.)

17 Cam: no I don't,
18 (0.2)

19 Nick: sketch a- (0.2) che==

20 Cam: =what about the <f:ish sla:pping, so::ng?>
21 (0.6)

22 Cam: >can yeh do it?<
23 (0.5)

24 Cam: Nick can yeh do it,
25 (2.2)

26 Nick: no I'm no:t gonna do it,
27 (0.2)

28 Cam: neh neh ne ^neh neh neh ^neh ne ^neh (.) neh, ((singing))

Next, Example B was recorded on the second day of recording at the park. This social environment was cheerful and good-humored, and during the time before this interaction, Cam and Nick had been goofing around and laughing while re-enacting different Monty Python sketches in the park. Thus, the social atmosphere was markedly more positive in this example, compared to that in Example A. Note that, in this example, in line 13 Nick accepts Cam's (indirect) request for action.

Example B: Day 2

```
((hanging out at the park))  
1   Ali:   he:y,  
2           (0.8)  
3   Ali:   question about Monty Py:tho:n.  
4   Nick:                                     [what,=  
5   Cam:   =what.  
6   Ali:   what's you're fa:vorite skits:. from [Monty Python  
7   Cam:                                     [sketch=  
8   Ali:   =sketch. sorry  
  
((deleted 1 min. 45 sec. Cam and Nick telling favorites and re-enacting sketches))  
  
9   Cam:   the Fish Slapping da::nce.=  
10  Nick:  =Yea:h >that's one a' my< favorites too.  
11          (0.7)  
12  Cam:   do the fish slapping da:nce,=  
13  Nick:  =((stands up, dances)) ^o::: o::: o::: o:: eh?
```

Duranti (2004) wrote: “Through linguistic communication, we display our attitudes, feelings, beliefs, and wishes” (452). In other words, to recognize the expression of “attitudes, feelings, beliefs, and wishes,” we must be aware of each other’s agency, for it is through agency that these actions are accomplished. Yet, engaging in interaction and exercising agency also holds actors accountable for the “implications and consequences” of their linguistic expressions (Duranti, 2004: 459). Keep these ideas in mind throughout this section, while I briefly outline Cam and Nick’s agentive potential with regard to Duranti’s (2004: 453) three qualities of agentive entities:

...entities (i) that have some degree of control over their own behavior, (ii) whose actions in the world affect other entities’ (and sometimes their own), and (iii) whose actions are the object of evaluation (e.g., in terms of their responsibility for a given outcome).

The differences in the sequence organization and turn design between these interactions is precisely what makes Cam and Nick's agentic work evident. Briefly, it is important to note that as agentic entities with agentic potential, Cam and Nick embody all of these qualities at once. Yet, they are also only able to exercise their agency within the confines of the discourse context (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005). Thus, agency is exercised within a social space external from the self, so the social actions Nick and Cam can accomplish through agency are limited to constraints of this space. Throughout this discussion, it will become evident that the interactional practices which directly shape the fine-grained components of social interaction—sequence organization and turn design—provide a rich analytic frame for studying agency and the actions agency can accomplish.

Duranti (2004) first posits that agentic entities require “some degree of control” over their behavior (453). In these examples, this quality is evidenced by Cam and Nick's ability to engage in and sustain back-and-forth interaction with each other. This claim indicates that all of the examples in this thesis, for which Nick and Cam engage in social interaction, demonstrate Cam and Nick's agency. Thus, language use is, in and of itself, an expression of agency (Duranti, 2004).

Next, Cam and Nick also demonstrate that their actions “affect other entities’ (and sometimes their own),” as evidenced by the distinct—and opposing—interactional outcomes of these two interactions. In comparing the outcomes of A and B, Nick's responses to Cam's requests for action (respectively, lines 26a and 13b) affected the organization of the sequence, and therefore, also affected Cam's subsequent interactional move. Specifically, in Ex. A the floor was open for Cam to respond to his own first pair-part, whereas in B, by accepting Cam's request, Nick held the floor—affecting Cam's next move. Cam's moves also influence Nick's

responses. In Ex. A, Cam's pursuit of a response, when he verbally selects Nick as his recipient (line 24), prompts Nick to respond, whereas after his inquiries in lines 20 and 22, Nick does not respond, because he does not know he is the selected recipient, or because he is uninterested in responding (or both). However, it does not matter whether Nick's lack of response is due to a lack of interest in responding, or a lack of knowledge of intended reciprocity. Cam's pursuit, prefaced by 'Nick', appears to influence Nick's following move.

Finally, Cam and Nick are also able to perform actions that shape a given outcome. This first example is related to Cam's choice to pursue a response from Nick in line 24 (Ex. A). Namely, a lack of response from Nick alerts Cam that, in the context of the interaction, if he wants to mobilize a response from his intended recipient then he must overtly select a recipient. Usually in multiparty interactions, selecting a recipient would be performed through eye-gaze; however, Nick is facing away from Cam, which means Cam must select Nick as his recipient in another way. Thus, Nick's action of not offering a response leads Cam to pursue response from Nick.

Next, on an "ethno-pragmatic level" Cam's request for action in line 12 (Ex. B) is (partly) responsible for Nick's response. Duranti (2004) suggests that to "fully appreciate" the objects of evaluation (iii), we must also connect the construction of agency to "words as they contribute toward the constitution of culture-specific acts and activities" (454). I propose that *interactional actions* which contribute toward the constitution of a culture-specific activity of interaction should also be included at this "ethno-pragmatic level" (454). Responding to a first pair-part in a certain way thus constitutes a culture-specific act, as sequence organization rules vary from culture to culture (Stivers et al., 2009). Since Cam and Nick are engaging in the process of interaction defined in an American English-speaking culture, Cam's request in Ex. B

makes relevant a response from Nick, just as Cam's request in Ex. A (line 24) makes relevant a response from Nick.

In this preliminary section, I have demonstrated that Cam and Nick are able to exercise agency in two different interactions on the same topic since these interactions had different outcomes with different sequence organizations and turn designs. Thus, by examining these interactions, Cam and Nick were shown to be agentive entities based on the three qualities outlined by Duranti (2004). This initial discussion was relevant before proceeding to discuss identity co-construction and intersubjectivity for two reasons. First, identity is created through the expression of agency. Second, some theories about autism strip autistic people of their agency. Now that we have witnessed expressions of Nick and Cam's agency, the rest of this discussion will turn to how they co-construct identity by positioning themselves and each other in interaction.

Co-constructing identity

The large body of (mostly experimental) research on twins in the natural and social sciences has funneled most of its attention and resources into understanding the heritability of a large variety of traits—the nature-nurture debate. Within this large body of research, there is a small subset of studies on twin social interaction, in which heritability (of social traits) played a central role (e.g., Stein, Jang, & Livesley, 2002; in autism, Skuse, Mandy, & Scourfield, 2005). For this thesis, I am interested in how Cam and Nick engage in social interaction; and in this chapter I investigate how they position themselves in interaction in relation to each other. Thus, this thesis appears to be one of the first (if not the first) interactional study with twins that does not involve the question of heritability or heritable traits.

In the sections below, I present examples in which Nick and Cam engage in naturalistic interaction to illustrate the ways in which Cam and Nick co-create their identities, combining methodologies of conversation analysis and analysis of identity (identity framework outlined by Bucholtz & Hall (2004; 2005), combined framework outlined above). Incorporating both of these methodologies will hopefully show that combining conversation analysis and identity analysis as complementary frameworks can be useful for investigating the relationship between the fine-grained components of conversation (i.e. turn-taking and turn design), and the intersubjective achievement of identity in a local social space (cf. Aronsson, 1998).

One important correspondence between a conversation analytic approach and an identity constructional approach to interaction is that their analyses are “in terms of positioning, not in terms of predefined social order” (Aronsson, 1998: 80). This similarity is important because the way in which Cam and Nick position themselves with respect to each other in the interactions below is the primary focus of this analysis. I will specifically look at how Nick and Cam are positioned in terms of two intersubjective relations—*adequation* (‘sameness’) and *distinction* (‘difference’) (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004; 2005). Bucholtz & Hall (2004) categorize these relations as *tactics of intersubjectivity*, where *tactics* invokes “the local and often situated, and often improvised quality of the everyday practices” individuals use to achieve their social goals, and *intersubjectivity* highlights “the place of agency and interactional negotiation in the formation of identity” (382; see Bucholtz & Hall, 2004 for more). So, by investigating Cam and Nick’s relations in terms of adequation and distinction, I address the question of *why* certain identities are formed, in order to understand “the purpose for which particular semiotic processes are put to use” (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004: 382).

In order to understand *why* Nick and Cam put particular semiotic processes to use, we must also understand the semiotic processes themselves. Semiotic processes provide insight into *how* identity is created. Bucholtz & Hall (2004) define four different, yet interconnected processes—practice, indexicality, ideology, and performance—that work together to create semiotic meaning. *Practice* and *performance* respectively denote habitual and deliberate social displays. *Indexicality* marks the relationship between social structures (practices) and social categories, and *ideology* represents a natural and inevitable connection between linguistic and social displays (a stronger indexical relation). These semiotic processes emerge in interaction on many levels. For this investigation, I will focus on how these semiotic processes emerge in the fine-grained interactional practices of turn-taking and turn design. In order to look at these linguistic practices in the construction of identity, I draw on conversation analytic methods and terminology. Thus, I will investigate *how* Cam and Nick co-construct their identities by looking at *how* fine-grained interactional practices contribute to the expression of semiotic meaning, and *why* Cam and Nick co-construct particular identities by looking at *why* these semiotic processes are put to use to form intersubjective relations of adequation and distinction.

Contested equalization in co-production

Now that we have established Cam and Nick's agential potential and been introduced to the basic analytic framework of this analysis, we turn to a case of identity co-construction in cooperative performance through fine-grained turn-taking practices. This case provides the foundation for a compelling investigation into how Cam and Nick co-construct their identities through choral productions and co-participant completions (Lerner, 2002). Thus, this interaction illustrates the relational nature of identity construction, and provides evidence that autistic people

can engage in intersubjectivity.⁶ Recently, a study by Du Bois, Hobson & Hobson (2014) supported the notion that autistic children appear to have difficulty with intersubjectivity, in-line with other findings. However, they condition their conclusions with the suggestion that our understanding of intersubjective relations between autistic people and others cannot “remain at the level of broad generalities or abstractions” as these relations are “achieved through specific acts of communicative engagement” (Du Bois et al., 2014: 438). In support of this notion, Nick and Cam’s interaction below demonstrates a strong example of their abilities to achieve a profound, yet comfortable intersubjective relation across a turn sequence performed so synchronously that it appears rehearsed.

In this example, Cam and Nick work together to describe some features of the then upcoming movie *Exodus: Gods and Kings* to me. This interaction occurred while Nick, Cam, and I were hanging out and talking about various different topics.

Example 1: *Exodus: Gods and Kings* description

1 Nick: Also, like you’ve ever ^heard a’ like ah the- (0.6) there’s like a:
 2 m:o::vie? based off the life of Moses somehow,
 3 (0.7)
 4 Ali: Mo:ses(h)?=
 5 Nick: =yeah (0.8) called Exodus?
 6 (0.4)
 7 Ali: Exodus.
 8 (0.3)
 9 Nick: **yeah [it’s- (0.2) >basically this Christian Bale< playin:g Moses**
 10 Ali: [I’ve never ^seen it.
 11 (0.2)
 12 Cam: **with [Joel Edgerton**
 13 Nick: **[Joel Edgerton** (tha’) plays like the pharaoh.

⁶ An overwhelming majority of research on self-other relations and autism describes an impaired ability for autistic people to construct and maintain intersubjective relations (cf. Maestro et al, 2001; Meyer & Hobson, 2004). Muratori & Maestro (2007) go so far as to classify autism generically as “a disorder of performed intersubjectivity” (105). While there is certainly evidence to support the notion that forming self-other relations can be a *challenge* for autistic *children*, these generalizations do not reflect the ability to develop these skills, nor the directionality of this “failure” (i.e. establishing self-other relations takes two participants).

14 (0.4)
 15 Cam: **with [Joel Edgerton as the pha:raoh =an' do you know who's directing it?**
 16 Ali: [hu:h
 17 (0.9)
 18 Nick: **Ridley Scott,**
 19 (0.6)
 20 Cam: **who directed A::lien.**
 21 (0.3)
 22 Nick: **and Gladiateh(h)=so basically >it's-< (0.2) Gladiator two point ze:ro,**

The collaborative sequence above emerged naturally in the unfolding discourse context, illustrating co-explaining (outlined and defined in Lerner and Takagi, 1999) as a social action which establishes and displays intersubjective relations between co-participants. Since the primary investigations into co-explaining, and co-production have clearly been products of conversation analytic methods, we can draw on this research and expand the ideas into the realm of relational identity co-creation—specifically, adequation. Adequation, as Bucholtz & Hall (2004) describe it, conveys “equation and adequacy” and “establishes sufficient sameness between groups” (383).

First described by Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974), collaborative turn sequences are initiated when a subsequent speaker completes (or attempts to complete) a prior speaker's turn constructional unit. Lerner & Takagi (1999) and Lerner (2002) further delineate two subtypes of collaborative turn sequences: co-explaining (or co-telling), and choral co-production. Co-explaining emerges when an utterance directed at one recipient is completed by a third-party, who initiates a collaborative turn sequence, and is typically characterized as either ‘shared authority’ or ‘competition’ (Lerner, 1992; Lerner 2004). In the interaction above, since I am the intended recipient of Nick's request for information in line 5, when Cam (the third-party) makes a bid to complete Nick's turn (line 9), he initiates a co-telling about the movie. Then, when Nick engages with Cam, the co-telling briefly becomes a choral co-production, where Cam and Nick

voice the same words at the same time (Lerner, 2002). This is the first linguistic evidence of the intersubjective relationship between Cam and Nick, and provides a starting point for our analysis of co-constructed identity.

Lerner (2002) describes that some co-productions are primarily ‘competitive’, while others are primarily ‘shared’. Based on Cam and Nick’s sequence organization, they appear to be ‘competing’ for (both turn and epistemic) authority, rather than ‘sharing’ it. I also propose that by simply engaging in co-productions Cam and Nick engage in a mutually cooperative sequence to accomplish a situationally relevant and unified goal—raising my epistemic status. The co-telling and choral co-production occur in lines 12-13:

9 Nick: **yeah** [it’s- (0.2) >**basically this Christian Bale**< **playin:g Moses**
 10 Ali: [I’ve never ^seen it.
 11 (0.2)
 12 Cam: **with** [**Joel Edgerton**
 13 Nick: [**Joel Edgerton** (tha’) plays like the pharaoh.
 14 (0.4)
 15 Cam: **with** [**Joel Edgerton as the pha:raoh=an’ do you know who’s directing it?**
 16 Ali: [hu:h

First, in line 9, Nick elaborates on the movie *Exodus: Gods and Kings*—‘it’s basically Christian Bale playing Moses’—after the initial sequence between Nick and me (lines 1-7). Then, during the pause Cam takes the opportunity to begin a turn in line 12 with which he further elaborates about the movie with a glue-on increment—‘with Joel Edgerton’.⁷ Cam appears to use this increment in an attempt to establish his own epistemic stance. However, Cam does not have the opportunity to accomplish this goal as Nick reasserts authority over the turn in line 13 by joining in. Nick’s join-in establishes a choral co-production, during which Nick and Cam say

⁷ Couper-Kuhlen & Ono (2007) define ‘glue-ons’ as “elements which are grammatically fitted to the end of” a prior unit (515, see this study for more information on ‘glue-ons’ in English).

“the same words in the same way at the same time”—‘Joel Edgerton’ (Lerner, 2002: 3). By producing the same words at the same time as Cam, Nick appears to be (1) working to take back authority over his turn and (2) asserting his epistemic stance as equal with or even superior to Cam. Thus, between Cam’s effort to establish his own epistemic stance (line 12), and Nick’s effort to regain authority over his telling, they have clearly established a competitive interactional environment.

During this choral co-production Cam drops out of the turn. Dropping out like this is a common practice for resolving overlapping speech, and demonstrates Cam’s “normative orientation to (re)establishing the state of one-party-at-a-time” in the interaction (Hayashi, 2013: 178). However, he does not drop out until he has completed the whole proper noun (phrase)—‘Joel Edgerton’. Although Cam still drops out of the turn rather quickly (instead of trying to finish his whole turn), producing the full name (as opposed just ‘Joel’ or ‘Jo-’) suggests that Cam weakly competes to survive “in the turn-space” (Hayashi, 2013: 179). However, Cam’s drop-out ultimately allows Nick to reclaim authority of the turn, during which he claims epistemic authority by being the first to produce the information projected by Cam in his glue-on (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). Thus, Cam appears to be cooperatively dropping out for the sake of continuing the interaction initiated with the ultimate goal of raising my epistemic status.

In order to not be regarded in an epistemically subordinate position, Cam restarts the turn he began in line 12, evidenced by his repetition of ‘with Joel Edgerton...’. This notion is also supported by the fact that Cam repeats the same information that Nick had already asserted in his turn, despite the fact that the goal of raising my epistemic status with regard to that information was achieved during Nick’s turn.

Next, Cam produces a y/n question directed at me, latched at the transition-relevance place (after ‘pharoah’).⁸ By rushing into this question, Cam prevents anyone else from acquiring the floor, which indicates that Cam is attending to the competitive interactional environment.

I propose that by engaging in this complex co-telling and choral co-production sequence, Cam and Nick are co-constructing their identities. Specifically, I propose that *cooperation* is required to participate in and maintain a successful co-telling, even if the co-telling is *competitive*. In this case, then, *cooperation* in the negotiation of the sequence establishes an intersubjective relation of adequation, because the co-telling establishes a “temporary unity” between Cam and Nick with the shared goal of continuing the sequence in order to raise me to a higher epistemic status (Heritage, 2013). However, Cam and Nick are also *competing* for both the floor and epistemic superiority. Thus, Cam and Nick do not perform this *cooperative* sequence in solidarity.

Bucholtz & Hall (2004) caution that “the assertion of similarity through adequation does not necessarily involve solidarity” (384). Thus, it appears that Cam and Nick’s co-telling is an expression of “contested equalization rather than a consensual process of equation” (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004: 384). So, by engaging in this initial sequence of co-telling and choral co-production, Cam and Nick reveal a relationship of adequation through “contested equalization” through their effort to accomplish two goals: (1) They are *cooperating* to raise my epistemic status (equalization) and (2) They are *competing* for the floor to establish their own superior epistemic stances (contestatation). Furthermore, this brief and complex sequence demonstrates that co-participants engaged collaborative sequences can co-construct their identities in and around the relationship between self and other (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004). As this interaction unfolds, Cam

⁸ ‘Latching’ within the same turn “marks no discernable silence” between two syntactically complete utterances (Hepburn & Bolden, 2013: 59).

and Nick appear to continue co-constructing a relational identity of adequation through “contested equalization” in the following *competitive*, yet *cooperative* sequence by extending each other’s clauses.

As we see in the transcript below, between lines 15 to 22, authority over the turn sequence continues to shift back and forth:

15 Cam: with [Joel Edgerton as the pha:raoh =an’ do you know who’s directing it?
16 Ali: [hu:h
17 (0.9)
18 Nick: Ridley Scott,
19 (0.6)
20 Cam: who directed A::lien.
21 (0.3)
22 Nick: and Gladiateh(h)=so basically >it’s-< (0.2) Gladiator two point ze:ro,

As mentioned above, Cam gains authority over the turn in line 15 by repeating the information he looked to convey with his ‘glue-on’ increment, and promptly posing a yes/no question for which I am the intended recipient (evidenced by Cam’s eye-gaze on the video), leaving no transition-relevance place for anyone else to enter into the turn-space. In line 17 there is a long pause when an answer has likely been made relevant (by me) in the absence of a verbal response from me, to which Nick responds with an informative answer—‘Ridley Scott’. This action establishes Nick’s epistemic superiority over the information, and continues the competitive interaction; especially since Cam’s utterance appears to project that Cam will provide the name of the director. Next, after Nick responds in line 18, the floor is open for either Cam or me to take a turn. After a short pause, Cam extends Nick’s turn with another glue-on increment and clause by elaborating about Ridley Scott—‘who directed Alien’ (line 20).

By providing more contextually relevant information in this way, Cam picks up the co-telling through anticipatory completion, rather than starting his own syntactically separate clause. In providing new and relevant information, Cam regains a position of epistemic superiority and raises my epistemic status. Furthermore, performing a glue-on increment also continues the cooperative sequence. Next, Nick extends Cam's extension of his original answer by adding a coordinating clause in line 22, elaborating by mentioning another movie Ridley Scott has directed and adding a latched subordinating clause which conveys an assessment of *Exodus*. The continuation of Cam's turn and subsequent latched clause, which provide new epistemic information indicates continued competition over the authority of the turn and epistemic domain. Since Nick does not initiate his own syntactically separate clause, he continues the cooperative sequence, and further raises my epistemic status.

Through this second co-telling sequence Cam and Nick continue to construct their identities intersubjectively in a relation of adequation through contested equalization in order to raise my epistemic status and put forth their own epistemic superiority.

With this example, Nick and Cam have demonstrated their ability to construct their identities intersubjectively through cooperative turn sequences of co-telling and choral co-production. In doing so, they are agents performing social actions to construct their identities by drawing from their positions in the local discourse context, and navigating the sequence as it unfolds. Furthermore, I have also illustrated that collaborative turn sequences can be used by researchers to analyze co-construction of identity at a fine-grained level of interaction. Most importantly, however, you have seen a little glimpse of who Cam and Nick are as people—as agentive entities—who are able to achieve identity as a social action through their social

Monitoring turn-taking and navigating social spaces

Example 2: *The Little Prince* and Gene Wilder

- 34

16 (0.4)
 17 Ali: prince 'prince'
 18 (0.5)
 19 Nick: Le Petit Prince 'The Little Prince'
 20 (1.5)
 21 Ali: <Le Pe:ti Prince> 'The Little Prince'
 22 (10.4) ((both reading their own materials))
 23 Ali: **do'you still speak French?**
 24 (0.5)
 25 Nick: (.h)oui (0.7) uhh (0.2) (.h)un peu
 26 (0.5)
 27 Ali: un peu?
 28 (.)
 29 Nick: °yea-° (0.4) °oui
 30 (2.4)

I initially direct my question about *The Little Prince* to Cam in line 1, then I subsequently ask Nick the same question in line 5. Since *The Little Prince* was originally written in French, and I know that Nick speaks French, I continue asking him questions about the book.⁹ Since I also speak French, Nick and I are both members of the local social group of French speakers.

After a 1.5 second silence Nick and I engage in a new sequence (lines 23-25). First, I ask a yes/no question in English, and then Nick responds with an answer in French—'oui' ('yes'). Nick is able to respond in French because he knows that I also speak French—if I did not speak French, answering in French would be less relevant in this context. This response introduces codeswitching to the interaction, which achieves adequation between Nick and me by creating a social space to which we both belong (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004). Furthermore, Nick appears to perform this codeswitch for emphasis, meaning that by answering this question in French he literally demonstrates that he still speaks French (Blom & Gumperz, 1972). Thus, Nick provides

⁹ Nick and I know each other speaks French because he originally asked me to teach him French in 2009. I knew that Nick had continued with French in high school for a couple years, and therefore, I was looking forward to speaking French with him again.

affirmation in two different functional ways. Furthermore, since Cam does not speak French, Nick's codeswitch also achieves distinction between us and Cam.¹⁰ This means that Nick's use of codeswitching marks an interactional transition into a new social space, in which Cam cannot reside because he does not speak/understand French. In the following segment (continued from above), Nick and I continue speaking in French, and we see the ways in which Cam attempts to break into (and break down) the new social space by vying for a turn, with which he introduces a new topic (in bold):

Example 2 continued

| | | | |
|----|-------|---|--------------------------------|
| 31 | Ali: | tu <u>aime</u> (.) parler français? | 'do you like speaking French?' |
| 32 | | (1.7) | |
| 33 | Nick: | °mais oui= | 'very much so' |
| 34 | Cam: | =um | |
| 35 | | (0.2) | |
| 36 | Ali: | oui?= | 'yes?' |
| 37 | Cam: | =what about <u>this</u> one, | |
| 38 | | (0.2) | |
| 39 | Nick: | oui. | 'yes.' |
| 40 | | (0.2) | |
| 41 | Cam: | d'you know what? | |
| 42 | | (0.2) | |
| 43 | Cam: | Learner an- (.) Alan (Shane) Learner and Frederick Row did (.) The | |
| 44 | | Little Prince for their last movie <u>musical</u> . | |
| 45 | | (0.5) | |
| 46 | Ali: | I didn't know that (.) I didn't know it was a <u>mu:sical</u> | |
| 47 | | (0.8) | |
| 48 | Cam: | it was, | |
| 49 | | (0.4) | |
| 50 | Ali: | I'm surprised (.) that they could make songs hhh | |
| 51 | | (0.7) | |
| 52 | Ali: | out of the book | |
| 53 | | (1.0) | |
| 54 | Cam: | ((reading from book)) it has Richard Kylie, (0.6) ss- Bob Fosse, Gene | |
| 55 | | Wilder and Steven Warner.= | |

¹⁰ Codeswitching is "the use of two or more linguistic varieties in the same conversation or interaction" (Myers Scotton & Ury, 1977: 5).

56 Ali: =Gene Wilder? (0.5) I know that name.
 57 (4.8)
 58 Cam: (AND there's)
 59 (0.9)

As this interaction continues to unfold, Cam attempts to re-enter the interaction by infiltrating the new social space, and is eventually successful. His first attempt to secure a turn in line 34 is placed after Nick responds to my question at a possible sequence completion point. This placement demonstrates that even though Cam does not necessarily understand the content of the interaction, he is able to monitor the turn-taking sequence. Furthermore, Cam latches his attempt in line 34 (and then again in line 37), further indicating that he is carefully monitoring the turns for a transition-relevance place where he can enter into the turn-space.

Once I follow up with a tag-question in French in line 36, it alerts Cam that his first attempt was unsuccessful. But he does not give up. In line 37 he tries again; however, he makes a stronger attempt by asking a question, and making a response conditionally relevant—‘what about this one?’ Since he asks this question before the sequence is closed, he does not receive an immediate response, but by asking he indicates that he is pursuing participation in the interaction. Thus, Cam appears to be aware of his distinction, and is doing interactional turn and sequence work to change it.

After Nick completes the sequence in French, Cam takes advantage of the silence by self-selecting and taking the turn he had been vying for (line 41). He changes his strategy, however, from a request for information to the first pair-part of a pre-announcement. Because it projects an upcoming turn, pre-announcement is a powerful device for acquiring a turn (Schegloff, 2007). Thus, this move ends up being successful, as Cam performs the projected turn in line 43. Furthermore, Cam’s pre-announcement is directed at me—‘do *ya* know what?’. By selecting an

intended recipient (me), Cam increases the likelihood of mobilizing my attention. Thus, using these interactional tools leads Cam to accomplish his goal of securing a turn, and consequently infiltrate the social space that Nick and I shared. This action mitigates his distinction from Nick and me, and engages me in an interactional relation with him, ending my interaction with Nick (for the moment). This outcome is the culmination of Cam's interactional work to break into the social space that Nick and I occupy without him, and highlights his work on identity through navigation of local interactional relationships. Eventually, the interaction between Cam and me comes to a lull, and after a 4.8 second silence, I re-enter the interaction and French-speaker social space with Nick by speaking French, consequently re-building the distinction between Cam, and Nick and I. We will see that Cam displays persistent attention to the intersubjective relations between him, and Nick and me by doing more interactional work (in bold) to break down this social space and the distinction it represents:

Example 2 continued

60 Ali: .hhh (1.5) hey Nick,
61 (2.0)
62 Nick: ((looks up from book)) yeah?
63 (0.4)
64 Ali: comment ça va? 'how are you?'
65 (0.3)
66 Nick: ça va bien. 'I am well'
67 (2.0)
68 Ali: comment t'app[els-tu? 'what is your name?'
69 Cam: [((sigh/1.1))
70 (2.4)
71 Nick: .hhh (2.6) that's basicall:y um?
72 (2.4)
73 Ali: comment vous appelez-vous? 'what is your name?'
74 (1.8)
75 Nick: what I'm doing?
76 (1.0)
77 Ali: °your name°
78 (0.3)

79 Ali: c[omment t'appels-tu? 'how are you?'
 80 Nick: [oh
 81 Nick: je m'appelle ah Nicolas. 'my name is Nicholas'
 82 (0.7)
 83 Ali: Nichola:s? 'Nicholas?'
 84 (0.7)
 85 Nick: oui. 'yes'
 86 (0.3)
 87 Ali: oui?= 'yes?'
 88 Cam: **=.hhh pfhhhhhh .hhh I- I don't (.) understand French.**
 89 (0.7)
 90 Ali: hhhh he he ha °ha ha° °hhh
 91 Ali: Nick (0.4) your French is aw:esome.
 92 (1.1)
 93 Nick: >merci< beaucoup 'thank you very much'
 94 (0.4)
 95 Cam: what abo:ut (.) u::hhhhh (0.8) Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory:: ya
 96 ever seen that mo[vie?
 97 Ali: [°hhh GENE WILDer's in that movie [right?
 98 Cam: [yea-
 99 Nick: ()=
 100 Cam: =yeah
 101 (1.5)
 102 Cam: it's ☺ scrumdidilyumptious ☺=
 103 Ali: ((singing)) =Oompa:: Loompa::...

It appears that Cam produces a stand-alone sigh in line 68 to communicate his displeasure with the action underway, and his state of distinction (Hoey, 2014). Hoey (2014) demonstrates that sighs, in general, are indexically related to negative emotions, and specifically, stand-alone sighs often function to “affectively [evaluate] the prior action and its implications” (186). So, this stand-alone sigh likely indexes a negative affective evaluation of my prior move. Then, in line 86, Cam produces more sighs and emphatic breathing, followed by the statement, ‘I- I don’t understand French’ (line 88). This turn, placed in the middle of an unclosed sequence, upholds the notion that he is experiencing a negative emotional state as a result of the ongoing interaction in French. Thus, Cam produces this turn as an indirect request for us to stop conversing in

French. This turn also demonstrates that Cam can produce interactional moves with specific sequential placement and design to infiltrate the social space to which he does not belong. In other words, by producing this utterance, Cam openly acknowledges and establishes his intersubjective distinction. Thus, it appears that this action of overtly highlighting and associating his distinction with his negative emotional experience works to break down the social space and, again, mitigate his distinction. This notion is supported by the fact that I produce coping-laughter, which appears to facilitate topic-transition (Warner-Garcia, 2014).

Based on the remainder of the interaction, Cam's sequence disturbing actions achieved the dissolution of the social space he could not occupy, thus damping his distinct positioning. Once Cam has opened the space, marked by silence, Cam promptly introduces a new topic of conversation. Remarkably, this new topic is subtly related to the previous topic—shows in which Gene Wilder has been cast (cf. lines 54-56 to 95-97). This association is indicative of a local relation between Cam and I, created earlier in the conversation, and available as a result of Cam and my shared world-knowledge that Gene Wilder starred in *Willy Wonka & the Chocolate Factory*. This shared knowledge thus achieves a locally shared social space in which Cam and I exist, creating an intersubjective relation of adequation (in a similar way that Nick and I achieved adequation in the French-speaker social space, through shared knowledge). This adequation is highlighted at the end of this interaction when Cam and I engage in a goofy sequence, where Cam performs one of the tag-lines of *Willy Wonka & the Chocolate Factory* (line 102), and I respond by singing an iconic song from the movie. Thus, this sequence is only possible in this social space because we have a shared knowledge of and interest in *Willy Wonka & the Chocolate Factory*. Thus, Cam has successfully created and transitioned the interaction into a new social space in which he can reside.

This example demonstrated Cam and Nick’s ability to navigate a local, yet changing discourse context of shifting social worlds. Specifically, Cam attended to turn-taking practices in order to perform turns to break down a social space to which he did not belong. In the final example of this analysis, Nick creates a relation of distinction between him and Cam by positioning himself in a “normative” social space by pointing out the marked nature of Cam’s behavior.

Ideology, preference, and shifting identity position

In this example, Nick works to highlight a distinction between himself and Cam by highlighting the marked nature of Cam’s behavior. Before this interaction, Cam and Nick had been reading on their e-readers, meaning we had not been engaging in an interaction for approximately 15 seconds. Then, in lines 1-2, Cam produces an utterance with no other designed features for mobilizing response besides its sequential initial positioning, which does not elicit response from Nick or me.¹¹ When neither potential recipient produces a response, Nick looks up from reading and explains that Cam ‘just likes ta talk to himself’. By highlighting Cam’s behavior, Nick reveals that he is sensitive to its marked nature.

Example 3: Talking to oneself

```

1   Cam:   one timex digital watch, (0.3) broken. ((re-enacting line from Blues
2           Brothers, looking at e-reader))
3           (1.2)
4   Nick:  ((looks up at Ali)) Oh he just likes ta talk to himse:lf.
5           (0.7)
6   Cam:   =one(slot)
7           (0.4)
8   Cam:   fssssh=
9   Ali:    =Ca:meron?
10          (0.5)
```

¹¹ See Chapter 3 for an example where a similar utterance appears designed to mobilize response.

11 Nick: [yeah.
 12 Cam: [yeah,
 13 (2.8)
 14 Cam: ()
 15 (1.9)
 16 Ali: ^sometimes I talk ta my:self ^too
 17 (0.3)
 18 Nick: **I do too.**

Up to this point in the discussion, ideology had not played a significant role in the analysis of the social space of the interactions. This interaction is different because it appears to be established partly as a result of the negative implications of the ideology that talking to oneself is negatively marked. Specifically, that it is associated with both autism, and mental health issues (i.e. schizophrenia). Thus, Nick's account (line 4) for Cam's behavior appears to distance himself from Cam, as well as from the social implications of his behavior. Meaning that by performing this account, I propose that Nick positions himself in a social space occupied by people who do not talk to themselves, achieving adequation with the "norm" (as he sees it), and distinction from Cam, and people who do talk to themselves—including autistic people.

Specifically, there are many negative ideologies about autism motivated by pathological generalizations, including the belief that autistic people lack any aptitude for social interaction. There are many linguistic patterns defined as autistic pathologies related to this lack, including repeating memorized phrases, most generally known as echolalia (Prizant & Douchan, 1981; Prizant & Rydell, 1984). Since echolalia is a pathological feature of autism in the general sense, it is a clinically disordered practice, and thus, socially marked. Furthermore, echolalia is often also considered negative and unproductive (Lovaas, 1977; Schreibman & Carr, 1978). So, Nick appears to position himself outside of the "autistic" social space by distancing himself from the negative social ideologies that reside in it. Bucholtz & Hall's (2005) demonstration of how

people index their identity by distancing themselves from labels, behavior or ideologies normatively ascribed to them also supports this notion (also see Baines, 2012).¹²

Since the *tactics of intersubjectivity* require there to be an entity, group, or idea against/with which individuals are positioned in the social space, Nick's achievement of distinction consequently positions Cam in the social space—in the *marked* social space (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005). Thus, in this case, Cam's identity position is partly the result of Nick's "perceptions and representations," and exemplifies Bucholtz & Hall's (2005) notion that relationality operates on many levels (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005: 606).

Briefly, there is also an interesting aspect to Nick's statement that I would like to mention, which is not obvious from the transcript. Recall that I have known Cam and Nick for 15 years, and have spent an extensive amount of time with them over the course of several years. My response in line 9 even indicates that I do not appear to have noticed anything marked about Cam's utterance before Nick's account. Based on this, and the fact that we had just spent five hours together, it is unlikely that Nick makes this comment to position himself in an unmarked social space for only me. But, since they are aware that they are being recorded, it is possible that Nick makes this comment to directly engage with the audience in a displaced intersubjective relationship of adequation.

Eventually, I respond to the implication that Cam's behavior is marked in line 16.

16 Ali: ^sometimes I talk ta my:self ^too
17 (0.3)
18 Nick: **I do too.**

¹² Baines (2012) describes in her case study on the social aspects of identity and autism that her participants' "[desire] to be accepted shapes their storylines" (549).

By rejecting the perceived implications that talking to oneself is negative, I position myself in the marked social space locally occupied by Cam. This statement is, therefore, a dispreferred response, because it does not affiliate with the stance taken up by Nick. This dispreferred response appears to shape Nick's next move in line 18. Specifically, Nick backs-down and realigns himself likely to prevent disagreement—a common move in light of dispreferred responses (Lerner, 1996). Attending to the dispreferred environment and responding accordingly appears to affect Nick's identity positioning as well. For with this comment—'I do too'—he equates himself with my position in the social space. And since I equated myself with Cam, by positioning myself in his social space, Nick positions himself, whether purposefully or unintentionally, closer to (or even inside of) Cam's social space—the space from which he had originally done work to distance himself.

In this interaction, we see that identity position can shift across a local discourse context, and be directly affected by preference organization of an interactional sequence. This example, therefore, calls the relationship between interactional preference and identity into the spotlight. Although it is outside of the scope of this investigation to look into this relationship on a deeper level.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented the ways in which Cam and Nick co-construct their identities in social interaction by combining methods of conversation and identity analysis. In order to recognize that Nick and Cam are able to achieve identity, I demonstrated their agentive potential by demonstrating how we know they are agentive entities. Agentive potential is

important for recognizing identity construction because identity is a social action agency can accomplish.

Once Cam and Nick's agentic potential was established, I presented three interactional examples to investigate *how* and some likely reasons *why* Cam and Nick co-constructed particular relational identities. To do this, I demonstrated that identities were accomplished within the confines of the social and interactional structures, through fine-grained interactional practices, the social processes they indexed, and the intersubjective relations that emerged as a result. Since this analysis is grounded in local interactional contexts, analysis of these few examples cannot tell us much about Cam and Nick's overall relationship as twins. However, this discussion demonstrates that Nick and Cam have a variety of interactional tools at their disposal to create their identities in relation to one another in different interactional contexts. Finally, this investigation contributes to the small, yet growing body of research on autism and identity construction by providing a new perspective on Cam and Nick's ability to draw on intersubjective relationships to accomplish social goals with regard to identity.

Chapter 3: Cam initiating interaction

“Hello! My name is Inigo Montoya! You killed my father! Prepare to die!”

-Inigo Montoya, *The Princess Bride*

Using the method of Conversation Analysis, I demonstrate below that Cam is able to perform a wide-range of actions and participate actively in conversation with others. For this analysis, I specifically demonstrate that Cam has access to a wide-range of practices for initiating interaction.

This investigation was primarily inspired by some initial observations I made about Cam’s practices for initiating interaction—particularly in the selection I analyze in the main body of this chapter. Another motivation for developing this chapter was an aspect of the social communication and interaction criteria for diagnosing autism in the DSM-V: “failure to initiate or respond to social interaction” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Thus, between my initial observations, and this criterion, I chose to look at Cam’s interactional practices with regard to initiating interaction. The first step in understanding Cam’s practices for initiating interaction is to answer the question of whether Cam can initiate interaction. He can. The following examples (Examples A & B) illustrate this.

Initiating interaction

Social interaction is reciprocal action that is defined by and demands active involvement of two or more parties. In the first example (Example A), Cam performs a prototypical request

for information first pair-part, initiating a question-answer adjacency pair, and making response conditionally relevant.¹³ In line 4, I respond.

Example A: Request for information

```
((Cam eating breakfast))
1   Cam:  ((food in mouth; gaze to Ali)) how ^come you're alw'ys(hh) <wearing that
2         hat.>
3         (0.2)
4   Ali:  .hhhh (.) hhh that's a great question (0.2) u::m .hh (.) well
5         (1.0) ((Cam chewing))
6   Ali:  I'm not used ta waking up so early? ☺ (hh)heh...
```

Example B, taken from a different interaction, shows Cam's ability to initiate interaction using another practice—a type-2 knowable (in bold, see Pomerantz, 1980 for definition).

Example B: B-Event statement

```
((previously reading e-reader aloud and performing The Pied Piper of Hamelin))
1         (4.2)
2   Cam:  I know yeh like A:lice in Wonderla:nd.
3         (.)
4   Ali:  I ^do: like Alice 'n Wonderla:nd
5         (0.4)
6   Ali:  .hhhhh
7         (0.6)
8   Ali:  °hhhhm°
9         (.)
10  Cam:  hhhhh.=
11  Ali:  =why d'you bring ^tha:d'up.=
12  Cam:  =hhhhhm.
13        (0.8)
14  Cam:  ^one a' the movies I saw last yea:r, Epic
15        (0.8)
16  Ali:  yea:h
17        (0.6)
18  Ali:  I didn' see it=
19  Cam:  =(I) ^think it was a loo:se ad'ptation of A:lice in Wonderla:nd
```

¹³ A 'how come' format can also introduce a complaint (Maynard, 1989).

This time, Cam initiates interaction by producing a type-2 knowable B-event statement (see Pomerantz, 1980 and Labov & Fanshel, 1977, respectively). Briefly, type-2 knowables assert information known to speakers through limited knowledge, and are usually marked by evidential verbs like *know* or *think*, while B-Event statements assert knowledge known to the recipient, but not the speaker, and communicate requests for information (Pomerantz, 1980; Labov & Fanshel, 1977). This type of statement can be and is often used to initiate a sequence (Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Heritage, 2012).

In these two examples, Cam demonstrates his ability to launch sequences in two different ways. I turn now to a discussion of how he designs turns to launch sequences by looking at an interaction primarily dedicated to initiating interaction.

Designing turns to mobilize response

The question I address in this section is: What are some resources Cam has in his repertoire of interactional practices to initiate interaction? Part of the answer to this question is evident in the examples above. So far, we know that Cam is able to initiate interaction by performing requests for information using interrogative and declarative syntax. In the following discussion, we will see evidence that Cam can access a wide-range of other practices for initiating interaction. Thus, in order to gain a better understanding of Cam's repertoire of practices for initiating interaction, I now turn to an interaction, chosen due to its abundance of response mobilizing practices, in spite of its complex composition in terms of atypical sequence organization and underlying social ideologies.

As I mentioned earlier, social interaction requires active participation of two or more parties to progress. So, although producing a turn in sequentially initial position (i.e. a first pair-

part) is likely to mobilize response, producing the turn does not establish the interaction. Rather, it is response (i.e. a second pair-part) that establishes an interaction. Thus, speakers must actively design turns to mobilize response to initiate interaction. For the remainder of this discussion, I turn to how Cam designs his turns using various paralinguistic and linguistic practices to mobilize response. Due to the unusual composition of this interaction, although Cam's turns are designed to mobilize response, they do not end up mobilizing response (for reasons that become clear in the transcription). Thus, I focus on the ways in which Cam designs his turns to mobilize response based on research in the field of conversation analysis on turn-design and mobilizing response. By the end of this discussion, it will be clear that Cam has a wide-range of practices in his repertoire, with which he can design turns to mobilize response in order to initiate interaction.

Before moving on to the analysis, it is important to briefly explain why this interaction is complex. First, throughout this interaction it is clear that Cam selects me as his recipient, primarily through eye-gaze, among other features. Thus, the principal reason this interaction has an unusual sequence organization is because an unaddressed participant (Cam's PCA) produces the majority of "responses" to Cam's turns' talk. It appears that Cam's PCA responds to his turns in an effort to "coach" Cam through the interaction. This means that throughout the interaction, the PCA monitors and assesses Cam's turns for whether they are sufficient to initiate response. When the PCA determines the turn to be insufficient, he prompts Cam to try again. But if the PCA judges the turn to be sufficient, he permits the interaction to progress. Even though this is an unusual interaction to analyze, Cam works to initiate interaction five times, during five *different* turns. Since each of these turns displays features often employed to mobilize response,

this interaction concisely reveals a great deal of evidence regarding Cam’s interactional practices for initiating interaction.¹⁴

For this discussion, I will go through and analyze each turn Cam produces to initiate interaction in succession. I will begin by discussing the response mobilizing features in the first, non-prompted, turn Cam produces, then move on to the other three turns, which Cam performs after being prompted by the PCA. Then, I will conclude this discussion with analysis of the response mobilizing features in the fifth (and other non-prompted) turn, which occurs after the PCA leaves.

In the first and fifth turns, Cam uses a voice style I call *voiceover narration*, which appears to act, in part, as a (albeit less canonical) response-mobilizing feature, as well. Since Cam uses this voice style in both non-prompted turns, I will also bring the first turn (lines 1-8) back into the discussion at this point. So, this discussion, as a whole, is split into two greater sections based on the canonicity of the features being analyzed: more canonical, then less canonical (i.e. *voiceover narration*). Overall, I will demonstrate that Cam is able to design his turns to mobilize response using both canonical practices, as well as less canonical practices. Finally, I will also demonstrate Cam’s ability to actually mobilize response.

In this interaction, the PCA is supervising Cam sweeping the front porch, while I am holding the camera/recording. In line 1, Cam performs the first response-mobilizing feature I will discuss, eye-gaze (Stivers and Rossano 2010), and then proceeds to produce a turn in sequentially initial position—the second response-mobilizing feature I discuss. Although the video begins only seconds before Cam produces this turn (meaning we do not know whether

¹⁴ Not to mention that, with regard to all of the ways in which Cam’s turns *could have* initiated interaction, it appears that the PCA’s motivation for “coaching” is rooted in specific, prescriptive ideologies about how speakers initiate interaction. For if the PCA had treated Cam’s turns as designed to mobilize response, Cam would not have needed to produce four turns before the interaction was “allowed” to progress.

there was a previous sequence, or how a previous sequence may have ended) the lack of talk between the start of the video and Cam’s glance, and then also during the pause between Cam’s glance and the start of his turn, are sufficient to support the notion that this turn is sequentially initial (i.e. a first-pair part).

Segment 1: Initial (non-prompted) turn

1 Cam: ((twist + glance at Ali, no change in body position; returns to sweeping))
 2 (3.0)
 3 Cam: ()
 4 (0.3)
 5 Cam: ((voiceover narration)) *teh p(h)la:y, the ro:le, of <Ha:ns Christan
 6 Andersen.>
 7 (0.3)
 8 Cam: <Disney, de:ci:ded [Ben Whi°shaw° of Sk- Skyfall*]>
 9 PCA: [hey Cam why don’t you involve (.) us in (that)
 10 conversation,

Recall that for now analysis of this segment will focus on the canonical features—practices traditionally employed to mobilize response—with which Cam designs his turn, with the plan to return to the *voiceover narration* voice style later in the discussion.

I begin this discussion with the feature of sequence organization—sequence-initial turn—then I proceed to discuss Cam’s use of eye-gaze. First, Cam deploys this turn in a sequentially initial position (lines 1-8)—a practice that, according to Stivers (2013), typically invites response from an addressee. Thus, simply performing actions in first position “push for response” from recipients (Stivers, 2013: 207). So, although Cam’s turn is not a prototypical variety first pair-part, it nevertheless “*invite[s]* response by virtue of [its] sequentially initial positioning” (Stivers, 2013: 206). However, since Cam’s turn is not a prototypical first pair-part, it does not make response conditionally relevant. Thus, Cam’s turn is less likely to mobilize response by default.

Next, Stivers & Rossano (2010) explain that actions in sequentially initial position that do not make response conditionally relevant “place increasingly more pressure” on recipients to respond when they incorporate response mobilizing features—especially eye-gaze. Eye-gaze is one of the most effective practices for mobilizing response, especially in multiparty interaction, because it selects an intended recipient. Cam employs eye-gaze by glancing at me before beginning his turn’s talk, which indicates that I am the designed recipient of his turn. Employing this feature in his turn design should thus increase the likelihood of response from me, showing that Cam has done some work to initiate interaction.

By designing his turn using eye-contact, Cam demonstrates that he can use eye-contact for paralinguistic pragmatic functions. This action, therefore, demonstrates that Cam has access to eye-contact as a practice in his repertoire to accomplish social goals. Cam’s gaze behavior is in-line with recent research on autism and eye-gaze in social interaction, which demonstrates that, like non-autistic speakers, autistic speakers use gaze to mobilize response, by selecting recipients and initiating action (for autism see Robins, Dickerson, Stribling & Dautenhahn, 2004; Dickerson, Rae, Stribling, Dautenhahn, & Werry, 2005; Korkiakangas & Rae, 2014; for general discussion see Goodwin, 1979; Heath, 1984; Lerner, 2003).

There are a few issues with Cam’s use of eye-gaze in this turn that I must address. First, Goodwin (1980; 1981) states that “a speaker should *obtain the gaze of [their] recipient* during the course of a turn-at-talk” (275; 57, emphasis added). So, in order to select a recipient using eye-gaze a speaker should make eye contact with the intended recipient. Unfortunately, it is not possible to know whether we make eye contact, because I am behind the camera, meaning my gaze orientation is not visible. However, it is possible that this short glance (<1 second) indicates that Cam obtained my gaze quickly, thus quickly displaying reciprocity (and initiating action).

Since Cam is involved in a competing activity, once this action is accomplished, he is able to re-orient his gaze to sweeping. In other words, if Cam had not met my gaze, he would have likely maintained his gaze until his intended action of selecting a recipient was accomplished. So, Cam appears to withdraw his gaze after we make eye contact because (a) he is involved in a competing activity, and (b) briefly obtaining my gaze is sufficient to alert me of intended reciprocity.

Next, the time it takes for Cam to begin the verbal portion of his turn calls into question whether Cam's glance was designed to mobilize response or instead to perform a regulatory function. Thus, because the verbal portion of Cam's turn was so far displaced from his gaze, there is a possibility that Cam's glance is regulatory (Rossano, 2013). For example, monitoring being recorded is one regulatory function Cam's gaze could have accomplished. However, Cam does not do any work to glance at the camera (he only glances at me), which makes it less likely that his glance performs that regulatory function. Furthermore, the delay between his glance and the verbal portion of his turn can be justified by the fact that he is engaged in a competing activity.

By deploying eye-gaze seemingly as a response-mobilizing feature to launch a turn that does not make response conditionally relevant, Cam is able to increase the likelihood of mobilizing a response while engaging in a competing activity. Since Cam is performing a competing task during the verbal part of his turn, it is resourceful on his part to obtain recipient gaze *beforehand*, so that he does not need to attend to selecting a recipient while also sweeping, and speaking later on. Therefore, during the verbal part of his turn (while he is multi-tasking), Cam does not have to wonder whether his intended recipient is receiving his turn's talk. So, in this case pre-verbal eye-gaze allows Cam to verify that his recipient (me) is aware of coming

action, which increases the chances that I will be attentive to his projected turn's talk. Thus, Cam's turn in a sequence-initial position, combined with a use of eye-gaze, provides arguably sufficient evidence that Cam designs his turn to mobilize response and initiate interaction.

In the next segment, Cam produces three turns (also in bold) that appear to be designed to mobilize response. Note that with each new turn of interest, Cam modifies aspects of his turn's design. In the discussion below, I explore a variety of interactional resources Cam employs during these turns, and demonstrate how each practice contributes to our understanding of Cam's wide-range of interactional practices for initiating interaction. Although it is outside of the scope of this investigation to go into detail on how these response mobilizing features work together, it is important to keep this in mind throughout this analysis, especially since Stivers & Rossano (2010) suggest that turns with more response mobilizing features are more likely to mobilize response.

Segment 2: Prompted turns (turns 2-4)

9 PCA: [hey Cam why don't you involve (.) us in (that)
 10 conversation,
 11 Cam: ()
 12 PCA: CA:m?
 13 (1.5) ((Cam sweeping))
 14 Cam: **hey ((gaze, body to Ali)) (0.2) if there was a Fro:zen sequel,**
 15 **(.)**
 16 Cam: **I [would see Ha:ns Christan Andersen >played by Ben Whisha:w.<**
 17 PCA: [No- Ca:m. Cam CAMeron.
 18 (1.6) ((Cam gaze on Ali))
 19 Cam: ((orients gaze and body to Brandon)) >what.
 20 PCA: A::? (0.2) is Hans Christian Andersen (.) in, Frozen,
 21 (0.2)
 22 Cam: ((looks down)) no:,
 23 (0.2)
 24 PCA: n[o.
 25 Cam: [he crea:ted it.
 26 PCA: yea::h, (0.2) but that's [different.
 27 Cam: [(it's) the town's [°stor-°

28 PCA: [Bee::
29 (0.2)
30 PCA: CAm.
31 (0.8)
32 PCA: s::[pouting facts is not a conversation=how do we start a co:nversation.=
33 Cam: [(with Ben) (Wishaw) ((gaze down))
34 Cam: ((gaze at broom handle)) =SO U::H (0.4) >do'ya know what-<
36 (0.5)
37 Cam: ((glance to Ali/0.5))
38 PCA: who are you talking to,=
39 Cam: =A:li.
40 (0.3)
41 PCA: mhm
42 (0.2)
43 Cam: I have
44 (1.0)
45 Cam: this year's thee fiftieth anniversary 'a Mary Poppins an' My Fair Lady.,
46 ((orients gaze to Ali))
47 (0.2)
48 PCA: kay, (.) that['s still kind of a fact (.) how do you invo:lve her in a:
49 conver[sation,
50 Ali: [hh.^ (he-)
51 Cam: [ya like those movies? ((gaze to ground; returns to sweeping))
52 PCA: that's a good start.
53 (.)
54 Ali: .hhh I do: like those movies, (.) ya know- (.) <I just watched My Fair
55 Lady.> thee other week for the fir:st ti:me,

In order to discuss some of these tools and practices, I will proceed line-by-line through the interaction, beginning with Cam's first turn of the segment (lines 14-18), and concluding with his third turn (line 51). For each turn of interest, I present a couple of features with which Cam designs his turns to engage a recipient in an interaction. These features are characterized as response mobilizers either by turn design or by sequence organization.

The first prompted turn (lines 14-18) follows the PCA's prompt to 'involve us in that conversation'.¹⁵

First prompted turn: Summons and conditional statement

9 PCA: [hey Cam why don't you involve (.) us in (that)
 10 conversation,
 11 Cam: ()
 12 PCA: CA:m?
 13 (1.5) ((Cam sweeping))
 14 Cam: **hey** ((gaze, body to Ali)) (0.2) if there was a **Fro:zen sequel**,
 15 (.)
 16 Cam: **I [would see Ha:ns Christan Andersen >played by Ben Whisha:w.<**
 17 PCA: [No- Ca:m. Cam CAMeron.
 18 (1.6) ((Cam holds gaze on Ali))
 19 Cam: ((orients gaze and body to Brandon)) >what.

In designing this turn, Cam adjusts many aspects of his initial turn's design. Here I highlight two types of adjustments in order to discuss the response mobilizing features of this turn: one *added* feature, and one *augmented*. First, Cam *adds* a summons preface to his turn—'hey'—which, based on the ensuing pause, appears to constitute a first pair-part of a summons-answer sequence. Thus, the pause gives the recipient an opportunity to provide an answer (i.e. 'what?' or 'hey' or 'yeah?'). Since summons-answer pre-sequences are canonically associated with the act of opening a conversation (e.g., on the telephone), this strategy appears to be designed to mobilize response (Schegloff, 2007). Although neither participant responds verbally, since Cam orients his gaze and posture toward me during this pause, it is possible that Cam treated mutual eye contact between us as an answer (I am still behind the camera so my gaze orientation is unknown). After the short pause, Cam continues with the "business of the sequence" (Stivers, 2013: 194), marking 'hey' as a projection of coming "news" [initiates

¹⁵ Indicating the PCA did not recognize Cam's eye-gaze as an action to select me as a recipient.

action], and (re)calling the hearer to the interaction [engages recipient] (Schegloff, 2007). We will see that this pre-sequence does, in fact, serve to announce upcoming “news.”

Second, Cam *augments* his use of eye-gaze by increasing its duration, and incorporating other paralinguistic behavior—a posture shift—into this turn. While Cam’s glance was short in the preceding turn, in this turn Cam fixes his gaze on me through the majority of his turn, and through the following 1.6 second delay (line 18). According to Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps (2005), speakers often withdraw their gaze during their turn to reduce the cognitive load brought on by speaking. Thus, it is possible that Cam purposefully maintains his gaze orientation through the majority of his turn to secure my attention and make it apparent to all participants that he is selecting me as the recipient, in spite of the high cognitive load.¹⁶ In addition to increased gaze duration, Cam also augments his eye-gaze practice by shifting his posture so that his torso is facing me as well. According to Heath (1984), combining gaze and shifting posture toward a particular participant can be used to select recipients by breaking “the environment of continuous opportunity, and [declaring] an interest in having some particular action occur in immediate juxtaposition with the display” (253). Body movement, thus, allows a speaker in first position to begin or continue a conversation by selecting and eliciting speech from the selected recipient (Rossano, 2013). This posture shift supports the notion that Cam increases eye-gaze duration in an effort to make the goals of his paralinguistic practices more evident for both the addressed and the unaddressed participants. Also, recall that Stivers (2013) suggests that increasing the response mobilizing features in a turn increases the pressure for response when the turn does not make response conditionally relevant. Since this statement is not a canonical first pair-part, it is

¹⁶ Cam only averts his gaze during his turn at the point of highest apparent cognitive load—when the PCA speaks at the same time as Cam—‘Cam, CAMeron’—with high intensity, while Cam is performing a ‘rush-through’. It is also possible that Cam averts his gaze for other reasons, but discussing these possibilities is outside of the scope of this investigation.

possible that by augmenting eye-gaze, Cam designs his turn to increase the likelihood that I will respond.

There is one additional feature present in this turn that is important for representing Cam's repertoire of practices for initiating interaction. In this turn, Cam produces a subjunctive conditional statement—'if there were..., I would see...'—as the "news" he projected in his summons-answer pre-sequence (Heritage, 2012). Since this "news" is counterfactual and exists in Cam's territory of knowledge—it is an idea of his—Cam occupies the K+ (more knowledgeable) epistemic status, while I occupy a K – (less knowledgeable) epistemic status (Heritage, 2012). By deploying a subjunctive conditional statement, Cam provides me with information that raises me to his territory of knowledge. Heritage (2012) proposes that making an assertion in K+ position can act as "the basis for initiating or expanding a sequence" (49). Heritage's proposal, along with the fact that Cam prefaces his assertion with a pre-sequence suggests that Cam presents new information in an effort to launch an interaction and mobilize response.

Cam produces a turn designed to mobilize response by *adding* a pre-sequence first pair-part (summons), *augmenting* his eye-gaze practice by increasing its duration and adding a posture shift. Cam also produces a subjunctive conditional statement to introduce new information, or "news" apparently in an effort to initiate interaction. Next, Cam's second prompted turn reveals two additional features in Cam's repertoire of practices for mobilizing response.

After the PCA prompts Cam for a second time in line 32, this time to 'start a conversation', Cam launches another pre-sequence, prefaced with the discourse marker, 'so' (line 34). After Cam completes the first-pair part of his pre-announcement, he also employs eye-

gaze, seemingly in an effort to select a recipient after a delay and lack of response. In the following discussion, I will demonstrate that (1) the ‘so’-preface is designed to mobilize attention and project topic-shift, before launching a new course of action via (2) a pre-sequence—pre-announcement—designed to alert a recipient of intent to engage in interaction, after which (3) Cam employs eye-gaze to re-select me as a recipient. I will also provide a couple of potential explanations for why neither participant responds efficiently to Cam’s pre-announcement as a first-pair part.

Second prompted turn: ‘So’-prefaced Pre-telling

20 PCA: A::? (0.2) is Hans Christian Andersen sen (.) in, Frozen,
 21 (0.2)
 22 Cam: ((looks down)) no: ,
 23 (0.2)
 24 PCA: n[o.
 25 Cam: [he crea:ted it.
 26 PCA: yea::h, (0.2) but that’s [different.
 27 Cam: [(it’s) the town’s [°stor-°
 28 PCA: [Bee::
 29 (0.2)
 30 PCA: CAm.
 31 (0.8)
 32 PCA: s::[pouting facts is not a conversation=how do we start a co:nversation.=
 33 Cam: [(with Ben) (Wishaw) ((gaze down))
 34 Cam: **((gaze at broom handle)) =SO U::H (0.4) >do’ya know what-<**
 36 (0.7)
 37 Cam: **((glance to Ali/0.3))**
 38 PCA: who are you talking to,=
 39 Cam: =A:li.
 40 (0.3)
 41 PCA: mhm

‘So’-prefaces carry different functions depending on context. Knowing that the content of Cam’s former turn was rejected (see lines 20-26), we can infer that Cam’s use of ‘so’ as a preface in this turn functions to launch a new course of action—introducing a new conversational

topic (Bolden, 2006). Bolden (2006) also demonstrates that, “overwhelmingly” ‘so’ as a discourse marker “prefaces sequences that accomplish other-attentive courses of action” (664). This idea applies to Cam’s pre-announcement, though not in the same way Bolden (2006) describes in her study. In Bolden’s (2006) investigation of ‘so’ as a preface to first position turns, she explains that the wide range of actions launched by ‘so’-prefaces (i.e. congratulations, introducing new topics, making arrangements, etc.) are “concerned with the addressee and events in the addressee’s life rather than with the person who launches the sequence” (668). For this analysis, it is only important to demonstrate that Cam’s ‘so’-preface launches an action that is concerned with the addressee, in the sense that it “[displays] involvement with the addressee,” as this is helpful for engaging another participant in interaction (Bolden, 2006: 664). Since ‘so’ prefates Cam’s pre-announcement, which verbally selects the addressee as his recipient, this is an action that is concerned with the addressee. Thus, Cam’s use of ‘so’ allows him to project “involvement with the addressee” at the beginning of his turn (Bolden, 2006: 664). Thus, prefacing a pre-announcement with ‘so’ should be considered a practice in Cam’s repertoire of practices for mobilizing response as it appears to project (a) the introduction of a new conversational topic, and (b) involvement with the addressee.

In this turn, Cam also projects the introduction of a new conversational topic and involvement with the addressee by performing a pre-announcement. I argue that a lack of response to Cam’s first pair-part does not imply Cam’s first-pair part was not designed to mobilize response, and engage an addressee in interaction. To the contrary, I will first demonstrate that this first-pair part as a pre-announcement is designed to mobilize response based on its sequential location, and explain how pre-announcements as pre-expansions mobilize

attention and project future action. I will also demonstrate that Cam's use of the second person pronoun increases the likelihood of response by overtly addressing the recipient.

First, pre-sequences actively mobilize attention participants (Schegloff, 2007). Next, pre-sequences are, in and of themselves, designed to be a preparation for a forthcoming "but as-yet-unspecified, project" (Schegloff, 2007: 49). Heritage (2012) also demonstrates that pre-announcements often project upcoming "news," which the recipient is understood by the speaker to not know yet.

Next, in Cam's pre-announcement, he produces a question which overtly recruits a recipient by using the second person pronoun, 'ya'. As I explained above, this overt reference indicates Cam's intention to engage another participant by "displaying involvement with the addressee" (Bolden, 2006: 664).

Since this turn is designed to mobilize response, it raises the question as to why neither participant responds. One possible reason is because 'what' is cut-off indicated by a word-final glottal stop (Clayman, 2013). By cutting-off 'what', participants might perceive Cam's turn as unfinished, since cut-off speech can signal the intent to continue speaking—or pre-empt the next turn—especially at a transition-relevance place (Clayman, 2013; Schegloff, 2007). If this was Cam's intention, a lack of response would allow Cam to finish his turn without interruption (for example, 'do ya know what- *movies I got?*'). Since Cam did not add any more and proceeds to glance up, selecting a recipient, it appears that he had either finished his turn, or that he chose to abandon the remainder of his turn. Thus, after 0.7 seconds of delay, Cam glances up at me, selecting me as his recipient. This raises the question of why Cam did not make eye contact sooner, such as during his pre-announcement. One possibility is that he assumed I knew that I was his intended recipient, since he had previously selected me twice. What is more important,

however, than his failure to select me *during* his pre-announcement, is that he acted to select a recipient *after* a lack of response. Thus, Cam appears to have employed eye-gaze to pursue a response from me. This notion is supported by the fact that Cam responds to Brandon's inquiry about who he is talking to by verbally selecting me as his intended recipient (line 38).

This turn demonstrates Cam's use of two new practices: 'so'-prefacing and pre-announcement to display involvement with the addressee, and project future action. It also demonstrates that Cam is able to attend to the (non)progression of an interaction due to lack of reciprocity by using eye-gaze to mobilize response.

Up until this point, we have seen Cam employ a variety of different practices for initiating interaction, including two types of pre-sequences, paralinguistic behavior, making an assertion from a K+ position, and prefacing with 'so'. At this point, Cam appears to have initiated an interaction (marked by the PCA's affirmation in line 42). This step forward in the interaction makes Cam's most likely goal for his next turn to progress the sequence further. Post-pre-announcement, this is often accomplished by producing the projected forthcoming "news," which he does in lines 45-46 (Schegloff, 2007; Heritage, 2012). And although Cam has secured a response and received a "go-ahead" from the PCA (line 41), once Cam produces his announcement (lines 43-46), the PCA rejects his turn and proceeds to repeat his prompt to 'involve [me] in a conversation' (line 50-1).

Third prompted turn: Y/N interrogative

38 PCA: who are you talking to,=
39 Cam: =A:li.
40 (0.3)
41 PCA: mhm
42 (0.2)
43 Cam: I have
44 (1.0)
45 Cam: this year's the fiftieth anniversary 'a Mary Poppins an' My Fair Lady:,

46 ((orients gaze to Ali))
 47 (0.2)
 48 PCA: kay, (.) that['s still kind of a fact (.) how do you invo:lve her in a:
 49 conver[sation,
 50 Ali: [hh.^ (he-)
 51 Cam: **[ya like those movies? ((gaze to ground; returns to sweeping))**
 52 PCA: that's a good start.
 53 (.)
 54 Ali: .hhh I do: like those movies, (.) ya know- (.) <I just watched My Fair
 55 Lady.> thee other week for the fir:st ti:me,

For this analysis, the most important aspect of this third prompted turn is that it is a request for information in the form of an interrogative—a canonical first pair-part yes/no question. Thus, we see another example (recall Ex. A) which demonstrates Cam's ability to ask questions that make response conditionally relevant as a part of his repertoire of interactional practices for mobilizing response and initiating interaction.

Knowing that requests for information (a) display involvement and overt interest in the addressee, and (b) make response conditionally relevant, along with the knowledge that (c) none of Cam's other attempts at initiating a conversation were requests for information, it is possible that the PCA had been (circuitously) prompting Cam to perform a prototypical request for information all along. This notion is supported by the PCA's response, endorsing this turn as sufficient to 'involve' me in the conversation.

One notable trend in the interaction above is that the majority of Cam's attempts above do not make response conditionally relevant. In other words, they are not the prototypical first pair-parts of adjacency pairs (i.e. question-answer, offer-acceptance, greeting-greeting, etc.). I would like to propose a hypothesis that not making response conditionally relevant gives the other participant(s) the ultimate choice of whether they want to engage, suggesting that not making a response conditionally relevant could also be a less traditional way of attending to

preference in a conversation. In other words, by not performing a canonical first-pair part that makes response conditionally relevant, Cam does not impose a topic on another; rather Cam makes space for someone to join if they want. Cam is a cinephile, which means he likes to talk about the film and theatre industry—his particular interests. Thus, Cam may be attending to not imposing a topic on others as a way of demonstrating awareness that participants may or may not share interest in the film industry. If Cam understands that people do not share his interests to the same degree, by not making a response conditionally relevant (i.e. by not asking requests for information), he gives participants the opportunity to choose whether to enter the interaction on their own terms. By doing this, he increases the likelihood that a participant who chooses to engage will sustain the topic of conversation.¹⁷

Above I discussed many practices, both linguistic and non-verbal, which Cam employs in turns designed to mobilize response and initiate interaction. In the following discussion, I turn to a more complex and marked practice that Cam uses, which appears designed in part to mobilize response. This practice entails performing a language variety that I have called *voiceover narration*. *Voiceover narration* has distinct voice quality, prosody, and syntactic constructions, and resembles the language style voice actors used to produce in movie trailers (e.g., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TbQm5doF_Uc).

Voiceover narrators have been frequently incorporated into film trailers “due to the extremely short span of time in which film trailers are supposed to simultaneously persuade, entertain and inform” (Maier, 2009: 161). Thus, voiceover narration in film is a rhetorical device used to capture an audience’s attention and convince them to act—convince them to respond by

¹⁷ Though I do not have space in this discussion to go into depth, I want to mention that Cam demonstrates his ToM based on how each turn changes. Thus, it is evident that Cam is able to attend to the fact that the PCA has his own perspective and belief of what constitutes a sufficient sequence launching turn. This is evidenced by the fact that Cam designs each prompted turn differently.

seeing the movie. Since *voiceover narration* plays a role in film studies, I believe it will be useful to incorporate this research on the voiceover narration in film trailers to this investigation, in order to facilitate our understanding of *voiceover narration* as an interactional practice. Thus, by interweaving film studies with conversation analysis in the immediate context, we can gain an understanding of how *voiceover narration* is a structured, functional, and resourceful device for interaction. First, I demonstrate that Cam's use of voiceover narration (in these cases) is not the result of re-enacting a movie trailer. Then, I analyze the response mobilizing features of voiceover narration as a novel social language variety and discuss how it might be designed to initiate interaction. I provide an analysis with an underlying belief that these turns, as they are designed, and as we can see, do serve to mobilize a response from me.

First, recall that the Initial turn occurs at the beginning of the recording, while Cam is sweeping outside, and the PCA is monitoring the activities.

Initial Turn: Non-prompted voiceover narration #1

```

1   Cam:   ((twist + glance at Ali, no change in body position; returns to sweeping))
2           (3.0)
3   Cam:   ( )
4           (0.3)
5   Cam:   ((voiceover narration)) *teh p(h)la:y, the ro:le, of <Ha:ns Christan
6           Andersen.>
7           (0.3)
8   Cam:   <Disney, de:ci:ded [Ben Whi°shaw° of Sk- Skyfall*>
9   PCA:           [hey Cam why don't you involve (.) us in (that)
10          conversation,
```

Then, Cam produces the other *voiceover narration* turn (see the Final Turn, below) after Brandon goes inside, leaving Cam and me as the only potential participants.

Notice that each turn is communicating the same general idea—Ben Whishaw being cast as Hans Christian Andersen. In the Final Turn below, I respond in line 134, which reveals that

Cam's turn's talk, performed in *voiceover narration*, can mobilize response and initiate interaction. Furthermore, it demonstrates that I draw on information that Cam provides in his second turn (i.e. first prompted turn (lines 14-16)—‘if there was a Frozen sequel...’), in that I do not understand his assertions, like ‘Ben Whishaw will be cast...’, as facts, but rather as a hypothetical assertion.

Final turn: voiceover narration #2

124 Cam: ((voiceover narration)) *fer the sequel ta Frozen.*

125 (0.6)

126 Ali: .hhh=

127 Cam: =*-zen*

128 (0.6)

129 Ali: [hey

130 Cam: [*Ben Whisha:w will be cast as Hans Christian Andersen.*

131 (0.6)

132 Cam: *the dan- (.) the famous (English) storyteller.*

133 (0.3)

134 Ali: *why would you want Hans Christian Andersen ta be- (.) cas::t in tha

135 movie. [when he ma:de it=

136 Cam: [neh neh

137 Cam: =Ben Whishaw,

Some might believe (as the PCA appears to believe) that Cam's uses of *voiceover narration* are echolalic expressions, and therefore, re-enactments of *voiceover narration* he has memorized from watching movie trailers. Before discussing why these do not appear to be echolalia, and not re-enactments, let us briefly go through the basic phonological and syntactic qualities of *voiceover narration*. Prosodically, Cam's *voiceover narration* appears to be characterized by low pitch, slow pace, and particular stress patterns.¹⁸ Next, one basic syntactic feature of *voiceover narration* is that it is produced in declarative assertions, even if the turn is asserting hypothetical ideas, as is the case in these examples. Thus, Cam violates Grice's Maxim

¹⁸ Low pitch represented by asterisks because when Cam lowers his voice it becomes creaky.

of Quality by conveying information that is neither factual nor supported by evidence in a factual manner (Grice, 1991). Some may suggest that this action supports the notion that Cam does not understand that telling the truth is important, because he is autistic (e.g., Surian, 1996). However, based on the information here, it is not possible to know what Cam might do by violating this Maxim. It is possible, and I argue likely, that he is violating it to accomplish a particular social goal, yet it is also possible that he is simply performing his turn this way because of syntactic rules that constrain *voiceover narration*.

I will address three aspects of this language variety as it is performed both in Cam's speech and in actual movie trailers to discuss how it acts as a practice to mobilize response.¹⁹ Specifically, *voiceover narration* works to mobilize the attention of a hearer—the first step in mobilizing response.²⁰ First, I consider how the practice of codeswitching into *voiceover narration* acts to mobilize attention, especially with regard to the markedness of prosodic features. Second, I investigate the rhetorical function of *voiceover narration* with regard to epistemic domains and Cam's agenda.

First, speakers can switch between different language varieties (i.e. languages, dialects, accents, etc.), typically called 'codes', "to signal changes in context" and indicate "clear changes in the participants' definition of each other's rights and obligations" (Nilep, 2006: 17; Blom & Gumperz, 1972: 424). In the previous chapter, we looked at a case in which Nick codeswitches into French to indicate that he is still able to speak French. This action, as I established, allowed Nick and I to share a social space—French speakers. In this case, there are a few possibilities that motivate Cam to switch into *voiceover narration* (another type of code). Thus, Cam

¹⁹ There are other functions of *voiceover narration*, which are outside of the scope of this particular investigation. For example, it is also likely that *voiceover narration* is also a practice for holding the floor.

²⁰ In order to discuss how *voiceover narration* can act to mobilize attention we assume Cam's use of *voiceover narration* is a functional practice intended to do interactional work.

presumably switches codes to accomplish a particular social goal, or set of goals. Furthermore, I propose that two of these goals act to both launch a telling, and mobilize my attention to initiate interaction. Since I am the designed recipient in both turns, and Cam had been successful at initiating interaction with me earlier that day using *voiceover narration*, there is precedent for initiating interaction using *voiceover narration* with me. Thus, Cam launches a telling by codeswitching, which marks a clear change in my obligations as the recipient. Furthermore, *voiceover narration* is a familiar, yet marked style of speech most frequently performed by voice over actors to capture an audience's attention for entertainment purposes. Thus, Cam appears to employ *voiceover narration* to mark a change in context in an effort to mobilize my attention as the recipient.

Second, in movie trailers, *voiceover narration* provides “a fundamental source of influence on the viewers’ point of view” (Maier, 2009: 167). Thus, *voiceover narration* in movie trailers is a rhetorical device, implemented to shape how the audience perceives the film. In conversation, *voiceover narration* appears to function as a type of storytelling, where storytelling is “built around conveying a stance toward an event” with the hope of shaping the hearer’s point of view to align with that of the teller (Stivers, 2013: 201). As a rhetorical device, I propose that Cam’s use of *voiceover narration* work to mobilize response by engaging to hearer in a telling. Thus, if we presume that Cam’s use of *voiceover narration* performs similar rhetorical functions to *voiceover narration* in a movie trailer, and has a similar effect on recipients as canonical telling sequences, then Cam’s use of *voiceover narration* should also mobilize attention, and response by inciting the recipient to adopt or reject his stance. In the Final Turn, my question (lines 134-135) illustrates the (attempted) rhetorical function of Cam’s telling as he was at least successful inciting this train of thought. Thus, although I do not appear to take an outright stance,

I ask a question leaning toward rejecting his stance. It is evident that I do not fully understand what Cam is proposing. Most importantly, however, I have demonstrated that the rhetorical and narrative functions of *voiceover narration* help to mobilize a recipient's attention by encouraging a recipient to consider and evaluate the information being conveyed.

As we can see, upon analysis *voiceover narration* is more complex than it appears on the surface. Thus, *voiceover narration* looks to be an interactional practice that acts to mobilize attention from recipients, which is one step in mobilizing response. I have also demonstrated that *voiceover narration* is a code with particular syntactic and prosodic qualities, which Cam is able to switch into (and out of) to perform social actions. In particular, I showed that *voiceover narration* can play a role in initiating interaction by mobilizing recipient attention by (a) launching a telling, and (b) engaging a recipient in working to adopt a stance toward the telling. Furthermore, these actions appear to reflect the functions of *voiceover narration* as it is performed in movie trailers. Over the course of this research, Cam told me he learned to perform this language variety from watching old movie trailers. Thus, Cam has learned this language variety from watching movie trailers, and is now able to produce novel utterances in the same style, which contributes to his wide-range of interactional practices for mobilizing response and initiating interaction.

Conclusion

This chapter provides evidence of a wide-range of practices Cam has at his disposal for initiating interaction. Some of these practices are canonical first pair-parts, such as requests for information, while others are less canonical declarative (indirect) questions. Other resources I have described are related sequence organization (specifically pre-sequences), including

summons and pre-announcements. Cam also has access to paralinguistic resources, like eye-gaze and posture shifting, which he employs repeatedly in his turn design. Furthermore, these paralinguistic actions are traditionally used to select recipients and initiate action (Stivers & Rossano, 2010). Cam also introduces new information, which Heritage (2012) proposed can be a practice to initiate action. Finally, Cam's codeswitching into *voiceover narration* also appears to be a stylistic resource with which he designs his only two 'natural' (non-prompted) sequence-initially positioned turns. Thus, *voiceover narration* appears to assist in mobilizing attention of the recipient. Through these examples, I have highlighted many different resources Cam employs in turns designed to initiate response, and thus demonstrate that Cam has the tools to successfully initiate interaction. I have also demonstrated that these tools, when employed are sometimes considered either non-communicative, or insufficient for mobilizing response, however, not due to a failure to implement them in a "traditional" way. In the next chapter I look at how Nick uses discourse markers to demonstrate his attention to the coherence and progressivity of an interaction.

Chapter 4: Nick's use of discourse markers

“Well, that escalated quickly”

-Ron Burgundy, *Anchorman: The Legend of Ron Burgundy*

In the previous section, I investigated Cam's repertoire of 'traditional' and 'less traditional' interactional practices for initiating social interaction, inspired by my initial observations of data, as well as the diagnostic criterion for diagnosing autism: “failure to initiate... social interaction” (APA, 2012).

In this chapter, I take a similar approach to investigate Nick's wide-range of practices for attending to interactional coherence and progressivity to accomplish active participation in successful back-and-forth interaction. There are many ways in which I could go about looking at Nick's attention to the back-and-forth of interaction; I have chosen to analyze a specific set of practices—discourse markers. Similar to the former section, this investigation was also inspired by a combination of some initial observations of Nick's practices in the data, as well as another diagnostic criterion for autism. Thus, I noticed that Nick used a large variety of discourse markers in most interactions, and the DSM-V defines “failure of normal back-and-forth conversation” as another criterion for diagnosing autism (APA, 2012).

The interactional selections below show how Nick uses discourse markers in various contexts to accomplish different pragmatic functions, and provide a glimpse into a wide-range of interactional practices in Nick's repertoire related to discourse markers. Nick's use of discourse

markers, therefore, demonstrates his ability to participate in and attend to the progression of efficient and effective back-and-forth conversation.

There is a “jungle of different approaches” for studying discourse markers (Fischer, 2006: 1). These approaches differ with respect to many aspects, including terminology, functions, problems, and methodology (Fischer, 2006). For this study, my approach is to describe and compare how Nick uses a small selection discourse markers (henceforth DMs) to perform different pragmatic functions using a conversation analytic approach. Specifically I will look at how a DM “[provides] instructions to the addressee” for how to interpret “the utterance to which [it] is attached” (Fraser, 1996). Thus, my goal for this discussion is to provide an analysis of Nick’s use of DMs as they relate to the ensuing interactions.

My approach is somewhat different from the other empirical, quantitatively based studies on the use of DMs by autistic individuals. These recent studies sought to quantify and compare the number of DMs used by autistic individuals and non-autistic individuals (e.g., Heeman, Lunsford, Selfridge, Black, van Santen, 2010; Muñoz, 2014).²¹ Heeman et al. (2010) [40 total participants] concluded that autistic participants produced less DMs, while Muñoz (2014) concluded that there was no statistically significant difference between the number of DMs used by autistic participants and non-autistic participants. Furthermore, Muñoz (2014) posits that from a qualitative perspective autistic participants actually used more DMs. This difference is likely a result of different approaches to defining/selecting discourse markers. For example, Heeman et al. (2010) defined their criteria for what constituted a DM as the first word of an utterance, and

²¹ A case study by Niemi, Otsa, Evtyukova, Lehtoaro & Niemi (2010) investigated general discourse structure of narratives produced by two Asperger’s compared to two individuals without developmental disabilities. They demonstrated that the both conditions produced the same amount of discourse markers, but did not consider this meaningful information, and thus, it did not inform their conclusion that “AS discourse carries features of impaired inter-personal and inter-subjective performance, manifest, for example, in linguistic deixis, atypical power-oriented features and lack of joint activity” (in abstract).

one of eight lexical items they selected *a priori* (see Heeman et al. p. 252 for list), while Muñoz (2014) selected DMs based on their semantic functions in recorded data.

I have taken the same approach as Muñoz (2014) for selecting DMs, as I have selected which ones to study based on their appearance and function in the discourse, rather than defining criteria *a priori*. However, Muñoz (2014) and I perform different types of analyses. Muñoz (2014) investigated *semantic* functions of DMs via quantitative analysis, while I look at Nick's use of DMs in terms of their *pragmatic* functions through a qualitative analysis. In other words, I will show that using DMs is one way in which participants attend to the back-and-forth of social interaction through qualitative analysis of their pragmatic functions. This brief investigation will provide a basis for a fresh approach to studying social abilities by describing naturalistic communicative events. Thus, this analysis provides a basic methodology for studying pragmatic abilities in action.

In the selection of interactions below Nick uses a handful of DMs, including 'well', 'oh', 'so', 'actually', 'basically', 'just', 'like', 'um', 'alright', and 'though' in various sequential and phrasal positions. To focus this investigation, I have elected to analyze the pragmatic functions of three of these DMs: 'well', 'oh' and 'so' in initial positions. Future research on both Nick and Cam's repertoire of discourse markers and various uses is needed, however, if we want to gain a fuller picture of how discourse markers mark their attention to back-and-forth interaction.

'Coherence' & 'progressivity'

In order to achieve successful back-and-forth social interaction, interactional participants must attend to both coherence and progressivity in an interaction.

I define attention to interactional ‘coherence’ as producing turns to shape interaction with ‘consistent and logically related parts’. This definition, although simplistic, is sufficient for this investigation.²² In order for there to be successful back-and-forth interaction, participants must attend to ‘coherence’ because if they do not, interaction would not make logical sense. Discourse markers appear to play a role in ‘coherence’, as I have defined it, in different ways. For example, I will demonstrate that when coherence is lost as a result of phonologically reduced speech (mumbling), the use of DMs pushes the interaction ‘back on track’. Another way I demonstrate that DMs can contribute to coherence is to alert the addressee that an upcoming topic is incipient, but not obviously relevant to the current interaction. Thus, the success of back-and-forth interaction hinges, in part, on having consistent and logically related parts.

Successful back-and-forth interaction also hinges on its ability to progress forward. Thus, while ‘coherence’ marks the relationship between past and current parts of an interaction, ‘progressivity’ marks the relationship between current and future parts of an interaction. So, there are two basic ways in which a participant can attend to ‘progressivity’. (1) A hearer can attend to progressivity by producing a relevant next turn, and (2) A speaker can attend to progressivity by producing a turn that pursues response from a hearer. DMs can also play a role in ‘progressivity’, such as when they act to introduce a new topic. Based on these definitions, I have also loosely defined ‘progressivity’. However, this definition is sufficient for this discussion, as I intend to focus more on the functions of particular DMs. Finally, it is also clear that ‘coherence’ and ‘progressivity’ are interconnected.

²² Many scholars in the field of linguistics have written about discourse coherence delineating particular definitions (e.g., Agar & Hobbs, 1982; Gioria, 1997; Wilson, 1998). However, my approach only requires us to look at coherence through a less technical lens.

DMs in interaction

DMs in turn or utterance-initial position are especially useful for investigating one's manner of attending to the back-and-forth of social interaction. This is because in turn or utterance-initial position, DMs, such as 'well', 'oh', and 'so', function to create a relationship between a previous turn, utterance or event, and the current turn's talk. Thus, the very nature of their position demonstrates attention to progressivity and the coherence of a particular interaction.

Three interactional segments will organize the following analysis. The first looks at Nick's use of an 'oh'-preface in response to a request for clarification, and his subsequent use of 'so (anyway)' to close one line-of-action and open another. Next, the second segment looks at Nick's use of 'oh' in response to inquiry, and 'well' to hedge a dispreferred response (and also possibly to indicate non-straightforwardness). Finally, the third segment looks at Nick's use of 'well' to introduce a new sequence and topic, and a request for information prefaced by 'so'. Through these examples, I provide a glimpse into Nick's rich repertoire of DM practices, by showing that Nick is able to use (a) different DMs in the same position for different pragmatic functions, and (b) the same DMs in the same position for different functions.

Change-of-state & change of topic

In the following interaction, Nick and I are sitting in his room. We had been talking about different plans for trips that Nick and Cam would go on that summer with their class. In line 1, I ask if going swimming ['that'] was Nick and Cam's idea for a field trip. Throughout this interaction, Nick has his headphones in his ears, and is effectively splitting his attention between

our conversation and looking at his iPod, which has an effect on the progressivity and coherence of the interaction.

Example 1: 'oh' and 'so'

1 Ali: was thad-eh hh. yer and Cameron's ide:a? hh.
(0.5)
2 Nick: tha'was- me an' °Cameron's idea.°
4 (0.6)
5 Ali: ni[ce
6 Nick: [yeas
7 (1.6)
8 Nick: hhhh.
9 (0.6)
10 Ali: ni:::ce.
11 (1.7)
12 Nick: hmm.
13 (4.2)
14 Ali: yer room ^is cle:an. that's im^pressive
15 (0.8)
16 Nick: ^thank you.
17 (9.0)
18 Nick: (h)hmm hh.
19 (0.4)
20 Nick: .hhh
21 (0.4)
22 Nick: (anyway),
23 (1.6)
24 Nick: °()°
25 (2.0)
26 Nick: ()
27 (0.8)
28 Nick: () ((glance to Ali))
29 (1.6)
30 Ali: hmm?
31 (1.2)
32 Nick: **(h)oh** nothing I jus-
33 (8.8)
34 Nick: .hhh ((reading))
35 (3.5)
36 Nick: **so:** u:mmm anyway ((looks up from iPod, gaze to camera, Ali, camera))
37 (1.5)

38 Ali: anyway
 39 (0.4)
 40 Nick: .hhhhhh (0.6) how is Colorado,
 41 (0.8)

Nick responds to my weak request for clarification (line 30) following his production of unintelligible speech (lines 24-28) by saying ‘oh nothing I jus-’ (line 32). Since clarification requests invite a speaker to make a repair, the preferred response here would be to provide clarification (Garvey, 1984: 40). However, Nick does not provide clarification, meaning his response is dispreferred.

Taking into account the delay of 1.2 seconds—which makes a dispreferred response more likely—Nick appears to hedge his turn with an ‘oh’-preface. In this sense, prefacing his response with an ‘oh’-hedge instructs the addressee to interpret his response as something dispreferred (Fraser, 1996; Jucker & Ziv, 1998). By prefacing this turn with ‘oh’, Nick displays an understanding of the pragmatic function of this DM, as well as the role it plays in the back-and-forth of the interaction. Specifically, by hedging his response with ‘oh’, Nick increases the likelihood that the interaction will progress without drawing negative attention to response as dispreferred.

According to Heritage (1998), ‘oh’-prefaced responses to inquiries indicate, at the most basic level, a shift in the respondent’s attention—a “change of state” marker (327). In this paper, Heritage outlines many different second-position (response) contexts in which ‘oh’-prefaces index different types of shifts in respondent cognitive awareness. Nick appears to be hedging this non-answer in order to mark my request for clarification as out of place (Heritage, 1998).

Then, after cutting-off his turn mid-account, and reading on his iPod over a long pause (lines 33-35), in line 36 Nick returns to his turn. However, instead of continuing with his

account, he initiates a new sequence with ‘so u:mm anyway’ (line 36). Both ‘so’ and ‘anyway’ have been studied in collocation, as well as on their own (i.e. not collocated). As for ‘so’-prefaced utterances not collocated with ‘anyway’, on one hand, Bolden (2006) demonstrates that ‘so’-prefaced utterances “launch action trajectories that are new for the conversation,” where ‘so’ often precedes an utterance that is “other-attentive” (668). On the other hand, Raymond (2004) demonstrates that “the stand-alone ‘so’” can be used as a marker of “incipient misalignment regarding what action is due, from whom it is due, and the like” (212). In other words, when ‘so’ is the only lexical component of a turn, it can mark a meta-interactional event during which discourse incoherence is acknowledged so it can be subsequently restored.

Next, the word ‘anyway’ can also preface an utterance or “stand-alone” in a turn. ‘Anyway’ has been analyzed in the majority of studies as resumption markers, which are used to pick-up an abandoned narrative or topic (Altenberg, 2002; Ferrara, 1997; Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 270; Lenk, 1995; 1998; Owen, 1985; Takahara, 1998; Wolfram, 1988). In this sense, Sacks (1992) describes ‘anyway’ as a “right-hand parenthesis,” which closes one topic and alerts participants of a speaker’s interest to re-open another (254). Often, speakers perform this function when using ‘anyway’ as a preface of an utterance, instead of as a “stand-alone” production. Park (2010), who studied “stand-alone” or “closure-relevant” ‘anyway’, demonstrates that it can be used to “indicate an impending break in contiguity,” which allows participants to “move away from a particular topic and start a new sequence that carries a new topic” (3285). Therefore, closure-relevant ‘anyway’ is used when a given topic fails to progress the interaction and/or when the recipient and speaker are not aligned (Park, 2010). These interactional environments are often dispreferred due to their incoherence and failure to motivate back-and-forth interaction. Furthermore, Park (2010) explains that by bringing attention to such

interactional incoherence, the speaker producing ‘anyway’ has a right to terminate the sequence, opening the interactional space for a new course of action. Park (2010) thus explains that the practice of using a closure-relevant ‘anyway’ attends to the coherence of an interaction.

Based on these explanations, either way Nick means ‘so u:mm anyway’ to function promotes discourse coherence and interactional progressivity. These competing possibilities raise an important question: What action did Nick design this turn to accomplish? It is evident that the question Nick asks in line 40—‘how is Colorado?’—is not directly related to an abandoned topic, since we had not been talking about me, or living situations—we had been talking about Nick’s school. So it is unlikely that ‘anyway’ is acting as a right-hand parenthesis, closing one topic in order to re-open another. Instead, ‘anyway’ appears contribute to the progressivity of the interaction by projecting a new topic and transition back to coherence. The ‘so’-preface also appears to play a role in this transition.

Park (2010) and Raymond’s (2004) explanations of what stand-alone ‘so’ and stand-alone ‘anyway’ accomplish are similar in that they mark transition from an incoherent sequence to a (potentially) coherent sequence. Therefore, in Nick’s use of ‘so anyway’, ‘so’ and ‘anyway’ appear to accomplish similar actions together. Thus, ‘so’ and ‘anyway’ seem to redundantly achieve the same actions. It is worth considering (a) what achieving redundant actions could indicate for the force of the transition, (b) whether ‘so’ could also be performing another action, and (c) how these actions could be working together. First, it is possible that ‘so’ and ‘anyway’ perform the same actions to make a stronger transition point, alerting participants that the speaker is adamant about moving on. Second, ‘so’-prefaces can also act to introduce a new course of action. So, it is also possible that when ‘so’ prefaces ‘anyway’ in a turn that consists of only ‘so anyway’, ‘so’ acts to project a new course of action. Therefore, Nick’s ‘so’-preface in

‘so anyway’ might also indicate to a participant that Nick has a future course of action he plans to take up. Now, ‘so anyway’ not only closes an incoherent sequence; it also projects that the speaker will take up a future course of action. This notion is supported by the delay between Nick’s turn and my reciprocal, ‘anyway’ (line 38), as it is possible that I was waiting for Nick to take up his new course of action. Thus, when he does not, I produce a reciprocal ‘anyway’ closing the sequence by mutual agreement. After this mutual agreement Nick then takes up a new course of action by asking me, ‘how is Colorado?’ (Park, 2010: 3287).

This interaction does not follow what one might consider canonical back-and-forth social interaction, since Nick fails for a short time to attend to the interaction, instead attending to a competing activity. This series of events causes an incoherent (and dispreferred) interactional environment. However, Nick recognizes this incoherence, and takes action to progress the discourse to a new course of action using ‘so anyway’. Thus, ‘so anyway’ acts (a) to mark misalignment between participants (b) close the incoherent sequence and (c) project a new course of action. With this turn, Nick attends to and facilitates the success of back-and forth social interaction.

In the example above, Nick displays interest in the back-and-forth of the interaction, while also attending to a competing activity by producing an ‘oh’-prefaced response to my clarification request. This ‘oh’-preface appears to hedge a dispreferred non-clarification non-answer that marks my request as inapposite. After cutting-off this turn mid-account, and after a long pause, Nick produces ‘so u:mm anyway’ in order to mark interactional incoherence, and project a new course of action. Once we are in mutual agreement of the state of our discourse, Nick launches a new course of action. Thus, Nick uses discourse markers to attend to discourse

coherence by attending to preference. Furthermore, he also attends to progress the interaction by “fixing” the troublesome sequence, which ensues as a result of a competing activity.

Self-evident answer & dispreferred non-answer

In the second example, we see Nick use an ‘oh’-preface for a different pragmatic function, and then ‘well’ in turn-initial position before a non-answer response.

This example occurs later in the same interaction as the first segment above. After Nick asks me, ‘how is Colorado?’ I tell him about the weather and eventually ask if he is interested in visiting. Then, Nick asks if I plan on living in Colorado, and after I respond, I ask him if he plans on living in Wisconsin (line 89).²³ Nick responds in line 73 by smirking, looking down, and saying ‘oh yeah’. When I respond by modifying my question to ask about what he wants to do, instead of what he plans, he responds by saying ‘well I dunno yet’. In the discussion below, I describe the apparent functions of these DM-prefaces, and also demonstrate how they contribute to the coherence and progressivity of the interaction.

Example 2: ‘Oh’ and ‘well’

```
89  Ali:  =.hh do you plan on living in Wisconsin?
90      (0.3)
91  Nick: hhhh ☺ ((looks down)) °oh° yeah
92      (1.0)
93  Ali:  >.hh would you ever wanna live somewhere else?
94      (0.9)
95  Nick: well I dunno yet (ehh) . .hhh
96      (1.8)
97  Ali:  you du[nno ye:t (eh)?
98  Nick:      [ (      )
99      (0.2)
100 Nick:  >I dunno yet< though,=
101 Ali:  =ya ever thought about it?
```

²³ State name changed for participant privacy.

102 (1.0)
 103 Nick: o:h u:mmm, ((hand on forehead)) (1.0) I dunno where °ta live though° (.) I
 104 was thinkin' maybe like New York perhaps for like university: leave .hhh
 105 but my parents being thee um (.) .hh knowing that I'm completely autist-
 106 mildly autistic ((looks at camera)) decided ta send me to SCHOOL NAME.=

In line 91 Nick produces an 'oh'-prefaced response to my inquiry.²⁴ Recall that Heritage (2012) outlined different response contexts in which 'oh'-prefaces emerge. In this case, 'oh' appears to indicate that Nick has a problem with my question's presuppositions, and thus my question is "rendered inapposite" (Heritage, 1998: 301). Respondents treat questions as inapposite either because the respondent already provided relevant information for a speaker to infer the answer in preceding talk, or because the object of inquiry is self-evident based on physical context, or cultural/personal knowledge. Since there was no context during the prior talk in which Nick and I discussed his future plans, nor is there any physical context for a self-evident answer, Nick seems to be treating my question as self-evident based on personal (and possibly also cultural) knowledge that I, as the questioner, should have taken into account in order to infer the answer before asking the question. Below I will discuss the features in the interaction that support this notion, as well as mention the cultural and personal context for this response. At the end of this discussion, I will compare this 'oh' to the 'oh'-preface in Example 1, and discuss how Nick's use of 'oh' here supplies pragmatic information important for the coherence of the interaction.

First, this type of response, produced to render a question inapposite, is often associated with a "recollection" or account provided by the respondent of the circumstances that the questioner should or might have known. In this case, Nick's account is delayed, and emerges in

²⁴ In line 103, Nick produces another 'oh'-prefaced response to a different inquiry. Unfortunately, space does not allow for a discussion of this 'oh'.

an answer to a different yet related question three question-answer sequences later (lines 104-106). This account (beginning with ‘...but my parents...’, line 104) provides the cultural and personal context that should have made the answer to my initial question self-evident—the cultural context being that he is ‘completely autistic- mildly autistic’ and the personal context being that I know he will be attending a local education program in the fall. Based on the structure and content of this interaction, Nick produces the DM ‘oh’ as a preface to his response to foreshadow the treatment of my “inquiry as problematic in virtue of information” that I should have considered (Heritage, 1998: 303).

Understanding the function of Nick’s use of ‘oh’ in this context raises an important question for this analysis. How does this ‘oh’ facilitate discourse coherence and/or progressivity? It is evident that ‘oh’ in this context creates a specific pragmatic effect. By marking the inquiry as problematic, Nick demonstrates attention to how he understands the interaction, which works to progress the interaction by alerting me of how he feels about it, which influences my next move. Thus, I change my question from asking about plans, to asking about what he would want to do.

After I ask about his wants, instead of his plans, Nick produces a ‘well’-prefaced non-answer response to maintain interactional coherence (line 95).

93 Ali: >.hh would you ever wanna live somewhere else?
 94 (0.9)
 95 Nick: **well** I dunno yet (ehh) . .hhh

This use of ‘well’ in line 95 comes down to an interest in promoting the coherence of the local interactional environment. Pomerantz (1975) demonstrates that ‘well’ often signals a dispreferred move. Since non-answers are dispreferred, Nick is, in a basic sense, marking both

that his response is dispreferred, and that he is aware of this dispreference. The function of this ‘well’ is described in more specific terms below.

Schiffrin (1985) observes in her corpus study that ‘well’-prefaces more frequently mark answers to wh-questions than yes/no questions, but that ‘well’-prefaces are used more often in response to yes/no questions when the response does not “fulfill the question options” (646). Since yes/no questions offer a “limited set of options” for response (yes or no), which delineate the “conditions for upcoming coherence,” if respondents select from this set of options when answering a yes/no question, they have produced a coherent (and preferred) response (644). Thus, when respondents produce another response, such as a non-answer (i.e. *I don’t know*), they are deviating from “the options for coherence offered by the form of [the] prior question” (Schiffrin, 1985: 645). Furthermore, respondents choose this option if they cannot provide a sufficient answer to the question, and ‘well’ often figures into such interactional moves as well (Lakoff, 1973; Schiffrin, 1985).

In addition to marking this response as dispreferred, Nick is also marking that it does not promote interactional coherence, and thus does not match my “assumptions as to what constitutes an answer” (Schiffrin, 1985: 646). This means that Nick attends to the success of the back-and-forth of this interaction by providing a cue to display “connections between utterances” (Schiffrin, 1985: 661). In other words, this ‘well’-preface works to restore interactional coherence by foreshadowing a response that does not align with an anticipated coherence of the interaction, and projects a forthcoming insufficient answer.

Topic ‘emerging from incipency’

In this third and final example, I investigate Nick’s uses of ‘well’ and ‘so’ in different initial positions and compare their functions to the instances of ‘well’ and ‘so’ in the former examples. Both DMs (in bold) occur during a ‘touched off’ change of topic (Couper-Kuhlen, 2004). Within the sequence, Nick first prefaces a pre-telling first-pair part with ‘well’ (line 162). Then, after a short silence, he produces a post-expansion topic-proffer ‘so’-prefaced yes/no question (lines 162-163).

Example 3: ‘well’ and ‘so’

1 Ali: is that- does that happen in the book? I don’t remember=
2 Nick: =yeah it’s like that scen- that’s () part where like thee ah- (0.4)
3 there’s like a tour of the buildi-ing (0.4) [(bas- when)
4 Ali: [oh yea-
5 (1.1)
6 Nick: ^have you read it? ((looking at e-reader))
7 (0.4)
8 Ali: yeah I did read it. that’s one of the ones that I have read that you- were
9 reading ^too, (0.9) what do you think about: t .hh I guess- how fa:r are
10 you
11 (1.2)
12 Nick: a:::hh (1.0) I’m i- on t’ chapter fi:ve
13 (0.4)

((129 lines deleted, discuss *Brave New World* and writing fiction))

142 Ali: so you get ta manipulate everything that [happens?
143 Nick: [yeah
144 (0.6)
145 Nick: yeah.
146 (1.2)
147 Ali: why do you like t- why do ya like that?
148 (1.2)
149 Nick: (there’s like uh) (0.3) (is like God) (0.2) they’re
150 basically just- create their own characters (.) place ‘em real
151 world or just (0.4) .hhh any fictitious: (0.3) wor:ld in general (0.6) and
152 (0.7) see what they do,
153 (4.0)

154 Ali: 't's nice ta feel like you're in control of something right?
 155 (.)
 156 Nick: yeah,
 157 (1.9)
 158 Nick: .hhhhhhh
 159 (5.0)
 160 Nick: ((looks at Ali, nods)) .hhhh
 161 (1.6)
 162 Nick: **well** >speaking a' which< (0.4) u:m, (0.7) **so** have you ^actua-eh **so** have
 163 you actually ^ever seen the movie Schindler's List?
 164 (0.6)
 165 Ali: I haven' (.) but I:ve heard of it, (0.2) I heard it's: (.) pretty sa:d,

For the analysis of Nick's post-expansion (lines 162-3), I will begin with an analysis of his 'so'-prefaced topic-proffer, and then backtrack to his use of turn-initial 'well' in the pre-telling—'well speaking a' which'. This is because analysis of the function of 'well' as marking the pre-sequence to the topic-proffer relies on our understanding of the function of 'so' as projecting a new course of action "emerging from incipency" (Bolden, 2006; 2009; see Bolden, 2005 for extended discussion).

In order to explain what "emerging from incipency" means in this context, I must provide a brief comment on the functions of a topic-proffer post-expansion. Schegloff (2007) explains that topic-proffers in a post-expansive position in a turn sequence sometimes perform "double duty" by "both enacting their own action," (like questioning), and serving "as the vehicle or instrument for another action" (169). Most importantly, topic-proffers proffer (or propose) a change in topic (Schegloff, 2007). Another practice that marks a new course of action is the use of the connective 'so', described in various discussions as a topic beginner/sequencer/developer (e.g., Howe, 1991; Johnson, 2002). Thus, 'so' can be used to preface a topic-proffer, because 'so' often projects a new interactional project and topic (Bolden, 2009). Furthermore, Schegloff (2007) describes that topic-proffers are most frequently

“recipient-oriented,” and Bolden (2006) demonstrates that ‘so’-prefaces often launch “other-attentive” courses of action.

In addition to launching a shift in the course of action, Bolden (2009) demonstrates that ‘so’-prefaces project that the forthcoming course of action is “incipient or pending” (997). To be “emerging from incipency” Bolden (2009) explains that the upcoming course of action does not emerge from the “immediately prior talk” and is thus understood as “delayed and pending” by participants (978). Since the topic Nick proffers in lines 162-3 is not related to the immediately preceding turn sequences, but is related (although distantly) to the topic of conversation 121 lines prior, Nick’s use of a ‘so’-preface appears to mark a course of action as delayed and pending.

Thus, the immediately prior talk in this interaction is about Nick’s interest in writing science fiction, where he explains what makes him feel like God when creating a fictional world. Immediately following this topic, in lines 157-161 there is a conversational lull, which Nick uses “as an opportunity to launch a new action trajectory” (Bolden, 2009: 991). In order to successfully launch this new action trajectory, however, Nick must alert me—the hearer—that the prior talk is not what warrants the introduction of the new topic (Bolden, 2009). Thus, he employs the ‘so’-preface. Bolden (2009) describes four reasons a speaker might use a ‘so’-preface; however, I will only discuss the reason that fits best with Nick’s topic-proffer: “launching a new course of action” (988).

Bolden (2009) makes a distinction between launching *new* and *revisited* courses of action. In order to understand the former, we must understand the difference between them. On one hand, speakers launch a *revisited* course of action by *re*-opening a topic that could or has been considered, for all intents and purposes, closed. On the other hand, speakers launch a *new* course of action by introducing a topic that had not been “evidently pending” but is (upon

reflection) somehow relevant based on topics in the prior (but not immediately prior) talk. This appears to be the case in the above interaction. For in line 6, Nick asks if I have read *Brave New World*—‘have you read it?’—after I forget one of the events in the book. So, when Nick launches the new topic with the ‘so’-preface in lines 162-3, asking if I have ever seen the movie *Schindler’s List*—‘so have you actually ever seen Schindler’s List?’—this is a *new* but somehow relevant topic. Thus, the new course of action “emerging from incipency” that Nick launches is remarkably subtle—classic works I’ve ‘ever’ seen/read—and delayed (by 150 lines). This connection between topics, although difficult to recognize, makes it evident that Nick is producing this ‘so’-prefaced topic-proffer to launch a new, incipient action. Bolden (2009) suggests that ‘so’-prefaced topic-proffers like this have “no shared expectation for a relevancy of a particular action at a particular interactional moment may be apparent in place” (988). This means the ‘so’-preface, itself, is designed to indicate to the hearer that this new course of action is to “be understood as advancing the interactional agenda” (988).

Since the ‘so’-preface marks a distantly relevant topic “emerging from incipency,” it appears that Nick produced the preceding ‘well’-prefaced pre-telling to “overtly characterize” this new topic “as having been incipient” (Bolden, 2009: 989).²⁵ In other words, by producing the pre-telling ‘well speaking a’ which’ before the topic-proffer, Nick might be attending to the fact that, from my perspective, this new course of action might seem ‘out of left field’ or unexpected. This possibility is a new hypothesis for why a speaker might overtly characterize a new topic as incipient, since Bolden (2009) describes a different context of overt characterization of a topic “emerging from incipency.” The hypothesis presented here is based on the notion that fitting an issue to prior talk is the most common and coherent way to introduce a new action or idea (Jefferson, 1978, 1984a; Sacks, 1995; Schegloff, 2007; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Thus, by

²⁵ It is a pre-telling because Nick goes on to talk about the movie.

performing a ‘well’-prefaced pre-telling before his ‘so’-prefaced topic-proffer, Nick is attending to the interactional coherence and progressivity by both acknowledging our “shared interactional history” and consequently emphasizing the incipient nature of this new course of action.

Now, let us look further into the function of this ‘well’ in the pre-telling—‘well speaking a’ which’—compared to his use of ‘well’ as a non-answer response preface in Example 2. In the discussion of Example 2, I demonstrated that ‘well’ functioned to mark both a dispreferred response, as well as an insufficient (i.e. non-answer) response to my question. Since this turn is not a response, nor dispreferred/insufficient, Nick displays an ability to produce the DM ‘well’ in another sequential position in order to perform a different function. Thus, instead of marking a dispreferred and insufficient turn, here ‘well’ appears to signal that the context to be shaped by the projected utterance may not be very (or at all) relevant based on prior talk. Thus, ‘well’ alerts the hearer that the forthcoming utterance will diverge from the context of the prior talk, subsequently giving rise to certain conditions for the coherence of future talk.

Example 3 and this discussion has demonstrated that Nick is able to (a) use ‘so’ to preface a topic-proffer in order to launch a new course of action “emerging from incipency,” (b) use ‘well’ to preface a pre-telling to “overtly characterize” the ‘so’-prefaced topic-proffer to emphasize its lack of relevance to the immediately prior talk, as well as the unapparent relation to the topic in the more distant prior talk, (c) use ‘so’ and ‘well’ in different positions in a turn sequence to accomplish different actions from those in Examples 1 and 2, respectively, and (d) attend to the coherence and progressivity of an interaction through the strategic use of discourse markers.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided a short classification and discussion of a few of the different DMs and their functions in Nick's turns' talk. By providing a few examples of each type of DM, this classification displays how Nick is able to (a) use different types of DMs in initial positions, and (b) use the same DMs for different pragmatic functions. First, I demonstrated that Nick is able to use 'well', 'oh' and 'so' to preface turns in different positions in a sequence. For example, Nick produced a 'so'-prefaced pre-announcement in the first example, and a 'well'-prefaced pre-announcement in the third. Next, I showed that Nick is able to use each of these DMs to perform different pragmatic functions. For example, in Example 1, the 'oh'-preface hedged a dispreferred response, while in Example 2, Nick's 'oh'-preface marked the self-evident nature of the answer to my question. Finally, I demonstrated how each DM discussed displayed Nick's ability to attend to the coherence and/or progressivity of the conversation, which promoted the efficiency, effectiveness, and overall success of our social interaction. Finally, due to the many other DMs present in non-initial positions, it is evident that this analysis has barely brushed the surface of Nick's repertoire DMs and the many actions he is able to accomplish with them. Therefore, this analysis has also provided a basis for studying the pragmatic practices autistic individuals might employ in the back-and-forth of naturalistic social interaction using conversational analysis.

Chapter 5: Conclusion & future directions

“Without change something sleeps inside us, and seldom awakens.”

-Duke Leto Atreides, Frank Herbert's *Dune*

Through a linguistic analysis of Cam and Nick's social interaction, I put forth a study that places Cam and Nick's human experiences first. By focusing on their abilities in social interaction, and not focusing on how being autistic affects their social abilities, I have situated being autistic, not as a characterizing feature of their language and social practices, but as a layer of their human experience. Through this display, I hope this thesis is a step in the right direction toward shifting the “typical” academic (and socio-cultural) approach to understanding autism and autistic people—where autism is considered an experience of “deficit and loss”—to a perspective of autism as a part of an autistic person's experience—a part that is not necessarily the cause of their social practices. Thinking about autism in this way recognizes that autistic people do not necessarily do things because they are autistic, and respects the notion that autistic people have different feelings about being autistic, and different ways in which autism fits in their lives.²⁶

In order to provide this perspective, I looked at two different aspects of social interaction, through two different, yet related approaches. First, I investigated how Cam and Nick co-

²⁶ First, the difference in Cam and Nick's descriptions of how they feel about being autistic supports this notion. Second, I am epileptic, and understand what it is like to feel differently about being epileptic from others with epilepsy. I know from talking with others who have epilepsy that epilepsy fits into my experience differently from theirs. Thus, I do not believe that because I am epileptic, I understand Cam and Nick's experiences as autistic, I only understand that people with the same label can have completely different perspectives and feelings about where and how it fits in their lives.

construct their identities in interaction through creating intersubjective (self-other) relations by positioning themselves and each other in various social spaces. In order to do this, I incorporated conversation analysis and identity analysis methodologies into one to provide a rich socio-cultural interactional study. I found that (1) by engaging in a collaborative, yet competitive co-telling Cam and Nick created an relation of adequation marked by “contested equalization” instead of a “consensual process of equation” (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004: 384), (2a) using codeswitching, Nick was able to create a new and distinct social space to which Nick and I (as French speakers) belonged, and then (2b) Cam, (as a non-French speaker) was able to monitor the turn-taking and then used interactional tools to break down the social space, working to dampen his relation of distinction, and (3) Nick created a relation of distinction from Cam by pointing out Cam’s marked social behavior, after which he backed-down, in an apparent effort to attend to preference organization of the interaction. Consequently, this analysis also demonstrated some examples of sequence structures and features of turn design that can inform an analysis of intersubjectively created identity in future studies.

Next, I looked at a couple of aspects of Cam and Nick’s social interactional practices using a more traditional conversation analytic approach. These investigations were split into two chapters, each focused on one particular interactional feature. However, both chapters aimed to represent Cam or Nick’s wide-range of practices with regard to their respective features of interest.

Chapter 3, the first chapter using traditional conversation analysis, investigated Cam’s repertoire of interactional practices for initiating interaction. To introduce the chapter, I demonstrated two ways in which Cam was successful at launching a sequence with me using (a) a direct request for information, and (b) an indirect, B-Event statement, request for information.

Then, I looked at a more complex interaction focused on initiating interaction, in which Cam produced a total of five attempts to launch a sequence. For analysis of this interaction, I looked at the response mobilizing features of Cam's turns, as they were designed. These included nonverbal (eye-gaze and posture shift), sequence (sequentially initial positioning, pre-sequences), and linguistic (summons, pre-announcement, request for information, presenting new information) practices. Then I discussed the response mobilizing features of *voiceover narration*, including the marked nature of the language variety. Thus, in these interactions, Cam demonstrates that he has access to a wide-range of sequence launching practices. Since the diagnostic criteria for autism outlines "failure to initiate... social interaction" as one of the impairments of social interaction, I have demonstrated (1) that Cam is autistic and has a wide-range of tools (both canonical and less canonical) for initiating interaction, (2) that interaction can be initiated in many different ways, through many combinations of response mobilizing features, and (3) that sometimes a failure to initiate social interaction is the result of external prescriptive ideologies motivated by ideologies about autistic people's lack of social abilities.

Finally, Chapter 4, the second chapter to utilize a traditional conversation analysis methodology, aimed to describe how Nick used discourse markers to preface utterances. I looked at four interaction segments in which Nick used different discourse markers ('oh', 'well', and 'so') to accomplish different actions in the sequence. Thus, I demonstrated how Nick performed different actions using these discourse markers to preserve the back-and-forth of the interaction by attending to coherence and progressivity. First, Nick used an 'oh'-preface to hedge a dispreferred non-answer response to a request for clarification he did not provide. Then, in another interaction, Nick used an 'oh'-preface to signal the self-evident nature of the answer to a question. Next, in one interaction Nick used a 'so'-preface to launch a new topic in the phrase

‘so anyway’. In another interaction, Nick prefaced a request for information in order to mark a change in topic emerging from incipency. Finally, Nick used ‘well’ to hedge a dispreferred non-answer response to a pursuit for information. This ‘well’-preface also appeared to signal that the explanation for his response was not straightforward. The next ‘well’-preface Nick uses appears to overtly project that his forthcoming ‘so’-prefaced question emerging from incipency is not locally relevant based on the prior talk. Each of these uses of discourse markers demonstrates an attention to coherence and progressivity of the interaction in different ways. Some by acknowledging a lack of coherence in an effort to progress the interaction and move back on track. Others by projecting the progression to a new topic.

There is a great potential for this study to inform future research. First, there is a need for more research initiatives in the social sciences to look at both the social abilities and challenges autistic adults experience, particularly autistic adults. By providing a foundation for what autistic people are able to do in interaction, discussing any differences in social practices can be framed in the perspective of “difference in terms of ability,” instead of “difference in terms of impairment.”

Furthermore, “neurologically typical” researchers (and the general population) need to make space for autistic people to start, join, and contribute to research initiatives, policy making, education, employment, (see Yergeau, 2010; 2013 for more discussion). Unfortunately, the circumstances surrounding the development and analysis of this study limited the amount of input I was able to collect from Cam and Nick. As a result of these circumstances—physical distance, busy schedules, and limited time frame—I failed to discuss these specific findings with Cam and Nick. In any future research I conduct, I look to prioritize discussing my findings with

participants, to make sure they have an active role in the discussion and development of the analysis.

This study was also purposefully limited in scope in terms of the amount of interactional data that was analyzed and the number of participants. This study intentionally looked at a small scope of particular practices in order to discuss Cam and Nick's social practices through a fine-grained analysis. However, it would also be beneficial for future research to analyze other social practices across many contexts with other participants. Thus, more studies could also set out to show that autistic people are able to do many things in social interaction through both canonical and less canonical practices, which autistic people are generally believed to fail to do. For example, with regard to Cam and Nick, in order to gain a better understanding of their abilities in social interaction future research could look into how, when, and why Cam and Nick perform (animate) different language varieties and movie quotes in social interaction.

Finally, it is important for any research project looking at features of social practice through this perspective to be wary of making generalizations across contexts, and across people—as all people (not just autistic people) are different and contexts change. And as we have seen in the literature review and descriptions of former research throughout the chapters, generalizations appear to contribute more to the pathological perspective of autism, than the perspective I aim to express in this study.

I have written this thesis as Cam and Nick's friend, and as an ally of autistic people and the disabled community. Thus, this thesis is aimed to stand up against the limiting and pathological "typical autism (essay)" perspective taken in academic research and extended to the general public view—the pathological perspective of pathological restriction.²⁷ This perspective

²⁷ Note the multiple meanings of "pathological" applicable to both uses. "Pathological" as "medical" and "Pathological" as "uncontrolled and unreasonable."

restricts our ability to understand autistic individuals and the role autism plays in autistic people's lives. Thus autism is not an "atypical experience of deficit and loss." It is not the disembodied "autistic mind." It is not "autistics-as-specimens." Thus, it is time to appreciate the value of the human experience in all forms—every human life.²⁸

I cannot, nor do I want to, speak for Cam and Nick. This space exists to hear their voices—to appreciate their human experiences. Because they are valuable and inherently worthwhile—not because they are *autistic*—because they are *humans*. Because all humans, regardless of disability, are inherently worthwhile. We—all of us—who make up the neurodiverse human population have the responsibility to create more spaces like this, where autistic and neurologically typical people can respect, appreciate, and learn about the extent of the human experience.

I will conclude with one final remark. A remark of Nick's that has stuck in my memory. A remark that says what I have been trying to say better than I ever could, simply because it is in Nick's words. A remark with which Nick concluded his response to the question: "What do most non-autistic people not understand about being autistic?"

"We're people."

²⁸ Recall Yergeau (2010) and (2013).

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Appendix A: TRANSCRIPTION NOTATION

Speech delivery:

| | |
|----------------|--|
| <u>movie</u> | Underlined speech indicates marked stress |
| °I don't know° | Degree signs indicate whisper or markedly decreased volume |
| YES | Capital letters indicates markedly high intensity |
| < > | Outward-brackets indicate slowed speech |
| > < | Inward-brackets indicate faster speech; single left-hand bracket indicates rush-in |
| ☺ | Smiley face indicates speaker talking while smiling |
| u::::h | Colon indicates long sound. More colons signify longer sound. |
| I jus- | Single dash indicates abrupt cut-off |
| * * | Asterisks indicate creaky voice |
| an' 'ts | Apostrophe indicates reduced speech (in some places) |

Intervals:

| | |
|-------|---|
| (1.5) | Within parentheses, numbers indicate silence in tenths of a second. |
| (.) | Within parentheses, a period marks a micro-pause (a pause of less than 0.2 seconds) |

Simultaneous speech:

| | |
|---|--|
| [| Left bracket marks the start of overlapping speech |
|---|--|

Contours of Intonation:

| | |
|---------------|--|
| I don't know? | Question mark indicates sizeable rising intonation |
| yeah, | Comma indicates slight rising intonation |
| I don't know. | Period indicates falling intonation. |

[^]I don't know

Upwards carrot indicates sharp rise in intonation (often word-initial or word-medial)

Commentary in transcript:

((looks up))

Double parentheses contain transcriber's comments/description, including non-verbal behavior and language variety

(let's) go

Single parentheses contain unintelligible speech and uncertain transcription

Appendix B: LIST OF MEDIA PRODUCTIONS AND LITERATURE

- Buck, C. & Lee, J. (Directors). (2013). *Frozen* [Motion picture]. USA: Walt Disney Animation Studios.
- Carroll, L. (1865). *Alice in Wonderland*. UK: MacMillan.
- Cukor, G. (Director). (1964). *My Fair Lady* [Motion picture]. USA: Warner Bros.
- De St Exupery, A. (1943). *The little prince*. Reynal & Hitchcock.
- Donen, S. (Director). (1974). *The Little Prince* [Motion picture]. USA: Paramount Pictures.
- Fisher, A. (Director). (2003-). *Jimmy Kimmel Live!* [Television series]. USA: ABC Studios.
- Fleming, V. (Director) (1939). *The Wizard of Oz* [Motion picture]. USA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM).
- Herbert, F. (2003). *Dune* (Vol. 1). London, UK: Penguin Books.
- Huxley, A. (1932). *Brave New World*. UK: Chatto & Windus.
- Landis, J. (Director). (1980). *The Blues Brothers* [Motion picture]. USA: Universal Pictures.
- MacNoughton, I. (Producer). (1969-1974). *Monty Python's Flying Circus* [Television series]. UK: BBC.
- McKay, A. (Director). (2004). *Anchorman: The Legend of Ron Burgundy* [Motion picture]. USA: Dreamworks SKG.
- Mendes, S. (Director). (2012). *Skyfall* [Motion picture]. UK: Eon Productions.
- Negulesco, J. (Director). (1953). *Titanic* [Motion picture]. USA: Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation.
- Reiner, R. (Director). (1987). *The Princess Bride* [Motion picture]. USA: Act III Communications.
- Scott, R. (Director). (1979). *Alien* [Motion picture]. USA: Brandywine Productions.
- Scott, R. (Director). (2000). *Gladiator* [Motion picture]. UK: Dreamworks SKG.
- Scott, R. (Director). (2014). *Exodus: Gods and Kings* [Motion picture]. UK: Chernin Entertainment.
- Spielberg, S. (Director). (1993). *Schindler's List* [Motion picture]. USA: Universal Pictures.

Stevenson, R. (Director). (1964). *Mary Poppins* [Motion picture]. USA: Walt Disney Productions.

Stuart, M. (Director). (1971). *Willy Wonka & the Chocolate Factory* [Motion picture]. USA: Wolper Pictures Ltd.