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Karma as an "Apparatus": The Etiology of Non-normative Sexualities in Classical Āyurveda

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KARMA AS AN “APPARATUS”;
THE ETIOLOGY OF NON-NORMATIVE SEXUALITIES IN CLASSICAL ĀYURVEDA

By

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B.A. Stanford University, 1996
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The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we
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Karma as an “Apparatus”: The Etiology of Non-normative Sexualities in Classical Āyurveda
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This thesis examines the Hindu notion of karma as an etiological factor in the development of individuals of non-normative sexualities in classical Indian medicine. Sweet and Zwilling (1993) argue that Foucault was mistaken in arguing that the notion of homosexuals as a distinct “species” of human being originated in the nineteenth century West, locating a similar phenomenon in Āyurvedic texts penned two millennia earlier. Here, I suggest that their analysis overlooks the critical etiological factor of karma, and that to understand the formation of sexualized subjectivity in an early Indian context we may productively use Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of the Foucaultian “apparatus.” The notion of karma, of circumstance linked to one’s past deeds and past lives, is itself an apparatus. Further, I propose that medicalization arises from an ontological issue key to our understanding of karma as an apparatus in the formation of subjectivity as articulated in early Indian medical texts.

Part One of this thesis will gloss some of the key debates regarding the origins of Āyurveda as well as the texts that I will engage with here, the Caraka Saṃhitā (Caraka’s Compendium) and Suśruta Saṃhitā (Suśruta’s Compendium) two of the three foundational Āyurvedic texts known as the bṛhattrayī (the great threesome) of Āyurveda, and Cakrapāṇidatta’s 11th Century commentary on the Caraka Saṃhitā. I will also discuss karma theory, in particular, emphasizing two key issues that impact function of karma in Āyurvedic
texts 1) the relationship between karma and the two poles of human action and fate and 2) the transferability of karma. Part Two of this thesis examines discussions of the development of individuals of variant gender and sexuality in classical Āyurvedic texts and commentary, especially, noting discussions of karmic etiology. Translations are mine unless otherwise indicated. Part Three of the thesis explored how the notion of karma in the early Āyurvedic texts functions in the formation of subjectivity with regards to the development of individuals of non-normative gender and sexuality. There I will explore how the notion of karma in early India intersects Agamben’s model of an apparatus.
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Introduction

The work of Michael Sweet and Leonard Zwilling, “The First Medicalization: The Taxonomy and Etiology of Queerness in Classical Indian Medicine,”¹ suggests that Foucault was mistaken² in his famous argument that the notion of homosexuals as a distinct “species” of human being originated in the nineteenth century West.³ They argue that the classification of gender⁴ and sexually variant individuals as different due to an inherent or inherited nature, rather than a set of chosen behaviors, is found in the “medicalization,” or taxonomic and etiological classification, of these types of individuals in classical Indian medical literature as early as the first century.⁵ While not fleshing out the meaning of “medicalization,” the authors use the term to refer to the process of incorporation into a medical system through classification, as well as the analysis of causative factors leading to a disease, deformity or

² In a more recent publication Michael Sweet uses stronger language stating, “Foucault could often be spectacularly wrong. Such is the case concerning his famous contention that sexuality as we know it did not exist prior to the bureaucratization of society that accompanied modern capitalism.” M.J. Sweet, "Eunuchs, Lesbians, and Other Mythical Beasts: Queering and Dequeering the Kama Sutra," Queering India: Same-Sex Love and Eroticism in Indian Culture and Society, ed. Ruth Vanita (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002) 78.
⁴ While the notion of gender as a social construct is arguably modern, there is scholarship suggesting that this concept, or something like it, may have been operable in the context we examine here. For example, Zwilling and Sweet’s work on Jain religious literature suggests that “The Jains’ ability to differentiate between a psychological sexuality or sexual orientation and biological sex foreshadows the complex typologies of modern sexological theory... .” L Zwilling and MJ Sweet, "Like a City Ablaze’: The Third Sex and the Creation of Sexuality in Jain Religious Literature," Journal of the History of Sexuality 6.3 (1996): 383. Janet Gyatso justifies her use of the term “gender” in an article on sex and gender in early Vinaya and Buddhist monasticism, “Mind you, it is only barely the case that we can say that a notion of gender as such is explicitly identified in the sources I am looking at here. With the exception of one novel usage that does indeed seem to overlap with the function of the modern sense of gender, the traditional categories I explore in what follows seem to have been understood, perhaps unreflectively, as being based specifically upon sexual characteristics [here Gyatso refers to biological differentiations that manifest in physical bodies]. Hence I have largely used the word “sex” to refer to those categories. Even these, however, came in many contexts to take on a metaphorical rather than strictly physicalistic denotation. Such metaphorical application already inches those categories over into the domain of what we now understand to be gender-not to mention the fact that even strict anatomical specification about sexual identity is relative and culturally constructed.” J Gyatso, "One Plus One Makes Three: Buddhist Gender, Monasticism, and the Law of the Non-Excluded Middle," History of Religions 43.2 (2003): 90.
⁵ Sweet and Zwilling, "The First Medicalization: The Taxonomy and Etiology of Queerness in Classical Indian Medicine."
other medical condition, i.e. etiology. As noted by Sweet and Zwilling, in classical Āyurvedic
texts, variations in gender and sexuality are generally delineated in the portions of these texts
describing fetal development and since they are treated as a kind of “genetic” abnormality
their description is often accompanied by an etiological analysis. ⁶ (I use the term “genetic”
here because Sweet and Zwilling use it, but with hesitation, as the application of contemporary
scientific terms to Āyurvedic processes is fraught with issues.) However, there is a crucial
aspect of etiology related to non-normative gender and sexualities that Sweet and Zwilling do
not discuss in the article, and that is, karma. For example, in Caraka Saṃhitā Śārīrasthāṇa 2.17-
2.21 eight kinds of sexually abnormal individuals are described, and at the conclusion of the
passage Caraka explains, “In this way these are the eight types of afflictions; they are defined
as being produced by karma.”⁷ Here I argue that key passages on the development of
individuals of non-normative gender and sexuality in the classical Āyurvedic compendiums,
Caraka Saṃhitā and Suśruta Saṃhitā, treat karma as a central etiological factor and that this
treatment is elided by Sweet and Zwilling’s translation of these passages. I demonstrate that
through an analysis of the function of karma in these passages we may gain insight into the
formation of subjectivity that they implicate—subjectivity shaped by the notion of karma
relating to moral action, not only as it marks souls, but also as it manifests through bodies.

To help us think about the function of karma as etiology I use a discussion of karma
theory refined by Charles Keyes and engaged by Wendy Doniger in her introduction to Karma
and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions. According to Keyes, the three constituent strands of

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⁶ Ibid., 593.
⁷ ityevamāṣtau vikṛtiprakārāḥ karmātmakānāmupalākaṃśaṃyāḥ/ My translation. Here I use the following Sanskrit
edition of the Caraka Saṃhitā and commentary: Agniveśa, Cakrāṇidatta, R. K. Sharma and Bhagwan Dash,
Agniveśa’s Caraka Samhita: Text with English Translation & Critical Exposition Based on Cakrapāṇi Datta’s
karma theory are “(1) explanation of present circumstances with reference to previous actions, including (possibly) actions prior to birth; (2) orientation of present actions toward future ends, including (possibly) those occurring after death; (3) moral basis on which action past and present is predicated.” This definition is helpful in that it links the notion of rebirth to a moral schema, however we will expand upon Keyes’ framework because in Āyurvedic texts we also encounter prajñā-’parādha, “violations of good sense,” and what I identify as a notion of parental karma. Both of these modifications shift the emphasis in etiological discussions of karma from past lives to present behavior. By parental karma I refer to the transfer of karma from parent to child, as exemplified by Suśruta Saṃhitā Śārīrasthāna 2:50 “A strong sin committed by the mother shall be understood as the cause of those created with deformities in the shape of a gourd, scorpion or snake.” Parental karma is not explicitly named in the passages I will translate and analyze, however as the passage above suggests, the idea that the karma of a parent can be transferable to his or her offspring is arguably present in the texts.

In order to consider how the notion of karma functioned in the formation of subjectivity in an early Indian context as understood through classical Āyurvedic texts and commentary, I will engage Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of the “apparatus.” Agamben’s discussion is especially helpful because it provides a conceptual link between subject formation and the function of karma theory within the early Āyurvedic texts. Through his discussion of the Foucaultian dispositif, in “What Is an Apparatus?” Agamben demonstrates

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8 Wendy Doniger and Joint Committee on South Asia., eds., Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) xi.
10 sarpavṛścīkākāśmāndāviktākṛtyaśca ye/garbhāstvete striyāṣaiva jñeyāḥ pāpakṛtato bhṛṣam// I provide a full translation and discussion of Suśruta Saṃhitā Śārīrasthāna 2.37-2.52 in part two.
11 “Apparatus” is the term used to translate the French dispositif in the English translation of “What is an Apparatus?” In a recent article Jeffrey Bussolini argues that “apparatus” is is not an accurate translation for dispositif and suggest the use of the English term “dispositive,” a term distinct in meaning from the French appareil
that subjects are formed through the interaction between apparatuses and beings. The notion of karma, of circumstance linked to one’s past deeds and even past lives, a law of universal cause and effect, may itself be analyzed as an apparatus. This will be further evidenced through a discussion of Gerald Larson’s model of karma as a “sociology of knowledge,” providing us with an understanding of how karma theory functions to links systems of thought with social reality. There is a subtle difference between the discursive power of karma as it functions in legal treatises, such as Manu’s Code of Law (Mānava-Dharmasāstra) to warn “Some evil men become disfigured because of bad deeds committed in this world, and some because of deeds done in a previous life,”12 and the way that it functions in Āyurvedic texts to explain the birth of individuals of non-normative sexualities. In the latter case, the notion of karma is intensified as it becomes implicated in the transmission of inherited traits, rather than simply applied to an individual soul over many lifetimes. However, in both cases, the theory of karma functions as part of a discursive network, an apparatus, so to speak. Apparatus designates a “network” that exists between “technologies of power”13 or “anything that has in some way the capacity to capture orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings.”14 The apparatus fundamentally mediates the experience of a human being in relation to other beings. Delineating “two great classes,” living beings and apparatuses, Agamben considers the subject to be “that which results from the relation and, so to speak, from the relentless fight between living beings and

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14 Ibid., 14.
apparatuses.”\textsuperscript{15} It is through the interaction between beings and apparatuses that the subject emerges. It is this link that will enable us to consider the implications of karma as an apparatus playing a role in the formation of subjectivity in an early Indian context.

In their conclusion to “The First Medicalization,” Sweet and Zwilling briefly pose and answer two questions that arise from their central thesis that medicalized views of sexuality arose independently in ancient India and the modern West. First, they ask, what “uses” were made of this medicalization in the different contexts of ancient India and the modern West, and, second, (given their answer to the first) why were the “uses” so different? According to their analysis, in both ancient India and the modern West, individuals of non-normative sexualities were recognized as fundamentally different from sexually normative human beings and in both contexts there were codified legal penalties for homosexual behavior. However, via their argument, in contrast to the modern West, in India, penalization was relatively minor and there is no evidence that it was enforced. Further, there was no effort made to “cure” people of their non-normativity.\textsuperscript{16} (Note that I am not arguing these points here, merely tracing the argument). Sweet and Zwilling explain the difference away in a few sentences, ascribing it to the “larger fabric of cultural belief”\textsuperscript{17} in the two different temporal and spatial settings, a fabric that they define as comprised largely of religion. In the case of India, the authors point to what they call the sex-positive or sex-neutral milieu created by Hinduism and Buddhism, and in the West, the sex-negative, milieu of Christianity, to explain the different trajectories of each medicalization. In their discussion, they are clearly engaging the

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
phenomenon of “medicalization” as an apparatus, but I argue that in overlooking the role of karma they elide a more significant underlying apparatus in play. Sweet and Zwilling explain,

Despite its different forms and applications, medicalization is neither an exclusively Western nor a purely modern development; it springs from the universal human propensity to distinguish and explain phenomena that challenge our usual cognitive set.¹⁸

I suggest that at issue here is not merely a cognitive impulse to “distinguish and explain phenomena” not conforming to our common experience, but rather an ontology that resides at the center of karma theory, insofar as the notion of karma is a “theory of causation that supplies reason for human fortune, good or bad”¹⁹ and a framework for grappling with the fundamental anxiety of human existence. As we will see, this type of ontological moral concern resides at the center of Agamben’s discussion of the apparatus and at the heart of the formation of subjectivity.

Part one of this thesis, “Āyurveda and Karma,” glosses some of the key debates regarding the origins of Āyurveda as well as the texts that I engage with here, the Caraka Saṃhitā (Caraka’s Compendium) and Suśruta Saṃhitā (Suśruta’s Compendium) two of the three foundational Āyurvedic texts known as the brhatrayī (the great threesome) of Āyurveda, and Cakrapaññidatta’s 11th century commentary on the Caraka Saṃhitā. As necessary, passages from the Aṣṭāṅgahrdaya Saṃhitā (Heart of Medicine Compendium) the third text of the brhatrayī (I provide more details about these texts below) will also be provided. Here I will also engage in a discussion on karma theory, in particular, emphasizing two key issues that impact the function of karma in Āyurvedic texts: 1) the relationship between karma and the two poles of human action and fate and 2) the transferability of karma.

¹⁸ Ibid., 607.
Part two, “Karma as Etiology,” examines discussions of the development of individuals of variant gender and sexuality in classical Āyurvedic texts and commentary, especially, noting discussions of karmic etiology. This analysis rests on a critical passage cited in Sweet and Zwilling’s article relating to variant sexuality, in particular Caraka Saṃhitā Śārīrasthāna 2:17-21 with Cakrapañidatta’s commentary of this passage, and Suśruta Saṃhitā Śārīrasthāna 2.37-52. I will also discuss a passage dealing with the karmic etiology of leprosy, Suśruta Saṃhitā Nidānasthāna 5.28-5.32, as it sheds light on our discussion of karma transfer in the embryological passages. Translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.20

Part three, “Karma as Apparatus,” explores how the notion of karma in the early Āyurvedic texts functions in the formation of subjectivity with regards to the development of individuals of non-normative gender and sexuality. There I examine how the notion of karma in early India intersects Agamben’s model of an apparatus. I also consider Larson’s discussion of karma as a “sociology of knowledge,” Foucault’s work on biopower and Heidegger’s recognition of the ontological difference (the latter two elements are critical to Agamben’s analysis and discussion of apparatus), recognizing the ontological concern at the center of subject formation. I use the term ontological in a Heideggarian sense, to refer to concern with the nature of Being as distinct from beings, as entities, and the relationship, or difference between Being and beings.21

20 The translations that I use here were completed as a final Project for Second Year Sanskrit with Andrew Schelling, and in a Third Year Sanskrit Reading class with Dr. Loriliai Biernacki.
Part One: Āyurveda and Karma

While there is debate surrounding the origins of Āyurveda as coalesced in the brhattayī (the great threesome) and the laghutrayī (the lesser threesome), these texts form the base of a system of Indian medicine that extends back at least two millennia. Āyurveda translates as the knowledge (veda) of health, or duration of life (āyus). Monier Williams gives a definition of Āyurveda, that points us to the terms of the debate, stating that Āyurveda is “considered as a supplement of the Atharvaveda,”22 the Veda filled with healing remedies and charms. The notion of Āyurveda as a supplement, simultaneously elides the innovations found in the medical texts we will discuss and points to the hypothesis of Āyurveda’s continuity with its Vedic antecedents. However, the brahminical origins of Āyurveda23 are contested by Kenneth Zysk who argues instead for its heterodox origins at the interface between physicians and a community of Buddhist ascetics, śramaṇas, both groups relegated to societal margins.24 Zysk posits Āyurveda as an “empirico-rational” system superseding an earlier form of “magico-religious” healing found in the Atharvaveda,25 his approach exemplifying the bifurcated lens frequently adopted in contemporary studies on classical Āyurveda. Viewing Āyurveda as “empirico-rational” imposes a contemporary understanding of two completely distinct

spheres of science and religion onto the system delineated in classical Āyurvedic texts.\textsuperscript{26} If one were to take a bifurcated view of Āyurveda, then, for example, the inclusion of treatment regimes engaging mantra and ritual in classical Āyurvedic texts would be considered vestigial traces of Atharvavedic influence,\textsuperscript{27} and not the mainstream of classical “scientific” Āyurveda.\textsuperscript{28} Martha Selby suggests that one way to examine the interface between “medicine” and “religion” in classical Āyurvedic texts is to “see how religious and medical discourses work with each other to explain and mark specific physical phenomena.”\textsuperscript{29} In her analysis it is Sāṃkhya philosophy that provides a link between these two forms of discourses enabling them to function within the texts and providing the logic for ritual where it is found within.\textsuperscript{30} Here, I choose not to explicitly distinguish between the religious and the medical in the passages that we examine, proposing a softer distinction between the two that will enable us to view karma theory as a key part of the conceptual framework around health, healing and illness, rather than part of a distinct domain of religion.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{26} Heidegger argues that in the Western intellectual tradition the disciplines of religion and science are fundamentally “metaphysical” in that these seemingly disparate fields both ignore the ontological difference, the difference between being and Beings. This will become salient when I will engage Heidegger as background for Agamben’s discussion of the apparatus in part three. See “Being and Time” and “What is Metaphysics” in Heidegger and Krell, Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to the Task of Thinking (1964).


\textsuperscript{29} Selby, "Between Medicine and Religion: Discursive Shifts in Early Āyurvedic Narratives of Conception and Gestation," 42.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 45.

\textsuperscript{31} I am also emphatically not taking a perspective that essentializes all of Indian thought as inherently “religious.”
The origins of the classical Āyurvedic texts, in particular the earlier two members of the bṛhatrayī, the Caraka Saṁhitā and Suśruta Saṁhitā (Caraka’s Compendium and Suśruta’s Compendium), are also contested. The Caraka Saṁhitā is thought to have been written in layers, based on an earlier work that no longer exists called the Agniveśatantra, written by Agniveśa and then compiled, modified, and added to by Caraka sometime in the first two centuries C.E.\(^{32}\) Much of the volume is written as a series of questions posed by Agniveśa to Ātreya, a sage, who expounds the system of Āyurveda in his responses. There is no critical edition of the Caraka Saṁhitā, however, here I use the editions recommended by Dominic Wujastyk: a reprint of the Sanskrit publication edited by Ācārya including Cakrapāṇidatta’s 11\(^{th}\) century commentary\(^{33}\) and Sharma and Dash’s Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series translation.\(^{34}\) More is known of Cakrapāṇidatta, the commentator, whose father was the kitchen superintendent and minister for the king of Bengal, Nayapāla, of the mid 11\(^{th}\) century. His treatises are dedicated to Śiva, indicating that he was a Hindu, and he was an admired authority who authored his own works on Āyurveda and is widely commentated upon.\(^{35}\) While the Caraka Saṁhitā is a general medical treatise, the Suśruta Saṁhitā is a surgical compendium attributed to Suśruta and dated slightly later than the Caraka Saṁhitā. Written in several layers the text is through to have been completed prior to 500 A.D.\(^{36}\) Here I use P.V. Sharma’s Sanskrit

\(^{32}\) According to Jan Meulenbeld there is great scholarly debate regarding Caraka’s identity, and indeed whether he was even a specific person. See Gerrit Jan Meulenbeld, A History of Indian Medical Literature, Groningen Oriental Studies V. 15, 4 vols. (Groningen: E. Forsten, 1999) Vol. 1A 105-15.


\(^{35}\) Meulenbeld, A History of Indian Medical Literature Vol. 2A, 92-93.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., Vol. 1A, 351.
with English translation Chowkhamba edition for my own translations. The third member of the trio, the *Aṣṭāṅgaḥṛdaya Saṃhitā* is a general medical text produced around 600 A.D. and given its wide dissemination throughout Asia Dominic Wujastyk calls it “the greatest synthesis of Indian Medicine ever produced...” This study does not focus on the *Aṣṭāṅgaḥṛdaya Saṃhitā*, although examining this text closely for discussions related to the formation of gender and sexuality is a promising area for further inquiry given the text’s geographic scope of influence.

As evidenced by the histories of the medical texts themselves, Āyurveda as a codified system, or perhaps different but related systems, of therapeutics (*cikitsā*), arose in a complex religious and cultural milieu. During the period of the *Caraka Saṃhitā* compilation, “many primary issues in Indian Philosophy were also being debated, including the problems of salvation, selfhood, rebirth and *karma.*” In these classical Indian medical texts we see these debates arise through an interweaving of strands from the Indian philosophical schools including Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika, from the Vedic schools of the time, and according to some scholars, from Buddhist thought. Thus, in these texts, discussions of karma as an etiological factor occupy an illuminating crosscurrent with implications bearing on our inquiry into karma as an apparatus, or mechanism of subject formation in an early Indian context.

41 For example see *Caraka Saṃhitā Sārīraṇaḥ* Chapter 1 and Meulenbeld, *A History of Indian Medical Literature* Vol. 1A 28.
42 See ibid., Vol. 1A 110-12.
Before we turn to the karmic etiology of individuals of non-normative sexualities in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* and *Suśruta Saṃhitā* we must clarify what is meant by karma, and in particular, what issues arise from the treatment of karma in the classical medical texts. As proposed in the introduction I begin with one of the two models presented by Doniger in the introduction to her edited volume on karma and rebirth, the model distilled by Charles Keyes. Karma theory is an incredibly complex field but Keyes’ model provides us with a clear basis from which to proceed. He suggests that the three constituent strands of karma theory are “(1) explanation of present circumstances with reference to previous actions, including (possibly) actions prior to birth; (2) orientation of present actions toward future ends, including (possibly) those occurring after death; (3) moral basis on which action past and present is predicated.”

While this definition provides us with a helpful hinge through linking the notion of rebirth to a moral schema that bears on one’s actions past present and future, in classical Āyurvedic texts several complicating factors are foregrounded. These factors are related to two key points of tension that emerge across and within the religious traditions possessing a theory of karma and rebirth, that is to say the Hindu, Buddhist and Jain traditions: 1) the position of karma in relation to notions of human action and fate, and 2) transferability or non-transferability of karma. In examining these points of tension, it is important to note that karma is not a static notion, as it shifts over time and emerges through contradictory articulations, even within a particular text.

Let us begin with the first point of tension. How is karma related to human action and fate in a cultural system that presupposes rebirth? In his work on karma in the *Mahābhārata*,

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43 Doniger and Joint Committee on South Asia., eds., *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions* xi.
Bruce Long defines karma as “human action,” noting that within the text there is great ambivalence regarding the efficacy of karma or human action in the face of fate, or *daiva*. *Daiva* etymologically means, “that which pertains to the gods [devas],” but *daiva* is linked to humans insofar as God controls fate as it pertains both to humans, and to other gods. However, *daiva* is also at times conflated with karma, as in Doniger’s work on the Purāṇas where “karma and fate (vidhi, niyati or daivam) are sometimes equated and sometimes explicitly contrasted.” If karma is at once both, and neither, human action and fate, this implies that fate may also be the fabric woven from human beings’ deeds from previous lives. In either case, how does human action in one’s present life interact with fate? The conflation of human action with karma in the *Mahābhārata* may spring from the origins of the notion of karma, which both Herman Tull and Surendranath Dasgupta argue lay in the sacrificial rituals of the *Brāhmaṇas* of the Vedic period. Although the first mention of karma resembling the later Hindu doctrine is found in the *Bṛhadāranyaka* and *Chāndogya Upaniṣads*, Tull argues against the notion of a stark discontinuity between the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads*. Instead he demonstrates that the “doctrine of action” in the *Upaniṣads* originally referred to the human act of sacrifice central to the Brāhmaṇic cosmology. Highlighting a key passage from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, Tull demonstrates that the text likens the life of a human being to the elements of a sacrifice, thus extending the consequences of the manner of sacrifice, to consequences of the manner of the deeds of one’s entire life, resulting in what Frances Garrett calls an “ethicization” of karma.

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45 Doniger and Joint Committee on South Asia., eds., *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions* 24.
46 Ibid., xxii.
49 Ibid., 38.
It is precisely this “ethicization” that we will see, transforms the notion of karma into a kind of apparatus, or network of influence imbricated with the lives of individuals and communities in early Indian society.

Further illustrating the tension inherent in karma, as the hinge between human action and fate in a system of rebirth, Doniger cites a famous passage from the Devībhāgavata Purāṇa. In the passage, Devakī, who is fated to birth a child destined to kill the wicked king Kaṃsa, tries to convince her husband not to relinquish her final child, Kṛṣṇa. She exhorts him not to succumb to fatalism, “If you decide ‘What is to be, will be,’ then the medical books are in vain, and all the sacred recitation, and all effort is in vain.”51 This dramatic vignette provides us with a direct link to the way that the tension between human action and fate as they relate, or correspond, to karma play out in the Caraka Saṃhitā.52 There is much at stake in terms of Āyurveda’s cikitsā, or system of treatment, for if karma falls on the side of fate, as a combination of divine ordination and crystallized actions from one’s past defining the present, then why should one follow prescriptions regarding diet, lifestyle, seasonal regime, sexual practices, etcetera? It is clearly in the doctrinal interest of the Caraka Saṃhitā to present karma in a manner that retains the primacy of present human action in the outcome of one’s own life. Mitchell Weiss argues that the interjection of the notion of prajñā-‘parādha, “violations of good sense,” appearing in the Caraka Saṃhitā as a key etiological factor for diseases, shifts the emphasis in discussions of karma, from fate determined to some extent by past lives (and therefore seemingly immutable) to present behavior.53

50 Garrett, Religion, Medicine and the Human Embryo in Tibet 22.  
51 Doniger and Joint Committee on South Asia., eds., Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions 25.  
52 For a discussion of this tension as it plays out in Tibetan embryological texts see Garrett, Religion, Medicine and the Human Embryo in Tibet 142.  
Car. has in effect redefined the concept of karma, shifting the emphasis from past lives to present behavior in such a way as to make it clinically germane. In doing this with the concept of prajñā'-parādhā, Car. adds force to its own advocacy of a salutary lifestyle. One finds a greater willingness on the part of the Car. to venture farther from the doctrinal escape hatch—karma—than those later texts in which medical and speculative notions become more highly intertwined in their clinical applications.\textsuperscript{54} The later texts that he mentions here include the Suśruta Saṃhitā and the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya Saṃhitā. There are several passages in the Caraka Saṃhitā that expose the tension between present action and past life action in terms of disease etiology. In the Caraka Saṃhitā Vimānasthāna 3.29-37, Agniveśa asks Ātreya if the lifespan of individuals is predetermined. In the ensuing exposition, Ātreya draws a distinction between daiva, a term that we discussed earlier as fate, translated by Sharma and Dash as “what is done during the past life... where the effect is pre-determined”\textsuperscript{55} and puruṣakāra, “what is done during the existing life... where the effect is based upon human effort.”\textsuperscript{56} It is the relative strength and merit of these factors that determine one’s longevity. In Caraka Saṃhitā Śārīrasthāna 2.39-47, in the context of a discussion on the causative factors of disease, the concepts of fate and human action arise again, however the Sanskrit terms used in verse 2.44 are daiva and karma.\textsuperscript{57} Cakrapāṇidatta’s commentary explains that what is meant by karma (neuter) is puruṣakāra (masculine), and that this is indicated partly by the use of “saḥ” the masculine pronoun in reference to karma in the second line of the stanza.\textsuperscript{58} So here we find karma meaning solely the effects of the deeds of this life, manifesting as a result of human effort in this life in tension with a separate notion of fate. However, in the same verse we learn that, “The unrighteous deeds of the previous life induces

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} Agniveśa, Cakrapāṇidatta, Sharma and Dash, Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṃhitā: Text with English Translation & Critical Exposition Based on Cakrapāṇi Datta’s Ayurveda Dīpikā 151.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{57} Here I use Sharma and Dash’s translation of Caraka Saṃhitā Śārīrasthāna of these verses. See ibid., 363.

\textsuperscript{58} The verse reads: daivam purā yat kṛtamucyte tat tat puruṣam yattviha karma dṛṣṭam/ pravṛttihetuviṣamah sa dṛṣṭo nivṛttiheturhi samaḥ sa eva//
one to diseases...." The emphasis pivots back to the impact of deeds in this lifetime as “one who resorts to wholesome diet and regimens... seldom gets diseases.” This oscillation reflects the complexity of distinguishing between daiva and puruṣakāra in thinking about the function of karma in these passages. What is clear, however, is that according to the Caraka Saṃhitā, one’s actions, both in a past life and in the present, impact the present life. This raises the question- to what extent do the actions of one individual, whether in this life or a previous life, impact another person? It is to this issue, as another key point at stake in etiological discussions of karma in the Caraka Saṃhitā that we will now turn.

Critical to the notion of karma that we will see emerge in passages on the development of individuals of non-normative sexualities, is the issue of the transferability of karma. Doniger notes that while in the Jain tradition, karma is non-transferrable, in much of Hinduism and Buddhism there is a notion of karma as being transferred between individuals. In Buddhist tradition this may take place through the ritual transfer of merit and in some contemporary studies we find evidence for a conception of karma that us “corporate” or common to a group of people forming some type of community. Doniger argues that the transfer of karma is most likely to take place through food and sex as dense transfer points of Hindu “social activity and caste interactions.” Pointing to the Vedic roots of Hindu karma, Doniger argues for a relationship between the śrāddha of the Vedic period, through which a deceased parent’s

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59 Agniveśa, Cakrapāṇidatta, Sharma and Dash, Agniveśa’s Caraka Samhitā: Text with English Translation & Critical Exposition Based on Cakrapāṇi Datta’s Āyurveda Dīpikā 363.
60 Ibid., 364.
61 Doniger and Joint Committee on South Asia., eds., Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions 37 (also see introduction).
64 Doniger and Joint Committee on South Asia., eds., Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions 29.
entry into heaven (or into the next birth in the post-Vedic period) is assured through ritual offerings of food to the gods performed by their children, effectively making children responsible for their parents even in the next birth. By tracing the etymology of the word *piṇḍa*, the ball of food offered in the *śrāddha*, forward in time to its meaning as embryo, or ball of flesh in late Purānic texts\textsuperscript{65} and Āyurvedic texts, respectively, Doniger demonstrates a reversal, or perhaps a looping back, of the chain of causality. In these later texts, it is the actions and thoughts of parents that are responsible for the development of the *piṇḍa*, the child, rather than the *piṇḍa*, serving as the nutrients offered by the children to assure their parent’s safe passage. Although the explicit notion of parental karma, as such, is not present in the Purāṇas, she finds the underlying notion central to the texts\textsuperscript{66} citing stories where the birth as well as the physical makeup of the child is determined by parental karma. This tension is also manifest in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* as Weiss argues indirectly for a notion of parental transfer of karma,

> Recognition of the value of knowledgeable intervention predominates throughout *Car.*, not just with respect to maintaining health and staving off death, but also with detailed directives for promoting fertility and the birth of a healthy, intelligent male child. This is inconsistent with the more rigid interpretations of the karma doctrine holding that it is the karma of the fetus remaining from previous lives, not the activities of the parents, that determines the sex and characteristics of the child.\textsuperscript{67}

What is implicit here, is that the activities of the parents, their actions, are bound inextricably with the karma of their offspring. The *Caraka Saṃhitā* is “inconsistent with more rigid interpretation of karma doctrine” not only in its concern with the production of a healthy male baby, but also in its warnings against the production of the “other” non-normative genre of baby. However, rather than viewing this as an instance where the prescriptive empirical

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 6-7.  
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 22.  
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{67} Weiss, "Caraka Saṃhitā on the Doctrine of Karma,"  96-97.}
Āyurvedic treatment comes into conflict with a “rigid” religious interpretation of karma, I suggest that we view this as a moment where the discourse of Āyurveda draws upon karma as an explanatory schema appropriate to the cultural and historical moment, dynamically reshaping the notion of karma through its modified presentation in the Caraka Samhitā.

Paul Hiebert’s study on “Karma in a South Indian Village” proposes that karma is one of several competing explanation traditions marshaled strategically to address different types of issues faced by the villagers of his study site of Konduru. Hiebert organizes different types of explanation systems on a grid, distinguishing between empirical, or this-worldly, and transempirical, other-worldly, explanation traditions. In his schema, karma, astrology and “magic” are examples of otherworldly explanatory traditions and the “folk natural sciences” are this-worldly and empirical explanatory traditions.68 He divides karma from astrology and magic explaining the manner that each is employed by the villagers: karma to address higher order issues such as the “ultimate order and meaning of life and cosmos,” astrology and magic to deal with the more proximate category of “historical events of this world and human life,” and the folk natural sciences to engage issues of immediate concern related to the “empirically ordered society and world.”69 This grid is on one hand helpful, particularly bearing in mind that Hiebert found that individuals commonly used more than one mode of explanatory tradition in any given situation. As we will see in the passages to follow, a host of behavioral and physical explanations function alongside karma, and the way I read them, they are not competing explanatory traditions, but imbricated processes. On the other hand, Hiebert’s grid reifies the bifurcated approach to Āyurveda I am seeking to avoid. Considering the empirically ordered social and physical world as a category of concern distinct from the order of the

68 Hiebert, “Karma and Other Explanation Traditions in a South Indian Village,” 121.
69 Ibid.
cosmos seems to overlook the intertwined nature of these two domains when viewed through the explanatory tradition of karma. Certainly the cosmic explanation of karma serves to locate people within distinct positions within the larger social order. I suggest that in the excerpts from Āyurvedic texts that we will examine we do not find a stark distinction between explanatory traditions, the doctrine of karma is an integral part of the system of Āyurveda as it is articulated in the textual passages we will examine, and in turn karma theory is reshaped by these passages. Now we will turn to the Caraka Saṃhitā and Suśruta Saṃhitā to examine the issue of karmic etiology, one that neatly encapsulates both the questions of 1) the relationship between karma, fate and human action, and the 2) the transferability of karma, illuminating Sweet and Zwilling’s elision of this key apparatus in the process.
Part Two: Karma as Etiology

Perhaps the key passage on the development of individuals of non-normative gender and sexuality in the Caraka Saṃhitā, and one centrally employed by Sweet and Zwilling, is Caraka Saṃhitā Śārīrasthāna 2:17-21. Verse 2.17, poses a question which is answered in the subsequent verses.

Caraka Saṃhitā Śārīrasthāna 2:17-2:21

2:17 By what means are one having the mark of female and male (dviretas), one of wind afflicted seed (pavanendriya), a trait carrier (saṃskārarāhī), male and female hermaphrodite (naranārisaṇḍau), a bent one (vakrī), one who derives sexual excitement through watching others (irṣyābhirati), and a wind-affected hermaphrodite (vātikāsaṇḍaka), produced?

kasmādviretāḥ pavanendriya vā saṃskārarāhī naranārisaṇḍau71//
vakrī tathersyābhiratiḥ kathāṃ vā samjāyate vātikāsaṇḍakā vā//

2:18 When the embryo is of equal parts [male and female seed] and the male seed is afflicted, one having the mark of female and male (dviretas) comes into being. Having struck the abode of seed (śukra) [of the embryo] the wind causes wind-affected seed (śukra).

bijāt saṃāṃśadupataptabījāt strīpumsalingī bhavati dviretāḥ/
śukrāṣayaṃ garbhagatasya hatvā karoti váyuḥ pavanendriyatvam//

2:19 Wind makes someone a trait carrier71 (saṃskāra-vāha) by opening the door to the abode of seed (śukra). The sickness of man and woman is the cause of scant and slow seed, lack of strength, and impotence [of the male and female types of hermaphrodite].

śukrāṣayadvāravighaṭṭanena saṃskārarāhāṃ kurute ‘nilaśca/
mandālpabjāvavālāvaharsau klibau ca heturviktivāyaśya//

2:20 If there is a lack of desire or physical obstruction at the time of coitus on the part of the mother, and the father’s seed is weak, this may give rise to a bent one (vakrī). They say that the cause of cause of one a person who derives sexual excitement through watching others [or “jealousy”] (irṣyārati) is that both parents have a lack of passion and enjoy watching others [in the act of sexual intercourse].

māturvyavāyapratighenā vakrī syādvījādaurbalyatayaḥ pitaśca/
irṣyābhībhūtāvapi mandaharśāvīrṣyāratereva vadanti hetum//

70 According to Monier Williams the correct spelling is Sandra.
71 I translate this differently from Sharma and Dash who use the clinical term “anaphrodesia,” the condition of requiring aphrodisiacs for stimulation. Agniweśa, Cakrapāṇidatta, Sharma and Dash, Agniweśa’s Caraka Saṃhitā: Text with English Translation & Critical Exposition Based on Cakrapāṇi Datta’s Ayurveda Dīpikā 355. I will discuss this in greater detail in a moment.
Indeed one whose testicles are gone to ruin from the fault (doṣa) of wind and fire is a hermaphrodite whose condition is caused by afflicted wind (vāṭika ṣaṇḍaka). In this way, these are the eight types of afflictions;⁷² they are defined as being produced by karma.

vāyvagnidoṣādvṛṣaṇau tu yasya nāśam gatau vāṭikaṣaṇḍakah/
ityevamaṣṭau viktiprakārāḥ karmātmakānāmupalakṣaṇīyāḥ//

In a moment I will discuss the way that Sweet and Zwilling engage this passage by obscuring the issue of karma as an etiological factor, and I will examine in detail the ways that a notion of karma is interwoven throughout by analyzing the Sanskrit terms used in this classificatory scheme. First though, let us take a broad look at the passage and speculate on the function of karma within. The list of individuals, or “afflictions” delineated here are defined by physiological and behavioral traits related to non-normative gender and sexuality, for example, hermaphrodites with predominantly male or female characteristics, or an individual who achieves arousal through observing the sexual intimacy of others. Initially, the primary etiological factors presented in the passage are wind (pavan, vāt, vāyu) and parental behavior. Wind is a common etiological factor throughout Āyurveda, bearing the qualities of roughness, lightness, coldness, instability, coarseness and dryness.⁷³ Here we see the wind responsible for afflictions of the parental and natal seed, implying in verse 2.18 that the father’s wind-afflicted (here indicating sparse or weak) seed renders the nascent embryo vulnerable to a parallel affliction. Vincanne Adams explains that in classical Tibetan medicine wind is understood as a mechanism linking karma to the body, “Winds are responsible for movement in the body, as they are outside of it. Winds are aroused by the presence of karma— the effects of deeds from past lives.”⁷⁴ Given that classical Tibetan medicine was seminally influenced by Āyurveda as

⁷² See verse 2.17.
⁷³ See Caraka Saṃhitā Śūtrasthāna 12.4.
expounded in the *Aṣṭāṅghahṛdaya Samhitā* it is probable this conceptual link is operative in our passages and can help us understand how karma may be transmitted from parent to child as well as how karma acts through wind on the physical substances of the body. If karma stirs up winds that afflict parental seed—seed being the material bearing a portion of the etiological responsibility for the birth of an “afflicted” child (the child’s own karma and wind-affliction bearing another significant portion)—then the child is a carrier of not only its own karma, but also that of the parent(s). We learn through the commentary on verse 2.19 (which I will translate and discuss below) that a “trait carrier” (*samskāravāha*) is one who requires aphrodisiacs for stimulation and that several of the types of individuals delineated in verses 2.17-2.21 fall into this category. Of interest in verse 2.19 is the notion that through “sickness of the parents,” *vikṛti*, a term bearing a negative moral valence, which we may infer from the verses here indicates impaired fertility, the children become similarly infertile, and are known as “trait carriers.” In verse 2.20, we see the behavior and comportment of the parents, namely their lack of passion and voyuerism, giving rise to the same as a pathology in the offspring. Both wind (*vāyu*) and fire (*agni*) are presented as disease causing factors in the final verse, but ultimately, both are subsumed under the ultimate etiological factor, karma. These afflictions, regardless of the presence of additional causative factors, are by definition, attributable to karma.

In early Āyurvedic texts, contemporary Āyurvedic practice in the United States, and in popular Indian culture illnesses that are untreatable often are attributed to karma.

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Thus enabling the system to grapple with its own functional limitations while incorporating all maladies within its rhetorical scope. However, the delineation of types of individuals with non-normative gender and sexuality presentations as “afflictions” caused by karma seems to be more than an attempt to explain an untreatable malady or an explanation of last resort. As the verse unfolds we see the idea that one’s own sexual behavior, desire, gender etc., link not only to one’s own karma, but also to the actions, comportment, and health of the parents, suggesting the transfer of karma from parent to child, a type of karma transfer which I will call here, parental karma, though this term is not found in the texts we are examining. The verses begin with wind and end with karma, and in the interval, linking these factors, is the figure of the parent, including his or her own behavior, desire, comportment, and seed. This labeling, classification, and explanation of the development of non-normative individuals implicates one’s intimate life and bodily comportment in a system of power exerted over humans as a species, at least as imagined in the discursive realm of Āyurveda. The notion of parental karma implies a kind of intensification of the theory of karma, as it would certainly give one double pause to consider that one’s sexual behavior or even one’s desire, may blight one’s children. In a culture where offspring, and particularly male offspring, are valued more highly than females, this is something that I observed first-hand as a patient at an Āyurvedic clinic in the U.S., when an illness which I tried to treat for many months through Āyurvedic protocol did not resolve, and eventually I was diagnosed with a “karmic illness.” I found diagnostic resolution the following day when my appendix ruptured.  


are essential to one’s safe passage to the next life or afterlife,\(^{80}\) parental karma indicates a subject that is exhorted to self-consciously regulate his or her own intimate behavior, as the nature and health of the soul of one’s offspring, at least partly, hinges upon it.

One of the central pieces of evidence for the “First Medicalization” provided by Zwilling and Sweet is their translation of the passage I have presented above. Rather than a full translation, they distill a list of the eight “gender/sexual abnormalities” based on verse 2.17. Here I provide Sharma and Dash’s translation for verse 17, which is a list of the eight types of sexually abnormal conditions, because it provides a glimpse of the way that contemporary translations of Āyurvedic texts tend to use contemporary biomedical terminology (or perform a “medicalization” of the text itself), conveniently juxtaposed with the Sanskrit terms for each of the eight conditions, or types of non-normative individuals.

What are the reasons for dviretas (hermaphroditism), pavanendriyatva (aspermia), samskārvāhī (anaphrodesia), male sterility, female sterility, vakrī (hypospadia), īrsyābhirati \(^{81}\) (mixoscopia) and vātikāṣaṇḍaka (eviration) of the procreation?\(^{82}\)

Sweet and Zwilling’s translation of these types will assist our understanding of the contemporary clinical terms used by Sharma and Dash, but here, we should note they use different forms for some of the terms. This may partly be due to the fact that Sharma and Dash’s translation is a list of conditions, for example dviretas as hermaphroditism, rather than a typology of non-normative individuals as in Sweet and Zwilling’s reading where dviretas is

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\(^{80}\) See Doniger and Joint Committee on South Asia, eds., *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions* 4-5.

\(^{81}\) This seems to be an error, the correct Sanskrit spelling is īrsyābhirati.

\(^{82}\) Agniveśa, Cakrapāṇidatta, Sharma and Dash, *Agniveśa’s Caraka Samhitā: Text with English Translation & Critical Exposition Based on Cakrapāṇi Datta’s Ayurveda Dipikā* 355. Note the contemporary clinical language used by Sharma and Dash in their widely used translation of the CS. This is common of contemporary translations of the *Caraka Samhitā, Suśruta Samhitā* and other Āyurvedic texts. Though Sweet and Zwilling perform their own translation of the Āyurvedic texts that they cite in their work, it is interesting to think about the way that the use of this bio-medical language performs a contemporary “medicalization” of these the texts themselves.
translated as “the true hermaphrodite.” The only place where Sharma and Dash’s list deviates from the Sanskrit in verse 2.17 is in their choice of the term *pavanendriyatva*, to mean aspermia, the -tva suffix indicates having the quality of something, rather than simply *pavanendriya*, as a noun, and they draw the former term from verse 2.18, so indeed it is found within the text. Here the term *pavana* is a masculine noun meaning wind, in Āyurveda wind being the main source of afflictions of the body and mind, and *indriya* means semen, although it often indicates the five organs of sense perceptions. As a compound *pavanendriyatva* means having the quality of wind-afflicted semen, or as Sharma and Dash explain, aspermia.

Sweet and Zwilling’s list of types of sexuality and gender variant individuals draws the eight categories from verse 2.17 where the question framing the subsequent verses is posed, but they choose slightly different terms for most of the individuals based on the following verses, 2.18-2.21. Their list runs as follows: “the true hermaphrodite, having both male and female genitalia” (*dviretas*), “the man with a ‘windy organ’ (that is having no semen)” (*pavanendriya*), “those who employ special means such as aphrodisiacs for obtaining sexual potency” (*samskāravāhin*), “the effeminate homosexual male,” “the masculine lesbian female,” “the man with a bent penis” (*vakrīdhvaja*), “the voyeur” (*īrṣyādbhībhūta*), and “the man born without testicles and therefore sterile” (*vātikasaṇḍha*). In all cases but one they use slightly different Sanskrit terms than those used in the translation of 2.17 by Sharma and Dash. While in several cases this difference does not seem to bear significant meaning, in other cases, we will see that the terms they choose obscure the role of karma in the passage. Bearing no additional meaning is their use of *vātikasaṇḍha* rather than *vātikasaṇḍhaka* as in the Sanskrit. Here they correct a misspelling noted by Monier Williams, by adding the aspirate, but in

84 Ibid.
omitting the –ka suffix they are not performing a significant change of meaning. In this case
the –ka may indicate a diminutive, or the idea of a person who is X, that is, a sanḍha,
hermaphrodite that is vātika, produced or caused to come into being, by a disorder of the wind.

However, some of the terms that Sweet and Zwilling choose to emphasize lend
significance to my argument that they are overlooking the significant factor of karma. For
example, instead of using īrṣyābhirati from verse 2.17, they use īrṣyābhībhuṭa from verse 2.19. In
Monier Williams the term īrṣyābhirati, derived from the verbal root īry, meaning to envy, is
defined as equivalent to īrṣyaka “a particular kind of semi-impotent man whose power is
stimulated through jealous feelings caused by seeing others in the act of sexual union.”85 The
feminine noun, īrṣyā, means jealousy and abhirati, means pleasure or delight, so the tatpuruṣa
compound īrṣyābhirati, indicates pleasure or delight in or through jealousy, and in the context
of the verses, as well as the meaning of īrṣyabhirati, we understand that this means jealousy
incited by watching the sex of others. Sweet and Zwilling choose the term īrṣyābhībhuṭa that
appears in verse 2.20 and here, abhībhuṭa, indicates injured or overcome, so we have, a
meaning of one overcome by jealousy. The authors’ choice of īrṣyābhībhuṭa appears to bear no
significant shift in meaning, although it does lend a negative valence, however, in verse 2.20
the term appears in the dual as īrṣyābhībhuṭau and refers to the parents’ being overcome by
jealousy as a causal factor for the child’s nature. By choosing this term rather than īrṣyābhirati
(2.17) or īrṣyārati (same meaning also found in verse 2.20) Sweet and Zwilling simultaneously
allude to and overtly overlook this very direct reference to the impact of parental karma on
embryonic development in the verse.

85 See Monier-Williams, Leumann, Cappeller and Īśvaracandra, Sanskrit-English Dictionary: Etymologically and
Philologically Arranged  170.
In Sweet and Zwilling’s list, we find two items with explicitly etiological information taken from the subsequent four verses (see my translations above). First they explain that dvīretas, the “true hermaphrodite” is caused by both parents contributing equal portions of the male and female reproductive fluids, in this case the male semen and female blood. Predicate to the formation of a “normal” embryo is the predominance of one or the other fluid in the womb; if blood (rakta) predominates then the child will be female, and if semen predominates (śukra) then the child will be male. Second they explain that the vakrīdhvaja (I will return to their use of this Sanskrit term in a moment), whom they define as “the man with a bent penis,” is caused either by a mother’s “lack of sexual desire” or from “the weakness of the father’s seed.” In their introduction to their list compiled from verses 2.17-21 they use the term “genetic” to describe the “abnormalities” found within. The use of this contemporary biomedical term emphasizes their argument of “medicalization.” However it also implies the transmission of traits from parent to child, via some unspecified vector, in the context of abnormal (and presumably also normal) embryonic development. As we will see in a moment, it is not only the quality of parental “seed” that impacts the embryo but also parental behavior and comportment, all of these factors indicating one’s moral stance in the world. In the same way that we can understand the embryo to be impacted partly by its own past life karma, the parental seed, not only in its quality, but also in its quantity and availability due to behavior, is

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87 *Caraka Samhitā Sārīrasthāna* 2.12.

88 Ibid.

89 Doniger notes, “It is worthy of note that the ‘cognitive assumption’ underlying normal birth processes only becomes explicit in an abnormal circumstance….,” Doniger and Joint Committee on South Asia., eds., *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*. 9. Sweet and Zwilling, "The First Medicalization: The Taxonomy and Etiology of Queerness in Classical Indian Medicine," 593.

90 Recall that we have posited the link between karma and seed through the mechanism of wind.
impacted by the parents’ karma insofar as their past and present actions manifest in the present mind and body. Garrett’s recent study on Tibetan embryology provides us with further understanding of how karma links to moral agency and manifests in the body,

The vital role of karma is ubiquitous in all Tibetan medical notions of embodiment, seen at the level of embryogenesis and also at the level of an adult’s maintenance of health. Because health is defined as a particular balance of the individual’s humoral constitution, and human action is a central feature in defining this balance, the human body is quite literally defined, or created, by one’s moral agency.91

A good narrative example of this can be found in the Mahābhārata, when the deep aversions of Ambikā and Ambālikā to the sage Vyāsa’s physical countenance result in the birth of the blind Dṛtarāṣṭra and extremely pale Pāṇḍu.92 In the case of vakrīdhvaja we see ways that the actions of the parents, in the case of the mother’s lack of desire (the root cause of which can be imputed to either parent), or the weakness of the father’s seed, imprints a trait on the child. Like begets like, so either her lack of desire or the father’s lack of seed leads to the birth of an individual with his own impotency issues, and according to this paradigm, if by chance the offspring is able to beget, he would in turn beget a child with some sexual or gender abnormality. The text not only provides an explanation for why these types of “abnormal” individuals are produced, but also in functioning as the inverse of passages prescribing practices to beget a health male child,93 this list reads as an inventory of what not to do, what karma, as actions taken in this life (puruṣakāra), not to accrue so as to prevent the birth of an abnormal child in this or the next lifetime.

As noted earlier, Sweet and Zwilling use the term “genetic” rather than karma, consistently eliding the issue of karma as a causative factor in the passages translated above. In

91 Garrett, Religion, Medicine and the Human Embryo in Tibet 152.
an article published three years subsequent to “The First Medicalization,” addressing the formation of the Third Sex in Jain literature- in the conclusion- Sweet and Zwilling perhaps belatedly recognize the link between their notion of “genetic” and karma, writing, “Their attribution of distinct biological and ‘genetic’ (i.e., karmic) causes for the three types of sexuality….” However, in “The First Medicalization” a recognition of the importance of karma as an etiological factor is absent not only from their discussion but also submerged in the translation choices that they make, for example, in their use of the term vakrīdhvaja, which they translate as a man with a bent penis. Vakrī appears in a compound for vakra and derives from the verbal root vak meaning to be crooked or to go crookedly (think not only Lombard street but also Tricky Dick) and dhvaja indicates male or female genitalia. In the CS 2.20 this type of individual is listed not as vakrīdhvaja, but simply as vakrī, meaning curved, but also, “crooked in disposition, cunning, fraudulent, dishonest, evasive, ambiguous.” So in the original text there is ambiguity regarding the meaning and the implication of a reference to conduct and morality. Turning to Cakrapāṇidatta’s commentary, we find the following explanation of the verse,

“From the obstruction of the mother in intercourse” means that in the time of intercourse the mother is lacking desire or there is uneven placing of the [male] organ. Due to this, his [the father’s] semen is prevented from sexually approaching the womb, and the one born of this union is crooked. This means that by the weakness of the father’s seed in the union, a crooked one may be produced. Here ‘of the weak person’ means that the action (karma) is weak, and of that weak person the state of being is weak, through these means of the father’s seed, weakness is made.”

94 Zwilling and Sweet, ”'Like a City Ablaze': The Third Sex and the Creation of Sexuality in Jain Religious Literature,” 383.
Here the commentary makes explicit what is implied by vakrī in verse 2.20, that crookedness is a weakness in the offspring produced by the weakness of the parent. “Here ‘of the weak person’ means that the action (karma) is weak, and of that weak person the state of being is weak, by these means of the father’s seed, weakness is made.” In this sentence, we see a chain of karmic causality linking the father’s karma (action in the sense of past and present actions in the world) with his “being,” or demeanor, and his physiology, in particular, with the form of his seed. It is through the seed, that his karma is transmitted to his child who is also made of “weakness,” which in this case is equivalent to being “bent.” By using vakrīdhvaja rather than vakrī, the former term bearing the specific meaning of crooked generative organ, and being found nowhere in verses 2.17-2.21 or their commentary, Sweet and Zwilling foreclose on the broader meaning of vakrī. As we saw in their translation of verse 2.17, Sharma and Dash define vakrī as hypospadias, a congenital condition in which the opening to the urethra is located on the underside of the penis. Both of these definitions elide the other arena of meaning implicit in vakrī through emphasis on physical deformity, that is, the notion that vakrī is a subtler matter of comportment relating to one’s station in life, one’s karma, and importantly, to one’s offspring.

There is one significant difference in my translation of the Caraka Saṃhitā passage compared to that provided by Sweet and Zwilling and Sharma and Dash—my translation of saṃskāravāha in verse 2.19 reflects a secondary, non-technical, meaning related to karmic etiology. Saṃskāravāha is a technical term, although it is not presented as such in Monier Williams nor in Apte, and it is translated by Sharma and Dash “anaphrodesiac” which is the

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95 Key to an Āyurvedic understanding of the body is the system of seven tissues (dhatu-s) as successive byproducts of metabolism, locating seed (ṣukra) as the deepest and most refined corporeal tissue layer.

equivalent to Sweet and Zwilling’s description, “Those who employ special means such as aphrodisiacs for obtaining sexual potency.”

According to Sharma and Dash’s translation the verse reads, “Obstruction of the seminal passage by vāta [wind] makes the offspring samskāravāha (anaphrodesiac).” The commentary on this verse leads us both to this technical meaning, and also to an understanding of a possible secondary meaning that one may read into the notion of “trait carrier.” As Cakrapāṇidatta explains,

By “opening the abode of seed etc.” (śukra) he explains who the “trait carrier” (samskāravāha) is. “By bursting open the door” means by corrupting the passage [of seed, i.e. making it impossible for him to ejaculate]. By the techniques of enema and aphrodisiac practices etc. his seed is ameliorated (paraṁ), his channels become pure and unspoiled—he is called “trait carrier” (samskāravāha). Here by “trait carrier” it is said in Suśruta that these [types of individuals] have the nature of impotency etc., since these have a particular trait, they abandon their seed [prematurely], therefore it is said, “From a father of excessively low virility, a man would be impotent….”

In this passage from the commentary, Cakrapāṇidatta refers to a list of six types of individuals outlined by Suśruta in the Śārīrasthāna 2.37-2.52 (which I translate below) naming them all as examples of the samskāravāha or individual who requires the use of enemas and aphrodisiacs for arousal. However, as we see in the later part of the commentary, that this trait is linked to the paternal characteristic of low virility and it is transmitted to the son who is impotent. I render samskāravāha literally as a “trait carrier,” “one marked by deeds,” suggesting a possible secondary meaning of one bearing the marks of karma, according to the emphasis given by Cakrapāṇidatta to the transmission of this characteristic, and his suggestion that multiple

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categories of non-normative individuals are subsumed within the category of samskaravaha.

According to this meaning the verse reads as follows,

Wind makes someone a trait carrier⁹⁹ (samskaravaha) by opening the door to the abode of seed (śukra). The sickness of man and woman is the cause of scant and slow seed, lack of strength, and impotence [of the male and female types of hermaphrodite].

Saṃskāra bears many meanings, including adornment and purification, here, technically referring to the act of utilizing an enema or aphrodisiac therapy, but it also translates as the “impression in the mind of acts done in a former existence.”¹⁰⁰ This latter sense indicates that saṃskāra is linked to rebirth and to karma as a trait carried forward from life to life, an impression of the mind that may manifest as a behavioral trait. “An act, in Sanskrit karman, involves an intention, a physical or verbal action, and the results of the action, and actions leave upon the actor an imprint that travels with the individual across lifetimes.”¹⁰¹ The act or carrying or bearing, is indicated by vāha, which can also mean a vehicle. Therefore, saṃskaravaha may mean trait carrier, indicating that the individuals of non-normative sexualizes are marked by karma, and emphasizing the importance of karma as an etiological factor as stated clearly in verse 2.21 “In this way these are the eight types of afflictions; they are defined as being produced by karma.”

Mitchell Weiss suggests that through examining Āyurvedic literature one sees an influence of “traditional ideas about karma”¹⁰² that increases over time, and this may be reflected in the more explicit treatment given to the notion of karma in Cakrapaññidatta’s

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⁹⁹ This is a very different translation than Sharma and Dash who translate this as anaphrodesia, that is the condition of requiring aphrodisiacs for stimulation. Sweet and Zwilling give a similar definition as Sharma and Dash. Janet Gyatso’s translation lends a slightly different emphasis, “a condition of weak sexual desire.” See Gyatso, "One Plus One Makes Three: Buddhist Gender, Monasticism, and the Law of the Non-Excluded Middle," 96 (See footnote 14). I will discuss this in greater detail in a moment.


¹⁰¹ Garrett, Religion, Medicine and the Human Embryo in Tibet 128.

commentary written a millennium after the text of the *Caraka Saṃhitā* itself. The adoption of the notion of prajñā-parādha in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* indicates a shift towards emphasis on the behavior of an individual in her or his present life, however, Weiss notes the use of the term aparādha, rather than prajñā-parādha, in subsequent Āyurvedic texts such as the *Suśruta Saṃhitā* and *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya Saṃhitā*. Aparādha as a noun meaning transgression or sin, derives from the verbal prefix apa and the verbal root rādh, taken together meaning to offend or sin. Use of this term rather than prajñā-parādha marks a shift to an etiological model emphasizing karma as fate rather than human action. Now we will consider a passage from the *Suśruta Saṃhitā Nidānasthāna*, in order to see how this tension plays out in a passage addressing the etiology of kuṣṭha, leprosy, one of the most feared diseases.

*Suśruta Saṃhitā Nidānasthāna* 5.28-5.32

5.28 The menstrual blood and semen of a man and woman are spoiled by the disease of leprosy. It is known that offspring born to them are also leprous.

strīpunṣayoh kuṣṭhadoṣāduṣṭaśonitaśukrayoh/
yadapatyaṁ tayorjātām jīneyaṁ tadapi kuṣṭhitam//

5.29 The leprosy of a person who is prudent may be cured so long as it is situated in the skin, blood and flesh. Situated in the fat it is curable, but later, incurable.

kuṣṭhamāṭmavataḥ sādhyam tvagraktapiśīśritam/
medogataṁ bhavedāpyamasādhyamata uttaram//

5.30 By killing Brahmans, women and good people, by stealing the belongings of others etc. They proclaim that by these actions (karma) the sinful disease of leprosy is produced.

brahmastraśajjanavadhaparasvaharanādibih/
karmabhibhī pāparoṣasya prāhuḥ kuṣṭhasya sambhavam//

5.31 If one dies from leprosy it comes again in the next birth. Due to this there is no disease more difficult than leprosy; in this way leprosy is well known.

mriyate yadi kuṣṭhena punarjāte ‘pi gacchati/
nātaḥ kuṣṭataro rogo yathā kuṣṭha prakārtitam//

5.32 Persisting in conduct and diet is known as a great action. By adherence to austerities and specific herbal medicines one is freed and attains a meritorious way.
This passage in the Suśruta Saṃhitā address the two key tensions in notions of karma in medical texts that we have been discussing— the tension between human action and fate in karma theory, and the transferability of karma, in particular, from parents to children. The opening stanza indicates that it is due to abnormality of the parental seed that leprosy is passed on to the infected individual’s offspring. In stanza 5.30 we learn that leprosy is due to karma in the form of sinful actions, and in stanza 5.31 that these actions can have taken place in the same life or a previous life. Thus leprosy can follow a sinful individual from lifetime to lifetime, or it can be transmitted from parent to child, in the latter case it is the karma of the parents accrued through sinful actions that impacts the parental seed and is transmitted to the child. Leprosy is presented as immutable in that it follows an individual from one incarnation to the next, while at the same time, hope is held out for those who are able to be persistent in right conduct and regimen. In this way an individual, and presumably his or her offspring, may be freed from the blight of kuṣṭha. If we bear in mind the absence of a notion of prajñā-‘parādha in this text, then we see that the negative human acts causing leprosy shift away from the realm of choice and towards a notion of fate, as they manifest as sin emanating from the soul rather than as “violations of good sense.” In this regard, the etiology of leprosy presents as paradigmatically similar to the etiology of individuals with non-normative gender and sexuality in the next passage we examine from the Suśruta Saṃhitā.

In addition to the Caraka Saṃhitā Śārīraṣṭhāna 2:17-21, Sweet and Zwilling also draw on the Suśruta Saṃhitā Śārīraṣṭhāna 2.37-2.43, but here I consider the verses through 2.52 as the role of karma is explicated in the later passages. Again, they list the types of individuals
described here, in this case numbering six instead of eight in the Caraka Saṃhitā, without regard to the discussion of etiology central to this passage.

Suśruta Saṃhitā Śārīrasthāna 2.37-2.52

2:37 When a germ⁹¹ is split by internal wind, then by means of unrighteousness (adharma), two souls come from the belly known as twins.

bijé’ntarvāyunā bhinne dvau jīvau kkuśimāgatau/
yamāviryabhidhīyete dharmetarapuraḥsarau///

2:28 Parents with very scant seed may bear a man of weak reproductive capacity (āsekya). Having eaten semen, he doubtless gets an erection (lit. flag raising).

pitroratyalpabijatvāāsekyaḥ puruṣo bhavet/
śa śukra prāśya labhate dhvajocchāyamasamāsayaam///

2:39 One born from a smelly vagina is known as a sexually weak man (saugañdhika). Having smelled the odor of both male and female genitals, he obtains stimulation.

yah pūtyonau jāyet sa saugandhikasamjñītah/
śa yoniśeṣhasorgandhamāgṛyā labhate balam///

2:40 He who receives anal intercourse, man-to-woman style, is known as a catamite (kumbhīka).¹⁰⁴ Hear of the one stimulated by jealousy (iṛṣyaka), the fifth type.

sve gude’brahmacaryādyah strīṣu pumvat pravartate/
kumbhikah sa tu vijñeyah iṛṣyakaṁ śṛṇu cāparam///

2:41 One who having witnessed the intercourse of others is inspired to have his own is known as one stimulated by jealousy (iṛṣyaka). Hear of the fifth type, the man born without testicles (saṇḍhaka).¹⁰⁵
drṣṭvā vyāvāyamanyēśāṁ vyāvāye yah pravartate/
iṛṣyakah sa tu vijñeyah saṇḍhakam śṛṇu pañcamam///

2:42 When a man driven by delusion acts on his wife in a woman-like style during her fertile period, then one who performs similar woman-like coitus is born, known as the man born without testicles (saṇḍhaka).

yo bhāryāyāṁttau mohādaṁganeva pravartate/

¹⁰³ Although the word “zygote” would be a good fit here, I’m choosing not to use bio-medical terms that presume knowledge of “sperm” and “ovum.”

¹⁰⁴ Kumbhīka comes from the root khumba and could mean a small jar.

¹⁰⁵ Saṇḍhaka can be translated here as hermaphrodite or neuter, but should not be translated as eunuch since this term implies castration after birth. Sweet and Zwilling consider this term to be a catchall category for all of the types outlined here by Suśruta but this seems questionable since as the passage notes, “Āsekya, saugañḍhika, kumbhīka, and iṛṣyaka have semen, whereas saṇḍhaka is lacking semen.” See Sweet and Zwilling, "The First Medicalization: The Taxonomy and Etiology of Queerness in Classical Indian Medicine," 592-93.
tataḥ strīcēṣṭākāro jāyate śaṇḍhasamajñitah//

2:43 Or, if a woman in her fertile period should perform sexually like a man and a girl shall be conceived, then she shall be known as one who exerts effort as a man (naraceṣṭita).

ṛtau puruṣavadvā’pi pravartetāṅganā yadi/
tatra kanyā yadi bhavet sā bhavennaraceṣṭitā//

2:44 Āsekya, saugaṅdhika, kumbhika, and īrṣyaka have semen, whereas śaṇḍhaka is lacking semen.

āsekyaśca sugandhī ca kumbhīkaścervyakastathā/
saretasastvamī jīnēyā aśukraḥ śaṇḍhasamajñitah//

2:45 By this offense, when their semen carrying channels dilate from excitement they get an erection.

anayā viprakṛtya tu teṣām śukravahāḥ sirāḥ/
harṣāt spuṣṭatvamāṃyānti dhvajocchṛyastato bhavet//

2:46 In whatever way the man and woman who share intercourse, eat, behave, and have sex, their child will be similar.

āhārācāraceṣṭābhiryādṛśibhiḥ samanvītāu/
strīpumāsau samupeyātāṁ tayoh putrō’pi tāḍrśah//

2:47 When two amorous women mutually move reproductive fluid (śukra) in some way, a child with no bones is born.

yadā nārīvupēyātāṁ vrṣasyantyau kāthamcana/
muṇcataḥ śukramanyonyamanasthatra jāyate//

2:48 A woman who has bathed after menstruation and invites coupling in a dream, on account of wind haven taken her menstrual fluid (ārtava), makes a fetus in her belly.

ṛtuṃnātā tu yā nārī svapne maithunamāvahet/
ārtavam vāyurādāya kuṭsau garbham karoti hi//

2:49 Month by month, the symptoms of pregnancy experienced by the impregnated woman may increase, and an undifferentiated mass devoid of paternal qualities is born.

māśi māśi vivardhet garbhīnī āgarbhalakṣaṇam/
kalalam jāyate tasyā varjitaḥ paitṛkaairṅūnaiḥ//

2:50 A strong sin committed by the mother shall be understood as the cause of those created with deformities in the shape of a gourd, scorpion or snake.

sarpavrśīcikāṣmāndavīkṛtākṛtyaśca ye/
garbḥāstvete striyāściva jīnēyāḥ pāpakṛto bhṛṣam//

106 Ārtava may indicate menstrual discharge or another substance related to female fertility. It is commonly translated in contemporary Āyurvedic texts as ovum.
2:51 When a fetus undergoes neglect or the morbid longing of a pregnant woman, then, by means of a wind disturbance, it may be born a dwarf, with distorted arms, lame, dumb, or having a nasal voice.

\[
\text{garbho vātaprakōṇa dauḥrde vā’vamānite/}
\text{bhavet kubjha kūṇih pangurmūko minmiṇ eva vā}//
\]

2:52 The seeds of non-belief in the Vedas of the mother and father, sown long ago, may cause the fetus to become disfigured due to wind vitiation etc.

\[
māṭāpitrostu nāstikyādaśubhaiśca purākṛtaih/ 
vātādināṁ prakopeno garbho vaikṛtamāpnuyāt//
\]

There are several verses that stand out here in terms of our analysis of karmic etiology. In verse 2.37, an explanation of the birth of twins, we see the notion of adharma, unrighteous conduct, causing the joined male and female reproductive substances to be split by vāyu, wind, in the womb. Adharma is not only general unrighteous or immoral conduct, but also conduct that does not befit one’s station in life and the proper duties associated with that station, dharma. Actions of adharma are certain to be attached to karma, in this case likely the karma of the offspring accompanying the soul (jīva) in its union with joined male and female fluids. As Martha Selby notes of the Caraka Saṃhitā and Suśruta Saṃhitā, “Both texts understand a ‘moment’ of conception in the coming together of semen, blood, and life essence (śukra, śonita, and jīva)....”\(^{107}\) and it is along with the jīva that the individual’s own karma travels from life to life. However, in these verses we also see the impact of the karma of parents on their offspring.

In verses 2.38 and 2.39 the like begets like principle found in the passage on leprosy is expanded upon, as a parent of scant seed begets a son with difficulty attaining arousal, and a child born of a smelly vagina requires this smell in order to become aroused. In verse 2.42 a neuter is produced through improper sexual conduct of the parents, in particular, intercourse

in the viparīta, reversed or inauspicious, position with the woman on top, during her menstruation, a practice so transgressive as to be engaged in later periods in left-handed tantric ritual. The same act initiated by the female partner in the following verse will give rise to offspring that grows into a woman who acts sexually like a man. Verse 2.44 explains that āsekya, saugañdhika, and kumbhika are not completely without semen, but that they only gain arousal through viprakṛtyā, translated here as offense, but which etymologically might refer to something like perversion, the prefix vi added to prakṛti, literally translates as misdirected nature. Just as the parents have sex, behave and eat, so shall their children, as seen in verse 2.45. Verse 2.50 is explicit about parental karma stating that sin (pāpakṛta) committed by the mother can result in severely deformed offspring, and verse 2.52 provides perhaps the most explicit link for us, as we are told that “from the seeds of non-belief” (nāstikyāt) of the parents “sown long ago” disfigurement may arise in the fetus. The implication here is that the parental karma as actions or comportment taken in a past life may be transmitted to the fetus as a burden to carry via its own disfigurement.

In the above passages we have seen the ways that the gender variant and sexually “abnormal” individuals are etiologically explained through a combination of developmental influences, including the equal balance of semen and menstrual blood in the embryo, the individual’s karma, and the behavior, comportment and karma of the parents. The above passages, for the most part, read as a collection of deviances created and manifested in a variety of ways. However, in the latter portion of their article as well as in several other works, Sweet and Zwilling argue for a “third-sex” construct model within the sources they

109 See also L Zwilling and MJ Sweet, “The Evolution of Third-Sex Constructs in Ancient India: A Study in Ambiguity,” Invented Identities: The Interplay of Gender, Religion, and Politics in India, eds. Julia Leslie and Mary
examined, including medical, literary, sexological and literary works. That is to say, they view all of the complex delineations of types outlined above as subsumed in into one category of the neuter, *napuṃsaka*, the not female and not male. In a contemporary context, there has been great debate about the use of the category “third sex” in anthropological work,¹¹⁰ and Lal Zimman and Kira Hall, while arguing for the usefulness of the category in terms of understanding how sexual embodiment is historically constructed, also express one thread of the critique writing, “In short, the use of terminology like third sex can create the illusion of three homogenous groups—male, female, and other—rather than facilitating a subtler understanding of diversity both between and within gender groups.”¹¹¹ While this is a useful point in thinking about the applicability and political saliency of “third sex” in a contemporary context, and it is tempting on some level to apply this critique to our passages, it seems an ungrounded leap to draw this conclusion in the present analysis. Instead, I turn to Gyatso’s work on gender in early Buddhism, for guidance as to the possible function of the individual of variant gender and sexuality in the texts we have examined. While the third sex in Buddhist literature comprises a category of individuals strictly excluded from monastic life, Gyatso argues that “the same third sex that was defined as the excluded one could be turned on its head to subvert the very notion of excludability altogether.” Residing in the terrain of ambiguity between the two “opposite poles” and able to “assume features of either of these two poles” the third sexed individual came to “symbolize inclusiveness.”¹¹² This model of

¹¹⁰ McGee (New Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), Zwilling and Sweet, "'Like a City Ablaze': The Third Sex and the Creation of Sexuality in Jain Religious Literature."
¹¹¹ Lal Zimman and Carla Hall, "Language, Embodiment, and the 'Third Sex' " Language and Identities, eds. Carmen Llamas and Dominic James Landon Watt (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) 168-69. She makes this argument within the context of Nāgārjuna’s discussion and problematization of the “excluded middle.”
inclusivity links back to the notion of parental karma, as well as to the discussion of karma as an apparatus that is to follow, in that it implicates everyone, regardless of sex or gender, as interconnected subjects.
Part Three: Karma as Apparatus

As we have seen above, Sweet and Zwilling’s analysis in “The First Medicalization” relies centrally on lists of individuals of non-normative sexualities as presented in early Āyurvedic texts. Their claim that the “medicalization” of sexuality occurred in this vastly pre-modern context, contra Foucault, raises issues that I will treat briefly below. However, first, I suggest that viewing the passages that they provide as evidence with attention to karma as a key conceptual element allows us to begin to pursue a different line of inquiry, one that moves beyond list making and into the realm of subject formation. Specifically, we may ask—how is karma implicated in the formation of subjectivity as read through the classical Āyurvedic texts? As we have seen, discussions in the medical texts reflect tensions in the notion of karma with regards to the force of human action and fate over a series of lifetimes, as well as in relation to one’s offspring. Whether a text grapples with these tensions using a model of prajñā-’parādha, as in the Caraka Saṃhitā, or through the notion of aparādha, as in the Suśruta Saṃhitā, each reflecting different attitudes towards the efficacy of actions taken in this life, karma is an inescapable element of the larger “fabric of cultural beliefs” from which these texts emerged. Martha Selby reminds us,

Āyurvedic texts were part of a larger cultural world: they share information and attitudes with other Sanskrit textual genres, particularly with dharma-śāstras (legal treatises), especially when the subjects in question turn to women and the regulation of their bodies in times of ritual pollution and reproductivity. Her observation regarding the similarity in attitudes and content between Āyurvedic and dharma-śāstra texts may extend to the passages we have examined regarding “reproductivity”

in terms of the karmic etiology of individuals of non-normative sexualities. However, regardless of whether attitudes towards karma are shared across genres, it is a common theme and theoretical framework engaged with in a variety of texts and contexts, including medical and legal treatises, epic literature and philosophical texts.\textsuperscript{115}

Gerald Larson’s work on “Karma as a ‘Sociology of Knowledge’ or ‘Social Psychology’ of Process/Praxis”\textsuperscript{116} provides us with an insight into the way that karma may have functioned on a social level the formation of subjectivity. Here, Larson discusses karma as it is expounded in Śāṁkhyā philosophy, which had an integral relationship to the early Āyurvedic texts,\textsuperscript{117} to argue that drawing a distinction between the “transference of karma interpretation” and the “non-transference of karma interpretation” is an inadequate, and wholly “non-indigenous” approach to understanding karma.\textsuperscript{118} Instead, he suggests that in South Asia there is a “larger conceptual framework” encompassing both the transference and non-transference approaches, and further, that the larger framework of karma as discussed in Śāṁkhyā functions as a “sociology of knowledge.”\textsuperscript{119} By “sociology of knowledge” Larson means that the framework of karma links thought systems with social reality and as such “accounts for the ‘distribution’ of knowledge in a society.”\textsuperscript{120} So, karma is not itself merely a belief system, but instead it is a link between belief systems, for example those regarding the nature of an human being, and social reality as manifested in the system of varṇāśramadharma, the duties and order

\textsuperscript{117} For discussions of Śāṁkhyā in the \textit{Caraka Saṁhitā} see Selby, "Between Medicine and Religion: Discursive Shifts in Early Ayurvedic Narratives of Conception and Gestation.\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{a}}", Dasgupta, Agarwal and Jain, \textit{History of Indian Philosophy} 212-18, G.J. Larson, "Āyurveda and the Hindu Philosophical Systems," \textit{Philosophy East and West} 37.3 (1987).
\textsuperscript{118} Larson, "Karma as a "Sociology of Knowledge" or "Social Psychology" of Process/Praxis," 304.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 316.
of caste. Karma accounts for knowledge insofar as it explains why and how certain people, or classes of people, possess certain types of knowledge within society. Here we see the way that varṇāśramadharma can be seen as subsumed under the rubric of karma, perhaps, as one of many “technologies of power”\textsuperscript{121} through which karma theory manifest in social and political structures. Karma as a “sociology of knowledge” links back to Garrett’s discussion of the “ethicization” of karma (outlined in Section One) via the expansion of karma theory beyond the Vedic sacrifice to encompass an individual’s actions during his or her entire lifetime. Karma theory as a model for how one’s actions through lifetimes are consequentially linked, and in the case of the texts we have examined are also linked to the karma of one’s children, takes on an undeniably ethical dimension that impacts the individual on a broader societal level as well as on the level of relationships within the family. Karma theory also implicates one’s relation to one’s self, and in Āyurvedic as well as legal texts this self-relation is not only a matter of the spirit, but it is also a matter of the body.

In order to understand how the body is implicated in the formation of subjectivity through relations of power, we turn now to the work of Foucault and Agamben’s expansion on his work in this area. Foucault writes a genealogy of modern biopower, a form of power over individual and species life, superseding, though not entirely replacing, sovereignty and disciplinary power in the history of the West. Whereas sovereign power is based on the negative right to kill, both disciplinary power and biopower exert the positive “calculated management of life.”\textsuperscript{122} With the advent of population as a “natural phenomena” in the

\textsuperscript{121} Recall from the introduction that according to Agamben a Foucaultian apparatus is a network of “technologies of power.” Agamben, “What Is an Apparatus?” And Other Essays 13.

\textsuperscript{122} Foucault, The History of Sexuality 25.
eighteenth century West, arose a set of “quantifiable variables” enabling and requiring study and management in order to ensure the enhanced and optimized efficiency of society. In calling population a “natural phenomenon” Foucault indicates that, the population has dynamics of its own, it may increase or decrease in size, it has mobility, and the individuals that comprise it are all linked by a set of bonds not specifically governed by the state. It is in order to understand and regulate this population mass, on all levels, that disciplinary power and biopower operate. Disciplinary power acts through optimizing the “body as machine,” integrating it into efficient economic systems as individuals internalize the norms of society. Simultaneously, biopower acts to regulate the biological processes of the “species body,” optimizing the productivity of the population, and taking the form of schemes regulating fertility, morbidity, personal hygiene, etcetera. Explaining the birth of biopolitics, Agamben writes, “at the threshold of the modern era, natural life begins to be included in the mechanisms and calculations of State power, and politics turns into biopolitics.”

While I do not think that we can say that the passages from the early Āyurvedic texts examined can implicate something identical to disciplinary or bio- power, I suggest that perhaps elements from both models are helpful in understanding the passages we analyzed. Given the highly hierarchical and minutely subdivided varṇāśrama system it is clear that complex networks of power relations were operating on all levels of society at the time of the

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125. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* 139.
compilation of the early Āyurvedic texts. While the Āyurvedic texts are clearly attempting to regulate behavior and promote health in the interest of the social order, through the internalization of norms, they do so in a way that also effectively regulates society as an organism, at once attempting to prevent the production of “abnormal” individuals and to incorporate such individuals within the logic of the larger sociology of knowledge predicated on karma theory. This is in accordance with Gyatso’s observation regarding the symbolic inclusivity of the third sex, as well as Jeffrey Nealon’s description of the inclusivity of biopolitical norms, “Again, Foucaultian biopolitical norms do not primarily work to exclude the abnormal; rather, they work ceaselessly to account for it as such-to render it as normal or abnormal....”

In *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault links the development of biopower, techniques of power relating to regulation of the species body, to an explosion of discourse surrounding sex and sexuality as critical factors in population dynamics, writing, “Through the political economy of population there was formed a whole grid of observations regarding sex.” In order to facilitate this process of observation, techniques of power functioning at the boundary of the “political and economic domains” developed at every level of society and within institutions ranging from families and schools, to prisons and hospitals. Medicine was a key site for the production of discourses on sex and sexuality in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and these discourses were linked to a “whole machinery for specifying, analyzing and investigating.” Through the medical apparatus, an array of peripheral sexualities were classified, investigated, and Foucault argues, created in the service of population management.

129 Ibid.
130 Ibid., 32.
and optimization. Foucault argues four points of difference between the proliferation of discourses of sexuality in modernity and discourses of sexuality that had occurred previously: 1) the development of a “medico-sexual regime” in families, 2) the “incorporation of perversions and a new specification of individuals,” 3) the need for “examination and insistent observation” inextricably linked with the medicalization of variant sexualities, and 4) the proliferation of sexualities through discourse.\(^{131}\) Zwilling and Sweet only challenge the second of Foucault’s four points regarding the differences between the proliferation of discourses of sexuality in modernity, and discourses of sexuality that had occurred previously. That is, they challenge the notion that unique to modernity is the “incorporation of perversions and a new specification of individuals.” As evidence, they provide the detailed classificatory schemes found in the Caraka Saṃhitā and Suśruta Saṃhitā passages that we discussed above, and they argue that within these passages we find a new understanding of sexual “pathology,” a shift from viewing homosexuality as deviant behavior, to a notion of homosexuals, and other individuals with non-normative sexualities, as distinct species of humans. This echoes Foucault’s words,

> Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.\(^{132}\)

In early Āyurvedic texts, the individual of variant sexuality or gender is also considered to have a kind of “hermaphroditism of the soul,” as exemplified by the samskāravāha, or “trait carrier.” However, Sweet and Zwilling’s argument is problematic in that speaking about “medicalization” in a Foucaultian sense automatically presupposes the birth of population and biopower as outlined above. While it may be possible to argue that elements of these features were present to some extent in an early Indian context, such an endeavor would require

\(^{131}\) Ibid., 41-47.
\(^{132}\) Ibid., 43.
research and analysis of a different sort then they provide. Additionally, a critical distinction between our passages and the discourse that Foucault examines in the *History of Sexuality*, is that Foucault sees two distinct streams of knowledge in operation, a “biology of reproduction” and a “medicine of sexuality.”\(^{133}\) This distinction that does not seem operative in classical Āyurveda given that the manner of one’s sexuality is described as impacting the physiological process of reproduction and vice versa, both processes hinging on the mechanism of karma.

Returning to the issue of karma theory’s role in the formation of subjectivity we turn to Agamben’s essay *What is an apparatus?* Here, Agamben cites at length a passage from a 1977 interview with Foucault regarding the nature of the “apparatus,”

> What I’m seeking to characterize with this name is, first of all, an absolutely heterogeneous assembly which involves discourses, institutions, architectural structures, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific enunciations, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions; in short: as much the said as the un-said, these are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus is the network which is arranged between these elements... with the term apparatus I understand a type of—so to speak—formation which in a certain historical moment had as its essential function to respond to an emergency. The apparatus therefore has an eminently strategic function... The apparatus is precisely this: an ensemble (set) of strategies of relations of force which condition certain types of knowledge and is conditioned by them.\(^{134}\)

His explanation suggests that an apparatus is both an assembly of a range of discourses and structures, as well as the network connecting them. I suggest that we can consider karma to be an apparatus insofar as a range of discourses, for example medical and legal texts, institutional structures, such as the *varṇa*, or caste system\(^{135}\) etc. hinged upon the notion of karma as a conceptual network. As such, karma implicates a set of “strategies of relations of force,” i.e. discourse, social institutions and relationships that lead to the production of certain types of

\(^{133}\) Ibid., 54-55.
\(^{134}\) Agamben, *What Is an Apparatus?* And Other Essays 2.
\(^{135}\) Technically the *varṇa* system and the caste system are not the same, although often the terms are use interchangeably. There are four *varṇas* delineated as early as the *Puruṣa sūkta*, a hymn in the *Rg Veda*, in the *Brahmin*, *Kṣatriya*, *Vaiśya* and *Śūdra*. *Jāti* is a system of distinctions made on a local and community level related to family ties. The “caste” system is the British colonial nomenclature ascribed to these various subdivisions in Indian society.
knowledge and is reciprocally impacted by them. For example, if we look at the role of karma in the Caraka Samhitā we see that it is an important notion addressed and employed by the text, but the field of karma theory is also reciprocally conditioned by Caraka’s discussion of prajñā-‘parādha and allusions to parental karma. This reflects a necessary engagement with, strategic employment of, and morphing of the notion of karma that took place simultaneously over many centuries in a range of discursive and institutional settings. Therefore, like an apparatus, the notion of karma “appears at the intersection of power relations and relations of knowledge.”

Karma formed an active conceptual network, or apparatus, that impacted not only the public and structural aspects of one’s life, but also, may have framed actions taken in intimacy, as implied by the passages we examined above. This raises the crucial question of the relationship between the prescriptions found in these medical texts and commonly held notions and practices related to reproduction, healing and sexuality. Selby suggests that through a careful reading of the early Ayurvedic texts we can begin to recover “the ‘conceptual position’ of women, as objects of practice, but also as medical ‘actors’ in and of themselves.” I suggest that this type of fruitful speculative analysis may be furthered through considering the formation of subjectivity via karma as an apparatus in the early Ayurvedic texts.

An apparatus is not a modern phenomenon, and Agamben names language itself as “perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses,” opening the possibility for us to explore the applicability of the apparatus to the model of karma in a distant cultural and temporal context.

136 Agamben, "What Is an Apparatus?" And Other Essays 3.
138 While the apparatus is not modern, it has taken adopted new features in modernity, intensifying to a critical level that serves to simultaneously subjectify and desubjectify. I will discuss subjectification below, but for a full discussion of this simultaneous processes of subjectification and desubjectification see Agamben, "What Is an Apparatus?" And Other Essays 21.
139 Agamben, "What Is an Apparatus?" And Other Essays 14.
Delineating “two great classes,” living beings and apparatuses, he explains that it is in the interaction between the two that a subject emerges.\textsuperscript{140} The process of a being interacting with an apparatus is inherently subjectifying due to an ontological alienation at the heart of the matter. In the Western tradition, Agamben traces the ontological issue at hand through a “theological genealogy of economy” examining how the split of the trinity relegated \textit{oikonomia}, the management and economy of the household, to the realm of the Son, thereby separating it from its grounding in the plane of “God’s being.” He writes,

> The fracture that the theologians had sought to avoid by removing it \textit{oikonomia} from the plane of God’s being, reappeared in the form of a caesura that separated in Him being and action, ontology and praxis. Action (economy, but also politics) has no foundation in being: this is the schizophrenia that the theological doctrine of \textit{oikonomia} left as its legacy to Western culture.\textsuperscript{141}

It is through the removal of \textit{oikonomia}, or praxis, from the realms of God’s being, that a schism is created between action and being. \textit{Oikonomia} is translated in Latin as \textit{dispositio}, and in French \textit{dispositif}, or apparatus. Thus,

> The term ‘apparatus’ designates that in which, and through which, one realized a pure activity of governance devoid of any foundation in being. This is the reason why apparatuses must always imply a process of subjectification, that is to say, they must produce their subject.\textsuperscript{142}

This sense of governance devoid of a ground in being refers to a kind of alienation and it is this ontological problematic that is at the heart of \textit{techne} of the apparatus (its technology of power), and thus also inherent to the question of subjectivity. In the interview cited above, Foucault explains that an apparatus responds to an emergency, an emergency which can be thought precisely in relation to this ontological deficit; its lack of a “foundation” in “Being” in a Heideggerian sense. Both Foucault and Agamben were critically influenced by Heidegger’s

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 11.
perhaps most centrally, his notion of the ontological difference: recognition of the difference between Being, as such, and beings, as entities. Heidegger argues that the difference and relationship, between beings (entities), and Being, has been forgotten in the history of Western thought and that as a consequence Being suffers a double concealment. Whereas originary concealment is immanent in the very nature of Being itself—Being withdraws in the process of unconcealment of beings\textsuperscript{144}—the Western tradition had forgotten the very question of Being.\textsuperscript{145}

In fact, the ontological issue that resides at the heart of subject formation and the apparatus, according to Agamben, finds a striking parallel in Larson’s discussion of karma in \textit{Sāṃkhya}. He likewise suggests that at heart, the sociology of knowledge, or apparatus, of karma, bears a fully ontological concern,

All of our “ideas” and all of our “social realities” are valuable only to the extent that they make us aware of that which is closest to us and yet irreducible to any intellectual or social formation, namely, our simple presence to ourselves, our consciousness in and of itself.\textsuperscript{146}

So the “social reality” of karma functions to transform beings into subjects, bringing them at once closer to, and farther from consciousness itself. Fundamental to \textit{Sāṃkhya}, a philosophy that is expounded in its early forms by the \textit{Caraka Saṃhitā},\textsuperscript{147} is a reductive materialism encompassing the notion that gross matter is an “epiphenomenon of subtle material energy.” Thoughts and feelings as subtle material energy are fundamentally linked to \textit{prakṛti}, matter,

\textsuperscript{144} Just as light shines to illumine objects but does not reveal itself.
\textsuperscript{145} See “The Origin of Work of Art,” an essay in which Heidegger describes the double concealment as part of the essence of the unconcealment that is truth, or Being, itself. Heidegger and Krell, \textit{Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to the Task of Thinking (1964)} 176-80.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 179.
\textsuperscript{147} For a discussion of Caraka’s \textit{Sāṃkhya} see Dasgupta, Agarwal and Jain, \textit{History of Indian Philosophy} 211-18.
and *puruṣa*, spirit, which is simultaneously obscured and illuminated by *prakṛti*, is altogether distinct. The *buddhi* (intellect),¹⁴⁸ still part of *prakṛti*, is the field for potential illumination of consciousness, however,

Because of its contentlessness, “consciousness” appears as what it is not, and “awareness” appears as if it were “consciousness,” and it is this double negation occurring within *buddhi* that generates the epistemological confusion of bondage.¹⁴⁹

Because consciousness is contentless, it is invisible, but when awareness (which is rooted in materiality) appears, one mistakes it for consciousness, simultaneously negating both consciousness and materiality, seeing neither truly. Although Heidegger’s work emphasizes the double concealment of Being, I suggest that Larson’s discussion of the process of becoming a subject according to the framework of Śāṅkhya, which involves the double negation of both consciousness and awareness (as materiality), suggests that through the concealment of Being, beings are also concealed. This occurs through the process of subjectification— as beings are revealed (or unconcealed) by the withdrawal of Being, the remaining void impels them to interact with apparatuses, becoming implicated as subjects. It is this process of subject-making, that simultaneously, attempts to recover, and inexorably conceals beings’ grounding in Being.

Thus enters the apparatus, into this epistemological confusion, this space of bondage or ontological emptiness, as a device sought out by human beings for consolation. Certainly we can see the theory of karma as a kind of consolation in the face of the finitude and unpredictability of human life, an apparatus with which human beings engage, becoming implicated as subjects. Agamben suggests that in the modern era there has been an intensification and proliferation of apparatuses, yielding not only multiple processes of

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¹⁴⁸ This is distinct from *manas*, or mind.
subjectification taking place in the same individual, but also, a simultaneous subjectification and desubjectification that takes place through an apparatus. As individuals absorb discourse and engage with apparatuses they implicate themselves as subjects, but through this subjection to power, there is a simultaneous desubjectification. Driven to cope with the ontological insecurity of experiencing life, from the position of a being devoid of a foundation in Being, beings interact with apparatuses acquiring an intersecting palate of subjectivities. I suggest that in an early Indian context as viewed through the passages of Caraka Saṃhitā and Suśruta Saṃhitā describing and classifying the etiology of non-normative gender and sexualities, we can see the beginning of a biopolitical process of capture, of binding beings into relationality with an apparatus that defines them as human, as normative or non-normative, and creating a form of subjectivity that can be seen as simultaneously desubjectifying insofar as it implicates subjects in regimes of power. Here the regimes of power are social ordering systems based partly on the notion of karma, the varṇāśrama, or caste system, dividing people by birth into a hierarchically arranged unity.

In conclusion, I propose that this type of inquiry into the formation of subjectivity through karma as an apparatus may contribute to the field of Religious Studies by showing that models of subject formation emerging in very different cultural, temporal, and religious contexts can illumine one another productively. The discussion above gives us insight into how human beings grapple with the unseen, with the anxiety of coping with life’s misfortunes, with difference, with death. I am not suggesting here that Agamben’s model of the apparatus is something to be “applied” or used instrumentally in an analysis taken out of historical and cultural context. Rather I suggest that since anxiety and death are human universal religious themes it is fruitful to bring different modes of grappling with these ontological issue into
dialogue with one another— in this case we engage the apparatus with the Sāṃkhyan notion of karma. I have also demonstrated that the notion of the apparatus helps us understand the link between discourse, subjectivity and social structure. As Bruce Lincoln explains in his analysis on “How to Read a Religious text” (in this case the Chāndogya Upaniṣad),

“If texts acquire their agency only through the mediation of those subjects whose consciousness they reshape, it follows they have their greatest effects on entities that are themselves most fully the product of human activity. The shapes of houses and cities, for instance, are more open to human intervention than is the shape of a fire. The extreme case here is the way humans organize themselves and their relations with others.”

In this study we have encountered a perfect example of what Lincoln considers to be the “extreme case,” in the manner that articulations of karma through the Caraka Saṃhitā and Suśruta Saṃhitā form part of a wider network, or apparatus, that interacts with beings to form subjects and implicate them within a distinct system of ordering, varṇāśrama. However, it is critical to bear in mind that the interaction between subjects and texts is a circular or perhaps spiral process, in which we humans are shaped by interacting with an apparatus, but also, are always reshaping and re-creating the apparatus itself, in our efforts to cope with the very fact of our being.

Bibliography


